Lecture Il

NTERPRETATION OF STATUTESAND
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES

Synopsis
Introduction 14
1.

2. Interpretation 15
3. Construction 18
4. Differencebetween Interpretation and Construction 18
1. INTRODUCTION:
Thelegislation is the primary source of law. It consists of Act
delegated legislation or subordinate legislation. 1Legislation
orstatutes,
isthelayingdown of-rules by a sovereign or subordinate legislator. 2
It maytakeany of the following forms: Statute, Constitutions, Treaties,
Interstate
Compacts, Municipal Compacts and Ordinances.3 The
statuteis the edict of the legislature.4 It means an act of the
legislature
is declaring, commanding, or pröhibiting something; a
particular
law enacted and established by the will of the legislative
department
of government; the written will of the legislature solemnly
expressed
according to the forms necessary to constitute it the law
ofthestates. A governing body enacts Statutes for the purpose of
regulating
behaviour and conduct.
1.
M.ETandoon, Jurisprudence (Legal Theory), 179 (Reprint, 2016).
2.
P J Fitzgerald, Salmond on
3. Jursiprudence, 115 (•12thed., 2012).
M.p.Tandoon, Jurisprudence
4. (Legal Theory), 181 (Reprint, 2016).
u Dharmendra Textile Processors (2008) 13 SCC 369, 391; Vishnu
PratapSugar
AIR
WorksPvt Ltd v. Chief Inspector of Stamps Uttar Pradesh
1968 SC 102.
HenryCampbell Black,
M. A. , Black "s Law Dictionary, 1581-1582 (4th
RevisedEd., 1968), See also Federal Trust Co. v. East Hartford Fire
CC-A. 478,
196N.Y.s. Conn., 283 F. 95, 98; In re van TasselFs Will, 119 Misc.
491,494.

14
 Interpretation of Statutes
Lcc.lll and Construction of Statutes 15
Judiciary is an organ of the Government set up for the purpose
of deciding disputes under a law which is already pre-ekisting. l It
can be.said that the Courts play a vital role in deciding law even
though at their core duty is to apply the law and resolve the disputes.
Legislature while making law, makes the law in a broad sense and
for the future. Whereas the Courts apply the laws to the cases before
them and they are concerned only to the scope, such disputed point
in the issue of such cases allows them to be. It is not the letter that
contains the spirit of the law but the essence.A judge must resort
to do so and create new law, as Edgar Bodenheimer says, only when
the existing sources of the law fail to guide him or when a precedent
becomes obsolete, and it has to be abrogated.2
Justice Cardozo has suggested that where a statute is uncertain
statutoi-yconstruction becomes a trulyjudiciary function. It is the
job of the-legislature to make laws, and the function of the courts
is to declare the law. Lawmaking is not an exact science. The
boundaries of the legislative and judicial functions overlap, even
though the branches have functions that are distinct at their core 3.
Legislature, while framing laws cannot anticipateevery possible legal
problem that might arise in future. Also, it cannot do justice to the
unique case after they have arisen. In this situation where the Courts
step in.
2. INTERPRETATION:
Interpretation is a word derived from the Latin word
"interpretarü' which means to explain, expound and understand.
The general meaning of the word interpretåtion give meanino
to" particular subject matter. Accordingto Black's law dictionary,
fie word "Interpretation" means the art or process of discovering
and expounding the meaning of a statute, will, contract, or other
1. Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence,The Philosophy and Method of
the Law, 326 (1962).
2. Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence,The Philosophyand Method of
the Law, 327 (1962).
3. Wallace Mendelson, Mr. Justice Frankfurteron the Constructionof
Statutes, Vol.43, Issue 4 (California Law Review), 652, 652 (1955).
 Statutes [Lec.ll
16 Lectureson Interpretation of
Accordingto Salmond, where he has defined it
written documenti. to ascertain the
seek
as "the process by which the Courtsmedium of authoritative
meaning of the Legislaturethrough the
"2
forms in which it is expressed.
for all the instances
The legislatorcannotprovide specifically
act for. This must be
within the realm of the purpose he makes the
are to be filled
made good by thejudge.3 The gaps in the legislation
which is the duty
up by the decisionsofcourts4 by interpreting them
the will of
of the judges 5. A judge must enforCe the law whatever
whims and
the legislature has aimedat andfiot according to his own
words of
fancies. At the same time, he must not blindly follow the
of such
the legislature but try to understand the underlying purpose
will of the legislature.61nother words, the judge has to interpret a
statute by showingwhatprecisely the parliament has intended and
in its connection give meaning to a disputed point of an issue in it.
Interpretation is generally of two kinds literal and fupctional.
Literal interpretationfocuses on the verbal expression of the legislation,
i.e. litera legis whereasthe functional interpretation, also known as
1. Supra note 5 at 954; People v. Com 'rs of Taxes, 95 N.Y. 559; Rome v.
Knox, 14 How. Prac.,N.Y.,272; Ming v. Pratt, 22 Mont. 262, 56 279;
Tallman v. Tallmam3 Misc. 465, 23 N.Y.S. 734.
2. P J Fitzgerald, Salmond on Jurisprudence, 133 (12th ed., 2012).
3. WallaceMendelson,Mr. Justice Frankfurter on the Constructionof
Statutes, Vol.43,Issue 4 (California Law Review), 652, 652 (1955).
4. BenjaminN. Cardozo,LL.D., The Nature of the Judicial Process, 113
(1st ed., 1921);Gray,John Chipman, The Nature and Sources of the
Law, 121, 171-72(2nd ed., .1921);Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the
Common Law, i 72 (1921). See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205, 221 (1917)(Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting); Commissioner v.
Beck's Estate, 129F.2d243, 245 (2d Cir. 1942) (opinion by Judge Frank).
For recent discussionof the problem, see Fred V. Cahill, Judicial
Legislation: A Studyin American Legal Theory ( 1952) (recognizing the
existence ofjudicial legislation but questioning whether it is consistent
with popular government).
5. Sumtibai v.Paras Finance co, AIR 2007 SC 3166.
6. Irving Dilliard,ne spirit OfLibeny, 109 (1st ed., 1952).
 Interpretation of Statutes
Lec.lll and Construction of Statutes
the logical interpretationfocuses on sentential
legis.l No
courts have to apply the law given by the
legiélationliterate
i.e. letter of the legislation since it expresses
the sententiaor 3
legis, i.e. the intention of the legislature. The
courtsare
liberty to go beyond the plain meaning of the es
statute
of such statute clearly express the intent of the
legislature e
At the same time, it should be understood that
the CourtshqÅ the
not read something which is not there. There should
be nointapretabånci
of a statute on the assumption that the legislature
mighthavefean
a vacuum in case of clear and unambiguous nature of its
language.
The duty of the judges & courts is to-declare the law
and
make it. The same principle was derived from the maximnot
Judicouli
est jus dicerenon dare.3It should be assumed by the Courts
thied
no mistake was made by the legislature while makinga statuteal!0ft
proceed accordingly.4 The rules of interpretation are nottherulJan
of law. They are not to be applied as if they are'enacted
byth}te
legislature.5 en
In, Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.v. LV.ÅP
Dixitulu and Ors.,6 it has been held that, "the •primary
principl
of interpretation is that a constitutional or statutoryprovisi(ß
should be construed 'according to the intent of theythatmad t
it' (Coke), and normally,such intent is gathered from thelanguagqti
of the provision."

1. Dr Avtar Singh and Dr Harpreet Kaur, Introduction to Jurisprudencean

211 (4th ed., 2013).
2. Surendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of U. P. throughSecreta
Education, U. R, Lucknow 2007 (6) AWC 6229.
3. Supreme Courts Advocates on Record Association and Ors. v. Unio
1.
oflndia AIR 1994 SC 268.
4. Dadi Jagannadham v.Jammulu Ramulu and others AIR 2001SC2690
5. Superintendent and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, WestBengal
Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1967 SC 99.
6. (1979) scc 34.
 Lectureson Interpretation of Statutes [Lec.ll
8
CONSTRUCTION:
words"interpretation' and 'construction' are used in the
The Interpretation means the art Of finding out the
generally.
amesense enactment by giving the words their natural and
e of
whereas Construction means drawing conclusions
meaning
rdinalY u-uespirit of the enactment.l It is the well-settled
basis
thre of the
interpretation of Statute that construction should be
rincipleof to make the statute workable and not make it
eaningful
so as
dlé.2
According to Dr. Patrick Oevlin: "A better word, I think,
ouldbeconstruction,because construction, although one often
with interpretation, suggests that something
Iseå italternatively
oreis beinggot out in the elucidation of the subject matter
hancanbegot by a strict interpretation of the words used. In
the fullsenseof the word 'construction', the judges have set
themselvesin this branch of the law to try to frame the law as
the wouldlike to have it" . 3
] 4. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTERPRETATION
ANDCONSTRUCTION:
Interpretation Construction
t IStheprocessof ascertaining It is the process of the translating
h realmeaningof the words the meaning of-the words (used
tsedinthestatute. in the statute) into legal rules.
nterpretation
aims at removing Construction aims. at remoVing
mbiguity.
vagueness

Thomas
M. Cooley, LL.D., Constitutional Limitations, 91 (1871).
SriKaramat
ALR598;
Ullah v. District Judge, Kanpur and others, 2000 (39)
2000 (3) AWC 1900; oOOO(2) RCR (Rent) 546.
Wharton'sConcise Law Dictionary, 551 (Dr. Justice AR Lakshmanan,
15th
ed.•Reprint, 2011).
 Interpretation of Statutes
Lcc.lll and Construction of Statutes 19
Interpretation Construction
Interpretation is the process of Construction aims at
understanding the linguistic understanding the legal effect of
meaning of the words used in such words.l
the legislation
Interpretation is the activity of Constructionis the activity of
identifying the semantic meaning applyingthat meaning to particular
of a particular use of language factualcircumstances.2
in context.

1. Fashion Fabrics of Iowa v. Retail Investors Annotate, 266 N.W.2d 22

(1978).
2. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretationand Construction, Vol. 34 (Harvard
Journal of Law & Public Policy) 65, 66 (2011).
 Lecture Ill
CLASSIFICATION OF STATUTES

Synopsis
20
1. Introduction
21
2. Classification of Statutes
21
3. Classification with reference to duration
4. Classification with reference to Mode 22
5. Classification with reference to object 23
6. Classification with reference to the extent of application ... 30
7. Directory and Mandatory (Methods of interpreting
"may" and "shall") 30
8. Difference between Directory and Mandatory Statutes 31
9. Conjunctive and Disjunctive (Methods of Interpreting
"and" and "or") 38
1. INTRODUCTION:
Before classification of Statutes, one should know the meanino
of term 'statute'. The statute is nothing but an Act passed by the
legislature. A statute is a formal expressionof the legislature in
writing that governs a country or state. Usually, statutes are made
for the pumose of issuing a cotmnancl to do something, to Prohibit
something or to declare a policy. According to Black's law dictionary,
a Statute is an act of the legislature; a particular law enacted and
established by the will of the legislative department of government,
expressed with the requisite formalities!.
I)ujing the British era from 1600-1947A.D, the statutes
were
made in the form of chaners. For exaunple, East India Company
was
established under the Charter of 1600 issued by the crown
3 Istl)ecember, 1600. Similarly, Inany charters were issued on
for the
J. Jlenjy Canopbell Black, M. A., (Black's Law Dictionaty,
1581 (4th Revised
JUL, 1968).

20
 Classification of Statutes
establishment of the Bombay Presidency Act, SupremeCoun
Since 1947, the parliament of India passed many acts. Tilldate,
unionActs are prevailing in India.
2. CLASSIFICATION OF STATUTES:
Classification of Statutes is generally based on reference
duration,method, object, and extent of application.
.20 3. CLASSIFICATION WITH REFERENCE
21 DURATION 1.
21 2.
This classification is divided into two types they are(l.
22 Temporary Statute (ii) Permanent or perpetual statutes.
(i) Temporary Statute
:ation...30 A temporary statute means a statute passed for a particula
period or specific purpose or restricted to a short period. The A
itself specifies the validity or period of operation. If the legislatur
utes 31 desires to increase or decrease validation of an Act, then it cand
ing so through a new statute.
38 Example of temporary statutes is FinanceAct. This Act i
active for only one year, and it is to be passedevery year.
he meanin g In S. Krishnan v. the State of Madras,1the SupremeCourt
ssedby the held that "it is a general rule, with regard to a temporarystatute,
{islature in that in the absence of special provision to the contrary proceedings
are made which are being taken against a person under it, will ipsofacto
to prohibit terminateas soon as the statute expires.
dictionary, (ii).Permanent or perpetual statutes
nacted and
overnment, A permanent or perpetual statute is one in respect of time-
period. In perpetual or permanent statutes no specified time-period
is fixed, but this does not make the statute unchangeable; this statute
atuteswere continuesto be in force until unless repealedor replaced by new
mpany was Act. Even some of the provisions are added or deleted or omitted
crown on by the legislature the enactment will be in force until unless the same
ued for the was replaced with a new enactment. For an Illustration, Freedom
(4th Revised
1. AIR 1951SC301.
 on
of
2002 by
2005. "Vlw•ve
ave ennetjnentN panned
svhiel) ave still operative. Illustrations,
1872; Indian "VibeIndian
Acc. Nep.oqinble
1881 of 1882

In the case of Madurai District Central

Co-operativeIjank
„td.v. The Thinl Incotne Tax Officer, Maduraij (Ise
Supreme Court
vadheld that Incotne-tax Act is a permanent statute.
4. CLASSIFICATION WITLI REFERENCE,
METIIOD To
This classification"vas divided into two types they are
Mandaury.
imperativeor obligatory Statute and Directory or permissive
%tatute.
(i) Mandatory, imperative or obligatory Statute
A mandatory statute is one, which compels performanceof
cenain things or compels that a certain thing must be completedin
a prescribedform or manner as compulsory. In other words.a
mandatorystatute which insists to complete certain thingsin a
specifiedmanner and strict compliance with it. Whenever any B'tson/
personsit may be Natural Person or Artifical not compliedwith
mandatoryprovisions will have.penal consequences.
(ii) Directory or permissive statutes
Directory or Permissive statues merely directs or permitsa
thingto be done without compelling its performance. Whenever any
person/persons not-complied with directory or permissive provisions.
it doesn'tprovide any cause of action or ground of challenge.
Differencebetween Mandatory and Directory Statutes
Sutherland on Statutory Construction2 explained the differerwe
betweenmandatory and directory statutes is one of effect
questiongenerally arises in a case involving a determination of rights

AIR 1975 SC 2016.

JCl.Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, 77 (3rd ed., 1943).
 .111
Classification •or Statutes 23
ition
19th as affected by the violation of, or omission to•adhcre to, statutory
directions. This determinationinvolves a decision of whether or not
the violation or omission is such as to render invalid acts or proceedings
pursuant to the statute, or rights, powers, privileges or immunities
clairned thereunder. It the violation or omission is invalidating, the
statute is mandatory; if not, it is a directory." Crawford on Statutory
Constructioni also opined on the same lines and which is quoted: So
rt a tnandatory statutemay be defined as one whose provisions or
requirements, if not complied with, will render the proceedings to
which it relates illegal and void, while a directory statute is one where
non-cornpliance will not invalidate thenroceedings to which it relates.
5. CLASSIFICATIONWITH REFERENCE TO
OBJECT
This classificationwith reference to an object of the statute
as follows,
(i) Codifying Statute
(ii) Consolidating Statute
(iii) Declaratory Statute
(iv) Remedial Statute
(v) Enabling Statute
(vi) Disabling Statute
(vii) Penal Statute
(viii) Taxing Statute
(ix) Explanatory Statute
(x) Amending Statute
(xi) Repealing Statute
(xii) Curative or ValidatingStatute
(i) Codifying statute
A codifying statute is one which codifies the law, or in other
words, which imply to state exhaustively the entire law upon a
l. Crawford, Constructionof Statutes, 104 (1940).
 Statutes (Lec.IIJ
24 Lectures on Interpretationof
subject. The codc contains the pre-existing
patticular/spccific common
subject as well as the
provisions in different statutes on the
law on it.
.For example,
England is an Act to
The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 in Cheques
codify the law concerningto Bills of Exchange,
and Promissory Notes.
statute as
The Hindu SuccessionAct, 1956 is a codifying
for intestate successioryamongHindus.
The reason for codifying statute is to present an orderly and
authoritative statement of the leadingrules of law on a given subject1
whether those rules are to be found in statute law or common law.
(ii) Consolidating statute
A consolidating statute is one which combines/unites the law
on a specific subject at one place. It gathers all statutory enactments
on a particular subject and gives them the shape of one statute with
minor amendments, if necessary.
For example,
In England, the Law of Ihoperty Act, 1925 which combined
the Acts of 1922 and 1924(Act No. 2 of 1974) is a
consol idating Act.
In Australia, the New South Wales Justices Act, 1902 is
a consol idating Act.
In India, the Code ofCivil Ihocedtue, 1908 is a consolidating
statute relating to civil procedure,
In India, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is a
cognbining statute relating to criminal procedure.
'Che gnotivation behind a consolidating Act is to present the
whole body of statutory law on a subject in a complete fortn repealing
the prior Acts. Ilowevec, a consolidatingAct need not be a mere
cognpilation of prior statutes.
l, Coujlenay libeyt, lægisiauve Methods ami Poons, 128 ( 1901 i.
111 Classification of Statutes
Lectures on
(iii) Declaratory statute 6
non Remedial stati
A declaratory statute is a statute to remove doubts eithq (iv) statuteis
the common law; or the-statutory law. The passing Ofa declara remedial fundan
statute becomes desirable when cerfain words The
on latis conferred.
improvements
ct to statutes are being misconstrued. ake and
Aues redress of wrongs
This may happen, for instance, where the courts havebe Recently,another
interpreting a specific expression as indicating/signifying a particullegislation, is being pref
te as meaning which the legislaturefeels are a wrong view/ ideaofustatutes are the Materi
phrase. In such a case, the law making body may pass a declarat co'mpensationAct'
and statute declaring the right meaning of that phrase thereby setting many remedit
rest the controversy about the correct In
bject expressi have been used pron
awe 1 The mere use of the expression"it is hereby declared" doesn peopleincludin±
really make the statute a declaratorystatute. Generally, a declaratorSome expanding a.
statute contains a preamble, and also the word declared as well
e law en the narrow co
the word "enacted". existing common
nents
with The principle of such an Act is to remove doubts with reg all enactments in
to the meaning of the existing law or to rectify an interpretationwhif promoting the gener
the legislature thinks is wrong. Such a statute does not create real are more responsiv
substantive rights; it simplydeclaresthe law as it is and as it moreimmediatean
Ibined- been at the time when the Act came into force. airectly to achiev€
) is a construction,and
A declaratory Act has a retrospective operation but alread\dundividuals
for
decided matters under the Act can't be revived. If, however, durin'
902 is the pendency of an appeal, a declaratoryAct is passed, the appe& (v) Enablin
will be decided on the basis of such Act. An enablin:
idating For example, where it is narro
not be otherwise
In England, the Freshwater Fisheries Act, 1886 and thc enables somethi
73 is a
Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878 are examples necessaryrecom
declaratory statutes. for carrying out
ent the
In India, the Finance Act, 1987 amending the definition01 For examF
pealing
a mere "Owner of house property" in Section 27 and the Incom% Act for the
Tax (Amendment) Act, 1985 which added Explanation essential. Sucl
to Section 40 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 are declarat0rY
purpos€
Acts. of enumerate
(
 Statutes (Lcc.lll
on Interpretation of
2

26 statute
• Rcrncdial whereby new favour or a new remedy
is one
ither .dialstatute
r•cr1W question of passing such a statute is
The fundamental
at
confe11V
provementsin the enforcement of one's rights or for
is .efill mistakes in the preceding
andremove defects or
expres
another synonymous
Recently, prefer@d by numerous. Illustrations of remedial
law: is being
tic legislation, Act, 1961 and the Workmen's
the Maternity Benefits
statutesare Act, 1923.
Sato compensation
Ing InmanyremedialActs the Words "for remedy/ cure whereof'
Sio have been usedpromptly before the language of the enactment.
Blackstone hold the view that remedial statutes
including
people
some as restraining. The Acts could be expanded
as well
couldbeexpanding
law was widened or restraining when
whenthenarrowcommon
commonlaw right was cut down. It is probably evident that
existing
in a welfareState are enacted with the object of
allenactments
thegeneralwelfare. However, certain kinds of enactments
promoting
aremoreresponsiveto some urgent social demands and also have
la moremmediate and visible impact on social vices by operating more
toachievesocial changes. A remedial statute gets liberal
directly
construction,
and uncertainty/ doubt is resolved in favour of the
individuals
forwhosebenefit the statute is enacted.
al (v)Enabling statute
Anenablingstatute is o_newhich enlarges the common law
whereitisnarrow.It makes doing something lawful which would
notbeotherwiselaWful.By an enabling Act, the law making body
fnables
somethingto be done. It enables at the same time, by the
necessmyrecommendationto do the compulsory/ indispensable things
orcarrying
outthe objective of the legislation.
Forexample,The
ctforthe conditions which have been put by an enabling
publicgood must be
essential.
Such complied with as they are basic/
outth a statute grants
power to make rules etc. to carry
•lof epurposesOfthe Act and
enumerated '.zaeserules may provide for a number
mattersin particular
of the foregoing and without prejudice to the
provision. Sections 49-A (1) and 49-
 Classification of' Statutes 27
A (2) of the Advocates Act, 1961 as ajncndcd by Act 21 of 1964
is an illustration oc this kind.
(vi) Disabling statute
A disabling statute is onc which confines or restricts or cuts
down a right conferred by the common law. An Act limiting a
common law right is a disabling Act.
(vii) Penal statute
A penal statute is one which punishes certain acts or wrongs.
Such a statute may be in the form of a complete criminal code or
a large number of sections providing punishments for various wrongs.
Examples of penal statutes are the Indian Penal Code, Arms
Act, 1959, The Prevention .of Terrorism Act 2015, Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act, 1954 etc.
The punishment for the disobedience of the law may be in the
form of fine, forfeiture of property, imprisonment and even death.
Where obedience to law is enforced not by an individual action but
by a command of the law in the form of punishment, the statute is
penal. Punishment can be imposed only when the letter of the law
says so unequivocal, and any uncertainty has to be resolved in favour
of the alleged criminal.
(viii) Taxing statute
A taxing statute is one which imposes taxes on income or
certain other kinds of transaction. It may be in the form of income
tax, wealth tax, sales tax, gifts tax etc. Such a statute aims to collect
revenue of the government. Tax is levied for a public purpose. It
is a source of revenue generation for the State. The money so
collected is used for welfare activities of the public. Tax can be
collected just when a statute clearly so provides by utilising express
dialect to that effect, and any doubt is resolved in favour of the
assesses.
(ix) Explanatory statute
An explanatory statute is one which explains a law. Such a
statute is generally enacted with a view to supply an apparent
 [Lec.lll Lec
28 Lectureson Interpretation of Statutes
omission or to clear the ambiguity as to the meaning of an expression
used in a previous statute.An Acqenacted for the express reason
for Clarifying or clearing up doubts as to the meaning of a preceding
act is an Act of explanationor an explanatory statute.
For example, The Royal Mines Act, 1688 in Britain was passed
to encourage mining certainbase metals while the Royal MinesAct,
1963 was enacted for better clearing up of the prior Act. The latter
is an example of the explanatorystatute.
(x) Amending statute
An amending statute is one which makes an addition to or
works to change the originallaw so as to effect an improvement
therein or to more efficiently carry out the purposes for which the
original law was passed. An amending statute cannot be called a
repealing statute. It is part of the law it amends. def
For example, or
suc
• The Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2017
req
The Indian Institutes of Information Technology
(Amendment) Act, 2017
The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education inc
(Amendment) Act, 2017 va
The Collection of Statistics (Amendment) Act, 2017 co
The Taxation Laws (Amendmeu) Act, 2017 or
so
The Employees Compensation (Amendment) Act, 2017
Thé MaternityBenefit (Amendnient) Act, 2017
The Enemy Property (Amendment and Validation)Act,
2017
The Payment of Wages (Amendment) Act, 2017 bo
• The TaxationLaws (Second Amendment) Act, 2016 dij
im
(xi) Repealing statute
A repealing statute is one 9/hich repeals a prior enactment. This
revocationor terminationmay be by the express or unequivocal
dialect of the statute, or it might be by fundamental implication also.

i
 Lec.111J Classification of Statutes

For example,
The Hyderabad District Municipalities Act, 1956wm
repealing Act which repealed the HydeFabad Municikrrø

The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (ActNo.2

1974) repealed and re-enacted the Code of Sta
Procedure, 1898.
• The CompaniesAct, 2013 was a repealing Actwhich! Su
repealed the Companies Act, 1956.
Right to Information Act, 2005 was a repealing Actwhich
repealedthe Freedom of information Act, 2002.
in
(xii) Curativeor validating statute
A curative or validating statute is one which is passedtocuref P
defects in earlier law, or to validate legal proceedings, instrumentsP
or acts of public and private administrative authorities whichwithout c
such an Act would be void for want of conformity with existinglegal
requirements, but which would have been valid if the statutehadso
given at the time of enacting.
The function of a validating statute is to remove the casesof
ineffectiveness or invalidity of actions or.proceedings whichare
validated by a legislative measure.
•Validating legislation generally
contains the phrase "despite/notwithstanding
or order of any court." The any judgment, decree
reason for such phrase is to validate
some actions which would or
some
which may have been declared way or another be unlawful
invalid by a court.
A characteristicconsequence
might be the of the passing of a curativeAct
validation of such activities, which would somehow or
another be invalid, up
to the degree of the
body. The effect of the validation is thatvalidation by the lawmaking
different steps taken notifications or Other
invalid turned out which may some way, or another have been
to bevalid.
 29 on Interpretation of Statutes (Lec.lll
1cctures
30 ASSIFICATION WITII REFERENCE TO
cL OF APPLICATION
. ESTENT
was divided into two types they are Public
classification
Private Statute.
and
staw•te statute
unal (i) public
statute is one which relates to a matter of public policy.
Apublic be general, local or personal in nature.
lich sucha statute may
(ii)Private statute
concerns with matters which are individual
ich Aprivatestatute a body which has no public consequence.
related to
innatureor is Private Act seems to be in orders made by the
prigin of the
liament upon petitions of individuals who wanted redressal of
re par because no remedy for them was available in
•vate
grievances
common law.
7. DIRECTORY AND MANDATORY:
Thestatutes are classified into two types based on their
They are classified into mandatory and directory. A
application.
mandatorystatute is•a statute which compels the performance of
acertainthingor compels that a certain thing must compulsorily be
'completed in a prescribed form or manner as compulsory. According
totheBlack'sLaw Dictionary, a mandatory statute is "A law that
a course of action as opposed to merely permitting it." 1
requires
I/Tenthenon-compliance with provisions or the requirements of a
statute
willrender the related proceedings as void or illegal, then such
a statuteis called a mandatory statute.2
Adirectorystatute is a statute which only directs or indicates
whatis to be done and no provision for its enforcement will be
Providedland if the provisions of a statute are not complied with
andtheproceedings
related to such statute are valid and legal. In
l.
HenryCampbell
1990).
Black, M.A., Black's Law Dictionary, 1543 (6th ed.,
.2
Crawford,Construction
of Statutes, 104 (1940).
 Classification or Statutes 31
London Clydeside Estates Ltd v AberdeenDistrict Council
and Another,' the court held that directorystatutes can be further
subdivided into two classes as,
• Of those directory requirements"substantial compliance"
with which satisfied the requirementto the point at which
a minor defect of trivial irregularitycould be ignored by
the court, and
e those requirements are so purely regulatory in character
that failure to comply could in no circumstances affect
the validity OJyhat was done.
Legislatureuses the word 'may' with an intent to confer
discretion upon a court which has to be exercisedjudicially, i.e., after
taking into consideration the relevant factors?The word "shall" is
ordinarily copstrued as mandatory but sometimes,taking into account
the context or the intention, it can be held to be a directory. 3
8. DIFFERENCE BETWEENDIRECTORY AND
MANDATORY STATUTES:
A Mandatory Statute prescribes the requirement of doing specific
things and also prescribes the consequencethat will follow in case
those things are not done. This is not the case in case of a Directory
Statute. In this only, the requirement of doing a thing is specified. 4
Halsbury's Laws of England, aboutthe distinction between
Mandatory and Directory, states that "where a statute requires an
act to be done at or within a particular time, or in a particular manner,
the question arises whether the v.alidityof the act is affected by a
failure to comply with what is prescribed.If it appears that Parliament
J. [19801 1 W.L.R. 182; [197913All E.R. 876; 1980S.C. (H.L.) 1; 1980 S.L.T.
81 ; (1980) 39 P. & C.R. 549; (1979) 253 E.G 1011; (1980) 124 S.J. 100.
2. CementCorporation of India Limited.etc. v. Purya and others etc,
(2004) 8 SCC 270; AIR 2004 SC 4830.
3. VijayDhanuka Etc. v. Najima Mamtaj Etc, 1201414 S.C.R. 171, (2014)
14SCC638.
4. Church and another v. Director General of Income Tax (Ex emptions)
New Delhi and another, 325 ITR 362.
 Lectures on Interpretation of Statutes [Lec.lll
32
disobedience to render the act invalid, the provision in
intended "imperative" or
questionis described as "mandatory," "absolute", intended to
"obligatory", if on the other hand compliance was not to be
governthe validity of what is done, the provisionis said
"directory" 1
Sutherland's Statutory Construction states that the important
distinctionbetween the directory and mandatory statutes has
consequences,while failure to comply with the requirements of the
latter invalidates the alleged transactions or subjects the non-compiler
to affirmativelegal liabilities. Although directory provisions are not
intended that the by the legislature to be disregarded, the seriousness
of the breach is not considered so great that the liability automatically
adheres for non-compliance. 2
Crawford in Statutory Construction3, states that the Statute,
or one or more of its provisions, may be mandatory or directory. In
general, to determine whether a statute is mandatory or a directory,
the rules related to the consiruction of statutes must be applied;
however, as a general rule, it can be established that those provisions
that are related to the essence of the thing to be carried out or to
matters of substance, are mandatory, and those that are not related
to the essence and whose compliance is simply a matter of
convenienceinstead of substance, they are directory.Thus, the
Mandatory Statute may be defined as a law whose provisions or
requirements, if not fulfilled, render the action referred to it unlawful
and void, whereas the statute is directory statute where the non-
3
compliance does not invalidate the proceedings which it relates to.
In Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Amritsar v. Income-tax
Officer,Inhore 4, the court held that an exact compliance or obedience
should be shown towards an absolute enactment. And for a statute
which is a directory in nature, it is more than enough that there is
1. Halsbury's Laws of England, Simonds Edition, Volume36, Art 656.
2. J.G.Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3rded., 1943).
3. Crawford in Statutory Construction, 1940Edition.
4. AIR 1940 PC 230 also see Woodwordv.Sarsons, [18751L.R. 10 c.e
733.
 Classification of Statutes

only a substantial compliance or obedience. This brinciple

appliedlater in several cases. l
tof
The distinction between mandatory and dire
provisionsis given in the table below respec
mandat
MandatoryProvisions Directory Provisions
The word "shall" is used .in The-word "may" is used. atthe d'
statutes be sche
e proce
They are imperative in nature. They are mandatory in nature!n
a case
No option is available to the There is no compulsion to In
person as to the action to be or not perform any act. oug
performed or not performed. f me
There is a compulsion.
The result or consequence that Only talks about the requiremen be inte
will follow in case of non- of doing a thing, not the result&
compliance will be prescribed. its non-compliance. that the
Act in contravention is invalid. Act in contradiction is valid word
To be practical exactly and Only substantial obedienceis every
strictly.
instea
enough intem
The provisions impose a duty No imposition of such power. and s
upon a person on whom power
is granted to exercise that be
power
The provisions should be The provisions sbould be liberall) Sin
strictly interpreted interpreted is
Regard to be •given to context
The use of the words "may" or "shall" does not determineit
a statute is a directory or mandatory. There are instances when the
word 'may' is considered in directory sense and the word 'shall' ill
a mandatorysense. It depends on the object, subject-matter and the
1. See Limai Charan Panigrahi and Another v. M. Ram Chandra
and Others,AIR 1967 ORI 177; Narayan Krishnaji Marulkar an
Anotherv.state, AIR 1967 BOM 213.
 of Statutes [Lec.lll
3
on Interpretation
1 The purpose and object of the statute or
provision.
the to be considered to understand if it is
ontestof provisions one.
respe ora directory
the
mandatory Sahuf, the Supreme Court has held
a v. T.P.M.
Rajan
In p.n mandatory nature of a statute will depend upon
directoryandUsually, ev
that thereof. a mandatory one except
the provisionwill not become
theprocedural
where prejudice is caused.
re. in a case Pradesh v Jogendra Singh3, the Supreme
InState of Uttar
'o "it is well settleytfiat the word "may" is capable
courtheldthat or "shall" in the light of the context, and it is also
"must"
of meaning
that,where a discretion is granted to a public authority together
clear the word "may", which denotes discretion, must
with an obligation,
ent
be interpreted in the sense of a command."
t
of
InAjitSinghv. State of Punjab4, the Supreme Court held
thattheword"shall" in its ordinary import is mandatory. Unless, the
word"shall"does not need to have that connotation in each and
everycaseand the provisions can be interpreted as a directory
of mandatoryaccordingto the purpose that the legislator
instead
intended
toachieveas revealed by the object, the design, the purpose
andscopeof the statute.When interpreting the provisions in question,
thecontext,
subjectmatterand object of the statute in question must
be takeninto account.
In Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board v Shiv Mohan
ghandAnöther5, the Court
held that in general, the word 'shall'
considered
to be mandatory,in nature but it has to be interpreted
asdirectory
if contextor intention requires it
or if it demands.
1.
oveInvestments
Corporation,AIR (P) Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial investment
2. 2006 SC 1454.
3. 8 SCC 498;
[196412 AIR 2003 SC 4603.
4 SCR 197,AIR
[198312 1963 SC 1618.
5. sec 217.
AIR20m
SC
 Classificationof Statutes 35
Crawford on StatutoryConstruction/ says that "the question
as to vvhethera statute is mandatory or directory depends upon
the •intent of the legislatureandnot upon the language in Which
the intent is clothed. The meaning and the intention of the
legislature must govern,and this is to be ascertained and not
only from the phraseologyof the provision, but also by
considering its nature, its design, and the consequence which
would follow from constmuing it the one way or the other."
In Govindlal Chhagganlal v. Agricultural Produce Market
Committee,2 the court held that" the determining factor is the manner
and intent of the legislature that must be collected not only by the
words used by the legislatorbut by a variety and by other
circumstances and considerations.In other words, the use of the
word "shall" or "may" is not conclusive as to whether the specific
requirement of the law is mandatory or directory. But the conditions
under which the legislatorhas used compulsive force have great
importance in the absenceof any contrary element in the context
which indicates that a permissive interpretation is legitimate because
the law must be interpretedas imperative. One of the fundamental
rules of interpretation is that if the words of a law are themselves
clear and unambiguous, it js no longer necessary to expose these
words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words in such cases
declaring the best intention of the legislature."
In State of (NCTof Delhi) and others v. Jaysukh Bavanji
Shingalia and another,3 the Supreme Court held that the question
is whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the
intent of the legislation, language and wording of the legislation, and
also by consideringits nature,its design, and the consequences
legislation.
In Bachahan Devi v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur,4the Court
held that the use of the words "may" and "shall"may help the courts
1. Crawford on Statutory Construction (Edition 1940, Art. 261, para 516).
2. AIR 1976 SC 263.
3. (2014) 9 SCC 772; 2015 SC 75.
4. (2008) 12 scc 372.
 Lectures on Interpretation of Statutes [Lcc.lll
36
to cither a controlling
in ascertaining the legislative intent without givrng
auxiliary
or a detertninating effect. The ultimate rule in construing
intent, and
verbs like "tnay" ankl"shall"is to discover the legislative
its discretion
the usg of "may" like "may" and "shall"is not decisive of
may help
or mandates. The use of the words like "may" and "shall"
to either
the courts in ascertaining the legislative intent without giving
further to
a controlling or a determinating effect. The courts have
object
consider the subject matter, the purpose of the provisions, the
intended to be secured by the statute which is of prime importance,
as also the actual words employgd•.
In Santa Singh v State of Puniab, in this case, the Appellant
was convicted for the murder of his mother and his foster father.
Appellant was awarded sentence of death in the absence of his
lawyer. No hearing was provided to appellant on the question of
sentence. Whether provisions of s. 235 of CrPC have been committed
and the death sentence liable to be set aside? Under Penology and
sentencing procedures provide that when an accused is convicted,
he has to be given an opportunityto be heard in regard to the
sentence. The court can pass sentence only after hearing him. Non-
compliance with the requirement of the section cannot be described
as a mere irregularity curable u/s. 465. So the provision of s. 235
of CrPC is mandatory in nature. The Supreme Court sent back the
matter to the Trial Court for giving an opportunity to the appellant
to make a representation regarding sentence proposed.
In Wasinl Beg v State•of U.P2 the Supreme Court held that
it is mandatory to follow the principlesof natural justice by the
competent authority while discharge of on employee for ieagons
which are set out in the Rule. If the same was denied by the
natural
Competent authority, it is a serious violation of the principles of
competent
justice and vitiates the decision. So it the mandatory on
discharging
authority to follow the principles of naturaljustice while
the employee.

1. (1976) 4 SCC 190, AIR 1976 SC 2386.

2. AIR 1998SC SCC321,
 Classificationof Statutes
In Shivjee Singh v.Nagendra Tiwary and
court held that the provisions contained in others,l
Criminal
1973 are required to be interpreted keeping
in view
rule of construction that procedural prescriptions the well-
are
substantial justice. If a violation of the procedural meantfor66
result in provision
denial of a fair hearing or causes prejudice
the same has to be treated as directory to thepath
notwithstandingthepe a
the word "shall".
In State of U.S. Sasidharan v. K. Karunakaran
and
the question raised before the Supreme Court interpreting an
the
three clear days' notice mandatory,under section.27(3)of
f
Mysore Town Municipalities Act 1951, i.e., do thefailuretoanc
such notice make the proceedings of the meetingand
resolution passed there invalid? The Supreme Court heldth
notice must be given in s. 27(3) is the only directoryand
mandatory in light of the contentand other provisionsof theth4
In OTA Falloons Forwarders Private Limitedv. Unio
India and another,3 one of the issues raised before the cour
law is that the time limitsprescribed in Regulation22 of 1
Regulations of 2004 and Regulation20 of the Regulation
2013 mandatory or directory? To answerer the above question
court relied on the decision various decisions and arrives at a fin
that, the time limit in Regulation 20 of the Regulations of 201
not mandatory and that, any proceeding for revocation of Custl
House Agents' licence beyond ninety days of receipt of the Offe
report would not per se stand invalidated by mere reason Ofsi
belated initiation and the same reasoning regarding Regulati0111
of the Regulations of 2004 is not mandatory, but directory•
In Chandrakant Sakharam Karkhanis and others vs.
of Maharashtra and Others,4 in this case the court observed Il
various decision regarding Article- 166 of the Constitution and
that the Article 166 of the constitution is in directory in nature
1. SCC 578;AIR2010SC2261. 3. 2018 IndiawCAL54.
2. 1990SC924. 4. AIR 1977130M 193
 Interpretation of Statutes [Lec.lll
Lectureson
upr 8
framedby the Governor under clause (3) ofArticle-
furtherthetilles
the Government and are directory in
of business of any non compliance thereofwould
loescharacter andnotmandatory and •
proceduraldefect but would not confer any right upon
be a mere
us any cidzento approach the Court under Article-226 of the Constitution.
M/SSurendra Trading Company vs. M/S Juggilal
In
Jute Mills Co. Ltd. and others, 1 the Supreme Court was
Kantlapat
g asto whether the period mentioned for removal ofdefaults
ex
of in tens ofP!0Visoto sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Insolvency
to B Code,
ankruptcy 2016 is mandatory. It was held that no
and
isgoingto be served by treating the said period as mandatory.
purpose
hat TheCourtconcluded as under:- "Further, we are of the view that
cited by the NCLAT and the principlecontained
thejudgments
whiledeciding that period of fourteen dayswithin
applied
therein
ion whichtheadjudicatingauthority has to pass the order is not mandatory
)urt in nature would equally apply while interpreüng proviso
butdirectory
of (5) of Section 7, Section 9 or subsection (4) of Section
t?sub-section
ms 10aswell.Afterall, the applicant does not gain anythingby not
on theobjectionsin asmuch as till the objections areremoved,
removing
suchanapplicationwould not be entertained. Therefore, it is in the
013 ofthe applicant to remove the defects as early as possible."
interest
sto 'Thus,weholdthat the aforesaid provision of removing the defects
withinsevendays is directory and not mandatory in nature. However,
we would
liketo enter a caveat.
on 9. CONJUNCTIVEAND DISJUNCTIVE:
Conjunctive:
St
'd asa"
ThewordConjunctiveis defined by Black's I-nwDictionary
grammatical for joining phrases
orconnecting term for particles which serve
together." word which connects in
amanner A conjunctive is a
thatindicates
the word "and" is called
a union. Therefore
conjunctive
as, " Other examples of conjunctive wordsare as well
but
1.

2. (201') 16 scc
143
 Classification of Statutes 39
In Petrotech. Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs,
Bombay, the court observed that "a general relationor connection,
participation or accompanitnent in sequence, havingno inherent
meaning standing alone but deriving force from what comes
before and after. In its conjunctive sense the word is used to
conjoin words, clauses, or sentences, expressingthe relationof
addition or connection, and signifying that somethingis to
follow in addition to that which precedes and its use impliesthat
the connectedelements must be grammaticallycoordinate,as
where elements preceding and succeeding the use of the
words refer to the same subject matter. Whileit is said that there
is no exact synonym of the word in English, it has been defined
to mean 'along with."
In J. Jayalalitha v. U.O.I., 2 the court held that the dictionary
meaning of the word 'or' is: "a partiéle used to connectwords,
phrases, or clauses representing alternatives". It was furtherheld
that the word 'or', which is a conjunction, is normallyused for the
purpose of joining alternatives and also to join rephrasingof the same
thing but at times to mean 'and' also; alternatives neednot always
be mutually exclusive; it is a matter of common knowledgethat the
word 'or' is at times used to join terms when eitherone or the other
or both are indicated.
Disjunctive:
A Disjunctive -is defined as "One which is placed between
two .contraries, by the affirming •of%oneof which the other is
taken away; it is usually expressed by the word 'or'."
Even though the conjunctive word "and" and the disjunctive
word "or" are quite different from each other, the EnglishlaW3 as
well as the Indian law 4 is that where legislature's intentionor the

1. 1992 (52) E.L.T81 (Tri.): 1991 (37) ECR 75.

2. (1999) 5 scc 138.
3. Fowler v. Padget, (1798) 7 TR 509; Ledwith v. Roberts, (1937) 1 KB 232.
4. Emperor v.Asimulla Mondal, AIR 1925 Cal 1068,Rgyarappa v. Kelappa
Kurup, ILR40 Mad 594: AIR 1918 Mad 1026.
40 Lectures on Interpretation of Statutes [Lec.lll
object of the Act is defeated when literal interpretation is applied
then the conjunctive "and" and disjunctive "OF.'can be read one for
another. It has been held in Safat Mohammad Razak v. The
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay,/ that "It is true that
the disjunctiveword "or" can be read as a conjunctivenamely
"and" and vice versa."
Justice GP Singh observed that "The word 'or' is normally
disjunctive and 'and' is normally conjunctive but at times they
are read as vice versa to to the manifestintention
of the Legislature as disclosedfrom the context". •As stated by
Scrutton,LJ "Youdo sometimesread 'or' as 'and' in a statute.
But you do not do it unlessyou are obliged because 'or' does
not generally mean 'and' as 'and' does not generallymean

As pointed by Lord Halsbury the reading of 'or' ay 'and' is

not to be resorted to, unless some other part of the same statute
or the clear intention of it requires that to be done.2
In Shibani EngineeringSystems v Collector of Customs, 3
it has been stated that if an absurd or unintelligible result is produced
on the literal reading of language then the words "and" may be
replaced for "or" and vice versa.
In Fakir Mohd. v. Sitha Ram,4 the court held that the word
"or' 'is normally disjunctive and the word "and" is normally conjunctive.
But at times they are read as vice-versa to give effect to the manifest
intent of the legislature as disclosed from the context. It is permissible
to read "or"as "and"andvice-versa if some other part of the same
statute or the legislative intent clearly spelled out, require that to be
done.

1. (1993) J BomCR213.
2. Justice G.P Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 272 (5th ed.,
1992).
3. (1992) 62 ELT463.
4.
 Classificationof Statutes
The court in the case of Durrani Abdull ah
A. Latifkhan v State of Maharashtra, through KhanS/ot)utr
its 42
Minority Development Department, Mumbai
that the word "and" is normally conjunctive andand
normally the word" For
disjunctive. The word "and" is required to
be givenitslikfor
meaning. It is only if the use of the word "and" conjuncu•vl re
prOduces an unintelligible or absurd result, then
the
power to read the word 'or' as 'and' and vice versa Courthas
to the intention of the legislature. The interpretation togive
on the text and the context. The words normally are hastodepq
bereadin
ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. The
word 'or' as'art
and 'and' aeor' statute are read unless the sameisoblige
to do so. Reading of the word 'or' as 'and' and 'and'
as 'or'is a
to be resorted to unless some other part of the same statuteorth
clear intention of it requires to be done.
Maxwell Interpretationat page 230 as under:
Bankrupts Act 1603 made it an act of bankruptcyfora trade
to leave his dwelling house "to the intent, or whereb
his... .creditors shall or may be defeated or delayed."If this
construed literally then every trader, who leaves his homeevenf
an hour and during that period of his absence if a creditorcalls
for payment he would be exposed to bankruptcy. This absurdityhas
to be avoided by reading the word "or" as "and" and statingthat
only when the design of delaying or defeating creditorsis alsc
coupled with absence from home could it be called as an act0
bankruptcy?
In R. v. Oakes,3the court held that in a penal statute*'or'
should only be changed into "and" or vice versa if the resultis more
favourable to the subject, but there is no rule of law to thateffect
In R. v. Brixton Prison Governor, 4 the Kings benchheldthat
to carry out the intention of the legislature, it is occasionallyfound
1. AIR 2017 BOM 150.
2. v. Padget, (1978) 7 T.R 509 of R. v. Mortiake, (1805)6 391
3. (J 959) 2All.E.R.92.
4, 119371 J K.B, 305.
 on Interpretation of Statutes [Lec.lll
Lectures
conjunctions and "and" one for the other.
the
to read talking about property that is to be employed
while
anexample,
maintaining
soldiers who are either sick or maimed not just both.
to
Newbould,4 the Section 4(2) of the Prevention of
Jn R. v.
Act, 19 J6 the expression "local and public authorities"
nuption
to be not either local or public authorities.
s held
John G. Stein & Co. Ltd. v. O. Hanlon,2 the section 48(1)
In
Mines and Quarries Act, 4954 says that "It shall be the duty
the
manager of every miné to take, with respect to every road
the
working place in the mine, such steps by way of controlling
vement of the strata in the mine and supporting the roof and
idesofthe road or working place secure." Lord Reid said that
ecouldnot "suppose that it was intended that in every case the
anagermustboth attempt to control the movement of the strata
ndprovidesupport". The natural meaning of the words of the
ection is that one or other of the prescribed methods must be
Idopted in every case.

(1962)2
Q.B 102.
(1965)
A.c 890.