PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

V.

RENANTE MENDEZ and BABY CABAGTONG,

G.R. No.147671, November 21, 2002

FACTS: Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong charged with the crime of rope with homicide at the RTC,
Branch 22, Laoang, Northern Samar.

On December 8, 1996 in the morning, Candy Dolim left their house to collect bets on the PBA ending
games from the local residents. When she did not return home that night, Rico Dolim (father of Candy),
asked his father Ambrocio and daughter Jinky to look for Cindy, but they did not find her. On December
12, 1996, Rico heard that a young girl found dead at Sitio Tinotogasan. Rico immediately went to the
place and found the lifeless body of Candy. Her panty and shorts were hanging on the ankle, while her
shirt was rolled up to her throat. She had wounds in different parts of her body. Ronnie, who saw the
incident, offered to be a witness. According to Ronnie, he was about three meters away when he later
saw Renante Mendez was on top of Cindy, having sexual intercourse with her, while Baby Cabagtong
was holding the victim’s hands. On cross-examination SPO2 Cernio told the court that the arrest of
Renante Mendez without a warrant was based on their knowledge of his guilt. Baby Cabagtong was
also arrested without a warrant, based on the citizen’s arrest law. RTC finds both accused Renante
Mendez and Baby Cabagtong guilty of the offense of rape with homicide and sentenced them to death
penalty.

ISSUE: Whether of not, the warrantless arrest of accused justified?

HELD: No. Nor can we close our eyes to the palpable violations of the rights of accused- appellants
during the period of their detention. The record shows that accused-appellants were arrested without
any warrants from the court. Contrary to his claim, SPO2 Cernio did not have personal knowledge of the
commission of the crime to justify the warrantless arrest of Renante Mendez.

Personal knowledge under Rule 113, Rules on Criminal Procedure must be based on “Probable Cause”
which means “an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion”. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable only when it is based on actual facts, i.e. when it is supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,

G.R. No. 136267, [July 10, 2001], 413 PHIL 249-280)

FACTS: At about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City police
station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe
Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team, composed of SPO1 Malinao, Jr.,
PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded to the call and found Henry P.
Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked on the road. Police photographer Fred
Agana took pictures of the crime scene showing the victim slumped on the handle of the tricycle. PO3
Rosal testified that a tricycle driver, who refused to divulge his name, told him that accused-appellant
and the victim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in San Antonio near the
gate of Sangley Point, Cavite City, about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene.

Garcellano described accused-appellant as a lean, dark-complexioned, and mustachioed man who had
on a white t-shirt and brown short pants. Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told PO3 Rosal and
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. that Garcellanos description fitted a person known as alias Jun Dulce.

SPO4 Virgilio Pilapil, Chief Investigator of the Criminal Investigation Division, testified that on August 26,
1997, the case involving the killing of Henry Pecho Piamonte was forwarded to him by PO3 Rosal
together with the evidence consisting of a bloodstained white Hanes t-shirt, a .38 revolver with five live
ammunitions, and two deformed slugs.

After an evaluation of the evidence, he formally filed a criminal complaint for murder against accused-
appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Arrest without warrant, was lawful

HELD: NO, under rule 113 section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when:

When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense. The Police officer only arrived after the call to their station.

When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it. The Police officer has no personal knowledge and relies only
on the statement of the witnesses nearby the crime.

When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. The accused is not a prisoner.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs. RUBEN MONTILLA y GATDULA, G.R. No. 123872. January 30, 1998.

Facts: Appellant was apprehended by members of the Cavite PNP transporting 28 marijuana bricks
contained in a traveling bag and a carton box weighing 28 kilograms. The PNP officers alleged that they
acted on a tip-off by an informant that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio City with an
undetermined amount of marijuana. Appellant during the trial disavowed ownership of the prohibited
drugs. He admitted coming all the way from Baguio and proceeded to Dasmariñas, Cavite, but denied
carrying any luggage with him. The trial culminated in a verdict of guilty beyond reasonable doubt in a
decision of the trial court which imposed the extreme penalty of death on appellant. All errors assigned
by the appellant, i.e. insufficiency of evidence, unlawful warrantless search and seizure, and failure of
prosecution to establish that the 28 marijuana bricks confiscated from him were the same marijuana
examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court, did not impress the Court. The reversible
error or the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on appellant.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant was legally caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs.

Held: Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to
the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create
in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of
violating the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that
appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these
attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the
search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.

As amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now provides
inter alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in
the case of indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said Section 4, the transporting of
prohibited drugs carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. As found by the trial court, there were neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending appellant's violation of the law, hence the second
paragraph of Article 63 must necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is
the proper imposable penalty.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmariñas, Cavite in Criminal
Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-appellant.
Name: People
v. Mengote y Tejas,
G.R. No. 87059, [June 22, 1992], 285 PHIL 642-651

Facts: Rogelio Mengote along with his two companions were reported for looking suspicious for “looking
from side to side” and “holding his abdomen''. He was later confronted by policemen who responded to
the report. He and his companions were then searched and it was discovered that Mengote had in his
possession an allegedly stolen .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the
chamber. His companion also had a concealed fan knife. Mengote and his companion were then turned
over to the police for further investigation.

Issue: Whether or not Mengote’s warrantless arrest was unlawful.

Decision: Yes, the warrantless arrest was unlawful. The prerequisites of a warrantless arrest has not
been established in the case at bar. Par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires that a person be
arrested (1) After he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to
commit an offense (2) In the presence of the arresting officer. There was apparently no offense that had
just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their
presence.

The accused-appellant is acquitted and ordered released immediately.

Soria v. Desierto,
G.R. NOS. 153524-25. January 31, 2005

Facts: On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001, petitioners Soria and Bista, were arrested
without a warrant by respondents police officers for alleged illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition; A crime which carries with it the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and
for violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the Commission on
Election Resolution No. 3328. At the Santa Police Station, petitioner Bista was identified by one of the
police officers to have a standing warrant of arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur.

At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria was released upon the
order of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista was
brought back and continued to be detained at the Santa Police Station. From the time of petitioner
Soria's detention up to the time of his release, twenty-two (22) hours had already elapsed; On 15 May
2001, at around 2:00, Petitioner Bista posted bail and an Order of Temporary Release was issued
thereafter. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail, He was detained for 26
days.

Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari, contend precisely that the public respondents herein
- officers of the Office of the Ombudsman - gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint
for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code against private respondents herein, members of
the Philippine National Police stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur.

Issue: Whether, the public respondents gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint for
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Held: No, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be
included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in
courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a 'no-office day. (Medina v. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.).
Furthermore, Grave abuse of discretion is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the
part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law. No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein
public respondents. Their disposition of petitioners' complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of thin air as it was properly backed up by law and
jurisprudence.
CHESTER DE JOYA vs. JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ

G.R. No. 162416, January 31, 2006

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify and set aside the warrant of
arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03-219952 for violation of
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in accordance with the Presidential Decree No. 1689.
Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the
issuance of warrant of arrest against the accused?

RULING:

The court held that the documents presented were sufficiently established the existence of probable
cause as required under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Probable cause
where facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested without resorting to the calibrations of
technical rules of evidence of which he has no knowledge. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common
sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance which is less stringent than that used for
establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against
the accused, the trial court judge has sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest. In the same manner,
the accused continued refusal to submit to the court’s jurisdiction and gives the Court more reason to
uphold the action of the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the accused
under the custody of the law to hold him for trial. His evasive stance shows an intent to circumvent and
frustrate the object of this legal process.
Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (3rd division) , G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015

FACTS: On 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan based on their alleged involvement in the misuse of appropriations under the PDAF.
Enrile voluntarily surrendered when his warrant of arrest was issued and thereafter filed his Motion for
Detention at the PNP General Hospital and his Motion to Fix Bail, asserting that (1) the Prosecution had
not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (2) although he was charged with plunder
which entails a penalty of reclusion perpetua, his would only be reclusion temporal given the presence
of two mitigating circumstances (his voluntary surrender and his being over 70 years of age); and (3) he
was not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition which must be given serious consideration.

The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Fix Bail on the grounds that: (1) he is charged with a capital
offense; (2) that it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of his bail because the prosecution have
not yet presented its evidences.

ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail.

RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail
and unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s fragile health and advanced age. Bail is a matter right and is
safeguarded by the constitution, its purpose is to ensure the personal appearance of the accused during
trial or whenever the court requires and at the same time recognizing the guarantee of due process
which is the presumption of his innocence until proven guilty. The Supreme Court further explained that
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged should be allowed
independently of the merits charged, provided his continued incarceration is injurious to his health and
endanger his life. Hence, the Sandiganbayan failed to observeI that if Sen. Enrile be granted the right to
bail it will enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and attended, which will then
enable him to attend trial therefore achieving the true purpose of bail.
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño
Vs. Judge Alejadrino C. Cabebe., A.M. Oca No. 03-1800-RTC (November 26, 2004)

Fact/s: The case aroused from the complaint of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño
against Judge Alejadrino C. Cabebe, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Batac, Ilocos Norte of the Criminal Case No. 3950-18 for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated
drugs against Rey Daquep Arcangel, Victorino Gamet Malabed, William Roxas Villanueva, all police
officers, Jocelyn Malabed Manuel and Pelagio Valencia Manuel.
The respondent judge was charged with unjust judgement and gross ignorance of the law and
partiality after granting bail towards the accused without conducting a hearing. Under the present
Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. It must be
stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on
the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of
whether or not the evidencewhich remains with the judge.

Further, under the Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
that before the issuance of bail, a hearing for the application of bail must be sufficed in order to
prove the evidences that the guilt is strong on which the presiding judge Cabebe had failed to
conform.

Issue: whether or not the respondent, Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe violates the Sections 8 and 18, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Decision: The respondent judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe was found guilty of violation of Supreme
Court Rules, specifically Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the grant of bail.
Thus, the Court hereby fined the respondent with the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
the same to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOHN MAMARION
412 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 137554 (October 1, 2003)

FACTS On or about July 16, 1995 or and sometime prior thereto, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, John
Mamarion, Amado, Gale, Charlito Domingo, Roger Biona, Juliet Harisco, Leny Leysa, Bebot Dela Rosa,
Bebot Villarosa, Benie Bemaje, Sergio Mendoza, Ronald Porquez, Rolando V. Maclang, together with
John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and Edward Doe whose true names, identities and whereabouts are
still unknown, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with the use of firearms of
different calibers by means of violence against and intimidation of person, did then, and there, kidnap
ROBERTA COKIN, detain and deprive her of her liberty for the period of more than three (3) days for the
purpose of extorting money in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) from her sister,
Teresita Cokin, for her (Roberta’s) release and that after the pay-off was intercepted and accused John
Mamarion was arrested: as a consequence thereof, victim Roberta Cokin was inflicted multiple physical
injuries on different parts of her body which caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
Accused Gale filed a motion, with the approval of the public prosecutor, seeking that he be allowed to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, i.e., from, Kidnapping for Ransom to Slight Illegal Detention. Acting on
said motion, the trial court conferred with the victim’s sister, Teresita Cokin, and the latter agreed.
There being no evidence presented as yet against Gale and on the condition that he will testify for the
prosecution, the trial court found no impediment to grant the motion. Appellants assail Gale’s plea to a
lesser offense arguing that it should have been made during the plea bargaining stage of the trial and
that it should not be subject to the condition that he will testify against appellants.

ISSUE Whether or not the trial court erred in allowing principal accused Amado Gale to change his plea
of not guilty to a lesser offense in consideration of his undertaking to testify as one of the prosecution
witnesses and when the plea was not made during the plea bargaining stage of the trial.

DECISION No. It is immaterial that said plea was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made
only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses. In People vs. Villarama, Jr., a 1992 case,
the trial court allowed the accused therein to change his plea even after the prosecution had rested its
case, applying Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which also allowed Gale to change his plea.
Records show that during the May 13, 1997 hearing, the Chief State Prosecutor manifested that he has
approved Gale’s motion to be allowed to plead to a lesser offense, i.e. Slight Illegal Detention. Private
complainant Teresita Cokin, upon query of the trial court, consented to Gale’s offer of plea to a lesser
offense Slight Illegal Detention. In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead
guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation,
jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within
which their discretion may be properly exercised.
JOEL P. LIBUIT VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 154363 (September 13, 2005)

Facts: Libuit was charged with the crime of Estafa by Dominador Del Mundo. Del Mundo had
entrusted the repair of his car to the motor shop owned by Libuit. However, the shop failed to
repair and deliver the car after two weeks. Further, it had been found that the car had been sold
in pieces. On the other hand, a trial ensued and Libuit pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. But
the first defense counsel of Libuit withdrew from the case after initial cross-examination and the
second defense counsel failed to appear in subsequent hearings despite notices. Consequently,
the trial court issued an Order striking from the records his direct testimony and declaring the
case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence already on record. He was charged
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, penalized with Reclusion Temporal and ordered to pay Del
Mundo with an amount representing the value of his car plus costs of suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence,
petitioner Libuit filed for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the decision.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.
Decision: No. The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has no
counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of
arraignment. No such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then
the trial with a counsel of his own choice. Worth noting, when the time for the presentation of
evidence for the defense arrived, and the defendant appeared by himself alone, the absence of
his counsel was inexcusable.
In the present case, since the petitioner was represented by counsel de parte at the
arraignment and trial, the trial court could not be deemed duty-bound to appoint a counsel de
oficio for the continuation of the cross-examination. At the most, the appointment of a counsel
de oficio in a situation like this would be discretionary with the trial court, which discretion will
not be interfered within the absence of grave abuse. The Court was convinced that the trial
court had been liberal in granting the postponements asked by the petitioner himself that such
liberality removes any doubt that its order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
In this case, the Court ruled to deny the instant petition and upheld the decision of the
previous courts.
Genuino v. De Lima
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034 & 199046
[April 17, 2018]

Facts: In view of the criminal complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-422
dated August 9, 2011 against GMA pursuant to her authority under DOJ Circular No.
41. She also ordered for the inclusion of GMA's name in the Bureau of Immigration (BI)
watchlist. Thereafter, the BI issued WLO No. ASM-11-237, implementing De Lima's
order. On September 6, 2011, De Lima issued DOJ Amended WLO No. 2011- 422
against GMA to reflect her full name in the BI Watchlist. WLO No. 2011-422, as
amended, is valid for a period of 60 days, or until November 5, 2011, unless sooner
terminated or otherwise extended. This was lifted in due course by De Lima, in an Order
dated November 14, 2011, following the expiration of its validity.
In three separate letters dated October 20, 2011, October 21, 2011, and October 24,
2011, GMA requested for the issuance of an ADO, pursuant to Section 7 of DOJ
Circular No. 41, so that she may be able to seek medical attention from medical
specialists abroad for her hypoparathyroidism and metabolic bone mineral disorder. She
mentioned six different countries where she intends to undergo consultations and
treatments: United States of America, Germany, Singapore, Italy, Spain and Austria.
She likewise undertook to return to the Philippines, once her treatment abroad is
completed, and participate in the proceedings before the DOJ.

Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 41 series of 2010 of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) constitutional on the ground that it infringes on the constitutional right to travel.

Decision: The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal basis. there is no law
particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of
the right to travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.
Consistent with the foregoing, there must be an enabling law from which DOJ Circular
No. 41 must derive its life. Unfortunately, all of the supposed statutory authorities relied
upon by the DOJ did not pass the completeness test and sufficient standard test. The
DOJ miserably failed to establish the existence of the enabling law that will justify the
issuance of the questioned circular. Surely, the DOJ must have the best intentions in
promulgating DOJ Circular No. 41, but the end will not justify the means. To sacrifice
individual liberties because of a perceived good is disastrous to democracy.
Laviste vs Court of Appeals GR No. 189122 March 17, 2010

Facts:
Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by the
RTC for the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then
he field an application for admission to bail pending appeal, due to his advanced age
and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his
part. The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail
during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong
reasons. That bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing
medical care outside the prison facility. On this matter, Levisete questioned the ruling of
the CA and averred that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his
application for bail considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under
the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. That when the penalty
imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the
circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be granted to an
appellant pending appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application
for bail of Leviste.

Ruling:

No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3
of the same rule if the penalty impose is more than 6 years the accused shall be denied
bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other circumstances:
 1. that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
2.

3. that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence,

or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
4.

5. that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional

pardon;
6.

7. that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if

released on bail; or
8.

9. that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said
that CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the
presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail
ends, from then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN MONTILLA y

GATDULA, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 123872. January 30, 1998.
Facts: Appellant was apprehended by members of the Cavite PNP transporting 28
marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton box weighing 28 kilograms.
The PNP officers alleged that they acted on a tip-off by an informant that a drug courier
would be arriving from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of marijuana.
Appellant during the trial disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He admitted
coming all the way from Baguio and proceeded to Dasmariñas, Cavite, but denied
carrying any luggage with him. The trial culminated in a verdict of guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in a decision of the trial court which imposed the extreme penalty of
death on appellant. All errors assigned by the appellant, i.e. insufficiency of evidence,
unlawful warrantless search and seizure, and failure of prosecution to establish that the
28 marijuana bricks confiscated from him were the same marijuana examined by the
forensic chemist and presented in court, did not impress the Court. The reversible error
or the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on appellant.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant was legally caught in flagrante transporting the
prohibited drugs.
Held: Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the
point prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by
themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and
reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The search yielded
affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually
committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts,
it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the
search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.
As amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs
Act now provides inter alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved is, in the case of indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or
more. In said Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugs carries with it the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
reclusion perpetua and death. As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating
nor aggravating circumstances attending appellant's violation of the law, hence the
second paragraph of Article 63 must necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmariñas,
Cavite in Criminal Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-
appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all
other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
accused-appellant.

People of the Philippines vs. Elizar Tomaquin

G.R. No. 133188
July 23, 2004
Facts:
On December 17, 1996, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed an Information charging
appellant Elizar Tomaquin with Murder, committed as follows: That on or about the 15th
day of December, 1996, about 2:30 a.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a bladed instrument
(tres cantos), with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy, by stabbing her with said bladed
instrument, hitting her on the vital parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her physical
injuries, as a consequence of which, Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy died almost
instantaneously.
There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecution's evidence, aside from
appellant's extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial.
In the afternoon of December 15, 1996, barangay tanods Julius Yosores and Armando
Zabate of Lorega, Cebu City, searched for appellant because of the information given
by Rico Magdasal that the shoes and tres cantos found in the scene of the crime
belonged to appellant. The tanods told appellant that he is a suspect in the killing of
Jaquelyn, and brought him to the house of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan.
Atty. Parawan then told his tanods to take appellant to the police station.
In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1996, appellant was investigated by
SPO2 Mario Monilar of the Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station in Cebu City. After
being apprised of his constitutional rights, appellant told SPO2 Monilar that he was
willing to confess and asked for Atty. Parawan, the barangay captain, to assist him.
Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, with the assistance
of Atty. Fortunato Parawan is admissible in evidence against appellant as he is also a
barangay captain who is a lawyer can be considered an independent counsel within the
purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Decision:
Considering that Atty. Parawan’s role as a barangay captain, was a peacekeeping
officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing
competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his
jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan could not be considered as an independent counsel of
appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution
requires is the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will
effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.
Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that
the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his
extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would
undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and
to be presumed innocent. The assistance rendered by Atty. Parawan to appellant
cannot be fittingly described as effective and vigilant. Moreover, that Atty. Parawan is
not an effective and vigilant counsel is bolstered by his own testimony that he already
suspected appellant as having committed the crime when the latter was brought to his
house by the barangay tanods. It was posited that appellant cannot challenge Atty.
Parawan’s qualification as a competent and independent counsel because he was his
choice. As provided in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, “(A)ny person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right . . . to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Ideally, the lawyer
called to be present during such investigations should be as far as reasonably possible,
the choice of the individual undergoing questioning, CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021
cdasiaonline.com but the word "preferably" does not convey the message that the
choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. 29 What is
imperative is that the counsel should be competent and independent. That appellant
chose Atty. Parawan does not estop appellant from complaining about the latter’s failure
to safeguard his rights. It appears that appellant chose Atty. Parawan because he was
the barangay captain of Brgy. Lorega where appellant resides, and apparently,
appellant trusts Atty. Parawan to protect his rights. The latter, however, fell short in
tending to the trust reposed on him. Appellant did not finish Grade 1 and does not know
how to read and write. 30 As between him and Atty. Parawan who presumably knows
the intricacies of the law and appellant’s predicament, Atty. Parawan should have
known better and exercised his sound judgment before conceding to appellant’s choice.
But it did not occur to him to inhibit himself from acting as appellant’s counsel and
instead, he even let appellant go through the investigation and execute the extrajudicial
confession knowing fully well that he was biased as regards appellant’s innocence.
Clearly, Atty. Parawan failed to meet the exacting standards of an independent and
competent counsel as required by the Constitution. Thus, the extrajudicial confession
executed by appellant, even if gospel truth, is deemed an uncounselled confession and
therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
The circumstantial evidence in this case does not constitute an unbroken chain leading
to one fair and reasonable conclusion that appellant is the guilty person. Added to that
is the prosecution’s failure to establish the chain of custody of these valuable pieces of
evidence.
The prosecution’s evidence that is perceived to be conclusive of appellant’s guilt is
mainly the testimony of Rico Magdasal. Such testimony, however, is uncorroborated.
The rule is that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, if such
testimony positively establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Moreover, the doctrine of long standing that the testimony of a lone witness, if credible
and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused applies only to eyewitnesses. Thus, an
uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction when the
evidence itself is in serious doubt. Rico’s lone testimony is not sufficient to establish
appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant enjoys in his favor the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proven.
Proof of the guilt of the accused should not be tainted with ambiguity. Although
appellant’s defense is weak, conviction must come from the strength of the
prosecution's evidence and not from the weakness of the defense. In this case, the
prosecution’s evidence is not strong enough to justify a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Acquittal, therefore, is inevitable.
 WHEREFORE, appellant Elizar Tomaquin is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
RELEASED immediately, unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.

Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUFINO ERNAS Y VILLANUEVA,

G.R. NO. 137256-58, 6 August 2003

Facts:
Mr. Rufino Ernas Villanueva, appellant, was charged with three counts of rape for
sexually abusing his two daughters. Upon arraignment, he entered a separate plea of
not guilty to each of the three charges. Subsequently, however, he withdrew his former
plea of not guilty and voluntarily pleaded guilty to the three counts of rape. The trial
court granted appellant's motion to withdraw his former plea and ordered his re-
arraignment. With the plea of guilty entered by the appellant on the three counts of rape,
the prosecution opted to dispense with the direct testimony of the complaining
witnesses. Consequently, the trial court rendered a joint judgment and found appellant
guilty of three counts of rape and sentenced him to the supreme penalty of death for
each case.

Issue:
Did the trial court erred in not requiring the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused
despite the plea of guilty to a capital offense?

Decision:
YES. A conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. The
prosecution evidence must be sufficient to sustain a judgement of conviction
independently of the plea guilt. Under Section 3 of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, “Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.— When
the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea
and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his
culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf." The presentation of
evidence should be required in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the
mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that there
might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of
the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to
the commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser
degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties.
RTEMIO T. TORRES, JR. vs. SPS. DRS. EDGARDO AGUINALDO & NELIA T.
TORRES-AGUINALDO G.R. No. 164268 (June 28, 2005)
Facts:
Respondent-spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila, a complaint against petitioner Artemio T. Torres, Jr. for
falsification of public documents. Torres denied the allegations of forgery and claimed
that Aguinaldo sold the subject properties to him.
Finding probable cause, the OCP recommended the filing of an information for
falsification of public document against Torres, which was filed before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila (MTC), Branch 8, on October 3, 2001. Torres moved for
reconsideration but was denied. On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed the
findings of the investigating prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the information.
The motion for reconsideration filed by Aguinaldo was denied. A Motion to Withdraw
Information was filed which the MTC granted on June 11, 2003. It should be noted that
petitioner has not been arraigned.
Issue:
Whether the rule on provisional dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
Held:
NO. A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion to dismiss. While both put
an end to an action filed in court, their legal effect varies. The order granting the
withdrawal of the information attains finality after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof,
without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon reinvestigation. On the other
hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final fifteen (15) days after receipt
thereof, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order achieves
finality.
In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed and not a motion to
dismiss. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw information is not time-barred
and does not fall within the ambit of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides that the law on provisional dismissal becomes
operative once the judge dismisses, with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party.
There is provisional dismissal when a motion filed expressly for that purpose complies
with the following requisites: (1) It must be with the express consent of the accused; and
(2) There must be notice to the offended party. Section 8, Rule 117 contemplates the
filing of a motion to dismiss, and not a motion to withdraw information. Thus, the law on
provisional dismissal does not apply in the present case.
Tolentino v. Camano [G.R. 101837] January 20, 2000

Facts:
An information against Roderick Odiaman was filed for the violation of Child abuse Act or
Republic Act 7610 at the Regional Trial Court presided by respondent judge: Judge Policarpio S.
Camano. A motion to quash the information was then filed claiming lack of Preliminary
Investigation. The complainant: State Prosecutor Romulo SJ Tolentino was then ordered to
conduct the said investigation to produce evidence proving strong guilt against the accused. In
the meantime, a petition for bail was filed where the complainant, on the day of the hearing
failed to appear. The date for the hearing was then readjusted twice where the complainant, even
after being duly notified, still failed to appear prompting respondent judge to grant the bail at a
price of P50,000. After reconsideration, the order was then postponed to allow the prosecution to
produce evidence of strong guilt against the suspect Roderick Odiaman. Since the complainant
still failed to appear the bail was once again granted but this time with a larger price of P100,000.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge Camano is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave
abuse of authority in granting bail without hearing and whether or not the price for bail set by
respondent judge (P100,000) was excessive.

Held:
Judge Camano was found GUILTY by the Office of the Court Administrator for gross ignorance
of the law and grave abuse of authority for granting bail without hearing. This is due to the fact
that as much as the members of the legal profession are human and may make erroneous
decisions, the error made the respondent judge was not simply a common human error but was in
fact a violation of the fundamental law of procedural due process. Respondent Judge, should not
have acted on the petition for bail as there is still a pending reinvestigation of the cases at the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office. In doing so, he acted with grave abuse of authority and
wanton disregard of established rules and jurisprudence. Respondent Judge should have noted
that the Judge is under legal obligation to receive evidence from the prosecution whereas to
determine whether or not there is a presence of strong guilt enough to issue the denial of bail. If
the Prosecution fails to appear, instead of granting bail for the sake of convenience for
complainant’s obvious refusal to appear before court, respondent judge should have questioned
whether or not the evidence in actuality really exists so as to ascertain the validity of the grant of
the said bail. Lastly, the price set for bail was also excessive since the price set under Justice
Department Circular No. 4 was only P40,000. Far more than the P100,000 set by the respondent
judge.
MELBAROSE R. SASOT, vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 143193. June 29, 2005
Doctrine:
Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date
of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. When an
offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information. (Sec. 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court)
Facts:
In May 1997, the NBI conducted an investigation pursuant to a complaint by the NBA
Properties, Inc., against petitioners for possible violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal
Code on unfair competition. In its Report, the NBI stated that NBA Properties, Inc., is a foreign
corporation organized under the laws of the United States of America, and is the registered
owner of NBA trademarks and names of NBA basketball teams such as Chicago Bulls, etc.
These names are used on hosiery, footwear, t-shirts, sweatshirts, tank tops, pajamas, sport
shirts, and other garment products, which are allegedly registered with the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer. The Report further stated that during the investigation, it
was discovered that petitioners are engaged in the manufacture, printing, sale, and distribution
of counterfeit NBA garment products. Hence, it recommended petitioners prosecution for unfair
competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
In a Special Power of Attorney, Rick Welts, as President of NBA Properties, Inc., constituted the
law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell, as the companys attorney
in-fact, and to act for and on behalf of the company, in the filing of criminal, civil and
administrative complaints, among others. The Special Power of Attorney was notarized by
Nicole Brown of New York County and certified by Norman Goodman, County Clerk and Clerk
of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Consul Cecilia B. Rebong of the Consulate
General of the Philippines, New York, authenticated the certification. Welts also executed a
Complaint-Affidavit on February 12, 1998, before Notary Public Nicole J. Brown of the State of
New York. Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
following grounds: (1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense and (2) the court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused. Petitioners argue that the
fiscal should have dismissed Welts's complaint because under the rules, the complaint must be
sworn to before the prosecutor and the copy on record appears to be only a fax transmittal. The
prosecutor filed his Comment/Opposition to the motion to quash, stating that he has the original
copy of the complaint, and that complainant has an attorney-in-fact to represent it. The
prosecutor also contended that the State is entitled to prosecute the offense even without the
participation of the private offended party, as the crime
charged is a public crime. The trial court sustained the prosecutions arguments and denied
petitioners motion to quash.
Issue:
Whether or not a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines and not licensed to
do business in the Philippines have the right to sue for unfair competition.
Held:
Yes. Under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint is
substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by
complainants affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents, and the affidavits are
sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath,
or in their absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits. All these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed before Prosecution Attorney
Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be noted that even the absence of an oath in the complaint
does not necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a mere defect of form, which does not
affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits.
In this case, Weltss Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by Notary Public Nicole
Brown of the State of New York that the same has been subscribed and sworn to before her on
February 12, 1998, duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate. While the copy on record of
the complaint-affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosecution Attorney
Gutierrez stated that complainants representative will present the authenticated notarized
original in court, and Prosecutor Guray manifested that the original copy is already on hand. It is
apt to state at this point that the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of
accuracy.
Moreover, records show that there are other supporting documents from which the prosecutor
based his recommendation. Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no
showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public
prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court should respect such determination. More
importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal
Code is a public crime. It is essentially an act against the State and it is the latter which
principally stands as the injured party. The complainants capacity to sue in such case becomes
immaterial.