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Causality and Determinism in Modern Physics

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GRZEGORZ BUGAJAK
DEPARTMENT OF METHODOLOGY OF SYSTEM AND INFORMATION SCIENCES
CARDINAL STEFAN WYSZYŃSKI UNIVERSITY, WARSAW
gbugajak@uksw.edu.pl

Causality and Determinism in Modern Physics

Key words: causality, determinism, indeterminism, quantum mechanics

– interpretations.

1. Introductory remarks
Many philosophers share the view that the objects of examination
in physics are phenomena and relations between them, rather than the
deepest ‘structure’ of the objectively existing reality [cf. Rutowski
1984, 53], the research of which is the domain of metaphysics and the
philosophy of nature. In other words, physics deals with the phenomenal
aspect of reality. Whether one shares this standpoint or not, the standard
way of arriving at theorems in physics and the method of falsification
of hypotheses are, indeed, empirical in character. The starting point is
usually an observation of some phenomenon1. The term “observation”

1
What is meant here is the standard research practice in physics. However, nowadays
some attempts of another approach are known. According to this approach the starting
point is not the observation but rather some theoretical speculation. What is more,
even the justification of proposed theories is supposed to be independent of empirical
data. This approach is represented, for example, in the string theory: „After its suc-
cessful transition to metaphysics and its selfimmunization against empirical control, it
is not even clear, if there are any empirical means by which we could find out if string
theory does describe nature in any adequate way, or not. Even a wrong theory will not
necessarily be defeated by nature, if it is able to avoid any contact to nature” [Hedrich
2007, 274]. Therefore, the epistemological status of such attempts is unclear, and they
will be ignored in this analysis.
74 Grzegorz Bugajak

is used here in its broader sense, i.e. rarely, some direct observation is
meant. Most often an observation is performed with the use of special
measuring devices. It is practically impossible to think of an observation
in physics, from which all measurements would be eliminated. More-
over, the phenomenon under examination is, frequently, brought about
artificially, as an experiment, for the purposes of this examination.
And finally, already at this early stage of research, a scientist has some
theory, which, for more or less intuitional reasons, seems to be adequate
to describe the examined phenomena. The observed phenomenon un-
dergoes certain theoretical ‘symbolization’ in order for it to be described
within a given theory. From this point onwards, a researcher uses
mathematical objects and not real events; and logical and mathematical
inference applies to mathematical objects. This inference, in turn,
provides certain ‘symbolic events’, which are, subsequently, verified,
i.e. confronted with real events observed empirically. If the verification
is positive, we say that a given theory describes a given phenomenon
adequately. Otherwise, another theory is searched for; a theory, whose
predictions (those ‘symbolic events’ arrived at through logical inference),
will be consistent with empirical experience.
We should note that within the practice described above two
special assumptions are made:
(1) The assumption that in the process of observation and the sub-
sequent ‘theoretical symbolization’, we can, without a danger of
severe inadequacy making the whole research miss its point, ignore
the “negligibly small” quantities, i.e.:
– errors in measurement2, which as it has been already said, is practi-
cally inseparable from the process of observation in physics, do not
affect the validity of final conclusions;
– equally insignificant are simplifications made during theoretical
preparations, when some empirical parameters are ignored in order
for a given phenomenon to be, without excessive difficulties, placed
within the framework of a mathematical theory. This assumption can

2
What is meant here is the random error (leading to measurement uncertainty),
unavoidable in every measurement.
Causality and Determinism in Modern Physics 75

be called the assumption of the mathematicality and ‘idealizability’

of nature [Heller 1986, 14-16].
(2) The assumption that in such research, the enumerative induction is
sufficient to acknowledge the validity of the theorems. If an ex-
periment repeated many times (an observation made many times)
always proceeds in the same way, we assume that the regularity
acknowledged will always occur, whenever the situation happens.
The second assumption is not a problem for a physicist, as it is suf-
ficient that some regularity actually occurs in the cases acknowledged
so far and that it has practical significance. The first assumption is pos-
sible to maintain only, because physics doesn’t deal with individual
cases, but rather with regularities applicable to all (virtually countless)
events of the same kind [Gawecki 1969, 70]. In this case, what matters
is practical utility of a given theory and not the fact that it can describe
particular events a bit imprecisely.
Given this background, how can we understand the principle of
causality in physics? Its main formula, i.e. “Each event has its cause”
seems to be acceptable, or at least attainable within physics. For it
involves events – precisely this aspect of reality which is examined by
physics. However, the principle of causality, as formulated above,
cannot be accepted in physics, because physics, as it has been already
said, doesn’t deal with individual cases. Hence, in physics, we cannot
ask whether a given single event has its cause, or not. On the other
hand, even in some ideal world, where physics would be able to assert
a cause for each and every event examined so far, the use of the
enumerative induction does not allow for a general statement that
every event has its cause. The thesis of causality, as formulated above,
has to be, therefore, regarded as external to the system; it can only be
valuable for a natural scientist in that it encourages to search for causes,
since (according to this thesis) they exist [cf. Rutowski 1984, 54].
Ignoring this heuristic aspect, a natural scientist can agree with
Reichenbach, who writes: “If we seek for a particular cause, we need
not assume that there is one. We can leave this question open, like the
question of what is the cause. Only if we knew that there is no cause
would it be unreasonable to seek for a particular cause. But if nothing
76 Grzegorz Bugajak

is known about there being a cause, we can search at the same time for
the particular cause and for the answer to the question whether there is
one” [Reichenbach 1951, 112-113]. Hence, on the one hand, a physicist
does not have to take the principle of causality into consideration, e.g. by
accepting it tacitly as a precondition of their research, as some maintain
[Kiczuk 1977, 129]; on the other hand, there are no reasons, either, for
which they would have to reject it, either in a single case or in general.
In natural sciences, the idea of causality can be considered in so far
as it expresses the principle of determinism [Mazierski 1955-1957,
155]: the same cause (under the same circumstances) brings about the
same results [Krajewski 1967, 242], or, to put it in a more precise way:
if the state of a certain material system is known in the present, then,
its past and future states are known, too [Mazierski 1958, 27-29]. This
is the very formula of the principle of determinism, which we will take
into account during our discussion.
However, we should note here that, sometimes, it is postulated that
the principle of determinism should be extended to cover the convic-
tion that “individual representatives of a certain species always act in
the same way under the same circumstances” [van Melsen 1953, 208],
or more generally, that determinism equals the following conviction:
„a thing, of necessity, behaves as it does in accordance with its given
nature” [van Melsen 1953, 231]. Even if such views are correct, they
are philosophical in nature and hence cannot be considered within the
scope of physics.
Other attempts of extending the principle of determinism involve
introducing the notion of general determinism. Then, this principle
would include unambiguous (strict) determinism, as defined above, and
ambiguous (or statistical) determinism [e.g. Krajewski 1964, 141-143;
cf. Hacking 1983; Walton 1973], namely, the cases where the state
of the system S at the moment t0 would determine the whole group of
possible states S1, S2, ..., Sn at the moment t, each with some probability
P1, P2, ..., Pn in the way that the sum P1 + P2 + .... + Pn would equal 1
[Mazierski 1972, 346-347]. Yet, introducing the notion of general
determinism seems to be a misleading attempt, because it attributes the
term “deterministic” to cases commonly associated with indeterminism
Causality and Determinism in Modern Physics 77

[cf. Amsterdamski 1964, 85-92]. Therefore, we will confine ourselves

to the approach, which associates the notion of determinism with
unequivocal prediction (or retrodiction): the state S0 at the moment t0
determines the state S at the moment t.
With the above formula in mind it can be judged whether a given
theory is deterministic or not. It is important to note that such a judgment
concerns a theory understood here as a mathematical apparatus
with some accompanying physical interpretation. The question of
the determination of phenomena (whatever a ‘determination of a phe-
nomenon’ may mean) as certain manifestations of reality is an entirely
different one.
The notion of “the state of a system”, used in the principle of
determinism, deserves particular attention. What does it mean? The
physical state of a system is the set of empirical data, which “fully
describe the properties of a given system and of its surroundings,
affecting it” [Mazierski 1958, 27-29]. However, the phrase “fully
describe the properties…” raises important problems. We should
note that:
(1) As a result of the assumption of ‘idealizability’ of nature, men-
tioned above, and hence applying the procedure of ignoring the
“negligibly small quantities”, the properties of a system are never
fully described. The state of a system, described with taking into
account all its properties known in physics could be called the
“absolute state” [cf. Sławianowski 1969, 44-46]. (Yet, we should
remember that such a term may be misleading. This is because the
cognitive capacities of physics develop constantly and at no stage
of this development we can say that they are truly “absolute”).
(2) In practice, we obviously use a relative notion of state. This is a set
of empirical data, determining important properties of a system;
important properties are those which, when taken into account, are
sufficient for the theory in question to be applicable. The properties,
which should be taken into account are those, which, within a given
theory are subject to theoretical symbolization. Thus, the relative
state of a system is a notion relative to our purposes (needs) and our
78 Grzegorz Bugajak

cognitive capabilities3. Therefore it may be that a system, for some

of its relative states, is described by a deterministic theory, while
for another relative states there is no determination.
As we see from the above discussion, the way a relative state of
a system is perceived depends on the theory under consideration. A rela-
tive state is relative to our needs. The first need determining a descrip-
tion of the state of a system is the use of this notion within a given
theory. So, the properties taken into account while describing the state
of the system are those required by the theory [cf. Augustynek 1962, 11;
Mazierski 1972, 283-284]. If for some phenomenon it is impossible to
find a relative state of the system, appropriate for the theory by means
of which we are trying to describe this phenomenon, it means only that
this particular theory is not applicable to this phenomenon.
What follows is that it is possible for the same system to be described
both by a deterministic and an indeterministic theory, depending on
how the state of this system is defined. If the definition of this state is
possible to use within certain deterministic theory, then the system
will be regarded as capable of being described within this theory. But
if, for some reasons, we do not have the notion of state, which this
particular theory requires, it means that this theory is inapplicable. The
question of reasons, for which the required state of a system cannot be
found, doesn’t have to worry natural scientists. It is sufficient that they,
after deciding on such impossibility, attempt to describe the state of
the system in question in the way which could be analyzed within
some other practically useful theory.
This problem is different in philosophy, though. In philosophy, the
reasons, for which scientists rejected some particular way of describing

3
Cf. J. J. Sławianowski [1969, 50] and the example presented there. In case of vapours,
most frequently we are not interested in their microscopic structure, but rather in their
properties exhibited on the macroscopic level. Hence, we use the notions of pressure,
temperature, etc., to describe the state of the vapour, which is one of possible relative
states, presenting the properties important from practical point of view, while ignoring
others. The state described in this way will not be sufficient for the atomistic theory
because, for this theory, the pressure and temperature are not essential properties of
the system.
Causality and Determinism in Modern Physics 79

the properties of the system may appear very important. There are,
basically, three possibilities:
(1) The research methods used, inadequate measurements or measur-
ing devices did not allow for capturing the properties required.
(2) These properties are, by definition, impossible to consider within
a given theory, because they comprise a relative state of a system
different from a relative state required by the theory in question.
(3) These properties are impossible to be captured for some “funda-
mental reasons”, resulting in the necessity of resigning (not only
for practical reasons but for ever) from describing the system by
means of this theory, within which the capturing of these properties
was necessary to build up the notion of state it requires.
If the third possibility is the case, then a philosopher faces the prob-
lem concerning philosophical implications of the fact of “fundamental
impossibility” of capturing some properties of the system, and hence
the equally fundamental inapplicability of a given theory to the
description of phenomena in question. All the conclusions, which can
be drawn from such a situation have to respect two restrictions:
A. The impossibility of applying a deterministic theory doesn’t mean
the lack of determination in reality. The view that even all the
events in the universe are determined is not the same as the convic-
tion that precise prediction (or retrodiction) is always possible
[cf. Majewski 1970, 204-205]. If a phenomenon is possible to be
described in a deterministic way, we can conclude that it actually is
determined. However, the lack of such description – the lack of
a deterministic theory for a certain type of phenomena – doesn’t
exclude a possibility of actual determination, since a deterministic
relationship may occur independently of our knowledge. In other
words, determinism would be excluded here on the epistemological,
and not on the ontological level.
B. This “fundamental” impossibility of capturing required properties
of a system involves a given concrete theory and not the type of
theories. For instance, if the theory inapplicable to a certain case
was of the deterministic type, it doesn’t imply that no deterministic
theory at all can be applied to this case. Thus, ultimately neither
80 Grzegorz Bugajak

ontological nor epistemological determinism may be excluded,

even in the case of the fundamental impossibility of capturing cer-
tain properties of the system.

2. Classical physics
It seems that in many discussions of causality in classical physics,
what gets overlooked is that, strictly speaking, the notion of causality
– unlike the notion of determinism – has virtually no application in
physics. Questions expressing the issues of classical physics are of
this sort: “I’m moving an object, what is the cause of its movement?”
[Gawecki 1969, 163] or „An object is falling down. What is the cause
of it?” [Gawecki 1969, 162]. Questions of this sort, about the cause of
some phenomenon, are also asked in everyday life – “Something
happened, why?” Yet, in the field of physics, it doesn’t lead to explicit
conclusions. Considering, for example, the problem: “What is the
cause of falling down of an object?” may lead to various true, but not
necessarily unambiguous answers, e.g. the cause of falling down is:
(1) the Earth; (2) the gravitational force; (3) the preceding process of
taking an object up to the point from which it has fallen [Gawecki
1969, 164]; (4) some external factor causing an object to lose its
balance (if it has kept it before, despite the (1) – (3) factors). Each of
the above answers is correct, although each expresses the cause of
the same phenomenon in a different way. We can quote numerous
arguments for each of the above reasons, yet a physicist wouldn’t be
able to decide which of them is ultimately correct, because answers to
the above questions cannot be unambiguous. It is not surprising,
though. As we already said, physics doesn’t deal with answering the
question of the cause of a given individual phenomenon. And if
physicists ask such question, they treat it as an auxiliary one, as it can
lead to revealing and describing some general regularities (as in the
above example – to the analysis of gravitation).
The more appropriate question is, therefore, not the one about
causality, but about determinism. One may ask if classical physics is
Causality and Determinism in Modern Physics 81

deterministic or not? Or, more strictly, are the theories of classical

physics of the deterministic type or not? The basic theory of classical
physics is classical mechanics. Let us briefly remind why this theory
is deterministic.
Obviously, classical mechanics uses some notion of the state of
a physical system. Historically speaking, the first definition of a state
was the position of a body in space. Adding the momentum to such
a description, we have the classical pair of quantities, sufficient for a cer-
tain physical system to capture the behaviour of this system within
classical mechanics [cf. van Name 1962, 166]. This theory, for a given
state of a material system at a random initial time t0, determines one
and only one state of this system at every other time. Capturing the
state of the system (determining the momentum and the position),
constitutes the basis of describing this system within the theory. The
theory, in turn, enables the theoretical determination (prediction) of
the state of the system at any other moment of time. This prediction is
obviously expressed by means of providing the same pair of quantities,
i.e. momentum and position at a desired time. The notion of the state
of a system used here, refers to the relative state, since it includes only
those of physical features of the system which are essential from the
viewpoint of classical mechanics, and ignores many others [cf. Majewski
1988, 19-23]. However, this notion turns out to be sufficient for practical
purposes, as it, together with the whole theory of classical mechanics,
leads to the results consistent with empirical knowledge. The fact that
predictions of the future (or past) ‘state of a system’ are possible and
that they are consistent with empirical knowledge decides that the
classical mechanics is a theory of a deterministic type.

3. Quantum physics
Classical physics, together with its fundamental theory, i.e. Newton’s
mechanics, had such great achievements that, at the end of the 19th
century, it was regarded as the perfect and extremely important theory
in all the fields which ever were, or would be, examined within physics.
82 Grzegorz Bugajak

Some minor problems, as physicists thought, remained unresolved, but

they were supposed to be resolved later on within classical mechanics.
Yet, the very attempts to solve these problems led to the fundamental
turn in physics, namely to the rise of quantum theory4.
As we can notice, while reading the history of theories in physics,
the development of physics, most frequently, imposes some restrictions
on the application of previously established theorems [cf. Piersa 1983,
155-164], e.g. when physicists noticed that the classical description of
motion fails for the range of speed approximating the velocity of light,
although it is correct for “ordinary” range of speed. Quantum physics,
however, seemed to cause something more: total rejection of laws re-
garded as irrefutable till then. The problems the quantum theory posed
are not confined to strictly physical issues. For instance, some attempts
are made to build up a new system of logic for the purposes of quan-
tum mechanics, other than the classical binary one [e.g. Dickson 2001;
Kiczuk 1978, 53-64]. Moreover, some maintain that a kind of a theory
of “discontinuous existence” is necessary, because the notion of
motion is called into doubt in quantum mechanics [Whitehead 1925,
53], or even they go so far as to negate the existence of the objects of
microphysics [Semczuk 1987, 33-40]. The most frequently considered
problem, though, is the fact that as soon as the quantum theory had
emerged, defining the notion of causality and reaching some agreement
concerning the views on causality became more and more troublesome.
The problem of causality, or determinism, in the micro-world became
one of the fundamental problems considered by both scientists and
philosophers [cf. Schabowski 1966, 221].

3.1. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle

Philosophical discussions of causality and determinism in the mi-
cro-world most often focus on Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle,
which follows from quantum mechanics. This principle expresses the
fact that it is impossible to capture, at the same time, the position and

4
An excellent account of this fascinating history can be found in Kumar [2008].
Causality and Determinism in Modern Physics 83

momentum for a given particle with unrestricted accuracy5. This

principle has its strict mathematical expression, allowing to formulate
it in a more precise way, namely, to say that the product of measurement
error for momentum and for position cannot be lesser than the so-called
Planck constant6. As these very quantities, connected by the uncertainty
principle, served for defining the state of a system within classical
mechanics, the consequences of this principle seem to be very important
for considering the problem of determinism.
The understanding of the uncertainty principle is not unambiguous,
though. It can be captured in three ways:
(1) Uncertainty as an effect of measuring disruption.
The principle of uncertainty is often explained as follows: The act
of measuring disrupts the system under examination, for there occurs
an inevitable interference between the system and the measuring
device. Hence, if we try to determine the position of a particle very
precisely, its state is so disrupted as the momentum becomes totally
indeterminate. And the other way round, if we try to determine the
momentum of a particle accurately, its position becomes indeterminate.
Shortly speaking, the cause of uncertainty lies in the interference
between the measured object and measuring device [Gołębiewski
1982, 37]. Such an approach would suggest that the uncertainty principle
is a result of the imperfection of measuring devices.
(2) Uncertainty as a consequence of the structure of measuring act.
This interpretation, referring also to the measuring process, shows
that the disruption of the state of a particle, caused by measuring, doesn’t
depend on the quality of measuring devices but rather it is a result of
the very act of measurement and hence is more fundamental in character
[Svechnikov 1971]. It is impossible to imagine a measurement which
wouldn’t disrupt the state of the particle under examination. It follows
5
This principle applies also to other pairs of the so-called canonically coupled quantities,
yet, for our present purposes, it is sufficient to formulate this principle for the position
and momentum.
6
More strictly, this product cannot be lesser than certain quantity depending on Planck
constant; yet, what is important here is that it is a quantity of a positive value, and hence
that the position and momentum cannot be measured with unrestricted accuracy
84 Grzegorz Bugajak

from the fact that each measurement in physics involves some ex-
change of energy between the measuring device and the object being
measured. Imagine a microscope by which one looks at the world of
micro particles7. The light itself (a necessary ‘observational device’),
which carries certain energy, would disrupt the state of the particle
being observed. If, instead of a microscope, any other device was
used, it would always require some “mediator” (like light in a micro-
scope), which would enable the observation of a given particle, dis-
rupting, at the same time, its state and causing the uncertainty. The
reason for the disruption lies, therefore, not in the imperfection of
measuring devices but in the very structure of the act of observation
(measurement).
This interpretation usually leads to the conviction that the uncer-
tainty principle is universal, absolutely unavoidable. As far as it well
may be, such a point of view is based on two additional assumptions
(both may seem plainly trivial, nonetheless they are assumptions):
– it is impossible to imagine any knowledge about a physical object,
gained in other than experimental way (i.e. beyond any measurement);
– it is impossible to find an “empirical mediator”, which would enable
the observation of an object without disrupting its state significantly
and hence without causing the uncertainty.
It is noteworthy that the fact of disruption of an object state in the
process of measuring is not necessarily connected with microphysics
and remains true in the macroscopic cases. This problem did not surface
in the classical mechanics, because the influence of the interference
between an object and a measuring device is “negligibly small” there.
(3) Uncertainty as an effect of the properties of micro-objects.
According to this interpretation, the uncertainty principle would
express a certain objective feature of nature, namely the fact that such
characteristics like position and momentum are not applicable to the
objects of the micro-world, considered within quantum mechanics
[Wichmann 1971, 34]. Thus, there is no point in talking about position

7
This is an imaginary (and actually impossible) example, but what is meant here is to
illustrate problems connected with the act of measurement.
Causality and Determinism in Modern Physics 85

and momentum of a quantum particle, because such particle simply

doesn’t have these properties. The uncertainty principle would therefore
express a fundamental restriction, immanently rooted in the very nature
of the objects under examination [cf. Romanow-Broniarek 1978, 229],
and it would indicate the boundary, beyond which classical ideas and
notions of classical physics cannot be extrapolated.
Among various approaches to the uncertainty principle, we can
find opinions, which significantly limit too far-reaching conclusions
drawn from it. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle follows from
quantum mechanics, and hence it is valid only on the ground of this
theory. It is enclosed “within the description of nature provided by
quantum mechanics” [van Name 1962]. Hence, if we accept this
theory, we, indeed, will arrive at the conclusion that the position and
momentum of a particle cannot be known, at the same time, with
unlimited accuracy. The reverse implication doesn’t hold, though:
the conclusions concerning the correctness of this or that theory of
the quantum world do not follow from Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle. Thus, it is illogical to maintain that this principle forces us
to accept a given form of the theory of quantum mechanics as abso-
lutely valid.
If the uncertainty principle seems to impose no restrictions on the
possible theories of micro-world, it cannot impose such restrictions on
the way of the existence of things, either8. It concerns something more
than just our knowledge but still nothing more than real physical pro-
cesses [Feyerabend 1960, 27]. The strong expression that the uncer-
tainty “is rooted in the things themselves” may, if at all, be used in the
sense physicists attribute to it, namely: “Physical reality is all that may
be captured with the use of means available in physics” [Blanché
1969, 56-57].

8
The question whether uncertainty is epistemological or ontological is the matter of
discussion [e.g. Tanona 2004]. It seems that any particular ontological engagement of
the uncertainty principle may be rightly called to doubt [see for example: Fraley 1994;
Morikawa 2007].
86 Grzegorz Bugajak

3.2. Interpretations of quantum mechanics

Quantum mechanics is, in its fundamental form, like any other theory
in physics, a set of mathematical formulas. This mathematical formalism
becomes physics through some interpretation of mathematical formulas
it contains [cf. Weizsäcker 1980]. Hence, the discussion of the deter-
ministic or indeterministic character of quantum mechanics arises
only in connection with an interpretation of this theory [cf. Hajduk
1965, 57; Mazierski 1972, 314]. Before such an interpretation is
chosen, such general judgments as: “Wave mechanics is indeterministic
in nature” cannot be justified [Mazierski 1979, 76].
Interpretations of quantum mechanics can roughly be divided into
two groups. The first group includes those which claim that quantum
mechanics is a theory of individual processes [Aleksandrow 1953,
135-136; Głódź 1979, 40], while the second one includes those re-
garding quantum mechanics as a theory of large sets of micro-objects.
In the second case, the term “quantum statistics” used to be suggested.
An interpretation of quantum mechanics involves attributing some
physical meaning to the mathematical formulas of this theory. The most
often considered problems are: the question what the so-called wave
function (the solution of the Schrödinger’s equation, a fundamental
one in quantum mechanics) represents, and the sense of Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle9.

3.2.1. Schrödinger’s interpretation

This approach, coming from the author of the wave mechanics10,
takes into account the squared amplitude of a wave function (|Ψ|2),
9
The list of interpretations of quantum mechanics provided below is not complete. We
do not take into account the non-standard (although often discussed) interpretations,
e.g. the ones by David Bohm and Hugh Everett [see for example Birman 2009, 209-211].
New interpretations still appear too [e.g. Ghose 2009; Lombardi, Castiliano 2008].
10
Historically, the first approach to the quantum world was the so-called “matrix
mechanics”, yet it is much more mathematically complicated than the wave scheme;
and as these descriptions are equivalent, the one by Schrödinger soon became the
standard approach.
Causality and Determinism in Modern Physics 87

interpreting this quantity as the density of electron’s charge11. Thus, this

conception goes towards a kind of a “substantialist” direction. For what
it suggests is that an electron exists in a form of “blur”, the so-called
“electron cloud”. This interpretation was supported by the famous
wave-particle dualism, according to which an electron, exhibiting both
corpuscular and wave properties, is actually neither a particle nor
a wave; rather, it is something completely different, something which
appears as a wave in one type of experiments and as a particle in another.
Then, if an electron doesn’t have to be a particle, we can describe it as
the “electron cloud”, and we can interpret |Ψ|2 as the density of the
electric charge within this cloud.
Although this interpretation had to be rejected as inconsistent with
some experimental findings [Feynman et al. 1963, 21-26], it is worth
to note that such an interpretation would make quantum mechanics
a deterministic theory. If we know the wave function of a given electron
at the moment t0, we can also calculate it for any other moment t. And
since this function determines the space where an electron is (in the blur
form of the cloud of charge), then the theory itself fulfils the require-
ments of a deterministic theory [cf. Sławianowski 1969, 142-143].

3.2.2. Probabilistic interpretation

In our present discussion we need to introduce the distinction between
the probabilistic and the statistical interpretation. The probabilistic
one belongs to the first group of interpretations, i.e. to those, which
regard quantum mechanics as a theory of individual phenomena or
single objects, while the statistical interpretation belongs to the second
group, regarding quantum mechanics as a theory of large sets of objects.
This distinction allows to avoid numerous misunderstandings con-
nected with common intuitions about the term “statistical”. However,
there are authors who call the interpretation discussed here a “statistical
interpretation” [e.g. Szczęsny, Urbaniec 1988, 231].
According to the probabilistic interpretation, the wave function
represents a real quantum state of micro-object and the square of the
11
Here and in further analyses, we refer only to the most straightforward example,
i.e. to the description of a free electron.
88 Grzegorz Bugajak

wave function modulus determines certain probability concerning

a particle, e.g. the probability of finding it within a given space.
This very interpretation made many accept indeterminism in quan-
tum physics. The wave function expresses the state of a single micro-
object, on the one hand, but on the other, it only allows for calculating
the probabilities of given states in the future.

3.2.3. The interpretation of quantum ensembles

According to this conception, the wave function is also a charac-
teristics of an individual particle, but not “in itself”, but in the sense of
its belonging to the so-called statistical ensemble [Błochincew 1953, 62;
Błochincew 1954, 66]. Yet, the vicious circle error seems unavoidable
here, as the statistical ensemble, in turn, is understood as a set of particles
being in the same state described by a given wave function.

3.2.4. Statistical interpretation

Unlike the previous interpretations, this one treats quantum me-
chanics as a theory describing not single micro-particles but rather the
behaviour of large amounts of them. “Quantum mechanics is not the
theory of a real process, which a particular micro-object is subject to;
rather, it illustrates adequately only the behaviour of a set of micro-
objects” [Terlecki 1953, 21; cf. Pechenkin 2002].
We should note that, within this interpretation, Heisenberg’s uncer-
tainty principle determines only the relation between the dispersion of
some quantities within large sets of particles. Thus, one cannot deduce
from it any restrictions concerning single events, because nothing pre-
vents single values of the pairs of quantities, the uncertainty principle
connects, from being strictly determined [Fayerabend 1960, 30-31].
Within such framework, quantum mechanics would be nothing more
than a statistical method of calculating some values. Statistical character
of such theory may be underlain by the individually determined phenomena.
Such a statistical theory provides then a kind of an average of individual
effects [Sławianowski 1965, 40]. And the other way round: there is no
contradiction between applying a deterministic theory and using statistical
Causality and Determinism in Modern Physics 89

methods, which the “proper” statistical mechanics is an example of:

the behaviour of some system is basically possible to describe within
the theory of the deterministic type, yet, for practical reasons, using the
statistical description is sufficient and more convenient. The properties
of the system, found for the purposes of such conception, can be insuf-
ficient to apply a deterministic prediction; yet, this doesn’t exclude the
possibility of describing this system within a deterministic theory.

3.2.5. Copenhagen interpretation

This, probably the most popular interpretation, opposes the views that
quantum mechanics is a theory of objective phenomena. Within this
interpretation, the state of a system is not an objective property, but only
a relation to the measuring devices [Feyerabend 1960, 45]. Here, the wave
function has a kind of a double meaning: it describes a certain fact and
expresses our knowledge about this fact. The probabilities, which the
theory uses, do not result from the properties of the electron itself but from
our imprecise knowledge about it [Heisenberg 1999]. This probability
turns into certainty as a result of our observation when our knowledge
of the system changes suddenly. The act of observation “chooses” a con-
crete case out of numerous ones, which have been only probable so far.
A special consequence of such approach is the claim that we can talk
only about what happens in the act of measurement. What happens
between measurements is unknown. For example, it is impossible even
to think of a position that an electron has in between measurements.
As a comment to this approach, de Broglie wrote that quantum
mechanics theory describes adequately only stationary states but it
fails to describe the transitions between them. By declaring that these
transitions surpass the space-time frame, quantum mechanics just
hides its inadequacy [Blanché 1969, 50].
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is interpreted in a special way, too.
Referring to the relationship between this principle and measurement
disruptions, these disruptions are given a kind of ultimate character. The
uncertainty of position and momentum is supposed to be the objective
characteristics of nature. What matters here is not the fact that, because
of some more or less objective reasons, we are unable to determine
90 Grzegorz Bugajak

position and momentum, but the fact that these quantities do not exist,
in the case of electron, or rather they do not exist simultaneously
[Wichmann 1971]. Thus, the uncertainty principle is formulated as an
objective law of nature; and it is often understood that way, by both
supporters and opponents of the Copenhagen interpretation. Yet, we should
strongly emphasize that no claim within the subjectivist Copenhagen
interpretation, can be attributed the characteristics of objectivity, as
the whole interpretation goes in the anti-realistic direction. It seems
implausible to maintain that there is an objective regularity connecting
some properties of an object, if these properties, being the relation to
the measuring devices, are not objective in themselves12.

4. Conclusion
It is a widespread view that while the classical mechanics is the
flagship of deterministic theories, the quantum mechanics is an icon of
indeterministic ones. However, it appears that indeterminism of quantum
mechanics is limited, at least in the sense that it depends on the inter-
pretation of this theory (with its crucial elements like the wave function
and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle) one accepts. The developments
in the research of the micro-world made some interpretations more
credible than others, while some of them were totally rejected. Nonetheless,
even the claim that indeterminism is irremovable from the description
of the micro-world doesn’t imply the negation of the most general
formula of the philosophical causality principle, namely, that each event
has its cause. For judging the presence or lack of causes is raising an
ontological thesis concerning real world. And theses of this kind do
not directly follow from the characteristics of the scientific description
of this world, regardless of how accurately they are captured. In other
words, there is no direct implication between theses of the epistemology
of scientific knowledge and those of the ontology of the real world.
12
It is worth noting that the authors of the Copenhagen interpretation didn’t agree with
one another as far as its proper meaning is concerned [Camilleri 2006; 2007]. Accord-
ing to some authors, there are good reasons for rejecting this interpretation in general
[Norris 2001; Putnam 2005].
Causality and Determinism in Modern Physics 91

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