LESSON 1.

1 MICROLEVEL APPROACHES

RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (RCT)

Rational choice theory (RCT) is a powerful tool in making sense of why people act or

behave in the way they do. Nonetheless, it is not a comprehensive theory that can fully

account for one's behavior or action. According to Elster 1989 (in Ward 2002, 65),"(t)he

essence of rational choice theory is that 'when faced with several courses of action,

people usually do what they believe is likely to have the best overall outcome.

Individuals actions are based on their preferences beliets, and teasible strategies

(Ward, 2002). But as Ward (2002, 65) observed, rational choice theory "needs other

perspectives to help explain why individuals have the interests they do, how they

perceive those interests, and the distribution of rules, powers, and social roles that

determine the constraints on their actions."

The beginnings of rational choice theory (RCT) can be traced back to the behavioral

revolution in American political science of the 1950s and the 1960s (Ward 2002)

instigated by behavioralists or scholars following the behavioral tradition or persuasion,

and hence, the name behavioral movement.

The behavioral movement was strongly influenced by the positivist tradition in the social

sciences, in particular, by the writings of August Comte in the nineteenth century and

the logical positivism of the 'Vienna Circle in the 1920s. Behavioralists adopt the view of

positivism about the nature of empirical theory and explanation. In contrast to other

social scientists, behavioralists believe that:"(a) observable behavior, whether it is at the

level of the individual or the social aggregate, should be the focus of analysis; and (b)
any explanation of that behavior should susceptible to empirical testing" (Sanders 2002,

45).

The RCT has become a dominant approach to political science at least in the US. But

while it traces its beginnings to the behavioral movement, "rational choice theory draws

on the methodology of economics in contrast to behavioralists who drew on sociology

or psychology" (Ward 2002, 65).

Using similar methods as in standard microeconomics, it is the economists who carried

out largely early work in rational choice theory. The most important tool used is the

game theory. Central to the game theory is strategic interdependence, a situation where

others' choice of strategy affects an individual's best choice and vice versa (Ward

1995).

Rational choice theorists' explanations of individual actions and the outcomes they lead

to are anchored on three pillars, namely, (1) strategies or courses of action open and

available to them, (2) their preferences over the end-states to which combinations of

actions chosen by the various players lead, and, (3) their beliefs about important

parameters such as others' preferences. In making predictions, rational choice theory

proceeds by applying logic and mathematics to a set of assumptions. These

assumptions may include axioms about rational behavior as well as auxiliary

assumptions about the context that players find themselves in (Ward 2002).

A central feature of rational choice theories is the predominant focus on the individual

as the actor making the decisions (Lalman et al. 1993, 81). An assumption of the

mainstream variant of RCT is that "individuals have all the rational capacity, time, and
emotional detachment necessary to choose the best course of action, no matter how

complex the choice (Ward 2002; 1995). Rational choice theorists try to explain political

phenomena by using the behavioral conjecture that actors are rational, that is, they

make purposive, goal-seeking choices based on their own preferences, are able to rank

alternatives from best to worst, and choose according to what is best for them given

their own preferences or tastes (Lalman et al 1993, 79).

The quote below captures succinctly this feature of rational choice theory.

Individuals are assumed to be able to rank-order outcomes or actions. Thus, for any

pair of alternatives a and b they can say whether a is better than b, b is better than a, or

the two outcomes are indifferent Also preferences satisfy the transitivity property. This

implies that if a is better than b and b is better than c, a is better than c. To say that a is

preferred to b means no more than that a would be chosen above b, all references to

utility or other 'unobservable' mental phenomena being seen as inessential. To get

nontrivial explanations preferences are typically assumed to be stable over time. Then

rational individuals choose one of the highest-ranked feasible actions/outcomes

available to them (Ward 2002, 68).

Nonetheless, rationality in itself is silent about whether preferences of an individual are

benevolent or evil. RCT does not explain where preferences come from and how these

are mediated or negotiated. RCT only assumes that individuals pursue self-serving

goals by doing a rational calculation of what is strategically best among alternatives to

achieve their goals. This implies a cost-benefit analysis of alternatives and strategies.
As it exemplifies the deductive-nomological approach to explanation (Ward 2002), RCT

enjoys the advantages associated with this method. Some of these advantages include:

It forces you to be explicit about assumptions that are often left implicit in verbal

arguments

It provides a "positive heuristic" (Lakatos 1978)-a set of categories that help in

constructing explanations, a set of exemplary examples of good explanation to emulate,

and suggestions about fruitful lines of research

It provides a unified framework of explanation across different fields of the social

sciences and across subdisciplines, allowing cross-fertilization of ideas and a viewpoint

from which common patterns can be seen across diverse phenomena.

Even in circumstances in which action is irrational, it provides a standard against which

action can be judged and indicates variables that might lead to departures from

rationality (Mansbridge 19900, 20 in Ward 2002, 70)

Nonetheless, RCT has been the target of criticisms not only from political science but

also from other disciplines in the social sciences. Ward (1995 & 2002) grouped these

criticisms into four modes, namely (1) the heretics critique who wish to emphasize

bounded rationality, (2) the sociologists critique of RCT's tendency to play down social

structure and holistic modes of explanations; (3) the psychologists' critique of RCTs

main assumption that individuals often act rationally; and (4) critique from mainstream

political science on the basis of the implausibility of the assumptions made and the

predictive failures of the model.

Drawing on the work of Herbert Simon on bounded rationality, some rational choice

theorists question the highly implausible assumptions of RCT about the rational capacity

of individuals. Given limited information, time, and cognitive capacity to process

information, Simon believes that individuals use standard operating procedures as a

heuristic device and as a shorthand guide to rational action. For Simon, an action is

procedurally rational if it is based on beliefs that are reasonable given the context the

actor is in (Ward 2002 & 1995).

Since individuals can not have all the rational capacity, time, and emotional detachment

necessary to choose the best course of action, individuals resort to a range of heuristics

in dealing with any problems. Individuals can copy the methods used by those who are

more successful. They can rely on communication and others' reputations for

trustworthiness and adopt norms of appropriate behavior which there are intangible

costs to violating (Ward 2002).

In contrast to rational choice theorists, sociologists believe that individual behavior is

largely a function of social structures" and not based on individual choice (Ward 2002 &

1995, 74). Sociologists find it implausible that individuals are fully autonomous. For

instance, structural factors can shape decisions made by individuals. These may

include social norms, ideologies, as well as rules and conventions.

Sociologists recognize that individual behaviour can be driven by social norms

understood as deriving from society's need for system integration as well as by

structures of belief, such as ideologies. They argue that action can only be seen as
rational or irrational within the context of a particular system of meaning, hence,

symbolic and ritual action become important in human actions (Ward 2002)

Even collective actors in processes of deliberation with the end goal of achieving given

ends are influenced by structural factors. The processes that produce decisions and

actions of collective actors can be strongly influenced by rules and conventions used to

categorize problems, paradigmatic filters biasing the use of incoming information;

limited efforts to search for available solutions, pressures to appear consistent, even at

the cost of failures of goal attainment; the upgrading of means into ends in themselves,

and other organizational pathologies (March & Olsen 1984, Hindess 1988, in Ward

2002, 78)."

The pschologists' critique of RCT attacks the latter's assumption that individuals often

act rationally. They typically argue that individuals often do not act rationally in the

standard sense and are motivationally and psychologically complex" (Ward 2002, 72;

Ward 1995, 79). Motives of individuals do not necessarily reflect self-serving interests

since individuals frequently act altruistically in political life (Ibid. 79).

Moreover, psychologists also attack RCT's claim that individuals have all the emotional

detachment necessary to choose the best course of action. Emotions and unconscious

drives make the level of detachment highly unlikely. Individuals often make decisions

based on consistency with past actions, reduction of strains within the individual's belief

system (cognitive dissonance) or normative orientation than through a calculation of the

most efficient means to given ends (Ibid. 80).

Finally, many political scientists point to the poor empirical record of RCT (Ward 2002)

and its implausible assumptions and failure in predictive terms (Ward, 1995). They

argue that many of the variables in rational choice models, notably preferences, are not

directly measurable, and that rational choice theorists, in their desire to generate a

universally applicable model of politics, evade and ignore contrart evidence (Ward 200).

SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

Symbolic interactionism is a sociological framework that focuses on the different

meanings individuals attach to objects, peoples, and interactions as well as the

corresponding behaviors that reflect those meanings and/ or interpretations. It is a

framework that actualizes the nature of humans to make sense of their actions and

interactions through external cues from their everyday life and environment (Vejar

2015).

George Herbert Mead was an influential figure in the field of symbolic interactionism.

Gestures, according to him, are important in communication. When we interact with

others, our posture, tone of voice, voice inflections, as well as hand and facial

movements convey significance. They can either accentuate or contradict that which we

are verbally stating (Vejar 2015).

Mead's central concept is the self, "the part of an individual's personality composed of

self-awareness and self-image" (Macionis 2007, 124). The process of self-discovery or

self-development is enacted by the usage of gestures threefold through the play stage,

the game stage, and through a stage called generalized other. The term "generalized
other” refers to "widespread cultural norms and values we use as a reference in

evaluating ourselves" (Macionis 2007, 126). Verja (2015, 3-4) describes each stage.

In the play stage, young children identify with key figures in their environments, such as

the mother or father, as well as occupational or gender-specific roles to which they have

been exposed (e.g., police officer, nurse) and replicate the behavioral norms that

correspond with such roles. A young boy might sit on the edge of the bathroom counter,

attentive to the way in which his father goes about shaving, and emulate this action by

scraping the edge of a blunt object across his own face.

During the game stage, children extrapolate from the vantage point of the roles they

have simulated by assuming the roles that their counterparts concurrently undertake.

While engaging in a team sport, for example, it behooves a child to conceptualize the

roles of his teammates and opponents in order to successfully maneuver throughout the

game within his own particular position.

As people developmentally evolve, their anticipation of the generalized other helps them

construct morally sound and appropriate behavior, such as the employee who arrives

promptly to work in order to avoid scrutiny from his colleagues. Moreover, self identity

continuously fluctuates between the I, which is the impulsive, automatic, "knee-jerk"

responses we have to stimuli (Lane, 1984), and the me, which is the socially refined

reactions that were instilled through the process of adopting social standards (Baldwin,

1988).

There are three overarching premises that constitute symbolic interactionism. These

three premises are outlined below with examples as concrete illustrations.

The first assumes that meaning is an important element of human existence, a concept

that is both subjective and individualistic, and that people consequently act in

accordance with the meanings they construe. Imagine the scholar who, upon drawing

on the concept of a book (i.e., object), generates stimulating and intellectual constructs

Meanwhile, someone who struggles academically may harbor feelings of fear and

resentment toward that object. A dyadic conversation (.e., interaction) may consist of

one person disclosing emotionally-laden personal accounts to a person who is furrowing

his brow. Interpretations derived from such a nonverbal gesture can be varied, and the

speaker might either conclude that he has an attentive audience, or that he is being

critiqued. Another example shows how the role of "parent" (i.e., people) might generate

the image of a warm, nurturing, and supportive role model to one person, while eliciting

visualizations of an autocratic and punitive figure to another.

A second premise asserts that people identify and mold their unique symbolic

references through the process of socialization. This postulation suggests that people

are not inherently equipped with interpretive devices that help navigate through the

complex realms of human behavior. Through the act of establishing an intricate series

of relationships they come to certain symbolic determinations, which create a sturdy

platform on which subsequent behavior is structured. When a young child engages in

pleasant behavior that causes his parent to smile, he equates the concept of "good

behavior," with that of a specific facial expression resulting in an upturned mouth." As

the child encounters pleasurable deeds throughout the course of his life, he will be

prompted to implement the symbolic demonstration (1.e., a smile) he initially

corresponded with such acts.

Behaviors are adopted through an obscurely subtle learning process, and the third tenet

of symbolic interactionism affirms that there is a cultural dimension that intertwines the

symbolic "educational" development. For example, in conversation, the amount of

physical space in which we distance our bodies has culturally symbolic significance

(Rothbaum, Morelli, Pott, & Liu-Constant, 2000). Likewise, greetings in the form of

demonstrative affection, such as hugs and kisses can be warmly regarded by one

culture, and deemed as the obstruction of personal space and the crossing of

inappropriate boundaries by another (Graham 2007, Vejar 2015, 1-2)

As a theoretical perspective, symbolic interactionism is not known for homogeneity,

parsimony or consensus among its practitioners. Four of the most prominent

contemporary varieties of symbolic interactionism include the Chicago School, the lowa

School, the dramaturgical approach, and ethnomethodology. All these four schools of

thought or orientations share the view that human beings construct their realities in a

process of social interaction, and agree on the methodological implication of such, that

is, the necessity of “getting inside" the reality of the actor in order to understand what is

going on (Gecas 1980, 1458).

Nonetheless, the four varieties of symbolic interactionisrn differ significantly in terms of

purpose and methodology. The most glaring difference exists between the Chicago

School with a positivist orientation and the lowa School with a humanistic orientation.

Such difference reflects a basic divergence in purpose and methodology in the

discipline of Sociology (Gecas 1980).

Following a positivist orientation and with Thomas Kuhn as its chief progenitor the

Chicago School aims at prediction and unity of method for all the sciences. Adopting a

humanistic orientation, the lowa school under the influence of Herbert Blumer strives for

understanding and a distinctive method for sociology, one that is based on "sympathetic

introspection." The two other contemporary varieties of symbolic interactionism, namely,

Goffman's dramaturgical approach and Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, are both more

aligned with the positivist Chicago School (Gecas 1980, 1458).

Symbolic interaction has both "insider" "and outsider" critics. Insiders' criticism focus on

the method and the central concepts of symbolic interactionism, particularly the

ambiguity of major concepts used particularly the concept of the "self." These criticisms

attack the utility of symbolic interactionism in the production of cumulative and

generalizable knowledge. Outsiders' critique, on the other hand, highlights the

astructural bias in symbolic interactionism. This bias refers to the claim that symbolic

interactionism's perspective is ahistorical, noneconomic, and a limited view of social

power and social organization (Gecas 1980, 1459).

The disagreement between the Chicago School and the lowa School reflects not only

the positivist-humanistic debate in symbolic interactionism, but by extension, the

objectivist-subjectivist dichotomy and debate not only in Sociology but also in the Social

Sciences.

The debate between subjectivist (humanist) and objectivist (positivist or neopositivist)

orientations toward human behavior and social processes is long-standing. The debate

has been between those who focus on the (humanistic) subject matter of the social
sciences and those who call for the same (scientific) method for all the sciences, both

natural and social. The debate has not only divided each of the social sciences, it has

also divided many of the subfields within these sciences, subfields such as social

psychology (Warshay & Warshay 1987).

LESSON 1.2 MACROLEVEL APPROACHES

STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM

Structural functionalism is a framework for building a theory that sees society as a

complex system whose parts work together to promote solidarity and stability" (Macionis

2007, 15). Such parts of the whole system may vary in terms of functions but they are

all related to each other. Interdependent as they are, they all have one goal and that is

to maintain or keep the whole system, at least in its present form. It follows therefore

that the working of one part would have effects on the other parts.

Structural functionalism was developed by Talcott Parsons in the 1930s under the

influence of the works of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim (M&Mahon 2015). It

emphasizes social structure, "any relatively stable pattern of social behavior" and social

functions, the consequences of any social pattern for the operation of society as a

whole" (Macionis 2007, 15). Examples of social structure are the family, government,

religion, education, and economy. Social structure shapes our lives in various contexts

such as the family, the workplace, classroom, and community, and all social structure

functions to keep society going, at least in its present form (Macionis 2007)
Robert Merton (1910-2003) expanded the concept of social function by arguing that any

social structure may have many functions. He distinguished between manifest functions,

the recognized and intended consequences of any social pattern" and latent functions,

the unrecognized and unintended consequences of any social pattern." (Macionis 2007,

15).

Higher education, for instance, can be seen with both manifest and latent functions. The

manifest function of higher education is to provide the youth with the information and

skills needed to enable them to perform their jobs after graduation. By keeping millions

of young people out of the labor market, where a significant number of them may not

get hired right away after graduation, serves as the latent function of higher education.

As a "marriage broker", that is, bringing together peoples of similar social backgrounds

is an equally important, yet not often recognized latent function of higher education

(Macionis 2007, 16).

In his classification of social functions into manifest or latent, Merton recognized that the

effects or outcomes of social structure are not all necessarily good and not necessarily

good for everyone. He coined the term "social dysfunction." A social dysfunction is "any

social pattern that may disrupt the operation of society" (Macionis 2007, 16).

What causes social dysfunction? The lack of consensus among peoples in a given

polity or society about what is helpful or harmful to society is a key feature of every

society or polity. Differences in backgrounds or status, for instance, may lead to

differences in recognition and appreciation of what is functional or not to particular

individuals or groups of peoples. In a capitalist order, for example, high profits for

factory owners can be seen as dysfunctional for factory workers as they receive low

wages (Macionis 2007, 16).

The structural-functional approach built on the following premises:

1. Within every social structure or system-politics, family, organizations -each member

of the system has a specific function.

2. Those functions can be small or substantial, are dynamic in nature (i.e., they can

change), and work toward the same purpose: to keep the system operational within its

environment.

3. Change is evident within any society or system; however, for the system to survive, it

must adapt to that change in order to maintain its equilibrium (McMahon 2015).

To maintain the equilibrium of the system, Parsons identified four imperatives for
societies to survive, which he called the AGIL model, the acronym stands for the first
letter of each of these four imperatives. These are:

Adaptation: acquiring and mobilizing sufficient resources so that the system can survive.

Goal Attainment: setting and implementing goals

Integration: maintaining solidarity or coordination among the subunits of the system

Latency: creating, preserving, and transmitting the system's distinctive culture and
values (McMahon 2015 Emphasis added).

Structural functionalism was under sustained criticisms in the late 1960s such that by

the 1970s, it has lost its credibility (McMahon 2015). A generalized criticism of structural

functionalism was aimed at the theory's lack of explanation for social conflict or social
change in addition to its "bias of political conservatism" (Smelser 1990 in McMahon

2015).

In more specific terms, structural functionalism was criticized for being unable to explain

phenomena such as social change, disagreement with social and political aims, and the

influential underpinnings of the wealthy Moreover, structural functionalism's qualitative

methodology, its emphasis on the general rather than the specific, and its non inclusion

of psychology in the discussion of human behavior came also under attack from social

scientists (McMahon 2015).

Critics argue that structural functionalism's focus on social stability and social order

ignore inequalities of social class, race, and gender which cause tension and conflict in

the society (Macionis 2017). Feminists, in particular, are critical of structural

functionalism due to the theory's gender-blindness to the historical contributions of

women (McMahon 2015). Others find the focus on stability and order at the expense of

conflict of structural functionalism as somewhat conservative (Macionis 2017) and less

likely to produce cumulative and generalizable knowledge.

In response to these criticisms, some social scientists revert to structural functionalism

as it offers a valid explanation of consensus, which supports the concept of social order

(McMahon 2015). Others made a critical response. They developed the social-conflict

approach (Macionis 2017). In the social sciences, Marxism is an example of this social-

conflict approach in the Social Sciences.

INSTITUTIONALISM

The study of political institutions was dominant within political science in Britain and the

US in the early twentieth century. Until the 1950s, institutionalism enjoyed a privileged

status within the discipline-its assumptions and practices as well as its methodological

and theoretical premises were rarely questioned, let alone subject to the behavioralist

critique (Lowndes 2002).

The institutional approach can be understood as a subject matter, as a method, and as

a theory. As a subject matter, the study of political institutions is central to the identity of

the discipline of political science (Rhodes 1995).

To quote Rhodes (1995, 43), "If there is any subject matter at all that political scientists

can claim exclusively for their own, a subject mater that does not require acquisition of

the analytical tools of sister fields and that sustains their claim to autonomous existence,

it is, of course, formal-legal political structure."

Public administration, a subdiscipline within political science, has the study of

institutions as its key characteristic. Public administration is the study of "the institutional

arrangements for the provision of public services" (Hood 1987,504, in Rhodes 1995, 52)

or "the study of public bureaucracies” (Rhodes 1979, 7, in Rhodes 1995, 52). William
Robson (1975, 195, in Rhodes 1995, 52) describes the dominant approach in public

administration as institutional:

It concentrated attention on the authorities engaged in public administration, analyzed

their history, structure, functions, powers, and

relationships. It enquired how they worked and the degree of effectiveness they

achieved.

As a method, the traditional or classic institutional approach is "descriptive- inductive,

formal-legal, and historical-comparative." It is descriptive because it employs the

techniques of the historian and explores specific events, eras, people, and institutions

and inductive because inferences are drawn from repeated observations (Rhodes 1995,

43).

As such, the classic institutional approach systematically describes and analyzes

phenomena that have occurred in the past and explain contemporary political

phenomena with reference to past events. The goal is to explain and understand but not

to formulate laws (Kavanagh 1991, 482, in Rhodes 1995, 42).

The institutional approach also applies the formal-legal inquiry. Formal because it

involves the study of formal governmental organizations, and legal because it includes

the study of public law (Eckstein 1979, 2, in Rhodes 1995, 44). An example of formal-

legal methods in the study of political institutions is constitutional studies (Rhodes

1995).
The classic or traditional institutional approach is also comparative. Woodrow Wilson

(1989, xxxiv, in Rhodes 1995, 45) argued that one's "institutions can be understood and

appreciated only by those who know other systems of government... By the use of a

thorough comparative and historical method... a general clarification of views may be

obtained."

As a theory, the classic or traditional institutional approach does not only make

statements about the causes and consequences of political institutions. It also espouses

the political value of democracy (Rhodes 1995).

Proponents of the approach treat the functioning and fate of democracies (dependent

variable) as a function of, or influenced by legal rules and procedures (independent

variable). Moreover, the approach offers an opportunity for infusing into the empirical

study of politics the analysis of political values (Rhodes 1995). Influenced by the political

philosophy of Michael Oakeshott, Johnson (1975, 276-7, in Rhodes 1995, 47) describes

the rationale for the study of political institutions in the following manner.

political institutions express particular choices about how political relationships ought to

be shaped; they are in the nature of continuing injunctions to members of a society that

they should try to conduct themselves in specific ways when engaged in the pursuit of

political ends. This is to define political institutions as necessarily containing a normative

element.

Critics to the classic or traditional approach attack the approach's limitation both in

terms of scope and method. Peters (1999, 6-11, in Lowndes 2002, 92) describes the

"proto-theory of the traditional approach as "normative (concerned with good

government'), structuralist (structures determine political behavior), historicist (the

central influence of history), legalist (law plays a major role in governing) and holistic

(concerned with describing and comparing whole systems of government)" (Lowndes

2002, 92).

Similarly, Roy Macridis, a comparativist in political science, critiques the approach's

subject matter and method while focusing on the study of comparative government. He

claims that, comparative government was "excessively formalistic in its approach to

political institutions," did not have a sophisticated awareness of the informal

arrangements of society and of their role in the formation of decisions and the exercise

of power", was "insensitive to the nonpolitical determinants of political behavior"; was

"descriptive rather than problem-solving, or analytic in its method"; was insensitive to

hypotheses and their verification, and therefore, was unable to formulate a comparative

"political theory of dynamics" (Macridis 1963, 47-8, in Rhodes 1995, 48).

The historical methods and legal analysis of the classic institutional approach are

inadequate. Historical methods cannot explain systematically the structure and

behaviour of governments due to its focus on the unique. The gap between the formal

statements of the law and the practice of government renders legal analysis ineffective

(Rhodes 1995).

David Easton, the most influential critic of the traditional study of politics, found the

classic institutional approach wanting on two grounds.

First, the analysis of law and institutions could not explain policy or power because it did

not cover all the relevant variables (Easton 1971, ch. 6) Second, "hyperfactualism," or
"reverence for the fact" (75), meant that political scientists suffered from "theoretical

malnutrition" (77), neglecting "the general framework within which these facts could

acquire meaning" (89) (Rhodes 1995, 49).

Other critics noted that the approach was concerned with the institutions of government,

and yet operated with a restricted understanding of its subject matter. Its focus was on

formal rules and organizations rather than informal conventions and on official

structures of government rather than broader institutional constraints on governance

(within and outside of the state (Lowndes 2002).

By the 1980s, the traditional or classic institutional approach has declined in its

importance in political science. March and Olsen (1984,734 in Lowndes 2002, 94, and

Rhodes 1995, 53) coined the term "new institutionalism" critiquing the traditional or

classic institutional approach as having "receded in importance from the position they

held in the earlier theories of political scientists." Asserting that political institutions

played a more autonomous role in shaping political outcome, they make claims that:

The bureaucratic agency, the legislative committee, and the appellate court are arenas

for contending social forces, but they are also collections of standard operating

procedures and structures that define and defend interests. They are political actors in

their own right (March and Olsen 1984, 738, in Lowndes 2002, 94, and Rhodes 1995,

53).

In contrast to the traditional or classic institutional approach, now referred to as the "old

institutionalism," new institutionalism has a much broader, yet sophisticated definition of

its subject matter.

Political institutions are no longer equated with political organizations: 'institution' is

understood more broadly to refer to a 'stable, recurring pattern of behavior (Goodin

1996, 22). The new institutionalists are concerned with the informal conventions of

political life as well as with formal constitutional and organizational structures. New

attention is paid to the way in which institutions embody values and power relationships,

and to the obstacles as well as the opportunities that confront institutional design.

Crucially, new institutionalists concern themselves not just with the impact of institutions

upon individuals, but with the interaction between institutions and individuals (Lowndes

2002, 91).

New institutionalists argue that institutions do matter. In their seminal article on new

institutionalism, March and Olsen (1984) emphasized the central value of institutions

vis-a-vis individual choices in explaining political phenomena. They argue that political

behavior is "embedded in an institutional structure of rules, norms, expectations and

traditions that several limited the free play of individual will and calculation" (March and

Olsen 1984, 736). Burnham et al., (2004, 18) captures it succintly: "political phenomena

could not be simply reduced to the aggregate consequences of individual behavior";

rather, "the choices that people make are to a significant extent shaped by the

institutions within which they operate."

There are several variants of new institutionalism reflecting the divide between

"normative" approaches and a new, more sophisticated version of rational choice.

Normative institutionalism argues that political institutions influence actors' behavior by

shaping their "values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs" (March and Olsen 1989,
17). Hence "normative” refers to a concern with norms and values as explanatory

variables (owing much to the traditions of sociological institutionalism), and not to

'normative theory' in the sense of promoting particular norms.

Rational choice institutionalism denies that institutional factors "produce behavior" or

shape individuals' preferences, which they see as endogenously determined and

relatively stable (favoring utility maximization). Political institutions influence behavior by

affecting the structure of a situation" in which individuals select strategies for the pursuit

of their preferences (Ostrom 1982, 5-7). Institutions provide information about others

likely future behaviour, and about incentives (and disincentives) attached to different

courses of action (Lowndes 2002, 95).

LESSON 1.3 INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH

HUMAN-ENVIRONMENT SYSTEM APPROACH

The Human-Environment Systems (HES) in the social sciences is an interdisciplinary

approach in the social sciences. It bridges the gap between, and integrate knowledge
from, the social and the natural sciences within one framework in the study of
environmental and social issues.

Human-environment system (HES) refers to the interaction of human systems with

corresponding environmental or technological systems" Scholz & Binder, (n.d., 791).
The HES approach conceptualizes mutual dependence between human and
environmental systems. Scholz and Binder (n.d., 791) describe this mutual dependence
as "two different systems that exist in essential dependencies and reciprocal
endorsement." The use of the term human systems or "social systems ranging from
society to individuals" (Apostle 1952 in Scholz and Binder n.d.) can be traced as far
back as the time of the ancient Greeks, while the use of the term environmental
systems began late in the early nineteenth Century (Scholz and Binder n.d., 791).

Human-environment interactions existed since time immemorial, but the scope and
intensity of these interactions have increased significantly since the Industrial
Revolution. Whereas most of the early human-environment interactions have taken
place at a local/national scale, contemporary interactions between human and natural
systems have not only reached regional, subregional, continental, and global scales but
have also become special concerns (Liu J et al., 2007).

The human-environment system, also referred to as the "coupled human- environment

system" or the "coupled human and natural system" or CHANS "acknowledges the fact
that humans, as users, actors, and managers are not external, but integral elements of
the human-environment system" (Schrter D. et al. 2004, 11). As integral parts of the
human-environment system-as users, actors, and managers—they become duty
bearers themselves who must share the responsibility for the sustainability of the
human-environment system.

The science of CHANS builds on but moves beyond previous work such as human
ecology, ecological anthropology, and environmental geography (Liu. et. a., 2007). The
following are three central features of HES or CHANS.

First, CHANS research focuses on the patterns and processes that link human and
natural systems. Second, CHANS research, such as integrated assessment of climate
change, emphasizes reciprocaj interactions and feedbacks-both the effects of humans
on the environment and the effects of the environment on humans. Third understanding
within-scale and cross-scale interactions between human and natural components (e.g.,
how large-scale phenomena emerge from local interactions of multiple agents and in
turn influence local systems) is a major challenge for the science of CHANS. Although
each of these three aspects has been addressed in some studies on human-
environment interactions, the science of CHANS promotes the integration of all these
aspects (Liu J. et al., 2007, 639).

Liu, J. et al. (2007) made a clear articulation of the reason why an integration of the
three aspects is necessary. They argued that "such integration is needed to tackle the
increased complexity and to help prevent the dreadful consequences that may occur
due to the fundamentally new and rapid changes, because the magnitude, extent, and
rate of changes in human-natural couplings have been unprecedented in the past
several decades, and the accelerating human impacts on natural systems may lead to
degradation and collapse of natural systems which in turn compromise the adaptive
capacity of human systems."

To understand and appreciate the human-environment system (HES) approach in the

social sciences, the following discussion outlines three areas or fields of inquiry where
the HES approach is relevant and necessary both as an analytical tool and framework.

One is the study of the human causes of environmental change—not only proximate
causes, such as burning coal, releasing heavy metals into rivers, and clearing forests,
that immediately change a part of the environment-but especially indirect causes or
driving forces, such as population growth, economic development, technological
change, and alterations in social institutions and human values, that must be
understood to forecast trends in environmentally destructive human activity and, if
necessary, to change those trends.

A second field of inquiry concerns the effects of environmental change on things people
value-both proximate effects, such as on growing seasons and rainfall in agricultural
areas, soil fertility, endangered species, and so on, and indirect effects, such as on
population migrations, international conflict, agricultural markets, and government
policies.

The third field is the study of the feedbacks between humanity and the environment-the
ways individuals, organizations, and governments act on the basis of experienced or
anticipated environmental change to manage human activity and preserve
environmental values. These feedbacks provide the greatest challenge for scientists
and policy-makers, partly because there are so many ways people can intervene in the
system (Stern 1993, 1897).

To date, significant studies on the many problems of human-environment interaction

have been undertaken. For example, "in understanding how people perceive and judge
environmental risks; how societies create institutions for managing common-property
resources, such as fisheries, grasslands, and the atmosphere; what brought about
anthropogenic environmental changes in the past; the dynamics of public concern about
the environment; and the economic forces affecting natural resource availability" (Stern
1993, 1898).

However, the field of inquiry of human-environment interaction has achieved modest

progress only. Stern (1993, 1898) identified both scientific and institutional reasons that
explain such modest outcome.

It has all the scientific problems of other interdisciplinary fields, but more intensely
because it involves all the disciplines of environmental science and those of social
science as well. It is difficult in such a field to do high-quality interdisciplinary work,
integrate separate disciplinary projects, and set productive research agendas, and
some are tempted to proceed without the requisite background knowledge.

There are also significant institutional barriers in academia and government.

Universities are reluctant to give institutional support to interdisciplinary fields that do
not yet have widespread recognition or a proven ability to attract resources ... the field
does not have a unifying society or journal, university departments, or the other
conventional signs of a cohesive intellectual community.

In government, there is an almost complete mismatch between the roster of federal

agencies that support research on environmental change and the roster of federal
agencies with strong capabilities."

So what can be done? Adopting the National Research Council report's

recommendations for global change research, (Stern 1993, 1899) proposed that there
should be: (1) increased institutional and financial support for research, post-graduate
and-doctoral fellowships, as well as interdisciplinary research centers to enhance
interdisciplinary training; (2) improved systems for acquisition and management of data
related to human-environment interactions; and (3) environmental research activities of
disciplinary associations in social science.