1. Heirs of Leopoldo Delfin and Soledad Delfin vs.

National Housing Authority

FACTS: Delfin Spouses filed a Complaint for “Payment of Parcel(s) of Land and Improvements
and Damages claiming that they were the owners of a 28,800 square meter parcel of land in
Iligan City which they bought in 1951.
The Delfin Spouses had been declaring the Iligan Property in their names for tax purposes since
1952 and had been planting it with mangoes, coconuts, corn, seasonal crops, and vegetables.
They further alleged that NHA forcibly took possession of a 10,798 square meter portion of the
property. Despite their repeated demands for compensation, the NHA failed to pay the value of
the property.
The NHA, on the other hand, alleged that the Delfin Spouses’ property was part of a military
reservation area and that among all claimants, only the Delfin Spouses and two others remained
unpaid because of their disagreement on the property’s valuation.
The RTC favored the evidence presented by the Delfin Spouses. The NHA filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied. NHA then filed an appeal before the CA. The CA ruled that the
characterization of the property is no longer an issue because the NHA already conceded that the
property is disposable public land. The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the heirs of the Delfin Spouses. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners contention that they acquired the subject property through
acquisitive prescription is correct.

RULING: For acquisitive prescription to set in pursuant to Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, two (2) requirements must be satisifled: first, the property is established to be private
in character; and second, the applicable prescriptive period under existing laws had passed.

Accordingly, only publicly owned lands which are patrimonial in character are susceptible to
prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Consistent with this, Article
1113 of Civil Code demarcates properties of the state, which are not patrimonial in character, as
being not susceptible to prescription.

For prescription to be viable, the publicly-owned land must be patrimonial or private in character
at the onset. Possession for thirty (30) years does not convert it into patrimonial property.

Contrary to petitioners’ theory, for land of the public domain to be converted into patrimonial
property, there must be an express declaration — “in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress
or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law” 46 — that
“the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.”
2. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100709. November 14, 1997

FACTS: Respondent Morato filed a Free Patent Application on a parcel of land in Quezon. The patent
was approved and the Register of Deeds of Quezon. Both the free patent and the title specifically mandate
that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered within five (5) years from the date of the issuance of
the patent.
Subsequently, the District Land Officer found that respondent Morato had encumbered the land in
violation of the condition of the patent because a portion of the land was mortgaged by respondent
Morato to respondents Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan for P10,000.00. The spouses Quilatan constructed
a house on the land. Another portion of the land was leased to another where a warehouse was
constructed.
Petitioner filed an amended complaint against respondents and the Register of Deeds of Quezon for the
cancellation of title and reversion of a parcel of land to the public domain on the grounds that the land is a
foreshore land and was mortgaged and leased within the five-year prohibitory period.
The LC dismissed petitioner’s complaint ruling that there was no violation of the 5-year period ban
against alienating or encumbering the land, because the land was merely leased and not alienated. It also
found that the mortgage to Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan covered only the improvement and not the
land itself. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether the land in question, is really part of the foreshore lands which the private respondent
cannot acquire.

RULING: The Supreme Court defines foreshore land in the case of Republic vs. Alagad, 169 SCRA
455, where the rise in water level is due to, the ‘extraordinary’ action of nature, rainful, for instance, the
portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water in question. It
cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public dominion, and land capable of
registration as private property.

A foreshore land, on the other hand has been defined as that part of (the land) which is between high and low
water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides (Republic vs. C.A., Nos. L-43105, L-43190, August
31, 1984, 131 SCRA 532; Government vs. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil. 423) The strip of land that lies
between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide.

While at the time of the grant of free patent to respondent Morato, the land was not reached by the water,
however, due to gradual sinking of the land caused by natural calamities, the sea advances had
permanently invaded a portion of subject land. When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide
invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. The
subject land in this case, being foreshore land, should therefore be returned to the public domain.

3. Natural Resources and Environmental Laws G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006
FACTS: Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in
Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having
acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer
no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or
equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question
since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in
question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

ISSUE: Whether the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain.

HELD: No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in
question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or
possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands"
do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

4. Bilag et. al. v. Ay-ay et. al.. G.R. No. 189950, 24 April 2017

FACTS: Ay-ay et. al. filed a complaint for quieting of title with a prayer for preliminary injunction
against Bilag et. al. before the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”), Baguio City.
Ay-ay et. al. alleged that they had purchased various portions of a parcel of land in Sitio Benin, Baguio
City (“subject lands”) from Bilag’s predecessor-in-interest and that they had registered the deeds of sale
with the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City. They likewise claimed to have been in continuous possession
of the subject lands since 1976.
Bilag et. al. filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Bilag argued that since the
subject lands are untitled, unregistered, and form part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation which were
long classified as lands of public domain, it is the Director of Lands who has the authority to award their
ownership and not the RTC.
The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the
dismissal and remanded the case for trial.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over a case for quieting of title over lands which belong to the
public domain?

RULING: No, the RTC does not have jurisdiction. The subject lands being unregistered and untitled,
they are classified as lands of the public domain. Being lands of public domain, it is the Director of Lands
who has the authority to award their ownership and not the RTC.
Hence, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since it is a case for quieting of
title over lands which belong to the public domain.

5. Lucasan vs. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 176929 July 4, 2008

FACTS: Petitioners were the owners of lots in Bacolod City.

PBC extended a P5,000.00 loan to Lucasan, with Carlos Benares as his co-maker. Lucasan and Benares
failed to pay the loan. Consequently, PBC filed a collection case with the RTC of Bacolod City.
RTC rendered a decision ordering Lucasan and Benares to jointly and severally pay PBC.
Lucasan failed to pay the monetary award; thus, to satisfy the judgment, the RTC issued a writ of
execution. The lots were sold at public auction and were awarded to PBC as the highest bidder.
Lucasan, as well as the mortgagee banks, PNB and RPB, did not redeem the properties within the
redemption period. Nevertheless, PBC did not file a petition for consolidation of ownership. Not long
thereafter, Lucasan paid his loans with the PNB and RPB. He wrote a letter to the PDIC seeking the
cancellation of the COS. PDIC denied Lucasan’s request for the cancellation of the certificate of sale.
PDIC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. Lucasan opposed the motion. He
countered that the subject properties were still in his possession, and neither PBC nor PDIC instituted an
action for consolidation of ownership.

ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of Lucasan’s complaint for quieting of title was proper.

RULING: Yes. The Court held that to avail of the remedy of quieting of title, two (2)
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.20 Stated
differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal or at least an equitable title over the real
property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.
Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case.

ASSIGNMENT 3

1. Wee vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 176405. August 20, 2008

FACTS: Respondents rented out the subject property to petitioner on a month to month basis having
agreed that the rental payment shall be increased from P9,000.00 to P15,000.00. Petitioner, however,
failed or refused to pay the corresponding increase on rent.
Respondent George de Castro sent a letter to petitioner terminating their lease agreement and demanding
that the latter vacate and turn over the subject property to respondents. Since petitioner stubbornly refused
to comply with said demand letter, respondent George de Castro, together with his siblings and co-
respondents, filed the Complaint for ejectment before the MTC.
Petitioner, on the other hand, countered that there was no agreement between the parties to increase the
monthly rentals and respondents’ demand for an increase was exorbitant. Petitioner asserted further that
the MTC lacked jurisdiction over the ejectment suit, since respondents’ Complaint was devoid of any
allegation that there was an “unlawful withholding” of the subject property by the petitioner.
The RTC decreed that respondents’ Complaint failed to comply with the rule that a co-owner could not
maintain an action without joining all the other co-owners.
respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari13 with the Court of Appeals. the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision granting the respondents’ Petition and ordering petitioner to vacate the subject
property and turn over the same to respondents. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether respondent George de Castro cannot maintain an action for ejectment against petitioner,
without joining all his co-owners.

RULING: Article 487 of the New Civil Code is explicit on this point: ART. 487. Any one of the co-
owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of
possession, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion
publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). As explained by the renowned civilist,
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino: A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining
all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of
all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not
for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper. (Emphasis added.) In the more recent case
of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, 508 SCRA 469 (2006), this Court declared that a co-owner is not
even a necessary party to an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even in his absence.

2. Cruz vs. Catapang. G.R. No. 164110. February 12, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel of land.
With the consent of Norma Maligaya, respondent Teofila M. Catapang built a house on a lot adjacent to
the parcel of land. The house intruded, however, on a portion of the co-owned property.
When Leonor B. Cruz found out about it, she then made several demands upon respondent to demolish
the intruding structure and to vacate the portion encroaching on their property. The respondent, however,
refused and disregarded her demands. The petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against
respondent. The MCTC decided in favor of petitioner, ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is
not sufficient to justify defendant’s construction of the house and possession of the portion of the lot in
question.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MCTC’s ruling. Respondent filed a petition for review with the CA
which reversed the RTC’s decision ruling that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case
because respondent’s entry into the property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma
Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a cause of
action for forcible entry. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the consent of one co-owner will warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by
another co-owner against the person who was given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned
property.

RULING:  A co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the
co-ownership. In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-
owned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use. Article
486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he does so in accordance with
the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or
prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to
construct a house on the co-owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other
co-owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.