G.R. No. Nos.

111771-77 November 9, 1993

ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, vs. The Honorable HARRIET O.

DEMETRIOU Respondents.

Facts:

On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the

filing of appropriate charges against several persons, including the
petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and
the killing of Allan Gomez.

On August 12, 1993, PNP issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting

him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna.
It was served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993, and he was
immediately taken to the said camp. law library

At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by

Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed
confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and
the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and
taken to the Department of Justice in Manila. law library

The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his

arrival. law library

After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This warrant
was issued on August 13, 1993, by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS
Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined. library

On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued
a warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including the petitioner, in
connection with the said crime. library

Issue:
 1. WON Sanchez’ was arrested on August 13, 1993?

2. WON such warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not
acquired jurisdiction over him.

Held:

1. Yes, Sanchez was arrested on August 13, 1993.

"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the
taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest
is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his
voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.

In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official
and the investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp.
Although in the guise of a request, it was obviously a command or an order
of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. In fact,
apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went without protest (and in
informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch
him.

It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was
placed on "arrest status" after he was pointed to by Centeno and
Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
Respondent Zuño himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993
hearing that, on the basis of the sworn statements of the two state
witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested."

2. Initially, the arrest was illegal but was cured by the subsequent
issuance of the warrant of arrest.

Supreme Court agrees with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and law library

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escapes from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal.

Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on
August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the
rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.

Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, the SC find that
the trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner. The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, he may move to quash the information, but only on
that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the
motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have
submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court.  14chanrobles virtual law
library

The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the petitioner was unlawfully
arrested, Judge Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest against Antonio L.
Sanchez in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637
for violation of R.A No. 6713. 15Pending the issuance of the warrant of
arrest for the rape-slay cases, this first warrant served as the initial
justification for his detention.

The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges, and
the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person
invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him
the right to be released because of such defect. * Applicable by analogy to
the case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court that:

Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that

the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall, anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense
in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.

[G.R. No. 117397. November 13, 1996.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERMELINDO

SEQUIÑO, VICENTE TUMANGAN, and NENITO MELVIDA, Accused-
Appellants.

Facts:

On April 24, 1991, Jimmy Serafin, janitor and motorcycle driver of Medellin
Rural Bank, drove Eugenio Godinez and Pedro Broniola back to Hacienda
Jose Ancajas in Medellin, Cebu, after the two have withdrawn P50,557.17
to pay for the wages of the hacienda workers. Godinez carried the money
in a money bag which he hung over his left shoulder

As the three were in sitio Lahug, Antipolo, Medellin, Cebu, and nearing the
hacienda, the accused, armed with guns, tried to block their path and
ordered them to stop. Godinez recognized the armed men because Nenito
Melvida and Ermelindo Sequiño used to work in the hacienda while Vicente
Tumangan’s parents were Godinez’s neighbors.

Serafin drove on, but as the motorcycle went past the accused, he and
Godinez heard a gunshot. Godinez noticed that Broniola had fallen off the
motorcycle. Serafin leapt from the motorcycle and ran away. The
motorcycle toppled over Godinez, pinning him to the ground. Accused
Tumangan, with gun in hand, approached Godinez, took the money from
the money bag, and fled on foot with his co-accused. With the assailants
gone, Godinez ran home, leaving Broniola behind. Meanwhile, Serafin had
proceeded to the house of the Broniolas, which was near the crime scene,
and informed Broniola’s wife of the incident.

SPO Elpidio Luna, who was then at the Medellin police headquarters,
received a report from another policeman about a robbery at sitio Antipolo.
Together with other policemen and some "Cafgus," Luna went to the crime
scene where he found an abandoned motorcycle. People who by then had
milled around the site informed Luna "that the culprit had already fled."
Luna noticed that the "bushes were compressed" and found "a piece of
paper utilized as toilet paper with a stool on it which was somewhat newly
delivered." The paper was a bio-data sheet with the name "Melvida, Nenito"
and the entry for the father’s name filled in with “Elpidio Melvida."

One bystander volunteered to take Luna to Elpidio Melvida’s house where,

however, Elpidio told Luna that Nenito Melvida was not there but was at his
(Nenito’s) brother’s house. Elpidio took Luna to the said house where Luna
saw the accused Nenito Melvida playing cards with other persons. Luna
asked Melvida to go with him to the barangay captain’s house. Melvida
hesitated at first, but his companions prevailed upon him to go with Luna.

The barangay captain was not home, so Luna took Melvida to the police
station instead. Melvida was kept at the station the whole evening of 24
April 1991 for investigation conducted, first, by Luna, then, by his fellow
policemen Sgt. Pablo Ygot, Cpl. Alfredo Mondigo and Eliseo Tepait, as
Luna had to take his supper. Melvida was allowed to go home the next day,
but only after the police had filed criminal charges against him and he had
posted bail. Melvida’s was not assisted by counsel, he admitted that this
request did not appear in the record of the investigation. Luna’s
investigation of Melvida was not reduced into writing.

During the investigation conducted by SPO3 Alfredo Mondigo, Melvida

admitted that his (Melvida’s) companions during the robbery were Vicente
Tumangan and Ermelindo Sequiño, who were staying in the house of
Juanito Hones in Daanlungsod, Medellin, Cebu. Immediately, Mondigo and
policeman Proniely Artiquela proceeded to the house of Hones where they
saw Tumangan and Sequiño on the porch. Noticing something bulging on
the waist of Tumangan, Mondigo and Artiquela approached Tumangan and
asked him what was that bulging at his waist. Tumangan did not answer.
So, Mondigo patted the bulge which turned out to be a .38 caliber Squires
Bingham revolver with holster and four bullets. 16 When asked if he had a
license for the firearm, Tumangan answered in the negative Mondigo and
Artiquela then brought Tumangan and Sequiño to the police station.
Tumangan was then investigated in the presence of the Municipal Mayor.
Tumangan admitted that he was one of the hold-uppers.

The accused, however, denied the allegations.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused was arrested? And whether or not such arrest
is valid?

Held:

Regardless of Luna’s claim to the contrary, Accused Nenito Melvida was

arrested. An arrest "is the taking of a person into custody in order that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense," and it is made
"by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to
the custody of the person making the arrest." Melvida’s voluntarily going
with Luna upon the latter’s "invitation" was a submission to Luna’s custody,
and Luna believed that Melvida was a suspect in the robbery charged
herein, hence, Melvida was being held to answer for the commission of the
said offense.

Since he was arrested without a warrant, the inquiry must now be whether
a valid warrantless arrest was effected. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:aw library

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

The first and last conditions enumerated above are not applicable in this
case; and under the facts herein, neither does the second condition apply.
Luna’s basis for arresting Melvida was the bio-data sheet with Melvida’s
name on it found at the crime scene. By no means can this indicate that
Melvida committed the offense charged. It does not even connote that
Melvida was at the crime scene for the bio-data sheet could have been
obtained by anyone and left at the crime scene long before or after the
crime was committed. Luna, therefore, had no personal knowledge of facts
indicating Melvida’s guilt; at best, he had an unreasonable suspicion.
Melvida’s arrest was thus illegal.

After his unlawful arrest, Melvida underwent custodial investigation. The

custodial investigation commenced when the police pinpointed Melvida as
one of the authors of the crime or had focused on him as a suspect thereof.
This brought into operation paragraph (1) of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing the accused’s rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and his right to be informed of these rights. The said paragraph
provides:

SEC. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an

offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

There was no showing that Melvida was ever informed of these rights, and
Luna admitted that Melvida was not assisted by counsel during the
investigation. Indisputably, the police officers concerned flouted these
constitutional rights of Melvida and Tumangan and deliberately disregarded
the rule regarding an investigator’s duties prior to and during custodial
interrogation laid down in Morales v. Enrile and reiterated in a catena of
subsequent cases.

G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA
LLANA, Special Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA, respondents.

FACTS:

Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3(e),

Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. An order of arrest was issued
against her with bail for her release fixed at P15,000.00. She filed an
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond". The
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the Santiago to post cash
bond which the later filed in the amount of P15,000.00. Her arraignment
was set, but she asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be
allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred
the arraignment.

Meanwhile, it issued a hold departure order against Santiago by reason of

the announcement she made, which was widely publicized in both print and
broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a
fellowship at Harvard University. She directly filed a "Motion to Restrain the
Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction"
with the SC. She argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold
departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over her
person as she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily
surrendered. The hold departure order was also issued sua sponte without
notice and hearing. She likewise argued that the hold departure order
violates her right to due process, right to travel and freedom of speech.

ISSUES: 

1. Has the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of

Santiago?

2. Did the Sandiganbayan err when it issued the hold departure order
without any motion from the prosecution and without notice and hearing?

3. Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired?

HELD: 

1. How the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the

accused. 

It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the
accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly
arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading
to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings
requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the
same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule
the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been
acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.

Santiago is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction

of respondent court upon the filing of her "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond" wherein she expressly sought leave "that
she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the
Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings,"
and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of
P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered
as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Santiago cannot
now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is
effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier
recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that
jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

2. The ex parte issuance of a hold-departure order was a valid

exercise of the presiding court’s inherent power to preserve and to
maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the
person of the accused. 

Santiago does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public
statement that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to
pursue higher studies abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by
the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan
to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order.
To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent
court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its
jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

3.  By posting bail, an accused holds himself amenable at all times to

the orders and processes of the court, thus, he may legally be
prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. 

Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she
holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the
court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the
pendency of the case. Parties with pending cases should apply for
permission to leave the country from the very same courts which, in the first
instance, are in the best position to pass upon such applications and to
impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with
the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof.

[G.R. NO. 182336 : December 23, 2009] ELVIRA O.

ONG Petitioner, v. JOSE CASIM GENIO, Respondent.

Facts:

Petitioner Elvira O. Ong (petitioner) filed a criminal complaint against

respondent Jose Casim Genio (respondent) for Robbery which was
dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Makati City. However, pursuant to the
Resolutions dated September 15, 2006 and October 30, 2006 of the
Department of Justice, respondent was charged with the crime of Robbery
in an Information.

On November 21, 2006, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case for
Lack of Probable Cause Pursuant to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court and, in View of Compelling Grounds for the Dismissal of the Case to
Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest (Motion to
Dismiss). Petitioner filed an Opposition dated December 11, 2006 to
respondent's Motion to Dismiss.

In its Order of December 15, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 56, dismissed the case because the other elements of
the crime of Robbery, specifically the elements of intent to gain, and either
violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things, were
not specifically alleged in the Information filed against respondent.

In its Order dated February 12, 2007, the RTC granted respondent's Partial
Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the case for lack of probable
cause pursuant to Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. The RTC held that the evidence on record failed to establish
probable cause to charge respondent with the crime of Robbery.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC erred in relying on Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, claiming that the said provision
relates to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and it does not cover the
determination of probable cause for the filing of the Information against
respondent, which is executive in nature, a power primarily vested in the
Public Prosecutor.

Held:

The instant Petition is bereft of merit.

Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly
provides:

SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial
Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information,
the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the
judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue
must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint or information.32

Pursuant to the aforementioned provision, the RTC judge, upon the filing of
an Information, has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or
she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of
doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five days from notice, the issue to be
resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the information.

G.R. No. 180109               July 26, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSEPH "JOJO" V. GREY, FRANCIS B. GREY, and COURT OF
APPEALS-CEBU CITY, EIGHTEENTH DIVISION, Respondents.

The personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses is not

mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is
an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause.
Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor,
provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support
thereof.

Facts: 

Joseph Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar, his son, Francis Grey,
and two others were charge of the crime of murder for the death of Rolando
Diocton. Judge Bandal denied the motion for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. She directed the prosecution to present, within five days, additional
evidence but later, she inhibited. Judge Navidad continued the proceedings
of the case.
After finding that probable cause was supported by the evidence on record,
he issued warrants of arrest against respondents.

The CA held that Judge Navidad failed to abide by the constitutional

mandate for him to personally determine the existence of probable cause.
According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed Order did Judge Navidad
state his personal assessment of the evidence before him and the personal
justification for his finding of probable cause. It found that the judge
extensively quoted from the Joint Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor
and the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, and then adopted these to
conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of
probable cause. The CA held that the Constitution commands the judge to
personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing
warrants of arrest.

Issue:

Did Judge Navidad fail to personally determine the existence of probable

cause?

Held:

No. The duty of the judge to determine probable cause to issue a warrant
of arrest is mandated by Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution.
In Soliven v. Makasiar, the Court explained that this constitutional provision
does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the
complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate
the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he
may disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses. 

What the law requires as personal determination on the part of a judge is

that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor.
This means that the judge should consider not only the report of the
investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary
evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his
witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating
prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.

The Court has also ruled that the personal examination of the complainant
and his witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity
arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the
existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of
the investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the
documentary evidence in support thereof.

Contrary to respondents claim, Judge Navidad did not gravely abuse hid
discretion in issuing the same. Judge Navidad’s order reads:

In this separate, independent constitutionally-mandated Inquiry conducted

for the purpose of determining the sufficiency of the evidence constituting
probable cause to justify the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest, the Court
perforce, made a very careful and meticulous and (sic) review not only of
the records but also the evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly
the sworn statements/affidavits of Mario Abella, Uriendo Moloboco and
Edgar Pellina. 

It was only through a review of the proceedings before the prosecutor that
could have led Judge Navidad to determine that the accused were given
the widest latitude and ample opportunity to challenge the charge of Murder
which resulted, among others, (in) a filing of a counter-charge of Perjury.
Likewise, his personal determination revealed no improper motive on the
part of the prosecution and no circumstance which would overwhelm the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Thus, he
concluded that the previous Order, denying the motion for the issuance of
warrants of arrest, was not correct. These statements sufficiently establish
the fact that Judge Navidad complied with the constitutional mandate for
personal determination of probable cause before issuing the warrants of
arrest. 
G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994

DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial
Court, Makati, Metro Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME
COMMISSION, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the

College of Law, University of the Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm
of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of their profession, and
on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard, they
have been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without
bail by respondent judge.

Petitioners, in their 335-page petition, inclusive of annexes, principally

contend that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of jurisdiction in "whimsically holding that there is probable cause
against petitioners without determining the admissibility of the evidence
against petitioners and without even stating the basis of his findings,"  and
in "relying on the Resolution of the Panel and their certification that
probable cause exists when the certification is flawed."  Petitioners
maintain that the records of the preliminary investigation which respondent
judge solely relied upon failed to establish probable cause against them to
justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioners likewise assail the
prosecutors' "clear sign of bias and impartiality

Issue:

Whether or not there was sufficient finding of probable cause?

Held:

NO.

Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue only
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce.

Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the

warrant for the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally
examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses
in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the
certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. For, otherwise,
he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly
insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. 

Petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The warrant of arrest

issued against petitioner is set aside and the respondent judge is enjoined
from proceeding any further against petitioner.

G.R. No. L-60349-62 December 29, 1983

CITY FISCAL NESTORIO M. PLACER, ASST. CITY FISCALS AGELIO L.

BRINGAS, ERNESTO M. BROCOY, RAFAEL V. FLORES, FELIXBERTO
L. GUIRITAN, MACARIO B. BALANSAG and ROSARIO F. DABALOS,
all of Butuan City, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NAPOLEON D. VILLANUEVA, in his capacity as City
Judge of Butuan, respondent.

Facts:

The antecedent facts are not disputed. During the period from March 30 to
April 14, 1982, petitioners, The City Fiscal of Butuan City and his assistants
filed in the City Court of Butuan several information.

The information, except the last four, were certified to by the respective
investigating Fiscals as Follows: "that a preliminary examination has been
conducted by me in this case, having examined 'the complainant and his
witnesses; that on the basis of the sworn statements, and other evidence
submitted before this Official there is reasonable ground to believe that the
crime charged has been committed and that herein accused is probably
guilty thereof.

Following receipt of said information, respondent judge issued an order

setting on April 5, 1982 the hearing of said criminal cases for the purpose
of determining the propriety of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest.
After said hearing, respondent issued the questioned orders dated April 13,
15, 16 and 19, 1982, requiring petitioners to submit to the court the
affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in
support of the information to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial
review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners. 

Petitioners filed two separate motions for reconsideration of said orders,

contending that under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to
determine the existence of a probable cause in a preliminary
examination/investigation, and that their findings as to the existence thereof
constitute sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the
court. On April 28, 1982, respondent judge denied said motions and
reiterated his order to petitioners to submit the supporting affidavits and
other documents within five (5) days from notice. 
Upon the other hand, respondent justifies his order as an exercise of his
judicial power to review the fiscal's findings of probable cause. He further
maintains that the failure of petitioners to file the required affidavits
destroys the presumption of regularity in the performance of petitioners'
official duties, particularly in the light of the long standing practice of the
Office of the City Fiscal of Butuan of attaching to the information filed with
the court the affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing a
warrant of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting
affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation.

Held:

Position of respondent judge is sustained.

The primary requirement for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the

existence of probable cause. Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
provides that-

... no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except

upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer, as may be recognized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmance of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce ....

P.D. No. 911 authorizes the fiscal or state prosecutor to determine the
existence of probable cause. Thus,

If on the basis of complainant's sworn statements and

documents submitted, the investigating dismiss the raise. If
probable cause is established by complainant's evidence, he
 shall notify the respondent by issuing a subpoena .... (Sec. 1
[b], RA 5180, as amended by P.D. Nos. 77 and 911).

The fiscal or state prosecutor shall certify under oath in the

information to be filed by him that he has examined the
complainant and his witnesses; that on the basis of the sworn
Statements and other evidence submitted before him there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof ... (Sec.
1[d], Id.).

There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal's
certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest. But does such certification bind the judge to come
out with the warrant? We answer this query in the negative. The issuance
of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of
judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from
the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:

Warrant of arrest, when issued. If the judge be satisfied from

the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the
investigating officer that the offense complained of has been
committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order
for his arrest.

Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of
the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal’s certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable
cause.
The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of affidavits of the
complainant and of his witnesses is to enable the court to determine
whether to dismiss the case outright or to require further proceedings.

G.R. No. 88919 July 25, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ENRIQUE B. INTING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, DUMAGUETE CITY, AND OIC MAYOR
DOMINADOR S. REGALADO, JR., respondents.

Facts:

On February 6, 1988, Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against

OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), for allegedly transferring her, a
permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor
to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or
clearance from COMELEC as required by law.

Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo Lituanas,

Provincial Election Supervisor of Dumaguete City: (1) to conduct the
preliminary investigation of the case; (2) to prepare and file the necessary
information in court; (3) to handle the prosecution if the evidence submitted
shows a prima facie case and (3) to issue a resolution of prosecution or
dismissal as the case may be. The directive to conduct the preliminary
investigation was pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 1752 dated
January 14, 1986. The resolution, in turn, is based on the constitutional
mandate that the COMELEC is charged with the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose
of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections (sec. 2, Article XII-C of the
 1973 Constitution) and on the Omnibus Election Code which implements
the constitutional provision.

After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint, Atty. Lituanas found

a prima facie case. Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the
respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h),
Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor.

In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a

warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor. It also fixed the bail at
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as recommended by the Provincial
Election Supervisor.

However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could
be arrested, the trial court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the
ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The court stated
that it "will give due course to the information filed in this case if the same
has the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution
of the case shall be under the supervision and control of the latter."

Issue:

1. Whether or not the Provincial Election Supervisor has authority to

determine probable cause?
2. Whether or not the subsequent issuance of warrant of arrest by the
judge based on the finding of probable cause by the Provincial
Election Supervisor is void?

Held:

1. Yes, the Provincial Election Supervisor has the power to determine

probable cause. The 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only
to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This
means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of
 helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in
court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.

Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election

offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information charging an
election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he
has been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole
authority of his office. (People v. Basilla, et al., G.R. Nos. 83938-40,
November 6, 1989).i•t•c-aüsl In the instant case, there is no averment or
allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the Provincial Fiscal as a
deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to "approve" the COMELEC's
preliminary investigation.

2. No, the subsequent issuance of the judge of the warrant of arrest is not
void.

First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is

not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to
ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.

Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the
Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause.
The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By
itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the
report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all
other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are
material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.

And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary
inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether
the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries
are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should
be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause
for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper-whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or
not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of
trial is the function of the Prosecutor.

We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to

whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for
the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of
preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's
job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly
called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the
judge. It is in this context that we address the issue raised in the instant
petition so as to give meaning to the constitutional power vested in the
COMELEC regarding election offenses.

COJUANGCO, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Quisumbing, December 21,

1998)

FACTS:

January 12, 1990, a complaint was filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General before the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), petitioner, former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut
Authority (PCA), and the former members of the PCA Governing Board,
petitioner among them, for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for having conspired and confederated
together and taking undue advantage of their public positions and/or using
their powers; authority, influence, connections or relationship with the
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos without authority, granted a donation in the amount of
Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, using PCA special fund, thereby
giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence to
the grave (sic) and prejudice of the Filipino people and to the Republic of
the Philippines. 

Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that all proceedings in the

preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG were null and void and
the PCGG was directed to transmit the complaints and records of the case
to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.  

In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators

recommended the filling of an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019.

Resolution dated June 2, 1992 was referred by Assistant Ombudsman

Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for
review and if warranted, for the preparation of the criminal information.

In a memorandum dated July l5, 1992 the Office of the Special Prosecutor
affirmed the recommendation as contained in the Resolution dated June 2,
1992.

August 19, 1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the panel
of investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial question posed by
respondent Lobregat.

In a Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators

recommended that the motion to suspend proceedings be granted.
On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez referred for comment to
the Office of the Special Prosecutors the Memorandum dated December 1,
1993 of the panel of investigators on the issue of the existence of
prejudicial question.

On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by
the respondent Sandiganbayan.

On February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he likewise
filed, through counsel, a Manifestation stating that he was posting bail
without prejudice to the Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with
Motion For Leave To File a Motion For Reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's Resolution which he filed.

In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan

barred petitioner from leaving the country except upon approval of the
court.

On May 25, 1995, petitioner was conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty
to the Information.

In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995, Special

Prosecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil found no probable cause to
warrant the filing against petitioner and recommended the dismissal of the
case. The recommendation for dismissal was approved by the Honorable
Ombudsman on November 15, 1996.

On December 13, 1996 petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss

alleging that with the reversal of the earlier findings of the Ombudsman of
probable cause, there was therefore nothing on record before the
respondent Sandiganbayan which would warrant the issuance of a warrant
of arrest and the assumption of jurisdiction over the instant case.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by respondent

Sandiganbayan is null and void, or should now be lifted if initially
valid? YES
2. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner? YES

Held:

Sandiganbayan had two pieces of documents to consider when it resolved

to issue the warrant of arrest against the accused:

a. the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel of Investigators of

the Office of the Ombudsman recommending the filing of the
Information and
b. the Memorandum dated June 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor denying the existence of a prejudicial question which
will warrant the suspension of the criminal case. The
Sandiganbayan had nothing more to support its resolution.

The Sandiganbayan failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of

personally determining the existence of probable cause before issuing a
warrant of arrest. The 2 cited document above were the product of
somebody else’s determination, insufficient to support a finding of probable
cause by the Sandiganbayan.

With regards to jurisdiction, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting
of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.  By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim
exemption effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court.
While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has
been negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court
through the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs.

1. In La Naval Drug vs. CA , Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a
 defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this
defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be
deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. Moreover,
"[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole
and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the
appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an
appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person.  

[G.R. NO. 175162 : October 29, 2008]

ATTY. ERNESTO A. TABUJARA III and CHRISTINE S.

DAYRIT, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DAISY
AFABLE, Respondents.

Facts:

On 17 September 1999, respondent Daisy Dadivas-Afable simultaneously

filed two criminal complaints against petitioners for Grave Coercion and
Trespass to Dwelling, as the petitioners allegedly forcibly took the
respondent from his own home as witnessed by one Mauro de Lara.

Petitioner denied the allegation. They argued that on 14 September 1999,

they went to the house of respondent to thresh out matters regarding some
missing pieces of jewelry. Respondent was a former employee of Miladay
Jewels, Inc., a company owned by the Dayrits and who was then being
administratively investigated in connection with missing jewelries. Despite
several summons to appear, respondent went on AWOL (absence without
official leave).
Judge Calixtro O. Adriatico of the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, Branch II, conducted the preliminary examination. On 7 January
2000, he issued an Order dismissing the complaints for lack of probable
cause. The Court believes and so holds that the instant complaints are
merely leverage to the estafa case already filed against private complainant
herein Daisy Afable by the Miladay Jewels Inc. wherein respondent Atty.
Tabujara III is its legal counsel; while respondent Dayrit appears to be one
of the officers of the said company.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that when she filed
the complaints for grave coercion and trespass to dwelling on 17
September 1999 against petitioners, no information for estafa has yet been
filed against her. In fact, the information was filed on 5 October 1999.

On 2 May 2000, Judge Adriatico issued an Order reversing his earlier

findings of lack of probable cause. This time, he found probable cause to
hold petitioners for trial and to issue warrants of arrest. The judge stated
that he overlooked the sworn statement of Mauro de Lara who accordingly
witnessed the crime.

Issue:

Whether or not the finding of probable cause and ordering the issuance of
warrants of arrest based solely on the unsworn statement of Mauro V. de
Lara who never appeared during preliminary investigation and who was not
personally examined by the investigating judge is valid?

Held:

NO.

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.

It is constitutionally mandated that a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon

finding of probable cause personally determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he/she may produce, and particularly describing the person to be seized.

Section 6 of Rule 112 provides:

SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - x x x

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. - x x x [T]he judge may issue a warrant of
arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of
placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice.

Clearly, Judge Adriatico gravely abused his discretion in issuing the

assailed 2 May 2000 and 14 July 2000 Orders finding probable cause to
hold petitioners liable for trial and to issue warrants of arrest because it was
based solely on the statement of witness Mauro De Lara whom Judge
Adriatico did not personally examine in writing and under oath; neither did
he propound searching questions. He merely stated in the assailed 2 May
2000 Order that he overlooked the said statement of De Lara;
nevertheless, without conducting a personal examination on said witness or
propounding searching questions, Judge Adriatico still found De Lara's
allegations sufficient to establish probable cause. Plainly, this falls short of
the requirements imposed by no less than the Constitution.

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1628             June 8, 2007

P/SUPT. ALEJANDRO GUTIERREZ, PCI ANTONIO RICAFORT, SPO4
RICARDO G. ONG, and SPO1 ARNULFO MEDENILLA, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE GODOFREDO G. HERNANDEZ, SR., respondent.

Facts:

A rescue operation was conducted to save the ladies who were still minor
from illegal recruiters. Such rescue operations was conducted by CIDD
officers and agents, together with the father of one of the illegally recruited
minor, and ABS CBN personnel headed by Gus Abelgas who took the
footage.

As a result of the rescue operation, a complaint for violation of Republic Act

(RA) 9208 in relation to RA 7610 was subsequently filed before the City
Prosecutor's Office of Malabon against PO2 Ringor, his recruiter wife
Imelda and a certain Bebang. Thereafter, the rescued minors were brought
and turned over to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
Later, the corresponding Information was filed and warrants of arrest with
no bail recommended were then issued against PO2 Ringor, et al.

Several weeks thereafter, the persons who conducted the rescue

operations were surprised to discover that cases for grave coercion and
qualified trespass to dwelling had been filed against them, before the sala
of the respondent judge. Apparently, the rescued girls, except Joahna
Cruz, had retracted their complaint against PO2 Ringor, et al. and had,
instead, filed charges of grave coercion and qualified trespass to dwelling
against the members of the CIDD rescue team.

Warrants of arrests were issued against herein petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuance of warrant of arrest was valid having forgone
the mandatory conduct of preliminary examination and personal
determination of probable cause in contravention of the provisions of the
Rules of Court and in denial of complainants' constitutional rights to due
process?

Whether or not the setting the said criminal cases for arraignment without
the requisite Informations having yet been filed in court is valid?

Held:

NO for both issues.

It is apparent from the facts on record that the complainants were never
issued any subpoena to accord them the opportunity to file their counter-
affidavits to adduce evidence controverting those alleged in the criminal
complaints against them before the respondent judge issued the warrants
of arrest. Moreover, the warrants of arrest were issued without complying
with the requisite conditions therefor.

It was on August 23, 2004 that the complaints for qualified trespass to
dwelling and grave coercion were filed against "Ernesto Cruz and five (5)
John Does" before the sala of respondent judge. On August 24, 2004, a
motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Ernesto Cruz was
filed. Respondent immediately granted said motion and issued a warrant
for his arrest that same day.

On September 8, 2004, a Motion to Amend Criminal Complaint was filed by

Amylene, Imelda and Jackielou identifying the names of the members of
the CIDD rescue team including Gus Abelgas. Again, on the very same
day, warrants of arrest were hastily issued against herein complainants and
Gus Abelgas.

Indubitably, there was no preliminary investigation conducted as required

by the rules since no subpoena was issued to herein complainants for them
to file counter-affidavits. Furthermore, the inordinate haste attending the
issuance of the warrants of arrest against complainants, Ernesto Cruz, and
Gus Abelgas belies the conduct of preliminary examination and personal
determination of probable cause, in contravention of the provisions of the
Rules of Court, and constituting a denial of due process.

Section 6, par. (b) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. - When required pursuant to the

second paragraph of Section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary
investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal
Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court may be conducted by
either the judge or the prosecutor. x x x When the investigation is
conducted by the judge himself, he shall follow the procedure
provided in section 3 of this Rule. If his findings and
recommendations are affirmed by the provincial or city prosecutor, or
by the Ombudsman or his deputy, and the corresponding information
is filed, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. However, without waiting
for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant
of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of
the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions
and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a
necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice. [Emphasis supplied]

From the foregoing provision, there are three (3) conditions that must
concur for the issuance of the warrant of arrest by the municipal judge
during a preliminary investigation. The investigating judge must:

1. Have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his
witnesses by searching questions and answers;

2. Be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and

3. That there is a need to place the respondent under immediate

custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
The issuance of the warrants of arrest in this case was clearly irregular
since, not only did it lack a preliminary investigation, but the order granting
such issuance did not show any finding of a need to place complainants
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

Even if the judge finds probable cause, it is not mandatory for him to issue
a warrant of arrest. He must further determine the necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.6 It is improper for a municipal judge to issue a warrant of arrest
without any finding that it was necessary to place the accused in immediate
custody to prevent frustration of the ends of justice. 7

Worse still, in a clear display of gross ignorance, respondent set Criminal

Case Nos. 6149 to 6156 for arraignment and hearing knowing fully well that
no preliminary investigation had been conducted and no information had
yet been filed before his court. This clearly violates complainants' right, as
accused in those cases, to due process, to be informed of the accusation
against them and to have a copy of the Information before arraignment. As
record shows, complainants, as accused in those cases, had already
received subpoenas way back on February 11, 2005, commanding them to
appear before the court on March 4, 2005 for arraignment without the
corresponding Information having as yet been filed.

G.R. No. L-54016 October 1, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUCIO LUMAYOK, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

Accused Lucio Lumayok was charged for raping and murdering Gloria
Bemos on November 11, 1977. The evidence of the prosecution was black
comb owned by the accused which was found few meters away from where
the cadaver of the victim was found.

During the conduct of the investigation, Lumayok was accordingly invited

by the police authorities of Hagonoy to the municipal building to shed light
on what he knew of the crime. Patrolman Andres Bajao, a childhood
acquaintance of the accused made a casual investigation. The accused
admitted to the police officer that he raped Gloria Bemos and after the
sexual intercourse, he killed her by using his two hands in choking the neck
of the victim. On being asked by Pat. Bajao as to why he did the offense,
the accused replied that his bride-to-be had left her residence without
informing the accused.

However, the accused-appellant averred that he was maltreated for about

an hour by the policemen investigating him causing him to eventually admit
the crime.

Issue:

Whether or not the testimonies of the accused during the police

investigation is admissible as evidence?
Held:

No.

Discounting the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court, the
appealed judgment would now rest only on the purported confession of the
accused taken from him while he was under custodial investigation by the
police authorities. The first of these confessions is said to have been given
in the afternoon of November 12, 1977 after the appellant herein had been
tricked into acompanying Policeman arabo and CHDF Montefalcon to go to
the police station of Hagonoy, Davao del sur. Accused is said to have
acknowledged his guilt verbally to one Policeman Andres Bajao. This first
admission of guilt allegedly made by Lucio Lumayok was, however,
rejected by the trial court as inadmissible evidence. The trial court stated:—

It is true that the accused denied having committed the crime

when he was interviewed by Patrolman Arabo and Rojo when
he was brought to the Police station in Hagonoy in the evening
of November 12, 1977. While the accused confessed to
Patrolman Andres Bajao about his having raped and killed
Gloria Bemos, such a confession is inadmissible because the
accused was not only tricked into making the confession but
also the accused was not informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent, not to testify aginst himself and to be assisted by
counsel.

Paradoxically, even with the observation of the trial court that the initial
spontaneous reaction of the accused was a denial of having raped and
killed Gloria Bemos, said court, nevertheless, extended full faith and credit
to a subsequent thumb marked and unsubscribed extrajudicial confession
written in English and supposedly given also that very same day to another
policeman, Patrolman Sarona. Said confession was obtained while the
accused was detained and under custodial investigation without him being
afforded the benefit of counsel or even any form of assistance from any
member of his family. And with the accused being tortured and maltreated.

In the case of People versus Francisco Galit, G.R. No. L-51770,

promulgated on March 20, 1985, which cited the case of Morales vs. Ponce
Enrile, 121 SCRA 538, this Court reiterated the correct procedures for
peace officers to follow when making arrest and in conducting a custodial
investigation. Therein We said:—

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the

arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and
he must be shown the warrant of arrest, ... . He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
 counsel and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses
by the most expedient means-by telephone if possible- or by
letter of messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel. any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

Considering the non-observance of the requisites above prescribed and the

impairment of the basic rights of the herein accused-appellant, his alleged
confession constitutes inadmissible evidence.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO

ALBIOR y YBIOA, CARLOS MANALANGSANG y BAKATANO,
RODOLFO VASQUEZ y BALUGO, JOHN DOE alias "JUN" and PETER
DOE alias "BERNARDO," accused, FRANCISCO ALBIOR, Accused-
Appellant.

Facts:

Florencio Garces, the father of the rape victim, was fetched by his son from
the headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Service, where he was a
Supervising Agent, on May 30, 2984. He was informed that there had been
a robbery at their house at 12 Salary St. GSIS Village, Project 8, Quezon
City and that his daughter Dana May had been assaulted. Garces rushed
home and found his daughter’s room disarranged. He proceeded to the
Quezon City General Hospital where Dana May was brought. Together with
his wife, they transferred Dana May to the Chinese General Hospital,
where Dana May was employed as a staff nurse, but she was already dead
so they brought her body to the PC Crime Laboratory for autopsy. Garces
also testified on the items stolen from their house, among which were some
shoes belonging to him and a typewriter.

The typewriter was eventually found to have been purchased by a buyer

who pointed Manalangsang and Vasquez as the persons who sold it to
him.

Agent Teofilo Jamela took the statements of the accused Manalangsang,

Albior and Vasquez after their arrest, wherein Manalangsang and Albior,
after having been appraised of their constitutional rights, admitted that they
served as lookouts while Bernardo Reyes entered the victim’s room.
Vasquez stated that in a drinking spree at the house of one Rogelio Ferrer
on the afternoon of May 30, 1984 Manalangsang and Reyes related to him
that earlier that day they robbed the house of the victim and, in the course
of the robbery, Reyes raped and killed the victim.

Upon arraignment, Accused-appellant Albior, together with accused

Manalangsang and Vasquez pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. Accused
John Doe alias "Jun" and Peter Doe alias "Bernardo" remained at large.
Subsequently, Accused Manalangsang withdrew his plea of "not guilty" and
changed it to "guilty" and he was correspondingly sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Accused-appellant Albior and accused Vasquez were duly tried and were
found guilty.

As accused Vasquez had already served the term of his penalty while
under preventive detention, he was released while accused-appellant was
transferred to the National Penitentiary for service of his sentence. Thus,
only accused-appellant Albior interposed an appeal contending that at the
time of the commission of the crime, he was at the house of his cousin in
Baesa, Quezon City and that he had nothing to do with the crime. He said
that he did not understand Tagalog, the dialect in which the extra-judicial
confession was written, being a Cebuano, and that he only signed it
because he was told that if he did, he would be released.

In his brief, Accused-appellant Albior assailed the legality of his arrest and

the seizure of the stolen goods by the CIS agents. However, as these
issues were never raised in the proceedings before the trial court, they
cannot be considered and passed upon on appeal

Issue:

Whether or not Albior’s constitutional rights was violated during the conduct
of the custodial investigation, thus made his statements inadmissible as
evidence.

Held:

Yes.

With regard to Albior’s sworn statement, the Court finds obvious defects
that would render it inadmissible in evidence.

In the case of People v. Galit [G.R. No. L-51770, March 20, 1985, 135
SCRA 465], the Court, quoting from Morales, Jr. v. Enrile [G.R. No. 61016,
April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538], said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could
be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means — by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself of by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but
the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence. [Italics supplied.]

The lack of assistance of counsel in Albior’s waiver of his right to counsel is

evident from the testimony of the investigating officer, Agent Jamela.

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It must also be noted that although Albior hardly speaks Tagalog, Cebuano
being his native dialect, the sworn statement is in Tagalog. It does not
suffice that an interpreter, an agent of the CIS, was present during the
interrogation (as stated in the sworn statement) because by virtue of its
being written in Tagalog, Albior was deprived of the opportunity to
comprehend through his own reading what he was signing.

Finally, the testimony of Albior that he agreed to sign the sworn statement
because he was promised that he would be released adds to the
conclusion that he did not understand what he was signing. No reasonable
person would believe the promise that he would be released if he knows
that he had just signed a statement admitting his participation in the
commission of a very serious offense.

In view of the foregoing defects, the Court is constrained to hold Albior’s

sworn statement inadmissible in evidence.
 [G.R. NO. 139301 : September 29, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. HUANG ZHEN HUA and

JOGY LEE, Appellants.

Facts:

Police operatives received word from their confidential informant that

Peter Chan and Henry Lao, and appellants Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua
were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The policemen also learned that
Lee was handling the payments and accounting of the proceeds of the
illegal drug trafficking activities of Lao and Chan. Officer Anciro, Jr. and
other police operatives conducted surveillance operations and were able to
verify that Lao and appellant Lee were living together as husband and wife.
They were able to secure search warrants, one for violation of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms and explosives) and
two for violation of R.A No. 6425, as amended otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drug Act.

The implementation of the first Search Warrant, no persons were

found in the area, however the policemen found two kilos of shabu and
paraphernalias for its production, and machines and tools apparently used
for the production of fake credit cards. Thereafter, the police operatives
received information that Lao and Chan would be delivering shabu. The
policemen rushed to the area and saw Chan and Lao on board the latter’s
car. Thereafter, the shoot-out resulted to death of the two suspect during
the encounter. The policemen found two plastic bags, each containing one
kilo of shabu, in Lao’s car.

The policemen then proceeded to the area where to enforce the other
search warrant. The policemen coordinated with Antonio Pangan, the
officer in charge of security in the building. The policemen, Pangan and two
security guards proceeded to the condominium unit. Anciro, Jr. knocked
repeatedly on the front door, but no one responded. Pangan, likewise,
knocked on the door. Until Lee peeped through the window beside the front
door. The policemen allowed Pangan to communicate with appellant Lee
by sign language and pointed their uniforms to her to show that they were
policemen. The Lee then opened the door and allowed the team into the
condominium unit. 

The policemen conducted the search in all the rooms within the unit.
The team proceeded with the search and found other articles not described
on the the search warrant. Huang Zhen Hua was found sleeping in one of
the rooms during the search and was surprised to see police officers.
Anciro, Jr. found two transparent plastic bags each containing one kilo of
shabu, a feeding bottle, a plastic canister and assorted
paraphernalia. Anciro, Jr. also found assorted documents, pictures, bank
passbooks issued by the Allied Banking Corporation, credit cards,
passports and identification cards of Lao and Lee. Anciro, Jr. told Lee to
bring some of her clothes because they were bringing her to the PARAC
headquarters. Lee did as she was told and took some clothes from the
cabinet in the master’s bedroom where Anciro, Jr. had earlier found the
shabu.

Issue:

Whether or not the articles not specified in the search warrant, are
inadmissible evidence.

Held:

No, Admittedly, Anciro, Jr. seized and took custody of certain articles
belonging to the appellant and Lao which were not described in the search
warrants. However, the seizure of articles not listed in a search warrant
does not render the seizure of the articles described and listed therein
illegal; nor does it render inadmissible in evidence. Such articles were in
plain view of Anciro, Jr. as he implemented the search warrants and was
authorized to seize the said articles because of their close connection to
the crime charged. An example of the applicability of the ‘plain view’
doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant to search a
given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come
across some other article of incriminating character. An object that comes
into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in
scope under existing law may be seized without a warrant. Finally, the
‘plain view’ doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object.

It cannot be denied that the cards, passbook, passport and other

documents and papers seen by the policemen have an intimate connection
with the crime charged. The passport of the appellant would show when
and how often she had been in and out of the country. Her credit cards and
bank book would indicate how much money she had amassed while in the
country and how she acquired or earned the same. The pictures and those
of the other persons shown therein are relevant to show her relationship to
Lao and Chan. The Supreme Court ruled that Huang Zhen Hua should be
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, but that the conviction of Lee
should be affirmed.

G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA.
MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V.
SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.

Facts:

The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-

CAPCOM) received a confidential information about a member of the NPA
Sparrow Unit being treated for a gunshot wound in a hospital. Upon
verification, it was found that the wounded person who was listed in the
hospital records as Ronnie Javelon is actually petitioner Rolando Dural, a
member of the NPA liquidation squad responsible for the killing of the two
(2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before. He was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of CAPCOM
mobile patrol car and fired at the two CAPCOM soldiers seated inside.

The petitioner was subsequently arrested for being a member of the New
Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner was validly arrested?

Held:

Yes. Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples
Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being
a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified
as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The
crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in
the nature of continuing crimes
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding
Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner, in a case of road rage, shot the victim and left the scene. After
establishing that the petitioner was probably the assailant, the police
launched a manhunt. Six days after the shooting, petitioner presented
himself before the police to verify the news that he was being hunted. He
was immediately detained.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner’s warrantless arrest was valid.

Held:

NO. Petitioner’s arrest took place six days after the shooting of the victim.
The arresting officers were obviously not present, within the meaning of
paragraph a, Section 5 of Rule 113, at the time the petitioner allegedly shot
the victim. Neither could “arrest” effected six days after the shooting be
reasonably as effected when the shooting had in fact just been committed
within the meaning of paragraph B, section 5 of Rule 113. Moreover, none
of the arresting officers had any personal knowledge of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot the victim.

G.R. No. 130644 October 27, 1997

THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, represented in this suit by
his mother MARGARITA G. LARRANAGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

It appears that on September 15, 1997, some PNP CIG authorities went to
the Center for Culinary Arts located at 287 Katipunan Avenue, Loyola
Heights, Quezon City to arrest Francisco Juan Larranaga. Larranaga, thru
his lawyer, Atty. Raymundo Armovit remonstrated against the warrantless
arrest. The police did not carry out the arrest on the assurance that
Larranaga would be brought to Cebu City by his lawyer on September 17,
1997 for preliminary investigation.

On September 17, 1997, Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary

investigation conducted by the Office of the City State Prosecutor of Cebu.
Forthwith, he moved that his client be given a regular preliminary
investigation. He also requested for copies of all affidavits and documents
in support of the complaint against his client and that he be granted a non-
extendible period of twenty (20) days from their receipt to file the defense
affidavit. The motion was denied by the city prosecutor on the ground that
Larranaga should be treated as a detention prisoner, hence entitled only to
an inquest investigation. Atty. Armovit was ordered to present Larranaga in
person. He was warned that his failure would be treated as waiver of his
client's right to a preliminary investigation and he would be proceeded
against pursuant to section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Atty.
Armovit's verbal motion for reconsideration was denied by the city
prosecutor.

On September 19, 1997, Larranaga appealed to the Court of Appeals

assailing the actuations of the Cebu prosecutors thru a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. However, it turned out that on
September 17, 1997 the said prosecutors had filed an information with the
RTC of Cebu charging Larranaga with kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. The prosecutors recommended no bail. On September 22, 1997,
counsel filed a Supplemental Petition with the Court of Appeals impleading
the RTC of Cebu City to prevent petitioner's arrest. The move again proved
fruitless as Larranaga was arrested on the night of September 22, 1997 by
virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Executive Judge of the RTC of
Cebu City. A second Supplemental Petition was filed by Larranaga's
counsel in the Court of Appeals bringing to its attention the arrest of
Larranaga. On September 25, 1997 the Court of Appeals' dismissed
Larranaga's petitions, hence, the case at bar.

Issue: Whether or not Larranaga was validly arrested?

Held:

NO.

The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested." For one the
petitioner was not arrested on September 15, 1997, as his counsel
persuaded the arresting officers that he would instead be presented in the
preliminary investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on September 17,
1997. For another, the arresting officers had no legal authority to make a
warrantless arrest of the petitioner for a crime committed some two (2)
months before.

Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which

provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.

It then follows that the right of petitioner to a regular preliminary

investigation pursuant to section 3 of Rule 112 cannot stand any
diminution.

Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a

capital offense case should have been granted by the Cebu City
prosecutor. As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals,
'the right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound
over for trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right;
it is a substantive right.' A preliminary investigation should therefore be
scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a
potential accused can be protected from any material damage."

G.R. No. 144037. September 26, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NOEL
TUDTUD y PAYPA and DINDO BOLONG y NARET, accused-appellants.

Facts:

Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police
Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong
Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors have
been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the
proliferation of marijuana in their area. Reacting to the report, few members
of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station conducted surveillance
in Solier’s neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For five days, they
gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs.
According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana.

On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to
Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. 
At around 4:00 in the afternoon that same day, a team composed of
policemen posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur
Highway to await Tudtuds arrival. All wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 later
that evening, two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other
carry a carton marked King Flakes. Standing some five feet away from the
men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit
Tudtuds description. The same man also toted a plastic bag.

PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and
identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that
the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be
arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtuds description denied
that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the
contents of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, it was alright. Tudtud opened
the box himself as his companion looked on. The box yielded pieces of
dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped
plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to
unwrap the packages. They contained what seemed to the police officers
as marijuana leaves.

The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their
rights and brought them to the police station. The two did not resist.

Issue:

WON the accused were validly arrested without a warrant? WON the
marijuana leaves were seized in violation of their right against
unreasonable searches and seizures?

Held:

There was no valid arrest and the marijuana leaves were seized in violation
of the accused’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which states:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the places to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.

The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes
unreasonable within the meaning of the above-quoted constitutional
provision, and any evidence secured thereby, will be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. 61 Section 3 (2), Article III of
the Constitution explicitly provides:
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only unreasonable

searches and seizures. The following instances are not deemed
unreasonable even in the absence of a warrant:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of

the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);

2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements are: (a) a prior valid

intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they
are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) plain view justified
mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the

vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when
its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.62cräläwvirtualibräry A search

incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Prior to its
revision in 2000, Section 12,70 Rule 126 of said Rules read as follows:

SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may

be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules, in turn, allows warrantless arrests:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest.

Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the
process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. The
question, therefore, is whether the police in this case had probable cause
to arrest appellants.

Appellants in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in a
suspicious manner that would hint that a crime has been, was being, or
was about to be, committed. If the arresting officers testimonies are to be
believed, appellants were merely helping each other carry a carton box.
Although appellant Tudtud did appear afraid and perspiring, pale and
trembling, this was only after, not before, he was asked to open the said
box.

In no sense can the knowledge of the herein arresting officers that

appellant Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as personal,
having learned the same only from their informant Solier. Solier, for his
part, testified that he obtained his information only from his neighbors and
the friends of appellant Tudtud:

Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it

necessary to conduct their own surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out,
did not actually consist of staking out appellant Tudtud to catch him in the
act of plying his illegal trade, but of a mere gathering of information from
the assets there. The police officers who conducted such surveillance did
not identify who these assets were or the basis of the latters information.
Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal knowledge.

Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would
allow them to do away with the requisite warrant, PO1 Desiertos assertions
of lack of time notwithstanding. Records show that the police had ample
opportunity to apply for a warrant, having received Soliers information at
around 9:00 in the morning; Tudtud, however, was expected to arrive at
around 6:00 in the evening of the same day. 

Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview
of the constitutional guarantee.122 Consequently, appellants lack of
objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.

G.R. No. 133917       February 19, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y
MALAGURA @ "BOBOY", accused-appellants.

Fact:

Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the

Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City,
received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana
pusher in Davao City. His informer pointed to a motorcycle driver, accused-
appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1
Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest.

At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon

received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-
a, Davao City any time that morning. Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of
the same day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina,
Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio
Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1
Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass
by.

At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were
positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the
accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed
to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded
their, vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his
house, thirty meters from where the accused-appellants were accosted.

The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point,
accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to
accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced
himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the
bag. Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona
insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside.
Thereafter; accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the
police officers.

On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a

Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from
them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of
their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was
filed by accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accused-
appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint
memorandum.

Issue:

WON the arrest of the accused was valid and that the marijuana is
inadmissible as evidence for having been seized in violation of appellants’
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Held:

NO, the arrest was not valid and the marijuana is inadmissible as evidence.

Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search
in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when
the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search).

The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests.

Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it
(arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another ( arrest of escaped prisoners ).

Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must

concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.

In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication

that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-
appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or
have committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina
responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1
Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the
"suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused-appellants were
committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not
constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that
were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the
arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers),
accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable
or otherwise.

G.R. Nos. 136066-67             February 4, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BINAD SY CHUA, accused-appellant.

Facts:

On September 21, 1996, at around 10:00 in the evening, SPO2 Mario

Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag received a report from their confidential
informant that Binad Sy-Chua was about to deliver drugs that night at the
Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The informer further reported
that accused-appellant distributes illegal drugs in different karaoke bars in
Angeles City. On the basis of this lead, the PNP Chief of Angeles City, Col.
Neopito Gutierrez, immediately formed a team of operatives composed of
Major Bernardino, Insp. Tullao, Insp. Emmanuel Nunag, P02 Emmeraldo
Nunag, SP01 Fernando Go, and some civilian assets, with SPO2 Mario
Nulud, as team investigator. The group of SPO2 Nulud, PO2 Nunag and
the civilian informer positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near
Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting Thunder Inn Hotel. The other group acted as
their back up.

At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car driven by

accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the
Thunder Inn Hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a
sealed Zest-O juice box, police officers hurriedly accosted him and
introduced themselves. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small
transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right
back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which
yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left
back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O
box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly
confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the
twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by
accused-appellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other police
operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the
office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles
City.3

When Col. Gutierrez opened the sealed Zest-O juice box, he found 2 big
plastic bags containing crystalline substances. The initial field test
conducted by SPO2 Danilo Cruz at the PNP Headquarters revealed that
the siezed items contained shabu. 4 Thereafter, SPO2 Nulud together with
accused-appellant brought these items for further laboratory examination to
the Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. After due
testing, forensic chemist S/Insp. Daisy Babor concluded that the crystalline
substances yielded positive results for shabu. The small plastic bag
weighed 13.815 grams while the two big plastic bags weighed 1.942
kilograms of shabu.

The RTC rendered decision acquitting Chua for illegal possession of

ammunitions, but found him guilty for illegal possession shabu.

Issue:

WON Chua was validly arrested without a warrant?

WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu
allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.

Held:

No, Chua was not validly arrested and the search of his person and the
subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were conducted
in an unlawful and invalid manner.

In the case at bar, there appears on record some facts of weight and
substance that have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by
the trial court which casts doubt on the guilt of accused-appellant. Neither
the in flagrante delicto nor the "stop and frisk" principles is applicable to
justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by
the police operatives on accused-appellant.
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very
moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an
offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on
the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest.
Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of
a person and his belongings. 17 Accordingly, for this exception to apply two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 18

We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The
record reveals that when accused-appellant arrived at the vicinity of
Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked his car along the McArthur Highway,
alighted from it and casually proceeded towards the entrance of the Hotel
clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. Accused-appellant did not act in a
suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt
manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.

In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already had prior

knowledge from the very same informant of accused-appellant’s activities.
No less than SPO2 Mario Nulud, the team leader of the arresting
operatives, admitted that their informant has been telling them about the
activities of accused-appellant for two years prior to his actual arrest on
September 21, 1996.

The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged illegal activities
of accused-appellant. Considering that the identity, address and activities
of the suspected culprit was already ascertained two years previous to the
actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not
have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accused-appellant and
searching his person. Whatever information their civilian asset relayed to
them hours before accused-appellant’s arrest was not a product of an "on-
the-spot" tip which may excuse them from obtaining a warrant of arrest.
Accordingly, the arresting team’s contention that their arrest of accused-
appellant was a product of an "on-the-spot" tip is untenable.

In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" in this case. A

stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on
the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The
police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries,
approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious
conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed
weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in
accordance with the police officer’s experience and the surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a
search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.

G.R. No. 147671             November 21, 2002

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RENANTE MENDEZ and BABY CABAGTONG, accused-appellant.

Facts:

Accordingly, in the morning of December 8, 1996, Candy Dolim, then 13

years old, left their house to collect bets on the PBA ending games from the
local residents. When she did not return home that evening, Rico asked his
father Ambrosio and his daughter Jinky to look for Candy, but they did not
find her. On December 12, 1996, Rico Dolim, father of Candy, was
informed that a young girl was found dead in Sitio Tinotogasan. Rico
immediately went to the place and found the lifeless body of Candy. Her
panty and shorts were hanging from an ankle, while her shirt was rolled up
to her throat. She had wounds in different parts of her body.

In the morning of December 8, 1996, SPO2 Noli Cernio was informed that
a dead body had been found in Sitio Tinotogasan. For this reason, he went
to Barangay Burabud with Chief of Police Peter Longcop and Dr. Santiago
Engo to conduct an investigation. When they arrived in Sitio Tinotogasan,
Barangay Burabud, they found the lifeless body of Candy Dolim. Candy’s
grandfather identified her body.

After conducting initial investigation on that same day, December 12, 1996,
SPO2 Noli Cernio apprehended Ronnie Cabagtong, together with Renante
Mendez. SPO2 Cernio said he questioned Ronnie and accused-appellant
Renante Mendez. Ronnie told him that accused-appellants Renante
Mendez and Baby Cabagtong went to his house at around 10 o’clock in the
evening on the day of the incident. SPO2 Cernio said he did not take the
sworn affidavit of Ronnie Cabagtong because the latter denied involvement
in the case and claimed that he was in their house on the night of the
incident. SPO2 Cernio said that Ronnie Cabagtong was released from
custody after he had informed the Chief of Police that he was innocent.
Accused-appellant Renante Mendez remained in custody for investigation,
while the Chief of Police ordered accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong to be
arrested. Rene "Baby" Cabagtong was arrested on December 13, 1996 in
his farm in Sitio Pinamihagan, Gamay, Northern Samar, by barangay tanod
Mano Mejica. Accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong was on his way home to
take his meal when he met Mejica, who asked him to go with him. When
Baby demanded to know why he should do so, Mejica pointed a gun at
him.

Issue:

WON Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong were validly arrested without
a warrant?
Held:

NO.

Supreme Court cannot close thier eyes to the palpable violations of the
rights of accused-appellants during the period of their detention. The record
shows that accused-appellants were arrested without any warrants from
the courts. Contrary to his claim, SPO2 Cernio did not have personal
knowledge of the commission of the crime so as to justify the warrantless
arrest of Renante Mendez. Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without
warrant under §5(b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must
be based upon "probable cause," which means "an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when it is based on actual facts, i.e., when it is supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested.62

There is also an inconsistency between Ronnie's testimony and that of

SPO2 Cernio. SPO2 Cernio testified that Ronnie told him the day he was
arrested that accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong
went to Ronnie's house at around 10 o'clock on the night of the incident.
But Ronnie denied that he told the police what he knew of the incident
when he was investigated because he feared for his life. The police failed
to record the investigation, and so it is not now possible to determine who
was actually telling the truth. It is clear from the records, however, that
accused-appellant Renante Mendez was arrested together with Ronnie
Cabagtong. On the other hand, the only time the police had evidence
against accused-appellant Renante Mendez was when Aurea Cabagtong
came forward after her son's arrest and pointed to him (Renante Mendez)
and Baby Cabagtong as the perpetrators. But that was only on December
12, 1996, four days after the commission of the crime, and it could not
justify the arrest of accused-appellants without a judicial warrant.
Accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong, on the other hand, was arrested by
Zosimo Mejica, a member of the Citizens' Crime Watch, on the basis of the
citizens' arrest law. Mejica was neither a police officer nor a witness to the
incident. He was not a member of the investigating team. He did not have
any personal knowledge of the incident. He admitted during cross-
examination that he merely based his arrest on the information supplied by
Aurea Cabagtong to the police. 63This does not constitute personal
knowledge to warrant a citizens' arrest.

G.R. No. 125299 January 22, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @
"NENETH," accused-appellants.

Facts:

In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District, Philippine

National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information
from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal
drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap
and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a
meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on
December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.

At 7:20 in the morning of December 5, 1995, "Jun" appeared and the CI

introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana.
P03 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun"
instructed P03 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard
and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate. An hour
later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where P03 Manlangit, the CI and
the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object
wrapped in plastic and gave it to P03 Manlangit. P03 Manlangit forthwith
arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked
"Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed
that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth. "Jun"
led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.

The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside.
"Jun" identified the woman as his associate. 7 SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth"
about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house.
Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining
table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was
something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents
appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His
suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold
of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10)
bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.

Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked
bills from "Neneth." The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth"
and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the marked bills and
turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only then that
the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is
Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves
recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's"
house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. The bricks, eleven
(11) in all, were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights
totalling 7,641.08 grams. 

The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria

and Violeta Gaddao. Florencio Doria. Hence, the appeal.

Issue:

1. WON Doria was validly arrested during the buy-bust operation?

 2. WON the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the
search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of
evidence obtained therefrom are valid?

Held:

Supreme Court holds that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant

Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as
provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer

or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he

has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped

from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested

without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the
act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended
in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are
not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a
warrant. 
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and
residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are
different matters.

Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant

and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.  The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and
seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:  (1) search incident
to a lawful arrest;107 (2) search of a moving motor vehicle;  (3) search in
violation of customs laws;  (4) seizure of evidence in plain view;  (5) when
the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 

The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a

warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box of marijuana and
the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It is claimed,
however, that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was
made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest.

To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under

any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted.

Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust

operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She
was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court,
there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the
policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact, she was going about
her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.

Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second
instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without
warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable
cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence
of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged

identification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared
in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in
response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money
was. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in
the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills.
This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant
Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria
may have left the money in her house, with or without her knowledge, with
or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word, the
Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was
engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who
effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts
implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the
arrest is legally objectionable.

G.R. No. 123123           August 19, 1999

EDWIN CADUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:

This case stemmed from a charge for Illegal Possession of Firearms.

In the evening of January 2, 1992, between 6:30 and 7:00 in the evening,
PO3 Joselito Burdeos and companions, all assigned with the Central Police
District in Quezon City, were aboard mobile unit 118 patrolling the vicinity
of Fairview, Quezon City. While deployed, they received a radio dispatch
requesting them to proceed to Lot 10 Block 14, Alden Street, North
Fairview. Said dispatch was based on a report concerning an alleged
holdup of complainants Lourdes Bulos and her daughter Bernadette, who
were in need of police assistance.

At said address, police officers found both complainants who stated that
the alleged hold uppers had just fled. PO3 Burdeos asked where the
robbery took place. Complainants replied that they were held up by two (2)
men at the corner of Archer and Regalado Streets, near their house. The
police officers also asked in what direction the alleged hold uppers fled and
what they were wearing. Then, the police officers requested the
complainants to board the patrol unit in order to facilitate the search for the
two (2) men. As they were patrolling around the area, complainants
informed the police officers that one of the suspects was dressed in jeans
and a t-shirt while the other was dressed in a black top and black pants.
The police officers then noticed two (2) men walking alongside the street
and as the officers slowed down the mobile unit to get a closer look, the
complainants identified the men as the alleged hold uppers, one of which is
the petitioner in this case. The police officers slowed down to a stop,
alighted from the vehicle, and called out to the suspects. As Burdeos was
approaching the suspects, he noticed that petitioner Cadua was about to
pull something which was tucked at the right side of his waist. Burdeos
promptly pointed his firearm at Cadua and warned him not to move. He
then frisked Cadua and found in his possession a .38 caliber "paltik"
revolver. PO3 Reynoso Bacnat the apprehended Cadua's companion, who
was later identified as Joselito Aguilar. In Aguilar's possession was found a
fan knife.

Verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit revealed that petitioner-
accused Edwin Cadua is not a valid license holder of a .38 caliber "paltik"
revolver.

Originally, Chief Inspector Herminigildo Faustino referred to the City

Prosecutor's Office for investigation the cases of Robbery, Violation of PD
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms) and Violation of PD 5121
(Concealment of a Deadly Weapon). However, Assistant City Prosecutor
Edgardo Paragua by resolution dated January 6, 1992, found only the case
for Illegal Possession of Firearms warranting the filing of an Information.
According to Prosecutor Paragua, during the investigation for robbery,
complainants manifested their doubts as to the identity of the respondents,
hence he set this matter for further investigation. As to the charge for
Violation of City Ordinance 5121 against Aguilar, for concealment of a
deadly weapon, it was found that there was sufficient evidence to warrant
the filing of an Information against him. But, considering that said violation
falls under the Rules of Summary Procedure, it could not be included in the
Information for alleged possession of firearms, which concerned only
herein petitioner. On the same day that this Resolution by Prosecutor
Paragua was released, the Information against petitioner was filed.

Issue:

Whether or not the apprehension of the accused was illegal and that the
filing of the charges for illegal possession of firearms is but an afterthought
since the private complainant admitted that the accused Cadua was not the
hold-upper?

Held:

The apprehension, despite having no warrant of arrest, was valid.

Considering the circumstances in this case, we find that there was
sufficient reason to justify a warrantless arrest of petitioner for illegal
possession of firearms. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
provides that:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,

is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped

from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7.

The findings of the trial court, accepted by the appellate court, show the
pertinence of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5 above-cited. Through
police dispatch to the scene of a crime report and in the presence of
complainants, it was ascertained that a robbery had just been committed,
and the arresting officers had personal knowledge that petitioner was
directly implicated as a suspect. As explained by a respected authority on
criminal procedure:

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts", in arrests

without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. . . . Peace
 officers may pursue and arrest without warrant any person found in
suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances reasonably
tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to
commit, any crime or breach of the peace. Probable cause for an
arrest without warrant is such a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to
warrant a reasonable man in believing the accused to be guilty.
Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is
another protective bulwark for the officer. Under such conditions,
even if the suspected person is later found to be innocent, the peace
officer is not liable. The cases hold that a peace officer might arrest
and detain in prison for examination persons walking in the street at
night whom there is reasonable ground to suspect of felony, although
there is no proof of a felony having been committed; but the arrest
would be illegal if the person so arrested was innocent and there
were no reasonable grounds of suspicion to mislead the officer. The
reason of the rule is apparent. Good people do not ordinarily lurk
about the streets and uninhabited premises at midnight. Citizens
must be protected from annoyance and crime. Prevention of crime is
just as commendatory as the capture of criminals. Surely the officer
must not be forced to await the commission of robbery or other
felony, The rule is supported by the necessities of life. 31

Petitioner could not dispute that there was an initial report to the police
concerning the robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to the arresting
officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the
radio message. When they reached said place, they met up with the
complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers'
invitation, both mother and daughter boarded the mobile unit to join them in
conducting a search of the nearby area. The accused was spotted in the
vicinity. Based on the reported statements of complainants, he was
identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed.
Moreover, at that time that PO3 Burdeos called out to petitioner, the latter
was on the act of drawing out his "paltik" revolver.

Nothing in petitioner's testimony successfully rebuts Burdeos' narration.

Actual possession of an unlicensed firearm, which petitioner attempted to
draw out, by itself, amounts to committing an offense in the presence of the
arresting officer contemplated in paragraph (a), Section 5 of the
abovementioned Rule.

G.R. No. 123872. January 30, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUBEN MONTILLA

y GATDULA, Accused-Appellant.

Facts:

Appellant was apprehended at around 4:00 A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a
waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite by SPO1
Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both members of the
Cavite Philippine National Police Command based in Dasmarias. Appellant,
according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks
contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a
total weight of 28 kilos.

These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an
informer in the arrest of appellant. That informer, according to Talingting
and Clarin, had informed them the day before, or on June 19, 1994 at
about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier, whom said informer could recognize,
would be arriving somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias from Baguio
City with an undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the same informer
who pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant when the latter
alighted from a passenger jeepney on the aforestated day, hour, and place.
Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited
drugs. He claimed during the trial that while he indeed came all the way
from Baguio City, he traveled to Dasmarias, Cavite with only some pocket
money and without any luggage. His sole purpose in going there was to
look up his cousin who had earlier offered a prospective job at a garment
factory in said locality, after which he would return to Baguio City. He never
got around to doing so as he was accosted by SPO1 Talingting and SPO1
Clarin at Barangay Salitran.

He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias,

Cavite, he was never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact
even robbed of the P500.00 which he had with him. Melita Adaci, the
cousin, corroborated appellant's testimony about the job offer in the
garment factory where she reportedly worked as a supervisor, although, as
the trial court observed, she never presented any document to prove her
alleged employment.

Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the

course of an unlawful warrantless search and seizure. He calls the
attention of the Court to the fact that as early as 2:00 P.M. of the preceding
day, June 19, 1994, the police authorities had already been apprised by
their so-called informer of appellant's impending arrival from Baguio City,
hence those law enforcers had the opportunity to procure the requisite
warrant. Their misfeasance should therefore invalidate the search for and
seizure of the marijuana, as well as the arrest of appellant on the following
dawn

Issue:

WON the accused was validly arrested without warrant?

Held:

Yes.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a
search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a
judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional
provision. Evidence secured on the occasion of such an unreasonable
search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law,
it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This
exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus,
(1) customs searches; (2) searches of moving vehicles, (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (4) consented searches; (5) searches incidental to a
lawful arrest; and (6) "stop and frisk" measures have been invariably
recognized as the traditional exceptions.

On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on

appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him, still the search on his
belongings and the consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result
thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under that provision, a peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense.

A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks

the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from
the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense. On the other hand, the
apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in
effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the
instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a). These instances
have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante
delicto. The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a
relative term the determination of which must be resolved according to the
facts of each case, is understood as having reference to such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to
believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.

In the case at bar, when the officers approached appellant and introduced
themselves as policemen, they asked him about the contents of his
luggage, and after he replied that they contained personal effects, the
officers asked him to open the traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded,
presumably or in all likelihood resigned to the fact that the law had caught
up with his criminal activities. When an individual voluntarily submits to a
search or consents to have the same conducted upon his person or
premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.

After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other
rights, be waived either expressly or impliedly. Thus, while it has been held
that the silence of the accused during a warrantless search should not be
taken to mean consent to the search but as a demonstration of that
person's regard for the supremacy of the law, the case of herein appellant
is evidently different for, here, he spontaneously performed affirmative acts
of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to
do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his
right.

G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, it
appears that by virtue of an intelligent information obtained by the
Constabulary and INP units, stationed at Digos, Davao del Sur, on May 12,
1982, one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities at about 9:00 o'clock A.M. at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary
Headquarters, stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused Ruben
Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm
against his life, if he refused.

Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units,

on the following day, May 13, 1982, was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del
Sur, to arrest accused Ruben Burgos. The team left the headquarter at
1:30 P.M., and arrived at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM where
through the help of Pedro Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to
locate accused, who was plowing his field.

The accused was arrested and recovered from him was a .38 revolver
buried under the ground. Accused was not as well reminded of his
constitutional rights.

Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos denied that he is a member of the NPA.

He also averred that it was Masalmok himself who buried the revolver on
the ground during the time he was not home, and that such burying was
witnessed by Burgos’ wife, who was also threatened by Masalmok. Burgos
also claimed that he was tortured few days after his warrantless arrest
forcing him to admit ownership of the gun.

Issues:

1. WON the warrantless arrest of the accused is justified?

2. WON the exceptions of in arrest with warrant can be liberally
construed as in this instant case?

Held:

1. The warrantless arrest is not justified.

In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's
verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had
committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet
ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of
information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful,
If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally
nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The
fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.

The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report
made by Masamlok who was not required to subscribe his allegations
under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges
under pain of criminal prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982).
Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search
warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the
accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful,
the search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be
deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.

2. The exceptions must be strictly construed.

The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appellant without any
warrant as falling under one of the instances when arrests may be validly
made without a warrant.

The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.

Rule 113, Section 6 * of the Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as

follows:

a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,

or is about to commit an offense in his presence;

b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable

ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed
in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge

was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the
information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was
given by the appellant's wife.

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any
firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which
could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the
time of the arrest.

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his

body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental
one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of
warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within
the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly
unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule
on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases
specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty
and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full
protection.

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough

that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.
The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was
given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To
constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that
the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry
into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein

G.R. No. 120330 November 18, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
WENCESLAO JAYSON, accused-appellant.

Facts:

Accused-appellant Wenceslao Jayson was charged with violation of P.D.

No. 1866 in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

The prosecution evidence shows that in the evening of March 16, 1991,
accused-appellant, then a bouncer at the "Ihaw-Ihaw" nightclub on
Bonifacio Street, Davao City, shot one Nelson Jordan. He was arrested
after he had been pointed by eyewitnesses as the gunman. Recovered
from him was a .38 caliber revolver with serial number 91955, four live
bullets, and one empty shell. The firearm and ammunition were covered by
a memorandum receipt and mission order issued by Major Francisco
Arquillano, Deputy Commander of the Civil-Military Operation and CAFGU
Affairs of the Davao Metropolitan District Command.
Accused-appellant was initially charged with murder 5 in an information filed
on March 20, 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 22,456-91 in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Davao City but, after plea-bargaining, he
was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. 6 In a decision
dated September 24, 1991, the trial court sentenced him to imprisonment
of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.7

Issue:

Whether or not the accused was validly arrested despite the circumstances
surrounding accused-appellant and the seizure from him of the firearm in
question considering that both were made without any warrant from a
court?

Held:

Yes, the accused was validly arrested.

With respect to the arrest, SPO1 Loreto Tenebro testified that at around

10:00 in the evening of March 16, 1991, while he and Patrolmen Camotes
and Reinerio Racolas were patrolling in their car, they received a radio
message from their camp directing them to proceed to the "Ihaw-Ihaw" on
Bonifacio Street where there had been a shooting. Accordingly, they
proceeded to the place and there saw the victim, Nelson Jordan.
Bystanders pointed to accused-appellant as the one who had shot Jordan.
They then arrested accused-appellant. Seized from him was a .38 caliber
revolver with serial number 91955. The firearm was covered by a mission
order and memorandum receipt. Considering these facts, we hold that the
warrantless arrest and search were valid.

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
 (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it.

In the case at bar there was a shooting. The policemen summoned to the
scene of the crime found the victim. Accuse-appellant was pointed to them
as the assailant only moments after the shooting. In fact accused-appellant
had not gone very far (only ten meters away from the "Ihaw-Ihaw"),
although he was then fleeing. The arresting officers thus acted on the basis
of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that
accused-appellant was the assailant.

People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999)

Facts:

Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his
tasks was to take care of Isip’s house which was under construction
adjacent to the latter’s residence. The victim was a 12-year old girl who
used to frequent the residence of Isip.

On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was reported missing by
her mother. The following morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger
jeepney and disappeared.

The victim’s body was found, lifeless, at around 7:30 am that same day.
She was found in the septic tank wearing her blouse and no underwear.
The autopsy showed that the victim was raped and was strangled to death.

Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen found a pair of dirty white
short pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by
the victim’s mother to belong to her daughter. Also, they found a pair of
blue slippers which Isip identified as that of the appellant. Also found in the
yard, three armslength away from the septic tank were an underwear, a
leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified by
Isip as appellant’s belongings.
The appellant was soon arrested and executed an extra-judicial confession
wherein he narrated how the crime was committed. The trial ensued and
the lower court convicted him of the crime of Rape and was sentenced to
death. The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

Issues:

1.WON the appellant’s extra-judicial confession was validly taken and in

accordance with his rights under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights; and

2.WON the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient

to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:

The conviction of the appellant is affirmed.

The Court ruled that the appellant’s extrajudicial confession was taken
within the ambit of the law as evinced by the records and testimony of the
lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him his constitutionally
guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights.

As to the second issue, the appellant argues that the circumstantial

evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to warrant a
conviction of his guilt. However, the Court ruled otherwise.

People vs. Valdez G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000

FACTS:

Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating

Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as
amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused was allegedly caught in flagrante
delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven
(7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from which
dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant was arraigned
and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on
the merits then ensued.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay,

SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias
and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all member of the police force, who testified how
the information was received, the commencement of their operation and its
details under the specific instruction of Inspector Parungao. Accordingly,
they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look
around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-
foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters
away from his nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the
prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were
his. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos of appellant
standing beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. One of the said
plants was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for
analysis which produced a positive result. The prosecution also presented
a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
that the land cultivated by appellant where the growing marijuana plants
were found, was part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in
the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship
had yet been issued in his favor.

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was

weeding his vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose identity
he does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to see something.
This unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the
marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa
hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front
of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the
marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2
Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants.
Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the
marijuana. The police team then brought him to the police station at
Villaverde. At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew
nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police. Appellant
contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the
law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant.
Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not
remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is the immunity of one’s person, which includes his residence, his
papers, and other possessions.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the
present case is lawful and the seized evidence admissible.

(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the
accused.

(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.

HELD:

In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination of the existence of probable cause given the fact
that police had ample time to obtain said warrant. The protection against
illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under
specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The mantle of
protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty
alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of
the praiseworthiness of their intentions.

With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently
obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue,
which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the
prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and
seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the
proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of
the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana
plants as evidence to convict appellant.

In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an

accused may be convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by
proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the
accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed against the accused,
however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be
credible and competent. Competent evidence is “generally admissible”
evidence. Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence “of such a character
that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be
introduced at trial. And as earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court’s
part to have admitted evidences against the accused and to have relied
upon said proofs to convict him for said evidence is doubly tainted.

In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.” To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must
adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its
evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the accused. Absent the required degree of proof of an accused’s guilt, he
is entitled to an acquittal.
People vs. Burgos GR L-68955, September 4, 1986 (144 SCRA 1)

Facts: Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the

authorities stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos
(D) as member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against
his life, if he refused. Pursuant to this information, PC-INP members went
to the house of the Burgos (D) and saw him plowing his field when they
arrived. One of the arresting offices called Burgos (D) and asked him about
the firearm. At first, Burgos (D) denied having any firearm, but later,
Burgos's (D) wife pointed to a place below their house where a gun was
buried in the ground.

After recovery of said firearm, Burgos (D) pointed to a stock pile of cogon
where the officers recovered alleged subversive documents. Burgos (D)
further admitted that the firearm was issued to him by Nestor Jimenez,
team leader of sparrow unit.

Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid? Is the warrantless search valid?

Ruling: No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person
who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense
must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80
Phil. 859).

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge

was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the
information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was
given by the wife of Burgos (D).

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough

that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.
The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

In this case, the Burgos (D) was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's
verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had
committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet
ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of
information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful.
If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally
nothing that happened or is discovered afterward can make it lawful. The
fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.

PEOPLE VS VELOSO 48 PHIL. 169 (1925)

Facts:

In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
Manila, was used by anorganization known as the Parliamentary Club.
Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of theHouse of Representative
of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.-The
police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary
Club was nothingmore than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J.
F. Townsend, the chief of the gamblingsquad, had been to the club and
verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective AndresGeronimo
of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a
search warrantfrom Judge Garduño of the municipal court. Thus provided,
the police attempted to raid theParliamentary Club a little after three in the
afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They foundthe doors to the
premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including
policemanRosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window
of the house. Other policemen,headed by Townsend, broke in the outer
door.-Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were
apprehended by the police. One of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso
asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showedhim the search
warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative
Veloso andnot John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the
house. Townsend answered thatVeloso was considered as John Doe. As
Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gamblingutensils, Townsend
required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five
minuteswas consumed in conversation between the policemen and the
accused the policemen insistingon searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting
in his refusal to submit to the search.-At last the patience of the officers
was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Velosoonly to meet
with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him
a blow inanother part of the body, which injured the policeman quite
severely. Through the combinedefforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso
was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de
monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.-All of the
persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons.
Velosoagain refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the
police department. It wasnecessary for the policemen to conduct him
downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted sotenaciously that three policemen
were needed to place him in the patrol wagon.-The warrant read as follows:

SEARCH WARRANT (G) The People of the Philippine Islands, to any

member of thePolice Force of the City of Manila.GREETINGProof by
affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that
hehas good reason to believe and does believe that John Doe has illegally
in hispossession in the building occupied by him and which is under his
control, namely inthe building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
Manila, Philippines Islands, certaindevices and effects used in violation of
the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards,chips, reglas, pintas, tables and
chairs and other utensils used in connection with thegame commonly
known as monte and that the said John Doe keeps and conceals
saiddevices and effects with the illegal and criminal intention of using them
in violation of the Gambling Law.Now therefore, you are hereby
commanded that at any time in the day or nightwithin ten (10) days on or
after this date to make a search on the person of said JohnDoe and in the
house situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
PhilippineIslands, in quest of the above described devices and effects and
if you find the sameor any part thereof, you are commanded to bring it
forthwith before me as providedfor by law.Given under my hand, this 25th
day of May, 1923.(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO Judge, Municipal Court

Issue: WON the search warrant and the arrest of Veloso was valid.

Ruling: Yes. It is provided, among other things, in the Philippine Code on

Criminal Procedure that “a searchwarrant shall not issue except for
probable cause and upon application supported by oathparticularly
describing the place to be searched and the person of thing to be seized.”
The name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of
the warrant andwhere the name is unknown there must be such a
description of the person accused as willenable the officer to identify him
when found.A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is
unknown, by the name of "JohnDoe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true
name in unknown," is void, without other and furtherdescriptions of the
person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer
inacting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best
descriptio personae possibleto be obtained of the person or persons to be
apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the
proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to beserved; and
should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation
andplace of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he
can be identified.In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and
the search warrant itself described thebuilding to be searched as "the
building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, PhilippineIslands." This,
without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be
searched.As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling
apparatus in his possession in thebuilding occupied by him at No. 124
Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma.
Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose
Ma. Velosowithout difficulty.

PANGANDAMAN vs CAASR G.R. No. 71782, April 14, 1988

Facts: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of
a warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert that the respondent Judge issued a
warrant of arrest against fifty (50) “John Does” transgressing the
Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly
describe the persons or things to be seized.

Issue: Whether said warrant is valid

Held: No. Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) “John Does”
not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would identify, it is
of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as
unconstitutional and once anathematized as “totally subversive of the
liberty of the subject.”[30] Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction
that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to
be seized,[31] the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be
voided.

WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid

insofar as it orders the arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to
the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) “John Does.” The respondent
Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the
record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No.
1748 of his court for further appropriate action.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERMELINDO SEQUIÑO, VICENTE

TUMANGAN, and NENITO MELVIDA

FACTS Eugenio Godinez, overseer of Hacienda Jose Ancajas in

Medellin, Cebu, and Pedro Broniola, the hacienda's bookkeeper, went to
the Medellin Rural Bank to withdraw P50,557.17 The bank's cashier
instructed Jimmy Serafin, janitor and motorcycle driver of the bank, to drive
Godinez and Broniola back to the hacienda on one of the bank's
motorcycles. Serafin drove the motorcycle with Godinez behind him and
Broniola behind Godinez. Godinez carried the money in a money bag
which he hung over his left shoulder.

As the three were in nearing the hacienda, the accused, armed with guns,
tried to block their path and ordered them to stop. Godinez heard a
gunshot. Broniola had fallen off the motorcycle. Serafin leapt from the
motorcycle and ran away. The motorcycle toppled over Godinez, pinning
him to the ground. Accused Tumangan, with gun in hand, approached
Godinez, took the money from the money bag, and fled on foot with his
coaccused. With the assailants gone, Godinez ran home, leaving Broniola
behind. Meanwhile, Serafin had proceeded to the house of the Broniolas,
which was near the crime scene, and informed Broniola's wife of the
incident.

SPO Elpidio Luna went to the crime scene where he found an abandoned
motorcycle. People who by then had milled around the site informed Luna
"that the culprit had already fled." Luna noticed that the "bushes were
compressed" and found "a piece of paper utilized as toilet paper with a
stool on it. The paper was a bio-data sheet with the name " Melvida,
Nenito" and the entry for the father's name filled in with "Elpidio Melvida."
After finding Nenito Melvida, Luna asked Melvida to go with him to the
barangay captain's house. Melvida hesitated at first, but his companions
prevailed upon him to go with Luna.

The barangay captain was not home, so Luna took Melvida to the police
station instead. Melvida was kept at the station the whole evening of 24
April 1991 for investigation conducted, first, by Luna, then, by his fellow
policemen Sgt. Pablo Ygot, Cpl. Alfredo Mondigo and Eliseo Tepait, as
Luna had to take his supper.

Melvida was allowed to go home the next day, but only after the police had
filed criminal charges against him, he had posted bail. Melvida was not
assisted by counsel during the police investigation, although Luna assured
the trial judge that the Municipal Mayor of Medellin, who is a lawyer, was
present. Luna claimed he asked the Mayor to act as Melvida's counsel, he
admitted that this request did not appear in the record of the investigation.
Luna's investigation of Melvida was not reduced into writing.

During Luna's investigation, Melvida admitted that he kept "his share from
the loot" in his house. Melvida then was brought to his house where he got
P9,000.00, in one hundred peso bills, placed inside a shoe which he
delivered to the policemen. During the investigation conducted by SPO3
Alfredo Mondigo, Melvida admitted that his companions during the robbery
were Vicente Tumangan and Ermelindo Sequiño.

Mondigo and policeman Proniely Artiquela proceeded to the house of

Hones where they saw Tumangan and Sequiño on the porch. Noticing
something bulging on the waist of Tumangan, Mondigo and Artiquela
approached Tumangan and asked him what was bulging at his waist.
Tumangan did not answer. So, Mondigo patted the bulge which turned out
to be a .38 caliber Squires Bingham revolver with holster and four bullets.
When ask if he had a license for the firearm, Tumangan answered in the
negative. Mondigo and Artiquela then brought Tumangan and Sequiño to
the police station. Tumangan was then investigated in the presence of the
Municipal Mayor. Tumangan admitted that he was one of the hold-uppers.
Mondigo further declared that the police recovered P22,526.00, but could
not explain any further how the recovery was made and from whom. As to
this amount, SPO1 Mariano Remulta, property custodian of the Medellin
PNP station, merely declared that he was entrusted with the P22,526.00
which, according to the station commander, was "recovered in connection
with the highway robbery case."

The defense interposed alibi and denial and suggested a frame-up.

However, the trial court gave weight to the prosecution's evidence and in its
decision it found the accused guilty of robbery with homicide.

ISSUE(S)

1. W/N Melvida’s arrest is valid?

2. W/N Melvida's rights to remain silent and to counsel, and his right to be
informed of these rights are violated?

RULING(S)

1. No. Regardless of Luna’s claim to the contrary, accused Nenito Melvida

was arrested. An arrest “is the taking of a person into custody in order that
he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense,” and it is
made “by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.” Melvida’s
voluntarily going with Luna upon the latter’s “invitation” was a submission to
Luna’s custody, and Luna believed that Melvida was a suspect in the
robbery charged herein, hence, Melvida was being held to answer for the
commission of the said offense.

Since, he was arrested without warrant, the inquiry must now be whether a
valid warrantless arrest was effected. Luna’s basis for arresting Melvida
was the bio-data sheet with Melvida’s name on it found at the crime scene.
By no means can this indicate that Melvida committed the offense charged.
It does not even connote that Melvida was at the crime scene for the bio-
data sheet could have been obtained by anyone and left at the crime scene
long before or after the crime was committed. Luna, therefore, had no
personal knowledge of facts indicating Melvida’s guilt; at best, he had an
unreasonable suspicion. Melvida’s arrest was thus illegal.

2. Yes. After his unlawful arrest, Melvida underwent custodial investigation.

The custodial investigation commenced when the police pinpointed Melvida
as one of the authors of the crime or had focused on him as a suspect
thereof. This brought into operation par. (1) of Sec. 12, Art. III of the
Constitution guaranteeing the accused’s rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and his right to be informed of these rights. There was no showing
that Melvida was ever informed of these rights, and Luna admitted that
Melvida was not assisted by counsel during the investigation.

People vs. Joselito del Rosario – GR 127755, April 14, 1999

FACTS:

The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and

sentenced to death. The conviction of the accused was based on the
testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one
who drove the tricycle, which the suspects used as their get-away vehicle.
The accused was then invited by the police for questioning and he pointed
to the location where he dropped off the suspects. When the police arrived
at the supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death
of some of the suspects. After the incident, the accused was taken back to
the precint where his statement was taken however, this was only
subscribed on May and the accused was made to execute a waiver of
detention in the presence of judge Talavera. it was noted that the accused
was handcuffed through all this time upon orders of the fiscal and based on
the authorities* belief that the accused might attempt to escape otherwise.

ISSUES:
Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were violated.
Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.

HELD:

It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel in the course of the
investigation. The court held that the accused should always be apprised of
his Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the authorities as this
is deemed the start of custodial investigation. In fact, the court included
invitations by police officers in the scope of custodial investigations. It is
evident in this case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to
the station, he was already considered as the suspect in the case.
Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general inquiries into
an unsolved crime, but were intended to elicit information about his
participation in the crime. however, the Miranda rights may be waived,
provided that the waiver is voluntary, express, in writing and made in the
presence of counsel. 2nfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that
the accused made such a waiver. There are certain situations when
authorities may conduct a lawful warrantless arrest when the accused is
caught in flagrante delicto when the arrest is made immediately after the
crime was committed6 and 7 when the one to be arrested is an escaped
convict. The arrest of the accused in this case did not fall in any of these
exceptions. The arrest was not conducted immediately after the
consummation of the crime6 rather, it was done a day after. The authorities
also did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
to be arrested had committed the offense because they were not there
when the crime was committed. They merely relied on the account of one
eyewitness. Unfortunately, although the warrantless arrest was not lawful,
this did not affect the 8urisdiction of the Court in this case because the
accused still submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. )n
effect, he waived his right to contest the legality of the warrantless arrest.
PEOPLE VS PASUDAG GR No. 128822, May 4, 2001

FACTS:

SPO2 Pepito Calip urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the public
school. About five (5) meters away he saw a warden of about "square
meters. There were marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote
tops. he inquired from a store keeper nearby as to who owned the house
with the warden. The store owner told him that Pasuda owned it. A team
was dispatched and the team arrived and went straight to the house of
accused Pasuda. The police looked for accused Pasuda and asked him to
bring the team to his backyard warden which was about five (5) meters
away. Upon seeing the marijuana plants the policemen called for a
photographer who too pictures of accused Pasuda standing beside one of
the marijuana plants. They uprooted seven marijuana plants. The team
brought accused Pasuda and the marijuana plants to the police station. At
the police station accused Pasuda admitted in the presence of Chief of
Police Astrero that he owned the marijuana plants. SPO* +a&arito
prepared a confiscation report which accused Pasuda signed.

ISSUE:

Whether the arrest and seizure valid?

HELD:

As a general rule the procurement of search warrant is required before a

law enforcer may validly search or seize the person house papers or
effects of any individual. 0n the case at bar the police authorities had ample
opportunity to secure from the court a search warrant. SPO2Pepito Calip
inquired as to who owned the house’s was acquainted with marijuana
plants and immediately recognized that some plants in the backyard of the
house were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to uproot and
confiscate the plants. they were three months old and there was no
sufficient reason to believe that they would be uprooted on that same day
with the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case the
seized plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused1appellant. The
arrest of accused1 appellant was tainted with constitutional infirmity. The
testimony of SPO* ovencio a&arito reveals that appellant was not duly
informed of his constitutional rights. 0t has been held repeatedly that
custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody
and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under
investigation and the police officers begin to ask $questions on the
suspect3s participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission.
Obviously accused1 appellant was a suspect from the moment the police
team went to his house and ordered the uprooting of the marijuana plants
in his backyard garden.

People vs. Valdez G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000

FACTS:

Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating

Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as
amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused was allegedly caught in flagrante
delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven
(7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from which
dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant was arraigned
and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on
the merits then ensued.
The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay,
SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias
and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all member of the police force, who testified how
the information was received, the commencement of their operation and its
details under the specific instruction of Inspector Parungao. Accordingly,
they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look
around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-
foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters
away from his nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the
prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were
his. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos of appellant
standing beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. One of the said
plants was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for
analysis which produced a positive result. The prosecution also presented
a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
that the land cultivated by appellant where the growing marijuana plants
were found, was part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in
the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship
had yet been issued in his favor.

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was

weeding his vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose identity
he does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to see something.
This unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the
marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa
hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front
of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the
marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2
Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants.
Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the
marijuana. The police team then brought him to the police station at
Villaverde. At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew
nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police. Appellant
contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the
law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant.
Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not
remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is the immunity of one’s person, which includes his residence, his
papers, and other possessions.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the
present case is lawful and the seized evidence admissible.

(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the
accused.

(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.

HELD:

In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination of the existence of probable cause given the fact
that police had ample time to obtain said warrant. The protection against
illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under
specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The mantle of
protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty
alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of
the praiseworthiness of their intentions.

With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently
obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue,
which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the
prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and
seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the
proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of
the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana
plants as evidence to convict appellant.

In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an

accused may be convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by
proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the
accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed against the accused,
however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be
credible and competent. Competent evidence is “generally admissible”
evidence. Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence “of such a character
that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be
introduced at trial. And as earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court’s
part to have admitted evidences against the accused and to have relied
upon said proofs to convict him for said evidence is doubly tainted.

In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.” To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must
adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its
evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the accused. Absent the required degree of proof of an accused’s guilt, he
is entitled to an acquittal.
Miranda v. Arizona

Facts:

Miranda was arrested at his home and brought to the police station for
questioning. He was never informed of his right to remain silent or right to
have counsel present. After two hours of interrogation, Miranda made
incriminating statements including an oral and signed a written confession.
Evidence of the oral confession through police testimony and the written
confession were later used against him at trial. As a result, Miranda was
found guilty of rape and kidnapping.

Arizona trial court found Miranda guilty of rape and kidnapping. Upon
appeal to the state supreme court, the conviction was affirmed because
Miranda did not specifically ask for counsel. Miranda then joined several
other defendants and petitioned to the Supreme Court of the United States
for review.

Issue(s) and Holding:

Is the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination violated when an

individual is taken into custody for interrogation purposes without being
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and have counsel
present? Yes.

Judgment:

When taken into custody, an individual has a right against self-incrimination

under the Fifth Amendment, requiring the individual to be informed of his
constitutional rights.

The right against self-incrimination applies not only at trial but when a
suspect is taken into police custody. Since Miranda was not informed of his
rights, his confession was coerced by police in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.
Yes. Once subject to custodial interrogation, the Fifth Amendment requires
that a suspect is informed of their constitutional rights to: remain silent,
have an attorney present, if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed to him and that any statement made may later be used against
them at trial.

The court took into consideration common police tactics and police
instruction manuals and determined that each uncovered an interrogation
procedure aimed at attaining confessions through coercive means. For
example, many occur when the suspect is isolated and put in unfamiliar or
intimidating surroundings.

The Court held that police are encouraged to use trickery and make the
false promises necessary to obtain a confession. Although such methods
are not physically coercive, the interrogation process is aimed at putting the
suspect in an emotionally vulnerable state so his judgment is impaired.
These coercive tactics are a violation of the Fifth Amendment. To ensure
that a confession is obtained voluntarily, a suspect must be informed of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination in addition to the
consequences of a waiver. A waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be
made voluntary, intelligently and knowingly.

A suspect must also be informed that they have a right for counsel to be
present. Indigent individuals should receive the same right and will be
provided counsel if they cannot afford private representation. Denial of this
right also constitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment, as such presence
can prevent improperly coercive police tactics. When a suspect asserts his
Fifth Amendment right to an attorney or right to remain silent, the police
must cease questioning.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA May

17, 2000
FACTS:

Accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession was presented in evidence for

a Robbery with Homicide case against him. In it, accused-appellant said his
work was to deliver dressed chicken. Emma Cabrera was a regular
customer to whom he made deliveries in the morning. One day, his fellow
employee (Ronie), proposed that they rob Emma in order to be able to go
to La Union to visit his family. After learning that only two helpers were then
at the residence of Emma Cabrera, accused-appellant and Ronie decided
to pull the heist. Ronnie covered the mouth of one of the maids to prevent
her from shouting but, as she tried to run away, Ronnie stabbed and killed
her. Ronnie then gave the knife to accused-appellant who stabbed the
younger maid from which she died. Thereafter, the two proceeded to
Blumentritt Street and divided the money Ronnie had taken from the house
of Emma Cabrera. From Blumentritt Street, Ronnie went to La Union, while
accused-appellant proceeded to Pangasinan.

The extrajudicial confession is in Tagalog and signed by accused-appellant

in the presence of Atty. De los Reyes, a PC Captain of the WPD
Headquarters, U.N. Avenue, Manila. He said that while he was at Station 7
of the WPD, representing a client accused of illegal recruitment, he was
asked by Lt. Javier of the WPD Homicide Section to assist accused-
executing an extrajudicial confession. According to Atty. De los Reyes, he
apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional rights, explaining to him
that any statement made by him could be used against him in court, but
accused-appellant said he was willing to give a statement as in fact he did,
confessing to the commission of the crime of robbery with homicide.

RTC convicted accused-appelant for Robbery with Homicide.

Accused-appellant assails the validity of this extrajudicial confession which

forms the basis of his conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide. He
claims that Atty. De los Reyes, who assisted him in executing his
confession, was not the counsel of his own choice. That was the reason, he
said, he refused to sign the booking and information sheet. He said he
signed the extrajudicial confession five times as a sign that it was
involuntarily executed by him.

ISSUE: WON the accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is admissible

in evidence.

HELD: No. The accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is inadmissible

in evidence because of absence of independent counsel.

Art. III, §12 of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

Art. III, §12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial

interrogations be competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant
was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though presumably competent,
cannot be considered an "independent counsel" as contemplated by the
law for the reason that he was station commander of the WPD at the time
he assisted accused-appellant.

The independent counsel required by Art. III, §12(1) cannot be a special

counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the
police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case,
Atty. De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD,
was part of the police force who could not be expected to have effectively
and scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation, his claim
to the contrary notwithstanding. To allow such a happenstance would
render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial
investigation.

***** Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence

of conclusive evidence showing the declarant's consent in executing the
same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained.

The confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime could
have given. The details are consistent with the medico-legal findings that
the wounds sustained by the two victims were possibly caused by one and
the same bladed weapon. It has been held that voluntariness of a
confession may be inferred from its being replete with details which could
possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and
coherence which cannot be said of a mind on which violence and torture
have been applied. When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession
are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take
part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction
of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists
showing that the statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is
admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a
confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde
which dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession.

But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the

fact that accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively.
Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in
the United States from which Art. III, §12(1) was derived, is presumed to be
psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and
surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police
interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel.

Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the
suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1)
He must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned
that anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be
told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be
appointed to represent him.

There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to

accused-appellant without any effort to find out from him whether he
wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he
wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind of giving of warnings, in
several decisions of this Court, has been found to be merely ceremonial
and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect.
Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by
the police investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked these
questions considering that he only finished the fourth grade of the
elementary school. Indeed, as stated in People v. Januario:

Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial

investigation (if the latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the
accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or person authorized by him to
engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or
person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by
the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and
supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be
symbiotic.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, convicting

accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla of the crime of robbery with
homicide is REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on
the ground of reasonable doubt. Logronio

People v. Mojello, 425 SCRA 11 (2004)

Facts
The victim was last seen with the appellant Bebot Mojello. On December
16,200 the body of Lenlen Rayco was found lifeless, naked and bruised on
the seashore. The medico-legal report positively indicated that the victim
was raped.

When apprehended by the police officers and was subjected to an

investigation on 17 December 1996, the appellant admitted to the crime.

Six days after, on 23 December 1996, during custodial investigation, the

appellant, assisted by his counsel, executed an extrajudicial confession to
the crime.

The appellant was charged of the crime of Rape with Homicide defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659.The accused was arraigned and entered a not guilty
plea. The lower court found him guilty. Hence, an automatic review of the
case was submitted to the Supreme Court.

Issues

WON the extrajudicial confession of the appellant was admissible

WON the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged

Ruling

The decision of the lower court was affirmed and was modified. The
accused was found guilty of the crime of statutory rape.

The appellant avers that his extrajudicial confession, and admissions

therein, should be considered a fruit of a poisonous tree and being such,
should be inadmissible as evidence against him. The Court disagrees. The
Court finds the extrajudicial confession in compliance with the strict
constitutional requirements of the right to counsel as enshrined in Art. III,
Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2.
The Court observed that the confession itself expressly states that the
investigating officers informed him of such rights
Further, the appellant claimed that his confession was induced by a threat
against his life. The Court took cognizance, however, of his failure to
present evidence to prove such threat and neither did he file any case
against the person who threatened him nor did he report such incident to
his counsel. He also claimed that he did not understand the contents of the
confession which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he
uses the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse.

The Court also noted that even if improper interrogation methods were
used at the start, it does not bar the possibility of having a valid confession
by properly interrogating the subject.

With regards to the second query, appellant alleges that the lower court
erred in convicting him of the crime of rape with homicide sentencing him of
the death penalty despite of the insufficiency of circumstantial evidence to
prove his guilt.

The Court sustained the appellant’s conviction on the crime of rape based
on his admission to the said crime, the medico-legal report and the witness’
testimony proving the corpus delicti but held that there was no sufficient
evidence to prove that the appellant killed the victim or that the rape
committed caused the death of the victim. Therefore, he cannot be
convicted of the said special complex crime as that would raise a
reasonable doubt to his guilt.

The Court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime only that
of statutory rape, the victim being 11 years old, and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)

Facts. Petitioner Harris was charged with selling in heroin to an undercover

officer on two occasions. Petitioner took the stand in his own defense but
denied the offense, and he claimed he sold the officer two bags of baking
powder. On cross-examination the prosecution used contradicting
statements made by Petitioner to police shortly after his arrest. The
contradicting statements were made before Petitioner received his Miranda
warnings.

Issue. Was the prosecution improperly allowed to use the statements to

impeach Petitioner’s testimony since the statements were made without
Miranda warnings?

Held. Chief Justice Burger issued the opinion for the United States
Supreme Court in holding that Petitioner was allowed to be impeached
using his conflicting statements.

New York v. Quarles

Facts. A woman identified a man as her rapist to a police officer in a

supermarket. The officer frisked the respondent and found an empty
shoulder holster, and thus asked the respondent where the gun was. The
respondent said “the gun is over there,” and the officer retrieved it and then
gave the respondent their Miranda warnings. The trial court suppressed the
respondent’s statement in quotes above and the gun, and the state
appellate courts affirmed. The state of New York was then granted
certiorari.

Issue. Is there an exception to the requirement that a suspect be read their

Miranda rights before their answers can be admitted into evidence when
the officer’s aims in questioning are to insure that no danger to the public
results from concealment of a weapon?

Held. Yes. Reverse the decision of the lower court to suppress the gun and
statement.

Under these circumstances, there are strong public safety concerns

justifying the court creating an exception to the requirement that officers
provide Miranda warnings before asking questions. The officer’s trying to
retrieve a weapon he knew was somewhere nearby so that no accomplice
or customer would pick it up and start shooting protected the public, and
this type of action should not be discouraged.

Although admittedly this caveat may cloud the Miranda rule, police officers
have the ability to distinguish when this exception should apply.

His motivation in asking where the gun was is not at issue in this case.

People v. Trinidad GR No. 79123-25/ 9 January 1989/ Second Division

Facts: Lolito Soriano is a fish dealer. His helpers were Ricardo Tan and
Marcial Laroa. While the three were driving on their way to Davao City to
sell fish, accused Emeliano Trinidad asked for a ride to Agusan del Norte.
Trinidad, a member of the Integrated National Police, was in uniform and
had two firearms, a carbine and a .38 caliber revolver.

Tan was driving the car at that time, and he was instructed by Trinidad to
slow down because they were treading dangerous territory. Tan suddenly
heard two gunshots -- Soriano and Laroa slumped dead for both were hit
on the head. Trinidad had used his carbine in killing the two victims. Tan
was able to get off the car and hail a jeepney passing by. However, he
noticed that Trinidad was also seated at the back of the said jeepney. Tan
immediately got off the jeepney, followed by Trinidad. When the jeepney
started to drive away, Tan suddenly clung to its side, but Trinidad fired two
shots, one of which hit Tan on his right thigh. Tan jumped from the jeep and
fortunately a Philippine Constabulary member chanced upon him and
helped him board a bus for Butuan.

Trinidad was charged with FRUSTRATED murder in relation to the

shooting of Tan, and he was found guilty by the RTC. On appeal, Trinidad
claims that the RTC erred in convicting him of the crime of frustrated
murder.
Issues: W/N Trinidad is correct in contending that he can only be convicted
of attempted murder? YES

Ruling: Trinidad should only be held criminally liable for attempted murder.

Trinidad had commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt

acts but was unable to perform all the acts of execution which would have
produced it by reason of causes other than his spontaneous desistance,
such as, that the jeep to which TAN was clinging was in motion, and there
was a spare tire which shielded the other parts of his body.

Moreover, the wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that
where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death,
the crime is only ATTEMPTED murder, the accused not having performed
all the acts of execution that would have brought about the death (citing,
People v. Pilones)

Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)

FACTS: Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to

reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with

Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the first two petitioners
was rendered on March 8, 1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last
petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12,
1954. Each of the petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years
by virtue of their convictions.

They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which
negated such complex crime, a ruling which was not handed down until
after their convictions have become final. In
People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the
accused for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not
warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there being no such complex offense.
This ruling was not handed down until after their convictions have become
final. Since Hernandez served more than the maximum penalty that could
have been served against him, he is entitled to freedom, and thus, his
continued detention is illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a
retroactive effect is applicable in this case (WON judicial decisions
favourable to the accused/convicted for the same crime can be applied
retroactively)

RULING: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be

applied retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states
the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favour the
accused who is not a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also provides that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of our
legal system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to equal
protection, given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same
offense as they have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus
is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of
a favorable decision

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA

G.R. No. L-38975, January 17, 1980,
FACTS: Paquito Yupo y Gonzales was charged with murder by the
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed before the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, presided by respondent Judge. The accused pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, the prosecution had presented six witnesses, including the
father of the deceased, Miguel Tribol, and his common-law wife, Lydia
Begnotia who allegedly received the ante mortem statement of the victim,
Rodolfo Tribol. At the hearing, the prosecution presented Corporal Conrado
Roca of the Meycauayan Police Department, before whom a written
statement of the accused Paquito Yupo and his alleged waiver of his right
to remain silent and to be assisted by a counsel of his own choice was
taken. After this witness had Identified the statement of the accused and
the waiver, he was questioned on the incriminating answers in such
statement to the police, but there was an objection on the part of the
defense counsel based on the ground of such statement being inadmissible
in evidence, as the statement was taken by the police without any counsel
assisting the accused in the investigation. Respondent Judge sustained the
objection of the defense on the view that such judicial confession of the
accused is inadmissible in evidence for being unconstitutional, it appearing
that the accused was not assisted by a counsel when it was given. 8 He
likewise stated that such right could not be waived. 9 Upon his refuse to
reconsider such ruling, this petition was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not right to remain silent could be waived.

HELD: It was not shown that the alleged waiver was given freely and
voluntarily. The questioning was rather perfunctory. An even more telling
circumstance against such alleged waiver being given credence was that
private respondent, a native of Samar, then nineteen years old, was
interrogated extensively in Tagalog, no showing having been made that his
acquaintance with the language was such that he could fully understand
the import of what was asked him. The Court ruled that there is no bar to a
waiver of the right to counsel during custodial interrogation if made
intelligently and voluntarily, with full understanding of its consequences.
As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully
effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of
silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does not
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may
waive effectuation of those rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at
any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before
speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone
and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the
police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered
some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until
he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned." Thus, the alleged waiver falls far short. It is clearly
inadmissible.

PEOPLE VS GALIT MARCH 20, 1985

FACTS:

The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery.
He had been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days,
to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was no
evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be
done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers
began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted
on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be
obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his
face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowlful of human waste.
The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endure the
pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been
broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit
and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he
posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a
reenactment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to

remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could
be used against him.

RULING:

Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy

the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights
under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short
and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect
or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from
Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at
the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not
know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only
about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were
allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of
right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by
one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by
counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.
People vs Continente G.R. Nos. 100801-02 August 25, 2000

Facts:

The Decision dated February 27, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 88, in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-4843 and 89-4844
finding herein appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder, respectively for the killing of U.S. Col. James
N. Rowe and for seriously wounding Joaquin Vinuya.

It appears that appellant Donato Continente and several others were

initially charged with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder in two (2)
separate Informations dated June 20, 1989 in connection with the shooting
incident on April 21, 1989 at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog
Avenue in Quezon City which caused the death of U.S. Col. James N.
Rowe while seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. After the arrest
of another suspect, Juanito Itaas, on August 27, 1989 in Davao City, the
prosecution, with prior leave of court, filed two (2) separate amended
Informations for murder and frustrated murder to include Juanito T. Itaas,
among the other accused.

Issue:

Whether accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the two

amended separate informations for murder and frustrated murder?

Held:

Yes. With respect to the extra-judicial confession executed by accused

Itaas, the Court finds that such was made pursuant to the Constitution.
Although it may be argued that accused resides in Davao, the fact that he
could understand Tagalog as admitted by him in his testimony and proven
by the proceedings in court where he was answering questions addressed
to him in Tagalog militates against his inability to comprehend his right and
its subsequent waiver. Counsel for accused contests the independence
and competence of Atty. Filemon Corpuz on the ground that said lawyer
was a military lawyer. Although the military background of Atty. Corpuz is
admitted, this does not automatically disqualify him to act as lawyer for the
accused. Proof of the fact that he failed to render his duty to safeguard the
rights of the accused must be shown before this court nullifies the weight of
Itaas' extra-judicial confession. The allegation of torture similarly rings
hollow. No medical certificate had been shown by the accused that he had
indeed suffered brutal treatment from his jailers specially since he had
alleged to have been treated by a doctor for his injuries."

The following are the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court. In
Criminal Case No. Q-89-4843, appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato
Continente are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder, as principal and as accomplice, respectively. Appellant Itaas, as
principal, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant Continente as accomplice, is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Both appellants Itaas and Continente are ORDERED to pay
jointly and severally the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim,
Col. James Rowe, by way of civil indemnity.In Criminal Case No. Q-89-
4844, appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted murder, as principal
and as accomplice, respectively. Appellant Itaas, as principal, is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for six (6) years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to nine (9) years and six (6) months of prision mayor, as
maximum. Appellant Continente, as accomplice, is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR.

FACTS:
Accused Bernardo Quidato Jr was accused of parricide. He and two co-
conspirators allegedly attacked with a bolo and iron bars hack and stab the
victim, Bernardo Quidato Sr., appellant’s father and namesake, which
caused the victim’s untimely demise.

Among those presented as witness were accused’s wife and brother. Also
presented were the extrajudicial confessions of appellant’s two other co-
accused. Appellant’s wife testified that while the accused were drinking
tuba she overheard them saying that they were planning to go to the
victim’s house on the night of the incident in order to “get money” and that
she had no idea of what later transpired. Appellant objected to his wife’s
testimony as it was prohibited by the rule on marital disqualification.
Appellant likewise denies the allegations of his co-accused who in their
extrajudicial confession pointed to the participation of appellant.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions should be given credence

as they were obtained in violation of the constitutional right of appellant to
confront witnesses.

2. Whether or not the testimony of appellant’s wife is disqualified.

HELD:

1. NO. They should not be given credence, and indeed, appellant should
be acquitted. The prosecution relied heavily on appellant’s co-accused’s
affidavits. However, the failure to present the affiants in the witness stand
gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that
unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the
averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the
judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. “The voluntary admissions
of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against
his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear
him testify and cross-examine him.”
Section 30, Rule 130 is not applicable in this case because it refers to
confessions made during the existence of the conspiracy. In this case, the
conspiracy had clearly ended by the time the confession was made.

2. YES. The testimony of appellant’s wife must be disregarded. As

correctly observed by the court a quo, the disqualification is between
husband and wife, the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it
involves other parties or accused, but not where the testimony will be used
against the accused-husband directly or indirectly.

People vs Labtan

Facts:

Accused-Appellant Henry Feliciano, together with accused Orlando Labtan

and Jonelto Labtan, were convicted of highway robbery and robbery with
homicide. Feliciano was convicted on the basis of a sworn statement which
he repudiated during the trial. The prosecution’s case was mainly anchored
on the three-page sworn statement executed by Feliciano, originally in
Visayan dialect, before the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. According
to the prosecution, prior to the propounding of questions to the accused-
appellant, he was informed of his constitutional rights and he even signed
the confession in the presence of Atty. Pepito Chavez, Attorney de Officio
provided to the accused.

When the defense presented its case, only accused Henry Feliciano
testified for his behalf. His defense consisted of an alibi and a repudiation
of his sworn statement. He Testified that he was brought to the police
station, was mauled for two hours, and was forced to sign a document. He
was also brought to the office of Atty. Chavez and saw the latter sign the
documents. He did not know what was happening.Atty. Chavez did not
even talk to him before signing the document. Then he was brought back to
Jail. He appealed to the higher court alleging that the court a quo erred un
admitting in evidence the tainted extra-judicial confession he executed in
the absence of an effective and vigilant counsel.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the sworn-statement executed by accused Feliciano in

the absence of a competent counsel of his choice, is admissible in
evidence.

2. Did Atty. Chavez provide the accused the kind of counseling required by
the Constitution?

HELD:

The appeal is meritorious. Under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987

Constitution, the rights of persons under custodial investigation are
provided. In People vs Gamboa 13, the Court stated that:

" [T]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when
the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or
stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid
the pernicious practice extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the
commission of an offense. The moment there is a move or even urge of
said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information which may appear innocent or inocuous at the time, from said
suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the
presence of counsel."cralaw virtua1aw library

We find that accused-appellant Feliciano had been denied of his right to

have a competent and independent counsel when he was questioned in the
Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez testified that he
started questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of April 22, 1993 regarding his
involvement in the killing of jeepney driver Florentino Bolasito,
notwithstanding the fact that he had not been apprised of his right to
counsel.

In Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 15 we said that a person is deemed under

custodial investigation where the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular
suspect who had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.

2.The right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not a mere

presence of the lawyer beside the accused. Atty. Chavez did not provide
the kind of counselling required by the Constitution. He did not explain to
accused-appellant the consequences of his action — that the sworn
statement can be used against him and that it is possible that he could be
found guilty and sent to jail.

"Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial

investigation (if the latter could not afford one) ‘should be engaged by the
accused (himself), or by the latter’s relative or person authorized by him to
engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or
person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by
the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and
supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be
symbiotic.’"

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO GALLARDO y GANDER

et. al. G.R. No. 113684 January 25, 2000

FACTS:

On July 28, 1991, the lifeless body of Edmundo Orizal was found in the rest
house of Ronnie Balao. The victim was found to have sustained seven (7)
gunshot wounds in the chest, abdomen, back, left and right thighs, and two
(2) grazing wounds on the left arm and back.
Investigation by the Tuguegarao police station identified the suspects in the
murder of Edmundo Orizal as Armando Gallardo y Gander, Alfredo
Columna y Correa, and Jessie Micate y Orteza. The police received
information that the suspects were detained at the Camalaniugan Police
Station because of other criminal charges. The Tuguegarao police went to
the Camalaniugan Police Station to fetch the suspects. Only Armando
Gallardo and Alfredo Columna alias Fermin were in the custody of the
Camalaniugan Police Station. They were investigated by Police
Investigator SPO4 Isidro Marcos, and they gave statements admitting that
they, together with Jessie Micate, killed Edmundo Orizal.

During the investigation, the dialect used was Ilocano, the native tongue of
the accused, and during the taking of the statements, Atty. Rolando
Velasco assisted them. Judge Vilma Pauig was present. She administered
the oath on the jurat of the statements. Accused-appellants signed their
statements admitting the killing of Edmundo Orizal.

ISSUE:

Must the lawyer be known to the accused prior to investigation?

RULING:

The Court held that “while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a
person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer
is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the
final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for
another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by
the accused where he never raised any objection against the former’s
appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing
officer.
In the case at bar, although Atty. Velasco was provided by the State and
not by the accused themselves, the accused were given an opportunity
whether to accept or not to accept him as their lawyer. They were asked
and they immediately agreed to have Atty. Velasco as their counsel during
the investigation. There is no requirement in the Constitution that the
lawyer of an accused during custodial investigation be previously known to
them. The Constitution provides that the counsel be a competent and
independent counsel, who will represent the accused and protect their
Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

LUZVIMINDA DE LA CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 126183

March 25, 1999

FACTS: These consolidated petitions are among several petitions filed with
this Court arising from the much-publicized public school teachers' mass
actions of September/October 1990.

Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila
who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually
dismissed in October 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cariño of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).

The decision was anchored on the reports that the above-named teachers
participated in the mass action/illegal strike in Sept. 19-21, 1990 and
subsequently defied the return-to-work order dated September 17, 1990
issued by the Department.

The decision of dismissal by Secretary Cariño was affirmed by the CSC,

and later by the CA.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals grievously erred in affirming

the CSC resolutions finding them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service when their only "offense" was to exercise their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for
redress of their grievances.
Moreover petitioners insist that the mass actions of September/October
1990 were not "strikes" as there was no actual disruption of classes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioners was invalid as it is

against the right of the said teachers to peaceably assemble

HELD: NO. As early as December 1990 we have categorically ruled in the

consolidated cases of Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio
Jr., and Alliance of Concerned Teachers v. Hon. Isidro Cariño that the
mass actions of September/October 1990 staged by Metro Manila public
school teachers "amounted to a strike in every sense of the term,
constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of or
absence from work which it was said teachers' sworn duty to perform,
carried out for essentially economic reasons — to protest and pressure the
Government to correct what, among other grievances, the strikers
perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial implementation of the salary
standardization law, the non-payment or delay in payment of various fringe
benefits and allowances, and the imposition of additional teaching loads
and longer teaching hours."

In Rolando Gan v. Civil Service Commission, we denied the claim that the
teachers were thereby denied their rights to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances reasoning that this
constitutional liberty to be upheld, like any other liberty, must be exercised
within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare.

But the public school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions did not
exercise their constitutional rights within reasonable limits. On the contrary,
they committed acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service by staging
the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and
refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had the
teachers availed of their free time — recess, after classes, weekends or
holidays — to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper
authorities within the bounds of law, no one — not the DECS, the CSC or
even the Supreme Court — could have held them liable for their
participation in the mass actions.

People vs. Jara 144 SCRA 516, 30 September 1986

FACTS:

There were no extrajudicial confessions admitted in evidence. But

circumstantial evidence was presented to support a verdict of conviction
that Jara was the mastermind of the killing of his wife and the latter’s friend:
1.), Jara resented his wife for having a relationship with a girl, the other one
who was killed. 2.) At the canteen where they work, whenever Jara
committed even the slightest mistakes, his wife scolded and cursed him. 3.)
One of the waitresses observed that Jara shed no tears and his face did
not show any indication of sorrow when he saw the lifeless body of his wife.
4.) the hammer used in the killing is an instrument with which Jara is
familiar. 5.) During the investigation at the scene of the crime, blood stains
were found splattered in the trousers and shirt worn by accused Jara. His
eyeglasses were also smeared with blood. When asked to explain the
presence of said blood stains, accused Jara told the police that before he
learned about the killing, he was with his stepdaughter Minerva Jimenez in
the public market dressing chickens.

ISSUE:

Whether or not such evidences are sufficient to overturn the presumption of

innocence in favor of Jara.

RULING:

Yes. No general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of

circumstantial evidence which will suffice for any case, but that matters not.
For all that is required is that the circumstances proved must be consistent
with each other, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
The circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the guilt of the Jara beyond
reasonable doubt. Mere denials of the accused as to his participation in the
crime are only self-serving negative evidence which cannot outweigh
circumstantial evidence clearly establishing his active participation in the
crime.

People vs. Nicandro 141 SCRA 289

Facts:

After the complaints and reports were verified to be true, an entrapment

with the confidential informant acting as the buyer of marijuana was
organized. The police team formed to carry out the entrapment plan was
alerted of the presence of the drug pusher, the appellant Nelia Nicandro y
Velarma, alias ‘Nel’. The informant asked to buy some marijuana cigarette
and gave appellant the two (2) marked P 5.00 bills Thereupon, the
appellant delivered to informant four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarette.
Immediately the police team closed in and nabbed the appellant, was
frisked and got from the right front pocket of her pants the two (2), marked
P5.00 bills, and from the left pocket of her pants the marijuana flowering
tops wrapped in a piece of newspaper. Upon being investigated and after
having been duly apprised of her constitutional rights, appellant orally
admitted having sold the four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the
ownership of the marijuana flowering tops taken from her pocket, but
refused to reduce her confession to writing.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a violation of the accused constitutional rights to

be informed of his rights and to warnings.

Held:

Yes. When the Constitution requires a person under investigation “to be

informed” of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed
to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just
the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle. As a rule, therefor, it would not be sufficient for a police officer
just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20,
Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person
the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in
practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not
do, and in a language the subject fairly understands. (See People vs.
Ramos, 122 SCRA 312: People VS. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.) In other words,
the right of a person under interrogation “to be informed” implies a
correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and
contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding
what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot
truly be said that the person has been “informed” of his rights. Now, since
the right “to be informed” implies comprehension, the degree of explanation
required will necessary vary, depending upon the education, intelligence
and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under
investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is
needed where the subject is unlettered.

US vs Wade

Facts.

Two men robbed a bank in Eustace, Texas. One man, with two pieces of
tape on his face, went into the bank, pointed a gun at the cashier and
demanded the money. His accomplice waited outside in a stolen getaway
car. Wade and his accomplice were indicted for the robbery and counsel
was appointed. About two weeks later, a Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) agent caused the two men to be part of a lineup consisting of five or
six other men at which the bank employees were asked to make an
identification, and at which the two men were in fact identified.

At trial, Wade’s defense counsel objected to the identification procedures,

but his efforts to have them stricken were in vain. Wade was convicted of
the robbery. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the lineup had violated
Wade’s Sixth Amendment constitutional right to counsel.

Issue. Whether courtroom identifications of an accused at trial are to be

excluded from evidence because the accused was exhibited to the
witnesses before trial at a post indictment lineup conducted for
identification purposes, without notice to, and in the absence of, the
accused’s appointed counsel?

Held. Yes. The court must analyze whether potential substantial prejudice
to defendant’s rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of
counsel to help avoid that prejudice. The in court identification must be
found to have independent origin, free of the primary taint of the improperly
conducted lineup, in order to be admitted.

People vs. Pablito Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997

Facts:

Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with
homicide. The offense was committed on February 19,1994 in Baliuag,
Bulacan; the victim being Marianne Guevarra, 22 and a 2 nd year student at
the Fatima School of Nursing. On said day, victim left her home for her
school dormitory in Valenzuela. While on her way, appellant invited her to
his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's
grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to do so as the old woman
was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the
house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the
kitchen and raped her. By night time, Marianne, who was still unconscious,
was dragged by appellant to their backyard that was adjacent to a vacant
lot. Appellant was to transfer Marianne to the vacant lot when she moved,
prompting appellant to hit her head with a piece of concrete block. No
longer moving, he dragged her to the lot and abandoned her. At 11amher
body was discovered. The autopsy revealed that she died of "traumatic
injuries. “Marianne’s gruesome death drew public attention and prompted
Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form an investigation team. The
investigation pointed to the appellant. Appellant's nearby house was
searched but he was not there. On February 24, a police team led by
Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him and
brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially,
he denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police
confronted him with evidence, appellant relented but implicated two of his
neighbors, and that he was merely a lookout. Larin and Dizon were likewise
brought there by the police. The following day a physical examination
conducted on the suspects revealed that appellant has multiple scratches
on the neck, chest and back. By that time, people and media
representatives were already at the police headquarters awaiting the
results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived. Upon seeing the mayor,
appellant approached him and whispered that they talk privately. The
mayor led him to the office of the Chief of Police and there, he broke down
and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one
who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the
public and media representatives witness the confession. Since no lawyer
was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped.
In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and
appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He asked for
forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did
it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered
his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read
almost every day. After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son
and asked the mayor to help him. His confession was captured on
videotape and covered by the media nationwide. On arraignment, however,
appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that on said date he
was at his parent’s house for the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife
and son went home after 5pm, slept at 8pm, and woke up at 6am the next
day. Appellant claimed that after he was picked up by the police on
February 24, he was coerced to confess that he raped and killed Marianne.
Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told. The trial court convicted
the appellant and sentenced him to death. He was found guilty of the crime
charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized
accordingly. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue:

W/N the appellant’s confession not being assisted by a counsel is in

violation of the constitution, and is therefore

inadmissible as evidence against him.

Held:

Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that

appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a
municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes
of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However,
appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at
all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was
appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the
mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was
going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a
confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled confession
to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that
the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities,
but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section
12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as
would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that appellant’s
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant’s confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The
confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by
the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised
interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. The Court
therefore held accused-appellant Pablito Andan guilty of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide.

People vs. Decierdo 149 SCRA 496 G.R. No. L-46956, 7 May 1987

FACTS:

Decierdo was apprehended in his residence by Patrolman and was brought

to the municipal judge, where he supposedly executed a written confession
admitting responsibility for the shooting of Montillano. But the same was
made in the absence of a counsel. This was admitted by the judge himself.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of Decierdo should be admitted

in evidence considering that the same was made without counsel.

RULING:

No. There is no doubt that the accused’s alleged extrajudicial confession is

in the nature of an uncounselled confession and hence, inadmissible in
evidence. Decierdo was not assisted by a lawyer when he signed his
supposed confession. That makes that statement, in contemplation of law,
“involuntary,” even if it were otherwise voluntary, technically. And since the
confession is inadmissible, it follows that Decierdo is entitled to an acquittal
considering that there was no eyewitness.
JOSE C. MIRANDA v. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, GR NO. 158763, 2006-03-
31

Facts:

On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan,

Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is
now under the witness protection program.

Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño,
SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu,
SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Santiago City.

The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of
Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of
reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at
that time, being at large. The case was... appealed to this Court on
automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused
therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April

2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain
Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the
deaths... of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners,

Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of
SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo
Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.

On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary

investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of
arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted
the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent
motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by... the court. In the
meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T.
Reyes to the Department of Justice.

On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took

over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge
Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of
arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise... applied this Order
to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001.
State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of
Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration... was denied in a Joint
Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a
Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.

Issues:

WON an accused can seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court

Ruling:

YES: Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither

jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the
body of the accused.

Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application
for bail, but is not required for the... adjudication of other reliefs sought by
the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary...

surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns
bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

As we held in the... aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative

relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance.

Principles:

Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither

jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the
body of the accused.

There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the
case of pleadings whose prayer is... precisely for the avoidance of the
jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other...
grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash
a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest.

The first two are consequences... of the fact that failure to file them would
constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person.
The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court
process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the...
very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,

jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in
cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by... impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving
special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court
even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the
law. However, if a person invoking the... special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.

In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule
applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.

CHESTER DE JOYA vs. JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify
and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03-219952 for violation of Article 315, par.
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1689. Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in finding the
existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against him and his co-accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge erred in finding the existence of

probable cause that justifies the issuance of warrant of arrest against the
accused.

HELD:

The court held that the documents presented were sufficiently established
the existence of probable cause as required under Section 6, Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Probable cause where facts and
circumstances would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested without resorting to the calibrations of technical rules of evidence
of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common
sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance which is less
stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as
the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against the accused, the
trial court judge has sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest.

In the same manner, the accused continued refusal to submit to the court’s
jurisdiction gives the Court more reason to uphold the action of the
respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the
accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial. His evasive
stance shows an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal
process.

Talag vs. Judge Reyes

Facts:

This is an administrative complaint filed against Judge Amor A. Reyes of

the Regional Trial Court, Manila for partiality, grave abuse of authority and
oppression in connection with entitled “People of the Philippines v. Wilfredo
Talag.” Wherein Talag was charge for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22and Estafa occasioned by the dishonor of four checks. On May 12, 2003,
complainant filed a verified complaint before the Office of the Court
Administrator charging respondent Judge with partiality, grave abuse of
authority and oppression allegedly committed. That the Information was
filed on May 7, 2002 while the warrant of arrest was issued May 23,
2003despite complainant’s pending omnibus motion to defer issuance of
warrant of arrest. Also, when the matter was elevated to the Court of
Appeals and a temporary restraining order was issued, respondent seemed
to have waited for the TRO to expire and for the dismissal of complainant’s
petition before the Court of Appeals because she did not resolve the motion
for inhibition, and she immediately issued a warrant of arrest against him
after said petition was dismissed. And Respondent had a predisposition to
deny the motions filed by complainant since, although she was in haste in
issuing the warrant of arrest, she nonetheless dilly-dallied in resolving the
motions filed by complainant;

Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge show partiality, grave abuse of authority
and oppression?

Held:

The Court Administrator find that the charges filed against respondent are
baseless. When complainant filed the omnibus motion on May 7, 2002, the
court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person. With the filing of
Information, the trial court could then issue a warrant for the arrest of the
accused as provided for by Section 6 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. The issuance of the warrant was not only procedurally
sound but it was even required considering that respondent had yet to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of complainant. Consequently,
complainant’s charge that respondent Judge failed to act on the omnibus
motion before issuing the arrest warrant is untenable. Whether respondent
correctly disregarded the omnibus motion in view of the alleged fatal
defects is a judicial matter, which is not a proper subject in an
administrative proceeding. It bears noting that respondent court
immediately deferred the execution of the warrant of arrest upon issuance
by the Court of Appeals of the TRO. Neither can we ascribe partiality nor
grave abuse of authority on the part of respondent for issuing anew an alias
warrant after the expiration of the Court of Appeals’ 60-day TRO. With the
lifting of the restraining order, no legal obstacle was left for the issuance of
the arrest warrant and thus set in motion the delayed prosecutorial process
by acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No. 180906,

October 7, 2008

Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from

Bulacan who were suspected of being members of the New People’s Army,
were forcibly taken from their home, detained in various locations, and
tortured by CAFGU and military units. After several days in captivity, the
brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their abductors as members
of the armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that
they were being held in place for their brother, Bestre, a suspected leader
of the communist insurgents. While in captivity, they met
other desaperacidos (including the still-missing University of the Philippines
students Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also suspected
of being communist insurgents and members of the NPA. After eighteen
months of restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing acts, the
brothers were able to escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo.

Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected

by existing laws.

Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. At its core is the immunity of one’s
person against government intrusion. The right to security of person is
“freedom from fear,” a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity and
security.

To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if
the Orwellian sword of the State, wielded recklessly by the military or under
the guise of police power, is directed against them? The law thus gives the
remedy of the writ of amparo, in addition to the rights and liberties already
protected by the Bill of Rights. Amparo, literally meaning “to protect,” is
borne out of the long history of Latin American and Philippine human rights
abuses—often perpetrated by the armed forces against farmers thought to
be communist insurgents, anarchists or brigands. The writ serves to both
prevent and cure extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, and threats
thereof, giving the powerless a powerful remedy to ensure their rights,
liberties, and dignity. Amparo, a triumph of natural law that has been
embodied in positive law, gives voice to the preys of silent guns and
prisoners behind secret walls.
G.R. No. 70748 October 21, 1985 LAURENTE C. ILAGAN et al. vs. HON.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE et al. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS:

On May 10, 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City
by elements of the PC-INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of
a Mission Order allegedly issued by the Ministry of National Defense. On
that same day, fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty.
Ilagan. Thereafter, two other petitioners were arrested for the same cause.

This petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three
arrested lawyers hereinafter referred to as the detained attorneys on the
ground that their arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, since
arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders. and that there
appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers involved in national
security cases.

On May 16, 1985, the Court issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the
petition for hearing on May 23, 1985. Respondents contend that the
lawyers were arrested due to basis of a PDA issued by the President on
January 25, 1985 and that the lawyers played active roles in organizing
mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners herein were denied of their constitutional right to

due process and the benefit of a preliminary investigation.

HELD:
If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper
arrest, or that no preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy
is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial
court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or the Information on grounds
provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the
case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was
issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the
accused. So is it explicitly provided for by Section. 14, Rule of 102 of the
Rules of Court.

The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable, does not argue

against the validity of the proceedings, the most that could have been done
being to remand the case in order that such investigation could be
conducted. 

... The proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation

should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is
not wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go
to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the
proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived.
These are matters to be inquired into by the trial court, not an appellate
Court. 

Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure above

referred to provides:

SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.- When a person

is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the
offended party, peace officer or fiscal without preliminary investigation
having been first conducted on the basis of the affidavit of the offended
party or arrested officer or person.

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person

arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of
a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of
his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided
in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within
fifteen (15) days from its inception.

Velasco v. CA

G.R. No. 118644 July 7, 1995

Facts: A warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Padolina of RTC Pasig,

against accused Lawrence Larkins for violations of B.P. Blg. 22. But on 20
November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the NBI
a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly
committed against her on 19 November 1994. Acting on the basis of the
complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special Investigators Resurreccion and
Erum, Jr. proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati and arrested
him. Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft
Avenue, Manila. Two days later, Larkins posted a bail for the BP 22
charged by which Judge Padolina issued an order directing the release of
Larkins from confinement unless otherwise detained for some other cause.
However, Resurreccion and Erum refused to release Larkins because he
was still detained for another cause (rape), for which he would be held for
inquest. On 23 November 1994, a complaint against Larkins for rape was
executed by Alinea before the RTC of Antipolo. On 2 December 1994,
Larkins, through his counsel Mauricio C. Ulep, filed an Urgent Motion for
Bail and on 6 December 1994, Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty.
Theodore O. Te, filed another Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of
the Complaint and for Immediate Release,  based on the alleged illegality of
his warrantless arrest. These two motions was however denied. Unable to
accept the ruling, Larkins' common-law wife, Cuyag, filed before the CA a
petition for habeas corpus with certiorari. After hearing the arguments of
the parties, the CA held for Larkin’s immediately release.

In the petition petitioners insist that the respondent court erred in

granting the petition for habeas corpus because Larkins had already been
charged with the crime of rape and the trial court had denied his application
for bail. They further claim that the warrantless arrest in this case is valid
for it was made under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. On the
other hand, the private respondent contends that habeas corpus is
rendered unavailing not by the mere filing of an information, but by the
issuance of a warrant of arrest or warrant of commitment, which are the
only two processes recognized by law to justify deprivation of liberty, and
the order of Judge Caballes of 5 January 1995 denying the petition for bail
does not qualify as such. She asserts that the petitioners have
miscomprehended Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan 17 because that case did
not rule that the writ is no longer available after an information is filed
against the person detained; what it stated is that the writ of habeas
corpus will not issue when the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which
has jurisdiction to do so. She submits that the controlling doctrine is that
enunciated in Ilagan vs. Ponce Enrile, 18 adverted to in Sanchez
vs. Demetriou, 19 that "[t]he filing of charges, and the issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will
cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be
released because of such defect."

Issue:

1. Whether Cuyag has personality to institute the action.

2. Whether Writ of Habeas Corpus is proper.

3. Whether by filing his motion for bail, Larkins admitted that he is under the
custody of the court and voluntarily submitted his person to its jurisdiction
hence would invalidate from availing the remedy of habeas corpus.
4. Whether the order denying the urgent motion for bail is improper. If in the
affirmative, whether Larkins may benefit from such improper order.

Held:

1. YES. Cuyag has personality to institute on behalf of her common-law

spouse Larkins, on the habeas corpus aspect of the petition, as she falls
within the purview of the term "some person" under Section 3, Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court, which means any person who has a legally justified
interest in the freedom of the person whose liberty is restrained or who
shows some authorization to make the application. She is not, however, the
real party in interest in the certiorari aspect of the petition. Only Larkins
could institute a petition for certiorari to set aside order the denying his
motions for bail and for the dismissal of the complaint against him.

2. NO. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar
his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the
legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for
a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it
may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances
mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the
filing of the application. Among such supervening events is the issuance of
a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person.

Another is the filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which
the accused is detained, as in the instant case. By then, the restraint of
liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information and, therefore,
the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available.

3. YES. The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is
recommended has the same legal import and effect as the posting of bail in
cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that the giving or posting of
bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the
jurisdiction of the court. In the case of Carrington vs. Peterson, 30 this
Court declared that when a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a
competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to
avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must
raise the question of the court's jurisdiction over his person at the very
earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any
dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction
over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534) In
United States vs. Grant, 31 this Court held that conceding again that the
warrant issued in this case was void for the reason that no probable cause
was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant waived all his rights
to object to the same by appearing and giving bond.

While it may be true that on 6 December 1994, or four days after the filing
of the Urgent Motion for Bail, Larkins, thru a new counsel, filed an Urgent
Omnibus Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release
based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest, the said motion was
a mere afterthought which came too late in the day. By then, the trial court
had firmly acquired jurisdiction over his person.

Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for
a writ of habeas corpus will not prosper because his detention has become
legal by virtue of the filing before the trial court of the complaint against him
and by the issuance of the 5 January 1995 order.

4. NO. The trial court did not conduct a hearing of the urgent motion for
bail, as required under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The grant
or denial of bail must be based upon the court's determination as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be
exercised after evidence is submitted at the hearing conducted for that
purpose. The court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong; otherwise, the order would be
defective and voidable. In fact, even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce
evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may
ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the
State's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. It was thus
incumbent upon the trial court to receive the evidence for the prosecution
on the urgent motion for bail. For this procedural shortcoming, Larkins
should also be partly blamed. He did not press for a hearing after the
scheduled hearing on 5 December 1994 was cancelled because, as he
claimed, the presiding Judge was out of the country.

Moncupa vs. Enrile , No. L-63345, January 30, 1986

Facts: Petitioners were arrested and detained on the allegation that they

were members of a subversive organization. Petitioners filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss after the petitioner was temporarily

released from detention on the ground that the petition for habeas corpus
may be deemed moot and academic since the petitioner is free and no
longer under the respondent’s custody.

Petitioner argues that his temporary release did not render the instant
petition moot and academic because of the restrictions imposed by the
respondents which constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his
freedom.

Issue: WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus becomes moot and
academic in view of the detained person’s release with restrictions.

Held: No. Restraints attached to temporary release of a detained person

warrant the Supreme Court’s inquiry into the nature of the involuntary
restraint and relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal.

Reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the

detainee’s temporary release constitutes restraints on the liberty of the
detainee. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ
of habeas corpus.

Temporary release of detainee from detention with involuntary restraints

does not render the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic.
It is available where a person continue to be unlawfully denied of one or
more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process,
where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are necessary, and
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.

Navia, et al. v. Pardico

FACTS:

A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the

house of Lolita M. Lapore. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son,
Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both
staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two
uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately
asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could
answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with
them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged
against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision. Shortly
thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security
department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.

Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia

filed a Petition for Writ of Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of
Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners. The trial
court issued the challenged Decision granting the petition. Petitioners filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.

Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They

contend that the writ of amparo is available only in cases where the factual
and legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved
partys right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that in
the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the
petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state with some degree of
specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners
constituting a violation of or a threat to Bens right to life, liberty and
security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence Virginia
adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged
disappearance. On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear
the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released
Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the
trial court erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for Bens
disappearance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is proper?

HELD: RTCs decision is reversed and set aside.

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated
to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the
country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief “to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity.”

Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

recognizes every human beings inherent right to life, while Article 9 thereof
ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to life
must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be
impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This
overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and security
without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.
The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis
when this Court defined enforced disappearances. The Court in that case
applied the generally accepted principles of international law and adopted
the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances definition of enforced disappearances, as “the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of
the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection
of the law.”

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can

derive the following elements that constitute it:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation

of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or

acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to

acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to
issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are
not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that
the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal
to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of
said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the
petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation.

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance

alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such
disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization,
support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of
State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain
any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend
to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens
disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were
impleaded or implicated in Virginia’s amparo petition whether as
responsible or accountable persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an
allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Bens
disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in
investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or
its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.

We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of

amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person
sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a
private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the
disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are
mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos
City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work
for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or
connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As
discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation
to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some
governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation
differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a
missing person.
G.R. NO. 183871

Rubrico vs. Arroyo

February 18, 2010

FACTS:

Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed
men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based
at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City,
Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary
Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior
Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following
them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the
individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act
against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the
aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for
damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of
them on the case of Lourdes.

The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the
material inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the
defense that the President may not be sued during her incumbency.

Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex

parte against the President, et al.

By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in

the case .

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing
[their] Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party
respondent.

HELD:

The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution.
Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in
jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or
actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there
is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such. 

The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other
respondents for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out
a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and
the threats and harassment that followed.

Gen. Yano vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640 (2010)

Facts

Cleofas Sanchez filed before the Supreme Court a petition for issuance of
a Writ of Amparo with Motion for Production and Inspection directed
against Gen. Esperon, the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP). The Supreme Court resolved to issue a Writ of Amparo
and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a verified return of the writ before the
Court of Appeals. Cleofas amended her petition on January 14, 2008 to
include Marciana Medina ) and to implead other military officers including
Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos as therein additional respondents.

In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana alleged that their

respective sons Nicolas Sanchez

and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin,
Barangay Bueno,

Capas, Tarlac. On September 18, 2006 at around 1:00 a.m., the “wives” of
Nicolas, namely, Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home,
heard gunshots and saw armed men in soldiers’ uniforms passing by; and
that that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdez and Rosalie went
out to check on Nicolas and He her son but only saw their caps, slippers,
pana and airgun for catching frogs, as well as bloodstains. They likewise
alleged that Josephine Galang Victoria informed them that she saw Nicolas
and Heherson at the Camp of the Bravo Company sometime in 2006. the
respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of Amparo, the production of
the victims’ bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspection of certain
military camps, the issuance of temporary and permanent protection
orders, and the rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo.

Issue

1. Whether or not failure of the respondents to present substantial

evidence to prove that the public officials observed extraordinary diligence
in the performance of their duty is ground for the grant of the privilege of
the writ of amparo.
2. Whether or not the grant of provisional remedy in Section 14 of the
Amparo Rule is proper in cases where the public respondents were
absolved of the disappearance of the alleged victim.

Ruling

As regards the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Evidence is
required in Amparo petition. Effect of failure to establish that the public
official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duty the
requirement for a government official or employee to observe extraordinary
diligence in the performance of duty stresses the extraordinary measures
expected to be taken in safeguarding every citizen’s constitutional rights as
well as in the investigation of cases of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The failure to establish that the public official observed
extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the
automatic grant of the privilege of the Amparo writ. It does not relieve the
petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The
omission or inaction on the part of the public official provides, however,
some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain
interim reliefs.

On the second issue, the Court also ruled in the negative. The interim or
provisional remedies provided in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule are
intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of
the amparo petition – Section 14 of theAmparo Rule provides for interim or
provisional reliefs that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect
the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant
evidence, These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it
arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition.
Gen. Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3 2009

Facts

Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. More than a month after his
disappearance, the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
(petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla,
directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, et. al. The petition stated that
Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while
out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence
operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then
sped away without the knowledge of his student and according to a reliable
source; that he was in the custody of police intelligence operatives,
specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his
will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis
with the different terrorist groups; That the respondent filed a complaint with
the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, but instead of
helping her she was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her
husband, subject of the petition, was not missing but was with another
woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the
refusal to help and provide police assistance in locating her missing
husband.

The petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form and substance of the
Amparo petition filed before the CA. Petitioners contend that the petition
violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule.

Issue
Does the Amparo Rule intended that the petition be complete in every
detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights for it to
be given due course by the court?

Ruling

The Court ruled in negative. The framers of the Amparo Rule never
intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory
pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting
the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition,
however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose
of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner
may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly
disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her,
or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely
be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this
type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that
the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this
Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional
rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court requirement on
pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading
the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available
to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of
action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security
through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in
its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine
if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State or
private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life,
liberty or security – are present.
 People v. Alojado, 305 SCRA 236 (1999)

Facts:

On October 11, 1994, Julette Peñaranda and Gerra Rustia went to Amsic
Elementary School where they were Grade III pupils. During the recess at
around 10:00 a.m., both girls went to the house of Julette to get a dress
which Julette intended to show to her teacher. On their way back to school,
appellant talked to them, showed them a picture of a woman and asked
them if they knew the woman in the picture. Julette told appellant that she
did not know the woman. Appellant told them to help him look for the
woman. The two girls accompanied appellant who was then riding a green
bicycle. The three of them rode towards Amsic. In view of an obstruction on
the road, appellant told the girls to go down and walk as they made a turn
towards Plaridel. Thereafter, the two girls rode the bicycle again. This time
it was Julette who stayed at the back while Gerra was placed at the front of
the bicycle.

Upon reaching a grassy area in Plaridel, appellant brandished a knife, 6 to

7 inches long. Appellant said 'Papatayin ko yung babae kasi marami na
siyang kasalanan sa akin.' After hearing this, Julette told appellant she
wanted to go home because she was already scared. But appellant told
them to wait.

Appellant tied their hands at their back and tied the left foot of Julette to
one foot of Gerra with Gerra's belt. Appellant also tied their mouths with
Gerra's socks. Appellant made Julette and Gerra suck his sex organ.
Appellant removed the clothes of Julette and raped her by inserting his
penis into her sex organ. Appellant knelt down as he raped Julette. Julette
saw blood coming from her sex organ.

Appellant turned to Gerra and spat at her sex organ. He inserted his ' penis
into the genitalia of Gerra, who was made to lie down. After appellant raped
Gerra, he told the two victims to stay as he would just rest. When appellant
left, Julette removed the handle of the bag used to tie her hands and their
feet. They stood up and walked toward the house of Mrs. Stickle, whom
they asked for help. When Mrs. Stickle saw them at the gate of her house,
Julette was wearing her shorts while Gerra was wearing nothing. Mrs.
Stickle and the neighbors brought them to the Angeles City General
Hospital.

Dr. Hernand Tulud of the Angeles City Hospital attended to the victims. He
found blood clot on the genital area of Gerra, which was still bleeding.

Dr. Tulud also examined the vagina of Julette and found 'multiple
laceration[s] of the vagina; [and] positive laceration of the posterior wall
with penetration to the cul de sac.' (p. 24, ibid). After being given
intravenous fluids, she was transferred to Jose B. Lingad Hospital because
she was complaining of abdominal pains.

Dr. Efren Natino, the obstetrician and volunteer consultant of Jose Lingad
Hospital, examined Julette. He noted [a] laceration in her genitalia, which
was profusely bleeding. Dr. Natino opined that the laceration could have
been caused by an erect penis.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution is strong.

Ruling:

The Honorable Supreme Court is not convinced by appellant's argument

that he did not fit the rapist's physical appearance as described by, the two
children, who declared that their assailant was "semi-bald, with moustache,
dark with flat nose." It should be stressed that the descriptions given by the
victims are subjective terms, whose meanings vary with each individual.
The children may have described their assailant as semi-bald, although he
may have had only a wide forehead. The gap between his teeth may have
been referred to as bungi by some, but not by others. On the other hand,
the moustache, which their assailant allegedly had, can be disregarded
because it can easily be shaved.

We are not persuaded by appellant's allegation that the police conditioned

the minds of the victims to point to appellant as the assailant. In fact, the
two children identified him at the hospital when he was brought before them
and again during the trial. Thus, even when the defense counsel tried to
confuse her during cross-examination, Julette remained steadfast, as
shown by her testimony.

On her part, Gerra sufficiently explained why she had failed to immediately
identify appellant at the hospital. She had just awakened and, prior to that,
had undergone blood transfusion. What is important is that when she was
asked again, she promptly tried to be more alert; gathering her senses, she
admitted her mistake and subsequently pointed to appellant as the culprit.
She was probably just being careful not to point to anybody as the culprit,
especially when she had not yet gotten hold of her senses. Instead of
destroying her credibility and creating the impression that she was coaxed
by the police, the foregoing circumstances show her conscious awareness
that appellant was the man who had abused her and Julette. Thus, during
the trial, she again identified him. Indeed, the natural reaction of a victim is
to point to the guilty party, for to inculpate the wrong person is to let the
malefactor go unpunished and free to repeat the same outrage.

We are not persuaded by the argument that the first time appellant was
identified was not in a police lineup, but in the hospital where the police
brought him alone to face the two victims. The fact remains that the victims
were able to recognize him at the time and again during the trial.
Moreover, there is no law that requires a police lineup as the only means
by which culprits may be identified.

People vs. Rondero

FACTS: The accused was seen by the victim’s father with an ice pick and
washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9 year old victim was later
found dead and half naked with lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. He
was convicted of homicide only. For his conviction, several circumstantial
pieces of evidence were submitted including strands of his hair for
comparison with the strands of hair found in the victim’s right hand at the
scene of the crime as well as blood-stained undershirt and short pants
taken from his house. The accused-appellant avers the acquisition of his
hair strands without his express written consent and without the presence
of his counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his Constitutional right
against self-incrimination under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the
Constitution, to wit:

Sec. 12.

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

ISSUE: WON the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellant’s hair
strands can be admitted as evidence against him?

HELD: Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually

proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of
his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance
emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in
prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the
mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him.
Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were
forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination,
the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from
the accused are inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the
proper search warrant from the police officers. Accused-appellant’s wife
testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in their house,
took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was
never rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule
known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” evidence illegally obtained by the
state should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally
obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put,
accused-appellant’s garments, having been seized in violation of his
constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in
court as evidence.

UMIL V. RAMOS

FACTS:
Military agents received confidential information that a certain man, Ronnie
Javellon, believed to be one of the five NPA sparrows who recently
murdered two Capcom mobile patrols was being treated in St. Agnes
Hospital, for having gunshot wounds.

Later on, it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a fictitious name and that
his real name is Rolando Dural (verified as one of the sparrows of the
NPA).

Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the

CAPCOM, for security reasons.

Meanwhile, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one

who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

In this 8 consolidated cases, it assails the validity of the arrests and

searches made by the military on the petitioners; that a mere suspicion that
one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground
for his arrest without warrant.

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless arrest is valid

HELD:

YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the

contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, Dural was committing an offense,
when arrested because he was arrested for being a member of the New
People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized
and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs.
Enrile, a continuing offense.

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which

includes armed struggle for the overthrow of organized government, Dural
did not cease to be or became less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF
ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St.
Agnes Hospital.

Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his
arrest, without a warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2)
CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2)
policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA
member) did not end there and then.

Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other
policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of the organized
government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection)
is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common"
offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base
which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence
until the overriding objective of overthrowing an organized government is
attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by
the arresting officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was
based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts mentioned in this
case.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the
arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo,
Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent man can say that it would have been
better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest.
That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause
for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to

place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom
devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of
the law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest
is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest
without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section
5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public
interest in peace and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in

accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court
determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of
committing the crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence of guilt,
but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace
officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public
order, to conduct an arrest without warrant.

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law
requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later
found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. But
if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers
can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.

Bagcal vs. Villaraza, 120 SCRA 525 (1983)

Facts:

Petitioner was arrested without a warrant on February 28, 1982 by the

Philippine Constabulary and has been detained at Camp Alagar, Cagayan
de Oro City since then. The City Fiscal filed an information for murder
against petitioner. The information was accompanied with affidavits not
subscribed before the respondent Judge, who failed to ask affiants to ratify
their oaths nor asked searching questions. City Fiscal did not conduct
preliminary investigation before respondent judge issued a warrant of
arrest.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may assail the validity of his waarant of
arrest.

Ruling:

No. Although the warrant of arrest was irregularly issued, any infirmities
attached to it was cured when petitioner submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by applying for bail, submitting a memorandum in
support thereof, and filing a motion for reconsideration when his application
was denied.

Brown vs. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)

On May 13, 1968, Richard Brown was arrested outside of his Chicago,

IL. apartment by two members of the Chicago Police. The two officers,
William Nolan and William Lenz, entered Mr. Brown's apartment without
probable cause later testifying that they had entered to question Brown
concerning the death of Roger Corpus, who had been killed a week prior.

Following his arrest, Mr. Brown was taken to a police station

for interrogation; prior to beginning his interrogation, Mr. Brown was read
his Miranda Rights. During interrogation Mr. Brown produced a two-page
written document acknowledging his role in the killing of Roger Corpus. Mr.
Brown would later give another statement to the Assistant State's
Attorney assigned to the case again acknowledging his role in Mr. Corpus'
death but also containing a number of factual inaccuracies. Both
statements would later be introduced at trial, ultimately resulting in Mr.
Brown's conviction for the murder of Roger Corpus.

On review, the Illinois Supreme Court held that by giving Mr. Brown

Miranda Warnings, the causal chain between the illegal arrest and
statements obtained had been broken, and the statements were thus the
result of free will.

Decision:

In the case syllabus, the Court sums up its holding in three parts:

1. "The Illinois courts erred in adopting a per se rule

that Miranda warnings in and of themselves broke the causal chain
so that any subsequent statement, even one induced by the
continuing effects of unconstitutional custody, was admissible so long
as, in the traditional sense, it was voluntary and not coerced in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."

2. "The question whether a confession is voluntary under Wong

Sun must be answered on the facts of each case."

3. "The State failed to sustain its burden in this case of showing that
petitioner's statements were admissible under Wong Sun."

Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Blackmun held that reading a

defendant their Miranda Rights does not remove the taint of an illegal
arrest. The Court acknowledges that under Wong Sun statements and
evidence obtained from an illegal search can be admissible if the
connection between the search and the evidence is so attenuated that the
taint is dissipated. However, the Supreme Court held that attenuation
under Wong Sun requires a showing on the facts of the individual case.
Allowing Miranda Rights to automatically attenuate an illegal search would
dilute the exclusionary rule.

Under the attenuation doctrine, evidence obtained through government

misconduct is admissible if "the connection between the misconduct and
the discovery of the evidence is attenuated —weakened— so as to make
the evidence untainted by the government's conduct." Because there was
no intervening event in the two hours between Mr. Brown's illegal arrest
and the first statement that he made, the trial court erred in admitting it.
Similarly, as the second statement was a direct result of the first statement,
it too is inadmissible.

SAYO VS. CHIEF OF POLICE OF MANILA80 PHIL 859 (1948)

FACTS:

Upon complaint of one Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with

having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of
the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented
a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7,
1948, the petitioners were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal
had not yet released or filed against them an information with the proper
court of justice.

ISSUE:

a.Whether or not petitioners had been illegally restrained of their liberty?

b. Whether or not the city fiscal of manila is a judicial authority within the

meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the RPC?

c. Who are authorized to make a preliminary investigation?

Held:

a. Yes. Petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their

release is
 hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process i
ssued by acompetent court of justice. Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that “the penalties provided in the next
preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and
shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within
the period of six hours.”  Without making any pronouncement as to
the responsibility of the officers who intervened in the detention of the
petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith,
in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he
had complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the
petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter
might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being actually
detained when the said policeman filed a complaint against them with
the city fiscal, The court holds that the petitioners are being illegally
restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless
they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent
court of justice.

b. The surrender or delivery to the judicial authority of a person arrested

without warrant by a peace officer, does not consist in a physical
delivery, but in making an accusation or charge or filing of an
information against the person arrested with the corresponding court
or judge, whereby the latter acquires jurisdiction to issue an order of
release or of commitment of the prisoner, because the arresting
officer cannot transfer to the judge and the latter does not assume the
physical custody of the person arrested. The judicial authority
mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be
construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city,
because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or
temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the
detention of a person arrested without warrant. For the purpose of
determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for
 more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the
means of communication as well as the hour of arrested and other
circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material
possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the
necessary information, must be taken into consideration.

The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the
preliminary investigation proper provided for in section 11, Rule 108, above
quoted, to which all person charged with offenses cognizable by the Court
of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere investigation
made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding
information against the defendant with the proper municipal court or Court
of First Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation so warrants, in
order to obtain or secure from the court a warrant of arrest of the
defendant.

c. The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper

preliminary investigation in case of temporary absence of both the
justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the
municipality, town or place, are the municipal mayors who are
empowered in such case to issue a warrant of arrest of the caused.
(Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6, Rule 108, and
section 2 of Rule 109.)

Feliciano vs. Pasciolan, 2 SCRA 888 (1961)

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of kidnapping. When he found out
that an Information had been filed and that a warrant of arrest had been
issued against him, he went into hiding. His lawyer, at the instance of his
wife, fined a motion asking that the Court fix the amount of the bond at
P10K for the petitioner’s release pending trial, but the Provincial Fiscal of
Pampanga opposed the motion on the ground that the filing was premature
because the petitioner had been arrested. The respondent Judge
dismissed the motion on the ground that the petitioner does not have the
right to ask for the court to admit him to bail pending his arrest or
surrender.

The petitioner contends that as, under the Constitution, "all persons shall
before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged
with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong," Article III, Section 1,
paragraph (16), Constitution of the Philippines, and that the words "all
persons" used in said constitutional provision have been interpreted to
mean "all persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet
so charged with any criminal offense".

ISSUE: WON the judge erred in not granting the petition for admission to
bail.

HELD/RATIO: No.

There is no question as to the soundness of the rule invoked by petitioner.

Such is the law in this jurisdiction. But, the rule is subject to the limitation
that the person applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of
the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty.

In the case of Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634, this Court held:

xxx According to this provision, the general rule is that any person, before
being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he
is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of
course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained
or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek
the benefits of said provision. But in order that a person can invoke the
constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a
formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment
he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the
law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he
retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and
evidence of his guilt is strong.

And in the case of Manigbas vs. Luna, 52 O.G. 1405, it was held:

xxx the right to bail only accrues when a person is arrested or deprived of
his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would
be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is the
security required and given for the release of a person who is in the
custody of the law.'

Without surrendering himself, he filed the motion in which he asks that the
court fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial. It is,
therefore, clear that the petitioner is a free man and is under the
jurisprudence not entitled to admission to bail.

MIRANDA VS. TULIAO 486 SCRA 377 (2006)

Facts:

Two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela,

which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer
Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the
witness protection program.

Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño,
SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu,
SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Santiago City, but the venue was later transferred to the
RTC of Manila which convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to
two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be
arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to the
Supreme Court on automatic review where we accused therein was
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April

2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain
Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the
deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners,

Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of
SPO2 Maderal. Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued
warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.

Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to

reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.

Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order
denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard
by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State
Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.

Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued

against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners
Ocon and Dalmacio.

On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant

the prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid
resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001
dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19
November 2001, this Court took note of respondent’s cash bond evidenced
by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary
restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for
adjudication on the merits.

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad
dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001,

October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases
numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and
reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding
Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek
any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the
court.

Court: An accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the
accused may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as
warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he
surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already
acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the
processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr.,

A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be

placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his
petition for judicial reliefs.3

Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners
Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they
were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they
filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to
reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4

Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that

jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in applications
for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction
over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to
quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.The
voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the
merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the
exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is
intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the

law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before
the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is
accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not yet
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a
person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to
quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such
as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. 11
Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become
obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over
the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.

Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can

invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction
over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the
special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself
to the custody of the law.

If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is
foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large,
and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if
ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of
warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very
rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free.
This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who
will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination
of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really
did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.

CORTES VS CATRAL 279 SCRA 1 (1997)

FACTS: Cortes filed a complaint against Judge Catral for granting bail
without hearing.

Catral allegedly granted bail in two murder cases, a crime that is

supposedly not bailable) without hearing. Catral says:In one of them, the
case was frustrated homicide, and the prosecutor recommended bail of
200K, plus the circumstantial evidence were weak.

In the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal Case 08-866 for

murder, the inquest judge issued a warrant of arrest for the accused with
no bail recommended. When the case was elevated to the Regional Trial
Court upon information filed by the provincial prosecutor, the information
made no mention of a bailbond. In the hearing of the petition to determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, the fiscal opted not to
introduce evidence and recommended bail in the sum of P200,000.00
instead. Respondent judge “acting on the said recommendation and again
guided by the provision of Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94 in
conjunction with the evidence extant on the record approved the
recommendation of Prosecutor Apolinar Carrao.” A duplicate copy of trial
prosecutor Apolinar Carrao’s letter dated September 3, 1996 addressed to
the provincial prosecutor Romeo Sacquing was presented by the
respondent to disprove the accusation that he granted bail to the accused
without conducting any hearing.

Catral allegedly reduced bailbond for an illegal possession of firearms case

from 180K (recommended by prosecutor) to 30K without hearing.

Catral says: bailbond recommended was 180K. accused filed for reduction
and there was no opposition from prosecutor.

Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide case was granted with a
bailbond of P14,800.00 by Judge Segundo Catral. The amount is too low. It
is because this Nilo de Rivera is another goon of Julio Bong Decierto.

Catral says: he was acting on the recommendation of the OIC provincial

prosecutor and mindful of the guidelines in fixing a reasonable amount of
bailbond coupled by the fact that the evidence on record is merely
circumstantial and there was no eyewitness to the commission of crime
granted bailbond in the sum of P14,800.00.

Jimmy Siriban the right hand man of Julio ‘Bong’ Dicierto was sued for
concubinage and convicted by Judge Herminio del Castillo in MTC. Jimmy
Siriban appealed and it was elevated to the RTC Branch 08, the sala of
Judge Segundo Catral. Judge Segundo Catral acquitted Jimmy Siriban,
rumors in Aparri spread that the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to
Jimmy Siriban’s house to get the envelop warrant the imposition of
administrative sanction against respondent judge.

ISSUE: WON the allegations of the complainant would constitute a crime.

HELD/RATIO: YES.
Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case. The
amount fixed should be sufficient to ensure the presence of the accused at
the trial yet reasonable enough to comply with the constitutional provision
that bail should not be excessive. Therefore, whether bail is a matter of
right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to
the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must be asked for his
recommendation because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required
to take into account a number of factors such as the applicant’s character
and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a fugitive from
justice.

When the accused is charged with an offense punishable by death,

reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a
hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, not
only to take into account the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, but primarily to determine the existence of strong
evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the accused.

Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an accused charged

with murder, without having conducted any hearing as to whether the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

In a crime of murder. The provincial prosecutor recommended the sum of

P200,000.00 as bailbond for each accused. The records do not reveal
whether a hearing was actually conducted on the application for bail
although respondent judge implies that there was one, stating that “acting
on this recommendation of the provincial prosecutor and taking into
account the guidelines prescribed in Section 9 of Administrative Circular
12-94, the court issued a warrant of arrest and fixed the amount of
P200,000.00 for the provisional liberty of each of the accused.”
Subsequently, counsel for accused Ahmed Duerme filed a motion for
reduction of bail. The “hearing” of the motion was conducted on August 21,
1995 with the prosecution, not having interposed any opposition, and
submitting the resolution of the motion to the sound discretion of the court
instead. Respondent judge then issued an order granting a reduced
bailbond of P50,000.00 for accused Ahmed Duerme inasmuch as “the
evidence was not so strong to warrant the fixation of said amount.” The
order granting the reduced bailbond, however, did not contain a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution.

In another murder case, after conducting a preliminary investigation, the

inquest judge issued a warrant of the arrest for the accused with no bail
recommended. When the case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court,
the information made no mention of a bailbond. Consequently, accused
through counsel filed a petition for bail. In the hearing of the petition to
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused was
strong, the fiscal opted not to introduce evidence and recommended the
sum of P200,000.00 instead. Respondent judge, “acting on said
recommendation and again guided by the provision of Section 9,
Administrative Circular 12-94 in conjunction with the evidence extant on
record,” issued an order granting bail to the accused in the sum of
P200,000.00. Unable to post the said bond, accused through counsel filed
a motion to reduce bail. In the course of the hearing of the petition, the
public prosecutor manifested that he had no objection to the sum of
P50,000.00 as bail for the accused. Respondent judge, then “guided by the
factual setting and the supporting evidence extant on record” reduced the
bail bond from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00 as recommended by the
prosecutor. Once again, the order granting the bail of P200,000.00, as well
as the reduced bail bond of P50,000.00, did not contain a summary of the
evidence presented by the prosecution.

The judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the

prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail
to the sound discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to
grant and fix bail. The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not
a few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the prosecution refuses to
adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is
still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching
questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or
the lack of it against the accused.”

The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the determination of whether or

not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion, It may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted
to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly
exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise
of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the
court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce
evidence in his own rebuttal.

The procedural lapse of respondent judge is aggravated by the fact that

even though the accused in Criminal Case No. 07-874, People v. Ahmed
Duerme, have yet to be arrested, respondent already fixed bail in the sum
of P200,000.00. Respondent evidently knew that the accused were still at
large as he even had to direct their arrest in the same order where he
simultaneously granted them bail. At this juncture, there is a need to
reiterate the basic principle that the right to bail can only be availed of by a
person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and
it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for
some whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.

PEOPLE VS. MANALLO 400 SCRA 129 (2003)

FACTS:

Spouses Romeo Nabor and Liliosa Napay and their nine- year old daughter
Rosaldiza Nabor tenanted and lived in a coconut plantation located in
Barangay Salugan, Camilig, Albay. Rosaldiza helped in the household
chores by washing the family’s dirty laundry every Saturday at the
barangay reservoir. The route to the reservoir was uninhabited. Going there
was quite a long trek. It usually took Rosaldiza fifteen minutes to negotiate
the grassy path from the reservoir to their house.

In 1989, Romeo engaged the services of Alex Manallo, as coconut

gatherer. Alex helped the Nabor couple gather coconut produce once a
week.

One day, in 1992, Rosaldiza went to the reservoir to wash her clothes and
to take a bath. On her way back home, Manallo suddenly appeared from
the bushes, grabbed her and raped her. Alex dressed up and warned her
not to tell her parents, brothers and sisters of the incident, otherwise, he
would kill them all. Rosaldiza put on her clothes and ran home. Rosaldiza
related to her mother what had happened to her.

Then Rosaldiza and Liliosa went back to the police station and executed
their respective sworn statements. An information was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, charging Alex with rape.

No bail was recommended for the provisional liberty of Alex. He filed, on

May 8, 1992, a motion for bail with no specific date and time for the hearing
thereof. Upon the filing of said motion, the Executive Judge issued an order
granting the motion and fixing his bail bond at P50,000.00. On the same
day, Alex posted a property bond which was immediately approved by the
court. Alex was forthwith released from detention.

At his arraignment on June 17, 1992, Alex, duly assisted by counsel de

oficio, pleaded not guilty. Trial was set on June 18, 1992. The prosecution
prayed the trial court to cancel the bond of Alex considering that his petition
for bail was granted without due hearing. However, the trial court held in
abeyance resolution of the motion until after the prosecutor shall have
presented its witnesses on June 18, 1992. The trial court stated that the
evidence to be adduced by the prosecution would be its evidence in Alex’s
petition for bail and trial on the merits. On June 18, 1992, the trial court
issued an order that Alex would remain free on his bond until June 22,
1992, the date set for the hearing on his petition for bail. However, Alex
failed to attend the trial on said date. The trial court issued and order for his
arrest. However, Alex could no longer be found at his address. It was only
six years thereafter, or on January 22, 1998, that he was arrested.

He denied raping Rosaldiza and claimed that they were lovers. He was
found guilty.

ISSUE: WON the trial court gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant

not on the basis of the strength of the prosecution’s evidence but rather on
the weakness evidence for the defense.

HELD/RATIO:

NO. Even a cursory reading of the decision of the trial court will readily
show that it convicted appellant of the crime charged in light of the
testimony of Rosaldiza and Dr. Loria- Florece and the physical evidence
adduced by the prosecution.

The trial court considered appellant’s flight from the scene of the crime, his
having jumped bail and for eluding arrest for six long years as evidence of
his guilt for the crime charged.

The Court cannot write finish to this case without making of record its
concern and displeasure at the egregious procedural lapse of the trial court
in granting bail to appellant. It bears stressing that he was charged with
rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Section 5, Rule 114 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

SEC. 5. Burden of proof in Bail application. – At the hearing of an

application for admission to bail filed by any person who is in custody for
the commission of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,
the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong.
The evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the
court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the witness
is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify.

In this case, the appellant filed his motion for bail on May 8, 1992. There
was no specific date and time for the hearing of said motion. And yet, on
the same day that the motion was filed, the trial court granted the said
motion and fixed the bail bond for the provisional liberty of the appellant in
the amount of P50,000.00 without any factual basis therefore stated in the
order. Even when the public prosecutor prayed the court on June 17,
1992, for the cancellation of the property bond of the appellant on the
ground that the trial court granted his motion for bail without even affording
the prosecution a chance to be heard thereon and adduce its evidence in
opposition thereto, the trial court held in abeyance resolution thereof and
even allowed the appellant to remain free on his bond in the amount of only
P50,000.00. Patently, the prosecution was deprived of its right to due
process.

A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to
temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the State to protect the people
and the peace of the community from dangerous elements. These two
rights must be balanced by a magistrate in the scale of justice, hence, the
necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of jurisdiction.

LAVIDES VS CA

G.R. 129670 February 1, 2000

FACTS: Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse
under R.A. No. 7610 (an act providing for stronger deterrence and special
protection against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination, providing
penalties for its approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the
arraignment to enable this Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over
the accused; violation, and other purposes). His arrest was made without a
warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. It appears
that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel
reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been
contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioner’s room at
the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the
first time the police received reports of petitioner’s activities.

When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was
wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him.
Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the
arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for
violation of Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed against petitioner.

Petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of

Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully
Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of
Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to
Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged.

Nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the
same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children

No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate

applications for bail in the nine cases.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him. Pending

resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment
scheduled on May 23, 1997. He filed a motion in which he prayed that the
amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the
same be done prior to his arraignment.

The trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioner’s motions to reduce

bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment.
Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to
the charges against him and then ordered him released upon posting bail
bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the
May 16, 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order of April 10, 1997. The
pre-trial conference was set on June 7, 1997.

The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to
pass upon the validity of condition (d) on the ground that the issue had
become moot and academic. Petitioner takes issue with the Court of
Appeals with respect to its treatment of condition (d) of the May 16, 1997
order of the trial court which makes petitioner’s arraignment a prerequisite
to the approval of his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is void
and that his arraignment was also invalid because it was held pursuant to
such invalid condition.

ISSUE: WON the condition is void and the arraignment invalid.

HELD:

CONDITION IS VOID.

Bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be

precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed
and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment
of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the
presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and
ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as
arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the
proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while
under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is
required to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment
would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1)
filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his
motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2)
foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at
once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly
undermine the accused’s constitutional right not to be put on trial except
upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime
and his right to bail.

The condition imposed in the trial court’s order of May 16, 1997 that the
accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be
present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule
114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure
of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice
to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to
be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall
proceed in absentia." Jjsc Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing
trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at
certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea,
whether of innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial whenever necessary for
identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is
for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear by counsel or
representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required
and cannot be waived.

IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF PETITIONER

ON MAY 23, 1997 WAS ALSO INVALID. Contrary to petitioner’s
contention, the arraignment did not emanate from the invalid condition that
"approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even
without such a condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted.
In sum, although the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his
arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are valid.

Presumption of Innocence

People v. Espera
706 SCRA 704

Facts:
 Espera was accused of two counts of rape, to which he pleaded not
guilty to both charges. Pre-trial was conducted and trial ensued. The victim
was on her way home from her work at the clinic with her friend. They
hailed a tricycle at around 11:30 pm, when she shone a beam of flashlight
unto the driver and vehicle, she recognized the driver Espera by face,
wearing a red shirt and maong pants, but not by name. Victim’s friend was
first to disembark. Upon reaching her house, the tricycle did not stop but
kept on going until they reached a quarry site, where Espera said that the
brakes were faulty. While tracing her way home, the victim noticed that
Espera was following her, his shirt was already covering his face and
holding a gun. When she ran and shouted for help, Espera caught up with
her and beat her first before dragging her to a secluded location where he
raped her by inserting his organ into her mouth then proceeded to
penetrate her sex organ. After the deed, Espera threatened to kill her if she
would tell the truth. The next day, the victim told her mother of the ordeal;
she confessed the next day to her friend when she did not come to the
clinic. She was then examined by a doctor and reported the incident to the
authorities. At the police station, she recognized Espera through his voice,
even though he cut his hair and shaved his beard. Espera left town but was
eventually apprehended. Espera’s alibi was that he lived far away from the
crime scene and that he was at home drunk and sleeping.

RTC Bohol found Espera guilty on account of the victim’s richly

detailed testimony, results of the medical exam, positive identification of
Espera by the victim, the alibi of the accused, and his sudden flight from
town.

Upon appeal to CA, Espera contended that the prosecution failed to

prove the identity of the alleged perpetrator was doubtful. However, CA
affirmed the RTC’s finding of guilt with modification as to damages. Hence,
appeal to SC.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the
accused as the author of the crime.

Held:
No. An accused enjoys the presumption of innocence until and unless
his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The law requires the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only each element of
the crime but also the identity of the accused as the criminal.

In this case, the prosecution’s evidence on the identity of Espera as

the offender is clear and unmistakable: The victim and her friend positively
identified Espera as the tricycle driver wearing the same clothes on that
night when they beamed a flashlight on him and his tricycle; Espera
stopped the vehicle in a place where the victim is in a vulnerable position;
Espera took off his red shirt and covered his face then followed the victim
with a gun; she recognized him when Espera was presented at the police
station even though he changed his appearance; she also positively
identified him in open court upon testimony. CA also correctly ruled that
Espera was identified not only by his appearance but also his voice. Under
the victims’ testimony, Espera’s denial and alibi are weak and useless.

People v. Sy
590 SCRA 511

Facts:
Accused-appellant Jason Sy was charged before the RTC of San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 47, with illegal sale of shabu in violation of
Section 15, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425.

Members of Special Action Team 3rd CIDG, Camp Olivas, City of

San Fernando, Pampanga, together with a civilian informant, were
negotiating a drug-deal with a certain person allegedly named Jason Sy.
Consequently, at around 2:00 o’clock of the next morning, December 3,
2000, Major Mana conducted a briefing regarding a possible buy-bust
operation. The accused was arrested in a "buy-bust operation" at the
parking space of Chowking Restaurant at San Fernando City along the
Olongapo-Gapan Road.

In finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court gave full
faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, noting
that they testified in a clear and straightforward manner.

Issue: Whether the prosecution discharged its burden to support accused-

appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.

Held:

Yes. An accused in criminal prosecutions is to be presumed innocent

until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.13 This constitutional
guarantee cannot be overthrown unless the prosecution has established by
such quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption of
innocence and prove that a crime was committed and that the accused is
guilty thereof. Under our Constitution, an accused enjoys the presumption
of innocence. And this presumption prevails over the presumption of
regularity of the performance of official duty.

In dealing with prosecutions for the illegal sale of drugs, what is

material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug as
evidence. Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in
the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and
delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had
sold and delivered was a dangerous drug.

In the instant case, the Court finds that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses adequately establish these elements. The trial
court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded the
highest respect, because it had the advantage of observing their demeanor
and was thus in a better position to discern if they were telling the truth or
not. The Court has no reason to doubt the assessment of the trial court
regarding the credibility of the prosecution and defense witnesses. The
testimony of the buy-bust team established than an entrapment operation
against accused-appellant was legitimately and successfully carried out.
The testimonies are further bolstered by the physical evidence consisting of
the shabu presented as evidence before the court.

People v. Cantalejo
586 SCRA 777

Facts:
An Information for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, was filed against appellant Cesar Cantalejo y Manlangit. At the
arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to offense charged. Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.

During the trial, the prosecution failed to present evidence that

controvert the version of the defense.

The trial court convicted the accused relying heavily on the

performance of duty.

Issue: Whether the conviction of the accused is proper.

Held:
No. The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden
lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by
presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the prosecution
must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the
defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of
evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own
behalf. In which case the presumption prevails and the accused should
necessarily be acquitted.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt

People v. Clara
702 SCRA 273

Facts:
The accused was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
section 5 Article II of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.

On trial, (PO3 Ramos) narrated that he acted as a poseur-buyer in a

buy-bust operation conducted by their office. Inside the courtroom, PO3
Ramos identified Joel as the one involved in the illegal transaction. He also
identified the small plastic sachet of shabu as the sub1ect of the illegal
transaction through the marking he placed on it.

The accused, on the other hand, denied any involvement in the buy-
bust operation. On cross=examination, the accused inconsistent on the
part of his testimony. The accused was convicted.

Issue: Whether or not the conviction of the accused is valid.

Held:
No. It is basic in criminal prosecutions that an accused is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution has the burden to overcome such
presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required.

In numerous cases, the SC is inclined to uphold the presumption of

regularity in the performance of duty of public officers. However, this is not
a hard-and-fast rule. It does not mean that the SC straight away and
without a blink of the eye rule on the regularity of their performance of
duties. SC at all times harmonize the interest of the accused alongside the
interest of the State.

In case of conflict between the presumption of regularity of police

officers and the presumption of innocence of the accused, SC ruled that the
latter must prevail as the law imposes upon the prosecution the highest
degree of proof of evidence to sustain conviction.

Due to foregoing flagrant inconsistencies in the testimonies of police

officers which directly constitute the recollection of events of buy-bust
together and failure of observance of chain of custody of evidence which
effectively broke the links to sustain conviction, SC ruled for the acquittal of
the accused.

People v. Erguiza
571 SCRA 660

Facts:
Larry Erguiza was charged of the crime of rape. That on or about
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 5, 2000, AAA, a thirteen-year old
first year high school student, together with her friends, siblings Joy and
Ricky Agbuya, went to the mango orchard located at the back of ZZZ
Elementary School to gather fallen mangoes. When they were bound for
home at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAA's short pants got
hooked on the fence. AAA asked Joy and Ricky to wait for her but they ran
away and left her.

While AAA was trying to unhook her short pants, Larry suddenly
grabbed and pulled her. Poking a knife at her neck, Larry threatened to hurt
her if she would make a noise. Accused-appellant dragged AAA towards a
place where a tamarind tree and other thorny plants grow. Then Larry
removed his maong pants and forced AAA to lie down on the grassy
ground. Thereafter, proceeded in raping her.

RTC found Larry guilty in the crime of rape. The CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:
No. This Court is not unmindful of the doctrine that for alibi to
succeed as a defense, appellant must establish by clear and convincing
evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of
the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene
of the crime.

What needs to be stressed is that a conviction in a criminal case must

be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt - - moral certainty that the
accused is guilty. The conflicting testimonies of Joy and complainant, and
the testimony of Juanita that corroborated appellant's alibi preclude the
Court from convicting appellant of rape with moral certainty.

Faced with two conflicting versions, the Court is guided by the

equipoise rule. Thus, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction. The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence
in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of
innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.

It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with

clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and
inevitable conclusion. What is required of it is to justify the conviction of the
accused with moral certainty. Upon the prosecution's failure to meet this
test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be
tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest
of his life.

Atienza v. People
G.R. No. 188694 February 12, 2014

Facts:
This case involves crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public
Document against Atienza and Castro. Atienza and Castro (petitioners) are
employees of the CA, particularly assigned to its Budget Division and
holding the positions of Budget Officer I and Utility Worker I.

Abitula, Custodian of CA decisions was invited by Castro to attend

Atienza’s party where the latter introduced Atibula to a certain Dario and
asked him to assist in searching for the CA decision. Thereafter, Atibula
and Dario returned to the office and searched for the decision. Dario
requested Atibula to insert a decision in one of the volumes of CA Original
Decisions where the latter refused and immediately left. Atienza offered
Atibula 50,000 in exchange for records. Atibula reported the incident. He
further discovered that some of the volumes were missing which he also
reported.
 Nelson de Casto, Clerk IV detailed at the CA Reporter’s Division
handed to Atibula a bag containing a gift-wrapped package which turned
out to be the missing records. He claimed that it was Castro who asked him
to deliver the said package to Atibula.

The contents of the returned records were reviewed by Atibula and it

was found that there were new documents inserted therein. Upon Atibula’s
comparison, it was found that the duplicate original decisions did not bear
such promulgations. On investigation, it was found that the signatures of
the justices were forged.

Atienza denied the allegations. RTC found that there is conspiracy.

CA affirmed RTCs decision.
Issue: Are the circumstantial evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction

Held:
No. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on
reason and common experience. It is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain
which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. Stated
differently, the test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence
on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of
circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other and that
each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused’s guilt
and inconsistent with his innocence.
 Accordingly, there being no circumstantial evidence sufficient to
support a conviction, the Court hereby acquits petitioners, without
prejudice, however, to any subsequent finding on their administrative
liability in connection with the incidents in this case.

Rights to be informed

Pielago v. People
693 SCRA 476

Facts:
On July 1, 2006, between 2:00 p.m. to 2:30 p.m., AAA and her two
(2)-year old brother, CCC, were playing with Pielago whom they call as
Kuya Alvin at the porch of Boyet Ros’ (Boyet) house. After playing, the
three (3) went inside Boyet’s house to watch television. After a while,
Pielago turned off the television and brought AAA and CCC to a bedroom.
While CCC played with a toy carabao at a corner, Pielago made AAA lie
down on bed. Pielago then took off AAA’s short pants and inserted his right
hand’s forefinger inside her vagina. AAA felt pain and blood came out of
her vagina which frightened her. Unsatisfied, Pielago made AAA lie on her
chest on the same bed then fingered her anus. After a few minutes, AAA
and CCC were called for lunch by their mother, BBB. Pielago immediately
replaced AAA’s shorts then sent her and CCC out of the bedroom. BBB
noticed the bloodstains at the back portion of AAA’s shorts. When BBB
asked AAA what happened, AAA did not answer immediately until she said
“Kuya Alvin tugsok buyay saka lubot ko buda dila pa.” (which means “Kuya
Alvin inserted something in my vagina and my anus and he licked me).
Incensed by what AAA told her, BBB went to a certain Manay Eden who
accompanied her to the house of Boyet where she found Pielago still lying
on bed. BBB continually hit Pielago as she asked him what he did to AAA.
Pielago, however, denied the accusations and maintained that he was
asleep when the incident happened. At 6:00 p.m. of the same day, AAA
and BBB lodged a complaint at the Police Station where AAA was
physically examined by a medico-legal officer which issued a report
showing a superficial laceration caused by the insertion into the victim’s
genitals of a foreign object, possibly a small finger or any blunt object.
RTC found Pielago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape by Sexual Assault. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting Pielago of the crime of
Rape by Sexual Assault despite his being charged in the information for
Acts of Lasciviousness only.

Held:
No. It is well-settled that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused is
entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. In this respect, the designation in the Information of the specific statute
violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him
the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. In the instant case, the
designation of the offense in the Information against Pielago was changed
from the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610 to the crime of rape by sexual assault penalized under Article
266-A(2)26 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. It
cannot be said, however, that his right to be properly informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him was violated. This Court is not
unaware that the Information was worded, as follows: “x x x commit an act
of lasciviousness upon the person of [AAA], a minor being four (4) years
old, by kissing the vagina and inserting one of his fingers to the vagina of
AAA, x x x.” And, as correctly explained by the CA, the factual allegations
contained in the Information determine the crime charged against the
accused and not the designation of the offense as given by the prosecutor
which is merely an opinion not binding to the courts. As held in Malto v.
People:
 What controls is not the title of the information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the
information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission
of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines
the crime being charged in the information.

The CA further ratiocinated that the variance in the two crimes is not
fatal to Pielago’s conviction. Indeed, in order to obtain a conviction for rape
by sexual assault, it is essential for the prosecution to establish the
elements that constitute such crime. Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal
Code explicitly provides that the gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual
assault which is the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s genital or
anal orifice. In the instant case, this element is clearly present when AAA
straightforwardly testified in court that Pielago inserted his forefinger in her
vagina and anus. Jurisprudence has it that testimonies of child-victims are
given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape was indeed committed. Thus, AAA’s unrelenting narration of what
transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification of Pielago as the
malefactor, established the case for the prosecution.

People v. Lagarde
576 SCRA 809

Facts:
In this appeal, accused-appellant, Sergio Lagarde, seeks to reverse
the Decision of the CA affirming the judgment of conviction for rape handed
down by the RTC.
On December 27, 2001, around 12 noon, AAA, 11 years old, and her
mother were at the house of one Lolita Lagarde-Sarsosa to attend an
occasion wherein the accused-appellant was also there. After lunch, AAA’s
mother, Lagarde and the other visitors had a drinking spree. At around 4:00
p.m., AAA went outside towards the jackfruit tree to pick its fruit as ordered
by her mother. However, she was not able to pick the said fruit because
Lagarde was behind her who suddenly placed his hand over her mouth and
dragged her to the copra dryer where he allegedly raped AAA. After the
sexual assault, AAA told her mother and underwent a physical examination
which positively showed that the victim had a sexual intercourse.

The RTC convicted Lagarde and imposed death as penalty.

Lagarde questions the death penalty imposed on him, arguing that

the aggravating circumstances of minority, use of a bladed weapon, and
uninhabited place were not specifically alleged in the information.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty of death was proper.

Held:
No. SC agrees with the appellate court that the death penalty is not
warranted by the alleged aggravating circumstances, i.e., victim's minority,
use of bladed weapon, and uninhabited place. First, the death penalty was
abolished under Republic Act No. (RA) 9346. Second, the use of a bladed
weapon and uninhibited place cannot be appreciated here because these
were not specifically alleged in the information. Section 8, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information

shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver
the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation
of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection
of the statute punishing it.

It is a basic constitutional right of the accused persons to be informed

of the nature and cause of accusation against them. It would be a denial of
accused-appellant's basic right to due process if he is charged with simple
rape and consequently convicted with certain qualifying circumstances
which were not alleged in the information.

People v. Noque
610 SCRA 195

Facts:
Accused Joselito Noque was caught in a buy-bust operation
conducted by SPO4 Norberto Murillo on January 30, 2001. SPO4 Murillo
frisked the appellant and recovered the buy-bust money. He also
confiscated the pranela bag that contained a large quantity of crystalline
granules suspected to be shabu. Two Informations were filed before the
RTC of Manila docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 01-189458 and 01-189459
charging of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of a regulated
drug.

The trial court convicted the accused on both charges. The trial court
held that while the Informations alleged methamphetamine hydrochloride
as the drug seized from the appellant, the drug actually confiscated which
was ephedrine, which by means of chemical reaction could change into
methamphetamine. The trial court further held that under Section 4, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court, a variance in the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved shall result in the conviction for
the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. The CA held that the
designations and allegations in the informations are for the crimes of illegal
sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs.

Hence, the accused appealed the case before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not appellant’s right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusations was violated.

Held:
No. Appellants right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations was not violated. The Supreme Court agrees with the findings
of the CA and the trial court, as well as the testimony of the forensic
chemical officer, that the drug known as ephedrine has a central nervous
stimulating effect similar to that of methamphetamine. In fact, ephedrine is
an important precursor used in the clandestine synthesis of
methamphetamine, which in crystallized form is methamphetamine
hydrochloride

People v. Posada
667 SCRA 790

Facts:
Accused-appellants Roger Posada and Emily Posada were convicted
by the RTC Branch 43, Virac, Catanduanes, in Criminal Case No. 3490 for
selling 12 pieces of transparent sealed plastic sachet, containing
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu with a total weight of 0.4578
grams, in violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

Roger was also convicted by the same RTC in Criminal Case No.
3489 for possession of one piece of torn plastic sachet, containing residue
of a crystalline substance (allegedly shabu), a piece of small aluminum foil,
a pair of small scissors, and 15 pieces of used lighter all of which are
intended to be used for smoking or introducing dangerous drugs into the
body of a person, in violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
 Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, the accused-appellants filed an
appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA) which, via a Decision dated June
17, 2010, affirmed the RTC Decision as to the accused-appellants'
conviction in Criminal Case No. 3490 but acquitted Roger in Criminal Case
No. 3489 on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether or not the Information is defective for charging the

accused-appellants of selling 12 sachets of shabu.

Held:
Yes. The unfortunate fact of this case is that rather than separately
charging Emily for the sale of the one sachet of shabu and charging both
Emily and Roger for possession of the 12 sachets of shabu, the public
prosecutor lumped the charges together to sale of 12 sachets of shabu.
This is wrong. The Information is defective for charging the accused-
appellants of selling 12 sachets of shabu when, in fact, they should have
been charged of selling one sachet of shabu and possessing 12 sachets of
shabu. From the evidence adduced, Emily and Roger never sold the 12
sachets of shabu. They possessed them. Thus, they should have not been
convicted for selling the 12 sachets of shabu. However, this was exactly
what was done both by the trial court and the CA. Without basis in fact,
they convicted the couple for selling the 12 sachets of shabu.

Indeed, it must be pointed out that the prosecution filed a defective

Information. An Information is fatally defective when it is clear that it does
not really charge an offense56 or when an essential element of the crime
has not been sufficiently alleged. In the instant case, while the prosecution
was able to allege the identity of the buyer and the seller, it failed to
particularly allege or identify in the Information the subject matter of the
sale or the corpus delicti. We must remember that one of the essential
elements to convict a person of sale of prohibited drugs is to identify with
certainty the corpus delicti. Here, the prosecution took the liberty to lump
together two sets of corpora delicti when it should have separated the two
in two different information. To allow the prosecution to do this is to deprive
the accused-appellants of their right to be informed, not only of the nature
of the offense being charged, but of the essential element of the offense
charged; and in this case, the very corpus delicti of the crime.

Furthermore, when ambiguity exists in the complaint or information,

the court has no other recourse but to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the
accused.58 Here, since there exists ambiguity as to the identity of corpus
delicti, an essential element of the offense charged, it follows that such
ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused-appellants. Thus, from
the foregoing discussion, we have no other choice but to acquit the
accused-appellants of sale of 12 sachets of shabu.

Right to counsel and be present during trial

People v. Bermas
306 SCRA 135

Facts:
Complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by her own
father, appellant Rufino Bermas, while she was lying down on a wooden
bed inside their house armed with a knife and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has
carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her. Hence,
complainant as assisted by her mother accuses Rufino Mirandilla Bermas,
filed a complaint against the accused of the crime of Rape before the RTC
of Parañaque. Accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty. The
accused denied the allegation hence he even performed the dual role of a
father and a mother to his children since the time of his separation from his
wife and he thinks that the complainant might have been motivated by ill-
will or revenge in view of the numerous scolding’s that she has received
from him on account of her frequent coming home late at night.
 The trial court convicted the accused guilty of the offense charged
and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was denied his constitutional right to
effective and vigilant counsel.

Held:
Yes. Accused forthwith pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.
The prosecution placed complainant Manuela Bermas at the witness stand.
The counsel de officio testified on direct examination with hardly
any participation by defense counsel who, inexplicably, later waived the
cross-examination and then asked the court to be relieved of her duty as
counsel de officio. Furthermore, Atty. Roberto Gomez was appointed the
new counsel de officio and asked for a ten minute recess before he began
his cross examination which is far too inadequate On the day the defense
will present their evidence another lawyer Atty.Lonzame was appointed as
counsel de officio. Therefore, the accused has not properly and effectively
been accorded the right to counsel. So important is the right to counsel that
it has been enshrined in our fundamental law and its precursor laws

People v. Rapeza
520 SCRA 596

Facts:
Appellant Jerry Rapeza was charged of murder for killing the spouses
Cesar Ganzon and Priscilla Libas. Appellee contends that upon the
supplied information that the appellant wanted to confess, SPO2 Ciriaco
Gapas invited the former for questioning and thus was brought to the police
station without informing his rights. The Solicitor General further contends
that the appellant was not informed of his constitutional right at the time of
his alleged detention for the custodial investigation began only when the
investigators started to elicit information from him which took place at the
time he was brought to the house of Atty. Reyes. Moreover, appellant did
not interpose any objection to having Atty. Reyes as his counsel. However,
the appellant testified that he claims that he affixed his thumb mark through
violence and intimidation. He stresses that he was not informed of his rights
during the time of his detention when he was already considered a suspect
as the police had already received information of his alleged involvement in
the crimes. Neither did a competent and independent counsel assist him
from the time he was detained until trial began. Appellant likewise
maintains that although the Sinumpaang Salaysay states that his rights
were read to him, there was no showing that his rights were explained to
him in a way that an uneducated person like him could understand. The
RTC found him guilty of both crimes. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant’s right to counsel was violated.

Held:
Yes. The constitutional requirement obviously had not been
observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit
admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the
latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this
right in writing and in the presence of counsel. Appellant did not make any
such waiver.

The lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be as far

as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing
questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accused’s behalf, it is
important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is
willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as
distinguished from one who would be merely be giving a routine,
peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual’s constitutional rights.
In People v. Basay, this Court stressed that an accused’s right to be
informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel "contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle."

Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial

investigation (if the latter could not afford one) "should be engaged by the
accused (himself), or by the latter’s relative or person authorized by him to
engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or
person authorized by the accused to file such petition." Lawyers engaged
by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and
supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be
symbiotic

People v. Tolentino
423 SCRA 448
Facts:
In the Information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela,
appellant Warlito Tolentino y Laquin was charged of rape, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of February 06, 1996, at
Barangay Namnama, Batal, City of Santiago, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of
violence and intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant
MYLENE R. MENDOZA, a 7 year old girl against her will.

The RTC found the prosecution's evidence weighty and worthy of

belief, and accordingly convicted appellant of the offense charged.
Issue: Whether or not Tolentino’s claim that his rights under Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution were violated when he was made to join the
police line-up.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held in Gamboa v. Cruz, that a police line-up
was not part of the custodial inquest, inasmuch as the accused therein was
not yet being investigated and hence, the right to counsel had not yet
attached. This ruling was affirmed in People v. Loveria, and People v. De
Guzman. Both held that where the accused was not being investigated by
the police, when the witness was in the process of identifying him, his right
to counsel was not violated. The reason is that at this stage, he was not
entitled to the constitutional guarantee invoked. Under the circumstances of
this case, we see no reason to depart from these cited precedents.

Appellant attaches great emphasis on his identification at the police

line-up. Yet, there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a
proper identification. In this case, any doubt as to his identification at the
police line-up was dispelled by Mylene who identified in open court the
appellant as the malefactor.

Appellant insists that Mylene failed to disclose the name of the

person who raped her to her parents or to the barangay officers, so that his
identification later should be considered dubious. Identification of a person,
however, is not solely through knowledge of his name. In fact, familiarity
with physical features, especially those of the face, is the best way to
identify a person, for one may be familiar with the face but not necessarily
the name. It does not follow, that to be able to identify a person, one must
necessarily know his name.

People v. Lara
678 SCRA 332
Facts:
At the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was
positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie;and after being
identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently detained.

Issue: Whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in

the police line-up is inadmissible because Lara stood therein without the
assistance of counsel?

Held:
No. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at
this stage.

The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial

investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in
a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process.

This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet
shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness
or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the
course of the line-up.

An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of
police attention at the start of the investigation.

In the case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by

prosecution witnesses from a group of persons gathered for the purpose.
However, there was no proof that appellant was interrogated at all or that a
statement or confession was extracted from him. During the police line-up,
the accusatory process had not yet commenced.
 People v. Siongco
623 SCRA 501

Facts:
Appellants Siongco, Boton and Enriquez, induced 11-year old Nikko
Satimbre, a resident of Balanga, Bataan, to board a bus bound for Pilar,
Bataan and promised the latter a “Gameboy”. He was then bought to
Dinalupihan, Bataan where he was kept for the night. Two days after,
Siongco called Elvira Satimbre, Nikko’s mother, and demanded
P400,000.00, in exchange for the release of her son.

Siongco further threatened that Nikko would be killed if Elvira failed to

give the ransom money. Nikko was moved to Taguig City and was
cautioned not to tell anybody that he was kidnapped. Appellants were
finally arrested in an entrapment operation conducted by the PAOCTF four
days after Nikko was kidnapped.

The RTC convicted appellants of kidnapping with serious illegal

detention, then punishable by death, with the exception of Boton, on the
ground of reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed the conviction but modified
the penalty to reclusion perpetua. On review, the appellants claimed that
they were deprived of their right to an independent and competent counsel
when the RTC appointed Atty. Michael Moralde (Atty. Moralde) as their
counsel de oficio during the pre-trial conference, direct examination and
cross-examination of the prosecution’s principal witness, Nikko. This was
so, despite Atty. Moralde’s manifestation during Nikko’s cross-examination
that the defense of his actual client, accused Boton, conflicts with that of
the other accused.
Issue: Whether Appellants were deprived of their right to an independent
and competent counsel by the appointment of Atty.Moralde.

Held:
No. A scrutiny of the records shows that Atty. Moralde was appointed
as appellants’ counsel de oficio in six (6) hearings, because their regular
counsel de oficio, Atty. Antoniano from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO),
was inexplicably absent. There is no denial of the right to counsel where a
counsel de oficio is appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel
de parte, or in this case the regular counsel de oficio, pursuant to the
court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the
continuous trial system. The choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal
prosecution is not a plenary one. If the chosen counsel deliberately makes
himself scarce, the court is not precluded from appointing a de oficio
counsel, which it considers competent and independent, to enable the trial
to proceed until the counsel of choice enters his appearance. Otherwise,
the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused,
to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.

People v. Del Castillo

439 SCRA 601

Facts:
Appellant was then asked to sign a paper where a listing of the
contents of the envelope was made but she requested to contact her
lawyer which was denied. She was forced to sign otherwise she would be
handcuffed. The list of the inventory was neither read to her nor did they
leave a copy for her or to any of the occupants.

Thereafter, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation

of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the RTC and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court
the petition for certiorari contending among others that CA erred in finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited
drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the same
just because they were found inside the nipa hut.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in not finding that by the raiding
team ordering accused to sign the inventory after the arrest without the
assistance of counsel.

Held:
No. To insure that a waiver is voluntary and intelligent, the
Constitution requires that for the right to counsel to be waived, the waiver
must be in writing and in the presence of the counsel of the accused. There
is no such written waiver in this case, much less was any waiver made in
the presence of the counsel since there was no counsel at the time
appellant signed the receipt. Clearly, appellant affixed her signature in the
inventory receipt without the assistance of counsel which is a violation of
her right under the Constitution.

People v. Deniega
251 SCRA 626

Facts:
The accused was investigated and made an extrajudicial confession
without the presence of a counsel.

Atty. Sansano placed the time of arrival of appellant Deniega at the

IBP Quezon City chapter office at "around 11:30 in the morning" of August
31, 1989. However, Deniega's extrajudicial confession taken by Pat.
Maniquis gives the time of its execution as 11:20 A.M. also on August 31,
1989 or earlier than the time they allegedly arrived at the IBP office.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was provided with a competent and
independent counsel.

Held:
Yes. There would be denial of the right to the assistance of
competent and independent counsel if the investigation or, as in the case
before us, during the process of signing. The competent or independent
lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to end, i.e., at all
stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every
turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while
either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to
remain silent or terminate the interview.

The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is

rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as
opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing
questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless,
voluntariness is impaired. If the lawyer's role is reduced to being that of a
mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared document albeit indicating
therein compliance with the accused's constitutional rights, the
constitutional standard guaranteed by Article III, Section 12 (1) is not met.
The process above-described fulfills the prophylactic purpose of the
constitutional provision by avoiding "the pernicious practice of extorting
false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person
undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense" and ensuring
that the accused's waiver of his right to self-incrimination during the
investigation is an informed one in all aspects.

Ampong v. CSC
563 SCRA 293

Facts:
 Evelyn Junio-Decir applied and took a Professional Board
Examination for Teachers (PBET) and passed. At the time of the PBET
examinations, petitioner Sarah P. Ampong and Decir were public school
teachers under the supervision of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS). Ampong transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Alabel, Sarangani Province, where she was appointed as Court
Interpreter III. In July 1994, a woman representing herself as Evelyn Decir
went to the Civil Service Regional Office (CSRO) No .XI, Davao City, to
claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility. During the course of the
transaction, the CSRO personnel noticed that the woman did not resemble
the picture of the examinee in the Picture Seat Plan(PSP). Upon further
probing, it was confirmed that the person claiming the eligibility was
different from the one who took the examinations. It was petitioner Ampong
who took and passed the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir. The
CSRO conducted a preliminary investigation and determined the existence
of a prima facie case against Decir and Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. On
August 1994, they were formally charged and required to file answers
under oath. Decir denied the charges against her. The CSC found
petitioner Ampong and Decir guilty of dishonesty, dismissing them from the
service.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, assailing lack of jurisdiction and

that her confession was given without aid of counsel

Issue: Whether or not the right to counsel is necessary in an administrative

proceeding.

Held:
No. In police custodial investigations, the assistance of counsel is
necessary in order for an extra-judicial confession to be made admissible in
evidence against the accused in a criminal complaint. If assistance was
waived, the waiver should have been made with the assistance of counsel.
 But while a party's right to the assistance of counsel is sacred in
proceedings criminal in nature, there is no such requirement in
administrative proceedings. In Lumiqued v. Exevea, this Court ruled that a
party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel.
Moreover, the administrative body is under no duty to provide the person
with counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement.

Petitioner's admission was given freely. There was no compulsion,

threat or intimidation. As found by the CSC, petitioner's admission was
substantial enough to support a finding of guilt.

Right to speedy trial

Ombudsman v. Jurado
561 SCRA 135

Facts:
In the case at bench, the incident which gave rise to the complaint
against Petitioner happened on March 16, 1992. And yet it was only on
November 20, 1997 or a lapse of more than five (5) years that the case
relative to the said incident was filed against him. Records disclose that on
August 11, 1992, the complaint only charged George O. Dizon and 2
others. Then on February 13, 1996 or after almost 4 years, the Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the OMB made another
recommendation which ultimately included Petitioner as among those to be
charged. From February 13, 1996 to November 20, 1997 or a period of
more than one (1) year, what took them so long to decide that Petitioner be
included in the charges?

From the foregoing unfolding of events, it is quite clear that it took the
Ombudsman almost six (6) years to decide that a case be filed against
Petitioner. Under such circumstances. We cannot fault Petitioner for
invoking violation of his right to speedy disposition of his case.

Issue: Whether or not respondent’s right to speedy trial was violated.

Held:
No. In determining whether or not the right to the speedy disposition
of cases has been violated, this Court has laid down the following
guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3)
the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay.

Gleaned from the foregoing, the SC find that respondent's right to the
speedy disposition of cases has not been violated.

Mari v. Gonzales
657 SCRA 414

Facts:
The private respondent was charged for the crime of rape. He was
incarcerated on November 18, 2004 to March 16, 2005 while a preliminary
investigation of the case was conducted before the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sogod.

Then again he was imprisoned beginning June 27, 2008 when an

information had already been issued.

However, the petitioner moved for change of venue for hearing that
further caused the delay of the trail.
 On this ground, the accused applied for dismissal of the case for
violation of his right against speedy trial where it was granted on January
16, 2009.

Issue: Whether or not the right to speedy trial of the accused is violated.

Held:
No. in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused's right to speedy trial is
deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining whether petitioner was
deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the following:
(a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or
failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.

Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had already

been deprived of his liberty on two occasions. First, during the preliminary
investigation before the MCTC, when he was incarcerated from November
18, 2004 to March 16, 2005, or a period of almost four months; then again,
when an Information had already been issued and since rape is a non-
bailable offense, he was imprisoned beginning June 27, 2008 until the case
was dismissed on January 16, 2009, or a period of over 6 months. Verily,
there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for any duration of time is
quite oppressive. Because of private respondent's continued incarceration,
any delay in trying the case would cause him great prejudice. Thus, it was
absolutely vexatious and oppressive to delay the trial in the subject criminal
case to await the outcome of petitioners' petition for transfer of venue,
especially in this case where there is no temporary restraining order or writ
of preliminary injunction issued by a higher court against herein public
respondent from further proceeding in the case.

Hence, the Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion
committed by the trial court in dismissing the case against private
respondent for violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial.
 Coscolluella v. Sandiganbayan
701 SCRA 188

Facts:
Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental
(Province) for three (3) full terms which ended on June 30, 2001. During his
tenure, Nacionales served as his Special Projects Division Head, Amugod
as Nacionales’ subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer.

On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas

(Office of the Ombudsman) received a letter-complaint dated November 7,
2001 from People’s Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to investigate the
anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for the
Province in the amount of ₱20,000,000.00 which allegedly happened
around a month before Coscolluela stepped down from office.

Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Office

of the Ombudsman conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of
a Final Evaluation Report dated April 16, 2002 which upgraded the
complaint into a criminal case against petitioners. Consequently, petitioners
filed their respective counter-affidavits.

On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, among

others, that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was
violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after
almost eight (8) years since the complaint was instituted.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of cases was

violated.

Held:
 Yes. A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is
guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal

proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or
administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-
judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action
to all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.

It must be noted, however, that the right to speedy disposition of

cases should be understood to be a relative or flexible concept such that a
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient.
Jurisprudence dictates that the right is deemed violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;
or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured;
or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his case tried.

Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been

denied his right to a speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may
be considered and balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the
delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that
petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of their criminal case had been
violated.

Barcelona v. Lim
G.R. No. 189171 June 3, 2014

Facts:
 The records disclose that on 14 August 2000, respondent
businessman Dan Joel Lim (Lim), the owner of Top Gun Billiards, filed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay (sworn statement) with the Criminal Intelligence
Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Lim claimed as
follows: (1) his employees, Arnel E. Ditan and Pilipino Ubante, were
influenced by petitioner to file a labor complaint against Lim; and (2)
petitioner, then an NLRC officer, demanded 20,000 for the settlement of the
labor case filed against Lim. On the strength of this sworn statement, the
NBI organized an entrapment operation against petitioner.

On 16 August 2000, Lim informed the NBI that petitioner would drop
by Top Gun Billiards around seven o’clock in the evening, expecting to
receive the 20,000 petitioner was demanding from him; otherwise,
petitioner would order that Top Gun Billiards be closed. After Lim handed
him the marked bills, petitioner began counting them. The latter was
arrested by the NBI right when he was about to put the money in his bag.

After being duly informed of his constitutional rights, petitioner was

brought to the NBI office where he was booked, photographed, and
fingerprinted.

Six years after petitioner had filed his Appeal Memorandum, the CSC
dismissed it.

Issue: Whether the right of petitioner to the speedy disposition of his case
has been violated by the CSC.

Held:
No. The right to a speedy disposition of cases is guaranteed by the
Constitution. The concept of speedy disposition is flexible. The fact that it
took the CSC six years to resolve the appeal of petitioner does not, by
itself, automatically prove that he was denied his right to the speedy
disposition of his case. After all, a mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient, as the facts and circumstances peculiar to the
case must also be considered.

The right to a speedy trial, as well as other rights conferred by the

Constitution or statute, may be waived except when otherwise expressly
provided by law. One’s right to the speedy disposition of his case must
therefore be asserted. Due to the failure of petitioner to assert this right, he
is considered to have waived it.

Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan
442 SCRA 294
Facts:
After the termination of the requisite preliminary investigation in OMB
Cases Nos. 0-99-2188 to 2205, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
Resolution on July 27, 2000 finding probable cause against petitioners
Antonio H. Roman, Sr. and Marialen C. Corpuz, the President and Vice-
President of FILSYN Corporation, respectively, and several others. On April
10, 2000, the petitioners, the Undersecretary of Finance Antonio P.
Belicena, and the officers of the Petron Corporation, were charged with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, involving the so-called
"tax credit scam"
Several of the other accused also filed similar motions for reconsideration
and/or motions to quash/dismiss which the prosecution opposed.

On December 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan, by unanimous vote,

issued a Resolution denying all the motions respectively filed by the
accused, including the petitioners.

Only the petitioners filed their petition for certiorari and mandamus
assailing the February 4, 2002 and the December 12, 2003 Resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan, asserting that the graft court committed a grave abuse
of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
same.
 In its Comment on the petition, the Office of the Ombudsman, through
the Office of the Special Prosecutor, avers that the delay in the submission
to the Sandiganbayan of its report on its reinvestigation was caused by the
pendency of the other cases of equal, if not of more importance, not to
mention the filing of twenty-two (22) other motions for reconsideration
and/or reinvestigation by the other accused in the said cases. It asserts that
the more than one-year delay is not capricious, much less, intolerably
capricious.

Issue: Whether or not the right to speedy disposition of cases was violated.

Held:
No. In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his
right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors
must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant
that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent
oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the
accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired.
Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.
There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not
imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty
and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His
financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is
subjected to public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden

of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may
make it difficult or impossible for the government to carry its burden. The
Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary
efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate
that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly
prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must
show two things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond
that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there
was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary
processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of

the State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different
reasons or justifications invoked by the State. For instance, a deliberate
attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should
be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the
prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over the
defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case
load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less
heavily against the State. Corollarily, Section 4, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the factors for granting a
continuance.

Condrada v. People
398 SCRA 482
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with rape in Criminal Case No. 10770
presently pending before the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2.
When he was arraigned on February 26, 1999, petitioner pleaded not guilty
to the charge against him.

On March 31, 1999, the date set by the trial court for the initial
hearing, the prosecution moved that the same be postponed due to the
absence of the complainant and her witnesses. The hearing was reset on
April 29, 1999.

On April 29, 1999, the prosecution again moved to postpone the

hearing due to the absence of the complainant and her witnesses.
Petitioner objected to the motion on the ground that his right to speedy trial
was being violated by such postponements. The trial court granted the
prosecutions motion and reset the hearing on May 31, 1999. It also
directed that the subpoenae to the complainant and her witnesses be
coursed through the National Bureau of Investigation which handled the
investigation of the case.

During the hearing on May 31, 1999, the prosecution requested for
another postponement. Petitioner moved for at least a temporary dismissal
of the case. The prosecution manifested that it would not object to a
temporary dismissal. Thus, on the same date, the trial court issued an
order temporarily dismissing the case.

On June 22, 1999, the prosecution filed a Motion for Reinstatement

and/or Revival of Criminal Case No. 10770. Appended to said motion was
the affidavit of private complainant that the subpoenae sent to her for the
trial of the case did not reach her because in the meantime she had
transferred her residence. The trial court set the hearing on the motion for
reinstatement on June 25, 1999.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was denied of his right to speedy
disposition of cases.

Held:
No. It is clear from the records that the dismissal ordered by the trial
court on May 31, 1999 was a temporary dismissal of the case, and not a
permanent dismissal on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy
trial had been violated by the delay in the prosecution of the said case. The
trial court apparently denied petitioners motion to have Criminal Case No.
10770 dismissed on the ground of his right to speedy trial when despite
said motion made in open court on April 29, 1999, it ordered the resetting
of the hearing of the case on May 31, 1999. In subsequently granting
petitioners request for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10770 on May
31, 1999, the trial court expressly stated that the same was subject to
reinstatement within thirty days from the date of the temporary dismissal.
The trial court explained:

The defense, however, moved for, at least a temporary dismissal of

the case, to which the government prosecutor acceded provided the same
is temporary. Thus, as prayed for by the defense, the court on May 31,
1999 issued an order dismissing the case temporarily subject to its
reinstatement and/or revival within a period of thirty (30) days; otherwise, if
the case is not revived within the aforesaid period, the case would be
considered dismissed permanently.

Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that the dismissal of Criminal Case

No. 10770 on May 31, 1999 was provisional or temporary, without
prejudice to the revival thereof within thirty days from the date of dismissal.
Thus, the Court finds that the reinstatement thereof on June 25, 1999 did
not place petitioner in double jeopardy.

MOTION FOR PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION OF MATERIAL

EVIDENCE IN POSSESSION OF THE PROSECUTION
RULE 116, SECTION 11

People vs. Roldan 99 SCRA 422 (1980)

Facts:
 For the death of Certified Public Accountant Andrew Angelo and for
the hack wound in the face of Erolando Toledo, accused-appellants Roldan
Mancio y Salveron and Rolando Yero together with Edgar David, Rorong
Estrera and Richard Doe were charged with Murder and Attempted Murder.
The two (Roldan Mancio and Rolando Yero) pleaded not guilty when
arraigned. The other three accused were at large.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellants

of the crimes of murder and attempted murder despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt? NO.

Ruling:

The dying declaration or statement in articulo mortis of the deceased

(People vs. Odencio, 88 SCRA 1) as sadly narrated to his mother deserves
serious consideration — (TSN February 17, 1983) as Section 31, Rule 130,
Rules of Court states: "The declaration of a dying person made under a
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in a criminal case
wherein his death is the subject of inquiry as evidence of the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death." Finally, a restatement of the old
doctrine why the factual findings of the trial court are accorded much
credence and respect is again in order. (Peo. vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422).

The well settled rule that "where the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, an appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the
trial court, considering that it is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their treatment and
manner of testifying during trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of
the case." In the instant case, We find no justifiable or compelling reason to
disturb the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses singled out by herein appellants.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

People vs. Palacios, 108 Phil. 220 (1960)

Facts:

In an information dated 23 October 1956, subscribed by the

Provincial Fiscal and filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
on 8 November 1956, José Badiable alias Cabayo, Epifanio Cornelio,
Ernesto Ponciano, Lee Perfecta Ponciano Lee (Silvestre) and Jimmy
Ponciano Lee were charged with murder for the death of Jaime Salinel, the
first two as principals and the last three as accessories.

At the trial of the case on 27 August 1957, counsel for the defense
asked the Court to order the prosecution to furnish the defendants with a
list of all the names of the witnesses for the prosecution. The private
prosecutor answered that he had no objection to the motion and asked that
he be granted fifteen days within which to submit the names of the
witnesses. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal also did not object to the motion.
On the same day, 27 August 1957, the Court entered an order directing the
prosecution to furnish the defense with a list of all the names of its
witnesses within ten days therefrom.
Issue:

Whether or not the statement of the witnesses are inadmissible?

YES.

Ruling:

The fact that some of the witnesses for the prosecution who are not
listed in the information were present in the courtroom and heard the
testimony of the other witnesses does not disqualify them from being
witnesses. Counsel for the defense should have asked for the exclusion of
all witnesses who have not testified under and pursuant to section 14, Rule
115.

The writ prayed for is granted; the orders complained of are set aside;
and the respondent Court is directed to allow the witness or witnesses
called by the prosecution, whose names do not appear in the information
as witnesses, to testify in criminal case No. 4814 of the respondent Court,
without pronouncement as to costs.

II. PLEA
1. Not Guilty
People vs. Alba, 305 SCRA 811 (1999)

Facts:

In two consolidated cases, finding accused-appellant Alfredo Alba

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape under Article 355
of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him, in Criminal Case No. 94-
5517, to suffer the penalty of death, and in Criminal Case No. 94-5516, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused pleaded not guilty.
Issue:

Whether or not Alba’s plea was propert? YES.

Ruling:

In entering a plea of not guilty during his arraignment, he waived all

possible objections to the sufficiency of the informations against him. As
Sections 1 and 8 of Rule 117 provide:

Sec. 1. Time to move to quash. — At any time before entering his

plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or information.

Sec. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. —

The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before
he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion shall be
deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds
of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged,
extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in
paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this Rule.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court correctly found
accused-appellant guilty of two (2) counts of rape. The offended party was
born on January 7, 1984. 16 Accordingly, when she was raped for the first
time in May of 1993, she was just 9 years old. When she was raped a
second time on February 7, 1994, she was 10 years old.

Withdrawal of Improvident Plea of Guilt

RULE 116, SECTION 5
People vs. De Ocampo Gonzaga, 127 SCRA 158  (1984)

Facts:

In an information dated November 3, 1977, accused Gonzaga was

indicted for the crime of murder for fatally stabbing with a jungle bolo one
Amparo M. Quilatan, allegedly attended by the aggravating circumstances
of "evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior
strength deliberately making use of drunkenness or after having taken
liquor, armed with an illegally-possessed 27 inches jungle bolo (accused
has been separately charged for this offense), without due regard to the
profession of a public school teacher."

Five days later, or on November 8, 1977, accused Gonzaga

appeared for arraignment without counsel. The trial court thereupon issued
an order appointing Atty. Crisanto Saruca as counsel de oficio "for the
purpose of arraignment only." Immediately thereafter, Atty. Saruca
manifested that the accused was ready for arraignment and the accused
pleaded guilty to the offense charged.

Issue:

Whether or not plea of guilt by the accused in the absence of his

counsel’s manifestation is admissible? NO.

Ruling:

Under See. 5, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, whenever an attorney de

oftcio is employed or assigned by the court to defend an accused either at
the arraignment or at the trial he should be given a reasonable time to
consult with the accused and prepare his defense before proceeding
further in the case which should not be less than two (2) hours in case of
arraignment and two (2) days in case of trial. These requirements were not
complied with. After accused's arraignment on November 8, 1977, the court
immediately set the case for trial the next day, November 9, 1977,
disregarding counsel de oficio's manifestation that he be allowed the
required two-day period within which to prepare for trial.

2. Guilty
People vs. Villarama, 210 SCRA 246 (1992)

Facts:

On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with

violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The penalty
prescribed in the said section is imprisonment ranging from six years and
one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve
thousand pesos for without the corresponding license or prescription did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control 0.08 grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu).
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial ensued. On November 21, 1990, the prosecution rested its
case. On January 9, 1991, counsel for private respondent verbally
manifested in open court that private respondent was willing to change his
former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation
of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. 

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Judge erred in convicting accused of the

lesser offense? YES.
Ruling:

Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused

and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case
subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty
to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge
(ibid). Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the
criminal proceedings. However, the law still permits the accused sufficient
opportunity to change his plea thereafter. Thus, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court, Section 2 thereof, provides:

Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the

consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial
court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of
lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent
to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy.

However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser

offense is entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the case at
bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser
offense after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation,
jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor
with yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised.
Thus, in People v. Kayanan, We held that the rules allow such a plea only
when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of
the crime charged.

People vs. Mamarion, 412 SCRA 438 (2003)

Facts:

An Information for Kidnapping For Ransom was initially filed on

March 11, 1996 against appellant Mamarion together with Amado Gale, Jr.
(Gale for brevity), Roger Biona and a John Doe 2 based on a Resolution
dated March 4, 1996 issued by the Acting City Prosecutor and Assistant
City Prosecutor of Bacolod City finding probable cause against them and
dismissing the charges against Ronaldo Porquez and appellants Maclang
and Harisco for insufficiency of evidence. Only accused Gale and
appellants Mamarion and Domingo were arraigned on January 27, 1997.
Only Gale was re-arraigned and entered a plea of guilty to Slight Illegal
Detention.

Because of that, the trial court relied principally on the testimony of

Gale together with the corroborating testimonies of the other prosecution
witnesses, namely: Andres Sumpay, Teresita Cokin and Mario Mahusay as
to appellant Mamarion, establishing the participation of appellants in the
commission of the crime of Kidnapping with Ransom.

Issue:

Whether or not the Lower Court erred in appreciating the testimony of

Gale against accused Mamarion? NO.

Ruling:

Gale was allowed to change his plea pursuant to the then prevailing
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, 45 which provided:

Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the

consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial
court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charges, or is cognizable by a court of
lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary.

A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the

offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy.

RULE 116, SECTION 3

People vs. Sevilleno, 305 SCRA 519 (1999)

Facts:

By pleading guilty to the rape and killing of a 9-year old girl a death
sentence would seem inevitable. But a mere plea of guilt is not sufficient for
conviction as the court must first assure itself that the accused fully
understood the consequences of his plea. In the instant case, the trial court
failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of his admission
of guilt and that he fully comprehended the implications thereof. As the
court a quo inadequately discharged its duty of conducting a searching
inquiry, the plea of guilt to a capital offense therefore inevitably became null
and void.

When this case was called for the presentation of evidence for the
accused, counsel for the accused manifested that he had no evidence to
present in favor of the accused except the plea of GUILTY made in open
court. In view thereof, the above-entitled case is hereby submitted for
decision based on the evidence presented by the prosecution without the
accused presenting evidence in his behalf except the plea of GUILTY
which is admitted by the prosecution.
Issue:

Whether or not the accused plea of guilt automatically convicts him of

the crime without presentation of evidence? NO.

Ruling:

We sustain the defense. Under Sec. 3, Rule 116, of the Revised

Rules on Criminal Procedure, when the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. It must also
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his
culpability. If the accused so desires he may also present evidence in his
behalf. This procedure is mandatory and a judge who fails to observe it
commits grave abuse of discretion.

People vs. Laki-Idanum, 304 SCRA 429 (1999)

Facts:

As the victim was only nine years old, her mother, Lanie Calaguin,
filed the complaint for rape allegedly committed by Joseph Lakindanum.
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged. On
October 2, 1996, however, just before the direct examination of the victim
started, the defense counsel manifested that the accused wanted to
withdraw his original plea of "not guilty" and replace it with a "guilty" plea.
The Court gave defense counsel time to confer with his client and apprise
him of the consequences of entering a guilty plea. 3cräläwvirtualibräry

At the next hearing, the trial court judge examined the accused to
determine the voluntariness and full comprehension of the plea he was
about to make. Thereafter, Lakindanum was rearraigned and he pleaded
"guilty" to the charge.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in accepting the accused-

appellant’s improvident plea of gult? NO.

Ruling:

It is clear that the judge can hardly be said to have satisfied the
requirement of conducting a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension by the accused of entering a guilty plea. Worse, the
judge erroneously informed Lakindanum that by pleading guilty, the latter
forfeited his right to testify and to adduce evidence in his defense. Section
4, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court is clear on the matter:

"Sec. 4. Plea of guilty to a capital offense; reception of evidence. --

When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct
a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence
in his behalf."

Considering that Lakindanum stands accused of a capital offense for

which he may be put to death, the trial judge should have been more
vigilant and solicitous in making sure that the accused-appellant clearly
understood the legal consequences of the plea he was about to make.
People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 (1995)

Facts:

Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie

Mae Penecilla, a minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand.
The incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo
Santiago found the victim’s body and the parents and police were
informed. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length
from Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3
Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of
counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up
interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's
house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a
stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence
for the prosecution. He was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio
Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him.
Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death penalty.

Issue:

Whether or not the evidence obtained through appellant’s

uncounselled verbal confession may be admitted in evidence? NO.
Ruling:

The records do not reveal that the Information against

theappellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The
Information against the appellant is written in the English language. It is
unknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it
known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any
showing that the Information couched in English was translated to
theappellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The RTC violated
section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of
the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process
of law. It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of
theappellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean
on this rebuttable presumption. There could be no presumption. The court
must be sure.

The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the
plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section requires that the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence
in his behalf. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks
of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested,
who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was
medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its
efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if
involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.

People vs. Serna, 130 SCRA 550 (1984)

Facts:
According to the information, Eduardo Bandojo and Mamerto Artuz, in
conspiracy with each other, while on board a pumpboat on the seawaters
of Bantayan, Cebu, on June 15, 1983, fatally shot Consolacion Alfar and
then took her money in the sum of P5,000.00. Thereafter, they threw the
dead body into the sea and forced the other passengers to jump overboard
(although they were fortunately saved by another pumpboat). The accused-
appellants admitted the above charge in extrajudicial confessions taken
from them without observance of their rights under Article IV, Section 20, of
the Constitution on June 17, 1983.

Issue:

Whether or not the guilty pleas were valid and had been validly
accepted? YES.

Ruling:

It is not always de rigueur or mandatory upon the trial court to receive

evidence when a plea of guilty is entered in capital cases. The court has
discretion to dispense with the reception of evidence (People vs. Duaban,
L-31912, August 24, 1979, 92 SCRA 743). 

Probing without badgering, the trial judge was as thorough as he was

considerate, even giving defendant Bandojo a chance to relax before
resuming his testimony. With the other accused, the younger Artuz, who
was only 25 years old at that time, he was also fair but searching. And not
only that. What is especially noteworthy is that after interrogating them at
the time of their arraignment, he questioned them again at another hearing
he found it necessary to schedule, to be doubly sure that the accused-
appellants understood the consequences of their confessions. 

We are convinced that the accused-appellants committed the crime

of piracy under the circumstances alleged in the information. Their guilt,
which they repeatedly confessed in court, has been established beyond the
shadow of a doubt. The trial judge did not err in convicting them
notwithstanding the absence of the usual reception of evidence in cases
involving capital offenses. Considering the trial judge's earnest questioning
of the accused-appellants, one of whom, incidentally, was even a college
student, we hold that their pleas of guilty were knowingly made and not
improvidently accepted.

People vs. Tiongson, 130 SCRA 614 (1984)

Facts:

At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of October 26, 1971, the

accused Rudy Tiongson escaped from the Municipal Jail of Bulalacao,
Oriental Mindoro, together with George de la Cruz and Rolando Santiago,
where they were detained under the charge of Attempted Homicide. While
in the act of escaping, the said Rudy Tiongson killed Pat. Zosimo Gelera, a
member of the police force of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, who was
guarding the said accused, and PC Constable Aurelio Canela of the PC
Detachment stationed in Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, who went in pursuit
of them.

Upon arraignment, the said accused, assisted by counsel de oficio,

pleaded guilty to both informations. The trial court, however, did not render
judgment outright, but ordered the prosecution to present its evidence, after
which, it sentenced the said accused to suffer the death penalty in each
case, to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of P12,000.00 and
to pay the costs.

Issue:

Whether or not the guilty pleas were valid and had been validly
accepted? NO.

Ruling:

The norm that should be followed where a plea of guilty is entered by

the defendant, especially in cases where the capital penalty may be
imposed, is that the court should be sure that defendant fully understands
the nature of the charges preferred against him and the character of the
punishment provided by law before it is imposed. For this reason, the Court
requires that in every case under a plea of guilty, where the penalty may be
death, the trial court should call witnesses for the purpose of establishing
the guilt and degree of culpability of the defendant and not only to satisfy
the trial judge but to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether accuse
understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and
consequences of his plea.

In the instant case, the trial judge required the taking of testimony as
to the circumstances under which the crime was committed before passing
judgment so that the resulting verdict cannot in any way be branded as
deficient.

People vs. Camay, 152 SCRA 401 (1973)

Facts:
 Four score years ago, this Court first laid down the rule "that Courts
of First Instance may sentence defendants in criminal causes (sic) who
plead guilty to the offense charged in the complaint, without the necessity
of taking testimony. However, in all cases, and especially in cases where
the punishment to be inflicted is severe, the court should be sure that the
defendant fully understands the nature of the charges preferred against him
and the character of the punishment to be imposed before sentencing him."
The Court continued that" [While there is no law requiring it yet in every
case under the plea of guilty where the penalty may be death it is advisable
for the court to call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and
the degree of culpability of the defendant. This, however, must be left to the
discretion of the trial court." Thus, although Talbanos and a plethora of
other cases advise the trial court to receive evidence and to ensure that the
accused understands his plea of guilty, at the same time they recognize the
discretion of the trial court to convict the accused merely on his plea of
guilty if it is convinced that the taking of evidence is not necessary and that
the accused understands the allegations of the indictment and the
consequences of his plea of guilty.

Issue:

Whether or not the guilty pleas were valid and had been validly
accepted? YES.

Ruling:

The procedure to be followed strictly in a situation like this where the

accused, with the assistance of counsel, voluntarily pleads guilty to a
capital offense is explicitly laid down in Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure promulgated by the Court, and which went into effect
on January 1, 1985.
 Under the new formulation three (3) things are enjoined of the trial
court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense has been entered by the
accused:

1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness

and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence
in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.

We are convinced that the guilt of the accused has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt in the light of overwhelming evidence presented
by the prosecution, fully corroborated and substantiated by the plea of
guilty of the accused.

Effect of Improvident Plea

People vs. Violna, G.R. No. 141129-33, December 14,  2001

Facts:

Roland J. Molina, accused-appellant, was charged with attempted

rape and four (4) counts of incestuous rape penalized under RA 8353
amending Art. 266 of The Revised Penal Code committed against his very
own 16-year old2 daughter Brenda Molina.The Public Attorneys Office, in its
Brief for the Appellant, asserts that accused-appellant's plea of guilty was
improvidently made.

Issue:
 Whether or not the Improvident Plea of guilt had really affected the
case at bar? YES.

Ruling:

Where facts are however adequately represented in the criminal case

and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the
prosecution or the defense as a result of the improvident plea of guilty, the
settled rule is that a decision based on an irregular plea may nevertheless
be upheld where the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by
other evidence on record since it would be a useless ritual to return the
case to the trial court for another arraignment and further proceedings.

After a careful examination of the records, we find that the

improvident plea of guilt of accused-appellant has affected the manner by
which the prosecution and the defense conducted its presentation of the
evidence, and the trial court in carefully evaluating the evidence on record.
Remand of Crim. Cases for re-arraignment and further relevant
proceedings is therefore proper. First, the prosecution failed to lay the
proper foundation for the introduction of the alleged handwritten letter of
accused-appellant acknowledging his guilt for the rape of his daughter. This
could very well be attributed to the fact that this letter was introduced only
after accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the accusations for which reason
the prosecution no longer endeavored to elicit the proper foundation for this
evidence.

RULE 117: MOTION TO QUASH

B. Grounds
1. No Offense Charged
People vs. Asuncion, 161 SCRA 490 (1988)

Facts:
 On 30 July 1987, Rolando Abadina, a former colonel of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, was charged before the Relations regional Trial
Court, filing NCJR Quezon City, with the offense of Violation of Pres.
Decree No. 1866 [Megal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition) in an
Information.

Upon motion of the accused, the respondent judge, as aforestated, in

a Resolution dated 1 September 1987, dismissed the Information on the
ground that it did not allege sufficient facts to constitute an offense, since
the possession of loose firearms and explosives is not illegal per se, in view
of Executive Order No. 107 which gives holders or possessors of
unlicensed firearms and ammunition a period of six (6) months from its
effectivity, extended to 31 December 1987 by Executive Order No. 222,
within which to surrender the same to the proper authorities, without
incurring any criminal liability therefor, except if the unlicensed firearm or
ammunition is carried outside of one's residence, not for the purpose of
surrendering the same, or used in the commission of any other offense,
and there is no allegation in said information that the firearms and
ammunition enumerated therein were carried outside the accused's
residence or used in the commission of some other crime.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge erred in hooding that the

possession of loose firearms and explosives is not illegal? NO.

Ruling:

It may be true that there is nothing in Executive Orders Nos. 107 and 222
that expressly legalizes the unlicensed possession of firearms and
ammunition, but this Court, applying statutes 4 similar to the executive
orders in question, and which also provided for a period within which a
holder or possessor of unlicensed firearms and ammunition may surrender
the same to the proper authorities without incurring criminal liability, had
ruled that a criminal hability was temporarily filing hfted for mere
possession' of unlicensed firearms and ammunition during the period
covered, although such person is not exempt from criminal liability filing
within the period provided, he carries the firearm and ammunition (unless it
is for the purpose of surrendering the same) or he commits any other
offense with the use of such unlicensed firearm and ammunition. 

Executive Order No. 107, as amended by Executive Order No. 222, is

similar to Republic Acts Nos. 4 and 482. We are not prepared, nor are we
justified, to give it a different meaning because there is no basis for such a
difference.

2. No Jurisdiction Over Offense or Person

Lopez vs. City Judge, 18 SCRA 616 (1966)

Facts:

Petitioner Roy P. Villasor, as administrator of the intestate estate of

the spouses Mejia, together with his co-petitioners and other heirs of said
spouses, entered into a contract with respondent Trinidad T. Lazatin for the
development and subdivision of three parcels of land belonging to said
intestate estate. Subsequently Lazatin transferred his rights under the
contract to the Terra Development Corporation. Months later, petitioners
and other co-heirs filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City for the rescission of said contract for alleged gross and willful violation
of its terms. Thereafter, Lazatin and the Terra Development Corporation, in
turn, filed with the Fiscal's Office of the City of Angeles a complaint against
petitioners for an alleged violation of the provisions of Article 172 in relation
to those of Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code.

Parties charged moved for the dismissal of the case mainly on the
ground that the City Court of Angeles had no jurisdiction over the offense
because the private document that contained the alleged false statement of
fact was signed by them outside the territorial limits of said city. Petitioners
filed on November 26, 1965 with the City Court a motion to quash upon the
ground that said court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Issue:

Whether or not Court of Angeles has Jurisdiction over the case? NO.

Ruling:

The motion to quash now provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court is manifestly broader in scope than the demurrer, as it is not limited
to defects apparent upon the face of the complaint or information but
extends to issues arising out of extraneous facts, as shown by the
circumstance that, among the grounds for a motion to quash, Section 2 of
said Rule provides for former jeopardy or acquittal, extinction of criminal
action or liability, insanity of the accused etc., which necessarily involve
questions of fact in the determination of which a preliminary trial is required.
In the present case, the portion of the record of the reinvestigation which
was submitted to the respondent judge for consideration in connection with
the resolution of the motion to quash filed by the defendants shows beyond
question that the offense charged was committed far beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of Angeles City.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the

offense charged in the information filed in Criminal Case No. C-2268 of the
City Court of Angeles City is not within the jurisdiction of said court and
that, therefore, said court is hereby restrained and prohibited from further
proceedings therein. Costs against the private respondents.
3. No Authority to File Information
People v. Navarro, 270 SCRA 393 (1997)

Facts:

T/Sgt. Jose V. Sanchez, PC Investigator, 244th PC Company in

Concepcion Grande, Naga City filed a complaint for qualified theft directly
with the Regional Trial Court of Naga City against minor Carlos Barbosa.
Subsequently, the Public Attorney's Office, as counsel for the respondent
Barbosa, filed a Motion to Quash the Complaint on the ground that Sgt.
Sanchez is not authorized to file a complaint or information in Court. On
June 18, 1990, the Honorable Judge Gloriosa S. Navarro issued an Order
setting aside the Order of Prosecutor Cajot dated March 21, 1990 and
ordered Assistant Prosecutor Novelita Llaguno, who was appearing in her
sala, to conduct the required preliminary investigation. On June 29, 1990,
Prosecutor Llaguno filed a motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the police officer has the authority to file the
information? NO.

Ruling:

It is true that after a case has already been filed in court and the court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over it, fiscals as a rule are divested of the
power to dismiss a criminal action without the consent of the court. In the
case at bench, however, the RTC had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
complaint filed directly before it by Sgt. Sanchez who was not a prosecutor.
Neither was he authorized by the Provincial Prosecutor to file such case
directly with the respondent court.
 If the trial court cannot designate the prosecutor who will conduct a
reinvestigation, there is more cogent reason why it should not be allowed to
do so in original preliminary investigations, particularly where — as in this
case — the said trial court has not even validly acquired jurisdiction over
the case because of the lack of authority of the police officer who filed the
case.

4. Double Jeopardy
Manantan v. CA, 350 SCRA 387 (2001);

Facts:

Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of

homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability.
On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066,
the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him
to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas
P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
and moral damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death
of their son, Ruben Nicolas.

Issue:

Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the

Court of Appeals as to his negligence or reckless imprudence? NO.

Ruling:

Petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed
the findings of the trial court on the lack of negligence or reckless
imprudence under the guise of determining his civil liability. He argues that
the trial court's finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the
basis for his acquittal, and not reasonable doubt. He submits that in finding
him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only placed
his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in "double jeopardy."

When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated

either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent
of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or
identical offense. This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the
following elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated;
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.

In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by

the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his
discharge. The judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note,
however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private
respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was
not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal offense
identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second
criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the
lower court's judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of
acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against
petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second
jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's claim of having been placed in double
jeopardy is incorrect.

Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986);

Facts:
 Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was
killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport.
His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his
head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of
three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then
supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando
Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts
gunned him down in turn.  Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows
that Galman was the killer. 

Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the

dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that
the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled
to due process.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause?

Ruling:

There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a

void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double
jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars
anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this

case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their
petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering
its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required
the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no
restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not
have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused
pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge
manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

Galman v. Pamaran, 133 SCRA 294 (1984);

Facts:

Two (2) reports were submitted to His Excellency, President

Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon
Juliano Agrava; and another one, jointly authored by the other members of
the Board — namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon.
Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera. 'the reports were thereafter
referred and turned over to the TANODBAYAN for appropriate action. After
conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the
TANODBAYAN 5 filed with the SANDIGANBAYAN two (2) Informations for
MURDER-one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 10010 and another, criminal Case No.
10011, for the killing of Rolando Galman, who was found dead on the
airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same
fateful day. In both criminal cases, private respondents were charged as
accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice.

Issue:

Can there be implied waiver of right of self-incrimination or double

jeopardy? NO.

Ruling:

In support of the rule that there can be no implied waiver of the right
against self-incrimination and all other constitutional rights by the witness or
by the accused, is the fact that the right against double jeopardy can only
be renounced by the accused if the criminal case against him is dismissed
or otherwise terminated with his express consent. Without such express
consent to the dismissal or termination of the case, the accused can always
invoke his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Sta. Rita v. CA, 247 SCRA 484 (1995);

Facts:

Petitioner Sta. Rita was charged in the RTC with violating Section
2(a) in relation to Sections 22(d) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law. The Information
alleged that petitioner, "as President/General Manager of B. Sta. Rita Co.,
Inc. a compulsorily (sic) covered employer under the Social Security Law,
as amended, did then and there willfully and unlawfully fail, neglect and
refuse and still fails, neglects and refuses to remit to the Social Security
System contributions for SSS, Medicare and Employees Compensation for
its covered employees."

The People, through the Solicitor General, filed in the Court of

Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the
order of dismissal issued by the trial court. Respondent appellate court
granted the petition and ordered the Presiding Judge of the trial court to
reinstate the criminal case against petitioner. A motion for reconsideration
thereof was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 17 April 1995.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating the criminal

case, thus, resulting to Double Jeopardy? NO.

Ruling:

The Court of Appeals properly held that the reinstatement of the

criminal case against petitioner did not violate his right against double
jeopardy since the dismissal of the information by the trial court had been
effected at his own instance. There are only two (2) instances where
double jeopardy will attach notwithstanding the fact that the case was
dismissed with the express consent of the accused.

The first is where the ground for dismissal is insufficiency of evidence

for the prosecution; and the second is where the criminal proceedings have
been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the accused's right to speedy
trial. Neither situation exists in the case at bar. There is no legal
impediment to the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. Q-92-35426 against
petitioner Sta. Rita. WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the
Petition.

People v. Degamo, 402 SCRA 133 (2003);

Facts:

On October 4, 1994, a complaint was filed before the trial court

charging appellant with the crime of rape to which, upon arraignment,
pleaded not guilty. On January 17, 1995, before the start of the trial proper,
the court a quo allowed the complaint to be amended to include the
allegation that by reason of the incident of rape, the victim has become
insane.

Issue:

Whether or not amendment of the information would cause Double

Jeopardy? NO.

Ruling:
 It is also settled that amendment of an information to charge a more
serious offense is permissible and does not constitute double jeopardy
even where the accused was already arraigned and pleaded not guilty to
the charge, where the basis of the more serious charge did not exist, but
comes as a subsequent event. In this case the basis for the amendment
was the psychosis of complainant which was determined after the filing of
the information.

RULE 118: PRE-TRIAL

Matters Covered by Pre-Trial; Effect of Pre-Trial Agreement and Pre-
Trial Order
People vs. Abelita, 210 SCRA 446 (1992)

Facts:

The Information under which he was charged with violation of the

aforesaid section and article of Republic Act No. 6425 reads that on or
about the 16th day on February, 1990, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused in consideration of P10.00 bill with Serial No.
HB116649 received from poseur-buyer and without being authorized by
law, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously SELL, deliver
and distribute three (3) handrolled cigarette sticks wrapped in a small white
paper and which cigarette sticks when subjected to laboratory examination
were found positive Indian Hemp commonly known as "Marijuana", a
prohibited drug. On the same occasion (sic), accused who as aforestated is
not authorited (sic) by law was likewise found to be in possession of thirty
seven (37) handrolled cigarette sticks contained in a Bonna milk can for the
purpose of dispatch in transistor transporting the same; and which when
subjected to laboratory examination were likewise found positive for indian
hemp, commonly known as marijuana.

Issue:
 Whether or not the trial court erred in acquitting the accused on the
ground of the insufficiency of evidence for the reason that the NBI Forensic
Expert was not presented to testify on the NBI report of its findings? NO.

Ruling:

After a careful examination of the records of the case, We find no

error to warrant the reversal of the finding of facts and conclusion of the
trial court. We agree with the position of the Solicitor General that if the
matters taken up and embodied in the pre-trial order were not in
accordance with what was really stipulated upon, then accused-appellant
should have interposed his objections earlier or as soon as the pre-trial
order was issued. Hence, it is clear that upon the accused-appellant's
failure to interpose objections, the facts stipulated during a pre-trial
conference and embodied in a pre-trial order bind the parties.

People vs. Uy, 327 SCRA 335 (2000)

Facts:

RAMON was arrested in the evening of 11 September 1995 by the

elements of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Philippine National Police in
Malabon, Metro-Manila, in the course of a buy-bust operation 3 and a follow-
up search of his residence, and was subsequently charged in three cases,
namely, Criminal Case No. 16199-MN, Criminal Case No. 16200-MN and
Criminal Case No. 16201-MN. At the trial, the prosecution presented as
witnesses SPO1 Alberto G. Nepomuceno, Jr., who acted as the poseur-
buyer, and SPO4 Eddie Regalado, another member of the buy-bust team,
as rebuttal witness. The defense presented RAMON and Maritess Puno.
Issue:

Whether or not Ramon’s admission in the pre-trial is admissible? NO.

Ruling:

Even granting for the sake of argument that RAMON admitted during
the pre-trial that Exhibits "D" to "D-4," inclusive, and Exhibit "E" contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride, the admission cannot be used in
evidence against him because the Joint Order was not signed by RAMON
and his counsel. Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court expressly
provides:

Sec. 40. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or

admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in
evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed and his
counsel. 

Put in another way, to bind the accused the pre-trial order must be
signed not only by him but his counsel as well. The purpose of this
requirement is to further safeguard the rights of the accused against
improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissions which his counsel
may have entered into without his knowledge, as he may have waived his
presence at the pre-trial conference; eliminate any doubt on the conformity
of the accused to the facts agreed upon.

Effect of Non-Appearance
Fule vs. CA, 162 SCRA 446 (1985)

Facts:
 This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of
respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting petitioner (the accused-
appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks
Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the
prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial
Court. At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its
evidence. At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-
appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof,
submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial
Court convicted petitioner-appellant.

On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of

Facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse, with
petitioner-appellant contending that the Honorable Respondent Court of
Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting the
petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the
conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-
trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his
counsel. In Sec.4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures: SEC. 4. Pre-trial
agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against
the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel.
(Rule 118). Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above rule is
applicable.

Issue:

Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his
counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of
Facts inadmissible in evidence? YES.
Ruling:

YES. Judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and

this case is hereby ordered RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the
appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, for further
reception of evidence. By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under
the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be
regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory
(McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term “shall”
further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative,
operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador,
No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And more importantly, penal
statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by
consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally
in favor of the accused (People vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November 25,
1983, 125 SCRA 648).
Bonsubre, Jr. v. Yerro
G.R. No. 205952 February 11, 2015

Facts:
This case stemmed from a criminal complaint for estafa filed by
petitioner against respondents before the RTC. In the course of the
proceedings, the counsel on record, private prosecutor Atty. Luna,
manifested that there was an on-going settlement between petitioner and
respondents, and that they would file the necessary motion relative
thereto. Thus, in an Order dated September 12, 2000, the prosecution was
given 10 days from said date to submit such motion and directed the
prosecution to furnish the accused’s counsel a copy of the same for their
comment; after which, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution.
As a result, the RTC, in an Order dated September 18, 2001, dismissed the
case for failure of the prosecution to comply with the court’s directive, as
well as to take any further step to prosecute the case, in view of the
accused’s (i.e., respondents’) constitutional right to speedy trial. More than
2 years from the issuance of the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order,
petitioner, through a new collaborating counsel, Atty. Malabago, filed a
motion for reconsideration, claiming that he learned of the September 18,
2001 Dismissal Order only on June 7, 2004,and that he believed in good
faith that the case was merely archived in accordance with the terms of the
Compromise Agreement. Several hearings were conducted on petitioner’s
pending motions, including an amended motion for reconsideration and
second amended motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent’s Right to Speedy Trial has been
violated.

Held:
No. In this case, no such grave abuse of discretion can be attributed
to the RTC in dismissing the case for denial of the respondents’ right to
speedy trial. Aside from the lapse of two (2) years and nine (9) months from
the time the case was dismissed to the time petitioner sought for a
reconsideration of the same, it is also not disputed that it was petitioner
who caused the inordinate delay. As culled from the records, it was the
private prosecutor who sought for a temporary suspension of the case
during the September 12, 2000 hearing with a manifestation that they
would file the necessary motion relative to the settlement. Despite having
executed a Compromise Agreement – which this Court notes was not
notarized – petitioner and his counsel failed to furnish the RTC a copy of
the same or comply with the directive to submit the necessary motion. Even
when the respondents reneged on their obligation under the Compromise
Agreement having failed to pay not only the first two (2) installments, which
was already a ground to revive the criminal case under paragraph 3 (d)
thereof, but rather all 36 monthly installments, still, petitioner and his
counsel failed to lift a finger to prosecute the case. Such inordinate and
unjustified delay on the part of the prosecution clearly prejudiced the
respondents. Hence, there can be no gainsaying that their right to speedy
trial had been violated.
 Tan v. People
586 SCRA 139

Facts:
Two separate information were filed against respondent Tan for
violation of the Revised Securities Act, when he failed to file with SEC the
amount of all BWRC (Best World Resources Corporation) shares of which
he is the beneficial owner within 10 days after he became such beneficial
owner.

During the trial, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. RTC
admitted the pieces of evidence, but denied admission of all other exhibits.
Tan filed Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. Petitioner filed its
Opposition to which Tan filed a Reply. In the end, RTC issued an order
granting Tan’s Demurrer to Evidence.

Petitioner filed a petition before the CA assailing the order of RTC

which granted Tan’s motion. CA denied, ruling that the dismissal of a
criminal action by the grant of a Demurrer to Evidence is one on the merits
and operates as an acquittal, for which reason, the prosecution cannot
appeal therefrom as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.

Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in granting Tan’s Demurrer to

Evidence.
Held:
No. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at
bar, is “filed after the prosecution had rested its case,” and when the same
is granted, it calls “for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable
doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
acquittal of the accused.” Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of
demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place
the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the
case ends there.

The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the
trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, which is not present in this case. RTC did not violate
petitioner’s right to due process as the petitioner was given more than
ample opportunity to present its case which led to grant of Tan’s demurrer.
RTC never prevented petitioner from presenting its case. In fact, one of the
main reasons for the RTCs decision to grant the demurrer was the absence
of evidence to prove the classes of shares that the Best World Resources
Corporation stocks were divided into, whether there are preferred shares
as well as common shares, or even which type of shares respondent had
acquired,

Petitioner argues that the RTC displayed resolute bias when it chose
to grant respondents demurrer to evidence notwithstanding that it had filed
a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Resolution of Tan’s Demurrer to
Evidence and The Prosecution’s Opposition Thereto. Petitioner contends
that instead of acting on the motion, the RTC peremptorily granted Tan’s
demurrer to evidence which prevented petitioner from its intention to file a
petition to question the orders.
 While it would have been ideal for the RTC to hold in abeyance the
resolution of the demurrer to evidence, nowhere in the rules, however, is it
mandated to do so. Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the
same as an error on the part of the RTC, the same would merely constitute
an error of procedure or of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as
persistently argued by petitioner.

As such RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it conducted
the proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of respondent’s demurrer to
evidence.

Perez v. People
544 SCRA 532

Facts:
Petitioner, Zenon Perez was then the acting municipal treasurer of
Tubigon, Bohol, was found to be guilty of malversation of public funds. That
upon the examination of the Provincial Auditor’s Office to the account of the
petitioner, it was found out that instead of the supposed cash on hand
amounting to 94k, there was only 21k, thus incurring a shortage of 73k.
(estimated)

Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation

of public funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code on 1989,

When asked by the auditing team, as to the location of the missing

funds, the petitioner explained that part of the money was used to pay for
the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his
family, and the rest for his medicine.
 Petitioner remitted to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol
the amounts of 10k and 15k until the full restitution of the missing money on
April 1989. However, the accused was still convicted.
On September 23, 2004, petitioner resorted to invoke his right to speedy
trial.

Issue: Whether or not the accused has waived his right to speedy trial.

Held:
Yes. Petitioner has clearly slept on his right. The matter could have
taken a different dimension if during all those twelve years, petitioner had
shown signs of asserting his right to a speedy disposition of his case or at
least made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show
that he was not waiving that right.

Privilege against self-incrimination

People v. Besonia
422 SCRA 210

Facts:
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23, emanates the fiat
sentencing appellant Jonathan Besonia to two counts of the most severe
penalty of death for having committed two counts of murder. The decision
leaves much to be desired. More than half of it was devoted to the narration
about Besonia’s plea of guilty and the consequent searching inquiry
conducted by the trial court. Before the start of the trial, Besonia, through
his counsel Atty. Calixto Perez, manifested that he would enter a plea of
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide after a medical operation on his gall
bladder.5 Thereafter, the trial court ordered the prosecution to begin
presenting its evidence. The prosecution thereupon presented as
witnesses Dr. Tito Doromal and SPO1 Ricardo Clarete. RTC finds Besonia
guilty, thus, Bsonia argues that the trial court based mainly on his
confession, which is inadmissible for having been obtained in gross
violation of his constitytional right against self-incrimination.

Issue: Whether or not Besonia’s Right Against Self-Incrimination has been

violated.

Ruling:
No. We cannot subscribe to Besonia’s claim that his confession and
admissions during the searching inquiry were elicited in violation of his
constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. The right
against self-incrimination is intended to prevent the State, with all its
coercive powers, from extracting from the suspect testimony that may
convict him and to avoid a person subjected to such compulsion to perjure
himself for his own protection. It does not apply where, as in these cases,
the testimony was freely and voluntarily given by the accused himself
without any compulsion from the agents of the State. There is nothing in
the records that would indicate that Besonia was forced, intimidated, or
compelled by the trial court or by anybody into admitting the crimes. At any
rate, his plea of guilty and confession or admissions during the searching
inquiry cannot be the sole basis for his conviction.

Chavez v. CA
24 SCRA 663

Facts:
Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor
vehicle(thunderbird car together with accessories). An information was filed
against the accused together with other accused, that they conspired, with
intent to gain and abuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy
Lim, took the vehicle. All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the
fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be the first witness.
Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused
(Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of
accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in
favor of the fiscal.

Issue: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self –

incrimination had been violated.

Held:
Yes. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full
breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that
he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his
own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness.

Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted

to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission,
defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the
privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection – even to the
guilty

People v. Olvis
G.R. No. 71092 September 30, 1987

Facts:
On September 9, 1975, authorities from the Integrated National
Police station of Barrio Polanco, in Zamboanga del Norte, received a report
that a certain Deosdedit Bagon is missing. Bagon had been in fact missing
since two days before.

An unnamed volunteer, who informed them that Deosdedit Bagon

was last seen together with Dominador Sorela, one of the accused herein.
The authorities then thereafter picked up Sorela for interrogation. Sorela
bore several scratches on his face, neck and arms when the police found
him. Sorela made extrajudicial confession for his participation together with
Romulo Villarojo and Leonardo Cademas for the killing of Bagon.

The police soon picked up Villarojo and Cademas. Together with

Sorela, they were turned over to the custody of Captain Encabo the
Polanco Station Commander. The police thereafter made the three re-
enact the crime.

Issue: Whether or not re-enactment of the crime is a violation to the right

accused against self-incrimination.

Held:
Yes. Forced re-enactments, like uncounseled and coerced
confessions come within the ban against self- incrimination. Evidence
based on such re-enactment is a violation of the Constitution and hence,
incompetent evidence.

Here, accused is not merely required to exhibit some physical

characteristics; by and large, he is likewise made to admit criminal
responsibility against his will. It is a police procedure just as condemnable
as an uncounseled confession. The lack of counsel makes statement in
contemplation of law, 'involuntary' even if it were otherwise voluntary.

Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan
302 SCRA 102

Facts:
On February 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati
Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the
existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post
office. Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an
emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters
Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office.
For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of
Investigation in apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage in
the Makati Post Office.

On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI

agents to Legaspi Village following a report that the group would stage a
theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI
agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a
private car.

At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was
parked in front of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. Pasicolan
alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Upon reaching
Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two persons, who were later
identified as Ronnie Romero and petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter
transferred the contents of the mail bag to a travelling bag. Meanwhile, the
NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards
Amorsolo St., moved their car and started towards Amorsolo St. They were
just in time to see Pasicolan handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and
Romero. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested the two
accused. The NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and
arrested Pasicolan.

The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their

headquarters. Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their
signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of
the members of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and the
people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to Director
Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as
the very same letters confiscated from them.
A case for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan wherein the
accused were declared guilty.

Issue: Whether or not the letters signed by the petitioner were inadmissible
as evidence.

Held:
The Supreme Court held that the letters were valid evidence. It is
known that during custodial investigation, a person has the right to remain
silent and the right to an attorney. Any admission or confession made in the
absence of counsel is inadmissible as evidence. Furthermore, no person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In the instant case,
even though the petitioner was asked to sign the letters, the letters are still
admissible as evidence because the accused was convicted not only by
means of these letters but also by testimonies made by the NBI agents.
Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the letters were validly seized as an
incident of a valid arrest and therefore can stand on their own. The decision
of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed.

People v. Ayson
175 SCRA 216

Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines,
assigned at its Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him
of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in
accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by
Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings
of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused
proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said
amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two
months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos
pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written
admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession
was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent
Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making

inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of accused.

Held:
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against
self-incrimination. This is accorded to every person who gives evidence,
whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal,
or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a
witness against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be
claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is
actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does
not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear
before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is
a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be
waived.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the

rights of the accused include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible
in evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree
to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and
waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

Mapa v. Sandiganbayan
231 SCRA 783

Facts:
On January 20, 1987, petitioners Placido L. Mapa and Lorenzo
Vergara, together with Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, Fernando Balatbat, Ramon
Aviado, Jr., Dominador Lopez, Jr., Fernando Maramag, Jr., and Jose
Crisanto, Jr., were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. 3019). However he was granted an immunity from suit
by the PCGG related to the previous charges against him, provided that he
will testify as witness against the Marcoses in criminal proceedings in the
United States Vs Ferdinand Marcos, during the RICO, where Ferdinand
Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos were being tried for charges of
corruption. All the expenses of Mapa were shouldered by the PCCG when
they flew  to New York to testify against the Marcoses. During the trial,
Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella, the American prosecutor dispensed
the testimony of Mapa and thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since Mapa,
was not able to testify, it was contended that the immunity from suit of
Mapa took without force and effect. However, the record shows that the
petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the prosecution of
the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in
effect and force.

Ruling:
Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant
immunity to any person from being prosecuted provided they will meet the
conditions provided by the PCGG.

In the case at bar, Mapa was granted immunity from the prosecution
or criminal case where he is being tried, and the PCGG even shouldered all
the expenses of Mapa when they flew to New York to testify implying that
Mapa was able to meet the conditions and the PCGG accepted the
information given by him (MAPA) to testify against the Marcoses during the
RICO trial. Failure of the petitioner to testify on the RICO can not nullify the
immunity given to him by the PCGG since the petitioner was able to satisfy
the requirements both of the law and the parties’ implementing
agreements. Though the petitioners were not able to testify against the
Marcoses in RICO, it can be said that it not their own fault.

Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted on the basis of the

immunity granted by the PCGG, which under the law has the power to
grant immunity.

Kastigar v. US
406 U.S 441

Facts:
Subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury, the petitioners
refused to answer questions in asserting the Fifth Amendment, despite the
government having granted them immunity. The immunity was based on a
part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 stating that neither the
testimony nor any other information from the testimony could be used
against the witnesses. Petitioners argued that the scope of the immunity
they were given was not as broad as the scope of the privilege against self-
incrimination, and were unsuccessful in the District Court. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the order, and the petitioners were granted
certiorari.

Issue: Can the government compel immunized testimony even if the

subpoenaed persons have invoked the privilege versus self-incrimination?

Held:
Yes. Affirm the lower court’s decision allowing the compulsion of
testimony.
The total proscription on use found in this federal statute, that is, from both
use and derivative use, provides enough of a safeguard against Fifth
Amendment rights being infringed on by barring the testimony from even
being used as an investigatory lead.

The petitioners’ concern that the bar against derivative use could not
be enforced effectively is overcome by subsequent prosecuting authorities
having the burden of showing that their evidence comes from an
independent source.

Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 141675 – 96 November 25, 2005

Facts:
Tanchanco served as NFA Administrator from 1972 to 1986, during
the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos. His co-petitioner Romeo Lacson
(Lacson) was the Deputy Administrator of the NFA when he was the
Administrator.

On 6 May 1988, Tanchanco and the PCGG entered into a

Cooperation Agreement, occasioned by the desire of Tanchanco to
cooperate with the Philippine government in connection with the latter’s
efforts in the location and pursuit of government properties purloined by
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, their agents and others who hold property
on their behalf. In the Cooperation Agreement, the one of the stipulation
was the Philippines hereby represents and agrees as follows:

1) At a time to be mutually agreed upon between Tanchanco and the

Philippines, the Philippines shall move to dismiss all actions that
are presently pending against Tanchanco before the
Sandiganbayan and any such other courts;

2) The Philippines shall lift any sequestration orders against

Tanchanco's properties, if any, and rescind hold orders it may
have issued against his/her actions;

3)The Philippines shall not bring any additional civil or criminal charges
against Tanchanco, arising from:

(A) Service in or for the Marcos government;

(B) Any other actions revealed by Tanchanco pursuant to his/her
cooperation as defined in this Agreement.

Tanchanco was called as one of the witnesses for the prosecution in

the case filed against Imelda Marcos in New York for violation of the so-
called RICO Act. A criminal case was filed in 1991 against Tanchanco with
the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds in the amount of
P10,000,000.00 from the Philippine National Bank.
 Tanchanco filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, wherein he argued that
the case should be dismissed as he had been granted immunity from the
said suit by the PCGG.

Issue: Whether or not Jesus T. Tanchanco can be granted immunity under

the
Cooperation Agreement.

Held:
Tanchanco is entitled to immunity.

The court hold that Cooperation Agreement, validly undertaken

between the PCGG and Tanchanco as it was, precludes the prosecution of
Tanchanco under the subject changes. The Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the charges despite its lack
of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case against Tanchanco.

The present petition, in so far as it relates to Tanchanco, must be

granted. It goes without saying though that this ruling does not shield all
grantees under section 5 of E.O No.14-A from all kinds of criminal
prosecution. The extent of immunity available to each particular grantee
depends on their respective immunity agreements with the PCGG and the
surrounding facts.

Right to defend, be heard, confront witnesses against him and be

present

People v. Ortillas
428 SCRA 659

Facts:
 Appellant, Marlon Ortillas y Gamlanga (Ortillas), was charged for the
crime of Murder. His case was raffled to Branch 225 (Las Piñas) presided
over by Judge Florentino M. Alumbres.

After arraignment of appellant who pleaded not guilty to the offense

with which he is charged, the trial court dispensed with the pre-trial and
proceeded to trial on the merits.

On June 8, 1995, the prosecution presented Russel Guiraldo, an

alleged eyewitness. After Russel's direct examination, Atty. Jose G. de
Leon, the then counsel for Ortillas moved for postponement as he had a
very important appointment to keep which Judge Alumbres granted.
Subsequently, Atty. de Leon had to withdraw as counsel because of eye
ailment which the trial court approved.

The only other hearing that took place after the testimony of Russel
on June 8, 1995, was on September 5, 1995 when NBI Medico-Legal
Officer Roberto Garcia testified for the prosecution.

All in all, the continuation of the hearing was postponed thirteen times
from June 8, 1995 until May 8, 1996 when the prosecution finally rested its
case with the submission of its documentary evidence.

Judge Alumbres refused to give opportunity for Atty. Teresita

Carandang-Pantua of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the new counsel
for appellant, to cross-examine prosecution witness Russel on the ground
that the prosecution had already rested its case.

Witness Russel was never presented for cross-examination. The last

time he was subpoenaed was for the hearing set on November 6, 1995, but
records do not show that he appeared on said date. Although several
hearings were scheduled thereafter, Russel was not subpoenaed anymore.
 On the basis of the testimonies of Russel and Dr. Garcia, Judge
Alumbres rendered a decision finding Ortillas guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.

Appellant Ortillas contended that the judgment of the trial court has
unduly deprived him of his constitutional right to meet the witness face to
face which includes the right to cross-examine the witness.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Alumbres erred in refusing to allow the

defense counsel to cross-examine the prosecution’s witness.

Held:
YES. Section 6, Rule 132 of the then prevailing Rules on Evidence
provides:

SEC. 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. — Upon the

termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined
by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom from interest or
bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.

As the Court held in People vs. Rivera, to wit:

The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied in Art. III,

Sec. 14(2) of the Constitution which provides that the accused shall have
the right to meet the witnesses face to face and in Rule 115, Sec. 1(f) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to confront and cross-
examine the witness against him. The cross-examination of a witness is
essential to test his or her credibility, expose falsehoods or half-truths,
uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may
successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial
matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and
thus give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the
witnesses against him.

Equitable PCI Bank v. RCBC

433 SCRA 562
Facts:
On May 24, 2000, petitioners Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB) and
the individual shareholders of Bankard, Inc., as sellers, and respondent
RCBC Capital Corporation (RCBC), as buyer, executed a Share Purchase
Agreement5 (SPA) for the purchase of petitioners' interests in Bankard, To
expedite the purchase, RCBC agreed to dispense with the conduct of a due
diligence audit on the financial status of Bankard.

Under the SPA, RCBC undertakes, on the date of contract execution,

to deposit, as downpayment, 20% of the purchase price, in an escrow
account. The escrowed amount, the SPA stated, should be released to
petitioners on an agreed-upon release date and the balance of the
purchase price shall be delivered to the share buyers upon the fulfillment of
certain conditions agreed upon, in the form of a manager's check.

On June 2, 2000, RCBC deposited the stipulated downpayment

amount in an escrow account after which it was given full management and
operational control of Bankard. June 2, 2000 is also considered by the
parties as the Closing Date referred to in the SPA.

On December 28, 2000, RCBC paid the balance of the contract price.
The corresponding deeds of sale for the shares in question were executed
in January 2001.

Thereafter, in a letter of May 5, 2003, RCBC informed petitioners of

its having overpaid the purchase price of the subject shares, claiming that
there was an overstatement of valuation of accounts amounting to PhP 478
million, resulting in the overpayment of over PhP 616 million. Thus, RCBC
claimed that petitioners violated their warranty, as sellers, embodied in Sec.
5(g) of the SPA (Sec. 5[g] hereinafter).

Following unsuccessful attempts at settlement, RCBC, in accordance

with Sec. 10 of the SPA, filed a Request for Arbitration dated May 12,
20048 with the ICC-ICA. In the request, RCBC charged Bankard with
deviating from, contravening and not following generally accepted
accounting principles and practices in maintaining their books. Due to these
improper accounting practices, RCBC alleged that both the audited and
unaudited financial statements of Bankard prior to the stock purchase were
far from fair and accurate and, hence, violated the representations and
warranties of petitioners in the SPA.

Issue: Whether petitioners was denied of due process when they were
allegedly denied the right to cross-examine the witnesses presented by
RCBC.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held in Velez v. De Vera, the Court En Banc
expounded that in administrative proceedings, cross-examination is not
indispensable, thus:

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with

"judicial process" for a trial in court is not always essential to due process.
While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is
otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different
principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of
procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain
proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing [is]
not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of due
process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established
administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had
before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial
and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such
determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all
that due process requires. What is required for "hearing" may differ as the
functions of the administrative bodies differ.

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due

process.

Clearly, the right to cross-examine a witness, although a fundamental

right of a party, may be waived. Petitioners themselves admit having had
the opportunity to cross-examine RCBC's witnesses during the hearings
before the tribunal, but declined to do so by reserving such right at a later
time. Having had the opportunity to cross-examine RCBC's witnesses,
petitioners were not denied their right to due process.

Right to appeal

Hilario v. People
551 SCRA 191
Facts:
Petitioner, together with one Gilbert Alijid (Alijid), was charged with
two counts of Murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Quezon
City to which petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.

During trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO),
counsel of Alijid, took over representing petitioner in view of the death of
the latter's counsel.

On December 5, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision finding

petitioner and his co-accused Alijid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide.
 On May 10, 2002, petitioner, this time unassisted by counsel, filed
with the RTC a Petition for Relief from the Decision dated December 5,
2001 together with an affidavit of merit.

The Assistant City Prosecutor filed his Comment on the Petition for
Relief where he contended that the petition should no longer be
entertained; and that perfection of appeal in the manner and within the
period permitted by law was not only mandatory but jurisdictional and
failure to perfect the appeal rendered the judgment final and executory.

RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for relief and it was affirmed by

the CA.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to appeal was violated.

Held:
Yes. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to
appeal in the manner prescribed by law. The importance and real purpose
of the remedy of appeal has been emphasized in Castro v. Court of
Appeals where we ruled that an appeal is an essential part of our judicial
system and trial courts are advised to proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed that every party-litigant
should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. While
this right is statutory, once it is granted by law, however, its suppression
would be a violation of due process, a right guaranteed by the Constitution.
Thus, the importance of finding out whether petitioner's loss of the right to
appeal was due to the PAO lawyer's negligence and not at all attributed to
petitioner.

Guy v. People
582 SCRA 108
Facts:
These are consolidated petitions for review assailing the decision of
the Sandiganbayan dated 2 September 2004 in Criminal Cases No. 26508-
101 which found petitioners guilty of violating Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019 (R.A. No. 3019).

It appears that an audit investigation was conducted by the

Commission on Audit (COA) in response to a letter-complaint of one
Alfredo Alberca regarding the three projects.5 The audit team found that
the Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay 36, acting as the Pre-Qualification,
Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) accepted bid proposals from Amago
Construction and General Services (Amago Construction) without issuing
the proper plans and specifications for the basketball court and day care
projects and that the work programs for the day care center and the
elevated path walk were prepared long after the construction had been
completed. Likewise, Guy and Grefiel reported the construction of the
projects to the City Engineer’s Office only after they had already been
completed; thus, petitioner employees inspected the projects only after they
had already been accomplished. Petitioner employees approved the
accomplishment of the projects despite the absence of material documents,
according to the audit team’s report. Finally, the audit team found material
defects in the projects and discovered that the contract cost for the
basketball court and elevated path walk was overpriced.

The Ombudsman Prosecutor (Ombudsman-Visayas) filed the

corresponding information for the offenses, essentially charging petitioners
with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

The Sandiganbayan ruled as follows: Considering that all the

elements of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3(e) were without doubt established in
these cases and the allegation of conspiracy shown, a moral certainty is
achieved to find the accused liable for the acts they committed.
Issue: Whether the right to appeal was violated.

Held:
No. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the whole case wide open for
review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors or even reverse the
trial court’s decision on grounds other than those that the parties raise as
errors. We have examined the records of the case and find no cogent
reason to disturb the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan. We find that
the evidence on record amply supports the findings and conclusions of the
respondent court. The elements of the offense charged have been
successfully proven by the prosecution.

People v. Tambis
560 SCRA 343
Facts:
Cerilo Tambis was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City with Murder. At around 10:00 o'clock in the evening of June
12, 1998, as Luzviminda was at her neighbor's house to fetch her husband-
the victim who was drinking with a group, Tambis arrived. He suddenly
stabbed the victim on the left abdomen and attempted to stab him a second
time but Luzviminda pushed Tambis away as the victim repaired to hide
inside the neighbor's house. The victim died of the stab wound at a hospital
the following day.

Upon the other hand, Tambis, admitting that he stabbed the victim,
claimed self-defense, averring that when the victim saw him, the latter got
mad and attacked him with a knife to thus draw him to grab the knife with
which he stabbed the victim.

The trial court thus convicted Tambis of Murder. Tambis lodged an

appeal which it forwarded to the Court of Appeals following People v.
Mateo which directs the intermediate review of decisions imposing the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Issue: Whether the petitioner’s appeal will prosper.

Held:
Appellant's appeal thus fails.

As it is well-established that an appeal in criminal proceedings throws the

whole case open for review of all aspects, including those not raised by the
parties, the Court, after combing through the documentary evidence for the
prosecution, finds that a modification of the decision respecting the civil
aspect of the case is in order.

People v. Sison
555 SCRA 156

Facts:
This is an appeal by Renante Sison alias Dante from the Decision of
Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial
Region convicting him of the crime of murder. Both accused were arraigned
on September 10, 1993. Renante pled not guilty. Jessie was not arraigned
as the trial judge found him mentally unfit. He was ordered to be treated at
the Baguio General Hospital. His trial was suspended. In due time, he
recovered. Hence, on May 11, 1994, the trial judge directed his return to jail
to face trial. On June 16, 1994 the prosecution moved to discharge him as
a state witness. The motion was granted despite the opposition of the
accused-appellant.

Issue: Whether or not questions not raised in the trial court will not be
considered on appeal.
Ruling:
Yes. The records will show that it is only now that the accused-
appellant is assailing the discharge of Jessie Sison as a state witness. This
is too late in the day. In the early case of US v. Inductivo, where it was only
on appeal that counsel for the accused first argued against the competence
of one Obdulio as a state witness, we held that ". . . it is almost universal
rule . . . that aside from matters jurisdictional, which can only be raised for
the first time on appeal, and aside from a few other exceptions which need
not be noticed, questions not raised in the trial court will not be considered
on appeal."

Arraignment and Plea

People v. Alicando
251 SCRA 293

Facts:
Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of a four-
year old girl. He was arrested and during the interrogation, he verbally
confessed his guilt without the assistance of a counsel. On the basis of his
uncounseled verbal confession, the police came to know where to find the
evidence to support a case against him. He pleaded guilty during the
arraignment and was tried, convicted then sentenced to death.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court correctly convicted the appellant and
sentence him with death penalty.

Held:
NO. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge
failed to follow section (1) (a) of Rule 116 that the accused must be
arraigned before the court where the complaint or information has been
filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in open court by
the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or
information with the list of witnesses, reading the same in the language or
dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
The prosecutor may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those
named in the complaint or information."

In this case, the records do not reveal that the Information against the
appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. In addition, the
plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial court
violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the
appellant without conducting a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The
accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The bottom line of the
rule is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed
judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on:
(1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea.

The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the
plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The records do not
reveal any information about the personality profile of the appellant which
can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed
plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background
of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. The questions were
framed in English yet there is no inkling that appellant has a nodding
acquaintance of English. It will be noted too that the trial court did not
bother to explain to the appellant the essential elements of the crime of
rape with homicide.
 People v. Estomaca
256 SCRA 421

Facts:
The accused, an illiterate laborer, was charged guilty of five instances
of rape of her daughter. When he was arraigned, he pleaded guilty to all of
the complaints against him. Eventually however, he informed the court that
he was only guilty of two counts of rape that the other three might have
been done by the victim’s boyfriend and he was merely blamed for it.

Issue: Whether or not the arraignment was valid.

Held:
No. Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be
made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court furnishing
the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses
stated therein, then reading the same in the language or dialect that is
known to him, and asking him what his plea is to the charge. The
requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the
accused understands and known is a mandatory requirement, just as the
whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the
law affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-important
constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed of
the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really
an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal
thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the
Constitution.

In the case at hand, there is no showing that the rule above has been
followed or adopted in the arraignment of the accused. What it appears is
only a bare reading of the five complaints, synthetically and cryptically
reported in the transcript. Moreover, the court found out that the complaint
or information was not read to the accused in the language known to him,
as his local dialect was kinaray-a and the lower court conducted the
arraignment in Ilonggo. The bottom line of the rule is that a plea of guilt
must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching
inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the
plea; and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The
questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of
guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellants full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The records do not reveal
any information about the personality profile of the appellant which can
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea
of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background of
the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court.

People v. Gutierrez
91 Phil 876 (1952)

Facts:
Gutierrez, a Japanese collaborator, was charged with treason. Counsel
alleged the information did not plead specific acts constituting treason and
moved to quash but Motion to quash was denied. Instead of moving for
specifications or bill of particulars, counsel objected to the introduction of
evidence showing specific acts constituting the crime.

Issue: Whether or not the action of the counsel will prosper.

Held:
No. Section 2, Rule 113, points out the way to object to a defective or
insufficient information. It must be by a motion to quash.
A defendant in a criminal case who believes or feels that he is not
sufficiently informed of the crime with which he is charged and not in a
position to defend himself properly and adequately could move for
specifications. Failure to move for specifications or for the quashing of the
information on any of the grounds provided for in the Rules of Court
(section 2, Rule 113) deprives him of the right to object to evidence which
could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an information of more or
less general terms but which sufficiently charges the defendant with a
definite crime.

People v. Abad Santos

76 Phil 744 (1946)

Facts:
Joseph ARCACHE was accused of the crime of treason before the
People's Court in an information specifying the different kinds of properties
alleged to have been sold by him to the Japanese imperial forces during
the enemy occupation. Also added in the accusatory charge is the phrase
"and other similar equipments".
ARCACHE was duly arraigned before herein respondent-judges of the
People's Court, and entered a plea of not guilty.

At the very start of trial, counsel for ARCACHE verbally petitioned to

herein respondent-judges (Judges Abad Santos, Nepumuceno and Veluz)
that the prosecution should make more specific the phrase "and other
similar equipments" set forth in the information or have it stricken
therefrom, unless the prosecution should furnish a bill of particulars
specifying what those "other similar equipments" were. The special
prosecutor objected to said petition, on the ground that it was out of time,
since ARCACHE had already been arraigned. Respondent-judges granted
ARCACHE’s petition on the ground that the phrase objected to was indeed
too broad and too indefinite to enable the accused to properly defend
himself.

Issue: Whether or not the order for a bill of particulars is legal and valid.

Held:
 YES. The orders complained of are legal and valid and they were
issued by herein respondent-judges, in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion, for the protection of the rights and interests of the accused.

The filing of specifications or bills of particulars may be ordered in

criminal cases in accordance with existing (American) jurisprudence. In the
first place, all the accused wanted was to know specifically what the
alleged "other similar equipments" were, without demanding amendment
(in substance) of the information, which would require him to withdraw his
previous plea of not guilty. In any case, to order the filing of a bill of
particulars is purely discretionary on the part of the lower court. Hence, any
ambiguous phrases should not be permitted in criminal complaints or
informations if any such phrase has been included therein, on motion of
the defense, before the commencement of the trial, the court should order
either, (1) its elimination as surplusage; or (2) the filing of specification or
bill of particulars, which is but an amendment in mere matters of form not
substance.

People v. Arlegui
128 SCRA 556 (1984)

Facts:

William ESPAÑOLA was charged in an information1 for violating PD

381 in relation to Sec 4-B of PD 189 as amended for building/operating a
beach resort (in Nasugbu, Batangas) without prior approval from the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).

ESPAÑOLA sought dismissal of the case via a motion to quash

(information), accordingly, for its failure to state a criminal offense.
ESPAÑOLA argued that the accusation against him is not a penal offense,
but, more administrative in nature since the cited PD 381 in relation to PD
189 (under Sec 4-b thereof) do not impose any criminal liability against the
offender.

In fine, there are two sections numbered almost identically, one with a
capitalized "B" and the other with a non-capitalized "b", ("Section 4-B" and
"Section 4(b)") and both these sections of the same PD caused the
confusion encountered by the respondent-judge in the misreading and
misapplication of the law.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the case was warranted.

Held:
No. Respondent-judge ARLEGUI should have ordered a bill of
particulars instead of dismissing the case.

The more appropriate procedure under the circumstances would

have been an order from the lower court for a bill of particulars and
subsequent direction to the Fiscal to amend the information on account of
the defect, if there ever was one, as it is curable by the simplest of (formal)
amendments or clarifications.