JARRETT LEPLIN”

REFERENCE AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM

BY ‘Historical Relativism’ (HR) I shall mean the thesis that there are theories
which function as exclusive alternatives for the scientific community to which
no common standard of acceptability is justifiably applicable, the exceptions
being theories that refine or extend one of these. Another version is the thesis
that the justification of any standard of acceptability presupposes, if not the
very theory to which that standard applies, then some other theory whose
acceptability is thus circular. Both versions prohibit objective theory
assessment,
Some proponents of Hi? have attempted to mitigate this result by including
basic metaphysics in the extension of the term ‘theory’,’ a maneuver invited by
the absence from philosophy of a satisfactory analysis of the meaning of this
term. Since basic metaphysics is probably presupposed in the justification of
anything, this is mitigation only if an irremediable irrationality in human
credence generally, compensates an irremediable irrationality in science. I
prefer to reserve the term ‘theory’, in speaking of science, for systems of
propositions actually so called within science.
So many different lines of argument have been advanced on behalf of HR
that it cannot effectively be discredited by attacking the grounds of its support.
Its opponents have made the mistake made by the liberal press in response to
attacks by Spiro Agnew, of letting the opposition determine the issues. It
would have been more effective simply to maintain that HR instantiates itself,
in the maneuver successful against the verification principle. Instead, much of
the critical response has appeared to confirm HR through preoccupation with
problems HR itself raises.
Foremost among these are problems about meaning. The most
philosophically important strategy for defending HR is to infer changes in the
meaning of scientific terms from changes in the acceptability of hypotheses
employing them. By ‘Meaning Variance’ (Mv) let us understand the claim that
this inference is valid. In response to MV, HR has often been formulated
misleadingly as a statement about meanings, to the effect that terms do not
occur in different theories with the same meaning, or that terms have meaning
only in theoretical context; whereas HR is at most an inference from such
claims. Thus, philosophical criticism of HR has focused on meaning,
*The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of Philosophy, Greensboro, NC
27412, U.S.A.
‘E.g. Paul Feyerabend: ‘. . . the term “theory” will be used in a wide sense, including ordinary
beliefs (e.g. the belief in the existence of material objects), myths (e.g. the myth of eternal
Stud. H&t. Phil. Sci., Vol. 10. (1979), No. 4, pp. 265 -284.
Pergamon Press, Ltd., Printed in Great Britain.

265
266 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

maintaining that theory change does not imply meaning change, and that there
are conditions sufficient for meaning retention that do not require the
retention of any particular hypothesis. There are several reasons why this line
of criticism is unavailing.
Most blatant is that it makes a major concession unnecessarily in allowing
that HR follows from MV. To the contrary, there are a number of possibilities
for comparative theory evaluation consistent with MV. The limitation MV
imposes depends on the degree to which it impoverishes joint metalanguages
for the theories compared. The possibilities are thus delineated by types of
scientific terms which, used independently of disconfirmable hypotheses, are
exempt from MV.
Allowing purely formal concepts to be expressed in the metalanguage, we
get, minimally, formal standards of acceptability whose application depends
only on the internal semantics of the theories. Let T be an inconsistent theory
each of whose propositions is individually acceptable. Despite MV, the
semantics of T can be sufficiently stable to enable proponents of T’s
propositions to recognize the inconsistency and pronounce T less acceptable
than an alternative theory whose consistency they take on authority in
ignorance of its semantics.
Allowing evaluative concepts such as ‘experimental adequacy’,
‘experimental anomaly’, and ‘ad hotness’ into the metalanguage permits
objective judgments of relative methodological and epistemic culpability. It
also permits judgments of relative inconsistency, in a methodological sense of
‘inconsistency’, meaning the extent to which methodological constraints are
violated in achieving formal consistency. It is in this sense that such terms as
‘inconsistent’, ‘contradictory’, and ‘irreconcilable’ are normally used in
evaluations of theories by scientists.
The assumption that MV implies HR might be defended by alleging that
these modes of comparison fail to identify theories relatively acceptable in the
desirable sense of relatively approximating the truth, but pertain at most to
some weaker notion of progress that an historical relativist can endorse. A
standard of acceptability adequate for Scientific Realism (SR) must pertain to
crucial experimentation, and this MV disallows. This view has certainly
influenced those opponents of HR who have concentrated their criticisms on
MV.
One of its difficulties is that it ignores the historical fact that in some
paradigm cases of progressive theory change the competing theories were not,
during the period of transition, subject to crucial experimentation. This may
happen because both theories face serious experimental difficulties so that on
experimental grounds neither is acceptable, yet one must be selected as
providing the more promising direction for further research. This occurred in
the case of Fresnel’s and Stokes’s ether theories which was decided on the basis
Reference and Scientific Realism 267

of methodological consistency .’ Less frequently it happens because the

theories are mathematically equivalent, which is objectively recognizable
despite MYif the relevant mathematics is allowed into the metalanguage. Thus
not only methodological comparisons, but also objective recognition of the
need to rely on them are consistent with MV.
The possibility of mathematical comparisons raises a further difficulty for
the view that MV implies HR because evaluative standards must be
experimental. Without subjecting the mathematical terms of alternative
theories 27 and T2 to a common interpretation, it can be determined that
certain functions of T2 assign numerical values that approach those assigned
by certain functions of T, under certain limiting conditions, for some
correlation of the respective domains of these functions. This is reason
consistent with MV to regard T, as a limiting case of T, and to adopt the
semantics of T2, which is a progressive theory choice on traditional
experimental grounds.3
Recognition of the invalidity of infering HR from MYis important not only
because of the actual use of such standards of theory comparison as MV
permits, but also because of the likelihood that MV, in some qualified form, is
true. This likelihood certainly undercuts criticisms of HR directed against MV.
Such criticism has focused on the doctrinaire character of presentations of MV
and the cavalier use of prejudicially described historical examples in
illustrating MV, rather than on MV itself. A refutation of MV itself would,
after all, require a theory of meaning, which is a lot to expect from a
philosopher of science. One philosopher actually to approach the problem this
way is Wilfred Sellars, who concludes, however, that something like MV is
true.’ In the absence of an acceptable theory of meaning to the contrary, it is
implausible to deny that the meaning of a term is in part at least a function of
certain types of beliefs, say, general or scientific beliefs, in whose expression
the term is employed. That is, as meanings are what speakers share in
common, beliefs affecting meanings will be those at least accessible to, if not
entertained by all speakers. Thus it is not going to affect the meaning of ‘rose’
recurrence), religious beliefs, etc.,’ ‘Problems of Empiricism’, Beyond fhe Edge of Certainty, R.
Colodny (ed.) (Et&wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1%5), p. 219, note 3.
*Stokes’s theory of total ether drag requires that the ether’s motion be irrotational to account
for aberration. This assumption conflicts with the assumption of incompressibility. If the latter
assumption is abandoned it must be supposed that the velocity of light is unaffected by extreme
variations in the rarification and condensation of the ether, which is hardly plausible. The
alternative of supposing that although subject to rotational disturbance from the earth’s motion
the ether is unaffected by it is evidently ad hoc. Thus Lorentz maintains that Stokes’s conditions
‘can hardly be reconciled’ and that the ‘contradiction’ cannot be removed in a satisfactory way.
This is the reason Lorentz gives for preferring Fresnel’s ether. H. A. Lorentz, The Theory of
EIectrons (New York: G. E. Stechert, 1923), pp. 173 - 174.
‘For development of this point see I. Szumilewicz, ‘Incommensurability and the Rationality of
the Development of Science’, Bri. J. Phil. Sci. 28, (4) (1%‘7), 345 - 350.
“Conceptual Change’, Conceptual Change, G. Pearce and P. Maynard (eds.) (Dordrecht: D.
Reidel, 1973), pp. 76-93.
268 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

that none are believed to be in a certain room, but it may well affect the
meaning of ‘rose’ that there are believed to be yellow ones. If it is learned that
roses do not naturally occur in yellow - some were sprayed the wrong color
paint in preparation for a floral exhibit in Chicago once, and they have since
been selectively sprayed to cover the error - that changes the meaning of
‘rose’. Even if justified by objective evidence, a change in such general beliefs
may change meanings. Certainly it changes the statements made to convey
meanings.
MV reflects the idea that a scientific term represents a certain concept and
that only if concepts are identical do the terms representing them have the
same meaning. Assuming that beliefs are mental states, if there can be latent or
unconscious mental states, it is then natural, short of Platonism, to hold that a
term must represent different concepts for scientists who use the term to
express different beliefs. If meanings are mental, neither logical nor epistemic
relations among hypotheses can provide sufficient conditions for meaning
retention. The imposition of such conditions simply begs the question against
MV.
Any plausibility accruing to MV from this picture of meaning depends on
regarding meaning changes as partial. Only under the implausible suppositions
that meanings are determined exhaustively by beliefs and that no belief
whatever which a term is used to express survives theory change, would the
change in meaning of the term be complete on this picture. Proponents of HR
appear to believe that any meaning change carries relativistic implications. But
partial meaning change has figured in theories adverse to HR. Carnap did not
imagine his theory of partial interpretation to interfere with theory
comparison. Perhaps this is because once a theoretical term was introduced by
a reduction sentence, additional reduction sentences only added meaning; the
theory did not provide for meaning loss. Thus the term still meant what it had
meant, only more. But if meanings are reidentifiable through changes of
addition, they are reidentifiable through changes of loss; the term still means
what it did, only less.
Since MV does not imply HR and is not, on suitable interpretation,
intrinsically implausible, there is the problem of accounting for its status in the
debate over HR. MV was found implausible and selected for criticism by
opponents of HR because they thought it does imply HR. So the question is why
both sides thought this. Although the answer is complex for the relativists,
their inference was fairly direct: theories determine the meanings of terms used
to report evidence, and thereby, the criteria of their own acceptability. For
opponents of HR the answer is simple, but the inference indirect. If
hypotheses of different theories employ terms with different meanings, these
hypotheses cannot be contradictory. If they are not contradictory, the
adoption of a new theory is not the rejection of its predecessor, so that theory
Reference and Scientific Real&n 269

change is not assessable for correctness.

The interesting mistake in these arguments is the initial inference of
opponents of HR. That inference seems to take a narrower view of
contradiction than that required for their subsequent inferences to HR.
Needed subsequently is the relation that truth of one statement precludes truth
of the other. Needed initially is the relation that such preclusion holds on
semantic grounds alone. The preclusion is obtainable nonsemantically by use
of terms different in meaning but alike in reference. Thus theory change is
assessable in principle as correct or incorrect if it preserves reference, whether
or not it preserves meaning. Evidently it is Reference Variance (RV) rather
than MV that has relativistic implications.
It might be thought, then, that a confusion of meaning and reference is
responsible for HR. This is an attractive solution. For the motivation in
opposing HR is advocacy of SR, and SR is a thesis not about meaning but
about reference. SR is basically a denial of instrumentalism, asserting that
apparently referential terms of accepted scientific theories are genuinely
referential; that is, that terms having a grammatically referential role in
accepted theories also have a referent. If HR is true SR lacks a rational basis,
since there is then no theory neutral justification for the existential
commitments of accepted theory.
The history of science is relevant to SR insofar as the epistemic situation in
which rejected theories were once accepted is comparable to the present
situation. If rejection of a theory requires rejection of its existential
commitments, and the basis for having accepted any rejected theory is
comparable to the basis for accepting current theory, then the referential
status of current theory is suspect. There has been sufficient epistemic
continuity in theory acceptance to make it reasonable to expect current theory,
although well confirmed, to be rejected. Therefore, SR is tenable only if
existential commitments survive theory change. If MV does not imply R V it is
irrelevant to SR and so to HR.
The situation we now have in philosophy with respect to the status of SR is
roughly as follows. Either we just assert that meaning varies independently of
reference, or that the intensional part of meaning varies independently of the
extensional part, appeal to Fregian examples, and proclaim SR uncompro-
mised; or we adopt a certain theory as to what determines the referential status
of theories, from which it follows that RVis false. This is the popular theory
of Kripke and Putnam (Kp)s which is most notable for making SR contingent
on essentialism. KP holds that the reference of a term is determined by a causal
connection between the referent and actual uses of the term. The result is that
‘The Principalreferences for this theory are S. Kripke, ‘Naming and Necessity’, The Semonrics
of N&u& LuwW?ge, G. Harman and D. Davidson (eds.) (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1972), pp.
253- 355,and H. Putnam, ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”‘, H. Putnam, Philosophicul Papers, 2
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 215 - 271.
270 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

facts about the referent itself, rather than about any concept or description of
it, determine the reference. The causal connection has two parts. The first
links the referent with the experience by which reference to it was initially
fixed, whether ostensively or descriptively. The second links the term’s
inaugural referential usage with subsequent ones. Thus, term t is used to refer
to r if r is the same (type of) thing that caused whatever experience served
intially to fix the reference of t, and if the use of t is causally linked to that
initial referential use. A necessary condition for r to be the referent, then, is
that it have the essential properties of the original referent. RV is certainly
false on this theory since changes in beliefs about r whether or not
accompanied by changes in the meaning of r do not affect the conditions for
reference.
Philosophers who take the Fregian of the two alternative9 are really doing
HR a disservice. HR should be credited minimally with having issued a
legitimate challenge to provide an acceptable analysis of theory change on
which RVis false. That is, while not refuting SR, HR or the arguments for it
show SR to stand in need of a certain kind of defense. The Fregian alternative
offers none. R V might be true even if MV is false; indeed, according to KP or
a version of it which Putnam acknowledges to be possible if not preferable, r
may have distinct referents without having distinct meanings and without these
referents being objects of different beliefs.
But the Fregian alternative is inadeqate even to show the invalidity of the
inference from MV to R V. From the fact that some terms different in meaning
are the same in reference, it does not follow that a term can change in meaning
without changing in reference. For Frege, intension determines extension. And
while different intensions can determine the same extension, a change of
intension is likely to effect extension. A change of a term’s intension, or of
what Frege would consider the intersubjective part of meaning, amounts on
his theory to a change in the criterion for something’s qualifying as the term’s
referent - that is, in the characterization or ‘manner of designation’ (definite
descriptions in Frege’s examples) associated with the term as its ‘sense’, and
satisfaction of which qualifies something as the referent. Frege’s observation
that distinct senses can have common application is no basis for supposing
reference to survive such change. For the point of Frege’s observation is that a
difference in the senses conveyed by the terms of an identity statement renders
the statement informative. Once the statement’s truth is discovered either
sense can be used indifferently to determine the referent. Meaning change
without change of reference then amounts to abandoning what continues to be
a correct and referentially adequate characterization of the referent.
Moreover, a criterion which determines reference is also, for Frege, a criterion
??wch a philosopher is Israel Scheffler. See Science and Subjectivity (New York: Bobbs-Merrill,
1967), especially pp. 57 - 62.
Reference and Scientific Real&m 271

for reidentification of the referent. Distinct determinations of the same

referent must, accordingly, overlap at least to the extent of providing the same
principle of reidentification. Thus meaning change could preserve reference on
Frege’s theory only if partial. These points do not preclude referential stability
through meaning change, but they show that Frege’s theory provides no basis
for expecting such stability nor for identifying cases of it, as required for an
adequate response to HR.
There is, however, a more serious difficulty that arises for both the Fregian
and KP alternatives, preventing the latter from meeting the challenge neglected
by the former. The difficulty, basically, is that neither alternative is applicable
to the scientific terms most crucially at issue in the defense of SR. Both apply
to terms introduced by ostension or by properties straightforwardly descriptive
of the referent or of its experientially accessible effects. This is explicit in KP
on which the referent itself must be causally implicated in referential, linguistic
acts. It is at least implicit in Frege, both from his examples and from his
preference for ‘mode of presentation of the referent’ over other
characterizations of sense.’ These requirements are generally not met by what
have traditionally been considered ‘theoretical terms’ in science. Unlike
‘Hesperus’, ‘Cicero’, ‘heat’, or ‘water’, ‘electron’, ‘positron’, and ‘photon’,
for example, are terms of which we experienced neither the referent nor its
effects in initially fixing their reference.
‘Electron’ was introduced as a term for definite quantities of electric charge
which act as discrete units or ‘atoms’ in certain theoretical explanations of
Faraday’s empirical laws of electrolysis, and which, by analogy to electrolysis,
conduct electricity through gases upon decomposition of compound gases by
electric discharges. But ‘electron’ did not attain credibility as a referential term
on the basis of any of the proposed explanations of Faraday’s results or on the
basis of such analogical speculations. Prior to the general acceptance of
Maxwell’s theory, prior at least to the experimental detection of electric waves,
a number of physicists were inclined to interpret the conduction of electricity
through an electrolyte in atomistic terms. But this need only have meant that
there are definite amounts of electric charge or ‘electrical power’ possessed by
individual atoms of matter which do not vary as those material atoms move
through the electrolyte. The charge itself, on such an ‘atomistic’ view, could
still be considered a property of material atoms rather than particulate in its
own right. Even if particulate, there was no reason to suppose that charges
could exist independently of or apart from associated material atoms. The
very terminology ‘material atom’ used to contrast regular atoms with atoms of
electricity shows that the latter were being thought of as fixed amounts of
charge, rather than as material particles possessing such amounts of charge.
“On Sense and Reference’, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, P.
Geach and M. Black (eds.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960). pp. 56 - 79.
212 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

There was no need to suppose that charge, even if particulate, would always
occur in the same amount; indeed, just the opposite was suggested by analogy
to material atoms: different quantities of charge were associated with different
atoms and these quantities were fixed rather than subdividable to some
common unit. It is at least highly dubious that initial reference to electrons can
be traced as far back as atomistic theories of electricity.
What is required for a term to have credibility as a referential term, to
function, that is, as at least purportedly referential in normal usage? Certainly
neither belief in the existence of the referent nor acceptance of a theory in
which the term is given a grammatically referential role is required. But more
than surface grammar is required. The term ‘interest’ in ‘John has an interest
in the outcome’, or ‘The outcome serves John’s interests’, is not purportedly
referential; the meaning is that the outcome might or does help John.’ And the
more required is not provided simply by causal linkage of the initial use of
the term with observation. There must be some conception of the sort of thing
the term is intended to refer to whether or not that is the sort of thing it does
refer to. This conception cannot be totally arbitrary. Insofar as it lacks
plausibility or justification, the intention actually to use the term referentially,
rather than as a convenient fiction, say, is suspect. The conception must be
clear enough that if very different things turn out to be causally linked to the
same sort of observation, it determines which of these, if any, is the intended
referent. Reference cannot be so ambiguous that we might have to end up
saying that in its initial referential use a term referred to all of a number of
different things, some of which were not involved in producing the
observation that fixed the reference and are unlike what did produce that
observation. If it really were true that science recognizes fundamentally
different kinds of mass rather than different measures of mass, a convenient
one and a correct one, then we might have to question whether Newton could
have been referring to mass.
Normally, initial reference is disambiguated by some account
of the nature of the linkage, of how the observation fixing the
reference is produced by the referent. If this account turns out to be far from
true, the success of our initial reference depends on it not turning out that
various different things could have produced that initial observation. If I think
the sound I hear is made by a sad kitten for which I subsequently use the name
‘Tristesse’, as in ‘Tristesse is probably lost’, and that sound turns out to have
been made by a vacuum cleaner with a dirty motor, ‘Tristesse’ does not then
refer to a vacuum cleaner. If I think the object I see is an intra-Mercurial
planet for which I subsequently use the name ‘Vulcan’, as in ‘The gravitational
attraction of Vulcan accounts for the discrepancy in the precession of
‘Compare R. Barrett, ‘Referential Indeterminacy: A response to Professor Putnam’,
Conceptual Change (note 4) p. 224.
Reference and Scientific Realism 273

Mercury’s perihelion’, and that object turns out to be a sunspot, ‘Vulcan’ does
not then refer to a sunspot.g The reference of ‘heat’ is alleged to have been
fixed by the experience of feeling hot, and ‘heat’ is alleged to refer to whatever
in fact causes feeling hot, however unanticipated or at variance with
expectations that cause turns out to be. Perhaps; but there is an implicit
assumption that ‘what in fact causes this way of feeling’ is unambiguous. If
importantly different physical conditions turn out to cause this way of feeling
under circumstances similar to those in which the term was introduced, then
‘heat’ does not refer to the one which happened on that occasion to cause this
way of feeling. In the absence of an account of how the feeling is caused which
discriminates among the possible causes, the reference of ‘heat’ was simply not
fixed by the experience.
It may be that none of the atomistic theories of electricity prior to Lorentz’s
succeeded in fixing the reference of those of their terms which we retroactively
credit with reference to electrons. There is an inclination now to call any
atomistic theory of electricity an ‘electron theory’, although Lorentz’s was the
first theory actually so called. The reason for extending this appellation is to
locate the Lorentz theory within an established tradition which had competed
with the tradition of continuous theories that, by Lorentz’s time, had eclipsed
it. Thus credit is given to Lorentz’s historical precursors, something which
Lorentz himself took care to do, although in quite different terminology.‘0
Perhaps this reason is good enough, although the Lorentz theory is equally in
the continuous tradition, a fact which merely appears less noteworthy since
that was the going tradition at the time. But even if justified, calling pre-
Lorentzian theories ‘electron theories’ may be misleading.
For example, Weber’s attempt to unify electrodynamics with electrostatics,
that is, Faraday’s laws with Ampere’s, might be considered the first electron
theory. It is rather difficult for a post-Lorentzian commentator to interpret the
formalism of the theory without referring to electrons.” Yet nothing in the
formalism requires an atomistic analysis of electric fluids, and Weber himself
regarded such an analysis as a convenience for calculation in particular
applications, not as a realistic theory of the nature of the fluid.‘2 If the theory
is interpreted as reducing electric currents to the motions of discrete particles,

*‘Vulcan’ was introduced on the basis of such an observation and was intended to be the name
of a newly discovered planet, not a hypothetical one.
‘OH. A. Lorentz, ‘La Thtorie Electromagnetique de Maxwell et son Application aux Corps
Mouvants’, Archs nkerl. Sri., 25 (1892). 432 -433.
“See the references to Weber’s theory in E. T. Whittaker, A Htitory of the Theories of Aether
and Electricity, (Dublin: Dublin University Press, 1910) and A. G’Rahilly, EIectrokagnetic
Theory (New York: Dover, 1%5). O’Rahilly is particularly interested in crediting Weber with as
much-of the modern view of electricity as possible. _
“See K. L. Caneva, ‘From Galvanism to Electrodynamics: The Transformation of German
Physics and its Social Context’, Historical Studies in the PhysicaI Sciences, 9, R. McCormmach
and L. Pyenson (eds.) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978). pp, 99- 101.
214 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

its resulting account of the nature of such particles raises problems of

referential credibility.
The theory assumes that the force between charges is a function of their
relative velocities and accelerations as well as their separation, and that the
direction of the force depends on the direction of motion of the charges as well
as their signs. These assumptions conflicted with all known laws involving
action at a distance and were thought, initially, to violate conservation of
energy. Without compensating theoretical support they appeared arbitrary
and implausible. Thus some scientists at once commended the theory for a
successful systematization of induction phenomena and denied that it provides
information about the nature of electricity.13 In effect, they treated it
instrumentally.
Because of these assumptions about electric forces and the fact that a
constant current exerts no force on a static charge, the theory requires that in a
conductor, equal numbers of positive and negative charges move in opposite
directions with equal velocities relative to the material atoms. Positive and
negative charges cannot, then, be distinguished by relative mobility in a
conductor. They are distinguished only by taking a charge of one type to be in
circular motion about a charge of the other in the production of an Amperian
current. But this distinction the theory exactly reverses, taking the negative
charge to be at rest and associated with a material atom. And even this
distinction is at most suggestive, since only relative velocities appear in the
formalism. There seems to be no more reason to credit the theory with
reference to electrons than with reference to protons, just the sort of ambiguity
which suggests that no reference has been achieved.
There is also a problem with the coherence of the concept of a charged
particle required by the theory: a charge may increase in velocity without limit
when subjected to a force acting against its direction of motion, as though it
possesses negative mass. (This cannot be considered an incredible
premonition.)
If it is correct now to credit Weber with reference to electrons, this must be
taken to mean that Weber was referring to that which Lorentz and subsequent
experimentalists later referred to, rather than to mean that reference to
electrons had already been fixed by Weber’s earlier theory or, still less
plausibly, by the experimental basis for that theory. The fact that enough of
Weber’s theory carries over to Lorentz’s to enable Lorentz to be identified
with an atomistic tradition reaching back to Weber does not imply that
Weber’s theory achieved an independent reference to electrons. And if it did
not, then it is really a kind of implicit, selective reconstruction of it,
emphasizing and embellishing features that carry over while discounting
“See P. G. Tait, Sketch of Thermodynamics, 1877, p. 68 f. and O’Rahilly (note 1 l), vol. 2, pp.
531-532.
Reference and Scientific Real&m 275

others, for which coreference is plausible. Perhaps the fact that an early theory
lends itself to such reconstruction in the light of later knowledge is sufficient
basis for retroactive reference. But it is not sufficient basis for crediting that
theory with having determined initial reference.
Perhaps the case for a pre-Lorentzian initial reference to electrons is
stronger for those whose ideas could be based on cathode ray observations and
electrochemistry as well as on the laws of Faraday and Ampere. Helmholtz’s
analysis of Faraday’s law in light of refined observations is said to have been
highly influential on behalf of electroatomism. But Helmholtz’s actual
position is only that it would be inconsistent in view of Faraday’s law to
maintain atomism in chemistry without recognizing it in electricity. Helmholtz
explicitly declines to propound any specific hypothesis as to the nature of
electricity. He denies that Faraday’s results or their electrochemical
corroborations require such an hypothesis and commends Faraday’s restraint
in refraining from such speculation,” Schuster explained the failure of Tait
and Goldstein to observe a Doppler effect for cathode rays by supposing that
the light is emitted by slow molecules struck by fast particles composing the
rays. But Schuster later denied that this explanation constituted
electroatomism or that he had even imagined the possibility of independent
atoms of electricity. His actual proposal had been that the ray particles are
negatively charged fragments of gas molecules repelled by the cathode.15
My contention is that the first credible reference to electrons, and, in
particular, the first credible use of ‘electron’ as a referential term were
achieved by the Lorentz theory, and that the referential credibility of ‘electron’
in that theory did not result from postulating electrons as causes of
unexplained or problematic empirical phenomena, as earlier theories had
postulated an atomistic structure for electricity as the cause of the
proportionality of the rate of decomposition to current strength in electrolysis.
Indeed, the outstanding problematic phenomenon initially confronting the
Lorentz theory was the Michelson-Morley result, which the theory could not
at first explain but subsequently incorporated without reference to electrons.
Only in 1904 do electrons become involved in the explanation of null results,
and the null results most directly at issue then were later ones challenging the
adequacy of this incorporation.
The Lorentz theory achieved reference to electrons, rather, on the basis of
the theoretical role it ascribes to them of providing a mechanism for the
production of such electrical and optical phenomena as were already
systematized by Maxwell’s equations or independently accounted for on the
electromagnetic theory of light. This theoretical role was definitive on a
“H. V. Helmholtz, ‘On the Modern Development of Faraday’s Conception of Electricity’, J.
Chem. Sot., 39 (1881) 282 - 283. 290.
IsA. Schuster, The Progress of Physics during 33 years, 1875 - 1908 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 191l), p. 59.
276 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

number of points as to the nature of electrons which the empirical basis of

earlier atomistic theories had left vague or undetermined. Electrons exist
within the interiors of molecules and atoms. They have a definite internal
distribution of charge density, falling off continuously from their centers.
They are clearly discrete particles, the continuity of charge density at their
boundaries functioning as a mathematical simplification.” They move as
discrete particles, oscillating about equilibrium positions in the atoms of
dielectrics in response to electrical forces exerted on them by the ether, and
moving freely in conductors. And their identification, on the basis of
Zeeman’s work, with cathode ray particles indicates that they are negatively
charged and permits the calculation of their charge to mass ratio. Their mass
and radius can then be calculated on the basis of the theory by treating the
mass as resulting entirely from self-induction.
These are properties on the basis of which the electromagnetic production of
light rays and the electric interactions of bodies are explained. Thus the reason
that the Lorentz theory warranted giving serious consideration to an existential
commitment to electrons is that the postulation of electrons effected a
generalization of Maxwell’s equations, retaining their applicability to charge
free ether but applying to bodies in motion and, incidentally, accounting for
the apparent Fresnel ether drag. Electrons were also involved in the
explanation of various optical phenomena which had eluded Maxwell’s
original theory but had subsequently been incorporated into Maxwell’s
equations without recourse to electrons. Lorentz does cite an experiment of
Rowland as justification for regarding an electric current as the motion of
discrete charges.” But this experiment showed only that a magnetic field is
produced by the motion of an electrified body as by a current,18 a result
suggesting the identification of convection and conduction currents but not
requiring indivisible units of charge. Certainly Rowland attached no atomistic
interpretation to the experiment; he advocated a continuous ether theory.lg
There is, of course, an inclination to credit a number of experiments
reaching back to Faraday’s with the significance of having ‘demonstrated’ the
existence of electrons,*” as well as to describe all atomistic theories of
electricity as electron theories. But this inclination dates from the Lorentz
theory, rather than from these experiments themselves. Such experimental
results as the Zeeman Effect and J. J. Thompson’s charge to mass ratio
“The Theory of Electrons (note 2), p. 11.
“The Theory of Electrons (note 2), pp. 12- 13.
‘OH.A. Rowland, ‘On the Magnetic Effect of Electric Convection’, PhysicalPapers (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1902) p. 131.
‘@SeeH. A. Rowland, ‘Modern Theories of Electricity’, Physical PU~I-S (note i@, pp.
285 - 293.
10“. . .
The facts knownto Ampere and Faraday were sufficient to demonstrate that no other
ConCePtiOn of electricityother [sic]than the atomicone is logicallyself-consistent’. J. Larmor in
Phil Mug., 7 (1904), p. 624, quoted in O’Rahilly (note 11) vol. 1, p. 205.
Reference and Scientific Realbm 277

determinations for cathode ray particles might have provided a sufficient

empirical basis for initially fixing the reference of ‘electron’, but ‘electron’ was
established as a credible referential term by the Lorentz theory prior to those
results. Thus they had the status of confirmations of the theory rather than of
providing a basis for the theory. Pre-Lorentzian atomistic theories of
electricity based on Faraday’s work never really received significant confirm-
ation.
The case is more straightforward for ‘positron’ and ‘photon’ being terms
whose initial reference was fixed by their role in a certain theoretical context,
rather than on the basis of some experience attributed to the causal agency of
the referent. Initial reference to positrons was achieved by Dirac’s quantum
theory of the electron which required that there be ‘negative energy’ solutions
to the wave equation. The realization that such solutions must refer to
positrons resulted from Weyl’s demonstration that they have electron mass,
and predates Anderson’s experiments which provided an independent basis for
fixing reference to positrons, and which actually occasioned the first use of the
term ‘positron’. The realization that the particle Anderson detected is the
particle Dirac’s theory requires was evidently due to Blackett’s observation
that the small lifespan of the particle needed to account for its appearance only
in cloud chamber experiments is a consequence of Dirac’s theory.2’ The idea
that the particle could be created and destroyed in interactions and need not
have a role in the constitution of stable matter removed a major impediment to
its acceptability.
‘Positron’ might have been introduced on the basis of Gordon’s earlier
attempt to relativize quantum mechanics, for Dirac’s negative energy solutions
carry over from Gordon’s wave equation, to which Dirac’s was designed to
reduce in the limit of large quantum numbers. Hanson almost suggests that it
should have been.22 But since Gordon’s equation, being nonlinear in time,
attaches a probability only to the positions of electrons, it applies only to their
emission or absorption, not to their behavior as independent particles. Thus it
could not really be the basis for introducing a new particle.
‘Photon’ was introduced as a name for light quanta first hypothesized by
Einstein as a natural extension of his proposal of a quantum structure for
radiation. This proposal is motivated by a formal analogy between entropy
changes for monochromatic radiation and for an ideal gas, corresponding to a
decrease in volume. Since the expression for the entropy change of a gas results
from a probabilistic analysis of entropy, Einstein suggests that radiation also
has a structure which can be treated probabilistically. The initial reference to
light quanta is fixed by this theoretical argument, rather than by such
“See N. R. Hanson, The Concepf of fhe Positron, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1%3) p. 147 f. and 162 f. and the references given there.
‘?The Concept of the Positron (note 21) p. 145.
278 Studies in H&tory and Philosophy of Science

observations as Einstein cites as confirmation. It may be that black body

radiation, the photoelectric effect, and so forth could have been ‘better
understood’ on the view that light energy is discontinuous, but the available
data did not even require quantizing the energy involved in all such
interactions between radiation and matter. They certainly did not justify
postulating a corpuscular structure for light generally, particularly as there is
no indication in this early work as to how interference and dispersion
phenomena are to be understood on a corpuscular theory. There is only the
statement that our empirical knowledge of such wavelike phenomena is strictly
consistent with a corpuscular structure since it pertains to average values over
temporal intervals rather than to instantaneous values.Z3
Thus only retroactively can one suppose Planck to have been referring in his
empirical law of black body radiation to radiation quanta. The problem is not
that Planck himself did not believe that quanta exist, that for him they had
much the same status that atoms of electricity had for Maxwell - roughly,
that it would be a condition of adequacy of an acceptable theory that it get rid
of them.*’ One can refer to something without believing that it exists, even
believing that it does not exist. Dirac thus referred to positrons at first, falsely
believing himself to be referring to protons. The problem, rather, is similar to
that of the Gordon equation: Planck quantized energy only in the process of
interaction between radiation and matter, and then only under equilibrium
conditions. Thus there is no suggestion on Planck’s analysis, as there is on
Einstein’s, that energy quanta possess momentum. Quanta did not function
for Planck as independent entities even as an idealization.
‘Electron’, ‘positron’, and ‘photon’ are terms whose reference was initially
fixed by a certain theoretical context on the basis of properties descriptive of a
certain theoretical role their referents were to assume in that context. This is
not to say that their reference was fixed by theories; reference to photons was
fixed 21 years before photons were so named on the basis of a ‘heuristic
proposal’, which I take to be a certain type of model functioning as a stage in
the development of a theory. *$Nor is it to deny that the referents of such terms
are observable. The referents may become ‘directly observable’ in the useful,
scientific sense that the evidence for their existence is the best evidence
theoretically possible. It is to say that what initially fixes the reference of these
terms is not any experience but certain properties whose ascription to their
referents carries theoretical commitments underdetermined by experience.

zSA. Einstein, ‘On a Heuristic Point of View about the Creation and Conversion of Light’, D.
ter Haar, The b/d Quantum Theory (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1967), pp. 91 - 92.
“See J. C. Maxwell. A Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1892), vol. 1, pp. 380-381.
‘“For analysis of this type of model and its role in theory construction see J. Leplin, ‘The Role of
Models in Theory Construction’, forthcoming in the Proceedings of the First Annual Guy A.
Leonard Conference in Philosophy, University of Nevada, Reno, 1978.
Reference and Scien tlfic Realkm 279

In contrast to Fregian and KP examples, the existence of the referents of

such theoretical-context (TC) terms is generally speculative at first, and the
hypotheses introducing them rather tentative. Commitment to their existence
is conditional on the eventual empirical success of the theory in the context of
which they are introduced or the eventual incorporation of such hypotheses
into an empirically successful theory. There generally are foreseeable
circumstances under which the scientist proposing these hypotheses would
deny that the alleged referents exist after all, circumstances that would
disconfirm (portions of) the relevant theory. This outlook is quite unlikely in
the case of terms whose reference is fixed by experiences. If there is going to be
some unanticipated way, ultimately, of accounting for those experiences, it
may be plausible then to give an associated, unanticipated description of the
very items now referred to in accounting for those experiences. This will be
plausible if, although the identity of the cause of the experience is
unanticipated, its uniqueness and the nature of its causal agency is not.
Tristesse might, for example, turn out to be a puppy if not a vacuum cleaner.
For we do not expect ever to deny the occurrence of the experience, nor can we
envision circumstances that would impel such denial. Thus according to KP,
the most outstanding attribute of the referent so far as we are concerned in
initially referring to it is its responsibility for this experience. This attribute it is
able to retain however sweeping our re-evaluation of how this responsibility is
exercized.
Thus reference fixed under KP conditions enjoys an ontological immunity
while vulnerable to extensive descriptive revision. Reference fixed by
theoretical context wobld seem to work oppositely. The referent (or alleged
referent) might easily turn out not to exist at all, but if it does exist it will have
to have these particular theoretical properties or this particular theoretical
role, because that is all there is to identify it. There would be no reason to take
something whose properties are thought to be very different to be the same
thing. There will be an inclination to identify these things if the same
grammatically referential expression is used for them, but this alone is
inadequate as a reason. Identity of referential expressions does not guarantee
coreference among theories; neither does diversity of referential expressions
preclude it. So it looks as though for TC-terms reference is going to be hard
pressed to survive theory, and will do so only insofar as certain hypotheses
involving the terms survive as well. Neither Frege’s theory not KP forestalls
HR.
The objective of this paper is to offer another alternative. This alternative
credits KP with an important contribution. Like that theory it insists on a role
for some kind of observational situation as a fixed element in reference. It is
not, however, an element in the initial determination of reference, but in the
comparison of references independently determined.
280 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

Those situations in which I have deferentially countenanced coreference

thus far are situations in which reference was not fixed independently but
extended retroactively, or so I have argued. The basis of the extension in such
cases is the selective retention by the theory initially fixing the reference of
important hypotheses of the earlier theory. Were it not for the retention of
such hypotheses, I do not think it would be possible to recognize coreference in
such cases, and then relativistic implications would apply, except for such
standards of comparison as MV allows. But the hypotheses whose retention
provides for coreference in these cases are such that these are not cases in
which the theories function as exclusive alternatives for the scientific
community. Lorentz was returning to the atomistic approach of Weber and
Clausius. He was explicitly adopting Gauss’s hypothesis that the force with
which one charge acts on another is retarded, so that the effect of the force at a
time depends on the state of the charge exerting it at an earlier time. The
theory Lorentz’s replaced was really Maxwell’s, although in the context of
problems common to continuous theories it would become appropriate to
speak of ‘Maxwell - Lorentz’ electrodynamics. Thus the success of Lorentz’s
theory represented a vindication of earlier electron theories rather than their
rejection. The theory special relativity replaced was Lorentz’s (and Newton’s),
and the success of special relativity vindicated Maxwell. Thus Einstein
identifies Maxwell and Lorentz in the context of founding the quantum theory
and divides them up in the context of founding relativity.26 Einstein adopts
Planck’s hypothesis that radiation energy is quantized, contending in his
second quantum paper that Planck’s theoretical argument for the radiation
law requires light quanta and finally using Planck’s constant. Thus the
empirical success of Einstein’s light quantum hypothesis vindicated Planck’s
hypothesis, if not Planck himself who did not really believe the hypothesis.
What is required of an alternative to Frege’s theory and KP beyond an
account of the conditions for retroactive reference, which I take to be selective
retention of hypotheses, are criteria of coreference for cases in which, unlike
those last considered, the theories do function as exclusive alternatives. Even if
a X-term carries over in such cases, so that its use in one theory is causally
explained by its use in the other, it may be possible to regard its reference as
fixed independently by each theory. What then makes its reference the same? I
suggest that it is the fact that an intervening experimental result successfully
predicted by the earlier theory becomes part of the foundation for the latter.

“The problems most important to Einstein in the context of the quantum theory are common to
both the Lorentz and Maxwell theories. Thus although the Lorentz theory introduces electrons, it
fails to provide an adequate basis for understanding their structure; that is, the stability of the
electron requires the introduction of nonelectrical forces. Einstein’s treatment of the Maxwell and
Lorentz theories as constituting a common system of electrodynamics is most explicit in the first of
his 1909 papers in Phys. Z., 10, 185. For development of this point, see M. J. Klein,
‘Thermodynamics in Einstein’s Thought’, science, 157 (3788) (1967), 513-514.
Reference and ScientificRealism 281

Let T, and Tz be successive, alternative theories such that T2 replaces T,. T,

predicts a result E on the basis of hypotheses employing a TC-term s. E then
forms part of the factual basis for T,, which Tz explains by hypotheses
employing s. The T, hypotheses predicting E predict it on the basis of
properties they ascribe to the (purported) referent tt of s as used in T,, such
that according to T, the existence of r, is a necessary condition for E. In
confirming T,, E then confirms an existential commitment to rl . T2 accords a
similar status to r,, the (purported) referent of s as used in T2: the acceptability
of Tz’s explanation of E is conditional on an existential commitment to r2.
My contention is that these circumstances constitute a good reason for
assuming r, = r, and that this reason is typically a basis for diagnosing
coreference among successive, alternative theories. It applies in particular
where T, subsumes T, as a special case, a relation often cited as evidence of
coreference. It is not, to be sure, the sole basis. There is bound to be a
presumption of coreference just in virtue of the retention of terminology.
Proponents of T, surely intended to refer to what they took T,‘s proponents to
be referring to or it would have been rather perverse of them to retain T,‘s
referential terminology. What the intervention of E supplies is a rationale for
this intention. Although T,‘s explanation of E in terms of r, becomes
unacceptable, the ability of T, to predict E by reference to rl remains a
significant fact which an adequate replacement of T, must somehow
incorporate. That is, it must be understandable on the basis of T2 how T, was
able, on the strength of mistaken hypotheses, to achieve this correct
prediction. And the natural explanation is that although wrong about the
nature of r, , T, was not wrong about the existence of r, nor its involvement in
the production of E.
This account depends on distinguishing the explanation of E from the
prediction of E; while the former is rejected, the latter carries over as a fact to
be assimilated in a new theory. This distinction will have to be artificial if
recognizable at all, if we presume a formal analysis of theories. For it is, in
effect, a distinction between what a theory achieves in virtue of its formalism
and what it achieves in virtue of physically plausible interpretations of its
formalism. Quantum mechanics successfully predicts and is confirmed by
virtually everything but explains virtually nothing. The successful prediction
of E is a reason for existential commitment to rl even if the explanation of E
offered in terms of s by T, becomes unacceptable. The reason for accepting r,
= r, is that the very reason we had for commitment to the existence of r,
becomes a reason for commitment to the existence of r,.
This reasoning is cogent for proponents of T2 even if MI/ applies and they
have some systematic propensity for misunderstanding T,‘s explanation of E
or the significance or ‘interpretation’ of E in the context of T,, even if s
changes meaning. For it depends only on formal aspects of T, . This reasoning
282 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

may not, however, be completely theory neutral. If we reject or are unable to

fathom the explanations of both theories, the fact that each predicts E may not
be a good enough reason to accept r2 = r,. If formalism alone is accessible we
may not even be able to determine that s is being used referentially. But SR
does not require complete theory neutrality. It requires a defense of credibility
of reference for theories that we have good reason to accept now, against the
fact that theories we had good reason to accept before, are rejected. And this
requires that in some cases, important cases, the reference of a rejected theory
survive in its replacement.
On the basis of KP we would have to say that the reference of a term in
current theory is determined by the conditions of its initial referential use in
past theory. It may be objected that it will be impossible to determine what
those conditions were, and thus to determine the reference of our present use
of the term. It may be replied, with some nerve I think, that this objection is
purely epistemological - an unpromising denouement. On the alternative
account I suggest we determine that however the reference of the term was
initially fixed, we have good reason for taking its initial referent to be the very
thing we now use it to refer to. Thus it is reference as fiied by current theory
rather than reference as fixed by past theory that provides the basis for
evaluating coreference. We get to look at things from a contemporary
perspective, which is how we see them anyway.
Even for non TC-terms, KP is problematic on this point. For what KP really
is a theory of is not what determines the reference of our use of, say, ‘water’,
but rather what it takes for the referent of our use of ‘water’, however that
referent is determined, to be water. We can very easily use ‘water’ to refer, and
refer successfully, to something other than, that is, different in nature from,
what ‘water’ referred to when its reference was initially fixed. If the first
Earthmen to visit Twinearth*’ are not scientists but, say, ambassadors or
members of a cultural exchange (probably ballet dancers) they will never know
that the Twinearth stuff is not water and will use ‘water’ to refer to it. After
all, Twinearthmen tell them it is water and they generally identify things
correctly. We are inclined to assume that tricorder readings will be taken
before they drink the stuff. Seasoned travelers do not just drink the water in a
strange place, however innocuous its appearance, without checking it out. But
if Twinearth Coke costs as much as Earth Coke and they are very thirsty,
perhaps they do just drink it. Then they find that it tastes O.K., doesn’t make
them ill, and so forth, and that is good reason to presume that it is water. It
would be remarkable for something radically different chemically to turn out
experientially indistinguishable from water. There would be more wrong with
Twinearth than the water; physical laws would have to be different. Twinearth
“What follows is yet another variation on Putnam’s Twinearth example. See ‘The Meaning of
“Meaning”’ (note 5).
Reference and Scientific Realism 283

is at most a possible world, not a possible planet. But if all this were so, our
travelers would certainly be using ‘water’ to refer to stuff that on up is not
water. Returning to Earth they might remark upon the ‘water’: ‘Visit
Twinearth, the people speak English and you can drink the water!‘. Thereby
the reference is successfully transmitted. ‘Water’ as used on Earth then refers
both to water and to the stuff on Twinearth. Being so like Earth, Twinearth
has low priority for a scientific expedition, and more cultural missions
disseminate this usage before scientists arrive years later to discover that either
the Twinearth stuff is not water or is a different kind of water.
All this depends on a certain mistake being made and a certain ignorance
sustained. So long as Earthmen do not know that the Twinearth stuff is not
water they can perfectly well use ‘water’ to refer to it. This ignorance need not
be universal, or, rather, planetary. Having taken tricorder readings I can still
successfully use ‘water’ to refer to the Twinearth stuff in speaking to you if
you believe it to be water, or if you believe that I believe that you believe it is
water. One way to formulate this is to introduce another term such as
‘denotes’ and say that a term need not refer to what it denotes. Its denotation
depends only on its initial reference. Its reference depends on epistemic
features of the context of its use. SR requires the survival of reference, not
denotation. We can rationally accept r2 = r, without even knowing what s
denotes in T, . r2 = r, is grounded on similarity of the epistemic situations of T,
and T2 with respect to E, while their dissimilarities account for T,‘s
unacceptable hypotheses as to the properties of r,.
In the story it is the reference of ‘water’ that changes while the properties
that determine the reference are stable. Let us invert this: there is water on
Twinearth but it does not look or taste like water and there is no suspicion that
it is at all like water chemically. On the contrary, it is hypothesized to be XYZ
and various XYZ-type microscopic properties are ascribed to it. These
ascriptions are tested, and of course they are empirically confirmed because if
XYZ has HzO-type macroscopic properties H20 will naturally have XYZ-type
macroscopic properties. So we have a situation like T,‘s justifiable ascription
of the wrong properties to r,. The moral about reference is the same. T,‘s
reference to r2 does not require that T, ascribe the right properties to rl,
provided the epistemic situation justifies the mistake. Proponents of T2 can
accept r2 = r, while rejecting T, if they have information supporting r2 = r,
that explains the mistake. And they have it in E’s confirmation of T,.
The account I offer is not supposed to be a necessary or sufficient condition
for coreference, but a justification for assuming coreference in an important
class of cases. Whether or not this is an adequate justification may depend on
additional features of particular cases. It is not, in general, adequate where the
TC-terms are distinct. But this justification is, I think, central to the general
problem of assessing coreference through theory change. For it is applicable
284 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

indirectly to cases of kinds other than that assumed in its formulation. Most
important among these are cases of contemporaneous, competing theories
where neither theory’s use of a TC-term is causally explained by that term’s
use in the other. If coreference in such a case is not based on the retention by
each theory of hypotheses of a common, background theory, it will depend on
these theories being proposed as alternative replacements of an earlier theory
whose empirical successes will have to be accounted for by its successor.
Less important are cases of exclusive theories which do not actually function
as alternatives for the scientific community. If the theories have no direct
historical connection, one not replacing the other but replacing a theory which
replaces . . . a theory which replaces the other, then coreference again is
derivative from the conditions I have given. That is, there is not a general
criterion of coreference for such theories which compares them directly. A
popular presumption to the contrary generates various puzzles about reference
by raising such questions as ‘Was Democratus referring to atoms or to
molecules?’ and ‘Was Newton referring to atoms or to elementary particles?‘.
Such questions are, I think, inconsequential for SR. The difficulty in
answering them is the difficulty of filling in the intervening theory. It is not a
difficulty of stipulating in general how far wrong a conception can be and yet
be a conception of the right thing. SR does not require accuracy of description
as such, but predictive success and explanatory power of descriptions by which
their accuracy is supported. And it is not a difficulty in applying experimental
standards before science was experimental. SR entitles us to apply the
standards of current science because it is the referential credibility of accepted
theory that is at issue. If theories and standards were to change so radically
that science ceased to be empirical, then SR would be false. Experimental
standards provide a basis for crediting a theory with reference to, say, atoms
even if the conception of atoms on that theory is as different from the present
conception as it is from the conception of an earlier theory that we do not
credit with reference to atoms. Lorentz’s conception of the electron may be
further from Dirac’s than from the earliest atomistic conception of electricity.
But the intervention of the Zeeman Effect, among other empirical results,
enables us to recognize coreference for the Lorentz and Dirac theories.
This case for the centrality of my account of coreference is relatively
speculative. My basic argument is that available theories of reference do not
meet the challenge HR poses for SR because, apart from internal weaknesses,
they are inapplicable to TC-terms which are the important cases for SR. I have
therefore proposed a basis for assessing coreference for these terms. This basis
applies even under conditions of meaning variance. Thus it is independent of
attacks on HR which rely on inconclusive criticisms of MV.z8

“1 wish to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities for support of research.