11. Cruz v. Youngberg, G.R. No.

L-34674, October 26, 1931

(Supplementary and Contingent Regulation)

12. Dagan v. Philippine Racing Commission, GR No. 175220, February 12, 2009

(Requisites for Valid Administrative Regulation)

Requisites for the validity of an administrative issuance.

The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines, hinges on

compliance with the following requisites:

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;

3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;

4. It must be reasonable.

Latin maxim: potestas delegate non delegare potest.

The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated. This rule is based upon
the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon
the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. This rule however
admits of recognized exceptions such as the grant of rule-making power to administrative
agencies. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the
implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical
necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public
functions.

Here, all the prescribed requisites are met as regards the questioned issuances.
Philracom’s authority is drawn from P.D. No. 420. The delegation made in the presidential
decree is valid. Philracom did not exceed its authority. And the issuances are fair and
reasonable.

13. Department of Health v. Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, Inc.

GR No. 202943, March 25, 2015 (Primary Jurisdiction to Regulate)

Principle of lex specialis derogat generali.

General legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so
interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable. In other
words, where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
specially designed therefore should prevail.

In the case a bar, the Court agrees with the CA that it is the IAC-Tobacco and not the DOH
which has the primary jurisdiction to regulate sales promotion activities. As such, the DOH’s
ruling, including its construction of RA 9211 (i.e., that it completely banned tobacco
advertisements, promotions, and sponsorships, as promotion is inherent in both advertising and
sponsorship), are declared null and void, which, as a necessary consequence, precludes the
Court from further delving on the same. Hence, in the proper exercise of its rule-making
authority, nothing precludes the IAC-Tobacco from designating any of its pilot agencies to
perform its multifarious functions under RA 9211.

14. Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Executive Secretary,

GR No. 180046, April 2, 2009 (Powers of attached agency)

Doctrine/Legal Principle:

The exercise of the President's residual powers under this provision requires legislation

Importance of Doctrine:

This doctrine is important because as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the
President's other powers and functions has to be provided for under the law. And it just so
happened that there is no law or the President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to
amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. It should be noted that legislative power is
the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them, and this power is vested with the
Congress.

As ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Ople v. Torres, the Court declared void, as
a usurpation of legislative power, Administrative Order No. 308 (AO 308) issued by the
President to create a national identification system.

15. David v. Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006

(Power of President to create Decrees)

1.) Moot and Academic Principle.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening eventsso that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value.Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.

However, it is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation
of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review. An otherwise “moot” case may still be decided “provided the party
raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct
result of its issuance.” The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule
pointed out by the Chief Justice.

2.) Locus Standi Principle

Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In

private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Accordingly, the “real-party-in
interest” is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own
right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
“public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He
could be suing as a “stranger,” or in the category of a “citizen,” or ‘taxpayer.” In either case, he
has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to
make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
“citizen” or “taxpayer.

3.) Non-Suability of the Chief Executive during his tenure.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution
or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can
be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be
freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only
one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge
of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not
accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people, but he
may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.

4.) principle of constitutionalism”—ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency

governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief Executive,
while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and
under effective limitations and checks.