Duty To Observe Candor and Fairness

DUTY TO OBSERVE CANDOR AND FAIRNESS
IN RE OZAETA
92 SCRA 1 July 30, 1979
FACTS:Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May
5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. HerminioOzaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to
continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2,
1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which includes the name of a
deceased partner;
2. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a deceased partner in the firm
name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association
declares that….The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is not
unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
3. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased partners were well-
publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify
all leading national and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths.
4. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's name.
5. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S.
Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world.
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court n 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case)
continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court
advising the firm to desist from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not this Court shall depart from the above-mentioned ruling over the instant case, based on Canon 33 as cited.
RULING: No.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name
of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner's
name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or
partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how
their firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed.
A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. For one thing, the
law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy.
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons
of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its possessor
integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust."
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their
respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms
indicating the years during which they served as such.
DUTY TO KEEP ABREAST WITH LEGAL DEVELOPMENT

BUMACTAO vs. ATTY. FANO
A.C. No. 10286 April 7, 2014
FACTS: Atty. Restito F. Fano admittedly indicated a false MCLE compliance number. Respondent endeavors todouse his culpability
by shifting the blame to the MCLE providers, insisting that he acted in good faith.He likewise attributes the indication of the false
MCLE number to his secretary by reason of an honestmistake because of the pressure of his many duties.
ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Fano should be held responsible for falsely indicating his MCLE number
RULING:Yes.
Bar matter no. 1922 requires “practicing members of the bar to indicate in all pleadings filed beforethe courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the
number and date of issue of their MCLE certificate of complianceor certificate of exemption, as may be applicable”. It further provides that
“failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from
the records”.
At the very least, respondent was negligent in failing to monitor his own MCLE compliance. This is a sortof negligence that is
hardly excusable. As member of the legal profession, respondent ought to haveknown that non-compliance would have
resulted in the rendering inutile of any pleading he may filebefore any tribunal.

UY vs. ATTY. MAGHARI
A.C. 10525 Sepetember 1, 2015
FACTS:Lilia Hofileña (Hofileña) filed a Petition before the RTC praying that she be designated administratrix of the estate of her
common-law partner, the deceased Jose Uy. Hofileña was initially designated administratrix. However, a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order designating Hofileña as administratix was filed by Wilson Uy, one of Jose Uy’s children, on behalf of Jose Uy’s spouse
and other children. In its Order the RTC designated Wilson Uy as administrator of Jose Uy’s estate. Subsequently, Hofileña’s claims
in the settlement of Jose Uy’s estate were granted. Hence, she filed a Motion for Execution.
In other proceedings arising from the conflicting claims to Jose Uy’s estate, Hofileña was represented by her counsel, Atty. Mariano
L. Natu-El (Atty. Natu-el). In a pleading filed in the course of these proceedings Atty. Natu-El indicated the following details:
MARIANO L. NATU-EL
Counsel for Private-Respondent
Rm. 14, J.S. Building
Lacson-GaloSts., Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLENO. 0015970
Thereafter, Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, her counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with Alternative
Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny K.H. Uy. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C.
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLECompl. 0015970 1/14/09
Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to Magdalena Uy’s Motion to Quash.
Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed her Reply to Wilson Uy’s Opposition. In signing this Reply, Maghari indicated the following
details:

Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C.
PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 0015970 1/14/09
The RTC subsequently denied Magdalena Uy’s Motion to Quash. Thereafter, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion for
Reconsideration. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:

Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 815530 1/4/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. IH-0000762 1/14/09
As the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum. In
signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:

Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B.C.
ROLL NO. 44869
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/09
At this point, Wilson Uy’s counsel noticed that based on the details indicated in the March 8, 2012 Motion, Maghari appeared to have
only recently passed the bar examinations. This prompted Wilson Uy to check the records. Upon doing so, he learned that since 2010,
Maghari had been changing the professional details indicated in the pleadings he has signed and has been copying the professional
details of Atty. Natu-El.
Wilson Uy filed before this court the present Complaint for disbarment. Pointing to Maghari’s act of repeatedly a changing and using
another lawyer’s professional details, Wilson Uy asserts that Maghari violated the Lawyer’s Oath and acted in a deceitful manner.
For resolution are the issues of whether respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III engaged in unethical conduct and of what proper
penalty may be meted on him.
ISSUE:Whether the Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when he failed to put his correct Attorney Details in
his pleadings?
RULING: Yes, A counsel’s signature is such an integral part of a pleading that failure to comply with this requirement reduces a
pleading to a mere scrap of paper totally bereft of legal effect. Thus, faithful compliance with this requirement is not only a matter of
satisfying a duty to a court but is as much a matter of fidelity to one’s client. A deficiency in this respect can be fatal to a
client’s cause.As with the signature itself, these requirements are not vain formalities: The inclusion of a counsel’s Roll of Attorneys
number, professional tax receipt number, and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) receipt (or lifetime membership) number is
intended to preserve and protect the integrity of legal practice. They seek to ensure that only those who have satisfied the requisites for
legal practice are able to engage in it. With the Roll of Attorneys number, parties can readily verify if a person purporting to be a
lawyer has, in fact, been admitted to the Philippine bar. With the professional tax receipt number, they can verify if the same person is
qualified to engage in a profession in the place where he or she principally discharges his or her functions. With the IBP receipt
number, they can ascertain if the same person remains in good standing as a lawyer. These pieces of information protect the public
from bogus lawyers. Paying professional taxes (and the receipt that proves this payment) is likewise compliance with a revenue
mechanism that has been statutorily devolved to local government units.
The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from) Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seeks
to ensure that legal practice is reserved only for those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for “keep[ing] abreast with
law and jurisprudence, maintaining] the ethics of the profession[,] and enhancing] the standards of the practice of law.”
Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel’s address and contact details is designed to facilitate the dispensation of justice. These pieces of
information aid in the service of court processes, enhance compliance with the requisites of due process, and facilitate better
representation of a client’s cause.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III, having clearly violated his Lawyer’s Oath and the Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution.

ARNADO vs. ADAZA
A.C. 9834 August 26, 2015
FACTS: This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Adaza for his failure to comply with the requirements of the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under Bar Matter No. 850.In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado
called the attention of this Court to the practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his
pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in
2012.
In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes, Assistant Executive Officer of the MCLE Office, forwarded to the Court
the rollo of the case together with the MCLE Governing Board's Evaluation, Report and Recommendation. In its Evaluation, Report
and Recommendation, the MCLE Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo, MCLE
Chairman, informed the Court that respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April
2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of
Bar Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. In the same letter, the MCLE Governing
Board noted that respondent neither applied for exemption nor complied with the Third Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14
April 2010.
In his Compliance and Comment, respondent alleged that he did not receive a copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He
stated that he was wondering why his application for exemption could not be granted. He further alleged that he did not receive a
formal denial of his application for exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano was based
on the letter of complainant who belonged to Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the law office of his political opponents, the
Romualdo family. Respondent alleged that the Romualdo family controlled Camiguin and had total control of the judges and
prosecutors in the province. He further alleged that the law firm had control of the lawyers in Camiguin except for himself.
Respondent further claimed that he had written five books. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration of the notice for him to undergo
MCLE. He asked for an exemption from MCLE compliance, or in the alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law while
complying with the MCLE requirements.
The Office of the Bar Confidant reported that respondent failed to meet the requirements necessary for the exemption. The OBC found
that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated that respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients because the pleadings he filed could be stricken off from the records and considered
invalid. The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of non-compliance with the
MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC also recommended that
respondent be directed to comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE Governing Board.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE requirements.
RULING: YES. Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that throughout
their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the
practice of law."
The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four compliance periods. The records also showed
that respondent filed an application for exemption only on 5 January 2009. According to the MCLE Governing Board, respondent's
application for exemption covered the First and Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply for exemption for the Third
Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground
that the application did not meet the requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. Clearly,
respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter No. 850. His application for exemption for the
First and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up the status of his
application for exemption. He furnished the Court with his letter dated 7 February 2012 to the MCLE Office asking the office to act on
his application for exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office. He did not comply with the Fourth
Compliance Period. Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only cover his
deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court
has not been furnished proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only cover his deficiencies for the First
Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished
proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period. that his application for exemption, filed after the compliance periods, would be
granted. He purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application but claimed that his secretary forgot to send
the letter.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009, it
took the office three years to inform respondent of the denial of his application. However, after he had been informed of the denial of
his application for exemption, it still took respondent one year to file a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still asking, his time to satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when
respondent indicated "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for
reconsideration before the MCLE Office.
Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of the MCLE Office warrant his
declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP.
DUTY OF A LAWYER EMPLOYED IN THE GOVERNMENT

PCGG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
455 SCRA 526 August 26, 2015
FACTS: In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account
with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution
declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and
ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged
ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on
properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The
abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol
Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting
PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s
former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A
lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service.”
RULING: The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has
no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However
there is still the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he
made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is
“advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of
Manila.
The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter”
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that
“drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are
acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The
legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not
include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved
in the Civil case of sequestration.
In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it
is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist
where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of
Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such
a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:

Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held public office or having
been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated
or passed upon while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests
extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically
applicable to lawyers who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served
in the government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the service.

CATU vs. RELLOSA
A.C. 5738 February 19, 2008
FACTS: Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot 1 and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila.
His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu 2 and Antonio Pastor3 of
one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against
them in the LupongTagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila4 where the parties reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. 5 When the parties failed to arrive
at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood
as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong
barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the
barangay's LupongTagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of
the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however,
were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his
legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to
prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there was
no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position
papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. 7
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard
the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the
ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer
with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA
6713 (Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one month
with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. 9 This was adopted and approved
by the IBP Board of Governors.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent is guilty for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: Yes, but only Rule 1.01 and Canon 7.
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies
only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service."
In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service." Respondent was an
incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice
of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
As punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.As punong barangay, respondent should have
therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as
counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do. The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men
of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of
this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed
to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HECK vs. GAMOTIN
A.C. 5329 March 18, 2014
FACTS: Heinz Heck filed a complaint for disbarment against then City Prosecutor Gamotin on the ground of faulty, highly improper,
suspicious, anomalous and unlawful practice by respondent who had obstructed justice by delaying cases and disregarding court
procedures, and displayed favor towards Atty. Adazam his business partners and friends. The following acts allegedly committed by
City Prosecutor Gamotin are as follows:
1. Pending complaints against a certain Cabrera filed by Heck were dismissed by the OCP several times;
2. City Prosecutor held a private meeting with Atty. Adaza, the counsel for Heck’s opponent;
3. At one time, he acted furiously by kicking the chair holding the door to his office open and slamming the door, almost hitting
the face of Heck’s friend;
4. For entertaining Atty. Adaza who was suspended from practice by the Supreme Court; and,
5. For arrogantly claiming and screaming at Heck that he is the Authority and the Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not City Prosecutor Gamotin could be disbarred for the aforementioned conduct.
RULING: No.
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction against a misbehaving member of the Bar which is only imposed for the
most imperative reasons and in cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer. A lawyer like the
respondent is not to be sanctioned for every perceived misconduct or wrong actuation. It is the burden of proof of the complainant to
properly show that the assailed conduct or actuation constituted a breach of norms of professional conduct and legal ethics which, in
this case, was not sufficiently established. The private meeting between the Prosecutor and Atty. Adaza did not by itself indicate any
illegal or corrupt activity. Moreover, the Prosecutor’s angry reactions is but a natural response to Heck’s disrespectful remark against
the Philippine authorities in general. Gamotin’s actuations were not shown to be impelled by any bad motive, or had amounted to any
breach of any canon of professional conduct or legal ethics. Complaint for disbarment is dismissed.

AREOLA vs. ATTY. MENDOZA
A.C. 10135 January 15, 2014
FACTS: Edgardo D. Areola a.k.a. Muhammad Khadafy filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, from
the Public Attorney’s Office for violation of her attorney’s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron Arca, JoselitoMirador, Spouses
Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that on October 23, 2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo
City Jail and called all detainees with pending cases before the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City where she was assigned, to attend her
speech/lecture. Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech:
"O kayong may mgakasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay magingpraktikalsana kayo kung gusto
ninyongmakalayaagad. Upangmakatiyak kayo nahindimasasayangangperaninyo ay sa akin ninyoibigay o ngkamag-
anakninyoangpera at akonaangbahalangmaglagaykay Judge Martin at Fiscal Banqui; at kayongmgadetenidongmgababaena
no bail angkasosa drugs, iyak-iyakanlangninyosi Judge Martin at palalayainna kayo. Malambotangpuso noon."
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients in
violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall
not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule 15.07 states that "a
lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."
Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system. Judges must be free to judge, without
pressure or influence from external forces or factors according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s careless remark is uncalled for.
In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two months as excessive and not commensurate to Atty.
Mendoza’s infraction. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be
imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the
bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. The Court notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-
iyakanlangninyosi Judge Martin at palalayainna kayo. Malambotangpuso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While
her remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace
to the Judiciary.
In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating factors.
Factors such as the respondent’s length of service, the respondent’s acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse,
family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondent’s advanced age, among other things, have had varying
significance in the Court’s determination of the imposable penalty. The Court takes note of Atty. Mendoza’s lack of ill-motive in the
present case and her being a PAO lawyer as her main source of livelihood. Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola is clearly
baseless and the only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to Atty. Mendoza’s own admission. For these reasons, the
Court deems it just to modify and reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.
Accordingly, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02
and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

FACTURAN vs. BARCELONA
A.C. 11069 June 08, 2016
FACTS: On June 4, 2004, complainant FACTURAN filed a complaint for qualified theft against 5 persons before the Provincial
Presecution Office of Alabel, Sarangani. It was assigned to ProsecAmerkhan for PI.
Thereafter, ProsecAmerkhan forwarded the RECORDS of the case, together with his RESOLUTION, and the corresponding
INFORMATION, to the respondent BARCELONA for his approval and signature. However, the respondent neither approved nor
signed the resolution. Instead, he removed the case records from the office and brought them to his residence. It appears that the
respondents in the qualified theft case filed by the FACTURAN were personally known to BARCELONA, as Elezar Barcelona is his
cousin, while the other 4 are his close friends.
Aggrieved, FACTURAN sought the intervention of the DOJ through the State Prosecutor. Unfortunately, State Prosecutor could not
take appropriate action as the case records remain in the possession of BARCELONA who failed to turn them over despite the
directive to do so.
On July 20, 2005, the complainant learned that the cased record had been turned over but without the corresponding resolution and
information. Neither did the respondent approve or act upon the same, prompting the complainant to file the present complaint for
disbarment against Barcelona.
ISSUE: WON there are grounds to hold Prosecutor Barcelona administratively liable when he failed to resolve the criminal case and
turn over the case records despite being directed to do so.
RULING: Yes.
Prosecutor Barcelona violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the CPR.

Canon 6 applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
Rule 6.02 provides that: a lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to PROMOTE or ADVANCE his
private interests, nor ALLOW the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of
his duties as a government official. He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
Rule 6.02 enjoins lawyers from using one’s public position to: 1) promote private interests; 2) advance private interests; or 3) allow
private interest to interfere with public duties.
Moreover, the Court recognized that such private interest is NOT limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interests of
relatives.
In the case at bar, Prosecutor Barcelona’s accountability in the Qualified Theft complaint has been duly established when
ProsecAmerkhan forwarded to him the case records, together with the resolution recommending the filing of the appropriate
information.
The Court notes respondent’s defense that the complainant was already aware beforehand that he was inclined to disapprove the
resolution of ProsecAmerkhan. However, if such was the case, then nothing should have prevented him from proceeding to disapprove
the resolution. Yet, the records show that he absolutely took no action thereon.
Worse, the respondent removed the case the records from the office of the Provincial Prosecutor and, when directed to turn them over,
failed to do so notwithstanding his assignment to the DOJ in Manila. His assignment to the DOJ in Manila should have even prompted
him to turn over the case record for appropriate action, but still failed to do so, without any plausible reason.
Therefore, the Court held that absent any intelligent explanation, it can only be inferred that the respondent not merely failed, but
ostensibly and deliberately refused to perform his duties as a prosecutor. Indeed, his actions and omissions in this case appear to
have been committed for the benefit of and to safeguard private interests.
It bears stressing that a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the
trust and confidence of the citizenry to the government, but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times.
Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher that other lawyers in private practice.
Wherefore, the respondent is found guilty of violating Rule 6.02. he is suspended for 1 year, and is sternly warned that repetition of
similar acts be dealt with more severely.
DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO HIS PROFESSION; DUTY TO MAINTAIN THE DIGNITY OF THE PROFESSION
BANSIG vs. CELERA
A.C. 5581 January 14, 2014
FACTS: Rose Bunagan-Bansig filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera for Gross Immoral Conduct.
On May 8, 1997, Atty. Celera and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified
xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila. Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie, legal wife of
respondent. However, Atty. Celera contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as
evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.
Bansig stressed that the marriage between Atty. Celera and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his
second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Despite repeated summons and resolutions issued by the Court, Atty. Celera failed to properly answer the complaint. The complaint
dragged on for over a decade.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Celera is guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders.
RULING: Yes. In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage despite the
existence of his first marriage.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence
of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing
evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is
subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent’s defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated
by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002.
In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to
have pre-selected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions directing
respondent to comment on the complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not
received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a
show cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not
reached him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before this Court which he
could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring
the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied
with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a
recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.
The respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA is guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders
rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law
and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO HIS PROFESSION; DUTY TO MAINTAIN THE DIGNITY OF THE PROFESSION
NUEZCA vs. VILLA GARCIA
A.C. 8210 August 8, 2016
FACTS: In their verified complaint, complainants averred that respondent sent them a demand letter 2 dated February 15, 2009, copy
furnished to various offices and persons, which contained not only threatening but also libelous utterances. Allegedly, the demand
letter seriously maligned and ridiculed complainants to its recipients. Complainants likewise posited that several news clippings 3 that
were attached to the demand letter were intended to sow tear in them, and claimed that the circulation thereof caused them sleepless
nights, wounded feelings, and besmirched reputation. 4 Thus, they maintained that respondent should be held administratively liable
therefor.
In a Resolution5 dated July 22, 2009, the Court directed respondent to file his comment to the verified complaint. However, for failure
to serve the aforesaid Resolution at respondent's address given by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the complainants were
then ordered6 to furnish the Court the complete and correct address of respondent. Still, complainants failed to comply with the Court's
directive; thus, the Court resolved,7 among others, to refer the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation, which set
the case for a mandatory conference/hearing.
Unfortunately, despite notices,9 complainants failed to appear for the scheduled mandatory hearings. Likewise, the notices sent to
respondent were returned unserved with the notations "RTS Moved Out" and "RTS Unknown." Thus, in an Order 10 dated October 24,
2014, the IBP directed the parties to submit their respective verified position papers together with documentary exhibits, if any.
In its Report and Recommendation11 dated May 29, 2015, the IBP -Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner
Honesto A. Villamor, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months for
violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Likewise, for defying the lawful order of the IBP, the latter
recommended that respondent be declared in contempt of court and fined the amount of PI,000.00, with a warning that repetition of
the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Finding that respondent did not intend to file any comment and in the process, purposely delayed the resolution of the instant case, the
IBP recommended that respondent be held in contempt of court. In a Resolution 14 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors
resolved to adopt and approve with modification the May 29, 2015 Report and Recommendation of the IBP — CBD by suspending
respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and deleting the fine imposed on him.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based on the allegations of the verified complaint.
RULING: Yes, by violation of Rule 8.01.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of
these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the CPR provides, A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In this case, the demand letter that respondent sent to complainants contained not merely a demand for them to settle their monetary
obligations to respondent's client, but also used words that maligned their character.
Indeed, respondent could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to the alleged indebtedness of complainants to his client, made
the demand for settlement thereof, and refrained from the imputation of criminal offenses against them, especially considering that
there is a proper forum therefor and they have yet to be found criminally liable by a court of proper jurisdiction. Respondent's use of
demeaning and immoderate language put complainants in shame and disgrace. Moreover, it is important to consider that several other
persons had been copy furnished with the demand letter. As such, respondent could have besmirched complainants' reputation to its
recipients.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the
legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 19 Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not
offensive.20 In this regard, all lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the
dignity of the legal profession, hence, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. 21 Thus, respondent ought to temper his
words in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and an officer of the court.
DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO HIS PROFESSION; DUTY OF COURTESY TOWARDS FELLOW LAWYERS
SABERON vs. LARONG
A.C. 6567 April 16, 2008
FACTS:Jose C. Saberon charged Atty. Fernando T. Larong before the Office of the Bar Confidant of grave misconduct for allegedly
using abusive and offensive language in pleadings filed before the BangkoSentralngPilipinas (BSP).
Saberon filed in the BSP a petition against Surigaonon Rural Banking Corporation and Alfredo Tan Bonpin for cancellation of the
bank's registration and franchise. The petition arose from the bank's and/or Bonpin's refusal to return various checks and land titles,
which were given to secure a loan obtained by Saberon’s wife, despite alleged full payment of the loan and interests.
Larong, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, filed an answer with affirmative defenses to the petition in which
he stated that the petition was another in the series of blackmail suits filed by Saberon.
The Investigation Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that Larong be found guilty of gross
misconduct. The IBP Board of Governors, in a resolution, however disagreed with the recommendation and dismissed the case.
ISSUE: WHETHER Larong is guilty of gross misconduct
RULING:NO. Larong is guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
The adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance
the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive
and abusive language.
Members of the Bar should abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
GIMENO vs. ZAIDE
A.C. 10303 April 21, 2015
FACTS: On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Cimeno) filed a complaint 3 with the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline,
charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2) falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive
language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust. In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission to the Bar
and receipt of his notarial commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on March 29, 2002.
She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his notarial registers.
On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for mandatory conference. Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr.
(Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting
interests, and using abusive and insulting language in his pleadings.
He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a) and 1(b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules when he maintained several active
notarial registers in different offices. These provisions respectively require a notary public to "keep, maintain, protect and provide for
lawful inspection, a chronological official register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered papers" and
to "keep only one active notarial register at any given time.
Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used intemperate, offensive, and abusive language when he called
Gimeno a "notorious extortionist" in one of his pleadings.
ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a) and 1(b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules when he maintained several
active notarial registers in different offices and violated Notarial Practice Rules.
RULING: YES. The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires anotary public to maintain only one (1) active notarial register andensure
that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The “oneactive notarial register” rule is in place to deter a notary public from
assigning several notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial services on his behalf.
Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also personally administer the notarial acts 29 that the
law authorizes him to execute. This important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other person, other than the notary public,
should perform it.
This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his powers and duties are impressed with public interest.A
Notary public's office is not merely an income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who has been privileged to
receive a notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform.
Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial commission. His flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule
VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and excusable negligence. It amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer [should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes." The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a lawyer's
professional dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any other person, is based on the following canons and rules of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
(emphasis supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide,in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist." And
in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and immoderate language in presenting his comment
against his opposing counsel.
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and the
Department of Justice in particular, where the taxpayers paid for her salary over her incompetence and poor performance as a
prosecutor...This is a clear manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental incompetence as regard her mandate as an
Assistant City Prosecutor.35 (emphasis supplied)This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words
- a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and
illuminating but not offensive.On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from any offensive
personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings, must be dignified.
NOBLE vs. AILES
A.C. 10628 July 1, 2015
FACTS: Noble III alleged that Ailes, a lawyer, filed a complaint for damages against his own brother, Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr.
(Marcelo), whom Maximino represented, together with other defendants, therein. In the said complaint, Ailes stated the following
data: "IBP-774058-12/07/09-QC x xx MCLE Compliance No. II-00086893/Issued on March 10, 2008." Noble claimed that at the time
of the filing of the said complaint, Ailes' IBP O.R. number should have already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the
year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance,
not just the second.
Sometime in December 2011, Noble learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for grave threats and estafa against
Ailes. When Noble was furnished a copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through text messages, Ailes had been maligning him
and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees,
saying, among others: "x xx Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable [professional]
fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage, x xx get rid of [Noble]
as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you], x xx daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol."
Records show that Ailes even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel in the complaint for damages, which stated that
Noble "x xx has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a manner not befitting his representation as a
seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount of professional fees and questionable expenses. Affronted,
Noble filed the instant complaint charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of damages.
AILES' DEFENSE:
1. His late submission of the third MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate Services of
Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was declared in default in the
aforementioned civil case.
2. The allegedly offensive language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother communication" and were
uttered in good faith.
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Ailes was downgraded to unjust vexation and Ailes
was convicted of the crime of unjust vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo by " texting insulting, threatening
and persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x xx."IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case against
Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE compliance requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to disclose
the required information would merely cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records. IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case against
Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Orlando.
HELD: PARTLY YES, PARTLY NO.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Consequently, a
lawyer mustat all times, whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow
lawyers.
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the
right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the
legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial forum. 23 In Buatis
Jr. v. People,24 the Court treated a lawyer's use of the words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan" in a letter
addressed to another colleague as defamatory and injurious which effectively maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of insulting
language to describe the opposing counsel is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal profession. library
In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual communications considering that they
were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however, the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were
clearly intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence
that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in violation
of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case filed
against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes, an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a
departure from the judicial decorum which exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language.With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his failure to disclose the
required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for
disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the
records.
MALABED vs. DELA PENA
A.C. 7594 February 09, 2016
FACTS: In an administrative case, Atty. De la Pena was charged with dishonesty and gross misconduct for misrepresenting that he
submitted a certificate to file action when there was none, conflict of interest for notarizing a deed of donation executed by
complainant’s family when eventually he is a counsel for those opposing parties in a case where complainant’s family is involved, and
for violation of prohibition in employment in government office after his dismissal as a judge. In his pleadings before the IBP, Atty.
De la Pena called the counsel of the complainant a “silahis by nature and complexion” and also accused complainant of “cohabiting
with a married man before the wife of that married man died.” The IBP found that Atty. De la Pena is guilty of dishonesty and gross
misconduct, and also noted the offensive language used by the lawyer. One-year suspension from the practice of law was
recommended. The Supreme Court increased it to 2-year suspension for repeated gross misconduct.
ISSUE 1: W/N there is a conflict of interest involved in the notarization of documents by a lawyer
No. Notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the notarial acts authorized by the Rules on
Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal
representation, on the other hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.
ISSUE 2: W/N the lawyer’s use of offensive language violates the ethics of the profession
Yes. For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper. While respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using improper
language in his pleadings.
DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO HIS PROFESSION; DUTY TO BE FAIR TO FELLOW LAWYERS
BINAY-AN vs. ADDOG
A.C. 10449 July 28, 2014
FACTS:Complainants herein, who happened to be the heirs of BarotBinay-an, are the plaintiffs in a civil case for the Annulment of
Documents against defendants Angeline Damaso and the Cordillera Small Business Assistance Center, Inc. before the National
Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP). Complainants are represented by Atty. Jerome Selmo while the defendants are represented
by respondent Atty. AtanacioAddog.
From the allegations of the complainants, on Feb. 8, 2008, Damaso, who is the constituted representative of the heirs of BarotBinay-
an, called for a meeting in Mandarin Restaurant. This meeting was attended by the respondent as well as Paul Palos and Bienvenido
Palos, both of which are also heirs of BarotBinay-an. There, Paul and Bienvenido were convinced by the respondent and by Damaso
to execute separate Affidavits of Desistance, which was later notarized by the respondent. This notarized affidavits were then
submitted by respondent to the NCIP, which denied the same. The NCIP Hearing Officer cautioned the respondent on the ethical
consideration in having the affidavits submitted. The respondent later withdrew his representation for the defendants. Thus, a
complaint for misconduct was filed against the respondent before the IBP.
On his part, respondent, while admitting that he was present in Mandarin Restaurant and notarized the affidavits of desistance, denied
the complainants’ charge. He also denied lawyering for Paul and Bienvenido. According to him, he submitted the said affidavits in
behalf of his clients and not in behalf of the complainants.
The IBP Board of Governors, adopting with modifications the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
recommends that respondent be suspended for a period of six (6) months. The respondent filed his MR but the same was denied.
ISSUE: W/N respondent is guilty of misconduct
RULING:YES. Respondent, despite knowing that the Complainants Palos were not represented by a counsel during that meeting they
had with defendant Angeline Damaso, communicated with the Palos and in fact indications are ripe that it was he who convinced them
to execute their affidavits of desistance in exchange for monetary consideration. This presumption is strongly supported by the fact
that the affidavits were prepared and notarized by him during the said meeting. Significantly, he did not take it upon himself to inform
Atty. Jerome W. Selmo about the act of his clients. He too failed to advise the Palos to first consult their counsel about it. In fact he
showed that he needed the affidavits badly as in fact he went on to present the same to the NCIP Hearing Officer to prove that the
Palos had clearly wanted to withdraw their complaint against the defendants. The affidavits of desistance [were], however, rejected by
the NCIP Hearing Officer.
Canon 8, Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.”
In this case, the respondent knew that Paul and Bienvenido were represented by counsel, Atty. Selmo. His act of preparing the
affidavit of desistance, even assuming that it was only the joint affidavit of Paul, Isabela Daniel and Romana which he drafted and
notarized was true, nonetheless encroached upon the legal functions of Atty. Selmo. Worse, the respondent even disclosed that the
affidavits of desistance were executed by the affiants in exchange for a certain sum of money. It was unscrupulous of the respondent
to compel some of the complainants in Civil Case No. 005-CAR-07 to execute the affidavit of desistance sans the knowledge and
agreement of Atty. Selmo.
Similarly, in this case, the respondent's acts clearly violated the ethical tenets of the legal profession and must, therefore, be
disciplined. "Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left unpunished for not only do they erode confidence
and trust in the legal profession, they likewise prevent justice from being attained."
WHEREFORE, Atty. Atanacio D. Addog is hereby imposed the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of SIX
(6) MONTHS, effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO HIS PROFESSION; DUTY TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
TAPAY vs. BANCOLO
A.C. 9604 March 20, 2013
FACTS: Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them
to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices
filed against them by NehimiasDivinagracia, Jr., a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration.
The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the JarderBancolo Law Office
based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them
before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in
person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact.
The Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a
prejudicial question to the Complaint’s validity.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo.
Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the JarderBancolo
Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office
secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions.
The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document for insufficiency of evidence. The
administrative case for dishonesty was also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence.
Tapay and Rustia filed with the IBP a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The
complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged
signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that
was forged. Complainants attached a Report by the PNP Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by
Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the
letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus,
complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved
in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.
ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is administratively liable
RULING:Yes. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed
in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and
policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character.
The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for
members of the legal profession.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the
wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, the court finds Atty. Jarder
is not administratively liable.
DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO HIS PROFESSION; DUTY TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
ANGELES vs. BAGGAY
A.C. 8103 December 3, 2014
FACTS:This case stemmed from the letter, dated June 11, 2008, submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. ( Atty. Angeles, Jr.), the
Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time he was out of the
country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008.
These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who had information that they were
notarized while respondent was outside the country attending the Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the
affidavits of the persons who caused the documents to be notarized which showed a common statement that they did not see
respondent sign the documents himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or the documents came out of the office
already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the
country on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008. The copy of the Certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration was also
attached to the letter.
The Report and Recommendation of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III (Atty. Abelita III) as Investigating Commissioner found that the letter
of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated June 11, 2008, was not verified, that most of the attachments were not authenticated photocopies and that
the comment of respondent was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III, however, observed that respondent’s signature on his comment
appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in most of the attached documents which he admitted were notarized in hisabsence
by his office secretary. He admitted the fact that there were documents that werenotarized while he was abroad and his signature was
affixed by his office secretary who was not aware of the import of the act. Thus, by his own admission, it was established that by his
negligence in employing an office secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal and records especially pertaining to his
notarial documents without the proper training, respondent failed to live up to the standard required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.
Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty which gave his office secretary the opportunity to
abuse his prerogative authority as notary public, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the immediate revocation of
respondent’s commission as notary public and his disqualification to be commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said recommendation in its Resolution, dated September 28, 2013.
ISSUE: Whether the notarization of documents by the secretary of respondent while he was out of the country constituted negligence.
RULING: The Court answers in the affirmative.
Respondent admitted in his comment and motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents were notarized under his notarial seal by
his office secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible for
the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a “Notary Public” refers to any person
commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary public’s secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the
official acts of a notary public.
Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full
responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register. He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his
secretary.
Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Due to his negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice
law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to
notarize documents without any restraint.
Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. The people, who came into his office while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the
activity being conducted therein. They expected that their documents would be converted into public documents. Instead, they later
found out that the notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any force and effect. By prejudicing the persons
whose documents were notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was eroded.

Duty To Observe Candor and Fairness

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Duty To Observe Candor and Fairness

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DUTY TO OBSERVE CANDOR AND FAIRNESS

Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:

DUTY TO KEEP ABREAST WITH LEGAL DEVELOPMENT

DUTY TO KEEP ABREAST WITH LEGAL DEVELOPMENT

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to Magdalena Uy’s Motion to Quash.

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

DUTY TO KEEP ABREAST WITH LEGAL DEVELOPMENT

DUTY OF A LAWYER EMPLOYED IN THE GOVERNMENT

Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:

DUTY OF A LAWYER EMPLOYED IN THE GOVERNMENT

RULING: Yes, but only Rule 1.01 and Canon 7.

DUTY OF A LAWYER EMPLOYED IN THE GOVERNMENT

DUTY OF A LAWYER EMPLOYED IN THE GOVERNMENT

DUTY OF A LAWYER EMPLOYED IN THE GOVERNMENT

Prosecutor Barcelona violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the CPR.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

RULING: Yes, by violation of Rule 8.01.

ISSUE: WHETHER Larong is guilty of gross misconduct

HELD: PARTLY YES, PARTLY NO.

ISSUE: W/N respondent is guilty of misconduct

ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is administratively liable

RULING: The Court answers in the affirmative.

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