Assignment No.

2
Q.No.1Discuss the circumstances under which Pakistan People’s
Party emerged on the political scene or Pakistan.
The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) represents another part of Pakistan's political
spectrum. The PPP was a vehicle for the political ambitions of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.
His immediate aim was to bring down the government of his former political mentor,
Ayub Khan. The party's inaugural convention was held in Lahore in 1967. The PPP
adopted the slogan "Islam our Faith, Democracy our Polity, Socialism our Economy."
The party, like its founder, was enigmatic and full of contradictions. A left-leaning
populist movement, the PPP attempted to blend Islam with socialism. The PPP
espoused such policies as land reform to help the peasants; nationalization of
industries to weaken the industrialists; and administrative reforms to reduce the power
of the bureaucrats. The party, however, was built on the foundations of the wealthy,
landed elite, Pakistan's traditional ruling class.
The PPP came to power in December 1971 after the loss of East Pakistan, when
Bhutto was sworn in as president and chief martial law administrator. Bhutto lifted
martial law in April 1972 and in 1973 stepped down as president and became prime
minister. The PPP did little to advance the first two tenets of its platform, Islam and
democracy, but promoted socialism with a vengeance. Bhutto nationalized large-scale
industries, insurance companies, and commercial banks, and he set up a number of
public corporations to expand the role of the government in commerce, construction,
and transportation. The heavy hand with which Bhutto and the PPP exerted their
power aroused widespread resentment. Matters came to a head in 1977 when the PPP
won 155 of the 200 seats in the National Assembly with 58 percent of the total votes
cast. The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a coalition of nine opposition parties and
with 35 percent of the votes, won only thirty-six seats. The PNA charged widespread
electoral fraud, and the resulting PPP-PNA confrontation and the accompanying civil
unrest precipitated the imposition of martial law.
The survival of Bhutto's party after his execution in 1979 was facilitated by dynastic
politics. His widow Nusrat and his daughter Benazir, led the party as cochairpersons.
During martial law, the PPP joined with ten other parties in the Movement for the
Restoration of Democracy (MRD) to pressure the Zia government to hold free
elections under the 1973 constitution. Four of the MRD's component parties were
members of the PNA, which had been formed to oppose the PPP in the 1977 elections.
The PPP joined the MRD coalition, hoping the military would be prepared to
negotiate with the MRD if it were part of a larger political alliance.
The MRD campaign launched in February 1981 appeared to gain momentum. In
March 1981, however, a Pakistan International Airlines aircraft was hijacked by
terrorists demanding the release of political prisoners. The hijacking was the work of
an organization--Al-Zulfiqar--allegedly run by Bhutto's son, Murtaza. Although the
PPP dissociated itself from the episode, the hijacking was a major setback for both the
PPP and the MRD. Another MRD agitation failed in 1983. After Zia's death in 1988,
the MRD was dissolved, and the PPP, the largest party in the alliance, contested the
1988 elections on its own. Although the PPP emerged as the single largest party in the
National Assembly as a result of the 1988 elections, it won a narrow plurality, and
only with the support of the Refugee People's Movement (Muhajir Qaumi
Mahaz--MQM) and other parties was it able to form a government. After a troubled
period in power, the PPP government was dismissed by President Ishaq Khan in 1990.
The PPP was the principal member of the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA),
which lost the 1990 elections to the IJI. The PDA blamed its defeat on alleged
tampering with the vote. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs,
an international observer team, did note irregularities in the election but declared that
the ultimate outcome was in general accordance with the popular will.
In the October 1993 general elections that returned Benazir to power, the PPP won
eighty-six of the 217 seats in the National Assembly, while Nawaz Sharif's PML-N
won seventy-two. The PPP was successful in forming a coalition with other parties to
control a block of 121 seats.

Q.No.2Discuss the origin and growth of ANP and MQM in Pakistan.

What were the factors that led to the creation of these regional
political parties in Pakistan?
AWAMI NATIONAL PARTY
FORMED IN: 1986
THE AWAMI NATIONAL PARTY FOLLOWS THE IDEOLOGY OF KHAN
ABDUL GHAFFAR KHAN, LOVINGLY KNOWN BY HIS SUPPORTERS AS
BACHA KHAN, WHO PREACHED NON-VIOLENCE AND BELIEVED IN
MAXIMUM PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY.
TOP LEADERS
 Asfandyar Wali Khan
 Ameer Haider Hoti
 Afrasiab Khattak
 Ghulam Ahmad Bilour
 Zahid Khan
 Bushra Gohar
 Shahi Syed

KEY CONCERNS:
 Advocates for maximum provincial autonomy and implementation of the 18th
Amendment.
 Will reduce security checkposts and replace them with enhanced intelligence,
state-of-the-art surveillance with a backup from quick response force
 Advocates for a stable democratic system and opposes army intervention in
government matters.
 Believes in maintaining neutral relations with all neighbouring states, including
India and Afghanistan. The party is against interference in other countries'
internal matters.
 Wants a separate province for Pakhtun-majority areas following KP's merger with
Fata.
 Wants reduction in military expenditure in order to spend on public welfare.

ELECTIONS 2018
ANP has fielded candidates from 60 NA seats — out of these, three seats are from
Punjab, 10 from Sindh, 29 from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, eight from Balochistan, nine
from Fata and one from Islamabad.
1984
March
The All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organisation launches the party, Mohajir Qaumi
Movement.
1987
November
MQM formally enters politics, after winning local municipal elections in Karachi and
Hyderabad.

1988
November
The MQM swept the 1988 election in Sindh’s urban areas and entered into a
cooperation agreement with PPP, enabling it to become part of the government.
1989
October
Differences developed between the PPP and MQM after dozens were killed at an
MQM congregration by Sindhi nationalists, and the alliance fell apart in the wake of
ensuing violence. The MQM lent its support to Nawaz Sharif’s Islami Jamhoori
Ittehad instead.
1990
October
In the 1990 election, MQM again emerged as the third largest party forming an
alliance and a coalition government with PML-N, the leading party at the time.
1992
January
MQM chief Altaf Hussain leaves for London for medical treatment. He has not
returned since then.
June
The army launches the infamous ‘Operation clean-up’, ostensibly to rid the city of
terrorism. The operation targeted the MQM in particular. As a result, a breakaway
faction known as the MQM-Haqiqi emerged. Meanwhile, party leaders went into
hiding and party offices were shut down.
1993
October
Elections are held once again. The MQM boycotts the national assembly polls, but
sweeps provincial elections, and once again allies with the PPP in Sindh. Their
participation was despite on-and-off action against the party all the way till 1996.
1997
February
Benazir Bhutto’s government is dismissed on charges of the murders of MQM
workers in fake encounters by the police. The MQM wins national and provincial
assembly seats in the 1997 polls, and allies with PML-N again.
July
After much deliberation and delay, the Mohajir Qaumi Movement changes its official
name to Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM).
1998
October
The murder of Hakim Sayeed, a famous Pakistani philanthropist leads to the
imposition of Governor rule in Sindh. The MQM and PML-N’s alliance came to an
end.
2002
October
The then President Pervez Musharraf, who had overthrown Nawaz in a military coup,
held elections. The MQM performed well, and became a coalition partner of its arch
enemy, the military government.
2006
January
MQM threatens to quit the coalition government, ostensibly over army operations in
Balochistan. It later retracts the ultimatum.
2007
May
MQM was accused by anti-Musharraf parties and sections of the media for instigating
violence on the streets of Karachi when Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry
arrived in the city to address a lawyers’ meeting.
2008
February
In the 2008 election, the party again became part of the ruling coalition government at
the centre and in Sindh — once again with the PPP.
2012
December
The MQM’s office in London was raided in connection with Farooq’s murder.
December
MQM chief Altaf Hussain criticised the judiciary and said that judges of the Supreme
Court should apologise for their remarks about delimitation of Karachi’s
constituencies or face consequences.
December
The Supreme Court ordered the MQM chief to appear before it in person and explain
why he should not be charged with contempt for “his contemptuous assertions against
the judiciary”.
2013
January
Hussain files an unconditional apology, which was accepted by the apex court.
February
The MQM announced that it had decided to quit the federal and provincial
governments in protest against what it described as the ‘negative attitude’ of the PPP.
February
The Sindh People’s Local Government Act, 2012 is repealed. The act had been seen a
major prize for the MQM for its oft-broken alliance at the centre and in Sindh for
providing for a separate local government system for its powerbase of Karachi.
May
MQM sweeps elections across most of Karachi and in parts of lower Sindh.
Allegations of rigging in NA-250 bring MQM-PTI tensions to the forefront, with
polls delayed there.
May
The London Metropolitan police launched an investigation against the MQM chief
following complaints by hundreds of British and Pakistani citizens.
May
Following the death of PTI office bearer Zahra Shahid Hussain, the tensions between
the two parties continued to flare up after PTI chief Imran Khan directly accused Altaf
Hussain of her murder. MQM boycotted the polls in NA-250, and PTI won the
constituency’s provincial and national seats.
May
MQM’s Karachi Organising Committee is disbanded, in an apparent reaction to
‘hooliganism’
May
The MQM’s Rabita (Communication) Committee was disbanded. The decision was
made by the committee itself and was approved by Hussain, according to MQM. The
decision followed the party chief’s proclamation to rid the party of ‘corrupt elements’.
The roots of Pakistan's multifaceted problems can be traced to March 1940 when the
All-India Muslim League formally orchestrated the demand for a Pakistan consisting
of Muslim-majority provinces in the northwest and northeast of India. By asserting
that the Indian Muslims were a nation, not a minority, the Muslim League and its
leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had hoped to negotiate a constitutional arrangement
that provided an equitable share of power between Hindus and Muslims once the
British relinquished control of India. The demand for a "Pakistan" was Jinnah's and
the League's bid to register their claim to be the spokesmen of all Indian Muslims,
both in provinces were they were in a majority as well as in provinces where they
were a minority. Jinnah and the League's main bases of support, however, were in the
Muslim-minority provinces. In the 1937 general elections, the league had met a
serious rejection from the Muslim voters in the majority provinces.
There was an obvious contradiction in a demand for a separate Muslim state and the
claim to be speaking for all Indian Muslims. During the remaining years of the British
Raj in India neither Jinnah nor the Muslim League explained how Muslims in the
minority provinces could benefit from a Pakistan based on an undivided Punjab, Sind,
North-West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan in the northwest, and an undivided
Bengal and Assam in the northeast. Jinnah did at least had tried to get around the
inconsistencies by arguing that since there were two nations in India-Hindu and
Muslim-any transfer of power from British to Indian hands would necessarily entail
disbanding of the unitary center created by the imperial rulers. Reconstitution of the
Indian union would have to be based on either confederal or treaty arrangements
between Pakistan (representing the Muslim-majority provinces) and Hindustan
(representing the Hindu-majority provinces). Jinnah also maintained that Pakistan
would have to include an undivided Punjab and Bengal. The substantial non-Muslim
minorities in both these provinces were the best guarantee that the Indian National
Congress would see sense in negotiating reciprocal arrangements with the Muslim
League to safeguard the interests of Muslim minorities in Hindustan.
Despite Jinnah's large claims, the Muslim League failed to build up effective party
machinery in the Muslim-majority provinces. Consequently the league had no real
control over either the politicians or the populace at the base that was mobilized in the
name of Islam. During the final negotiations, Jinnah's options were limited by
uncertain commitment of the Muslim-majority province politicians to the league's
goals in the demand for Pakistan. The outbreak of communal troubles constrained
Jinnah further still. In the end he had little choice but to settle for a Pakistan stripped
of the non-Muslim majority districts of the Punjab and Bengal and to abandon his
hopes of a settlement that might have secured the interests of all Muslims. But the
worst cut of all was Congress's refusal to interpret partition as a division of India
between Pakistan and Hindustan. According to the Congress, partition simply meant
that certain areas with Muslim majorities were 'splitting off' from the "Indian union."
The implication was that if Pakistan failed to survive, the Muslim areas would have to
return to the Indian union; there would be no assistance to recreate it on the basis of
two sovereign states.
With this agreement nothing stood in the way of the reincorporation of the Muslim
areas into the Indian union except the notion of a central authority, which had yet to
be firmly established. To establish a central authority proved to be difficult, especially
since the provinces had been governed from New Delhi for so long and the separation
of Pakistan's eastern and western wings by one thousand miles of Indian territory.
Even if Islamic sentiments were the best hope of keeping the Pakistani provinces
unified, their pluralistic traditions and linguistic affiliations were formidable
stumbling blocks. Islam had certainly been a useful rallying cry, but it had not been
effectively translated into the solid support that Jinnah and the League needed from
the Muslim provinces in order to negotiate an arrangement on behalf of all Indian
Muslims.
The diversity of Pakistan's provinces, therefore, was a potential threat to central
authority. While the provincial arenas continued to be the main centers of political
activity, those who set about creating the centralized government in Karachi were
either politicians with no real support or civil servants trained in the old traditions of
British Indian administration. The inherent weaknesses of the Muslim League's
structure, together with the absence of a central administrative apparatus that could
coordinate the affairs of the state, proved to be a crippling disadvantage for Pakistan
overall. The presence of millions of refugees called for urgent remedial action by a
central government that, beyond not being established, had neither adequate resources
nor capacities. The commercial groups had yet to invest in some desperately needed
industrial units. And the need to extract revenues from the agrarian sector called for
state interventions, which caused a schism between the administrative apparatus of the
Muslim League and the landed elite who dominated the Muslim League.

Q.No.3 Explain political system on the basis of following:

(a) Single party system
A one-party state, single-party state, one-party system, or single-party system is a type
of state in which one political party has the right to form the government, usually
based on the existing constitution. All other parties are either outlawed or allowed to
take only a limited and controlled participation in elections. Sometimes the term de
facto one-party state is used to describe a dominant-party system that, unlike the
one-party state, allows (at least nominally) democratic multiparty elections, but the
existing practices or balance of political power effectively prevent the opposition
from winning the elections.

(b) Two party system

A two-party system is a party system where two major political parties[1] dominate the
political landscape. At any point in time, one of the two parties typically holds a
majority in the legislature and is usually referred to as the majority or governing
party while the other is the minority or opposition party. Around the world, the term
has different senses. For example, in the United States, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Malta,
and Zimbabwe, the sense of two-party system describes an arrangement in which all
or nearly all elected officials belong to one of the only two major parties, and third
parties rarely win any seats in the legislature. In such arrangements, two-party
systems are thought to result from various factors like winner-takes-all election
rules. In such systems, while chances for third-party candidates winning election to
major national office are remote, it is possible for groups within the larger parties, or
in opposition to one or both of them, to exert influence on the two major parties. In
contrast, in Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia and in other parliamentary
systems and elsewhere, the term two-party system is sometimes used to indicate an
arrangement in which two major parties dominate elections but in which there are
viable third parties that do win seats in the legislature, and in which the two major
parties exert proportionately greater influence than their percentage of votes would
suggest.
Explanations for why a political system with free elections may evolve into a
two-party system have been debated. A leading theory, referred to as Duverger's law,
states that two parties are a natural result of a winner-take-all voting system.

(c) Multiparty system:

A multi-party system is a political system in which multiple political parties across

the political spectrum run for national election, and all have the capacity to gain
control of government offices, separately or in coalition.[1] Apart
from one-party-dominant and two-party systems, multi-party systems tend to be more
common in parliamentary systems than presidential systems and far more common in
countries that use proportional representation compared to countries that
use first-past-the-post elections. Several parties compete for power and all of them
have reasonable chance of forming government.
First-past-the-post requires concentrated areas of support for large representation in
the legislature whereas proportional representation better reflects the range of a
population's views. Proportional systems may have multi-member districts with more
than one representative elected from a given district to the same legislative body, and
thus a greater number of viable parties. Duverger's law states that the number of
viable political parties is one, plus the number of seats in a district.
Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Tunisia,
and Ukraine are examples of nations that have used a multi-party system effectively
in their democracies. In these countries, usually no single party has a parliamentary
majority by itself. Instead, multiple political parties are compelled to form
compromised coalitions for the purpose of developing power blocks and attaining
legitimate mandate.
A system where only two parties have the possibility of winning an election is called
a two-party system. A system where only three parties have a realistic possibility of
winning an election or forming a coalition is sometimes called a "Third-party system".
But, in some cases the system is called a "Stalled Third-Party System," when there are
three parties and all three parties win a large number of votes, but only two have a
chance of winning an election. Usually this is because the electoral system penalises
the third party, e.g. as in Canadian or UK politics. In the 2010 UK elections, the
Liberal Democrats gained 23% of the total vote but won less than 10% of the seats
due to the first-past-the-post electoral system. Despite this, they still had enough seats
(and enough public support) to form coalitions with one of the two major parties, or to
make deals in order to gain their support. An example is the Conservative-Liberal
Democrat coalition formed after the 2010 general election. Another is the Lib-Lab
pact during Prime Minister James Callaghan's Minority Labour Government; when
Labour lost its three-seat majority in 1977, the pact fell short of a full coalition. In
Canada, there are three major federal political parties: the Conservative Party of
Canada, the Liberal Party of Canada, and the New Democratic Party. However, in
recent Canadian history, the Liberals and Conservatives (and their states) have been
the only two parties to elect a Prime Minister in Canada, with the New Democratic
Party, Bloc Quebecois and Green Party often winning seats in the House of Commons.
The main exception was the 2011 Canadian election when the New Democrats were
the Official Opposition and the Liberal Party was reduced to third party status.
Unlike a one-party system (or a two-party system), a multi-party system encourages
the general constituency to form multiple distinct, officially recognized groups,
generally called political parties. Each party competes for votes from
the enfranchised constituents (those allowed to vote). A multi-party system prevents
the leadership of a single party from controlling a single legislative chamber without
challenge.

Q.No.4Discuss the role of pressure groups in Pakistan. What are the

characteristics of the business community in Pakistan as a
pressure group?
According to the writer the reason behind the instability is basically the lack of a
proper political system in Pakistan. No government has survived for long and
successfully. The national assembly has been dissolved 10 times and 3 times the
reason was military interference. No political parties have worked together in peace.
There has been always a conflict of interest or power. At the same time religious
parties have created their own brand of Islam and are exploiting the situation. Lack of
fair elections and corruption has led to extreme cases like political victimization and
political polarisation. Even though democratic political institutions exist they are
weak and fragile. Another factor is of the existence of feudal lords, which has caused
a structural imbalance between the middle class, and the upper class, which comprises
of mostly landlords and industrialists. Majority of the power lies in the hands of the
upper class. Another issue that has been highlighted in the article is the ethnic conflict
that has been in debate for years. Other issues that are discussed in the article are the
role of army, rising power of the religious parties and lack of proper rule of law. To
conclude the article discusses that future of Pakistan lies in a more democratic
environment where there is less corruption and the role of judiciary would be stronger
in maintaining a balance between the arbitrary power and the party in power. Today
the masses are more informed about the political system in Pakistan and one way it
has contributed to the development of the country as a whole however there are other
major factors like increase in the level of suicide attacks, food shortage, water and
power shortage which has adversely affected the country.
What was a basic ideology for the existence of the country is now more of a pressure
group that seeks to gain power by exploiting the constant military intervention and
forcing out the secular political parties. The creation of political polarisation amongst
civilian and military, among different ethnic groups and provincial groups and among
Islamists and secularist has disrupted the regime stability. Also now religious pressure
groups have become more powerful, well armed and well financed and influence
different branches of government. People have lost trust in the secular parties like
Muslim League (Nawaz) and PPP and at the same time most of the military rulers
have used Islamist for their own political purpose, be it Zia or be it Musharraf.
According to the author the best way to control the growing power of Islamists is
through democracy and strengthening the civil society. Also he suggests that U.S
intervention in such matter should be taken especially after September 11 attacks. The
biggest limitation of this article is that it focused more on the role of Islamist in the
past than their existing role. Also the conclusion is very uncertain and vague as to
how should this pressure group be controlled. The condition of Pakistan is
deteriorating and if we look at the current scenario the one of the biggest problem the
religious groups that has created disruption and fear among the lives of the people.
The writer focuses more on the past the past then the future.
From 1947-1958 the two most economically powerful pressure groups in West
Pakistan were the landlords and the business groups. In East Pakistan the power lied
in the hands of the middle class income groups, after the land acquisition act in 1951.
Whereas in West Pakistan feudalism was on it peak whereby one-fifth of the
cultivable land was owned by one-half of one percent of the owners. Not only were
these landowners active in politics by capturing the majority seats in the assembly. In
provincial elections in 1951 in the former Punjab about 80 percent of the members
elected were landlords. Out of 40 members in the constituent assembly 28 members
were landlord groups. The landlords groups have been long engaged in rivalries. As
rival groups were more or less in agreement in retaining their landed interests, politics
in Pakistan has become a cynical pursuit of sheer power. The domination of feudal
lords and family rivalries affected the politics of Pakistan. The influence of business
groups was small since at that time there were few industries. It was indirect, whereby
they were formally organized and they put effective pressure on the decision-making
authorities from outside the governmental institution. The labor class is very weak,
but slowly the trade unions are growing strong and influential when it comes to labor
issues.
Feudal system is still prevalent in the rural areas whereby the decision of the big
landlord is considered to be the final verdict. Also the major leaders of political
parties have the landowning background be it Asif Ali zardari, Sharif brothers or Altaf
hussain. These landowners due to their rivalries have affected the stability in a bad
way. Even though this article is very old but is of extreme relevance as discuses the
root cause that lead to the emergence of Pressure groups in Pakistan and is can be of
importance when comparing the regimes over-time and how the roles have changed.
The later impact of this was that when Zia’s regime ended the position and the jobs
that were promised to the religious Ulemas who had no formal education but merely
an informal education in the madrasas were rejected. This frustrated the religious
militancy, which resulted in an extreme behavior and disruption. Furthermore
religious groups can be categorized as the role of Taliban in destruction of Pakistan.
The impact of the training of Taliban’s during the Afghanistan war and providing
them with arms and funding them has now become problematic for Pakistan with a
huge number of suicide attacks happening and terrorizing the whole country.
Zia-ul-haq immense support for the Islamic activists has resulted in the religious
polarisation that exists in today’s Pakistan. The statistics say that by 1996 there were
around 2463 madrasas only in Punjab and 1700 were supported from outside sources
that included the Persian Gulf and Middle East. These Islamic teaching centers are
more now a central place for the political activities. Thus, it can be concluded from
this article that the rise of Islamists and constant battle between Sunni and Shia has
resulted in instability in Pakistan over the years.
However Pakistan which is presided by Musharraf and is in the shackles of economic
recession and anarchy needs heavy financing for not only sustaining the Musharraf’s
regime but also its economic well being. Despite strong U.S alliance it doesn’t do a
sufficient to save Pakistan from drenching. Religious extremism diverts a lot of
attention of the government of Pakistan as the attacks and events leading to deaths and
bloodshed have recently increased in the country. People feel insecure and threatened
by their own fellows. In the name of religion wrong doers are exploiting the weaker
ones. Military has taken over the country, sometimes directly by enforcing Marshal
law and sometimes indirectly by influencing the government when making the
decisions. Also the prevailing condition as the country is on the verge of Civil war
military is more active within the country than on the outskirts to protect it from its
neighbors.
The four categories of elites are economic, political social and religious. Each of these
exerts different levels of influence over the government. According to the author
Political elites include, officers, and members of large landowning families.
Economic elites include the industrialist class, which can be considered as newly
wealthy and newly influential. The conflict between the two elite classes is one of the
major reasons for instability.
As 4th president has been dismissed since 1988, the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
won the majority of seats however Benazir Bhutto claimed that the elections were
unfair and there has been extensive fraud. Although PPP became popular because of
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto for giving an ordinary man a political voice but Benazir ruled the
party in a completely opposite opinion of her father by supporting privatization over
nationalization and viewing US as a major ally rather than a potential threat. From a
position of weakness in martial law period the judiciary has began to re-assert its
independence. However, the role of judges is still controversial. The emergence of
free press was a positive sign but at the same time, Pakistan’s mismanagement of
economies reflects the weakness of the political structure. The political game has
taken over a priority in the long-term policy making. Problems such as fiscal
deficiency, debt and long-term business interest erosion have always drifted the
economic cursor.
The increase in ethnic fragmentation, religious extremism and centralization if
political power has created political crisis which needs to be solved as soon as
possible otherwise it will result in civil war amongst the ethnic groups, domestic and
international terrorism and implementation of marshal law. Not only the government
of Pakistan should work on this but also should form allies with the external players
like US, Japan and European Union (EU). Furthermore in this article the author talked
about the regime of Nawaz Sharif as this article is written during that period of time.
Here the writer highlights some of policies adopted by Nawaz Sharif, in which he
aims at centralizing the power to the central and creating anarchy. Furthermore the
conflicts between the ethnic groups have increased widely whereby Punjab is
considered to be the most popular, developed and largely focused on in terms of
allocating resources, improving education system. This has resulted in other 3
provinces becoming more backward and less developed and sense of deprivation. The
writer also discusses on how the civil institution have weakened during Nawaz
Sharif’s era as he is trying to gain popular support of the military. Other problems that
were identified in the article were drug trafficking and settling of refugees. In
conclusion the writer has basically focused on support from the international players.
first is democratization and civil-military relations; and second islamization and
Islamism’s relation to the state. Both of issues are separate yet interdependent on each
other and needs to be analyzed and focused on as the future of the country is at stake.
The writer also highlighted Musharraf’s era and despite that he was more liberal than
Zia but he used the brand of Islam and is exploiting the public.

Q.No.5 Critically analyze the failures and successes of the 1983 MRD
movement.
Dozens of civilians were killed, hundreds arrested and many escaped into the thick
forests near the cities of Dadu and Moro to (eventually) become dacoits.
A movement that had begun as a nationwide anti-Zia agitation, mutated into
becoming a civil war of sorts between Sindhi nationalists and the state. The
movement was eventually crushed with the help of the army.
One of the most intriguing characters of the movement was a middle-aged Sindhi man
reportedly belonging to a small Maoist party, the Awami Tehreek.
His sudden claim to fame had to do with just one act of his: In September 1983, he
had jumped in front of an armored limousine in which Zia was travelling (in Dadu),
lift the DHOTI he was wearing, and flashed his privates for the dictator to see, all the
while shouting (in Sindhi), 'BHALI KAREY AYA, BHALI KAREY AYA'
(‘welcome, welcome’).
He was arrested and never seen or heard from again.
The following narrative was weaved from one of the most detailed papers on the 1983
MRD Movement (written by Amir Ali, Mughal Ahmad and Fauzia Naseem
for BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES); and an insightful paper
authored by eminent political scientist, Khalid B. Sayeed, PAKISTAN IN 1983:
INTERNAL STRESSES MORE SERIOUS THAN EXTERNAL
PROBLEMS (University of California, 1984); and dispatches from BBC’s South
Asian correspondents who regularly reported from the movement’s hotspots in the
interior of Sindh.

MAKING THE MOVE

Though protests against the Ziaul Haq dictatorship had begun almost immediately
after his military coup in July 1977, his regime’s harsh measures against any and all
opposition did not allow opposition groups to organise themselves in a more coherent
and systematic manner.
The beginning of the anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan in early 1980 had meant
that the Zia regime was poised to attract recognition from the United States, and
become its vessel to carry the large military and financial aid that the US and Saudi
Arabia pledged as a way to back Afghan insurgents in Afghanistan. But it would take
another few years for Zia to use this patronage to strengthen his position.
The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) was formed in 1981. It was
a multiparty alliance initiated by the left-leaning Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which,
at the time, was being led by former Prime Minister ZA Bhutto’s widow, Begum
Nusrat Bhutto, and her then 28-year-old daughter, Benazir Bhutto. Both had been in
and out of jails ever since ZA Bhutto was executed through a controversial trial in
April 1979.
The MRD included the centre-left PPP; the center-left Pakistan National Party; the
far-left Awami Tehreek; the far-left Qaumi Mahaz-i-Azadi; the far-left Muzdoor
Kissan Party; the centre-left National Democratic Party; the centrist Tehreek-i-Istaqlal;
the centre-right Pakistan Democratic Party; the centrist Muslim League (Malik Qasim
faction); and the right-wing Jamiat Ulema Islam, which was the only mainstream
religious party that was opposing Zia.
Though the movement kicked off in early 1981, it took another two years for MRD to
gather a more substantial momentum against Zia’s dictatorship.
But by 1983, Zia had consolidated his political position and revived the economy. Yet,
this revival, which was largely built upon the substantial flow of US and Saudi aid
that had begun to arrive, brought with it a new kind of institutional corruption and the
initial emergence of thorny factors such as heroin/gun smuggling, and the
mainstreaming of radical clerics who were propped up by the state to recruit and
indoctrinate young Pakistanis and Afghans for the insurgency against Soviet forces in
Kabul.
THE BATTLE FOR PUNJAB
The country’s largest and most populated province, Punjab, was a bastion of the PPP
ever since the late 1960s. The party, though led by a Sindhi (ZA Bhutto), had swept
the election in the province in the 1970 election and then again in the (latter annulled)
1977 election.
To dent the PPP’s support base in Punjab, Zia (an immigrant Punjabi), began to
overtly patronise those sections of the province that had been adversely affected by
the Bhutto regime’s haphazard ‘socialist’ policies. Such sections included prominent
business groups of the province.
Zia’s economic policies were also designed to attract the support of Punjab’s urban
middle and lower-middle-class traders and shopkeepers (or those urban sections of the
province who had overwhelmingly voted for ZA Bhutto’s PPP in the 1970 election).
Zia then gradually aligned these sections with certain radical religious outfits that he
had begun to foster. Thus, an economic revival witnessed during the Zia regime was
accompanied by a burst of religiosity within Punjab’s bourgeoisie and
petty-bourgeoisie.
The MRD leadership reacted to this by deducing that the fruits of the economic
revival witnessed (after 1980) were mostly falling in the hands of central/urban
Punjab’s industrialist and business communities and the trader classes; whereas rest of
the country (as well as working-class and rural Punjabis) were being ravaged by
economic exploitation, the rising rates of crime and corruption, and the growing
incidents of sectarian violence.
On August 14, 1983 (one year after Zia had gotten himself elected as ‘President’
through a dubious referendum), the MRD launched a movement against him.
Though the movement kicked-off simultaneously in Sindh and the Punjab, it failed to
gather much support in the latter province. Soon, it became restricted to Sindh, where
at one point, it treateningly began to look like it would turn into a full-blown Sindhi
nationalist movement and even a civil war.
MRD activists and youth belonging to the student-wings of MRD parties and various
left-wing Sindhi nationalist groups plunged into the fray and disrupted everyday life
in Sindh. Sindh’s metropolitan capital, Karachi too, witnessed widespread protests by
journalist, student and women’s organisations, but compared to the rest of the
province, Karachi remained relatively unruffled.
In the interior of Sindh, the situation eventually became too hot for the police to
handle and Zia had to call in the army. Dozens of MRD supporters were killed in the
ensuing violence.
By September 1983, the movement had squarely become a militant Sindhi nationalist
expression when Punjab failed to rise.
We have already discussed how Zia managed to change the political and social
complexion of Punjab by initiating the gradual process of drying up the support that
the PPP had enjoyed in that province.
But whereas he managed to also keep Balochistan quiet (after releasing Baloch
nationalists who had been thrown in jails by the Bhutto regime); and with the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa caught-up in receiving waves of Afghan insurgents (termed as ‘guests’)
and refugees (described as ‘brothers’), Sindh was largely left to its own devices.
Apart from the fact that there was already anger among the Sindhis against the
hanging of a Sindhi prime minister, contributing to the violence in the province in
1983 was the feeling that Sindhis, as well as the Urdu-speakers (Mohajirs) in Karachi
were being ‘invaded’ by elements that were posing a threat to their economic and
political interests.
Firstly, from 1982 onwards, Karachi began receiving large numbers of Afghan
refugees, some of whom came for the sole purpose of setting up illegal drug and
weapons businesses in the city. This trend would go on to trigger the vicious circle of
ethnic violence in Karachi from 1985 onwards.
Secondly, Zia began to allot lands in interior Sindh to Punjabis who were encouraged
(by the regime) to migrate from Punjab to Sindh.
Zia did this to create a constituency for himself in Sindh. But what he received was
resistance and resentment from the Sindhis and Urdu-speaking traders and members
of the Sindhi landed elite.
In Karachi, Memon, Sindhi, and Urdu-speaking traders and businessmen formed an
organisation called the Maha Sindh to ‘protect the interests of Sindh’s Mohajirs and
Sindhis’. But this organisation was mostly centred in Karachi. It soon became an
entirely Mohajir vehicle and would partly evolve into becoming the Mohajir Qaumi
Movement (MQM) in 1984.
But the reaction to the regime’s manoeuvres was more violent in the interior of Sindh,
where protesters turned militant and military troops had to be called in to quell the
turmoil.
Begun on August 14 1983, the MRD Movement had started to whirl out of control by
early September, not only for the Zia dictatorship but for the main MRD leadership as
well. Sindh was in serious turmoil.
In August, Sindh’s capital, Karachi (in the south), had witnessed court arrests and
protest rallies on a daily basis by labour and trade unionists, student leaders and
anti-Zia politicians. But in September, the focus of the movement had shifted to the
central and northern parts of Sindh that got caught in a whirlpool of violence.
The MRD movement here had begun to take the shape of a Sindhi nationalist uprising
bordering on an insurgency against the state.
Faced with a volley of questions (mainly from foreign journalists), Zia decided to
prove that ‘only a handful of troublemakers’ were involved in the violence. He
announced that he would go on a whirlwind tour of Sindh to attest that he was as
popular there as he believed he was in the Punjab.
So he took off from Rawalpindi in his big military aircraft (C-130) to Sindh’s capital,
Karachi.
Zia’s plane landed at the Karachi International Airport, and from Karachi, he planned
to fly to Hyderabad with his posse. With him was also a crew from the
state-controlled Pakistan Television (PTV) who was to cover the general’s ‘successful
tour of Sindh.’
After arriving in Karachi, Zia briefly talked to a select group of journalists and
reiterated his views about the situation in Sindh, insisting all was well, and that the
MRD movement was the work of a handful of politicians who were ‘working against
Islam, Pakistan and the country’s armed forces.’
He sounded confident about the success of his visit to the troubled spots of Sindh.
This confidence was not only generated by what he was hearing from the
brownnosers he had gathered around him; but also because by the time he reached
Sindh’s second largest city, Hyderabad, he’d already had telephonic conversations
with Sindh’s most respected nationalist leader and scholar, GM Syed.
Syed was the main architect of the historical and scholarly narrative behind Sindhi
nationalism. After building a radical narrative against the so-called ‘Punjabi ruling
elite,’ Syed formed the Jeeay Sindh Tehreek (JST). In 1973, he called for Sindh’s
separation from Pakistan. He was promptly jailed by the ZA Bhutto regime.
Ironically, 10 years later when Sindh erupted during the MRD movement in 1983,
Syed was nowhere to be seen. He had decided to stay out of the movement, a fact
cleverly exploited by Zia.
A staunch opponent of Bhutto and his PPP, Syed, right after Bhutto was hanged in
April 1979, was quoted as saying: ‘The (Punjabi) establishment doesn’t realise it has
hanged its greatest asset …’
In September 1983, when journalists asked Syed why his party wasn’t taking part in
the MRD Movement, he replied: ‘Zia is doing my work. His actions will force the
separation of Sindh (from rest of Pakistan). That’s what I want as well. So I’ll let him
do it for me.’
In another statement he said: ‘It (the MRD Movement) is a PPP-led movement and it
has nothing to do with Sindhi nationalism. PPP is just trying to grab power.’
The decision to ignore the 1983 MRD Movement would eventually cost Syed his
political career. Though respected as the Sindhi nation’s greatest scholar till the time
of his death in 1996, Syed, however, lost his political clout when a major faction from
his Jeeay Sindh Tehreek broke away and joined the movement.
Syed’s logic behind opting not to take any part in the movement seems to be linked to
his perception of the PPP as a party that was being used by the ‘Punjabi ruling elite’
to keep nationalist sentiments in Sindh at bay.
This narrative was well known by Syed’s admirers. Yet, what shocked many of them
was not really the act of Syed not taking part in a PPP-led movement, but the fact that
Syed was actually responding to Zia’s friendly overtures towards him.
Syed’s apologists have suggested that Syed did this to neutralise the PPP’s influence
in Sindh so he could construct a Sindhi separatist movement on his own terms.
So Syed sat quietly, watching the MRD movement in Sindh fast becoming a Sindhi
nationalist uprising – without him.
By September, the movement had begun to slip away from the hands of the top
leadership of the PPP and of other MRD component parties. PPP chairperson, Benazir
Bhutto, released a statement from her jail cell urging Punjab to rise if it wanted to
save Pakistan from breaking up. She was getting nervous.
The movement was now almost entirely being navigated by the local leaders of PPP’s
youth-wing; Maoist outfits such as Awami Tehreek, Qaumi Mahaz-i-Azadi and
Mazdoor Kissan Party; left-wing student organizations such as the revamped
Democratic Students Federation (DSF), and the breakaway faction of the Jeeay Sindh
Tehreek.
Though several rallies were also taken out in Punjab’s capital city, Lahore, the
province did not rise the way MRD was expecting it to.
Back in Hyderabad, Zia spoke about the inherent patriotism of all Sindhis. By this, he
meant not only indigenous Sindhis, but also the Urdu-speakers (Mohajirs) and the
Punjabis settled in the province (called ‘New Sindhis’).
Radical left-wing Sindhi nationalist, Rasool Baksh Palejo, scoffed at Zia’s comment.
Palejo, though not a Syed disciple, echoed Syed’s original narrative about Mohajirs.
In the 1960s, Syed had accused the Urdu-speakers of coming to Sindh (as migrants
from India), but behaving like those Europeans who had invaded the lands of the ‘Red
Indians’ in the Americas and had treated them shabbily.
Palejo’s rebuff did not go down well with the Mohajir members of the various small
left-wing parties and youth outfits that were taking part in the movement.
Aamer Zain, a young Urdu-speaking activist of the DSF in the Sindh city of Khairpur,
was quoted in a pro-PPP Sindhi newspaper as saying: ‘With all due respect to
Palejo SAHIB, I am as much a Sindhi as he is, otherwise why would I be risking my
student life, future, and everything else by taking part in this movement …?’
On 15th September, Zain was arrested by the police during a violent rally in the Sindh
city of Nawabshah and severely tortured. After his release in 1988, he joined the
MQM.
In 1983, there was no Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM). The Mohajir majority in
Karachi and the Mohajirs in the rest of Sindh were voters and supporters of three
main political parties.
The progressive Mohajirs were either associated with the PPP, or with various leftist
student outfits such as the NSF. The conservative Mohajirs backed the Jamat-i-Islami
(JI) and Jamiat Ulema Pakistan (JUP). After the rise of MQM in 1985, however, the
majority of Mohajirs went on to become MQM aficionados. They still are.
But in 1983, there were just two tiny Mohajir nationalist organisations with not much
influence. There was also the student outfit, All Pakistan Mohajir Students
Organisation (APMSO), but it wasn’t as prominent as it would become after 1985.
The Mohajir community largely sat out the MRD movement.
The Sindhi nationalists’ biggest grudge during the MRD movement, however, was
with the Punjabi settlers. Sindhi nationalists had been accusing the Zia regime of
sending and settling ambitious Punjabi traders and agriculturalists in Sindh to prop up
a constituency for himself in the province.
The nationalists claimed that these settlers were taking over Sindhi businesses and
jobs and siding with the pro-Zia feudal elite to repress Sindhi nationalism. One of the
most prominent among these feudal leaders was Peer Pagaro.
From Hyderabad, Zia began his tour of the troubled interior of the Sindh province. He
particularly wanted the cameras to capture his tour of Dadu and Moro, the two cities
most affected by the movement. It was decided by his security team that he would use
a helicopter to fly there. His aides seemed a tad fidgety and nervous.
The thick forests around Moro and Dadu had become sanctuaries for hundreds of
activists escaping Zia’s forces. Another rallying point for the activists were the many
big and small shrines of Sufi saints across Sindh.
As Zia sat in the helicopter, waiting to land in Dadu, some of his security advisers
shared with him his regime’s latest triumphs in the area: Hundreds of ‘troublemakers
and traitors’ had been arrested and eliminated, he was told, and a plan was also afoot
to flush out ‘rebels’ hiding in the shrines and the forests.
Most of Sindh’s influential peers (Sufi spiritual leaders) were opposing Zia. They had
thrived during the Bhutto regime, especially the powerful Peer of Hala. So Zia
contacted another influential Peer, Peer Pagaro (who was a Zia supporter), and
requested him to use his influence to make the keepers of the Sufi shrines reject
‘Sindhi rebels’. Pagara tried but failed.
One September evening in 1983, Pakistanis watched a video clip on the state-owned
PTV’s 9pm Urdu news bulletin that showed Zia descending from a helicopter and
being greeted by a dozen or so smiling men in Sindhi caps. He had reached Dadu.
Viewers were told that Zia was ‘warmly greeted by patriotic Sindhis in Dadu.’
The next day, however, when Pakistanis tuned into BBC Radio’s Urdu service at 8pm,
the newscaster, after detailing the nature of the day’s rallies, protest marches and
violence in Sindh, also added a brief report about a more amusing episode.
This report became a topic of glee at the Karachi Press Club that was heavily involved
in accommodating the journalists who were taking part in the movement.
This is what happened: As Zia’s helicopter landed on a helipad in Dadu, he was
greeted by a few men wearing Sindhi caps. He was then escorted towards a
bulletproof limousine that was followed by jeeps carrying armed security personnel.
He was expecting the roads of Dadu to be lined up with Sindhis cheering his arrival.
In fact, he was sure that his aides had done well to organise a colourful show for the
TV cameras to capture.
His motorcade moved into the city on its way to a building where he was expected to
speak to the press. To his satisfaction, he did find a sprinkling of people on the
roadsides, holding small Pakistani flags. But then, suddenly, his speeding limo
swayed to the right, closely avoiding hitting a stray dog that had appeared, as if out of
nowhere.
It was no ordinary dog. It had been pushed in front of the general’s motorcade by the
same small roadside crowd. On the dog’s body something (in Sindhi) was scribbled
with red paint. It read: ‘Zia’
The journalists and the BBC correspondent accompanying the motorcade were not
sure what Zia’s reaction to this was.
As the motorcade moved on, a donkey was seen being made to run on the edges of the
scruffy Dadu road that Zia’s limo was travelling on. The poor beast was being chased
by a group of small kids and on its body too, the red paint screamed Zia’s appellation.
So much for the show of pomp and popularity the President was expecting from his
aides.
The general’s limo now gathered even more speed, until it came to a bumpy portion
of the road. Here, it slowed down. In front of the limo was a jeep packed with police
guards. The jeep came to an abrupt halt and the cops rushed out, brandishing their
rifles. What happened?
A middle-aged man, hiding in a tree whose branches hung over this part of the road,
had suddenly jumped down from the tree and landed (on his backside) right in front of
Zia’s limo.
The man was wearing a traditional Sindhi dress that also included a DHOTI (a long
piece of cloth wrapped around the waist).
Before the guards could grab him, he lifted his dhoti and exposed his privates, all the
while shouting (in Sindhi) ‘BHALI KAREY AYA! BHALI KARY AYA!’
(Welcome! Welcome!).
He was grabbed, pulled back to one side of the road and beaten up by the guards, as
Zia’s limo screeched away.
Nobody quite knows what happened to the gentleman-flasher after he was arrested.
But Zia did decide to suddenly end his ‘famous’ tour of Sindh the very next day –
terming it a ‘great success.’