This article was downloaded by: [University of Connecticut]

On: 02 February 2015, At: 09:49

Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

History and Philosophy of Logic

Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/thpl20

Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic

a
D. Raymond
a
Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College Station,
TX 77843-4237, USA
Published online: 21 Feb 2014.

Click for updates

To cite this article: D. Raymond (2014) Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic, History and Philosophy of Logic,
35:2, 209-211, DOI: 10.1080/01445340.2014.889388

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2014.889388

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising
out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
 Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-
and-conditions
Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 09:49 02 February 2015
 HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC, 2014
Vol. 35, No. 2, 209–217

Book Reviews
Marko Malink, Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2013. xi + 366 pp. £39.95, $49.95. ISBN 9780674724549.
Reviewed by D. Raymond, Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College
Station, TX 77843-4237, USA, raymond@tamu.edu.
© 2014 D. Raymond
Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 09:49 02 February 2015

In contrast with Aristotle’s assertoric logic, which became the logic of the west, suffering
only minor modifications at the edges, Aristotle’s modal logic (AML) appears to be rife with
errors. It has consistently drawn reactions like that of Reid 1806 (p. 99): ‘let this doctrine
rest in peace, without giving the least disturbance to its ashes’. Despite this time-honored
advice, Malink stirs the ashes in his monograph Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic (AMS). His
resulting system, which was first published in Malink 2006, is a mereological system, called
‘Preorder Semantics’. Its results match the entire modal syllogistic. They are broader than
the existent, logically adequate reconstructions of the apodeictic portion, such as, Johnson
1989, Thompson 1993, 1997 and Raymond 2010.
AMS divides into three sections: the Assertoric Syllogistic, the Apodeictic Syllogistic
and the Problematic Syllogistic. It contains three appendices and three useful indices. AMS
has two goals: first, to develop a means of representing Aristotle’s modal logic within first-
order predicate logic (PL); second, to explain why Aristotle held the views that he held. The
second objective takes AMS beyond Malink’s previous work.
By grounding preorder semantics on Aristotle’s theory of predicables in the Topics, AMS
seeks to explainAristotle’s modal intuitions.As Malink points out, the explanation is limited.
It explains the apodeictic syllogistic, but not the problematic syllogistic (p. 5 and Section
III). Further Malink’s model may not accommodate all assertoric assertions (p. 128). Let us
see why by focusing on the portion that goes beyond his 2006 publication: his explanation
of the apodeictic syllogistic (Sections I and II). I will set aside Section III, which usefully
collects together Aristotle’s claims, but leaves us still puzzling over Aristotle’s intuitions.
A remark at An. Pr. 1.1, traditionally called the dictum de omni, informs Malink’s analysis.
The dictum expresses the meaning of predicative relations by linking a plurality to each
term. Malink characterizes it as: ‘A belongs to all B’ iff ‘if M is a member of the plurality
associated with B, then M is also a member of the plurality associated with A’ (p. 37). Taking
the dictum as a primitive relation (pp. 4, 20, 66–68, 286), Malink bases each of the four
categorical assertions on it (p. 37).
The dictum is open to two readings: first, the orthodox dictum (Chapter 3), which main-
tains that the plurality is a plurality of individuals (i.e. singular terms, such as ‘Socrates’);
and second, the heterodox dictum (Chapter 4), which maintains that the plurality is a
plurality of terms (i.e. general terms, such as ‘Man’). The former leads to a standard set-
theoretic semantics; the latter leads to Malink’s mereological semantics. Malink rejects the
orthodox reading.
In Chapter 5, he links the heterodox dictum to PL. Since quantifiers range over terms,
Malink treats Aristotle’s categorical terms as zero-order individual terms, he treats copulas
(e.g. ‘belongs to all’) as first-order two-place predicates. Since Aristotle’s modal terms
modify copulas (p. 27), modal assertions are also equated with two-place predicates. With
 210 Book Reviews

these conventions, he defines equivalencies, equating assertions in the heterodox dictum

with formulas in first-order PL (pp. 70–72). (This provides Malink with the completeness
of first-order PL.)
Preorder semantics ‘does not specify the nature of the semantic values of categorical
terms’ (p. 73). That is, there are no commitments to individuals (i.e. primary substances,
such as Socrates), per se. Instead, the value of a categorical term is the expression itself
(p. 74). Malink is carful not to attribute this approach to Aristotle. Instead, he sees it is
a convenience, one that grants him access to model theory without making ‘substantive
commitments about the meaning of categorical terms’ (p. 74).
In Section II (Chapters 7–12), Malink links his mereology to Aristotle’s predicables
(see especially Chapter 9). This appears to explain Aristotle’s intuitions for the apodeictic
syllogistic, with the two Barbaras problem providing a test case: Aristotle accepts only
Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 09:49 02 February 2015

one of two possible mixed mode syllogisms in Barbara as obviously valid, rejecting the
other one.

Invalid for Aristotle (Barbara XLL) Valid for Aristotle (Barbara LXL)
A belongs to all B A necessarily belongs to all B
B necessarily belongs to all C B belongs to all C
A necessarily belongs to all C A necessarily belongs to all C

Aristotle’s counterexample to Barbara XLL

Motion belongs to all animals
Animal necessarily belongs to all men
Motion necessarily belongs to all men
Theophrastus’ counterexample to Barbara LXL
Motion necessarily belongs to all walking
Walking belongs to all men
Motion necessarily belongs to all men
Malink is able to both reject the counterexample to LXL, and explain Aristotle’s intuition
by drawing upon distinctions from the Topics: (i) types of predicative relations and (ii) types
of terms.
Definition, genus, differentia are predicate relations, involving essential predication. They
express an apodeictic joining of terms (a necessary copula). Proprium and accident involve
non-essential predication (Chapter 8). There are two types of terms: essential and non-
essential. Essential terms, such as ‘color’ and ‘redness’, stand for species. Since ‘red’ does
not stand for a species, it is a non-essential term (p. 7, 133, Chapter 8–10). In preorder
semantics, non-essential terms cannot serve as the subject of true apodeictic (essential)
predications.
Theophrastus’s counterexample is thus rejected. The major premise is false: ‘walking’
does not stand for a species; it is not an essential term (pp. 7, 133). By contrast, Aristotle’s
counterexample to XLL is legitimate: in each apodeictic assertion, the subject term is an
essential term.
Malink’s interpretation of Topics 4.2 further explains why Aristotle took LXL to be obvi-
ously valid. According to Malink, Aristotle holds that: ‘If there is an A that is predicated
essentially of B, and B is predicated of C, then B is predicated essentially of C’ (p. 124).
In other words, the minor premise of Barbara LXL is covertly apodeictic. LXL is a covert
version of the uncontroversial LLL. In preorder semantics, there can be no counterexample
to LXL. The same cannot be said of XLL.
 Book Reviews 211

Malink’s solution comes at a price, especially for the Topics’s theory of predicables.
First, Aristotle regularly says things like ‘color’ is the genus of ‘white’. This violates the
essential/non-essential classification of terms in preorder semantics, leading Malink to reply
that Aristotle erred; Aristotle, Malink tells us, should have said ‘color’ is the genus of ‘white-
ness’ (p. 133). Second, there is a problem with counterpredication, a test used to distinguish
predicables (i.e. definition and proprium from accident) at Topics 1.5 and 1.7. ‘Risible’, for
example, is a proprium of ‘man’. According to Aristotle, ‘risible’ counterpredicates with
‘man’: ‘Risible’ belongs to all ‘man’ and ‘man’ belongs to all ‘risible’. This causes a prob-
lem in preorder semantics. Since ‘animal’ is the genus of ‘man’, and ‘man’ belongs to all
‘risible’, ‘man’ is essentially predicated of ‘risible’ (by Topics 4.2). But, according to pre-
order semantics, proprium involves non-essential predication and ‘risible’ is a non-essential
term. As a non-essential term, it cannot serve as the subject of a true apodeictic predication.
Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 09:49 02 February 2015

Something has gone awry, and Malink notices the problem. In a footnote on p. 124, he
maintains that counterpredication is not expressible in terms of predication (within pre-
order semantics); he suggests that counterpredication requires co-extension. This solution,
however, is outside of preorder semantics. Co-extension is part of a set-theoretic seman-
tics. Not having extensions of individuals (i.e. primary substances) assigned to categorical
terms (i.e. secondary substances) is what prevents preorder semantics from collapsing into
set-theoretic semantics. Further, the lack of extensions is needed for Malink’s equivalencies
between the heterodox dictum and first-order PL, allowing Malink to avoid second-order
logic. Malink wants the completeness of first-order PL to obtain results that may not other-
wise follow. Given this, preorder semantics may not accommodate all assertoric assertions,
such as counterpredicating propria.
Even if the price is too great, Malink’s approach is a bold innovation, providing an
innovative adaptation of first-order PL. AMS is an engaging, thought-provoking read that
repays the effort.

References
Johnson, F. 1989. ‘Models for modal syllogisms’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 30, 271–283.
Malink, M. 2006. ‘A reconstruction of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic’, History and Philosophy of Logic, 27, 95–141.
Raymond, D. 2010. ‘Polarity and inseparability: the foundation of the apodictic portion of Aristotle’s modal
syllogistic’, History and Philosophy of Logic, 31, 193–218.
Reid, T. 1806. Analysis of Aristotle’s Logic with Remarks by Thomas Reid, Second Edition, Edinburgh: William
Creech.
Thompson, S.K. 1993. ‘Semantic analysis of the modal syllogistic’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 22, 111–128.
Thompson, S.K. 1997. ‘Relational models for the modal syllogistic’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 26, 129–141.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2014.889388

Charles Bolyard and Rondo Keele, editors, Later Medieval Metaphysics. Ontology,
Language & Logic. New York: Fordham University Press, 2013. 328 pp. $95 (cloth),
ISBN 978-0-8232-4472-0, $35 (paper), ISBN 978-0-8232-4473-7

Reviewed by Andreas Blank, Department of Philosophy, University of Paderborn,

Warburger Str. 100, D-33098 Paderborn, Germany, andreasblank@hotmail.com.

© 2013 Andreas Blank

The present volume brings together work that will be of interest both to specialists in
medieval philosophy and to those working in contemporary or more recent historical periods