BIFLEX PHILS. INC. LABOR UNION (NAFLU) VS.
FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the respondents guilty of an
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION and BIFLEX (PHILS.), INC.,
December 19, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners were officers of Biflex (Phils.) Inc. Labor Union. And Filflex Industrial and
Manufacturing Labor Union.
The two petitioner-unions, which are affiliated with National Federation of Labor Unions
(NAFLU), are the respective collective bargaining agents of the employees of corporations.
Respondents Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation
(respondents) are sister companies engaged in the garment business. Situated in one big
compound along with another sister company, General Garments Corporation (GGC), they
have a common entrance.
On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to protest the
accelerating prices of oil. On even date, petitioner-unions, led by their officers, herein
petitioners, staged a work stoppage which lasted for several days, prompting respondents
to file on October 31, 1990 a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure to
comply with procedural requirements.
PETITIONERs CONTENTION:
On November 13, 1990, respondents resumed their operations.[5] Petitioners, claiming
that they were illegally locked out by respondents, assert that aside from the fact that the
welga ng bayan rendered it difficult to get a ride and the apprehension that violence would
erupt between those participating in the welga and the authorities, respondents’ workers
were prevented from reporting for work.
Petitioners further assert that respondents were “slighted” by the workers’ no-show, and as
a punishment, the workers as well as petitioners were barred from entering the company
premises.
On their putting up of tents, tables and chairs in front of the main gate of respondents’
premises, petitioners, who claim that they filed a notice of strike on October 31, 1990,
explain that those were for the convenience of union members who reported every
morning to check if the management would allow them to report for work.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the work stoppage was illegal since the
following requirements for the staging of a valid strike were not complied with: (1) filing of
notice of strike; (2) securing a strike vote, and (3) submission of a report of the strike vote
to the Department of Labor and Employment.[7]
LABOR ARBITER:
The Labor Arbiter, by Decision of December 15, 1992, finding for respondents, held that
the strike was illegal.[8] The decretal text of its decision reads:
illegal strike. Consequently, their following officers are declared to have lost their
employment status:
LIST:
1. BIFLEX LABOR UNION (NAFLU) – 12 officers
2. FIFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING LABOR UNION (NAFLU) -13 off
SO ORDERED.[9]
Respondents thereupon terminated the employment of petitioners.
NLRC:
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the ruling of
the Labor Arbiter, it holding that there was no strike to speak of as no labor or
industrial dispute existed between the parties.[10] It accordingly ordered respondents
to reinstate petitioners to their former positions, without loss of seniority rights, and with full
backwages from the date of their termination. [11]
CA:
On respondents’ petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of May 28, 2002,
reversed that of the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter.
In finding for respondents, the appellate court discredited petitioners’ claim of having
been illegally locked out, given their failure to even file a letter of protest or complaint with
the management,[12] and their failure to comply with the legal requirements of a valid
strike.[13]
The appellate court further noted that while petitioners claimed that they filed a notice of
strike on October 31, 1990, no copy thereof was ever produced before the Labor Arbiter.
[14]
Hence, the instant petition which faults the appellate court to have:
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioners were guilty of illegal strike
2. WON respondents committed illegal lock out
3. WON the union officers were illegally dismissed from employment
HELD: The petition fails.
1. There was illegal strike.
That petitioners staged a work stoppage on October 24, 1990 in conjunction with the welga
ng bayan organized by the labor sector to protest the accelerating prices of oil, it is not
disputed.
Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike, an
extended sympathy strike. It affects numerous employers including those who do not have
a dispute with their employees regarding their terms and conditions of employment.[15]
Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they are
scheduled to work, refuse to work and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an illegal
work stoppage.[16]

Even if petitioners’ joining the welga ng bayan were considered merely as an

exercise of their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly or freedom to petition the
government for redress of grievances, the exercise of such rights is not absolute. There
being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or that they were
allowed by respondents, to join the welga ng bayan on October 24, 1990, their work
stoppage is beyond legal protection.

2. NO ILLEGAL LOCKOUT
If there was illegal lockout, why, indeed, did not petitioners file a protest with the
management or a complaint therefor against respondents? As the Labor Arbiter observed,
“[t]he inaction of [petitioners] betrays the weakness of their contention for normally a
locked-out union will immediately bring management before the bar of justice.”[20]

Even assuming arguendo that in staging the strike, petitioners had complied with legal
formalities, the strike would just the same be illegal, for by blocking the free ingress to and
egress from the company premises, they violated Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which
provides that “[n]o person engaged in picketing shall … obstruct the free ingress to or
egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public
thoroughfares.”

3. UNION OFFICERS WERE NOT ILLEGALLY DISMISSED

Petitioners, being union officers, should thus bear the consequences of their acts of
knowingly participating in an illegal strike, conformably with the third paragraph of Article
264 (a) of the Labor Code which provides:

. . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer
during such lawful strike.
In Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[22] this Court, passing on the use of the word “may” in the immediately
quoted provision, held that “[t]he law . . . grants the employer the option of declaring a
union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment.”

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.


NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW), petitioner,
vs.
ETHELWOLDO R. OVEJERA, CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE LA CARLOTA (CAC), COL.
ROGELIO DEINLA, as Provincial Commander, 3311st P.C. Command, Negros
Occidental, respondents.
PLANA, J:
FACTS —
1. NFSW has been the bargaining agent of CAC rank and file employees (about
1200 of more than 2000 personnel) and has concluded with CAC a collective bargaining
agreement effective February 16, 1981 — February 15, 1984. Under Art. VII, Sec. 5 of the
said CBA —
Bonuses — The parties also agree to maintain the present practice on the grant of
Christmas bonus, milling bonus, and amelioration bonus to the extent as the latter is
required by law.
The Christmas and milling bonuses amount to 1-½ months' salary.
2. On November 28, 1981, NFSW struck allegedly to compel the payment of the
13th month pay under PD 851, in addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration
bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers.
3. To settle the strike, a compromise agreement was concluded between CAC and
NFSW on November 30,1981. Under paragraph 4 thereof —
The parties agree to abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any case
involving the 13th Month Pay Law if it is clearly held that the employer is liable to
pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given.
4. After the Marcopper decision had become final, NFSW renewed its demand that
CAC give the 13th month pay. CAC refused.
5. On January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE) Regional Office in Bacolod City a notice to strike based on non-payment of the
13th month pay. Six days after, NFSW struck.
6. One day after the commencement of the strike, or on January 29, 1982, a
report of the strike-vote was filed by NFSW with MOLE.
7. On February 8, 1982, CAC filed a petition with the Regional Arbitration
Branch at Bacolod City to declare the strike illegal, principally for being violative of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, that is, the strike was declared before the expiration of the 15-
day cooling-off period for unfair labor practice (ULP) strikes, and the strike was staged
before the lapse of seven days from the submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-
vote.
LABOR ARBITER:
LA Ovejera declared the NFSW strike illegal. The dispositive part of his decision
1. Declaring the strike commenced by NFSW on January 28, 1982, illegal,
2. Directing the Central to resume operations immediately upon receipt hereof;
3. Directing the Central to accept back to work all employees appearing in its
payroll as of January 28, 1982 except those covered by the February 1, 1982
memorandum on preventive suspension but without prejudice to the said employees'
instituting appropriate actions before this Ministry relative to whatever causes of action
they may have obtained proceeding from said memorandum;
4. Directing the Central to pay effective from the date of resumption of operations
the salaries of those to be placed on preventive suspension as per February 1, 1982
memorandum during their period of preventive suspension; and
5. Directing, in view of the finding that the subject strike is illegal, NFSW, its officers,
members, as well as sympathizers to immediately desist from committing acts that may
impair or impede the milling operations of the Central
-----------------------------------------------------------
On February 26, 1982, the NFSW — by passing the NLRC — filed the instant
Petition for prohibition alleging that Labor Arbiter Ovejera, CAC and the PC Provincial
Commander of Negros Occidental were threatening to immediately enforce the February
20, 1982 decision which would violate fundamental rights of the petitioner, and praying for
preliminary injunction:
1. Restraining implementation or enforcement of the Decision of February 20,
1982;
2. Enjoining respondents to refrain from the threatened acts violative of the rights of
strikers and peaceful picketers;
3. Requiring maintenance of the status quo as of February 20, 1982, until further
orders of the Court;
and on the Main Petition, judgment be rendered after hearing.
1. Declaring the Decision of February 2O, l982 null and void;
2. Making the preliminary injunction permanent;
3. Awarding such other relief as may be just in the premises.
Hearing was held, after which the parties submitted their memoranda. No restraining order
was issued.
II ISSUES —
1. Whether the strike declared by NFSW is illegal, the resolution of which mainly
depends on the mandatory or directory character of the cooling-off period and the 7-day
strike ban after report to MOLE of the result of a strike-vote, as prescribed in the Labor
Code.
2. Whether under Presidential Decree 851 (13th Month Pay Law), CAC is obliged to
give its workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration
bonuses, the aggregate of which admittedly exceeds by far the disputed 13th month pay.
(See petitioner's memorandum of April 12, 1982, p. 2; CAC memorandum of April 2, 1982,
pp. 3-4.) Resolution of this issue requires an examination of the thrusts and application of
PD 851.
HELD:
(e) NFSW strike is illegal. — The NFSW declared the strike six (6) days after filing
a strike notice, i.e., before the lapse of the mandatory cooling-off period. It also failed to
file with the MOLE before launching the strike a report on the strike-vote, when it
should have filed such report "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike."
Under the circumstances, we are perforce constrained to conclude that the strike staged
by petitioner is not in conformity with law. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to
determine whether the pendency of an arbitration case against CAC on the same issue of
payment of 13th month pay [R.A.B No. 512-81, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI-A,
NLRC, Bacolod City, in which the National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the
Philippines (NACUSIP) and a number of CAC workers are the complainants, with NFSW
as Intervenor seeking the dismissal of the arbitration case as regards unnamed CAC rank
and file employees] has rendered illegal the above strike under Art. 265 of the Labor Code
which provides:
It shall likewise be unlawful to declare a strike or lockout after assumption of jurisdiction by
the President or the Minister, or after certification or submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same
grounds for the strike or lockout. (Emphasis supplied.)
Articles 264 and 265 of the Labor Code, insofar as pertinent, read:
264
(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the certified or duly recognized bargaining
representative may file a notice of strike with the Ministry (of Labor and Employment) at
least thirty (30) days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practices,
the period of notice shall be shortened to fifteen (15) days; ...
(d) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the voluntary settlement.
Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from
the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a
lockout.
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of
the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerened by secret ballots in
meetings or referenda. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based
on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken .
The Ministry, may at its own intitiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise
the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union of the employer shall
furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the
intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.
(Emphasis supplied).
ART. 265. Prohibited activities. — It shall be unlawful for any labor organization or
employer to declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in
accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in
the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having
been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
(a) Language of the law. — The foregoing provisions hardly leave any room for
doubt that the cooling-off period in Art. 264(c) and the 7-day strike ban after the strike-vote
report prescribed in Art. 264(f) were meant to be, and should be deemed, mandatory.
When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the dispute "remain unsettled
until the lapse of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the filing of the
notice," the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse
of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after
the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that "in every case," the union
shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting "at least seven (7) days before
the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period." It must be
stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be
complied with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within
the statutory cooling-off period.
It would indeed be self-defeating for the law to imperatively require the filing on a
strike notice and strike-vote report without at the same time making the prescribed
waiting periods mandatory.
(b) Purposes of strike notice and strike-vote report.— In requiring a strike notice and
a cooling-off period, the avowed intent of the law is to provide an opportunity for
mediation and conciliation. It thus directs the MOLE "to exert all efforts at mediation and
conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement" during the cooling-off period .
So, too, the 7-day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General —
Many disastrous strikes have been staged in the past based merely on the insistence of
minority groups within the union. The submission of the report gives assurance that a
strike vote has been taken and that, if the report concerning it is false, the majority
of the members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late. (Answer of public
respondents, pp. 17-18.)
So it has been held that, when a statute is founded on public policy [such as the
policy to encourage voluntary settlement of disputes without resorting to strikes],
those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions. (82 C.J.S.
873-874. Emphasis supplied.)
(c)Waiting period after strike notice and strike-vote report, valid regulation of right to strike.
The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the filing of a strike- vote report, as
prescribed in Art. 264 of the Labor Code, are reasonable restrictions and their imposition is
essential to attain the legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. We hold that they
constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
(2) The Second Issue.
This view is justified by the law itself which makes no distinction in the grant of exemption:
"Employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not
covered by this Decree." (P.D. 851.)
The term "its equivalent" ... shall include Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus, profit-sharing
payments and other cash bonuses amounting to not less than 1/12th of the basic salary
but shall not include cash and stock dividends, cost of living allowances and all other
allowances regularly enjoyed by the employee, as well as non-monetary benefits. Where
an employer pays less than 1/12th of the employee's basic salary, the employer shall pay
the difference." (Italics supplied.)
The Marcopper decision is therefore a Court decision but without the necessary eight votes
to be doctrinal. This being so, it cannot be said that the Marcopper decision "clearly held"
that "the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses
already given," within the meaning of the NFSW-CAC compromise agreement. At any rate,
in view of the rulings made herein, NFSW cannot insist on its claim that its members are
entitled to a 13th month pay in addition to the bonuses already paid by CAC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED
INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN) — THE PENINSULA MANILA CHAPTER (Interim Union
Junta), MELVIN COWAN, SERAFIN TRIA, JR., PORPERIO YAPE, LINDA GALVEZ,
BENJAMIN ESTEVES, LUTHER ADIGUE and RAYMUNDO VANCE, petitioners,  Meanwhile, the Union, headed by Genato, filed a petition for injunction in the DOLE
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and THE PENINSULA
MANILA, respondents., REGALADO, J.: G.R. No. 125561 March 6, 1998
The principal parties involved in this labor dispute are petitioner National Union of Workers
in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) — The Peninsula Manila
Chapter (the Junta, for brevity); the NUWHRAIN — The Peninsula Manila Rank and File
Chapter (the Union, for short); and private respondent, The Peninsula Manila (hereafter,
the Hotel).
The rank and file employees union, representing approximately 800 employees of the
Hotel, was the herein Union which entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
with the Hotel on December 15, 1991. 4 Petitioners claim that the signing of that CBA by
the Union officers, headed by one Rudolpho Genato, and representatives of the Hotel was
tainted with irregularities, prompting the Union to file a notice of strike on the ground of a
CBA deadlock. It was further asserted that instead of proceeding with said strike, the Union
officers and the officers of its national office thereafter mysteriously signed the CBA without
consulting the general membership of the local chapter. 5 These anomalies created anxiety
in the Union which continued to prevail in the following years.
On February, 1993, some of the union members submitted a letter-petition for the
resignation of the incumbent union officers on the ground that they were abusive and
neglectful of their duties. 6 Because the demands went unheeded, a faction of the Union
conducted what was ostensibly an impeachment proceeding, causing the removal from
office of the incumbent officers headed by Genato. 7 The faction proclaimed itself as the
Interim Union Junta, now the petitioners in this case.
Subsequent to the supposed impeachment of Genato and his group, the Junta requested
from the Hotel the conduct of a special election of officers. The Hotel referred the request
to the NUWHRAIN-LMC-IUF, the Union's national office. The latter disallowed the holding
of the election on the ground that it did not recognize the Junta because it was allegedly
constituted illegally. 8
The Junta nonetheless conducted the election resulting in the choice of a set of officers led
by petitioner Melvin Cowan, but which the supposedly impeached employees, the Union's
national office, and the Hotel refused to recognize. 9
On August 10, 1993, a notice of strike was filed by the Junta before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) based on alleged acts of the Hotel consisting
unfair labor practice (ULP), particularly, discrimination, undue interference in the exercise
of the right to self-organization, and bias in favor of the impeached officers. 10
The NCMB dismissed said notice on the ground that the imputed ULP acts were
mere conflicts between two sets of union officers or intra-union disputes, and, being
categorized under the nomenclature of "non-strikeable acts," fall under the jurisdiction
of the appropriate office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The NCMB
likewise ordered that the notice of strike be reduced to a preventive mediation case to be
subjected to conciliation and mediation proceedings. 11
to enjoin the Junta from usurping the functions of the rightful officers. On the other
hand, the Hotel filed a petition for interpleader and declaratory relief so that it may be
properly guided on which of the two sets of officers, the Genato group or the Cowan group,
it should recognize and deal with in matters pertaining to the CBA.   12
Despite the dismissal of the first notice of strike and the pendency of the aforestated
conciliation proceedings and cases, the Junta filed a second notice of strike on September
9, 1993. 13 Additional grounds were set forth therein, including the suspension of an
alleged Junta officer, one Sammie Coronel, which the Junta claimed constituted an
unfair labor practice. This notice of strike was likewise dismissed by the NCMB as the
grounds were found to be mere amplifications of those alleged in the preceding
notice, 14 hence, likewise non-strikeable.
Coronel was eventually dismissed from employment and allegedly because the Junta
believed that said dismissal was a ULP act,  15  it staged a wildcat strike on October 13 and
14, 1993, notwithstanding the prohibition to strike issued by the NCMB, thereby disrupting
the operations of the Hotel. 16 The officers of the Junta and 153 of its members were
involved in the strike.
The DOLE Secretary certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration. 17 In the meantime, an order was issued by the med-arbiter in the interpleader
and injunction cases declaring illegal the formation of the Junta, the impeachment of the
union officers led by Genato, and the subsequent election of officers led by Cowan. It
acknowledged the incumbency of the Genato group as officers and ordered the Hotel to
recognize them as representatives of the rank and file employees. 18 Said order of the
med-arbiter was appealed by the Junta to the DOLE Secretary who, as earlier noted,
affirmed the same in a resolution dated December 22, 1994.
On December 29, 1993, the Hotel filed in the NLRC a petition to declare the wildcat strike
illegal and to dismiss the employees who went on strike. 19 On January 13, 1994, the 15
officers of the Junta involved in the strike were dismissed for alleged acts of union
disloyalty. Said employees and the Junta then filed a case for illegal dismissal before the
NLRC. 20
NLRC:
The NLRC consolidated the foregoing cases and, in decision dated February 7, 1996, its
Second Division Declared the strike held on October 13 and 14, 1993 illegal as it was not
based on valid grounds pursuant to the ruling of the NCMB when the latter dismissed the
two notices of strike filed by the Junta. The NLRC held that the issue involving the
suspension and termination from employment of Coronel did not   per se  constitute ULP
which justified a strike, as the matter involved purely an exercise of management
prerogative which petitioners should have questioned by filing the proper complaint and
not by staging a strike. 21
Consequently, the dismissal of the 15 officers of the Junta was declared to be valid. With
respect to the 153 members whose illegal acts in the strike were in issue and whose
dismissal was likewise sought by Hotel, the NLRC ordered the remand of the case to the
labor arbiter for further proceedings.  22
In a dissent from the decision of the majority, the opinion was advanced that the strike was
legal because it was premised on a valid ground, particularly, the belief of the workers in
good faith that there existed ULP acts constituting a cause to strike.  23
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the Junta but it was denied,  24 thus the instant
petition to set aside the abovementioned NLRC decision and denial resolution.
The petitioners contend that public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion
in declaring the October 13 and 14, 1993 strike illegal and in remanding to the labor arbiter
the matter of the allege illegal acts of the 153 Junta members for further proceedings.  25
SC:
This Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case and finds the petition at
bar to be unmeritorious.
Generally, a strike based on a "non-strikeable" ground is an illegal strike; corollarily, a
strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no such acts actually exist. As an exception, even if no
ULP acts are committed by the employer, if the employees believe in good faith that ULP
acts exist so as to constitute a valid ground to strike, then the strike held pursuant to such
belief may be legal. 26 As a general rule, therefore, where the union believed that the
employer committed ULP and the circumstances warranted such belief in good faith, the
resulting strike may be considered legal although, subsequently, such allegations of unfair
labor practices were found to be groundless. 27
An established caveat, however, is that a mere claim of good faith would not justify the
holding of a strike under the aforesaid exception as, in addition thereto,  the circumstances
must have warranted such belief . It is, therefore, not enough that the union believed that
the employer committed acts of ULP when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima
facie showing to sustain such belief. 28
The Court finds that NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
subject strike was illegal, and accordingly holds that the circumstances prevailing in this
case did not warrant, as it could not have reasonably created, a belief in good faith that the
Hotel committed acts ULP as to justify the strike.
The dismissal of Coronel which allegedly triggered the wildcat strike 29 was not a sufficient
ground to justify that radical recourse on the part of the Junta members. As the NLRC later
found, the dismissal was legal and was not a case of ULP but a mere exercise of
management prerogative on discipline, the validity of which could have been questioned
through the filing of an appropriate complaint and not through the filing of a notice of strike
or the holding of a strike. 30 Evidently, to repeat, appropriate remedies under the Labor
Code were available to the striking employees and they had the option to either directly file
a case for illegal dismissal in the office of the labor arbiter  31 or, by agreement of the
parties, to submit the case to the grievance machinery of the CBA so that it may be
subjected to voluntary arbitration proceedings.  32
Petitioners should have availed themselves of these alternative remedies instead of
resorting to a drastic and unlawful measure, specifically, holding a wildcat strike at the
expense of the Hotel whose operations were consequently disrupted for two days. Not
every claim of good faith is justifiable, and herein petitioner's claim of good faith shall not
be counternanced by this Court since their decision to go on strike was clearly
unwarranted.
With respect to the claim of petitioners that additional acts of discrimination by the Hotel
generated their belief in good faith that ULP acts existed as to justify a strike, the Court
deems it unnecessary to again scrutinize and expound on the same. The NLRC has
already held that the alleged acts of discrimination are not "strikeable" grounds as
found and explained by the NCMB when it dismissed the two notices of strike filed
by the Junta. 33
The findings of fact of the NLRC, except where there is grave abuse of discretion
committed by it, are conclusive on this Court and it is only where said findings are bereft of
any substantial support from the records that the Court will step in and proceed to make its
independent evaluation of the facts. 34 The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the
aforestated findings of the NLRC in the present case.
Besides, petitioners should have complied with the prohibition to strike ordered by the
NCMB when the latter dismissed the notices of strike after finding that the alleged acts of
discrimination of the hotel were not ULP, hence not "strikeable." The refusal of petitioners
to heed said proscription of the NCMB is reflective of bad faith. In light of the foregoing
circumstances, their claim of good faith must fall and we agree with the NLRC that there
was no justification for the illegal strike.
We accordingly uphold the dismissal from employment of the 15 officers of the Junta who
knowingly participated in the strike. An employer may lawfully discharge employees for
participating in an unjustifiable wildcat strike and especially so in this case, because said
wildcat strike was an attempt to undermine the Union's position as the exclusive bargaining
representative and was, therefore, an unprotected activity. 35 The cessation from
employment of the 15 Junta officers as a result of their participation in the illegal strike is a
consequence of their defiant and capricious decision to participate herein.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is hereby DISMISSED for lack of any grave abuse of
discretion imputable to public respondent. The assailed decision and resolution of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission are consequently AFFIRMED. The case
is remanded to the labor arbiter a quo for further proceedings on the matter of the 153
members of the Junta who participated in the strike.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T.
BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE
ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C.
PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents., G.R. No. 85279July 28,
1989
CORTES, J:
1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9,
1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the
entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for
work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was
reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to
return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered
damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to
work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the
strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's
demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued
overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; etc.
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending
resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction In the meantime,
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for the
issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222].
RTC QUEZON CITY:
On July 22,1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss
and converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after
finding that the strike was illegal.
As petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also
denied on August 14, 1988 petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction before this Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 79577. In
a resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third Division, resolved to
refer the case to the Court of Appeals.
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of
strike they filed with the Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and to
maintain the status quo .
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear
the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary
injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or the National
Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.
SSS CONTENTION:
SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees of the SSS are
covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code,
therefore they do not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has
jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from
striking.
COURT OF APPEALS:
Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government
employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial
Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from continuing with
their strike.
ISSUES:
1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?
2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the
SSS and to enjoin the strikers from continuing with the strike and to order them to return to
work?
RULING:
While there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government
employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the
right to strike.
A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to
organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike.
BASED ON DELIBERATIONS: the right to form an organization does not carry with it the
right to strike. [Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 1, p. 569].
At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to
strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they
are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6
and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be stated that the validity of
Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987
Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the
employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the
SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v.
NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners' "Petition/Application
staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13,1988 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the public
employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily regard the
right to strike given to unions in private industry as not applying to public
employees and civil service employees. It has been stated that the Government, in
contrast to the private employer, protects the interest of all people in the public service,
and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present in private labor relations
could not exist in the relations between government and those whom they employ.

If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector
Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service
may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in
the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now
provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the
Right of Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant
dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- owned and controlled
corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not
strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."

2. The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union
being prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.

It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a
writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself provides
that terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180
vests the Public Sector Labor - Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved
labor disputes involving government employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no
jurisdiction over the dispute.

This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction
over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for
therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor - Management Council has not been
granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction.
Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor
dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin
the strike is appropriate.

Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or overzealousness, for in fact it
had proceeded with caution. Thus, after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the
continuance of the strike to prevent any further disruption of public service, the respondent
judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to refer the unresolved controversies
emanating from their employer- employee relationship to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council for appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the
instant petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court dated
G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA), ED CUBELO
et. al Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, (NLRC-2ND DIVISION), HON.
COMMISSIONERS: VICTORINO CALAYCAY, ANGELITA GACUTAN, and RAUL
AQUINO, TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, TAKESHI FUKUDA, and
DAVID GO, Respondents,
x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x
G.R. Nos. 158798-99
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA),
Respondent.
The Facts
 
          The Union is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) and is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all
Toyota rank and file employees.[5]
 
Toyota, on the other hand, is a domestic corporation engaged in the assembly
and sale of vehicles and parts. It is one of the largest motor vehicle manufacturers in the
country employing around 1,400 workers for its plants in Bicutan and Sta. Rosa, Laguna. 
          On February 14, 1999, the Union filed a petition for certification election among
the Toyota rank and file employees with the NCMB , Med-Arbiter Ma. Zosima C. Lameyra
denied the petition, but, on appeal, the DOLE Secretary granted theUnion’s prayer, and,
through the June 25, 1999 Order, directed the immediate holding of the certification
election.[7]
After Toyota’s plea for reconsideration was denied, the certification election was
conducted.  Med-Arbiter Lameyra’s May 12, 2000 Order certified the Union as the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of all the Toyota rank and file
employees. Toyota  challenged said Order via an appeal to the DOLE Secretary.[8]
In the meantime, the Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
proposals to Toyota, but the latter refused to negotiate in view of its pending appeal.
Consequently, the Union filed a notice of strike on January 16, 2001 with the NCMB,
based on Toyota’s refusal to bargain. On February 5, 2001, the NCMB-NCR converted
the notice of strike into a preventive mediation case on the ground that the issue of
whether or not the Union is the exclusive bargaining agent of all  Toyota rank and file
employees was still unresolved by the DOLE Secretary.
 
          On February 21, 2001, 135 Union officers and members failed to render the
required overtime work, and instead marched to and staged a picket in front of the
BLR office in Intramuros, Manila.[9]  The Union, in a letter of the same date, also
requested that its members be allowed to be absent on  February 22, 2001 to attend the
hearing and instead work on their next scheduled rest day. This request however was
denied by Toyota.
          Despite denial of the  Union’s request, more than 200 employees staged mass
actions on February 22 and 23, 2001 in front of the BLR and the DOLE offices, to protest
the partisan and anti-union stance of  Toyota. Due to the deliberate absence of a
considerable number of employees on February 22 to 23, 2001, Toyota experienced acute
lack of manpower in its manufacturing and production lines, and was unable to meet its
production goals resulting in huge losses of PhP 53,849,991.
 
          Soon thereafter, on February 27, 2001, Toyota s ent individual letters to some
360 employees requiring them to explain within 24 hours why they should not be
dismissed for their obstinate defiance of the company’s directive to render overtime work
on February 21, 2001, for their failure to report for work on February 22 and 23, 2001, and
for their participation in the concerted actions which severely disrupted and paralyzed the
plant’s operations.[10]  
 
          Meanwhile, a February 27, 2001 Manifesto was circulated by the Union which
urged its members to participate in a strike/picket and to abandon their posts, On the next
day, the Union filed with the NCMB another notice of strike for union busting amounting to
unfair labor practice.
On March 1, 2001, the Union nonetheless submitted an explanation in
compliance with the February 27, 2001 notices sent by Toyota to the erring employees.
The Union members explained that their refusal to work on their scheduled work time for
two consecutive days was simply an exercise of their constitutional right to peaceably
assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. It further argued that
the demonstrations staged by the employees on February 22 and 23, 2001 could not be
classified as an illegal strike or picket, and that Toyota had already condoned the alleged
acts when it accepted back the subject employees.[13]
 
          Consequently, on March 2 and 5, 2001, Toyota issued two (2) memoranda to the
concerned employees to clarify whether or not they are adopting the March 1, 2001
Union’s explanation as their own.  The employees were also required to attend an
investigative interview,[14] but they refused to do so.
 
          On March 16, 2001, Toyota terminated the employment of 227 employees [15] for
participation in concerted actions in violation of its Code of Conduct and for
misconduct under Article 282 of the Labor Code.  
The foregoing is also a violation of TMP’s Code of Conduct (Section
D, Paragraph 6) to wit:
           
            “Inciting or participating in riots, disorders, illegal
strikes or concerted actions detrimental to
TMP’s interest.”
 
In reaction to the dismissal of its union members and officers,
the Union went on strike on March 17, 2001.  Subsequently, from March 28,
2001 to April 12, 2001, theUnion intensified its strike by barricading the gates of  Toyota’s
Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants. The strikers prevented workers who reported for work
from entering the plants.
          On March 29, 2001, Toyota filed a petition for injunction with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) with the NLRC, It sought free ingress
to and egress from its Bicutan and Sta. Rosa manufacturing plants.  
NLRC:
Acting on said petition, the NLRC, on April 5, 2001, issued a TRO against the  Union,
ordering its leaders and members as well as its sympathizers to remove their barricades
and all forms of obstruction to ensure free ingress to and egress from the company’s
premises.  In addition, the NLRC rejected the Union’s motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction.[18]
 
          Meanwhile, Toyota filed a petition to declare the strike illegal with the NLRC
arbitration branch, and prayed that the erring Union officers, directors, and members be
dismissed.[19]
 
DOLE SECRETARY:
On April 10, 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute
and issued an Order[20] certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC. In said Order, the
DOLE Secretary directed all striking workers to return to work at their regular shifts by  April
16, 2001.  On the other hand, it ordered Toyota to accept the returning employees
under the same terms and conditions obtaining prior to the strike or at its option,
put them under payroll reinstatement.  The parties were also enjoined from committing
acts that may worsen the situation.
          The Union ended the strike on April 12, 2001.  The union members and officers tried
to return to work on April 16, 2001 but were told that Toyota opted for payroll-reinstatement
authorized by the Order of the DOLE Secretary.
 
          In the meantime, the Union filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOLE
Secretary’s April 10, 2001 certification Order, which, however, was denied by the DOLE
Secretary in her May 25, 2001 Resolution. Consequently, a petition for certiorari was filed
before the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64998.
 
          Meanwhile, on May 23, 2001, at around 12:00 nn., despite the issuance of the DOLE
Secretary’s certification Order, several payroll-reinstated members of the Union staged
a protest rally in front of Toyota’s Bicutan Plant bearing placards and streamers in
defiance of the April 10, 2001 Order.   COURT OF APPEALS:
Then, on May 28, 2001, around forty-four (44) Union members staged another
protest action in front of the Bicutan Plant.
 
          In the meantime, the NLRC, in Certified Case No. 000203-01, ordered both parties
to submit their respective position papers on June 8, 2001. The union, however,
requested for abeyance of the proceedings considering that there is a pending
petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the validity of the DOLE Secretary’s
Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.
 
          
 
On June 29, 2001, only Toyota submitted its position paper.  On July 11,
2001, the NLRC again ordered the Union to submit its position paper by July 19, 2001,
with a warning that upon failure for it to do so, the case shall be considered
submitted for decision.
COURT OF APPEALS:
Meanwhile, on July 17, 2001, the CA dismissed the Union’s petition for certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 64998, assailing the DOLE Secretary’s April 10, 2001 Order.
 
          Consequently, the NLRC issued an Order directing the  Union to submit its position
paper on the scheduled August 3, 2001 hearing; otherwise, the case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution based on the evidence on record.
 
          During the August 3, 2001 hearing, the Union, despite several accommodations,
still failed to submit its position paper.  Later that day, the Union claimed it filed its
position paper by registered mail.
NLRC:
Subsequently, the NLRC, in its August 9, 2001 Decision, declared the strikes staged by
the Union on February 21 to 23, 2001 and May 23 and 28, 2001 as illegal, dismissal of
227 employees who participated in said strike as legal, but ordered company to pay
them separation pay.  
 
          The NLRC considered the mass actions staged on February 21 to 23, 2001 illegal
as the Union failed to comply with the procedural requirements of a valid strike
under Art. 263 of the Labor Code.
          After the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the Toyota dispute on April 10,
2001, the Union again staged strikes on May 23 and 28, 2001.  The NLRC found the
strikes illegal as they violated Art. 264 of the Labor Code which proscribes
any strike or lockout after jurisdiction is assumed over the dispute by the President
or the DOLE Secretary.
  
Accordingly, both Toyota and the Union filed Motions for Reconsideration, which
the NLRC denied in its September 14, 2001 Resolution.[23]  Consequently, both parties
questioned the August 9, 2001 Decision[24] and September 14, 2001 Resolution of the
NLRC in separate petitions for certiorari filed with the CA, which were docketed as CA-
G.R. SP Nos. 67100 and 67561, respectively.  The CA then consolidated the petition.
CA ruled that the Union’s petition is defective in form for its failure to append a
proper verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, given that, out of the 227
petitioners, only 159 signed the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. 
 Despite the flaw, the CA proceeded to resolve the petitions on the merits and
affirmed the assailed NLRC Decision and Resolution with a modification, however, of
deleting the award of severance compensation to the dismissed Union members.
 
In justifying the recall of the severance compensation, the CA considered the
participation in illegal strikes as serious misconduct.  It defined serious misconduct as
a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment. 
However, in its June 20, 2003 Resolution,[28] the CA modified its February
27, 2003 Decision by reinstating severance compensation to the dismissed
employees based on social justice.
 
The Issues
(1)     Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal
strikes; and
(2)     Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated
in the illegal strikes.
 
 
 The Court’s Ruling
 
The alleged protest rallies in front of the offices of BLR and DOLE Secretary and at
the Toyota plants constituted illegal strikes
 
When is a strike illegal?
 
Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an illegal
strike, viz:
(1)        [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law,
such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or
 
(2)        [when it] violates a specific requirement of law[,
such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid
strike]; or
(3)        [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such
as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against
non-union employees; or
 
(4)        [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of
its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for
example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or
 
(5)        [when it] is declared in violation of an
existing injunction[, such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by
the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code];
or
 
(6)        [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such
as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.[33]
Petitioner Union contends that the protests or rallies conducted on February 21
and 23, 2001 are not within the ambit of strikes as defined in the Labor Code,
Shrouded as demonstrations, they were in reality temporary stoppages of
work perpetrated through the concerted action of the employees who deliberately
failed to report for work on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at the
BLR and DOLE offices in Intramuros, Manila, on February 21 to 23, 2001.    What
comes to the fore is that the decision not to work for two days was designed and calculated
to cripple the manufacturing arm of Toyota.  It becomes obvious that the real and ultimate
goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally acknowledge the Union as the sole
bargaining agent of the company.  This is not a legal and valid exercise of the right of
assembly and to demand redress of grievance.
 
It is obvious that the February 21 to 23, 2001 concerted actions were
undertaken without satisfying the prerequisites for a valid strike under Art. 263 of
the Labor Code. The Union failed to comply with the following requirements:  (1) a notice
of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike, or 15 days in case
of unfair labor practice;[39] (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called
for that purpose; and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least
seven days before the intended strike.
 
It is clear that once the DOLE Secretary assumes jurisdiction over the labor
dispute and certifies the case for compulsory arbitration with the NLRC, the parties
have to revert to the status quo ante (the state of things as it was before). The
intended normalcy of operations is apparent from the fallo of the April 10, 2001 Order
of then DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, which reads:
X x x x 
Further, the parties are hereby ordered to cease and
desist from committing any act that might lead to the worsening of
an already deteriorated situation.[42] (Emphasis supplied.)
 
It is explicit from this directive that the  Union and its members shall refrain from
engaging in any activity that might exacerbate the tense labor situation in  Toyota, which
certainly includes concerted actions.
 
Union officers are liable for unlawful strikes or illegal acts during a strike
 
          Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code provides:
 
ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES
(a)        x x x
 
            Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a
consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement
with full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates
in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may
be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That
mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
 
The rule on vicarious liability of a union member was abandoned and it is only
when a striking worker “knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike” that he will be penalized with dismissal.
 
Now, what are considered “illegal acts” under Art. 264(a)?
 
No precise meaning was given to the phrase “illegal acts.”  It may encompass a
number of acts that violate existing labor or criminal laws, such as the following:
 
(1)     Violation of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that “[n]o person
engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct
the free ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct
public thoroughfares”;
 
(2)     Commission of crimes and other unlawful acts in carrying out the strike;
[54]
 and
 
(3)     Violation of any order, prohibition, or injunction issued by the DOLE
Secretary or NLRC in connection with the assumption of jurisdiction/certification Order
under Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code.
 As earlier explained, this enumeration is not exclusive and it may cover other
breaches of existing laws.
In the cases at bench, the individual respondents participated in several
mass actions,
After a scrutiny of the records, we find that the 227 employees indeed joined the
February 21, 22, and 23, 2001 rallies and refused to render overtime work or report for
work.  These rallies, as we earlier ruled, are in reality illegal strikes, as the procedural
requirements for strikes under Art. 263 were not complied with.  Worse, said strikes were
in violation of the company rule prohibiting acts “in citing or participating in riots, disorders,
alleged strikes or concerted action detrimental to Toyota’s interest.”
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 158786 and 158789 are DENIED while
those in G.R. Nos. 158798-99 are GRANTED.
The June 20, 2003 CA Resolution in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 67100 and 67561
restoring the grant of severance compensation is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The February 27, 2003 CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 67100 and 67561,
which affirmed the August 9, 2001 Decision of the NLRC but deleted the grant of
severance compensation, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

ON SEPARATION PAY:

One exception where separation pay is given even though an employee is validly
dismissed is when the court finds justification in applying the principle of social justice well
entrenched in the 1987 Constitution.  In Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) v.
NLRC, the Court elucidated why social justice can validate the grant of separation pay,
thus:
  
In the same case, the Court laid down the rule that severance compensation
shall be allowed only when the cause of the dismissal is other than serious misconduct
or that which reflects adversely on the employee’s moral character.  The Court
succinctly discussed the propriety of the grant of separation pay in this wise:
 
In disposing of the Union’s plea for reconsideration of its February 27,
2003 Decision, the CA however performed a volte-face by reinstating the award of
separation pay.
 
The CA’s grant of separation pay is an erroneous departure from our ruling
in Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC that serious misconduct forecloses
the award of separation pay.  Secondly, the advertence to the alleged honest belief on
the part of the 227 employees that  Toyota committed a breach of the duty to bargain
collectively and an abuse of valid exercise of management prerogative has not been
substantiated by the evidence extant on record.  There can be no good faith in
intentionally incurring absences in a collective fashion from work on February 22
and 23, 2001 just to attend the DOLE hearings. Lastly, they blatantly violated the
assumption/certification Order of the DOLE Secretary, exhibiting their lack of obeisance to
the rule of law.  These acts indeed constituted serious misconduct.
 
One last point to consider—it is high time that employer and employee cease to
view each other as adversaries and instead recognize that theirs is a symbiotic
relationship, wherein they must rely on each other to ensure the success of the
business. Even though strikes and lockouts have been recognized as effective bargaining
tools, it is an antiquated notion that they are truly beneficial, as they only provide short-
term solutions by forcing concessions from one party; but staging such strikes would
damage the working relationship between employers and employees, thus endangering
the business that they both want to succeed.  The more progressive and truly effective
means of dispute resolution lies in mediation, conciliation, and arbitration, which do
not increase tension but instead provide relief from them. In the end, an atmosphere
of trust and understanding has much more to offer a business relationship than the
traditional enmity that has long divided the employer and the employee.
 
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES (UFE), MANUEL L. SARMIENTO et al.
vs.
NESTLÉ PHILIPPINES, INC., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON.
EDUARDO G. MAGNO, HON. ZOSIMO T. VASALLO and HON. EVANGELINE S.
LUBATON,
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the NLRC, dated November 2, 1988 on the
consolidated appeals of petitioners, the dispositive portion of which provides as follows:
In a lengthy and voluminous petition, dwelling largely on facts, petitioner Union of
Filipro Employees and 70 union officers and a member (henceforth "UFE") maintain
that public respondent NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion in its
affirmance of the decisions of the Labor Arbiters a quo, declaring illegal the strikes
staged by UFE.
Respondent NLRC premised its decision on the following sets of facts:
1. In NCR 12-4007-85 and NCR 1-295-86:
UFE filed a notice of strike on November 14, 1985,with the Bureau of Labor Relations
against Filipro (now Nestle Philippines, Inc., ["Nestle"]). On December 4, 1988, UFE filed
a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) against Nestle and its officials for violation
of the Labor Code (Art. 94) on Holiday Pay, non-implementation of the CBA provisions
(Labor Management Corporation scheme), Financial Assistance and other unfair labor
practice (p. 381, Rollo).:- nad
Acting on Nestle's petition seeking assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute or its
certification to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, then Minister of Labor and
Employment Blas F. Ople assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and issued the
following order on December 11, 1985:
"WHEREFORE, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute at Filipino,
Inc. pursuant to Article 264(g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. In lime
with this assumption a strike, lockout, or any other form of concerted action such as
slowdowns, sitdowns, noise barrages during office hours, which tend to disrupt
company operations, are strictly enjoined.
Notwithstanding the automatic injunction against any concerted activity, and an absence of
a restraining order, the union members, at the instigation of its leaders, and in clear
defiance of Minister Ople's Order of December 11, 1986, staged a strike and
continued to man picket lines at the Makati Administrative Office and all of Nestle's
factories and warehouses at Alabang, Muntinlupa, Cabuyao, Laguna, and Cagayan
de Oro City. Likewise, the union officers and members distributed leaflets to employees
and passersby advocating a boycott of company products (p. 383, Rollo).
On January 23, 1986, Nestle filed a petition to declare the strike illegal (NCR-1-295-86)
premised on violation of the CBA provisions on "no strike/no lockout" clause and the
grievance machinery provisions on settlement of disputes.
On January 30, 1986, then Labor Minister Ople issued another Order, with this
disposition:
"WHEREFORE, in line with the Order of December 11, 1985, this Office hereby orders all
the striking workers to report for work and the company to accept them under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the work stoppage within forty eight (48) hours from
notice of this Order.
Despite receipt of the second order dated January 30, 1986, and knowledge of a notice
caused to be published by Nestle in the Bulletin on February 1, 1986, advising all workers
to report to work not later than February 3, 1986, the officers and members of UFE
continued with the strike.
ON THE MR: denied
"The parties are further enjoined from committing acts that will disrupt the peaceful and
productive relations between the parties while the dispute is under arbitration as well as
acts considered illegal by law for the orderly implementation of this Order like acts of
coercion, harassment, blocking of public thoroughfares, ingress and egress to company
premises for lawful purposes or those undertaken without regard to the rights of the other
party.
UFE defied the Minister and continued with their strike. Nestle filed criminal charges
against those involved.
NEW Minister of Labor and Employment, Augusto B. Sanchez, issued a Resolution,
the relevant portions of which stated thus:
"This Office hereby enjoins all striking workers to return-to-work immediately and
management to accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing previous to
the work stoppage except as qualified in this resolution. 385, Rollo)
On March 17, 1986, the strikers returned to work.
On March 31, 1986, We granted UFE's Motion to Withdraw its Petition for Certiorari (G.R.
No. 73129) (p. 385, Rollo)
On April 23, 1986, Minister Sanchez rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Union charge for unfair labor practices is hereby dismissed for want of
merit. Nestle Philippines is hereby directed to make good its promise to grant an additional
benefit in the form of bonus equivalent to one (1) month's gross compensation to all
employees entitled to the same in addition to the one-month weighted average pay granted
by this office in the return-to-work Order." (p. 786, Rollo)
On June 6, 1986, Minister Sanchez modified the foregoing decision as follows:
"WHEREFORE, our 23 April 1986 Decision is hereby modified as follows:
"1. Nestle Philippines is directed to pay the Anniversary bonus equivalent to one
month basic salary to all its employees in lieu of the one month gross compensation
previously ordered by this office." (p. 787, Rollo)
LABOR ARBITER AFTER TRIAL ON THE MERITS:
1. Declaring the strike illegal.: nad
2. Declaring all the respondent union officers to have lost their employment status.
3. Declaring the union guilty of unfair labor practice; and
4. Dismissing the Union complaint for unfair labor practice."
2. In RAB-
Filipro (Nestle) and the Cagayan de Oro Filipro Workers Union-WATU, renewed a 3-year
contract, the union officers, together with other members of the union sent a letter to
Workers Alliance Trade Unions (WATU), advising them "that henceforth we shall
administer the CBA by ourselves and with the help of the Union of Filipro Employees
(UFE) to where we have allied ourselves." WATU disregarded the unions's advice,
claiming to be the contracting party of the CBA. UFE filed a petition for administration
of the existing CBAs at Cebu, Davao and Cagayan de Oro bargaining units against TUPAS
and WATU.
From January 22, 1986 to March 14, 1986, the rank and file employees of the company
staged a strike at the instigation of the UFE officers, who had represented themselves as
officers.
Nestle filed a petition to declare the strike illegal. The strikers countered that their strike
was legal because the same was staged pursuant to the notice of strike filed by UFE on
November 14, 1985 of which they claim to be members, having disaffiliated themselves
from CDO-FWU-WATU.
Executive Labor Arbiter Zosimo Vasallo issued his decision, disposing as follows:
1. Declaring the strike illegal;
2. Declaring respondent union guilty of unfair labor practice; and
"3. Declaring the following individual respondent Union officers namely: Roy Y. Baconguis
ET AL, to have lost their employment status." (p. 388, Rollo)
3. In NCR-00-09-03285-87.
On various dates, UFE, its officers and members staged a walkout from their jobs,
and participated in the Welga ng Bayan, sympathy strikes, illegal walkout and sit-
down strike which resulted to economic losses.
(d) On December 4, 1986, UFE filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor
Relations (to protest the unfair labor practices of Nestle, such as hiring of contractual
workers to perform regular jobs and wage discrimination
(e) On December 23, 1986, then Minister Augusto S. Sanchez certified the labor
dispute to the Commission for compulsory arbitration, strictly enjoining any
intended or actual strike or lockout (p. 392, Rollo);
HON. FRANKLIN DRILON’S ORDER:
(l) On September 8, 1987, Hon. F. Drilon issued the following order:
"All the workers are hereby directed to return to work immediately, refrain from resorting to
any further slowdown, sitdown strike, walkout and any other kind of activities that may tend
to disrupt the normal operations of the company. The company is directed to accept all
employees and to resume normal operations.: nad
Parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any and all acts
that would aggravate the situation." (p. 394, Rollo)
(m) Despite the order, UFE staged a strike on September 11, 1987, without notice of
strike, strike vote and in blatant defiance of then Labor Minist er Sanchez's
certification order dated November 23, 1986 and Secretary Drilon's return-to-work order
dated September 8, 1987." (p. 409, Rollo);
(n) Nestle sent individual letter of termination dated September 14, 1987 dismissing
them from the service effective immediately for knowingly instigating and participating in an
illegal strike, defying the order of the Secretary of Labor, dated September 8, 1987, and
other illegal acts (pp. 394-395, Rollo).
On September 22, 1987, UFE filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal, ULP and
damages (NLRC NCR-00-03285-87). Labor Arbiter Evangeline Lubaton ruled on both
issues of dismissal and strike legality, upon the premise that the issue on validity of the
dismissal of the individual complainants from employment "depends on the resolution of
the issue on whether or not the strike declared by complainants was illegal."
UFE appealed, the three appeals were ordered consolidated and elevated to the NLRC en
banc (p, 95, Rollo)
The NLRC affirmed the unanimous decisions of the three labor arbiters which
declared the strikes illegal, premised on the view that "the core of the controversy
rests upon the legality of the strikes."
In the petition before Us, UFE assigns several errors (pp. 63-321, Rollo), which We have
summarized as follows:
1. that Articles 263 and 264 are no longer good laws, since compulsory arbitration has
been curtailed under the present Constitution.
2. that the question on the legality of the strike was rendered moot and academic when
Nestle management accepted the striking workers in compliance with the return-to-work
order of then Minister of Labor Augusto Sanchez
3. that the union did not violate the no-strike/no lock-out clause, considering that the
prohibition applies to economic strikes, UFE, it is claimed, premised their strike on a
violation of the labor standard laws or non-payment of holiday pay, which is, in effect, a
violation of the CBA.
4. on the commission of illegal and prohibited acts which automatically rendered the strike
illegal, UFE claimed that there were no findings of specific acts and identifies of those
participating as to render them liable
SUPREME COURT:
We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition failed to show that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in its affirmance of the decisions of the Labor
Arbiters a quo.
At the outset, UFE questions the power of the Secretary of Labor under Art. 263(g) of the
Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute tainted with national interests, or to
certify the same for compulsory arbitration. UFE contends that Arts. 263 and 264 are
based on the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 9 of Art. II thereof, the pertinent portion of
which reads:
"Sec. 9. . . . The State may provide for compulsory arbitration." (p. 801, Rollo)
UFE argues that since the aforecited provision of Sec. 9 is no longer found in the 1987
Constitution, Arts. 263(g) and 264 of the Labor Code are now "unconstitutional and must
be ignored."
We are not persuaded. We agree with the Solicitor General that on the contrary, both
provisions are still applicable.
"Article 7 of the New Civil Code declares that:
'Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.
x x x'
"In the case at bar, no law has ever been passed by Congress expressly repealing
Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code. Neither may the 1987 Constitution be
considered to have impliedly repealed the said Articles considering that there is no
showing that said articles are inconsistent with the said Constitution. Moreover, no court
has ever declared that the said articles are inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution.
"On the contrary, the continued validity and operation of Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor
Code has been recognized by no less than the Congress of the Philippines when the latter
enacted into law R.A. 6715, otherwise known as Herrera Law, Section 27 of which
amended paragraphs (g) and (i) of Article 263 of the Labor Code.
"At any rate, it must be noted that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code have
been enacted pursuant to the police power of the State, which has been defined as
the power inherent in a Government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society (People vs. Vera
Reyes, 67 Phil. 190). The police power, together with the power of eminent domain and the
power of taxation, is an inherent power of government and does not need to be expressly
conferred by the Constitution. Thus, it is submitted that the argument of petitioners that
Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code do not have any constitutional foundation is
legally inconsequential." (pp. 801-803, Rollo)
On the issue of the legality of the strike committed, UFE seeks to absolve itself by
pointing out qualifying factors such as motives, good faith, absence of findings on specific
participation and/or liability, and limiting the no-strike provision to economic strikes.
Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking
workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine
this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification
order is issued.
"One other point that must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is issued
pending the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say
that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the strike
is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to maintain the status quo while the
determination is being made. Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike is
legal can refuse to return to work to their work and cause a standstill on the company
operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management
to fill. Worse, they will also claim payment for work not done, on the ground that they are
still legally employed although actually engaged in the activities inimical to their employer's
interest. (Emphasis supplied)
"This is like eating one's cake and having it too, and at the expense of the
management. Such an unfair situation surely was not contemplated by our labor laws and
cannot be justified under the social justice policy, which is a policy of fairness to both labor
and management. Neither can this unseemly arrangement be sustained under the due
process clause as the order, if thus interpreted, would be plainly oppressive and arbitrary.
We also wish to point out that an assumption and/or certification order of the Secretary of
Labor automatically results in a return-to-work of all striking workers, whether or not a
corresponding order has been issued by the Secretary of Labor. Thus, the striking workers
erred when they continued with their strike alleging absence of a return-to-work order.
Article 264(g) is clear. Once an assumption/certification order is issued, strikes are
enjoined, or if one has already taken place, all strikers shall immediately return to
work.
The NLRC also gave the following reasons:
1. The strike was staged in violation of the existing CBA provisions on "No Strike/No
Lockout Clause" stating that a strike, which is in violation of the terms of the collective
bargaining statement, is illegal, especially when such terms provide for conclusive
arbitration
2. Instead of exhausting all the steps provided for in the grievance machinery
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement to resolve the dispute amicably and
harmoniously within the plant level, UFE went on strike (p. 398, Rollo)
3. The prescribed mandatory cooling-off period and then 7-day strike and after submission
of the report of strike vote at Nestle's Makati Offices and Muntinlupa and Cabuyao Plants
were not complied with, while no notice of strike was filed by respondents when they
staged the strike at Nestle's Cagayan de Oro Plant
4. In carrying out the strike, coercion, force, intimidation, violence with physical injuries,
sabotage, and the use of unnecessary and obscene language or epithets were committed
by the respondent officials and members of either UFE or WATU. It is well-settled that a
strike conducted in this manner is illegal (United Seamen's Union vs. Davao
Shipowners Association, 20 SCRA 1226). In fact, criminal cases were filed with the Makati
Fiscal's Office (p. 402, Rollo).
Thus, the NLRC correctly upheld the illegality of the strikes and the corresponding
dismissal of the individual complainants because of their "brazen disregard of
successive lawful orders of then Labor Ministers Blas F. Ople, Augusto Sanchez and
Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon dated December 11, 1985, January 30, 1986 and
February 4, 1986, respectively, and the cavalier treatment of the provisions of the
Labor Code and the return-to-work orders of the Minister (now Secretary) of Labor
and Employment, or Articles 264 and 265 (now renumbered Arts. 263 and 264),
providing in part as follows:
.
On the alleged lack of jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter Lubaton, NLRC has clarified that the
question on the legality of strike was properly resolved by the Labor Arbiter, not only
because the question is perfectly within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter to adjudicate, but also because the issue was not subsumed by the Order of Labor
Minister Sanchez, dated December 23, 1986, certifying the Notice of Strike dated
December 4, 1986 for compulsory arbitration, further clarifying that the issue of whether or
not the strike staged on September 11, 1987 by UFE and its officials and members was
illegal is a prejudicial question to the issue of whether or not the complainants were illegally
dismissed. We shall not belabor the issue any further.: nad

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED, and the decision of public respondent NLRC,
dated November 2, 1988, and its Resolution, dated March 7, 1989, are both AFFIRMED in
their entirety. No costs.

SO ORDERED.