Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Pedro P. Buenaventura RCBC then appealed to the CA.
d to the CA. In the assailed November 21, 2006
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 176479               October 6, 2010
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,  application of the acceleration clause. The CA, however, deemed the same
vs.
PEDRO P. BUENAVENTURA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) assails the Decision1 dated November 21, 2006 and the
Resolution2 dated January 30, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 82079.
Respondent Pedro P. Buenaventura and his first wife (now deceased)
owned a townhouse unit in Casa Nueva Manila Townhouse, Quezon City.
On December 27, 1994, they obtained a loan from petitioner. As security
for the loan, they mortgaged the townhouse to petitioner. 3 Under the loan
agreement, respondent was to pay RCBC a fixed monthly payment with
adjustable interest for five years. For this purpose, respondent opened an
account with RCBC’s Binondo branch from which the bank was to deduct
the monthly amortizations.4
On April 19, 1999, respondent received a Notice of Public Auction of the
mortgaged townhouse unit. He wrote Atty. Saturnino Basconcillo, the
notary public conducting the auction sale, demanding the cancellation of
the auction sale. However, the notary public proceeded with the public
sale on May 25, 1999, where RCBC emerged as the highest bidder. The
Notary Public’s Certificate of Sale was registered with the Register of
Deeds on September 28, 2000.
On September 18, 2001, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City a complaint for Annulment of Sale and Damages
against RCBC, notary public Saturnino Basconcillo, and the Registrar of
Deeds of Quezon City. Respondent prayed that the RTC (1) annul the
extra-judicial foreclosure and sale of the property; (2) cancel the
Certificate of Sale; and (3) direct the payment of P170,000.00 as actual
damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P70,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus P2,500.00 for every court
appearance of his counsel, and the costs of the suit.
RCBC failed to timely file an Answer and was declared in default. Based on
respondent’s evidence, the RTC rendered a decision, 5 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the foreclosure sale of the plaintiff’s (respondent’s)
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 39234 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City conducted on May 25, 1999 by
notary public ATTY. SATURNINO M. BASCONCILLO, and the
resulting certificate of sale issued by said notary public on May
27, 1999 null and void and of no effect; and
2. Ordering RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION
to pay to the plaintiff P100,000.00 as moral
damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P70,000.00 as
actual damages; and the costs of suit; and
3. Dismissing the complaint as against ATTY. SATURNINO M.
BASCONCILLO and the REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
CITY.
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC found that respondent made regular payments of the monthly
amortizations as they fell due, as evidenced by his passbooks and the
various deposit slips acknowledged by RCBC. 7 The RTC also found that
RCBC’s own computer-generated amortization schedule showed that no
balance was due respondent after his last payment on March 27, 2000. 8
RCBC filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied in a
resolution9dated February 11, 2004.
Decision,10 the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision with modification, deleting
the award of moral and exemplary damages.
The CA ruled that the foreclosure sale was premature. It held that
respondent made valid and sufficient payments on his loan obligation. It
found respondent’s evidence as sufficient proof to negate default on his
part in paying the monthly amortizations. It noted that sometime in
September 1996, RCBC sent respondent a letter informing the latter of
past due accounts since January 27, 1996, which would warrant the
to have been "cured" by a subsequent Amortization Schedule given by the
bank to respondent stating that, as of March 27, 2000, he no longer had
an unpaid balance on his loan. The CA said this clearly suggests the
uninterrupted receipt by RCBC of the installments, thus, negating the
claim that respondent was in default. It also noted respondent’s evidence
(his passbooks) which indicated that he had sufficient funds to cover the
remaining balance of his loan at the time of the foreclosure sale. Moreover,
the CA said that based on the term of the loan (April 27, 1995 to March 27,
2000), the loan was not yet due and demandable at the time of the
foreclosure.
On the other hand, the CA found the award of moral and exemplary
damages unwarranted. It held that since respondent irregularly paid his
monthly amortizations, RCBC did not act maliciously and in bad faith
when it initiated the foreclosure proceedings.
RCBC moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but it was denied in a
Resolution dated January 30, 2007.
In this petition, RCBC argues that the CA Decision is not in accord with
law and applicable jurisprudence. In particular, it assails the CA’s finding
that respondent was not in default at that time of the foreclosure of the
mortgage. It says that the foreclosure sale was done in the lawful exercise
of its right as mortgagee of the property as, at the time of the foreclosure
sale, respondent had unpaid amortizations. The bank points out that
respondent made payments until March 2000, but these payments were
not withdrawn by the bank and credited to respondent’s loan payments
but remained in his account.
In his Comment, respondent avers that he never received a copy of
petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to file the Petition for Review in
violation of Rule 45, Section 2. Thus, he argues that the motion is without
legal effect, and therefore, the petition has been filed out of time. He also
alleges that the petition lacks the requisite affidavit of material dates.
Respondent likewise posits that the petition does not raise questions of
law. He argues that the issue raised by petitioner, while purportedly a
question of law, in reality questions the sufficiency of evidence relied upon
by both the trial court and the CA, which this Court has held in the past to
be a question of fact.
In its Reply, petitioner counters respondent’s arguments by saying that the
issue it raised - whether respondent’s subsequent payment of unpaid
amortizations done after the foreclosure and public sale of the property
invalidates the extra-judicial foreclosure and public sale proceedings - is a
purely legal question.
The petition lacks merit and must be denied.
Clearly, the petition disputes the factual findings of the CA, 11 which, in
turn, merely affirmed the factual findings of the RTC.
It is settled that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and
confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on this Court and will
generally not be reviewed on appeal. Inquiry into the veracity of the CA’s
factual findings and conclusions is not the function of the Supreme Court,
because this Court is not a trier of facts. Neither is it our function to
reexamine and weigh anew the respective evidence of the parties. 12
While it is true that there are well-established exceptions to this principle,
petitioner in this case has failed to show that this case falls under one of
such exceptions.
The RTC and the CA both found that respondent was not in default on the
monthly payments of his loan obligation.
These findings are supported by the evidence on record.
At the time of foreclosure - April 1999 - respondent’s savings account
deposits showed a balance of P852,913.26.13 This was more than enough to
cover whatever amortizations were due from him at that time. Moreover,
the Amortization Schedule shows that, as of April 27, 1999, respondent’s
loan account with the bank totaled only P269,023.38.14 The same schedule
shows that, by March 27, 2000, he had "0.00" balance left to
pay,15 meaning he had paid his loan in full.
Foreclosure is valid only when the debtor is in default in the payment of
his obligation.16 It is a necessary consequence of non-payment of mortgage
indebtedness. As a rule, the mortgage can be foreclosed only when the
debt remains unpaid at the time it is due. 17
In a real estate mortgage, when the principal obligation is not paid when
due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose on the mortgage, to have the
property seized and sold, and to apply the proceeds to the obligation. 18
RCBC’s own Amortization Schedule readily shows the applicability of
Article 1176 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1176. The receipt of the principal by the creditor, without reservation
with respect to the interest, shall give rise to the presumption that the said
interest has been paid.
The receipt of a later installment of a debt without reservation as to prior
installments, shall likewise raise the presumption that such installments
have been paid.19
Respondent’s passbooks indicate that RCBC continued to receive his
payments even after it made demands for him to pay his past due
accounts, and even after the auction sale.
RCBC cannot deny receipt of the payments, even when it claims that the
deposits were "not withdrawn."20 It is not respondent’s fault that RCBC
did not withdraw the money he deposited. His obligation under the
mortgage agreement was to deposit his payment in the savings account he
had opened for that purpose, in order that RCBC may debit the amount of
his monthly liabilities therefrom. He complied with his part of the
agreement.
This bolsters the conclusion of the CA that respondent had no unpaid
installments and was not in default as would warrant the application of
the acceleration clause and the subsequent foreclosure and auction sale of
the property.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The Decision dated November 21, 2006 and the Resolution
dated January 30, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82079
are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Antonio Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-49542 September 12, 1980
ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH
MEJIAS,respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This petition for review seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 54618-R which reversed the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX dismissing the action for recognition
and support filed by respondent Elizabeth Mejias against petitioner
Antonio Macadangdang, and which found minor Rolando to be the
illegitimate son of petitioner who was ordered to give a monthly support of
P350.00 until his alleged son reaches the age of majority (p. 47, rec.; p. 10,
ROA).
The records show that respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman,
her husband being Crispin Anahaw (pp. 61-62, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972; pp.
10-11, Brief for Respondent [P. 198, rec.]) She allegedly had intercourse
with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967 (p. 38,
t.s.n., June 7, 1972 in CC No. 109). She also alleges that due to the affair,
she and her husband separated in 1967 (p. 63, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). On
October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter),
she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in
baptismal rites held on December 24,1967 (Annex "A", List of Exhibits).
The records also disclose that on April 25, 1972, respondent (then
plaintiff) filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner
(then defendant) with the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX.
This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 263 (p. 1, ROA).
Defendant (now petitioner) Macadangdang filed his answer on June 30,
1972, opposing plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal (p. 3, ROA).
On August 9, 1972, the lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-
trial Order formalizing certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues
on which both parties agreed (pp. 4, 5, and 6, ROA). Correspondingly,
upon agreement of the parties, an amended complaint was filed by
plaintiff on October 17, 1972 (pp. 7,8 and 9, ROA).
In its decision rendered on February 27, 1973, the lower court dismissed
the complaint,. The decision invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code
and Rules of Court and authorities (pp. 10-18, ROA).
On April 18, 1973, plaintiff appealed the CFI decision to the Court of
Appeals (p. 59, In her appeal, appellant assigned these errors:
1. The Honorable Trial Court erred in applying in the instant
case the provisions of Arts. 255 and 256 of the Civil Code and
Secs. 4[a], 4[b] and 4[c], Rule 131, of the Revised Rules of Court
(p. 18, rec.);
2. The Honorable Trial Court erred in holding that plaintiff-
appellant cannot validly question the legitimacy of her son,
Rolando Macadangdang, by a collateral attack without joining
her legal husband as a party in the instant case (p. 18, rec.).
In its decision handed down on June 2, 1978, the Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court's decision (p. 47, and thus declared minor
Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang (p. 52, rec.).
On November 6, 1978, the Court of Appeals denied appellant's motions for
reconsideration for lack of merit. (p. 56, rec.).
Hence, petitioner filed this petition on January 12, 1979.
The issues boil down to:
1. Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the
legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin
Anahaw; and
 2. Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would
bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally
presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.
The crucial point that should be emphasized and should be straightened
out from the very beginning is the fact that respondent's initial illicit affair
with petitioner occurred sometime in March, 1967 and that by reason
thereof, she and her husband separated. This fact surfaced from the
testimony of respondent herself in the hearing of September 21, 1972
when this case was still in the lower court. The pertinent portions of her
testimony are thus quoted:
By Atty. Fernandez:
Q — What did you feel as a result of the incident where Antonio
Macadangdang used pill and took advantage of your
womanhood?
A — I felt worried, mentally shocked and humiliated.
Q — If these feelings: worries, mental shock and humiliation, if
estimated in monetary figures, how much win be the amount?
A — Ten thousand pesos, sir.
Q — And because of the incidental what happened to your with
Crispin Anahaw.
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A — We separate, sir. (pp. 61-63, T.s.n., Civil Case No. 263, Sept.
21, 1972; emphasis supplied).
From the foregoing line of questions and answers, it can be gleaned that
respondent's answers were given with spontaneity and with a clear
understanding of the questions posed. There cannot be any other meaning
or interpretation of the word "incident" other than that of the initial
contact between petitioner and respondent. Even a layman would
understand the clear sense of the question posed before respondent and
her categorical and spontaneous answer which does not leave any room
for interpretation. It must be noted that the very question of her counsel
conveys the assumption of an existing between respondent and her
husband.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that respondent and her husband were
separated in 1965 cannot therefore be considered conclusive and binding
on this Court. It is based solely on the testimony of respondent which is
self-serving. Nothing in the records shows that her statement was
confirmed or corroborated by another witness and the same cannot be
treated as borne out by the record or that which is based on substantial
evidence. It is not even confirmed by her own husband, who was not
impleaded.
In the case of Tolentino vs. De Jesus (L-32797, 56 SCRA 167 [1974], this
Court restated that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise, and
conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension
of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and
its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee;
(6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the finding of facts of the Court
of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by
evidence on record [Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation vs. Yap, L-
36232, December 19, 1974; Roque vs. Buan, L-22459, 21 SCRA 642 (1967);
Ramos vs. Pepsi-cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, L-225533, 19
SCRA 289 (1967); emphasis supplied].
Again, in Roque vs. Buan, supra, this Court reiterated the aforestated
doctrine adding four more exceptions to the general rule. This case
invoked the same ruling in the previous case of Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Company, etc., supra.
In the recent case of Francisca Alsua-Betts, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.  (L-46430-31, July 30, 1979), which petitioner aptly invokes, this Court
thus emphasized:
... But what should not be ignored by lawyers and litigants alike
is the more basic principle that the "findings of fact" described as
"final" or "conclusive" are those borne out by the record or those
which are based upon substantial evidence. The general rule
laid down by the Supreme Court does not declare the absolute
correctness of all the findings of fact made by the Court of
Appeals. There are exceptions to the general rule, where we have
reviewed the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals ... (emphasis
supplied).
The following provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court should
be borne in mind:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other
than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of
the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were separately, in
such a way that access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.
Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of
the conception of the child, but there was no physical
impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth
in article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be
illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons,
that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this
article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy —
(a) Children born after one hundred eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed legitimate.
Against presumption no evidence be admitted other than that of
the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his
wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
[1] By the impotence of the husband
[2] By the fact that the husband and the wife were living
separately, in such a way that access was not possible;
[3] By the serious illness of the husband;
(b) The child shall be presumed legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.
(c) Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the
conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility
of access between her and her husband as set forth above, the
child is presumed legitimate, unless it appears highly
improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the
husband. For the purpose of the rule, the wife's adultery need
not be proved in a criminal case. ... (Rule 131, Rules of Court).
Whether or not respondent and her husband were separated would be
immaterial to the resolution of the status of the child Rolando. What
should really matter is the fact that during the initial one hundred twenty
days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the renamed child,
no concrete or even substantial proof was presented to establish physical
impossibility of access between respondent and her spouse. From her very
revealing testimony, respondent declared that she was bringing two sacks
of rice to Samal for her children; that her four children by her husband in
her mother's house in the said town; that her alleged estranged husband
also lived in her mother's place (p. 73, pp. 21 & 22, 64 & 65, t.s.n., Sept. 21,
1972). It should also be noted that even during her affair with petitioner
and right after her delivery, respondent went to her mother's house in
Samal for treatment. Thus, in the direct examination of Patrocinia Avila
(the boy's yaya), the following came out:
Q — Why were you taking care of the child Rolando, where was
Elizabeth Mejias?
 A — Because Elizabeth went to her parents in Same Davao del
Norte for treatment because she had a relapse (p. 13, t.s.n., of
Sept. 21, 1972).
From the foregoing and since respondent and her husband continued to
live in the same province, the fact remains that there was always the
possibility of access to each other. As has already been pointed out,
respondent's self-serving statements were never corroborated nor
confirmed by any other evidence, more particularly that of her husband.
The baby boy subject of this controversy was born on October 30, 1967,
only seven (7) months after March, 1967 when the "incident" or first illicit
intercourse between respondent and petitioner took place, and also, seven
months from their separation (if there really was a separation). It must be
noted that as of March, 1967, respondent and Crispin Anahaw had already
four children; hence, they had been married years before such date (t.s.n.,
pp. 21-22, Sept. 21, 1972). The birth of Rolando came more than one
hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said marriage
and before 300 days following the alleged separation between aforenamed
spouses.
Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her
husband.
The fact that the child was born a mere seven (7) months after the initial
sexual contact between petitioner and respondent is another proof that the
said child was not of petitioner since, from indications, he came out as a
normal full-term baby.
It must be stressed that the child under question has no birth certificate of
Baptism (attached in the List of Exhibits) which was prepared in the
absence of the alleged father [petitioner]. Note again that he was born on
October 30, 1967. Between March, 1967 and October 30, 1967, the time
difference is clearly 7 months. The baby Rolando could have been born
prematurely. But such is not the case. Respondent underwent a normal
nine-month pregnancy. Respondent herself and the yaya, Patrocinia
Avila, declared that the baby was born in the rented house at Carpenter
Street, which birth was obvisouly normal; that he was such a healthy baby
that barely 5 days after his birth, he was already cared for by
said yaya when respondent became sick (pp. 28, 29 & 43, t.s.n., Sept. 21,
1972); and that when he was between 15 days and 2 months of age,
respondent left him to the care of the yaya when the former left for Samal
for treatment and returned only in February, 1968 (pp. 30-32, t.s.n., Sept.
21, 1972). From the aforestated facts, it can be indubitably said that the
child was a full-term baby at birth, normally delivered, and raised
normally by the yaya. If it were otherwise or if he were born prematurely,
he would have needed special care like being placed in an incubator in a
clinic or hospital and attended to by a physician, not just a
mere yaya. These all point to the fact that the baby who was born on
October 30, 1967 or 7 months from the first sexual encounter between
petitioner and respondent was conceived as early as January, 1967. How
then could he be the child of petitioner?
In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its
pronouncements on the value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that
while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered public
documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified — but not the veracity of the
states or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or
citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case
of Fortus vs. Novero  (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that
a baptismal administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic
Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the
veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate
that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations
and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must
indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law.
The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and
her spouse. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof
that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the
first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This
presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted
by only one evidence — the physical impossibility of access between
husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the
birth of the child. This physical impossibility of access may be caused by
any of these:
1. Impotence of the husband;
2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible and
3. Serious illness of the husband.
This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is
sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception.
Hence, proof of the physical impossibility of such sexual union prevents
the application of the presumption (Tolentino, Commentaries &
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p. 513 citing Bevilaqua, Familia p.
311).
The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of
legitimacy, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no
access as could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child.
Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not
disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the
contrary; where sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband
must be taken to be the father of the child (Tolentino, citing Madden,
Persons and Domestic Relations, pp. 340-341).
To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore, there must be physical
impossibility of access by the husband to the wife during the period of
conception. The law expressly refers to physical impossibility. Hence, a
circumstance which makes sexual relations improbable, cannot defeat the
presumption of legitimacy; but it may be proved as a circumstance to
corroborate proof of physical impossibility of access (Tolentino, citing
Bonet 352; 4 Valverde 408).
Impotence refers to the inability of the male organ to copulation, to
perform its proper function (Bouvier's Law Dictionary 514). As defined in
the celebrated case of Menciano vs. San Jose (89 Phil. 63), impotency is
the physical inability to have sexual intercourse. It is not synonymous with
sterility. Sterility refers to the inability to procreate, whereas, impotence
refers to the physical inability to perform the act of sexual intercourse. In
respect of the impotency of the husband of the mother of a child, to
overcome the presumption of legitimacy on conception or birth in wedlock
or to show illegitimacy, it has been held or recognized that the evidence or
proof must be clear or satisfactory: clear, satisfactory and convincing,
irresistible or positive (S.C. — Tarleton vs. Thompson, 118 S.E. 421, 125 SC
182, cited in 10 C.J.S. 50).
The separation between the spouses must be such as to make sexual access
impossible. This may take place when they reside in different countries or
provinces, and they have never been together during the period of
conception (Estate of Benito Marcelo, 60 Phil. 442). Or, the husband may
be in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual
union took place through corrupt violation of or allowed by prison
regulations (1 Manresa 492-500).
The illness of the husband must be of such a nature as to exclude the
possibility of his having sexual intercourse with his wife; such as, when
because of a injury, he was placed in a plaster cast, and it was
inconceivable to have sexual intercourse without the most severe pain
(Tolentino, citing Commissioner vs. Hotel 256 App. Div. 352, 9 N.Y. Supp.
p. 515); or the illness produced temporary or permanent impotence,
making copulation impossible (Tolentino, citing Q. Bonet 352).
Thus, in the case of Andal vs. Macaraig (89 Phil. 165), this Court ruled that
just because tuberculosis is advanced in a man does not necessarily mean
that he is incapable of sexual intercourse. There are cases where persons
suffering from tuberculosis can do the carnal act even in the most crucial
stage of health because then they seemed to be more inclined to sexual
intercourse. The fact that the wife had illicit intercourse with a man other
than her husband during the initial period, does not preclude cohabitation
between said husband and wife.
Significantly American courts have made definite pronouncements or
rulings on the issues under consideration. The policy of the law is to confer
legitimacy upon children born in wedlock when access of the husband at
the time of conception was not impossible (N.Y. Milone vs. Milone, 290
N.Y. S. 863, 160 Misc. 830) and there is the presumption that a child so
born is the child of the husband and is legitimate even though the wife was
guilty of infidelity during the possible period of conception (N.Y. Dieterich
vs. Dieterich, 278 N.Y. S. 645, Misc. 714; both cited in 10 C.J.S., pp. 18,19
& 20).
So firm was this presumption originally that it cannot be rebutted unless
the husband was incapable of procreation or was absent beyond the four
seas, that is, absent from the realm, during the whole period of the wife's
pregnancy (10 C.J.S. p. 20).
The presumption of legitimacy of children born during wedlock obtains,
notwithstanding the husband and wife voluntarily separate and live apart,
unless the contrary is shown (Ala. Franks vs. State, 161 So. 549, 26 . App.
430) and this includes children born after the separation [10 C.J.S. pp. 23
& 24; emphasis supplied].
It must be stressed that Article 256 of the Civil Code which provides that
the child is presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress has
been adopted for two solid reasons. First, in a fit of anger, or to arouse
jealousy in the husband, the wife may have made this declaration (Power
vs. State, 95 N.E., 660). Second, the article is established as a guaranty in
favor of the children whose condition should not be under the mercy of the
passions of their parents. The husband whose honor if offended, that is,
being aware of his wife's adultery, may obtain from the guilty spouse by
means of coercion, a confession against the legitimacy of the child which
may really be only a confession of her guilt. Or the wife, out of vengeance
and spite, may declare the as not her husband's although the statement be
false. But there is another reason which is more powerful, demanding the
exclusion of proof of confession or adultery, and it is, that at the moment
of conception, it cannot be determined when a woman cohabits during the
same period with two men, by whom the child was begotten, it being
possible that it be the husband himself (Manresa, Vol. I, pp. 503-504).
Hence, in general, good morals and public policy require that a mother
should not be permitted to assert the illegitimacy of a child born in
wedlock in order to obtain some benefit for herself (N.Y. — Flint vs. Pierce,
136 N.Y. S. 1056, cited in 10 C.J.S. 77).
immoral and hedonistic. Although her husband was a very potent man,
she readily indulged in an instant illicit relationship with a married man
she had never known before.
Respondent had shown total lack of or genuine concern for her child
(Rolando) for, even after birth, she left him in the care of a yaya for
several months. This is not the normal instinct and behavior of a mother
who has the safety and welfare of her child foremost in her mind. The
filing of this case itself shows how she is capable of sacrificing the psycho-
social future (reputation) of the child in exchange for some monetary
consideration. This is blatant shamelessness.

The law is not willing that the child be declared illegitimate to suit the
whims and purposes of either parent, nor Merely upon evidence that no
actual act of sexual intercourse occurred between husband and wife at or
about the time the wife became pregnant. Thus, where the husband denies
having any intercourse with his wife, the child was still presumed
legitimate (Lynn vs. State, 47 Ohio App. 158,191 N.E. 100).
With respect to Article 257 aforequoted, it must be emphasized that
adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption
of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the child is that of
the husband (Tolentino, citing 1 Vera 170; 4 Borja 23-24).
It has, therefore, been held that the admission of the wife's testimony on
the point would be unseemly and scandalous, not only because it reveals
immoral conduct on her part, but also because of the effect it may have on
the child, who is in no fault, but who nevertheless must be the chief
sufferer thereby (7 Am. Jur. Sec. 21, pp. 641-642).
It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to
evade the responsibility and consequence of her reckless behavior at the
expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all — her own son. For
this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardization of
respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching consequences
on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who
would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the
children born during such immoral relations by using them to collect from
such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wrecking the stability
of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.
And as between the paternity by the husband and the paternity by the
paramour, all the circumstances being equal, the law is inclined to follow
the former; hence, the child is thus given the benefit of legitimacy.
Finally, Article 220 of the Civil Code reinforces the aforesaid principle
when it provides thus:

In the case of a child born or conceived in wedlock, evidence of the
infidelity or adultery of the wife and mother is not admissible to show
illegitimacy, if there is no proof of the husband's impotency or non-access
to his wife (Iowa — Craven vs. Selway, 246 N.W. 821, cited in 10 C.J.S. 36).
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that only the husband can contest
the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and
he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of
the moral or economic interest involved (Tolentino, citing Bevilaqua,
Familia, p. 314).
The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock
belongs only to the alleged father, who is the husband of the mother and
can be exercised only by him or his heirs, within a fixed time, and in
certain cases, and only in a direct suit brought for the purpose  (La —
Ducasse vs. Ducasse, 45 So. 565, 120 La. 731; Saloy's Succ. 10 So. 872, 44
La. Ann., cited in 10 C.J.S. 77; emphasis supplied).
Art. 220. In case of doubt, an presumptions favor the solidarity
of the family. Thus, every of law or facts leans toward the validity
of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds,
the legitimacy of children the community of property during
marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of
unlawful aggression.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED
JUNE 2, 1978, AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 6, 1978 ARE
HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
SO ORDERED.

Thus the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is

never uncertain; she can only contest the Identity of the child (La — Eloi
vs. Mader, 1 Rollo. 581, 38 Am. D. 192).

Formerly, declarations of a wife that her husband was not the father of a
child in wedlock were held to be admissible in evidence; but the general
rule now is that they are inadmissible to bastardize the child, regardless of
statutory provisions obviating incompetency on the ground of interest, or
the fact that the conception was antenuptial. The rule is said to be founded
in decency, morality and public policy (Wallace vs. Wallace 137 Iowa
37,114 N.W. 527,14 L.R.A. [N.S.] 544,126 Am. St. Rep. 253,15 Ann. Cas.
761, Am. Jur. 26).

From the foregoing, particularly the testimony of respondent and her

witnesses, this Court has every reason to believe that Crispin Anahaw was
not actually separated from Elizabeth Mejias; that he was a very potent
man, having had four children with his wife; that even if he and were even
separately (which the latter failed to prove anyway) and assuming, for
argument's sake, that they were really separated, there was the possibility
of physical access to each other considering their proximity to each other
and considering further that respondent still visited and recuperated in
her mother's house in Samal where her spouse resided with her children.
Moreover, Crispin Anahaw did not have any serious illness or any illness
whatsoever which would have rendered him incapable of having sexual act
with his wife. No substantial evidence whatsoever was brought out to
negate the aforestated facts.

Crispin Anahaw served as a refuge after respondent's reckless and

immoral pursuits or a "buffer" after her flings. And she deliberately did
not include nor present her husband in this case because she could not
risk her scheme. She had to be certain that such scheme to bastardize her
own son for her selfish motives would not be thwarted.

This Court finds no other recourse except to deny respondent's claim to

declare her son Rolando the illegitimate child of petitioner. From all
indications, respondent has paraded herself as a woman of highly
questionable character. A married woman who, on first meeting, rides
with a total stranger who is married towards nightfall, sleeps in his house
in the presence of his children, then lives with him after their initial sexual
contact — the atmosphere for which she herself provided — is patently

People of the Philippines vs. Bienvenido Dela Cruz
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 135022            July 11, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
BIENVENIDO DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
A man descends into the depths of human debasement when he inflicts his
lechery upon a minor, and all the more when he imposes such
lasciviousness upon a woman whose capacity to give consent to a sexual
union is diminished, if not totally lacking. Such is the case of Jonalyn
Yumang (hereafter JONALYN).
Upon a complaint1 dated 5 July 1996 signed by JONALYN with the
assistance of her aunt Carmelita Borja, two informations were filed by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, charging Bienvenido Dela Cruz (hereafter
BIENVENIDO) with rape allegedly committed on 3 and 4 July 1996. The
informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 1274-M-96 and 1275-
M-96. The accusatory portion of the information docketed as Criminal
Case No. 1275-M-96, which is the subject of this appellate review, reads:
That on or about the 3 rd day of July 1996, in the Municipality of
Calumpit, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
[Bienvenido dela Cruz @ Jun] did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with lewd design have carnal
knowledge of one Jonalyn Yumang y Banag, a mentally deficient
female person, against her will and without her consent.
Contrary to law.2
Upon arraignment on 14 October 1996, BIENVENIDO entered a plea of
not guilty.3 The cases were consolidated, and joint trial on the merits
ensued thereafter.
When JONALYN was presented as its first witness, the prosecution sought
to obtain from the trial court an order for the conduct of a psychiatric
examination on her person to determine her mental and psychological
capability to testify in court. The purpose was that should her mental
capacity be found to be below normal, the prosecution could propound
leading questions to JONALYN. The defense, through Atty. Jesus M.
Pamintuan, vigorously opposed the prosecution's manifestation.
Nonetheless, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to conduct direct
examination on JONALYN so that if in its perception she would appear to
be suffering from mental deficiency, the prosecutor could be permitted to
ask leading questions. JONALYN was then made to identify her signature
in her sworn statement and to identify the accused, and was asked about
her personal circumstances. Thereafter, noticing that JONALYN had
difficulty in expressing herself, the trial court decided to suspend the
proceedings to give the prosecution sufficient time to confer with her. 4
At the next hearing, the trial court allowed the prosecution to put on the
witness stand Dr. Cecilia Tuazon, Medical Officer III of the National
Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City. Dr. Tuazon testified that she
conducted a psychiatric examination on JONALYN on 12 July 1996. She
found that JONALYN was suffering from a moderate level of mental
retardation and that although chronologically the latter was already 20
years of age (at the time of the examination), she had the mental age of an
8½-year-old child under the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Dr.
Tuazon also found that JONALYN could have attained a higher degree of
intelligence if not for the fact that she was unschooled and no proper
motivation was employed on her, and that she had the capacity to make
her perception known to others. She, however, observed that she had to
"prompt" JONALYN most of the time to elicit information on the sexual
harassment incident. She then narrated that JONALYN was able to relate
to her that she (JONALYN) was approached by a tall man named Jun-Jun
who led her to a house that supposedly belonged to her cousin, and that
Jun-Jun disrobed JONALYN and raped her twice. 5
After said testimony or on 11 March 1997, the trial court issued an
order6allowing leading questions to be propounded to JONALYN in
accordance with Section 10(c), Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence. 7 Thus,
JONALYN took the witness stand. She again identified her signature and
that of her aunt on her Sinumpaang Salaysay. She also identified
BIENVENIDO as the person against whom she filed a complaint for rape.
She declared in open court that BIENVENIDO raped her twice inside the
house of a certain Mhel located at Barangay Gatbuca, Calumpit, Bulacan.
She stated that BIENVENIDO placed himself on top of her and inserted
his private part into her womanhood.8
Dr. Edgardo Gueco, Chief and Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, testified that
he examined JONALYN on 8 July 1996, and the results of the examination
were indicated in his Medico-Legal Report. 9 He found that she was in "a
non-virgin state physically," as her hymen bore deep fresh and healing
lacerations at 3, 8 and 11 o'clock positions. He then opined that the
hymenal lacerations were sustained a week before the examination and,
therefore, compatible with the time the rapes were allegedly committed. 10
Carmelita Borja, aunt of JONALYN, testified that on 5 July 1996, she
accompanied JONALYN to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Office in
Calumpit, Bulacan, to lodge a complaint against BIENVENIDO. With
them were JONALYN's mother Conchita Yuson and Barangay Councilman
Roberto Dungo. Carmelita testified that in instituting this case, their
family incurred expenses amounting to P30,000.11
After the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its exhibits, the
defense filed a motion for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence,
which was granted. Thus, the defense filed on 5 December 1997 a
Demurrer to Evidence12 on the following grounds:
(a) That the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
cases; and
(b) The presumption of accused's innocence had not even [sic]
been overcome by the prosecution due to the insufficiency of its
evidence.
Expounding its theory, the defense first admitted that it could have moved
to quash the information but it did not because the complaint on which
the information was based was on its face valid, it having been signed by
JONALYN as the offended party. However, the undeniable truth is that
JONALYN had no capacity to sign the same considering her mental
deficiency or abnormality. The assistance extended to JONALYN by her
aunt Carmelita Borja did not cure the defect, as the enumeration in Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code of the persons who could file a complaint
for rape is exclusive and successive and the mother of JONALYN was still
very much alive.
The defense also insisted on assailing the competency of JONALYN as a
witness. It claimed that JONALYN's testimony, considering her mental
state, was coached and rehearsed. Worse, she was not only asked leading
questions but was fed legal and factual conclusions which she was made to
admit as her own when they were in fact those of the prosecution.
In its Order of 26 January 1998, 13 the trial court denied the Demurrer to
Evidence and set the dates for the presentation of the evidence for the
defense. However, BIENVENIDO filed a Motion for Judgment, stating in
part as follows:
[A]fter going over the Records … and carefully analyzing the
proceedings … as well as meticulously evaluating the evidence
presented and offered [by] the private complainant, in
consultation with his parents, and assisted by undersigned
counsel, [he] had decided to submit … the …cases for judgment
without the need of presenting any evidence to explain his terse
PLEA OF NOT GUILTY to the charges upon his arraignment. 14
Noting this new development, the trial court, in its Order of 17 February
1998, considered the case submitted for decision. 15
In its Joint Decision of 3 April 1998, 16 the trial court convicted
BIENVENIDO of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96, but
acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96 for insufficiency of
evidence. While conceding that JONALYN's narration of how she was
sexually abused by BIENVENIDO was not "detailed," the trial court,
nonetheless, concluded that it was candidly related by one who had the
mental age of an 8-year-old child. The trial court was convinced that
JONALYN was able to show in her "own peculiar way" that she was indeed
raped by BIENVENIDO on 3 July 1996. Finally, the trial court ruled that
BIENVENIDO's culpability was further bolstered by his choice not to offer
any evidence for his defense despite ample opportunity to do so.
Accordingly, it sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetuaand to pay JONALYN the amount of P60,000 by way of civil
indemnity.
In his Appellant's Brief,17 BIENVENIDO asserts that the trial court
committed the following errors:
1. ... in having taken the fatally defective criminal complaint for a
valid conferment upon it of jurisdiction to try and dispose of said
two (2) charges of rape.
2. ... in having accepted as competent the mentally deficient
private complainant even without first requiring any evidence of
her capacity as such a witness.
3. ... in having considered the narration read to the complaining
witness from prepared statements and asked of her simply to
confirm as true, as her own.
4. ... in having given full credence and weight to complainant's
conclusions of facts merely put to her mouth by leading
questions of the prosecutor.
5. ... in having convicted the accused-appellant in Criminal Case
No. 1275-M-96, but acquitting in Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96,
on the basis of private complainant's purported sworn versions
supposedly given in both charges.
BIENVENIDO reiterates the issues he raised in his Demurrer to Evidence.
He assails the competency of JONALYN as signatory to the complaint she
filed. He adds that the defect in the complaint was not cured by his failure
to interpose a motion to quash nor by the assistance lent by JONALYN's
aunt, which contravened Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
Consequently, BIENVENIDO asserts that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to try the case.
BIENVENIDO also stresses the incompetency of JONALYN as a trial
witness for the reason that the prosecution failed to prove her competency.
Further, JONALYN was merely asked to affirm the legal and factual
conclusions of the prosecution which evinced quite clearly the girl's lack of
comprehension of the court proceedings and the nature of her oath.
Besides, her statements concerning the alleged sexual penetration were
elicited a month after her initial offer as a witness, which reinforces the
rehearsed and coached nature of her testimony.
Finally, he wonders why he was convicted in Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96
but acquitted in Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96 when it was a joint trial and
the evidence was the same. He insists that he should also be acquitted in
the case at bar.
In the Appellee's Brief,18 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters
that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case, since the complaint and
information filed were valid. JONALYN's mental retardation does not
render her incompetent for initiating the prosecution of the crime
committed against her and for testifying in court. If minors are allowed
not only to initiate the prosecution of offenses under Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, but also to testify under the Rules on Evidence, JONALYN,
who had the mentality of an 8-year-old child, was competent to sign the
criminal complaint and to be a witness in court. JONALYN's competency
as a court witness was aptly proved when she was able to answer the
leading questions asked of her as allowed by Section 10(c), Rule 132 of the
Rules on Evidence. Moreover, the OSG asseverates that JONALYN's
testimony on the fact of rape is corroborated by medical and physical
evidence. As to BIENVENIDO's quandary that he should be acquitted also
in this case, it is convinced that he should have been convicted for two
counts of rape, as JONALYN expressly testified that she was raped twice
by BIENVENIDO. Finally, the OSG seeks an award of moral damages in
the amount of P50,000 for JONALYN, as well as a reduction of the award
of civil indemnity to P50,000 in conformity with current jurisprudence.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I. Validity of the Complaint for Rape
We agree with the disputation of the OSG that the trial court validly took
cognizance of the complaint filed by JONALYN. The pertinent laws
existing at the time the crimes were committed were Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code (prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 8353 19 otherwise
known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997," which took effect on 22 October
199720) and Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. -- …
… Dr. Tuazon. The finding of the trial court, as supported by the testimony of
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be.
Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions.—All criminal
actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.
However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts when there is no fiscal available, the offended party, any
peace officer or public officer charged with the enforcement of
the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority ceases
upon actual intervention of the fiscal or upon elevation of the
case to the Regional Trial Court.
…
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. In
case the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she
could file the complaint and has no known parents,
grandparents, or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal
action in her behalf.
The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to
initiate the prosecution for the above offenses, independently of
her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is
incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than
her minority. Where the offended party who is a minor fails to
file the complaint, her parents, grandparents or guardian may
file the same. The right to file the action granted to the parents,
grandparents or guardians shall be exclusive of all other persons
and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided,
except as stated in the immediately preceding paragraph.
A complaint of the offended party or her relatives is required in crimes
against chastity out of consideration for the offended woman and her
family, who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through with the scandal of a public trial. The law deems it the wiser
policy to let the aggrieved woman and her family decide whether to expose
to public view or to heated controversies in court the vices, fault, and
disgraceful acts occurring in the family. 21
It has been held that "[w]hen it is said that the requirement in Article 344
(that there shall be a complaint of the offended party or her relatives) is
jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the
prosecutory proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction
on the court to try the case. The court's jurisdiction is vested in it by the
Judiciary Law."22
The complaint in the instant case has complied with the requirement
under the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
vest upon JONALYN, as the offended party, the right to institute the
criminal action. As signed by JONALYN, the complaint started the
prosecutory proceeding. The assistance of JONALYN's aunt, or even of her
mother, was a superfluity. JONALYN's signature alone suffices to validate
the complaint.
We agree with the OSG that if a minor under the Rules of Court can file a
complaint for rape independently of her parents, JONALYN, then 20 years
of age who was found to have the mentality of an 8-year-old girl, could
likewise file the complaint independently of her relatives. Her complaint
can be rightfully considered filed by a minor.
The overriding intention of BIENVENIDO is to challenge the validity of
the complaint by assailing the competency of JONALYN to file the
complaint. But even he admits in his Demurrer to Evidence that the
complaint is proper and valid on its face for which reason he did not move
to quash the information. Thus, even he admits and recognizes the futility
of his argument.
II. Competence of JONALYN to Testify
The determination of the competence of witnesses to testify rests primarily
with the trial judge who sees them in the witness stand and observes their
behavior or their possession or lack of intelligence, as well as their
understanding of the obligation of an oath. 23
The prosecution has proved JONALYN's competency by the testimony of
Dr. Tuazon that JONALYN had the understanding of an 8-year-old child,
does not obviate the fact of her competency. Its only effect was to consider
her testimony from the point of view of an 8-year-old minor. Even a
mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a
witness.24 JONALYN, who may be considered as a mental retardate but
with the ability to make her perceptions known to others, is a competent
witness under Section 20 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. 25
JONALYN's competency is also better established in the answers she gave
under direct examination relative to the harrowing defilement she suffered
in the hands of BIENVENIDO, thus:
Q         And the nature of your complaint was that you were
abused or you were raped by the herein accused Bienvenido de la
Cruz y Santiago, is that correct?
A         Yes, sir.
...
Q         And do you know in what place where you raped by the
accused, Bienvenido dela Cruz y Santiago?
A         Inside the house, sir.
Q         Whose house?
A         In the house of Mhel, sir.26
… persistent, repetitious and painstaking effort in asking leading questions
Q         How many times were you raped by the herein accused
Bienvenido dela Cruz y Santiago alias Jun Jun?
A         Twice, sir.
Court: Where?
Fiscal: Where?
Witness: On top of the wooden bed, sir.27
Q         You said you were raped twice by the herein accused,
Bienvenido dela Cruz alias Jun-Jun on a "papag" inside the
house of Mhel at Barangay Gatbuca, Calumpit, Bulacan, how did
Jun Jun the herein accused rape[] you?
Court: On the first time?
A         He layed [sic] me to bed, sir.
Q         After you were layed [sic] on the bed what happened next?
A         He went on top of me, sir.28
…
Q         Last time, you stated that the herein accused whom you
called "Jun" laid you on top of a bed and after that, he went on
top of you. My question is, when he went on top of you, what did
he do to you, if any?
A:         Pumaloob sa akin.29
… understand the import of the questions. In the same vein, the
Q         Now, when the accused, which you called "Jun",
pumaloob sa iyo, what did you feel at that time?
A         I felt a hard object, sir.
Q         Now since you said it [was] a hard object, you could now
tell the Court, what that hard object [was]?
… Thus, JONALYN's behavior merely conformed to Dr. Tuazon's clinical and
A         I cannot remember.30
… repetitiously prompted" so that she could answer and recount a terrible
Public Prosecutor: When you said the last time around, you were
asked about, what you mean by "pumaloob siya sa akin" and
then you said that there was a hard object inserted and after
that, the follow-up question was asked on you, you said you
cannot remember, what is that hard object, what do you mean
when you say " I cannot remember? "
Atty. Pamintuan: Leading.
Court: Witness may answer, subject to your objection.
Witness: His private part was inserted in my private part, sir. 31
… Q         Because you understand that this was explained to you, I
Court: But there was an answer a while ago. Witness may
answer.
Witness: Yes, sir.
Public Pros.: And, when you say he did the same to you, he
inserted his penis to your vagina?
A         Yes, sir.
Public Pros.: No further question, Your Honor. 32
III. Credibility of JONALYN as a Witness
The foregoing narrative has established not only JONALYN's competency
but also her credibility. Moreover, considering her feeble mind, she could
not have fabricated or concocted her charge against BIENVENIDO. This
conclusion is strengthened by the fact that no improper motive was shown
by the defense as to why JONALYN would file a case or falsely testify
against BIENVENIDO. A rape victim's testimony as to who abused her is
credible where she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify
against the accused.33 It has been held that no woman, especially one of
tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of
her private parts, and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a public
trial if she is not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished.34
We, therefore, affirm the trial court's decision to lend full credence to the
testimony of JONALYN on the circumstances of the rape, thus:
In so few a word, complainant has made herself clear about the
sexual molestation she suffered in the hands of the accused.
Plain and simple her testimony may have been, unembellished,
as it is, with details, yet, it is in its simplicity that its credence is
enhanced. Certainly, we cannot expect complainant, in her
present state of mind, to come out with a full account of her
misfortune with all its lurid details. That, to this Court, is simply
beyond the reach of her enfeebled mind. She came to talk on her
sad plight from the viewpoint of an 8-year-old child, and she
must, by all means, be understood in that light. 35
Absent any cogent reason warranting a disturbance of the findings of the
trial court on the credibility and competency of JONALYN, this Court has
to give these findings utmost respect, if not complete affirmation. Settled
is the rule that the trial court's evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses is
accorded the highest respect, for it has an untrammeled opportunity to
observe directly the demeanor of witnesses on the stand and, thus, to
determine whether they are telling the truth. 36
IV. Propriety of Propounding Leading Questions to JONALYN
We likewise agree with the trial court's conclusion that JONALYN's
testimony should be taken and understood from the point of view of an 8-
year-old child. JONALYN's testimony is consistent with the
straightforward and innocent testimony of a child. Thus, the prosecution's
was necessary and indispensable in the interest of justice to draw out from
JONALYN's lips the basic details of the grave crime committed against her
by BIENVENIDO.
The trial court did not err in allowing leading questions to be propounded
to JONALYN. It is usual and proper for the court to permit leading
questions in conducting the examination of a witness who is immature;
aged and infirm; in bad physical condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or
unaccustomed to, court proceedings; inexperienced; unsophisticated;
feeble-minded; of sluggish mental equipment; confused and agitated;
terrified; timid or embarrassed while on the stand; lacking in
comprehension of questions asked or slow to understand; deaf and dumb;
or unable to speak or understand the English language or only imperfectly
familiar therewith.37
The leading questions were neither conclusions of facts merely put into
the mouth of JONALYN nor prepared statements which she merely
confirmed as true. The questions were indeed carefully phrased and
sometimes based on her Sinumpaang Salaysay to make JONALYN
prosecution's referral to JONALYN's Sinumpaang Salaysay to refresh her
memory was also reasonable. The purpose of refreshing the recollection of
a witness is to enable both the witness and her present testimony to be put
fairly and in their proper light before the court. 38
expert observation that JONALYN had to be "continuously and
experience. JONALYN's constant eyeball fixature towards her aunt and
mother does not by itself indicate coaching, in the face of a dearth of other
evidentiary bases that the latter did coach her. There was nothing in the
behavior of JONALYN which was indicative of her failure to understand
the import of the trial proceedings. Her identification of BIENVENIDO as
her assailant is quite telling on how simple, yet unassuming, her grasp of
the situation was. Thus:
Stenographer: Reading back the question.
would like to read to you particularly question number 3.
Tanong: Sino naman ang ibig mong idemanda?
Answer: Si Bienvenido dela Cruz y Santiago alias Jun
Jun po.
Was this explain[ed] to you?
Atty. Pamintuan: I stand correct[sic].
Witness: Yes, sir.
Fiscal: (to the witness)
Q         Now, this Bienvenido dela Cruz y Santiago alias Jun Jun,
which was the person whom you are filing the complaint of [sic],
will you kindly look around to this Court and tell us whether or
not he is inside.
A         Yes, sir.
Q         Would you mind to point him?
Interpreter: Witness pointing to a man wearing orange T-shirt
and when asked his name answered Bienvenido dela Cruz. 39
V. Sufficiency of Prosecution's Evidence
It is, therefore, beyond doubt that JONALYN's lone testimony, which was
found to be credible by the trial court, is enough to sustain a
conviction.40 At any rate, medical and physical evidence adequately
corroborated JONALYN's testimony. Time and again we have held that the
laceration of the hymen is a telling, irrefutable and best physical evidence
of forcible defloration.41
On the basis of the foregoing, we agree with the trial court's conviction of
BIENVENIDO under Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96. His acquittal under
Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96 is, at this point, beyond the review powers
of this Court.
Since the information charges BIENVENIDO with simple rape only and no
other modifying circumstances has been proved, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, which is the lesser of the penalties prescribed by Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, was correctly
imposed by the trial court.

We rectify the error of the trial court in granting JONALYN the amount
of P60,000 as civil indemnity. In conformity with current jurisprudence,
we hereby reduce it to P50,000.42 An award of moral damages in the
amount of P50,000 is also just under the circumstances. 43

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,

Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96 finding accused-
appellant BIENVENIDO DELA CRUZ guilty of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-appellant is
ordered to pay the victim JONALYN YUMANG civil indemnity in the
reduced amount of P50,000 and moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.