PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
I. Requisites of Marriage (Articles 1-34, Family
Code)
 
Cases:
1. Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-
1088, July 19, 1996
FACTS:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific
acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the
grounds of gross misconduct, inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law.
 The first allegation of Navarro to Domagtoy
is that the latter solemnized marriage of
Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on
September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge
that the groom has a subsisting marriage
was merely separated. It was told that the
wife of Gaspar left their conjugal home and
has not returned and been heard for almost
seven years.
 The second allegation of the plaintiff was
that the said Judge likewise solemnized
marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge
holds his office and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-
Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he
solemnized the said wedding at his
residence in the municipality of Dapa
located 40 to 50 km away.
 
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not the marriage solemnized by the
defendant Judge Domagtoy were void;
2. Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy
exhibits gross misconduct, inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law?
HELD:
The court held that the marriage between Tagadan
and Borja was void and bigamous there being a
subsisting marriage between Tagadan and his wife,
notwithstanding, the latter was gone for seven
years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not
institute a summary proceeding as provided in the
Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death
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of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del
Rosario, the said marriage was solidified as valid,
Albeit, Judge Domagtoy was not authorized to
solemnize the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario
as against Article 3 (1) of the Family Code with
regard to irregularity of formal requisites of
marriage. In addition, article 4 par 3 of the Family
Code of the Philippines states that formal requisites
shall not affect the validity of marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall
be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Hence, Domagtoy was held administratively liable
because of the latter’s failure to apply the legal
principles applicable in these cases, the Court find
Domagtoy  have acted in gross ignorance of the law
and because of this he was suspended for a period
of six months.
2. Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 187462, June 1,
2016
Facts:
             Petitioner’s parents summoned a clerk to
arrange necessary papers on one afternoon of May
31, 1972 for the intended marriage of parties
herein on the midnight as to exclude the public
from witnessing the marriage ceremony. They were
only able to fulfill such ceremony at 3AM of June 1,
1972 for reason that there was a public dance held
in town plaza that was adjacent to the church and
such dance only finished at 2AM. Due to the
shortness of period, said clerk was not able to
secure them a marriage license. RTC declared their
marriage null and void. CA reversed it stating that
the marriage was valid and subsisting.
            Issue: W/N CA erred to give due credence to
petitioner’s evidence which established the
absence or lack of marriage license when the
marriage was solemnized.
Held:
            Marriage is void. Art 58 and Art 80 (3) of the
Civil Code explicitly provides that no marriage shall
be solemnized without a license first issued by the
LCR (Art. 58). Marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void (Art. 80 (3)).
Court favors petitioner. 
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
3. Niñal vs. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778,
March 14, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. She was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year
and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986
stating that they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito
to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void
for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s
successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are
not among the persons who could file an action
for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the
Family Code.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living
together as husband and wife for at least five
years exempts them from obtaining a
marriage license under Article 34 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action
against defendant in asking for the declaration of
the nullity of marriage of their deceased father,
Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the
time of the filing of this instant suit, their father
Pepito G. Niñal is already dead
Ruling:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have
lived together as husband and wife for five
years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year
period should be computed on the basis
of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the
only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the
five-year common law cohabitation period, which is
counted back from the date of celebration of
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marriage, should be a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-
year period should be the years immediately before
the day the marriage and it should be a period
of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—
meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the five years, and continuity—that is,
unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-
year cohabitation period is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with
their spouse.
(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death
of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after death of either, in which case the parties
and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid.
4. Diaz-Salgado v. Anson, G.R. No. 204494,
July 27, 2016
Facts:
            Luis Anson is the husband of Severina de
Asis-Anson. They had 1 daughter, Maria Luisa and
she was wed to Gaston Maya. Severina had an
older daughter to a previous relationship, Jo ann
Diaz and she was also wed to Gerard Salgado. Luis
and Severina acquired several real properties and
according to him, since there was no marriage
settlement, the properties pertain to their conjugal
partnership. But without his knowledge and
consent, Severina executed 3 Unilateral Deeds of
Sale transferring then properties in favor of Jo ann.
When Severina died, Maria Luisa executed a Deed
of Extra-Judcial Settlement of Estate Deceased
Severina adjudicating herself as the sole heir. Due
to these acts, Luis filed a complaint for the
annulment of these Deeds against Sps Salgado and
Sps Maya. The latter countered that they were not
aware of any marriage between Luis and their
mother Severina but they knew they cohabited as
common-law couple and that after their
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
cohabitation, Luis went to the US and married one
Teresita. And due to Partition Agreement that
divided their properties without court intervention,
both Sps claim that the properties herewith are
separate and exclusive properties of Severina.   bigamy against Jose.  Subsequently, she filed an
            Issue: W/N marriage between Severina and
Luis is valid and the subject lands as conjugal
partnership
Held:
            Court finds that their marriage is void ab
initio for lack of marriage license. Luis asserted that
their marriage was an exceptional one but he failed
to justify the lack of marriage license. He admitted
that they did not seek to apply for it. The Partition
agreement is valid. Valdez v RTC Quezon City  held
that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties during
the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Art 147 or Art 148 as the case may be,
of the Family Code. Also, attesting that his marriage
with Severina was subsisting and valid, he
knowingly contracted to a subsequent marriage
abroad, and the Court finds such suspicious and
fraudulent thereby tainting his credibility.
5. Republic v. Dayot, G.R. Nos. 175581 &
179474, March 28, 2008
FACTS: Jose was introduced to Felisa in 1986.  He
later came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the
latter being his landlady.  Later, Felisa requested
him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, so she
could claim a package sent to her by her brother
from Saudi.  There, a man bearing three folded
pieces of paper approached them.  They were told
that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the
package could be released to Felisa.  He initially
refused to do so.  However, Felisa cajoled him, and
told him that his refusal could get both of them
killed by her brother who had learned about their
relationship. He signed the papers and gave them
to the man. It was in February 1987 when he
discovered that he had contracted marriage with
Felisa.  When he confronted Felisa, she said she
does not know of such. Jose claimed that their
marriage was contracted with fraud. Felisa denied
Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their
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marriage. Felisa expounded that while her marriage
to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August
31, 1990.  On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for
administrative complaint against Jose with the
Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina
were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board. The Ombudsman found Jose
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct ans suspended him for one year without
emolument. The RTC ruled against Jose claiming
that his story is impossible. RTC cited Article 87 of
the New Civil Code which requires that the action
for annulment of marriage must be commenced by
the injured party within four years after the
discovery of the fraud.
ISSUE: W/N the issue of validity of marriage due to
fraud is prescriptible
HELD: SC held that an action for nullifying a
marriage is imprescriptible.  It may be raised
anytime. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated
without a marriage license.  No other conclusion
can be reached except that it is void ab initio.
6. Garcia v. Receio, G.R. No.  138322, Oct. 2,
2002
FACTS:
Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married
to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving
the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became
an Australian citizen and was married again to
petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January
12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for
a marriage license, respondent was declared as
“single” and “Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and
respondent lived separately without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
his Answer, Rederick contended that his
first marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was
legally capacitated to marry Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the
couple’s wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending , respondent was
able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the
“marriage had irretrievably broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of
Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground
that the Australian divorce had ended
the marriage of the couple thus there was no more
marital union to nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent
and Editha Samson was proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be
legally capacitated to marry petitioner
RULING:
1st issue:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere
presentation of the divorce decree of
respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized
by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the
divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by
an Australian family court. However, appearance is
not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
2nd issue:
Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that
reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before
this decree becomes absolute (unless the other
party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the
divorrecce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the
trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence
on this matter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to
the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
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evidence. The Court mentioned that they cannot
grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void because of the question
on latter’s legal capacity to marry.
7. Rep. vs. Cipriano Obrecido III, GR No.
154380, Oct. 5, 2005
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24,
1981.  They were blessed with a with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and
Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along
their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in
California.
He then filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the
same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied. Orbecido filed a
petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of
the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry
under Article 26 of the Family Code.
Held:
Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code be
interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under
Philippine law.
The article should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on,one of them became naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtained a divorce decree.
The instant case was one where at the time the
marriage was solemnized, the parties were two
Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed, she remarried an
American citizen while residing in the US. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage.
However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as
fact his wife’s naturalization, he was still barred
from remarrying.
8. Van Dorn vs. Ronillo, Jr. et al., 139 SCRA
139
Facts:  Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton
is a citizen of the United States. They were married
in Hongkong in 1972 and established their
residence in the Philippines. They begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,
1975, respectively. But the parties were divorced in
Nevada, United States, in 1982 and the petitioner
had remarried also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against
petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn be ordered to
render an accounting of her business in Ermita,
Manila and be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the
petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a
Filipino citizen.
Held:
As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him
as an American Citizen. Owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the
petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent Richard Upton is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
Alice Van Dorn to exercise control over conjugal
assets. He was bound by the Decision of his own
5
country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
over him, and whose decision he did not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
9. Republic vs. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, 21
September 2005, 470 SCRA 508
FACTS:
Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in
Cebu City. They begot five children. After
the celebration of their marriage, respondent
nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the
Philippines for the United States
of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children
to the care of respondent Crasus. Sometime in
1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the
letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got
married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but
never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly using
the surname of her American husband in the
Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a
declaration of nullity of marriage on March 25,
1997.
On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file
for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied
having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus
requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers.
After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus,
Fely married her American husband
and acquired American citizenship. She argued that
her marriage to her American husband was legal
because now being an American citizen, her status
shall be governed by the law of her present
nationality. Fely also prayed that the RTC declare
her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void;
and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to
Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with
interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of
Crasus and Fely null and void ab ignition on the
ground of psychological incapacity. One factor
considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a
divorce decree in the United States of America and
married another man and has established another
family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous
situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
already married to another man in another country.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual
infidelity constitute psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely
abroad was valid.
RULING:
1st issue:
The totality of evidence presented during the trial is
insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely. Using the guidelines established
by the cases of Santos, Molina and Marcos,
this Court found that the totality of evidence
presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to
establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring
their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
the said Article.
2nd issue:
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a
special situation wherein one of the couple getting
married is a Filipino citizen and the other a
foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated.
By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of
respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the
time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer
filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce
from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for
the United States in 1984, after which she married
her American husband in 1985. In the same
Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce,
Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to
the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was
still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even
when she was already living abroad. Philippine
laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
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recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus,
Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.
The Supreme Court held that the marriage of
respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy
remains valid and subsisting.
10. Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June
26, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese
national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines. The marriage
did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara got married in
Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able
to re-establish their relationship. Fujiki then helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in
Japan declaring her marriage in Maekara void on
the ground of bigamy.
Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a petition
for a Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
before the RTC. However, the trial court dismissed
the petition maintaining that Fujiki lacks personality
file the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.
RULING:
Yes, a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse
and a foreign citizen.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only
requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
108 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the said rule
provides for who may file such petition, to wit:
Sec. 1: Who may file petition. — Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial
Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
In this case, there is no doubt that the prior spouse,
Fujiki, has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from
it. Thus, he has the legal personality to file the
petition. PETITION GRANTED.
11. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571,
August 11, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized
Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn
Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada
due to work and other professional commitments.
When he returned to the Philippines,
he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already
romantically involved with another man. This
brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by
Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by
the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A
month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two
years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another
Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil
Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian
divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto.
Tomas. However, despite the registration, an
official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz
that the former marriage still subsists under the
Philippine law until there has been a judicial
recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a
competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No.
4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition
for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC.
However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out
that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree because
he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided
further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who
can institute an action under the principle of Article
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26 of the Family Code which capacitates a
Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse
obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to
institute a petition for judicial recognition of a
foreign divorce decree?
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion –
i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens -
with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s
national law have been duly proven according to
our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment
and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence
of aright by proving want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution
must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of
res judicata between the parties, as provided in
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
12. Republic vs. Manalo, GR No. 221029, 24
April 2018
Based on the intent of the lawmakers. In view of
the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be
the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still
married to the Japanese national who is no longer
married to her. The fact that it was Manalo who
filed the divorce case is inconsequential.
ISSUE:
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
W/N a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry
under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable
judgment against his/her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry.
RULING:
YES, pursuant to Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family
Code. However, this case was remanded to the RTC
to allow Manalo to prove the Japanese law on
divorce.
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married in the
Philippines to Yoshino Minoro, a Japanese national.
She divorced Minoro in Japan and a Japanese court
issued the divorce decree dated December 6, 2011.
On January 10, 2012, she filed in the RTC of
Dagupan City a petition for cancellation of entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila,
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. She also
prayed that she be allowed to use her maiden
surname: Manalo. She claims there is an imperative
need to have the entry of marriage cancelled so
that it would not appear that she is still married to a
Japanese national who is no longer married to her,
and so that she shall not be bothered and disturbed
by said entry should she decide to remarry.
The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Dagupan
questioned the caption of the petition and alleges
that the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of judgment; this was
admitted by Manalo and accordingly amended the
petition.
RTC Ruling: Petition denied.
The divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should
not be recognized based on Article 15 of the New
Civil Code.
CA Ruling: RTC ruling was overturned.
Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable even if it
was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. vs. Exec. Secretary
Ermita, et al. ruling, the meaning of the law should
be
[Plain-Meaning Rule or Verba Legis Rule]
Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision,
it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be the one
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
8
decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether
the Filipino souse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the
words, to have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are
found in the statue. Verbal egis
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute
there should be no departure.
[The spirit of the law and the true intent of the
legislature prevails]
Assuming arguendo that the word “obtained”
should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien
spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of
the statute when to do so would depart from the
true intent of the legislature or would otherwise
yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to defeat
but to carry out such ends and purposes.
The purpose of Par. 2 of Art.26 is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country
where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino souse. The provision is a corrective measure
to address an anomaly where the Filipino souse is
tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry under the laws of his or her country.
[Regardless of who initiates the foreign divorce
proceeding, a favorable decree has the same effect
upon the Filipino spouse]
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign
divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or
her alien spouse to remarry will have the same
result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without
a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving
end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a distinction. In
both instance, it is extended as a means to
recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce
decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
souse are severed by the operation of the latter’s
national law.
[Par. 2 of Art.26 violates the Equal Protection
Clause - Sec. 1 Art. III of the Constitution]
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
The limitation of the provision only to a foreign
divorce initiated by the alien souse is unreasonable
as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical
classification.
A Filipino married to another Filipino is NOT
similarly situated with a Filipino married to a
foreign citizen. There are real, material, and
substantial differences between them. Ergo, they
should NOT be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed.
There are political, economic, cultural, and religious
dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Fililpino
national who is married to an alien souse has to
contend with. More importantly, while a divorce
decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against
another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree
obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino
spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the
national law of the foreigner.
On the contrary, there is NO real and substantial
difference between a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of
his/her alien spouse.
In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both
are considered as Filipinos who have the same
rights and obligations in an alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it
not for Par. 2 of Art 26, both are still married to
their foreign spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction
between them based merely on the superficial
difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. The treatment
gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate
the other.
The differentiation in Part. 2 of Art. 26 is arbitrary.
There is inequality in treatment because a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a
Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would
not be recognized even if based on grounds similar
to Arts. 35, 36, 37, and 38 of the FC. In filing for
divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse
cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim,
tantamount to insisting that he or she should be
governed with whatever law he or she chooses.
[Other topic which might be asked in the
recit/exams]
2 Types of Divorce
9
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage, are of 2 types: (1)
absolute divorce or a vincula matrimonii, which
terminated the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or
a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force.
In our jurisdiction, the following rules on divorce
exist:
1. The Philippine law does not provide for
absolute divorce; hence our courts cannot
grant it.
2. Consistent with Art. 15 and 17 of the NCC,
the marital bond between 2 Filipinos cannot
be dissolved even by an absolute divorce
obtained abroad.
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national
laws.
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, the former is allowed to contract
a subsequent marriage in case the absolute
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
13.   Edna S. Kondo, represented by Attorney-in-
fact, Luzviminda S. Pineda Vs. Civil Registrar
General G.R. No. 223628, March 4, 2020
 
II. Void Marriages (Articles 35-44, Family Code)
·  A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003
·  A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC, March 4, 2003
 
Cases:
Articles 35-36
1. Santiago v. People, G.R. No.
200233, July 15, 2015
Facts:
            4 months after solemnization of marriage,
Leonila (petitioner) and Nicanor Santiago were
served an information for Bigamy for the
prosecution adduced that Nicaonor was still
married to Estela when he entered into the
2nd marriage; he was able to escape while petitioner
pleaded ‘not guilty’ relying on the fact that when
she married him, she thought he was single. She
soon averred that their marriage was void due to
lack of marriage license, wherein she should not
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
then be charged with bigamy. 11 years after
inception if criminal case, Estela Galang, the first
wife, testified for the prosecution. She alleged that
she had met petitioner and introduced herself as
the legal wife. Petitioner denied allegation and
stated that she met Estela only after she had
already married Nicanor.
            Issue:   W/N petitioner is co-accused in the
instant case of Bigamy.
                        W/N marriage between Leonila and
Nicanor is valid
Held:
            Lower courts consistently found that
petitioner indeed knew of the first marriage as
shown by the totality of the following
circumstances: (1) when Nicanor was courting and
visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they
openly showed their disapproval of him (2) it was
incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not
know of his true civil status (3) Estela, who was the
more credible witness, compared to petitioner who
had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told
petitioner on two occasions that the former was
the legal wife of Nicanor. In People v. Archilla,
knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her
spouse’s existing prior marriage, constitutes an
indispensable cooperation in the commission of
Bigamy, which makes her responsible as an
accomplice. She is not co-accused. She is guilty of
Bigamy as an accomplice thereby sentenced to 6m
arresto mayor to 4y prision correccional.  cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of
2. Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805,
July 3, 2013
Capili vs People GR 183805
FACTS: On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged
with the crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig
City. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil
case for declaration of nullity of the second
marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by
Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the
marriage is declared null and void, it would
exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3)
the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of
nullity of the second marriage serves as a
prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
10
ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent declaration
of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
RULING: NO. It is undisputed that a second
marriage between petitioner and private
respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999
during the subsistence of a valid first marriage
between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili
contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC
of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature
of the second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of
petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
3. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 150758, 18 February 2004
FACTS:
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia
Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together
continuously and without interruption until the
later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas
that he had been previously married to a certain
Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left
the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas,
stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage
with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter
filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes
such. He further argued that his second marriage,
with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due
to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be
charged for bigamy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenebro can use psychological
incapacity as ground for absolution of bigamy case
against him.
RULING:
No. In invoking Article 36 of the Family Code,
petitioner failed to realize that a declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment
insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
does not retroact to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws
are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts
a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable
for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The prosecution was able to establish the validity of
the first marriage. As a second or subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of
petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological
capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes “any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.
4. Montañez v. Cipriano, G.R. No.
181089, 22 October 2012
FACTS: On April 8, 1976, respondent married
Socrates Flores. On January 24, 1983, during the
subsistence of the said marriage, respondent
married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent
filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa a Petition for the
Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the
ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as
defined under Article 36 of the Family Code. On July
18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, declared the
marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void.
Said decision became final and executory on
October 13, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner
Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter
from the first marriage, filed with the MTC of San
Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against
respondent. Lourdes Cipriano alleged that her first
marriage was already declared void ab initio in
11
2003. Thus, there was no more marriage to speak
of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24,
1983. The prosecution argued that the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated when
respondent filed her petition for declaration of
nullity. RTC ruled in favor of respondent on the
ground that both wedding were governed by the
Civil Code, and not the Family Code, hence, no
judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition
precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage.
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity of
respondent's first marriage in 2003 justifies the
dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against
her.
HELD: NO. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is
that as a general rule, no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural laws. In the case at
bar, the respondent’s clear intent was to obtain
judicial declaration of nullity to escape from the
bigamy charges against her.
5. Republic v. Tampus, G.R. No.
214243, March 16, 2016
FACTS: Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to
Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975. Three
days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a
member of the AFP, left respondent, and went to
Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had
no children. Since then, Nilda heard no news from
Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her
efforts proved futile. On April 14, 2009, she filed
before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as
presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage,
alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33)
years without any kind of communication from him,
she firmly believes that he is already dead.
ISSUE: W/N Dante should be declared
presumptively dead
RULING: NO. Before a judicial declaration of
presumptive death can be obtained, it must be
shown that the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the present spouse had
a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are
four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has
been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two
(2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil
Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to
remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-
founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4)
that the present spouse files a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death
requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based
on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It necessitates exertion of active
effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence
of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the
law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is
still alive, failure to communicate, or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would
not suffice.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's
disappearance, she tried to locate him by making
inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors
as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also
did not know where to find him. Other than making
said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further
efforts to find her husband. She could have called
or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request
information about her husband, but failed to do so.
She did not even seek the help of the authorities or
the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own
pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on
a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his
disappearance, she could have inquired from the
AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the
members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To
the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively
look for her missing husband, and her purported
earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's
parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the
strict standard and degree of diligence required to
create a "well-founded belief of his death.
12
6. Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr., G.R.
No. 199194, February 10, 2016
Facts:
On November 4, 2008
Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition[5]
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamiz[6]
City-Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive
death of his wife, Netchie S.[7]
Sareñogon (Netchie).
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin,
Misamis Occidental in 1991,[11] They later became
sweethearts and on August 10,1996, they got
married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall.[12]
However, they lived together as... husband and wife
for a month only because he left to work as a
seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a
domestic helper.[13] For three months, he did not
receive any communication from Netchie.[14] He
likewise had no idea about her... whereabouts.[15]
While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie's
parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left
Clarin, Misamis Occidental.[16] He returned home
after his contract expired.[17] He then... inquired
from Netchie's relatives and friends about her
whereabouts, but they also did not know where she
was.[18] Because of these, he had to presume that
his wife Netchie was already dead.[19] He filed the
Petition before the RTC so... he could contract
another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the
Family Code.[20]
Jose's testimony was corroborated by his older
brother Joel Sareñogon, and by Netchie's aunt,
Consuelo Sande.
The RTC... found that Netchie had disappeared for
more than four years, reason enough for Jose to
conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.
the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), elevated the judgment of the RTC to
the CA via a Petition for Certiorari[28], under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
the CA held that the Republic used the wrong
recourse by instituting a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA
perceived no error at all in the RTC's judgment
granting
Jose's Petition for the declaration of the
presumptive death of his wife, Netchie.
the Republic's appeal sought to correct or review
the RTC's alleged misappreciation of evidence
which could not translate into excess or lack of
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
jurisdiction... amounting to grave abuse of
discretion.
The Republic insists that a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the
proper remedy to challenge an RTC's immediately
final and executory Decision on a presumptive
death
The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence,
Jose's alleged efforts in locating Netchie did not
engender or generate a well-founded belief that
the latter is probably dead.
Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not
categorically assert that he wanted to have Netchie
declared presumptively dead because he intends to
get married again, an essential premise of Article 41
of the Family Code.
Issues:
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN DISMISSING THE REPUBLIC'S
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER
RULE 65, ON THE GROUND THAT THE PROPER
REMEDY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO APPEAL THE RTC
DECISION, BECAUSE IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND
EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS OR
DECISIONS ARE NOT APPEALABLE UNDER THE
EXPRESS PROVISION OF LAW.
THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN
LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE DO NOT
SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF"
THAT RESPONDENT'S ABSENT WIFE X X X IS
PROBABLY DEAD
Ruling:
This Court finds the Republic's petition meritorious.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is the proper remedy to question the RTC's
Decision in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death... the RTC's
Decision on a Petition for declaration of
presumptive death pursuant to Article 41 of the
Family Code is immediately final and executory.
Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to... entertain a
notice of appeal pertaining to such judgment.[49]
Concurring in the result, Justice (later Chief Justice)
Artemio Panganiban further therein pointed out
that the correct remedy to challenge the RTC
Decision was to institute a petition for... certiorari
under Rule 65, and not a petition for review under
Rule 45.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the
court in a summary proceeding shall be
13
immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the
trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive... death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code.
It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to question
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the
Court of
Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's
original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is
concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals
in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an... unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the
losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition
for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court
committed grave abuse of... discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. From the Decision of the C A,
the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The law did not define what is meant by "well-
founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances
of each particular case. Its determination, so to
speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able
to comply with this requirement, the present
spouse must prove that... his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts and
inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that
based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent
spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active
effort (not a... mere passive one).
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose 1ms
"well-founded belief that Netchie was already dead
upon the following grounds:
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie's parents
while he was still out of the country, but did not
reach them as they had allegedly left Clarin,
Misamis Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was
already dead because when he returned home, he
was not able to obtain any information that Netchie
was still alive from Netchie's relatives and friends;
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
(3) Jose's testimony to the effect that Netchie is no
longer alive, hence must be presumed dead, was
corroborated by Jose's older brother, and by
Netchie's aunt, both of whom testified that he
(Jose) and Netchie lived together as husband and
wife only for one month and... that after this, there
had been no information as to Netchie's
whereabouts.
Given the Court's imposition of "strict standard" in
a petition for a declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow
that there was no basis at all for the RTC's finding
that Jose's Petition complied with the requisites of
Article 41 of the
Family Code, in reference to the "well-founded
belief standard. If anything, Jose's pathetically
anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are
notches below the required degree of stringent
diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside
from his bare claims that he had... inquired from
alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie's
whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand
specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly
saw or met in the course of his search or quest for
the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove
that he... sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media, Nor did
he show mat he undertook a thorough, determined
and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least
two years (and what those years were), and naming
the particular places, provinces,... cities, barangays
or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and
identifying the specific persons he interviewed or
talked to in the course of his search.
7. Republic v. Molina G.R. No.
108763, February 13, 1997
Facts : On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O Molina
married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son.   Such incapacity must also be shown to be
After a year of marriage, Reynaldo show signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and
father as he preferred to spend more time with his
friends, depended on his parents for assistance, and
was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances resulting in frequent quarrels between
them.  The RTC granted Roridel petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage which was
affirmed by CA.
Issue : Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personality constitute psychological incapacity?
14
Ruling : There is no clear showing that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity.  It
appears to be more of a “difficulty” if not outright
“refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some
marital obligations.
Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and
“conflicting personalities” in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity.  It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence merely adduced that Roridel and her
husband could not get along with each other. 
There had been no showing of the gravity of the
problem, neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability.
The following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down for the guidance of the bench and
the bar:
 The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.
 The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical.
 The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at “the time of the celebration” of
the marriage.
medically of clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex.
 Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
“mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts”
cannot be accepted as root causes.
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220,221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven be evidence and included
in the text of the decision.
 Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from the 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983.
 The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition.
Judgment reversed and set aside.
8. Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No.
136490, October 19, 2000
FACTS:
Wilson Marcos and Brenda Marcos first met
sometime in 1980 when both of them were
assigned at the Malacanang Palace, she as an escort
of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of
President Ferdinand Marcos. They got married
twice, first was on September 6, 1982 and on May
8, 1983 and blessed with five children. After the
downfall of President Marcos, he left the military
service in 1987 and then engaged in different
business ventures that did not succeeded. Due to
his failure to engage in any gainful employment,
they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he
would hit and beat her. He would also inflict
physical harm on their children. In 1992, they were
already living separately. On October 16, 1994,
when Brenda saw him in their house, she was so
angry that she lambasted him. Wilson then turned
15
violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on
her mother who came to her aid. On October 17,
1994, she and their children left the house and
sought refuge in her sister’s house. On October 19,
1994, she submitted herself to medical examination
at the Mandaluyong Medical Center. Thus,
petitioner filed for annulment of marriage in the
RTC assailing Article 36 of the Family Code. The
court ruled the respondent to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
But the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the RTC because psychological incapacity had not
been established by the totality of the evidence
presented. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there is a need for personal medical
examination of respondent to prove psychological
incapacity? Whether the totality of evidence
presented in this case show psychological
incapacity?
 
HELD:
The testimonies of petitioner, the common
children, petitioner’s sister and the social worker
were not enough to sustain a finding that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
Personal medical or psychological examination of
respondent is not a requirement for a declaration
of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the
totality of the evidence she presented does not
show such incapacity. Although Supreme Court is
convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of these acts does not lead to a conclusion
of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his “defects” were
already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable.
9. Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No.
214064, February 6, 2017
FACTS:
As their parents were good friends and business
partners, Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then,
eventually, became sweethearts. During their
courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained
his affair with his former girlfriend. The couple's
relationship turned tumultuous after the revelation.
With the intervention of their parents, they
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
reconciled. They got married and were blessed with
two (2) children. Mirasol filed a Complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dasmarinas, Cavite.
The RTC declared the marriage between Mirasol
and Felipe null and void.
Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the RTC denied.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC, ruling that Mirasol failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe was
suffering from psychological incapacity, thus,
incapable of performing marital obligations due to
some psychological illness existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented
warrants, as the RTC determined, the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the
ground of the latter's psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code?
RULINGS:
It was held that "psychological incapacity" has been
intended by law to be confined to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e.,
it must be grave and serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
The presentation of any form of medical or
psychological evidence to show the psychological
incapacity, however, did not mean that the same
would have automatically ensured the granting of
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It
bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the
other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions
16
presented by the parties but on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings.
The Court finds that there exists insufficient factual
or legal basis to conclude that Felipe's sexual
infidelity and irresponsibility can be equated with
psychological incapacity as contemplated by law.
Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did not
present other witnesses to substantiate her
allegations on Felipe's infidelity notwithstanding
the fact that she claimed that their relatives saw
him with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is
considered self-serving and had no serious
evidentiary value.
10. Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA, GR No.
119190, Jan. 16, 1997
FACTS:
On 22 May 1988, plaintiff and the defendant got
married. Although they slept in the same bed since
May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, no sexual
intercourse took place. Because of this, they
submitted themselves for medical examinations.
She was found healthy, normal and still a virgin. Her
husband’s examination was kept confidential.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent,
a closet homosexual, and that the defendant
married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country
and to publicly maintain the appearance of a
normal man. The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile
with her husband.
The defendant claims that should the marriage be
annulled, it is his wife’s fault. He claims no defect
on his part, as he was found not to be impotent,
and any differences between the two of them can
still be reconciled. He admitted that they have not
had intercourse since their marriage until their
separation because his wife avoided him. He added
that his wife filed this case against him because she
is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces
of jewellery of his mother, and, that the defendant,
will consummate their marriage.
The trial court declared the marriage void. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is psychologically incapacitated?
RULING:
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
Yes. Senseless and protracted refusal to
consummate the marriage is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual
relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious
personality disorder which to the mind of the Court
clearly demonstrates an ‘utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage’ within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Petitioner further contends that respondent court
erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological incapacity
of both. However, neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have
sexual contact with the other. But the fact remains
that there has never been coitus between them. At
any rate, since the action to declare the marriage
void may be filed by either party,  the question of
who refuses to have sex with the other becomes
immaterial.
One of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is “to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage.” In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfil the
above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
The petition is DENIED.
11. Noel Buenaventura v. CA, et al.,
GR No. 127358, March 31, 2005
Facts:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner
Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground
of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife,
Isabel Singh Buenaventura... the lower court found
that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-
appellee into marrying him by professing true love
instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy
parental pressure to marry and that because of
pride he married defendant-appellee... that he had
17
no inclination to make the marriage work such that
in times... of trouble, he chose the easiest way out,
that of leaving defendant appellee and their son
On the other hand, the trial court declared the
marriage of the parties null and void based on
Article 36 of the Family Code, due to psychological
incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue
on the settlement of the parties' common
property,... Nor did it commit a reversible error in
ruling that petitioner and private respondent own
the "family home" and all their common property in
equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
liquidation and partition... of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership
under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in
relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code,
should aptly prevail
Issues:
awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217
and 2229 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines
Regarding Attorney's fees, Art. 2208... what to do
with the assets of the conjugal partnership in the
event of declaration of annulment of the marriage
Ruling:
the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring and decreeing the marriage
entered into between plaintiff Noel A.
Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia
Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null
and void ab initio... the appellate court
promulgated a Decision dismissing
petitioner's appeal for lack of merit and
affirming in toto the trial court's decision...
since psychological incapacity means that
one is truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that one must assume and
discharge as a consequence of marriage, it
removes the basis for the contention that
the petitioner purposely deceived the
private... respondent. If the private
respondent was deceived, it was not due to
a willful act on the part of the petitioner.
Therefore, the award of moral damages was
without basis in law and in fact
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it
follows that the grant of exemplary damages
cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that
exemplary damages are imposed in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.
since the award of moral and... exemplary damages
is no longer justified, the award of attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at
least half of the separation/retirement benefits
which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East
Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-
President of said company for the reason that the
benefits accrued from... plaintiff appellant's service
for the bank for a number of years, most of which
while he was married to defendant-appellee, the
trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true
with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in
Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-
appellant at the time he was married to defendant-
appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as
her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no
reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated
December 10, 1996 which are contested in the
Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby
MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees,... expenses of
litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving
respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of
petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and
one-half of petitioner's shares of stock in Manila
Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of
Companies is... sustained but on the basis of the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-
ownership and not of the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED
Principles:
The award by the trial court of moral damages is
based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code,
which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
18
damages may be recovered if they are the...
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product
of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the
control of the party because of an innate inability,
while at the same time considering the... same set
of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts
was negated. The award of moral damages should
be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into
the marriage, but on... specific evidence that it was
done deliberately and with malice by a party who
had knowledge of his or her disability and yet
willfully concealed the same.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law
states that the final judgment therein shall provide
for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive... legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
this article is what governs when it comes to their
property settlements as the marriage was void from
the beginning
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions
of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may
be, of the Family
Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the
Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous
cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired... by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.
12. Carating-Siayngo vs. Siayngo, G.R.
No. 158896, October 27, 2004
Facts:
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
01 July 2003, reversing the decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon
City,... dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed
by respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco
("respondent Manuel").
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24)
years of married life together, respondent Manuel
filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He
alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife
exhibited an over... domineering and selfish
attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her
extremely volatile and bellicose nature
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that
respondent Manuel is still living with her at their
conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he
invented malicious stories against her so that he
could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a
loving wife and mother; that it was... respondent
Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family
obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel
in all his endeavors despite his philandering; that
she was raised in a real h
In the pre-trial order,[3] the parties only stipulated
on the following:
That they were married on 27 June 1973;
That they have one son who is already 20 years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent
Manuel first took the witness stand and elaborated
on the allegations in his petition.
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel's Clerk of
Court, testified that petitioner Juanita seldom went
to respondent Manuel's office.[19] But when she
was there, she would call witness to complain
about the curtains and the cleanliness of the...
office.
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented
DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional
qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by
petitioner Juanita.[23] From her psychiatric
evaluation,[24] Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita
Victoria Carating-Siayngco contributed to the
marital collapse. There is a partner relational
problem which affected their capacity to sustain the
marital bond with love, support and understanding.
19
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied
respondent Manuel's allegations. She insisted that
they were a normal couple who had their own
share of fights; that they were happily married until
respondent Manuel started having extra-marital
affairs[26] which... he had admitted to her
Even when he already filed the present case, she
would still attend to his needs.[29] She
remembered that after the pre-trial, while they
were in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored
her to... give him a chance to have a new family.
[30]
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the
respondent to be psychologically... capacitated to
comply with the basic and essential obligations of
marriage.[32
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied
respondent Manuel's petition
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the
RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric
evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and
Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the
case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.
Issues:
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE
TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER
AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE
FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT
WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID
DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF
REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON
GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our
ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in
its factual milieu with the case at bar.
In our book, however, these inadequacies of
petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to
file a case against her do not amount to
psychological incapacity to comply... with the
essential marital obligations
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass,
we now resolve the issue of whether or not the
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity against
petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr.
Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties
and their witnesses is that the only essential marital
obligation which respondent Manuel was not able
to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.
[49]Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code.
In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist
was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that
petitioner was psychologically capacitated to
comply with... the basic and essential obligations of
marriage.[54]
Dr. Garcia's report paints a story of a husband and
wife who grew professionally during the marriage,
who pursued their... individual dreams to the hilt,
becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing
intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was
confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during his
direct examination
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null
and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is
reinstated and given full force and... effect. No
costs.
Principles:
we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals[47] that the
burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage
belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein).
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of... the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity
13. Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793,
February 13, 2009
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. R. CV
No. 71867. The petition further assails the January
20
19, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged decision.
Sometimes in January 1996 Petitioner Edward
Kenneth Ngo Te first met respondent Rowena Ong
Gutierrez YuTe in a gathering organized by the
Filipino Chinese association in their college. Sharing
similar angst towards their families, the two
understood one another and developed a certain
degree of closeness towards each other. In March
1996, or around three months after their first
meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At
first, he refused, bickering that he was young and
jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent.
Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that
month; he, providing their travel money and she,
purchases the boat ticket.
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a
month. Their pension house accommodation and
daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could
not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go
back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s
house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his
family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would
commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with
Rowena at her uncle’s place. On April 23, 1996,
Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get
married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.
Rowena suggested that he should get his
inheritance so that they could live on their own.
Edward talked to his father he told that he will
disinherited and insisted that Edward must go
home. In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to
Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they
should live with his parents, she said that it was
better for them to live separate lives. They then
parted ways.
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000,
Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the
annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis
of the latters psychological incapacity.  The trial
court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision
declaring the marriage of the parties null and void
on the ground that both parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
Issue:
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
Whether or not the contracted marriage is void on
the ground that both parties were psychologically
incapacitated
Held:
The Psychological test result and evaluation result
were both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to
be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive
upon swearing to their marital vows as each of
them was motivated by different notions on
marriage. Although there is no requirement that
the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.  Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.
The petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19,
2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R.
CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
14. Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No.
203284, November 14, 2016
FACTS:
Nicolas S, Matudan (petitioner) and respondent
Marilyn B. Matudan were married in Laoang,
Northern Samar on October 26, 1976. They had
four children. In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad.
Petitioner lost contact with her; she had not been
seen nor heard from again.
On June 20, 2008, petitioner filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in Quezon City
and alleged that before, during, and after his
marriage to Marilyn, the latter was psychologically
incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife and
mother; that she consistently neglected and failed
to provide petitioner and her children with the
necessary emotional and financial care, support,
and sustenance, and even so after leaving for work
abroad.
Based on expert evaluation conducted by Clinical
Psychologist Dr. Tayag, Marilyn's psychological
incapacity is grave, permanent, and incurable. Dr.
Tayag claimed that Marilyn was not ready for a
lasting and permanent commitment like marriage
21
as she never (gave) him and their children financial
and emotional support, for being selfish through
their six (6) years of cohabitation as Marilyn was
despicably irresponsible and has not shown love
and care upon her husband, and that she cannot
properly and morally take on the responsibility of a
loving and caring wife.
The RTC issued its dismissed the Petition on the
ground that petitioner's evidence failed to
sufficiently prove Marilyn's claimed psychological
incapacity. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marilyn was psychologically
incapacitated?
HELD:
No.
Petitioner argues that he was able to prove
Marilyn's psychological incapacity from Dr. Tayag's
diagnosis that she was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality.
Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial
affidavit and testimony. Marilyn did not participate
in the proceedings.
Petitioner's judicial affidavit and testimony during
trial failed to show gravity and juridical
antecedence. While he complained that Marilyn
lacked a sense of guilt and was involved in
"activities defying social and moral ethic0s," and
that she was irrational, irresponsible, immature,
and self-centered. He failed to sufficiently and
particularly elaborate on these allegations,
particularly the degree of Marilyn's claimed
irresponsibility, immaturity, or selfishness.
Petitioner contradicted his own claims by testifying
that he and Marilyn were happily married and
never had a fight, which is why they begot four
children and the only reason for his filing was
Marilyn's complete abandonment of the marriage
and family when she left to work abroad.
Dr. Tayag's supposed expert findings regarding
Marilyn's psychological condition were not based
on actual tests or interviews conducted upon
Marilyn herself; they are based on the personal
accounts of petitioner.
The observations and conclusions were
insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to
warrant the conclusion that a psychological
incapacity existed that prevented the respondent
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3
from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the
respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to
prove that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the
respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological,
not physical, nature.
Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report --i.e., that the
respondent suffered Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality
Disorder declared to be grave and incurable is an
unfounded statement. To make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent's psychological
condition based on the information fed by only one
side is the same as admitting hearsay evidence as
proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The January
31, 2012 Decision and August 23, 2012 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95392
are AFFIRMED.
15.  Tani-Dela Fuente Vs. Dela Fuente, Jr., GR NO.
188400 08 March 2017
Facts:
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo
De la Fuente Jr. got married in Mandaluyong City
after being in a relationship for five (5) years. They
had two children.
While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa
already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and
was prone to jealousy. His attitude worsened as
they went on with their marital life. His jealousy
became so severe that he even poked a gun to his
15 year old cousin and he treated Maria Teresa like
a sex slave who made the latter feel maltreated and
molested. Sometime in 1986, the couple quarreled
because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was
having an affair. In the heat of their quarrel,
Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. She
left and never saw Rodolfo again after that, and
supported their children by herself.
On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. As support to her petitions,
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clinical psychologist, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez was
presented as an expert witness. However, Rodolfo
did not file any responsive pleading. The trial court
eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver
of his right to present evidence.
Before the promulgation of its decision, on June 26,
2002, the trial court directed the Office of the
Solicitor General to submit its comment on Maria
Teresa's formal offer of evidence. The Office of the
Solicitor General was also directed to submit its
certification. The Office of the Solicitor General,
however, failed to comply with the trial court's
orders; thus, the case was submitted for decision
without the certification and comment from the
Office of the Solicitor General. On August 14, 2002,
the trial court promulgated its decision granting the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed a motion for reconsideration. The
Office of the Solicitor General explained that it was
unable to submit the required certification because
it had no copies of the transcripts of stenographic
notes. It was also unable to inform the trial court of
its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it
was handling On September 13 2002, the trial court
denied the motion for reconsideration..
The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal
before the Court of Appeals. It argued that the trial
court erred a) in deciding the case without the
required certification from the Office of the Solicitor
General, 58 and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's
conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality disorder.
It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on
insufficient data and did not follow the standards
set forth in the Molina case. Still, Rodolfo did not
file any responsive pleading.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
RTC. In its resolution dated May 25, 2009, CA
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
Maria Teresa.
On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari. This time Rodolfo filed a
Comment 70 stating that he was not opposing
Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly believes
that there is in fact no more sense in adjudging him
and petitioner as married."
Issue:
PERSONS – ATTY DC – MODULE 3

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking
denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of professional help. Respondent also refused to be
Marriage. examined by Dr. Lopez.
Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's
Held: personality disorder, he is incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations of giving love, respect, and
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in denying the support to the petitioner. He recommends that the
petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage marriage be annulled.
Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his
find that there was sufficient compliance wife from her family and friends, as well as his
with Molina to warrant the nullity of petitioner's increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his
marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what
discharge the burden of proof that respondent marriage and partnership entail. It would be of
suffered from psychological incapacity. The Court of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that
Appeals is mistaken when it chided the lower court petitioner should remain married to respondent.
for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage
Lopez since he had no chance to personally conduct and their family, respondent simply refused to
a thorough study and analysis of respondent's believe that there was anything wrong in their
mental and psychological condition. marriage. This shows that respondent truly could
not comprehend and perform his marital
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non- obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this
examination of one of the parties will not Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is
automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the incurable.
findings of the examining psychiatrist or
psychologist, since "marriage, by its very The petition is granted.
definition, necessarily involves only two persons.
The totality of the behavior of one spouse during
the cohabitation and marriage is generally and
genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.
Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband
and wife "to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support." In this case, petitioner and respondent
may have lived together, but the facts narrated by
petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could
not, comply with the obligations expected of him as
a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their
marriage.
The incurability and severity of respondent's
psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by
Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid
personality disorder would refuse to admit that
there was something wrong and that there was a
need for treatment. This was corroborated by
petitioner when she stated that respondent
repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted
a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested
couples counseling to respondent; however,

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