Content Analysis and the Theory of Signs

Author(s): Abraham Kaplan

Source: Philosophy of Science , Oct., 1943, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Oct., 1943), pp. 230-247
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science
Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/184268

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 CONTENT ANALYSIS AND THE THEORY OF SIGNS

ABRAHAM KAPLAN

During the past decade or two the influence of theories of language a

ing has made itself felt in almost every field of study, either because,
case of psychology and the social sciences, meaning phenomena were pa
subject matter, or because, as in the case of physics and philosophy,
guage used in the study demanded analysis and clarification. In recen
there has been (and is being) developed, especially by H. D. Lasswe
associates, a technique known as content analysis,l which attempts to ch
the meanings in a given body of discourse in a systematic and qu
fashion.
This paper proposes to elucidate content analysis from the point of view
general theory of signs, especially in the form in which the latter has
orated by C. W. Morris and the scientific empiricists.2 We shall ask: Ar
analysis and semiotic (the general theory of signs) simply two formulation
same discipline? If not, what are the characteristic differences in their
methods, concepts and conclusions? Answers to these questions will b
terest, not only for the light they may throw on both these much
studies, but also for the suggestions they may offer as to the contribution
each may make to the other.
The viewpoint which this paper will develop is that content analys
statistical semantics of political discourse, semantics being defined a
branch of semiotic. This formulation embodies three basic differences between
content analysis and semiotic:
(1) Content analysis is concerned with the semantical (and sometimes syn-
tactical) features of signs; semiotic deals with their pragmatical features
as well.
(2) Content analysis is interested chiefly in political discourse; semiotic takes
as subject matter all the forms of discourse in which signs may function.
(3) Content analysis aims at statistical formulations, directed toward em-
pirical problems; semiotic is oriented rather toward logical analysis.
We shall examine these three propositions in the order given, attempting to
clarify the technical terms which they contain, and to present the bases for
considering content analysis from this point of view.

1 By 'content analysis' throughout this paper is meant not any analyses of content, but
the specific investigations, concepts, procedures, etc. developed by Lasswell and his associ-
ates, especially those discussed in the papers listed in the references. It is only this specific
"content analysis" with which we shall be concerned, and which we distinguish from the
general theory of signs.
2 Cf. especially C. W. Morris, "Foundations of the Theory of Signs", International Ency-
clopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, No. 2, University of Chicago Press, 1939. Prof. Morris
has kindly made available to me the manuscript for his forthcoming book on the subject, in
which his earlier formulation is both more fully elaborated and made more precise.
230

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 CONTENT ANALYSIS AND THEORY OF SIGNS 231

Morris takes as his basic concept for the construction of semiotic the notion of
mediated-taking-account-of. When an organism takes account of something
through the mediation of something else a process of semiosis is said to take place;
semiotic is the study of this process. That which does the mediating is called a
sign; the organism is said to interpret the sign; that which is mediately taken
account of may be called the signification of the sign.
Signs enter into three basic sorts of relationships, and exhibit three kinds of
characteristics; the study of each of these may be regarded as a distinct branch of
semiotic. Relations holding among signs themselves are syntactical relations;
syntactical characteristics of signs are those which may be described without
reference to either interpreters or significations; the study of such relations and
characteristics is called syntactics. Similarly, semantics deals with the relations
between signs and their significations, pragmatics with the relations between
signs and their interpreters.
An attempt at a somewhat sharper formulation of the matter reveals the
possibility of two definitions of semantics (and correspondingly, of pragmatics).
We shall call these the narrower and the wider sense of semantics (with the reverse
order for pragmatics, as will be clear in a moment). The first of these is the
earlier concept, set forth in Morris's monograph on the general theory of signs;
the second he elaborates in a forthcoming book on the subject.
la. The narrower sense of semantics. Semantics studies significations in so far
as these do not directly involve the interpreter.
lb. The wider sense of pragmatics. Pragmatics studies the use and function of
signs, as well as those aspects of signification which directly involve the
interpreter.
2a. The wider sense of semantics. Semantics studies all types of signification,
whether the interpreter is directly involved or not.
2b. The narrower sense of pragmatics. Pragmatics studies the use and function
of signs.
Features of signs studied by semantics in both the narrower and the wider
sense may be called purely semantical characteristics; similarly for purely prag-
matical characteristics. Properties studied by both semantics in the wider sense
and pragmatics in the wider sense may be called mixed characteristics. A few
examples will help make these distinctions clear.
A. Propositions referring to purely semantical characteristics.
1. The phrase 'the democracies' refers to France, England, and the United
States.
2. 'I1 Duce' and 'der Fiihrer' both mean leader; they apply to Mussolini and
Hitler, respectively.
3. In the first chapter of the book, there is presented the experimental
basis for the theory of relativity.
B. Propositions referring to purely pragmatical characteristics.
1. The Koreans have twenty modes of speech, appropriate to various
differences in the social status of speaker and hearer.

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232 ABRAHAM KAPLAN

2. Even when Jones is most convinced of the truth of what h

prefaces his remarks with the phrase 'There is some reas
that....'
3. An effective technique is to begin by explaining that y
not to sell insurance but to educate the public about its o
C. Propositions referring to mixed characteristics.
1 'So are they all, all honorable men' is a splendid exam
2. 'Winnie' and 'Churchill' denote the same individual, bu
completely synonymous.
3. The editorial contained a considerable number of unfavorable remarks
about Russia.
Thus purely semantical characteristics roughly correspond to what have be
called "referential meanings"; mixed characteristics are those which correspo
to so-called "emotive" or "expressive" meanings; purely pragmatical cha
acteristics concern the use and function of signs, and involve meanings only
their relationships to their users.
Our first proposition, then, differentiates between content analysis
semiotic on the basis that the former confines itself to semantics, while the latte
is concerned with pragmatics as well. We shall first indicate briefly why c
tent analysis is not concerned with purely pragmatical characteristics, the
consider the position of content analysis with respect to mixed characteristic
The science of communication, on Lasswell's account, has three branches,
indicated by the basic questions: What is said? Who says it? What effe
does it have on whom? Clearly, only the first of these belongs to semantics;
others concern purely pragmatical characteristics, referring as they do to the use
of signs and the relations of signs to their interpreters. And it is the first of th
questions which Lasswell regards as appropriate to content analysis (4:
carefully distinguishing this study from "control analysis, or the study of w
and effect analysis." Elsewhere (7:1) he makes the same distinction in sligh
different terms, using "symbol" for "content" analysis, and "elite" for "cont
analysis.
The position is made explicit with respect to a theory of propaganda by
N. C. Leites and I. Pool (13:3):
The aim of a theory of propaganda may be agreed to consist in the establishment of two
sets of universal propositions: on the one hand propositions about conditions of a given
propaganda, on the other hand propositions about its consequences [both clearly belonging
to pragmatics in the narrower sense]. Such propositions, however, require-which is the
important point here-the existence of a body of terms referring exclusively to the character-
istics of propaganda themselves, as distinguished from both their conditions and their con-
sequences. That is, more specifically, terms are required that refer solely to 'contents' in
order to make possible the establishment of propositions about interrelations between con-
tents and intentions as well as contents and responses.

And it is the aim of content analysis, they make clear, to provide such terms,
i.e., to describe in a precise way the contents of given discourse, so as to make
3 The number before the colon indicates the source, as listed in the references; the number
after the colon gives the page.

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 CONTENT ANALYSIS AND THEORY OF SIGNS 233

possible the formulation of propositions of pragmatics-for exa

of a theory of propaganda. Thus their first requirement for
called one of content analysis is (13:1) that it "refer either t
acteristics of symbols (.e.g, the presence of a certain logical fallac
characteristics (e.g., the characteristic of having reference to
against persons)."
But while content analysis does not refer to purely pragmati
of signs, it may, and indeed must take account of these in de
aspects of the content will be analyzed, and in what ways. T
clearly stated by Leites and Pool (13:4):

. .. The postulate that references to intentions and/or responses ought n

definitions of the classification-terms of content analysis by no means i
ses about intentions and responses ought not to enter into those con
investigator which culminate in his decision in favor of a given class
the contrary they ought frequently to do so.

There is a certain sense in which consideration of purely p

acteristics, such as "intentions" and "responses" seems to be
semantics is an abstraction from the concrete situation studie
Language is empirically presented to us as a certain behavior
isms use certain physical objects or events, which we call signs
own and others' behavior. The relationships of such signs to o
the objects to which they refer are discoverable, fundamental
amination of the modifications in behavior associated with th
in question. "What is said", in short, is an abstraction fro
situation involving "who says it" and "who is affected, and ho
the particular significations which they have only in so far
produce such and such effects in such and such situation
standing the signs we are therefore in a certain sense taking
effects. But consideration of the conditions and consequen
signs belongs to pragmatics, and is thus presumably exclude
analysis. Thus Lasswell explicitly points out (7:8):
... It is not the purpose of symbol [content] analysis to prejudge in d
given body of symbols upon an audience. As little as possible of the
taken into consideration. We operate with a minimum number of assum

We must make clear, therefore, in what respects intentions an

into account, and in what respects not.
To this end, it may be pointed out that intentions and effects ca
in two contexts, which we may call the causal context and the
In the causal context, the intention is embodied in the act of
its concreteness, involving the speaker's motives and purposes
causal context is similarly the concrete reaction of the audienc
ever overt responses may result from interpreting the signs
meaning context, the intention and effect are the intended an
significations, not in the concrete case, but as an abstraction from
of causal contexts in which the signs occur. Introducing the

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234 ABRAHAM KAPLAN

stand for the intended and comprehended significations, we may

purport is the signification considered in the relationship to the speake
which it usually has.4 The point to be made, then, is that content
siders the purport of signs, but not the causally effective intention
And this, indeed, seems to be the position which Lasswell ta
observes (7:4):
We do not try to anticipate in detail the effects of any statement. We do n
describe what is said according to the usual meaning of language to those wh
whom it is assumed the statement is read.

It is clear that any inferences from the meaning to the causal context are haz-
ardous; i.e., the usual meaning, as revealed by semantical and mixed characters of
the signs only, need not be the actual meaning in the given case: the semantical
and mixed characters do not determine the purely pragmatical ones. As Lasswell
puts it (10:5):
We want the words used to be classified according to the way they are usually understood
by that audience. These rules, of course, do not justify an effort to guess in advance the
response to a given item .... The response of the readers to a given caption may not be in
accordance with this classification . .. The response, of course, cannot be determined by
inspecting the stimuli presented at the focus of attention; data must be obtained from other
sources.

And these "other sources", the causal context, are not available
analysis as such, which "limits its description of a statement to dat
from the flow of signs through a channel" (4:24), as distinguished from
be learned from the purely pragmatical characteristics of signs.
To crystallize the sense in which intentions and effects are taken
by content analysis, even though the latter does not concern itself with
context, Lasswell invokes the freudian terms manifest and latent conten

To speak of latent meaning [he explains in 7:2] is to predict that somethin

(or has been) said (or done) under certain circumstances. It is an interpret
my husband more than anyone in the world" may be taken at its face val
decide that the wife "doth protest too much." In the first instance, we de
fest content; and in the second, we interpret according to latent meaning.

Content analysis, then, is an analysis of manifest, not latent conten

It is clear that we cannot consider less than the manifest content
deal with content at all. If an analyst is not permitted to take
purport, he can describe only syntactical properties of signs: "Suc
marks appear in certain places; sequences of marks of such and such
be replaced by sequences of a certain other kind; etc." For when w
sign has a certain signification, we are taking account of the inten
effects usually associated with that sign. Nor can consideration of
avoided by setting up a list, coordinating each sign to be considered with
4 Other qualifications than 'usually' may be added to specify what is to be
standard usage.

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 CONTENT ANALYSIS AND THEORY OF SIGNS 235

signification. Such a list simply standardizes purport, it does

The list is a specification of what the analyst is to regard as
comprehended meaning.
It is quite another question, however, whether content analy
purport in describing content, i.e., whether the definitions of
refer to mixed as well as to purely semantical characters of sig
possible to take account of intentions in determining what the con
referring to these intentions when we characterize the conten
whether the categories employed by content analysis do (or o
them.
Leites and Pool answer this question in the negative.

The rules for the subsumption of particular symbols under a category

need not, and should not, however, make reference to those psychologi
investigator presumes to have contributed to the inclusion of these sym
ganda in question. These rules ought rather-to put the proposition he
extreme form-specify those constellations of black marks on white w
belong to the content analytic category thus constituted.

The last part of this passage makes clear that they mean to ex
intentions (and effects), not only in the causal context, but
context as well. (Indeed, they convey the impression that
characters-"black marks on white"-can be referred to; but it
other contexts that they do not go so far.)
Three objections to content categories which include referen
mentioned by them. Of these, one ("relevancy to the general l
of propaganda") seems to result from a failure to distinguish
contexts in which intentions and effects can be considered. The others are
(13:5-6):
Firstly, the procedure involved introduces irrelevant "subjective" elements, i.e., mere
presumptions of the investigator. Secondly, the categories thus arrived at will in mos
cases possess only a low degree of stability in their application.

As to the first objection, it must be reemphasized that the "subjective

elements are already introduced as soon as we concern ourselves with content
all. When a sign is regarded as a sign, and not merely as a sequence of marks
the analyst presumes that certain meanings are intended and comprehended-
not necessarily by the actual speakers and hearers, as was explained above, bu
usually, or in accord with other specified standards. The correctness of h
presumption can be checked both by the reliability of his analysis (his agreemen
with other analysts) and, as I. Janis has suggested, by the validity of the cor
relations into which his description of the content enters. The objection to
reference to intentions, then, can be only that thereby the reliability of the
description of content is materially reduced.
This is, indeed, the second of the objections just cited. The basis for thi
objection is, however, not entirely clear. Consider, for example, the caption
NAZI FLYERS STRAFE LIFEBOATS. Leites and Pool would presumably

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236 ABRAHAM KAPLAN

permit the application only of content categories like "military affairs", "ship
sinkings", "axis forces", etc. Categories like "unfavorable reference" would be
excluded, presumably, as "subjective" and unreliable. But "unfavorable refer-
ence" is no more a so-called subjective category than the others. In all cases the
analyst interprets the marks as having certain significations; in the last he in-
terprets them as having a certain purport. And there is at any rate no a priori
reason why such interpretation should be always less reliable than the purely
semantical. Indeed, it is easy to imagine cases where the mixed characteristics
of the signs are more obvious (and presumably subject to more reliable coding)
than the purely semantical characteristics. Suppose an editorial contains a
sentence like "The plan is without question communistic." Might there not well
be instances of occurrence in which it would be far clearer (and more reliable) to
say that the editorial expresses an unfavorable attitude toward the plan than to
say that the editorial characterizes the plan as being in accord with the doctrines
of Karl Marx? The former refers to mixed characteristics of the signs (an un-
favorable attitude is expressed and comprehended by these signs, in the meaning
context); the latter refers to purely semantical characteristics.
There are methods, moreover, for improving the reliability of application of
mixed categories. Leites and Pool mention only using a larger board of "judges",
i.e., analysts, and applying the techniques of L. L. Thurstone for the measure-
ment of attitudes. This they reject as impractical. But there are other possi-
bilities; for example, a dictionary of purport can be prepared, from the point of
view of a given investigation and set of signs5; or rules of interpretation could be
elaborated to any desired degree of complexity. Such rules could refer, if de-
sired, to semantical characteristics only, so far as possible. The categories them-
selves, however, would be mixed.
There is no necessity, on the other hand, for using mixed categories to describe
content. Whether such categories are required depends on the material being
analyzed, and the (purely pragmatical) hypotheses for which the analysis of
content is to provide data. We wish to correlate the content of certain signs
with certain non-sign events; which content categories are most useful for these
correlations is then clearly an empirical question. In certain content analysis
investigations, purely semantical categories have been found useful; in others,
mixed categories seem advisable.6
The categories used by Lasswell and his associates are clearly mixed (7:3):
Statements may be classified "semantically" and "syntactically". The former considers
the ego significance of a statement .... Semantic description falls into two divisions-inten-
tion, representation. To classify according to "intention" we ask how the speaker has
committed himself. To classify by "representation" we ask whether the statement will be

5 A method somewhat similar to this was used by Waples and Berelson in (18), where a
"dictionary-of sentimentalizations" was compiled.
6 Thus in a monograph entitled "A Study of War Communiques" (Jan., 1942), H. Speier
made much use of purely semantical categories like "military process sentences", "refer-
ences to the collective self", "planning expressions", etc. On the other hand, Waples and
Berelson are concerned to arrive at "the values stressed by the communications" (18:40),
and for this mixed categories are needed.

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 CONTENT ANALYSIS AND THEORY OF SIGNS 237

understood to place anybody or anything in a more or less favorable po

the distribution of values in society.

We shall consider these categories in more detail in the next

present we wish only to emphasize that they refer to mixed
signs.
We conclude, then, that content analysis restricts itself to semantics; in some
investigations to semantics in the wider sense, in others to semantics in the
narrower sense. With purely pragmatical characteristics content analysis, un-
like the general theory of signs, is not concerned.
II

The second basic proposition we are to consider is that content analysis, as at

present developed, is directed toward the analysis of political discourse, not of
discourse in general, nor of the various types of discourse. We shall see shortly
that 'political discourse' is here meant in a somewhat wider sense than usual
perhaps, but narrow enough, nevertheless, for it to be easily distinguishable from,
say, scientific or esthetic discourse. It should be made clear at once that the
present view is not that content analysis deals with the symbols and statements
of political science, but rather that it deals with the symbols and statements that
function in the behavior and institutions studied by political science. Using the
phrase 'political process' to refer to these institutions and behavior, we may say
proleptically that content analysis is concerned with the symbols that char-
acteristically function in the political process, and with other types of symbols
and discourse only in so far as they are relevant to that process.
We shall first indicate briefly the expressed aims of content analysis; sketch the
underlying conception of political discourse; then show how the categories used
"follow" from the aim of analysing political discourse thus conceived.
The following seem to be the kinds of questions which content analysis is
interested in answering-more strictly, the kinds of hypotheses for which content
analysis is interested in supplying data. There is no thought here of a compre-
hensive listing; our purpose is merely to present sufficient instances to make clear
the kind of materials content analysis deals with. We may group the questions
(hypotheses) about to be mentioned into those concerning the conditions of
occurrence of certain contents and those concerning their consequences, without
assuming that these groupings are necessarily exhaustive.
There are first questions concerning those responsible for given symbol out-
puts, e.g., Who controls the nature of the content to be found in a given channel?
In the concrete, such a question often takes the form of detection of propaganda:
given a set of symbols, to determine by an analysis of their content the indi-
viduals or groups whose propaganda is probably embodied in those symbols.
Thus in one of his monographs7 Lasswell gives three tests (among others) for the
detection of propaganda, the data for which can be provided by content analysis:

One of the simplest standards for the detection of propaganda is the parallel test. The
content of any channel of communication is compared with the content of a known propa-

7 Monograph entitled "Public Opinion", Sept., 1941, pp. 55-57.

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238 ABRAHAM KAPLAN

ganda channel. If the content is similar, and variations occur at the same tim
probable that they are subject to common propaganda control. ... A special
lel test is the consistency test. By this is meant the consistency of a stream
tion with the declared propaganda of one party to a controversy.... One o
standards of propaganda detection is the presentation test. This standard
examining the balance of favorable and unfavorable treatment given to diffe
and propositions in a channel of communication. Any channel that gives
presentation may be suspected of being under the propaganda control of t
favors....

Another sort of question in which content analysis would be

determination of the events known and considered by the con
channel of communication from the content appearing in th
more important are the inferences which might be based on t
content to public policy, a relation which is especially direct
observed, "in totalitarian countries, where the press and othe
communication are under strict discipline" (8:457). In another

We may endeavour to infer the intention of controllers from what ap

of communication, or we may aim to infer the facts about events know
... In general we should like to predict from the symbols the intended
persons or groups, the facts of indulgent or deprivational changes in th
their future responses to specified environments. (Do the Nazi leader
intended initiative by projecting a plan of the intended type upon t
Nazi leaders regularly understate victories during the early phases of

From the side of consequences, we may use the results of co

has been suggested (7:2), to help determine the effectiveness o
techniques of propaganda:
Policy makers . . . have always been sensitive to the political signif
public reads, sees, and hears. They have been resentful of criticism and
ship and propaganda. Policy makers watch the stream of communic
evaluating the success or failure of various measures that have been
manage opinion.

Again, content analysis will facilitate, perhaps, the isolation, ide

description of the "ideologies" and "propagandas" actually
certain groups at specified times-as is explicitly remarked in
One of the functions of content analysis is to establish the degrees o
obtain among statements and unit symbols in a given universe of di
period of time. Certain frequencies of occurrence under specified cond
before it is appropriate to apply such expressions as "ideology" to p
symbol and statement. By means of symbol analysis it is clear we a
rather unambiguous descriptions of fundamental features of society

More generally, the hope is entertained that content analys

. . . supply us with data about many of the missing links in the process
development. For a great many years scientific students of politics

8 Memorandum on "Specimen Hypotheses About the Focus of At

Politics", Feb., 1942, p. 4.

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 CONTENT ANALYSIS AND THEORY OF SIGNS 239

about the connection between "material" and "ideological" factors.... I

cult to discuss these questions objectively for lack of data about ideolog
time. Part of the deficiency is to be attributed to inadequate technique;
is in process of being superseded. The symbols that come to the focus
objectively described.... [8:459].

These and other questions with which content analysis is con

which it is to supply data) might perhaps be summarized, th
whom, under what circumstances, and with what effects do
content occur?
Certain types of content, let it be emphasized. In their definition of conten
analysis, Leites and Pool begin, "A social science sentence may be called one o
'content analysis' if ... ", and specify as one of the conditions to be satisfied th
the characteristics of signs described must be referred to "by terms which occu
(or which it is intended to make occur) in universal propositions of social science"
(13:1-2). Now content analysis is doubly sociological, so to speak. Not onl
are the propositions and terms of content analysis itself parts of social scienc
(as Leites and Pool have made explicit), but the propositions and terms analyze
are those which play certain roles in interpersonal relationships. The kinds o
questions in which content analysis is interested provide a basis for distinguish
ing between content analysis and other parts of social science which are also
concerned with signs and their content, e.g., the sociology of knowledge, whic
deals with the content of scientific discourse, or the sociology of art, which would
be concerned with esthetic discourse. Now it is not being denied that an
analysis of content can be made for types of discourse other than the political; on
the contrary, just such analyses are engaged in by the sociological disciplines just
mentioned, and by semiotic in a general way and with a logical orientation.
The point being made is that this analysis would not necessarily use the methods,
and certainly not the categories, of what is here being discussed as "content
analysis", which is concerned with propaganda, public opinion, ideologies, and
related matters.9
Let us in a few sentences make more explicit the conception of political dis-

9 The suggestion is made (7:13) that "the basic categories .. . are of general application
to communication of every kind-musical, pictorial, plastic. Every musical phrase, for
example, can be described semantically; it may be associated with gloom or gaiety, repose
or activity, or some other form of ego significance." But first, one must distinguish between
differences in channels of communication (physical characters of the signs used) and differ-
ences in types of discourse (functions fulfilled by the signs). With respect to the former, a
certain generality can be attained: many categories can be applied to political cartoons as
well as to political editorials, for example. But if one set of signs is political in its bearings,
the other esthetic, it is doubtful if any categories other than those of the general theory of
signs are applicable to both. Thus the example given here is a semiotical category, not
specifically one of content analysis, such as are discussed later in this section. On the other
hand, certain methodological concepts, such as the Janis-Fadner "coefficient of imbalance"
(1:2) might be applicable to various types of discourse. And moreover, content analysis
categories might also be applicable to kinds of discourse other than the political if these
resemble it in certain respects, e.g., are concerned with power relations. This is true to a
degree, Lasswell has suggested, of the symbols occurring in psychiatric interviews; cf. (5).

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240 ABRAHAM KAPLAN

course which underlies the interests and orientation of content

understood, of course, that the question whether this is an entir
conception of the political process is here quite beside the point.
Political science, as conceived by Lasswell and others, is the stu
interpersonal relationships (to be specified in a moment), more g
tain relationships among groups of persons. With respect to ev
may speak of a more or less definite set of values-the objects or
which the members of the group desire or are interested in
pattern in a given group is then meant the distribution of the va
possession of these values) among the members of the group
vidual or a group is said to have power over another (with respect to
of values) in so far as it can control the value pattern of the lat
litical science is, then, the study of power so defined; interperso
studied by it as conflicts over or exercises of power. Symbols
these relationships for the attainment of political goals are sai
political discourse. It is these symbols which content analysis s
the characterization of these symbols that the categories of cont
peculiarly adapted.
Before considering these categories, let us briefly contrast this per
that of semiotic. That interpersonal relations, i.e., the social ac
say, of G. H. Mead, is basic for the understanding of meaning p
be agreed to-language is intrinsically social. Content analysi
"natural", the psychogenetic order, in taking as the foundation for
the concept of communication (7:2), though the concept of sign
starting point for a logical development of the subject." We ca
regard the act in general as social in its aims, the qualification m
litical orientation. Signs are generated in situations in which in
communication with each other. But the individuals do not always com-
municate for the purpose of improving their value or power positions over one
another-or at any rate, the act need not always be regarded from this point of
view. Put crudely, scientific discourse, for example, aims at knowledge, not
political power. At least, there are problems and contexts in which we consider
scientific discourse chiefly from that point of view, and for which, therefore,
categories based on interpersonal relationships would be irrelevant, or at most
peripheral. And considerations of this kind would hold even more strongly,
perhaps, for other types of discourse, such as the esthetic. A general theory of
signs must consider the acts in which signs function in their full generality, ap-
plying special sign categories only in connection with acts which satisfy special
conditions.
We come then to the categories which have been elaborated in the theoretical
bases of content analysis and applied in the actual "coding" operations. We
shall consider only the main ideas, neglecting for our purposes the minor modi-
fications introduced in the various versions of the typology. Moreover, we shall
10 For this conception of politics, cf. especially (9) and (6).
11 The difference between a "logical" and a "natural" order will be amplified (though
obliquely) in the next section.

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 CONTENT ANALYSIS AND THEORY OF SIGNS 241

set aside the syntactical categories (e.g., "consistency")12,

signed a subordinate role in the elaboration of the framework,
plied in most of the investigations.
The first basic distinction is that between intention and
"presentation"), mentioned at the end of Part I. Roughly,
differentiations between the viewpoint of the speaker an
spectively: the categories of intention indicate "how the
himself"; those of representation, whether the referent
more or less favorable position with respect to the distrib
The important place assigned in the typology to commitme
is a direct result (and indication) of the political interest by
are guided.
From the point of view of intention, statements are cla
groups (with corresponding groups for unit symbols): statemen
"identification", and of "fact" (7:3). A demand is a statem
determination ("I want this", "I will have it"). Statemen
refer to "the boundaries of an ego" (the self and whatever is r
to the self) ("I am an American", "They belong to the uni
fact may be characterized for the moment as those which "do
to events" (5:203n).
The relation between these categories and the political o
direct. The units of the political process are not mere aggr
but associations-i.e., groups organized for the attainme
Thus an association is determined when two specifications
bership and the aims. And it is just these specifications wh
the symbols and statements of identification and of d
Such signs, therefore, clearly play a fundamental role in
-they are the ones which tell who "we" are and what "we
are the symbols which tell whether and how "we" are to
These constitute the so-called "statements of fact" (which
quite as inclusive a category as might at first have seemed
It is obvious that for the analysis of scientific discourse
different basic categories would be desirable. On the other
of these categories for the specific purposes of content analys
readiness with which they suggest and the ease with which th
to hypotheses like the following, for examplel4:
References to the self ("symbols of identification") increa
diminish.
War aims references ("symbols of demand") increase after military reverses.
12 Other syntactical categories mentioned (7:11), e.g., "generality" and "economy",
are perhaps better interpreted as being semantical.
13 (4:22): "For convenience we may call (non-demand, non-identification statements)
'fact statements', although it is in some ways objectionable to give an inclusive word like
'fact' a circumscribed definition. When fact statements refer to future events, they may be
called 'expectations'."
14 "Specimen Hypotheses" memorandum, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

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242 ABRAHAM KAPLAN

Future references ("symbols of fact" or of "expectation") increa

after conspicuous success or failure.
From the point of view of representation, the basic categories are those of
"direction" and of "standard". The former indicate whether the value position
is presented as indulgent (favorable), deprivational (unfavorable), or neutral
(10:5); the latter specify which values are in question. The most important
categories of standard and those most often used are "strength-weakness" and
"morality-immorality". The former standard
. .. refers to the position of the symbol as a cause (or effect) of value changes. It in-
cludes military, diplomatic, economic and ideological assets and effectiveness. The
morality standard relates to conformity or disconformity of a symbol to a norm (10:5-6).15

The connection of the categories of direction with the interest in the political
process is obvious. Categories of standard find their application to political
discourse in their correspondence to instrumental and intrinsic values. We may
evaluate the aim of the political association (or individual), or evaluate the means
available to him for its attainment.
In any specific investigation, certain "key" symbols are selected for study,
and these may also be said to constitute a set of "categories". If the investiga-
tion is limited to determining occurrences of these symbols (and specified syn-
onyms and indirect references), i.e., if it is interested in purely semantical and not
in mixed characteristics, Lasswell speaks of "topical analysis" (4:19):
When we speak of topical analysis, we refer to symbol lists that are not explicitly related
to a structure of scientific hypotheses about response. The symbols may be recognizable
when they occur, but they are not described as a class of response instigators .... Since we
are interested in politics, we carry the analysis forward to account for plus or minus re-
sponses; hence we would classify the references as plus or minus. We may say that topical
analysis is incomplete presentation analysis.

The specific symbols studied in content analysis Lasswell divides (in 4:5-6)
into six categories:
In preparing to study content we need to draw up a list of key symbols toward which
value responses in which we are interested are directed. These symbols may be conven-
iently grouped as follows:
1. Persons (Roosevelt, Stalin, . ..)
2. Groups (Americans, Russians, .. .)
3. Agencies (Congress, Soviet, . . .)
4. Policies (War, Peace, . .)
5. Participations (Enlist, Subscribe, . . .)
6. Ideas (Democracy, Nazism, . . )16

The direct connection of these categories of key symbols with the political
process is clear not only from the examples, but also from the categories them-

15 (10:6): "Strictly, the word 'morality' is too narrow. By definition, however, it in-
cludes the presentation of symbols in terms of beauty, goodness, consistency, and the like."
16 (4:5-6): "In the foregoing there are few ambiguities. By a 'policy' is meant an official
action of a group. A 'participation' is the act of an individual. The 'idea' category can be
expanded to include statements about the future and the past, and about all the beliefs of
a group."

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 CONTENT ANALYSIS AND THEORY OF SIGNS 243

selves. Obviously, categories like "agencies" and "policies" w

fruitful for the analysis of poetry, nor would categories like "c
have any useful application to political discourse.
In short, we may conclude that content analysis deals with po
and that the distinctions and categories it has elaborated for th
from this interest in political discourse. Semiotic is concerned w
discourse, and attempts to develop categories general enough t
what direction this attempt takes will be made somewhat clearer
section.
III

The third basic proposition with which we are concerned is that con
analysis is empirical in orientation and interests, while semiotic is logical
shall first examine this difference, then briefly consider its implications for th
contributions which each discipline can make to the other.
The empirical character of content analysis has already been brought out
the previous section: content analysis has as its subject matter empirically g
facts (specific instances of political discourse) and the propositions in whic
eventuates must fit those facts if they are to be true. To assert, for exam
that the content of a certain editorial is like that of another in certain respects
to enunciate a proposition of the same type as that one body is equal to ano
in length. In the language of the logician, both are synthetic propositions: t
truth depends not simply on their meanings, but on the actual states of affairs
which they refer.
The point is worth making because discourse about discourse is frequently
of this sort. Propositions about language are often true simply because of
meanings of the terms employed. The statement Propositions of the form '
not p' are always true can be seen to be true without any investigation in
matters of fact. It need only be understood for its truth to be apprehende
we know what it is for a proposition to have the form 'p or not p' we know
that such a proposition can not possibly be false. The semantics of the logic
consists of propositions of this sort, i.e., of propositions whose substantiat
requires no investigation into matters of fact. It must be clearly underst
therefore, that content analysis, though a semantics, is an empirical seman
It talks about meanings, but what it says about them can not be verified sim
from an understanding of the meanings used and referred to. We shall retu
this point shortly.
The empirical nature of content analysis is forcefully brought out by i
statistical character, one of its most distinctive attributes. In the Leites-P
definition already referred to (13: 1-2) the requirement is specified for a senten
to belong to content analysis that it
... indicate frequencies of occurrence of ... characteristics with a high degree of pr
cision. One could perhaps define more narrowly: it must assign numerical values to
frequencies.

17 Cf., for example, R. Carnap's Introduction to Semantics, Studies in Semantics, Par

Harvard University Press, 1942.

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244 ABRAHAM KAPLAN

Specifically, we may say that content analysis attempts to arrive

determination of two main types of variables: (1) the proportion
of various sorts of content in a given body of discourse, and (2)
these proportions through time.18 Now regardless of whether
cedures in this connection are worthwhile-i.e., whether their r
validity are sufficient to reveal more than could be found by an "im
method-it is indisputable, at any rate, that the problems involve
and to be solved by whatever methods of empirical investigation
selves to be most suitable.
Now does not semiotic also deal with empirical problems, albeit more gen-
eral ones than those that occupy content analysis? As a theory of signs, its
subject matter is constituted, as was remarked earlier in this paper, by certain
complexes of behavior and their modifications. And is not the study of this
behavior in general as empirical as the study of certain kinds and aspects of such
behavior?
The answer to this question is both "Yes" and "No", i.e., there is a distinction
to be invoked-that between pure and descriptive semiotic, in Morris's terms.
Content analysis is, indeed, a part of descriptive semiotic, but differs sharply,
both as to aims and methods, from pure semiotic.
Descriptive semiotic, as the qualifier suggests, is simply the description of
empirically given sets of signs-either of certain general types (e.g., discourse of
science, art, politics) or of specific instances (e.g., particular scientific treatises,
poems, propagandas). And such descriptions, as of any other matters of fact,
are subject to empirical verification. The statement 'Tomorrow it will rain or it
will not rain' is always true is a synthetic proposition, in contrast to our earlier
example, which it closely resembles. For its ascribes certain semantical and
syntactical characteristics to certain words in the English language; and whether
these words have these characteristics depends on the empirical facts concerning
the way in which they are actually used by English-speaking people. The propo-
sition states, in other words, that such and such signs have the form 'p or not p',
i.e., the form described by "a logical disjunction of a proposition and its logical
negation". Whether they have this form is a question of fact; whether they
would be always true if they had that form is a question of logic. Descriptive
semiotic deals only with the former question; the latter is the province of pure
semiotic.
Without introducing further complications, we may say simply that pure
semiotic is a system of definitions and their consequences, the concepts defined
being those of the various aspects of sign phenomena. As definitions, they are
without empirical content. But this does not rob them of their utility; far from
it. Though definitions are conventional, and it is for this reason that they do not
embody empirical knowledge, they are by no means arbitrary, and it is this on
which their utility rests.
They are not arbitrary in at least two respects: (1) They are formulated with
regard to the usage of the terms being defined, and (2) with regard to the im-
18 (7:12): "It is evident that through any period of time, symbol patterns undergo
redefinition. One function of our technique is to determine the direction and tempo of these
transformations."

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 CONTENT ANALYSIS AND THEORY OF SIGNS 245

portance of the complex of properties brought together in eac

of these concerns is associated with certain purposes which m
semiotic. We have time to do no more than enumerate som
special reference to their possible value for content analysis.
Perhaps the most obvious usefulness of semiotic lies in its attem
standardized terminology for discussing the various aspects of
Various analyses of content have been carried on for some time in
with other interests and categories than those of what we
"content analysis"-for example, in literary studies, e.g., (
serve to help translate the explanations, terms, and categorie
disciplines into those of the others. The importance of such tr
than terminological, of course. They can, for instance, fr
pseudo-problems that so often arise in connection with di
phenomena because of vague and ambiguous formulations
example, "poetic truth", "meaningfulness" or "meaningles
judgments, etc.).
Semiotic, with its preoccupation with logical analysis, can of
cepts whose obscurity is as great as their importance, and facil
definitions and explanations of them. Grammatical categorie
cannot be accepted without question as marking real distinct
properties; an interest in time references, say, calls for a the
dependent solely on the accidents of grammatical form. A
content analysis categories like "strength-weakness" and "mor
requires, for clarity, some analysis of value terms. And for th
fundamental notions like the distinction between "manifest" and "latent con-
tent" semiotic, with its wide perspective and concern for logical precision, migh
be particularly useful.
It is characteristic of semiotic that it attempts to systematize the terms used
in the description of sign phenomena. In this attempt it can be useful not onl
by making more clear and explicit the interrelations among the various cate-
gories of content, but also by suggesting new categories that might be overlooked
in a less systematic approach. There are many syntactical categories othe
than "consistency" and "economy" which might be useful for content analysis
e.g., frequencies of direct quotations or proper names, or occurrences of variou
types of sentential connectives; there are other semantical categories than thos
of "standard" which might prove fruitful, e.g., generality, vagueness, abstract
ness; there are other categories of sentential purport than those of "identifica
tion", "fact", and "demand", e.g., we might also examine the occurrences of
threats and promises, predictions and explanations, prophecies and sheer re-
ports. And so on. In short, the systematic character of semiotic might make i
useful as a source of hypotheses for content analysis.
Semiotic may have a heuristic value in perhaps a more important way than
that just mentioned. In attempting to construct the framework for a genera
theory of signs, it brings together various distinct disciplines on the basis of their
common problems and interests, and thereby helps overcome a certain artificia
separatedness and independence which frequently results from the more or les

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246 ABRAHAM KAPLAN

a priori delineation of the subject matter "appropriate" to each sc

fruitfulness of this coalescing of distinct disciplines has been illustrate
once in recent decades, as in the case, e.g., of mathematical biophys
tic represents, at least in its aims, the convergence on a single set of pr
the work of linguists, psychologists, philosophers, sociologists, mat
anthropologists, and many others. The treatment of various speci
sign phenomena can obviously profit not inconsiderably from the r
vestigations on similar matters undertaken from somewhat diffe
of view.
Finally, some of these possible applications of semiotic to content analysis
suggest that the general theory of signs might assist in explicitly setting forth the
logical elements from which the complicated structure of content analysis is
built up-the basic properties of signs which, in their various combinations, con-
stitute the characteristics which content analysis is interested in describing.
This formulation indicates at once both the difference between semiotic and con-
tent analysis and also their bond of connection. They are related as are logic
and mathematics in Bertrand Russell's famous characterization: logic probes
downward, toward the foundations; mathematics moves in the other direction-
that of synthesis rather than analysis-more interested in the structure which
can be erected than in the precise nature of the foundations on which it is based.
This formulation expresses also the importance of content analysis for semiotic.
The former, specialized though it may be, is an empirical discipline; semiotic, for
all its generality, is empty save for the empirical propositions supplied to it by
content analysis and other special empirical disciplines. It is outside the scope
of this introductory sketch to consider the problems involved in validating the
specific conclusions which might be reached in any particular content analysis
investigation. But the results already attained20 forcibly suggest that content
analysis marks the most promising direction along which the sciences of signs
might proceed to formulate and substantiate precise empirical hypotheses about
sign usage.

The Library of Congress

SELECTED REFERENCES

Papers on the theory of signs are altogether omitted here, as the sta
materials have often been listed. Also omitted are references on the th
and public opinion (except one or two items especially important for c
specific content analyses without explicit bearing on the general proce
(1) JANIS, I. L., AND FADNER, R. H., "A Coefficient of Imbalance fo
Experimental Division for the Study of War Time Communications
Library of Congress, 1942.

19 Lasswell's work in political science is, in part, a similar attempt to

lems in a certain field outside the narrow framework of the academic
cally, he attempts to consider the bearings on political phenomena of th
and hypotheses of psychology, especially abnormal psychology. Cf. h
and Politics, University of Chicago Press, 1930, and (9).
20 Cf., for example, Leites and Pool's studies of communist propag
Division for the Study of War Time Communications, Documents No. 2
Congress, 1942.

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 CONTENT ANALYSIS AND THEORY OF SIGNS 247

(2) AND JANOWITZ, M., "The Reliability of a Content Analysis Technique", Ex-
perimental Division. op. cit., Document No. 32, 1942.
(3) KINGSBURY, S. M., HART, H., ET AL., Newspapers and News, Putnams, 1937.
(4) LASSWELL, H. D., "Analyzing the Content of Mass Communication: A Brief Introduc-
tion", Experimental Division, op. cit., Document No. 11.
(5) , "A Provisional Classification of Symbol Data", Psychiatry, 1938, I, 197-204.
(6) --- , "Symbols", Chap. II in Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, McGraw Hill,
1936.
(7) - , "The Technique of Symbol Analysis (Content Analysis)", Experimental
Division, op. cit., 1941.
(8) , "The World Attention Survey", Public Opinion Quarterly, 1941, III, 456-62.
(9) , World Politics and Personal Insecurity, McGraw Hill, 1935.
(10) AND ASSOCIATES, "The Politically Significant Content of the Press: Coding
Procedures", Journalism Quarterly, 1942, XIX, No. 1.
(11) , AND BLUMENSTOCK, D., World Revolutionary Propaganda, Knopf, 1939.
(12) - , GELLER, A., AND KAPLAN, D., "An Experimental Comparison of Four Ways
of Coding Editorial Content", Journalism Quarterly, 1942, IV, No. 1.
(12a) , "The Differential Use of Flexible and Rigid Procedures of Content Analy-
sis", Experimental Division, op. cit., Document No. 12, 1943.
(13) LEITES, N. C. AND POOL, I., "On Content Analysis", Experimental Division, op. cit.,
Document No. 26, 1942.
(14) RICE, S. A. AND WEAVER, W. W., "The Verification of Social Measurements Involving
Subjective Classification", Social Forces, 1929, VIII, 16-28.
(15) RICKERT, E., New Methods for the Study of Literature, University of Chicago Press, 1927.
(16) WAPLES, D., People and Print, University of Chicago Press, 1937.
(17) - (ed.), Print, Radio, and Film in a Democracy, University of Chicago Press,
1942.
(18) AND BERELSON, B., Public Communications and Public Opinion, Graduate
Library School, University of Chicago, 1941.
(19) AND BRADSHAW, F. R., What Reading Does to People, University of Chicago
Press, 1940.
(20) WILLEY, M. M., The Country Newspaper, University of North Carolina Press, 1926.
(21) WOODWARD, J. L., "Quantitative Newspaper Analysis as a Technique of Opinion
Research", Social Forces, 1934, XII, 526-37.

COMMENTS

Dr. Abraham Kaplan's paper, Content Analysis and the Theory of S

illuminating study of the relation of the work being done under Dr
direction to the kind of studies carried on by Professor Rudolf Carn
myself. These two programs have grown up in essential independen
lan's analysis reveals their present status, and suggests how each ma
the other. His results seem to me to be clarifying and essentially correct.
There are several points, however, which I wish to elaborate.
Semiotic is still in a very embryonic state, both as respects its fundamental
terminology and as respects the empirical knowledge it has attained. The fact
that there are wider and narrower senses of 'semantics' and 'pragmatics', for
instance, complicates Kaplan's analysis, and causes him to introduce the concept
of 'mixed characteristics'. But if there are mixtures of semantical and prag-
matical characteristics of signs, there is no reason why there are not mixtures
of semantical and syntactical characteristics, or syntactical and pragmatical, or
mixtures of all three. And this fact argues for an acceptance of what he calls
the wider sense of semantics and the narrower sense of pragmatics, in which
case no special category of mixed characteristics is involved.

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