CMle p~ (eS199900030)

U, S. Department of State
Release Exdae~ Deny
DCCIaSISy: III PI&I Y In Pull
Esettipthn(i@ 8l
DEPARTIY, ENT OF TATE

MEMORANDUM
ICLRIFIED August 17, 1970
TO : J — Ambassador Johnson Dept of Siam, RPS/IPS, Msrgmst p. Gmfeg, Dm
ss (H Eswad ss (s l Downgrade ro
FROM : ARA - Cl&aries A. Mayer Dedsssify oa

SUBJECT: NSSM-97: Extreme Option — Overti&row of Allendc

In the attached memorandum we exarr:ine the//
c& creole
option to use if Allende is elected. This option assuraes ti&at
an Ailende government wouid be a surficiently great security
threat to the U. S. to justiry a covert effort to overthrow him.
We note in the memorandum that the Ci&ilean military is the only
inst"ument in Ci&ile capable oz over 'nrowing Ai. lcnde', but wc hold
out little promise ti&at the military would move to this cnd on
its own initiative, short of acts by Allende hat were ilagrantiy
subversive of Chilean institutions o- directly menacing to he
military itself. Allende is too cautious of ti&e armed forces
to act in such manner in the near fu ure, and we e&&pact that he
will use his powers of appointment and promotion to effectively
neutralize these forces in the long run.
Our lcnowledge of the relations that conservative Chilean political
and l&usiness leaders have with the military is not rull enougn
to let us judge whcti&er these leaders could stimulate a military
move against Allende. We doubt, however, ti&at the military leaders
would act unless they themselves were predisposed to do so. Nor
do we believe that he would respond to a possible initiative
by which, as far as we can tell, has no specific
ideas anyway about overthrowing Allende.

As for the part that the U. S. might play, we believe that U. S.

support would be no more than a mar inal factor in the calculatior.
of the Chilean military. Even were we to develop our assets among
the Chilean military to the point that we could ultimately suggest
or try to sponsor military acti. on against Allende, we believe that
in this case also the Chilean military must itself be already dispos
to move on Aliende were our efforts to have any effect.
The advantages from U. S. involvement with a successrui
flowing
Chilean military coup would bc that we would be rid of the threat
posed to us by an Allende government, and that moderate Chii. ean
forces would have demonstrated their unwillingness to see Chiie
become an authoritarian MIarxist state. The disadvantages, howe~et,

IIIIMIF8 goS
 )iKI.M~~ I/I)
of the fourth option are vravc. Tncrc is little si bstant'ai pro. .cut -.

that thc Chilean armed forces w wild attempt to (n. ;;row A c. u . uv n

with U. S. stimulation, and- there is no way to judge wucth t.:.c attempt
-,

would succccd. Ir made. The risk that our hand woi ld bc cup& .. d is
real. Exposure in an unsuccessful coup would involve costs teat would
bc prohibitively high in our relations in Chile, in tn« uumisphcrc,
and clscwhcre in the world. Even werc thc coup successful, c:posure
would involve costs only marginally less serious in all thcsc areas.
Recommendation

That you oppose adoption Jon the grounds tha"

its prospects of success are poor an its risks prohibitively high.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE
 This document is from the holdings of:
The National Security Archive
Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University
2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037
Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Read related article:

‘Extreme Option: Overthrow Allende’

2020-09-15