In the case of Aswini Kumar v.

Arabinda Bose (AIR 1952 SC 369), the above observation was

made.

The aid used by the court while interpreting the legal provision is the “Long Title” which
is an Internal Aid.

A statue is headed by a long title whose purpose is given a general description about
the object of the Act. Normally, it begins with words an Act to….. For instance, the long
title of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 says: An Act to consolidate and amend
the law relating to the criminal procedure, and that of the Prevention of the Corruption
Act, 1988 says: ‘An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention of
corruption and for matters connected therewith.’

In the olden days, the long title was not considered a part of the statue and was,
therefore, not consider an aid while interpreting it. There has been a change in the
thinking od the Courts in the recent times and there are numerous occasions whem
help has been taken from the long title to interpret certain provisions of the stature but
only to the extent of removing confusions and ambiguities. If the words in the statue
are unambiguous, no help is derived from the long title.Long Title of an Act is a part of the
Act and is admissible as an aid to its construction. The long title which often precedes the
preamble must be distinguished with the short title.

In Fisher v. Raven [1964 AC 210 (HL)], interpretation of the words ‘obtained credit’ in Section
13(1) of the Debtor’s Act, 1869 was involved. The House of Lords looked at the long title of the
Act which reads ‘An Act for the Abolition of Imprisonment for debt, for the punishment of
fraudulent debtors, and for other purposes’ and held that the words refer to credit for the
payment of money.

The principle of interpretation was applied by court in this case is the Mischief Rule.

The Mischief rule of interpretation originated in Heydon’s Case, in 1584. In this case, the
Barons of the Exchequer resolved “that for the sure and true interpretation of the statues in
general for things are to be discerned and considered;

1. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.
3. What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
Commonwealth.
4. The true reason of the remedy;
and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress
the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasion for
continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure
and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico’

This principle is also known as the rule of purposive construction.

It has been said in Macmillan v. Dent (1907 1 Ch. 107), that in interpretation an Act of
Parliament you are entitled, and in many cases bound, to look to the state of the law at the
date of the passing of the Act, not only to the common law but the law as it then stood under
previous statutes, in order to properly interpret the statute in question, Thus, the mischief
rule as it was originally laid down has now been modified to the extent that not only the
common law but also the statute law prior to the Act being interpreted needs to be looked
into. So basically, the Mischief Rule is a certain rule that judges can apply in statutory
interpretation in order to discover Parliament’s intention. The application of this rule gives
the judge more discretion than the literal and the golden rule as it allows him to effectively
decide on Parliament’s intent. It can be argued that this undermines Parliament’s supremacy
and is undemocratic as it takes law-making decisions away from the legislature. Legislative
intent is determined by examining secondary sources, such as committee reports, treatises,
law review articles and corresponding statutes.