STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP, vs.

SULPECIO MEDEQUILLO, JR
G.R. No. 177498
January 18, 2012

Facts:
On 6 March 1995, Sulpecio Madequillo (respondent) filed a complaint before the
Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the
petitioners for illegal dismissal under a first contract and for failure to deploy under a second
contract.

On 6 November 1991(First Contract), he was hired by Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc

on behalf of its principal Chung-Gai Ship Management of Panama as Third Assistant Engineer
on board the vessel "Stolt Aspiration" for a period of nine (9) month.

On February 1992 or for nearly three (3) months of rendering service and while the
vessel was at Batangas, he was ordered by the ship’s master to disembark the vessel and
repatriated back to Manila for no reason or explanation.

Upon his return to Manila, he immediately proceeded to the petitioner’s office where he
was transferred employment with another vessel named MV "Stolt Pride" under the same terms
and conditions of the First Contract;

On 23 April 1992, the Second Contract was noted and approved by the POEA,

The POEA, without knowledge that he was not deployed with the vessel, certified the
Second Employment Contract on 18 September 1992.

Despite the commencement of the Second Contract on 21 April 1992, petitioners failed
to deploy him with the vessel MV "Stolt Pride." He made a follow-up with the petitioner but the
same refused to comply with the Second Employment Contract.

On 22 December 1994, he demanded for his passport, seaman’s book and other
employment documents. However, he was only allowed to claim the said documents in
exchange of his signing a document, He was constrained to sign the document involuntarily
because without these documents, he could not seek employment from other agencies.

The petitioners argue that under the POEA Contract, actual deployment of the seafarer
is a suspensive condition for the commencement of the employment.

Issue: WON the contention of the Petitioner is correct that actual deployment of the seafarer is a
suspensive condition for the commencement of the employment

Ruling: The court ruled that even without actual deployment, the perfected contract gives rise to
obligations on the part of petitioners.

A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect
to the other, to give something or to render some service.29 The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy

The POEA Standard Employment Contract provides that employment shall commence "upon
the actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in the port of hire." We adhere to
the terms and conditions of the contract so as to credit the valid prior stipulations of the parties
before the controversy started. Else, the obligatory force of every contract will be useless.
Parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all
the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage
and law.

Thus, even if by the standard contract employment commences only "upon actual departure of
the seafarer", this does not mean that the seafarer has no remedy in case of non-deployment
without any valid reason. Parenthetically, the contention of the petitioners of the alleged poor
performance of respondent while on board the first ship MV "Stolt Aspiration" cannot be
sustained to justify the non-deployment, for no evidence to prove the same was presented.

Distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the
commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in
this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent
agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The
commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken
place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of
any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment
contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a
cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer
failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
 People of the Philippines v. Hirang
G.R. No. 223528
January 11, 2017

Facts:

AA was born on November 25, 1989. She was only 16 years old when Hirang recruited her in
August of 2006 as a sex worker, for which she was paid ₱1,000.00 per day, less Hirang's
commission of ₱200.00. She was later prodded to work as a sexy dancer and prostitute at the
Catwalk Club along Quezon Avenue. She joined her customers in their tables at the club, and
gave sexual services in hotels. She left the club after two nights, upon her live-in partner's order.
Still, Hirang sourced several other prostitution jobs for AAA. He convinced AAA to work in a
cybersex den in Muñoz, Quezon City. She received ₱700.00 a month, less ₱200.00 commission
received by Hirang. In September 2006, Hirang made AAA work again as a sexy dancer at
Philippine Village bar in Puerto Galera. AAA had to quit her job when she got pregnant, but
resumed work for Hirang after she gave birth.7

CCC was born on December 19, 1992. She was 14 years old when she was recruited by Hirang
for his illicit activities. She met Hirang at the house of Ka Lolet, her best friend's mother. She
knew Hirang to be scouting young girls who could be traded for sex. Sometime in June 2007,
Hirang asked CCC to go with him and meet some Koreans. 8

DDD, who was born on February 11, 1991, was 16 years old when she ran away from home in
2007 and stayed at a friend's house in Sta. Ana, Taguig City. As she was then in need of
money, she accepted an offer from one Ate Lolet, a pimp, that she be introduced to a male
customer, with whom she had sexual intercourse for ₱2,500.00. It was Ate Lolet who later
introduced DDD to Hirang.9

BBB was born on March 28, 1990. CCC is her younger sister. She was 17 years old when on
June 27, 2007, she visited CCC at Ka Lolet's house. There she saw Hirang, who invited her to
come with him in meeting some Koreans that evening. Later in the evening, at around 8:00
p.m., BBB went back to the house of Ka Lo let to meet Hirang. It was then on June 27, 2007
that Hirang sold BBB, along with AAA, CCC and DDD, to his Korean customers for sexual
activities. Hirang told his victims that they would receive ₱5,000.00 after a "gimik" 10 with them.
At around 10:00 p.m., their group proceeded to meet with the Koreans at Chowking restaurant,
C-5 in Taguig City. Hirang instructed the girls to tell the Koreans that they were 16 years of age,
as this was their customers' preference. 11

When their group arrived at Chowking, Hirang talked to a Korean and then introduced the girls
to him. The Korean handed money to Hirang and as the latter was counting it, NBI agents
arrived at the scene and announced a raid. NBI agents arrested Hirang, while a social worker
approached the girls and brought them to the NBI for their statements.

Issue: WON Hirang is guilty of Qualified trafficking in person.

Ruling: Yes, Hirang is guilty of Qualified trafficking in person.

Qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a) and of R.A. No.
9208, which read:

Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical,
to commit any of the following acts:

(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including
those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship,
for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as qualified

trafficking:

(a) When the trafficked person is a child;

The presence of the crime's elements was established by the prosecution witnesses who
testified during the trial.1âwphi1 The young victims themselves testified on their respective
ages, and how they were lured by Hirang to participate in the latter's illicit sex trade. Hirang
recruited the girls to become victims of sexual abuse and exploitation. Mainly upon a promise of
financial benefit, the girls agreed and, thus, joined him on June 27, 2007 in meeting with the
Korean customers in search for prostitutes. Police authorities personally, witnessed Hirang's
unlawful activity, as they conducted the entrapment operations and arrested him after Hirang
transacted with the supposed customers and received payment therefor.

Pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208, the crime committed by Hirang was qualified trafficking,
as it was committed in a large scale and his four victims were under 18 years of age.