3rd Issue P

MANU/PH/0252/2007
Equivalent Citation: (2007)147PLR122, 2007(3)RC R(C riminal)1040
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

Decided On: 26.02.2007
Appellants: State of Punjab
Vs.
Respondent: Nachhattar Singh
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Mehtab Singh Gill and Arvind Kumar, JJ.
Case Note:
Narcotics - Acquittal - State of Punjab had preferred appeal against the
judgment by which the trial Court acquitted the respondent from the
offence punishable under Section 15 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 - Held, Independent witness i who joined in the
investigation, was not examined by the prosecution due to the reasons best
known to it - By his non-examination, the trial court had rightly drawn an
adverse inference against the prosecution - Case of the prosecution came
under the clouds of doubt when PW.I H.C., one of the recovery witness to
the alleged recovery, showed his ignorance with regard to the spot
proceedings and showed his ignorance in his cross-examination, when
asked about material particulars of the investigations conducted at the
spot, after the alleged recovery - The trial Court also noticed major
discrepancies crept into statements of both the recovery witnesses - Trial
court adequately and rightly dealt with all these points before passing the
order of acquittal - Impugned judgment was neither perverse nor there was
any error of law - Appeal dismissed [para 11, 12, 13]
JUDGMENT
Arvind Kumar, J.
1 . The State of Punjab has preferred the instant appeal against the judgment dated
23.3.2006 passed by Presiding Officer, Special Court, Sangrur by dint of which the
trial Court acquitted the respondent from the offence punishable under Section 15 of
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (for brevity, the Act).
2. According to the prosecution allegations, on 11.5.2004 the police party headed by
A.S.I. Gurmail Singh apprehended the respondent and recovered poppy husk
equivalent to 62-1/2 Kg. from the pits near the bridge of canal in the area of village
Roopaheri, contained in two plastic bags, upon which he was sitting. One
independent witness Harjit Singh was also joined in the investigation. The contraband
was sealed and taken into police possession. The respondent was arrested and
thereafter on completion of usual formalities of investigations, final report was filed
in the Court against the respondent for the trial.
3. After commitment of the challan, the trial Court framed charges under Section 15
of the Act against the respondent.
4. During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as six official witnesses. The
22-10-2020 (Page 1 of 3) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

evidence of prosecution consists of testimonies of recovery witness PW.1 H.C. Jagdev
Singh and PW.4 A.S.I. Gurmail Singh, the investigating officer; and formal witnesses
PW.2 Const. Gurjant Singh, PW.3 A.S.I. Gurcharan Singh, PW.5 H.C. Ajaib Singh and
PW.6 Inspector Sewa Singh. Besides, report of chemical examiner was tendered by
the prosecution in its evidence.
5. When examined Under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the case of the respondent was of total
denial and false implication.
6 . The respondent examined two witnesses namely DW.1 Amarjit Kaur and DW.2
Gurmail Singh.
7 . The learned trial court, on appreciation of evidence led by the prosecution, held
that the prosecution has failed to connect the accused with the alleged recovery and
accordingly, as said above, acquitted him of the charge framed.
8 . We have heard learned State counsel as well as learned Counsel for the
respondent and have gone through the judgment of the trial court and find ourselves
in total agreement with the findings recorded therein.
9. Conscious possession is the core ingredient to be established before the accused is
subjected to punishment under this Act. It is well settled, as held in Syed Mohd. Syed
Umer Syed and Ors. v. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/0695/1995 : 1995CriL J2662 that
unlawful possession is sine qua non for conviction under the Act and that fact has to
be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Though possession has
not been defined in the Act but has been judicially construed to be conscious and
intelligent possession and not merely the physical presence of the accused in
proximity or even in close proximity of the object. There are two essential elements
of possession; firstly, the corpus- the element of physical control and secondly, the
animus or intent with which such control is exercised. It is for the prosecution to
establish that the accused was found in conscious and intelligent possession of the
contraband. In the instant case, it is evident that the respondent was sitting on
plastic bags, in the pits, near the bridge of canal minor. This is not suffice to prove
conscious possession. Merely by sitting on the bags, in absence of proof of anything
more, does not infer that he was in conscious possession of those bags. The
investigating agency had not tried to ascertain whether the bags containing poppy
husk were belonging to the accused or not? In a way, it had not adduced any
evidence to show the ownership of poppy husk. There was no investigation as to how
those bags of poppy husk were transported to the place of recovery. Moreover, no
efforts had been made to trace out the origin of contraband. The police should have
conducted further investigation to prove that the respondents was really in conscious
possession of those bags. There is nothing to establish that the place from where the
poppy husk was recovered was belonging to the respondent, rather, admittedly, the
place of recovery was a Government place, feasible and accessible to general public.
In State of Punjab v. Balkar Singh and Anr. MANU/SC/0258/2004 : 2004CriL J3839 ,
in the similar circumstances, when the accused were found sitting on the bag whereof
poppy husk was recovered, considering the factum of absence of any proof with
regard to ownership of that contraband, it was held that, in absence of any
satisfactory explanation by the accused for being present on that place, does not
prove that they were in conscious possession of those contrabands. Therefore, in the
light of this evidence, the learned trial court has rightly held that the prosecution has
failed to prove conscious possession of the contraband.

MANU/HP/1094/2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
Criminal Appeal No. 249 of 2012
Appellants: State of Himachal Pradesh
Vs.
Respondent: Mukesh Kumar
Sanjay Karol and Piar Singh Rana, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: B.S. Parmar, Additional Advocate General, Vikram
Thakur, Deputy Advocate General and J.S. Guleria, Assistant Advocate General
For Respondents/Defendant: Amrinder Singh Rana, Advocate
JUDGMENT
Sanjay Karol, J.
1 . State has appealed against the judgment dated 5.1.2012 of the learned Special
Judge, Fast Track Court, Kangra at Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh, passed in S.C.
RBT No. 26/D/VII-07, titled as State v. Mukesh and another, challenging the acquittal
of respondents Mukesh Kumar and Sunil Kumar (hereinafter referred to as the
accused), who stand charged for having committed an offence punishable under the
provisions of Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
(hereinafter referred to as the Act).
2. Case set up by the prosecution is that on 19.6.2007, police party, headed by ASI
Jitender Kumar (PW-6), and comprising of Amrik Singh (PW-1), Mohinder (PW-2),
Manoj Kumar (PW-3), Kailash Chand and Kuldeep Singh was present at Ghurlu Pul, in
relation to traffic checking duty. At about 2.20 a.m., vehicle bearing No. HP-40A-
2598 came from Yol side. Accused Mukesh Kumar was on the driver's seat and co-
accused Anil Kumar was sitting beside him. The vehicle was checked and from the
bag lying inside the vehicle, Charas was recovered, which upon weighment was found
to be of 850 grams. Two samples of 25 grams each were drawn, which were sealed
with seal impression 'A'. NCB form (Ex. PW-6/A) was filled up in triplicate.
Impression of the seal was taken on a piece of cloth (Ex. PW-6/E) and the seal was
handed over to Amrik Singh (PW-1). Contraband substance was seized vide Memo
(Ex. PW-1/A), in the presence of Mohinder Singh (PW-2) and Amrik Singh. Ruka (Ex.
PW-6/B) was sent through Manoj Kumar (PW-3) to Police Station, Dharamshala,
where FIR No. 120/07, dated 19.6.2007 (Ex. PW-6/C), under the provisions of
Section 20 of the Act, was registered. With the completion of spot investigation,
Jitender Kumar handed over the contraband substance and the samples to SHO R.P.
Jaswal, who resealed the same with his seal impression "T". Thereafter, it was
handed over to MHC Anil Kumar (PW-8), who deposited the same in the Malkhana
and kept it in safe custody. Sealed sample was sent for chemical analysis and report
(Ex. PW-6/F) from the FSL, Junga was obtained by the police. Special report (Ex.
PW-4/B) was also sent to the superior officer. With the completion of investigation,

has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the
benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in
disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the
advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to
say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will
act in accordance with rules and principles well known and
recognized in the administration of justice." "
9 . ASI Jitender Kumar (PW-6) states that on 19.6.2007, he had set up a Naka at
Ghurlu Pul, when accused came in a vehicle, which was searched and from the bag
lying inside the vehicle, Charas was recovered. Samples were drawn; NCB form was
filled up; ruka was sent to the Police Station; as also report was sent to the superior
officer. His testimony is corroborated by Amrik Singh, Mohinder Singh and Manoj
Kumar. However, in cross-examination part of the testimonies of all these witnesses,
we find that there are major contradictions, rendering the prosecution case to be
fatal.
10. Now, Jitender Kumar admits that it was a case of routine checking and no memo
of personal search was prepared. It has come on record through the testimonies of
these witnesses that in fact accused were searched personally. Amrik Singh does
state that before searching the vehicle, memorandum was prepared. Now where is
that memorandum? Why has it not been produced on record? Genesis of prosecution
story of having set up a naka and checked the vehicle in routine does not appear to
be correct, for according to Mohinder Singh "HC, Amrik Singh had received secret
information at police station". Now, if this were so, then why is it that no entry with
regard to the same was made in the Police Station or any action taken under the
provisions of Section 42 of the Act? Not only that, according to Jitender Kumar,
police party left Police Station at about 11 a.m., for "traffic checking", whereas
according to Mohinder Singh, police party left Police Station at 11.15 a.m. The
witness is categorical about the timing, which version is corroborated by Amrik
Singh. It is in this background statement of Mohinder Singh that Amrik Singh had
received secret information at Police Station at about 4-5 p.m. acquires significance.
Who is telling the truth is not clear. Also, why material fact was concealed from the
Court is not evident. It be only observed that the police party belonged to the CIA
staff, Dharamshala and as such unless there was a special reason they had no
occasion to have set up a naka. As to whether naka was set up or not itself is in
doubt, for according to Amrik Singh, 23 vehicle were searched, whereas according to
Mohinder Singh only 15 vehicles were searched, and according to Manoj Kumar, 4-5
vehicles were searched.
11. There is nothing on record to show that police party made serious endeavour for
associating independent witnesses. It is not that the contraband substance was
recovered from a place, which was inaccessible by road or that there was no
habitation nearby. Police could have associated independent witnesses, for it is
admitted by Jitender Kumar that Dari Bazaar and Sheela Chowk are just at a distance
of 2, 3 kms, respectively, where Government officials reside. Police party did have a
vehicle with themselves.
12. Special report also does not reflect true and correct facts, for police had prior
information but such fact was not recorded therein.
13. Hence, it cannot be said that prosecution has been able to prove its case, by
leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence so as to prove that

the accused were found in conscious and exclusive possession of 850 grams of
Charas.
1 4 . For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the well
reasoned judgment passed by the trial Court. The Court has fully appreciated the
evidence so placed on record by the parties.
1 5 . The accused have had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court
below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed
Ankoos and others versus Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh,
Hyderabad MANU/SC/1795/2009 : (2010) 1 SCC 94, it cannot be said that the Court
below has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the
accused has resulted into travesty of justice. No ground for interference is called for.
The present appeal is dismissed. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are
discharged.
Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any.
© Manupatra Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

MANU/MP/0282/1989
Equivalent Citation: 1990C riLJ1119
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

Criminal Appeal Nos. 201 and 393 of 1988
Appellants: Kalekhan and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: State of M.P. and Ors.
V.D. Gyani, J.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: C.R. Joshi, Adv.
For Respondents/Defendant: A.H. Khan, Adv.
JUDGMENT
V.D. Gyani, J.
1 . This appeal arises out of the judgment dt. 25-4-88, passed by the Additional
Sessions Judge, Neemuch in Sessions Trial No. 167/87, thereby convicting the
appellant under Section 8/18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and sentencing him to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for ten years with fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- or in default of payment of
fine, to suffer R.I. for one year.
2 . There is yet another connected appeal Cr. A. 201/88 Dinesh v. Union of India,
arising out of the same judgment preferred by another co-accused Dinesh. Both
Kalekhan and Dinesh were charged and tried together. Dinesh has been convicted
Under Section 8/25 of the Act and similarly sentenced as accused appellant No. 1
Kalekhan. Both these appellants have been convicted and sentenced by a common
judgment. The appeals were heard together and are being decided by a common
judgment.
3. The charge against accused appellant Kalekhan was that on 11-8-87, around 5.00
a.m. in village Telankhedi he was found to be carrying 9 kg. 500 gms. opium in a car
bearing registration No. RJB 7409 which was recovered from his possession. The
charge against accused appellant No. 2 Dinesh was that he knowingly permitted the
aforesaid car, of which he was the owner, for illegal transportation of opium.
4. Prosecution examined in all four witnesses to prove the charge against the accused
appellants. These witnesses include the Chemical Analyser K. P. Pillai (PW 1),
Omprakash -- a panch witness -- PW2, the Narcotic Inspectors Shivphersing Yadav --
PW 3 and Abdul Samad Khan -- PW 4. The Panch witness Omprakash PW2 has not
supported the prosecution case and was declared hostile. The other Panch witness to
the search, seizure and recovery has not been examined by the prosecution.
5. Prosecution case, stated in brief, Was that the officials of Narcotic Department had

case is concerned, even from the reported Short Note, particularly the paragraph
which records conclusion, the inference as drawn by the trial Court is not
supportable. The learned Judge would have done well to refer to any standard
textbook of law rather than referring to a short note.
19. Section 8 of the Evidence Act lays down that motive, preparation and previous or
subsequent conduct provides, (sic) is a relevant fact and as has been pointed out by
the Supreme Court in Anant Chintaman Lagu v. The State of Bombay
MANU/SC/0043/1959 : AIR 1960 SC 500: (1960 Cri L J 682); so far as conduct of an
accused is concerned, a criminal trial is not an enquiry into the conduct of an accused
for any purpose other than to determine, whether he is guilty of offence charged and
in this context, that piece of conduct, can be held to be incriminatory, which has no
reasonable explanation, except on the hypothesis that he is guilty. Conduct which
destroys the presumption of innocence can alone be considered as material. Although
the trial Court has not attributed any specific piece of conduct so as to infer any
incriminating circumstance against the accused-appellant Kale-khan the only fact
proved against him is that he was the driver of the car and this fact should be seen in
the light of the other established fact that two persons sitting in the car had either
escaped or allowed to escape when the car was intercepted and checked, and no
efforts worth its name were made to chase or trace them. It is the prosecution case
that opium was found concealed in the hollow gap of the door of the car.
20. Section 18 of the Act provides for punishment for possession or transportation of
opium. Possession is made up of two elements; firstly the corpus, -- the element of
physical control and secondly -- the animus or intent with which such control is
exercised. It is conscious possession, which is contemplated by penal statute, which
provides and penalizes possession of any contraband article or thing. A driver of a
vehicle, is certainly in possession of the vehicle in question, but he cannot be said to'
be in possession of any article or thing concealed in the body of the vehicle, unless
there are circumstances indicating knowledge to the driver of such concealment.
Thus, like a person in possession of land, does not become the possessor unless he
is aware of its existence . Prosecution has not chosen to adduce any evidence
whatsoever to suggest, much less establish that accused Kalekhan had knowledge of
concealed opium in the left side door of the car which he was found to be driving. It
is this guilty knowledge of being possessed of a contraband which exposes the
person in possession of penal consequence of such possession.
2 1 . Shri Khan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent urged that guilty
knowledge can be inferred from circumstances. As a proposition, it is all right that
guilty knowledge can be inferred from established circumstances. But this is a case
where except for the circumstance that the accused was driving the car in question,
there is no other circumstance whatsoever. The investigation has not been pursued in
the direction to connect the accused with the knowledge of the concealed article. It is
all the more necessary that two of the inmates sitting in the rear seat of the car have
very comfortably and conveniently escaped under the very nose of the authority. Can
it be said knowledge or no knowledge? The accused must be held guilty of the
offence.
22. This Court in Matadin v. State of M.P. MANU/MP/0124/1979, has pointed out that
so far as possession is concerned, corpus without animus is ineffective, but if animus
is established it does not matter whether the possession is actual or constructive. The
prosecution has miserably failed in establishing such circumstance which would have
pointed to that essential ingredient 'animus'. In a case where a rickshaw driver with

MANU/SC/0465/2015
Equivalent Citation: 2015V AD (S.C .) 581, AIR2015SC 2098, 2015(2)ALD185(SC ), 2015 (89) AC C 959, 2015 (3) ALT (C rl.) 287 (SC ),
2015(3)BomC R(C ri)67, II(2015)C C R216(SC ), 2015C riLJ2811, 2015(4)C rimes183(SC ), 2016(3)J.L.J.R.45, 2015 [2] JC C [Narcotics] 37, (2015) 2
MLJ(C rl) 717 (SC ), 2016(1)N.C .C .352, 2016(3)PLJR189, 2015(2)RC R(C riminal)779, 2015(3)RLW2664(SC ), 2015(5)SC ALE330, (2015)6SC C 222,
2015 (9) SC J 348
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Appellants: Mohan Lal
Vs.
Respondent: State of Rajasthan
Dipak Misra and S.A. Bobde, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Aishwarya Bhati, Sanjoli Mittal, Anshuman, Amit
Verma and Pawan Kumar, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: Shiv Mangal Sharma, AAG, Sitesh Narayan Singh, A.
Mohapatra, Akshat Anand and Milind Kumar, Advs.
Case Category:
CRIMINAL MATTERS - CRIMINAL MATTERS RELATING TO DRUGS AND COSMETICS,
NDPS ACT
JUDGMENT
Dipak Misra, J.
1. Calling in question the legal pregnability of the judgment and order dated 16.7.09
passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at
Jodhpur whereby the learned Single Judge has affirmed the conviction and sentence
recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jodhpur in Sessions Case No. 9 of
1986 convicting the Appellant Under Section 18 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 (for short, 'the NDPS Act') and sentencing him to
suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and pay a fine of Rs. 1 lakh, in default, to
suffer one year simple imprisonment and also for offence punishable Under Sections
457 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code (Indian Penal Code) and imposing separate
sentences for the said offences with a stipulation that all the sentences would run
concurrently.
2 . The relevant facts giving rise to the prosecution are that on 13.11.1985, at 9.30
a.m., Bhanwarlal, PW-8, posted in the Court of the Magistrate, Osian, lodged an FIR,
exhibit P-3, at Police Station, Osian informing that when he went to the Court to meet
the night chowkidar, he was absent and it was found by him that locks of the main
gate of the malkhana were broken and the goods were scattered. An information was
given at the concerned police station, but as the details of the stolen articles could
only be provided by the Criminal Clerk after he came from the Diwali holidays, an FIR
was lodged for an offence Under Section 457 Indian Penal Code. After the courts

which the thing is lying thereon to exclude others from enjoying the land and
anything which happens to be lying there; and Judges' concept of the social purpose
of the particular rule relied upon by the Plaintiff. The learned author has further
proceeded to state that quite naturally the policies behind different possessory rules
will vary and it would justify the courts giving varying weight to different factors
relevant to possession according to the particular rule in question. According to
Harris, the Judges have at the back of their mind a perfect pattern in which the
possessor has complete, exclusive and unchallenged physical control over the
subject; full knowledge of its existence; attributes and location, and a manifest
intention to act as its owner and exclude all others from it. As a further statement he
elucidates that courts realise that justice and expediency compel constant
modification of the ideal pattern. The person claiming possessory rights over a thing
may have a very limited degree of physical control over the object or he may have no
intention in regard to an object of whose existence he is unaware of, though he
exercises control over the same or he may have clear intention to exclude other
people from the object, though he has no physical control over the same. In all this
variegated situation, states Harris, the person concerned may still be conferred the
possessory rights. The purpose of referring to the aforesaid principles and passages
is that over the years, it has been seen that courts have refrained from adopting a
doctrinaire approach towards defining possession. A functional and flexible approach
in defining and understanding the possession as a concept is acceptable and thereby
emphasis has been laid on different possessory rights according to the commands
and justice of the social policy. Thus, the word "possession" in the context of any
enactment would depend upon the object and purpose of the enactment and an
appropriate meaning has to be assigned to the word to effectuate the said object.
12. Coming to the context of Section 18 of the NDPS Act, it would have a reference
to the concept of conscious possession. The legislature while enacting the said law
was absolutely aware of the said element and that the word "possession" refers to a
mental state as is noticeable from the language employed in Section 35 of the NDPS
Act. The said provision reads as follows:
35. Presumption of culpable mental state.-
(1) In any prosecution for an offence under this Act which requires a
culpable mental state of the accused, the Court shall presume the
existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the
accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with
respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution.
Explanation.-In this section "culpable mental state" includes
intention, motive, knowledge, of a fact and belief in, or reason to
believe, a fact.
(2) For the purpose of this section, a fact is said to be proved only
when the Court believes it to exist beyond a reasonable doubt and
not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of
probability.
On a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is plain as day that it includes knowledge
of a fact. That apart, Section 35 raises a presumption as to knowledge and culpable
mental state from the possession of illicit articles. The expression "possess or
possessed" is often used in connection with statutory offences of being in possession

MANU/SC/0599/2003
Equivalent Citation: AIR2003SC 3642, 2003(2)ALD(C ri)688, 2003 (47) AC C 763, 2003(2)C GLJ395, 2003C riLJ3868, 2003(4)C rimes60(SC ),
2004(1)C TC 381, 2003(89)EC C 241, 2003(3)JKJ1[SC ], 2003(4)RC R(C riminal)100, 2003(6)SC ALE483, (2003)7SC C 465, [2003]Supp2SC R716,
2003(2)ShimLC 429

Criminal Appeal Nos. 786 and 788 of 2002 and 905 of 2003
Appellants:Madan Lal and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent:State of Himachal Pradesh
Doraiswamy Raju and Dr. Arijit Pasayat, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Subhadra Chaturvedi (A.C.), Adv.
For Respondents/Defendant: J.S. Attri, Addl. Adv. General in Crl. A. No. 788/2002
Case Category:
NDPS ACT
JUDGMENT
Arijit Pasayat, J.
1 . Since these three appeals involve identical issues they are disposed of by this
common judgment.
2. The appellants and one other person faced trial for alleged commission of offence
punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985 (in short 'the Act').
3. All the five accused were found guilty of the alleged offence and all of them were
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of 10 years and to pay a fine
of Rs. 1 lakh with a default stipulation of a further rigorous imprisonment of 3
months in case of default to pay the fine.
4 . By the impugned judgment the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla
dismissed the appeals filed by the accused appellants.
5. In appeal Nos. 786/2002 and 788/2002 at the Special Leave Petition stage, there
were four petitioners. The special leave petition so far as petitioners Goyal Nath is
concerned was dismissed by an order dated 5.8.2002.
6 . Accusations which led to the trial of the accused appellants in a nutshell is as
follows:
On 5.10.1999, a secret telephonic message was recorded by Sunder Lal,
A.S.P. (PW-11) that charas was being transported in a Maruti Esteem blue car

that the same was placed before the concerned Superintendent of Police. In other
words, the materials clearly establish that the information was sent without delay to
the immediate superior officer of PW-11 i.e. Superintendent of Police. That being the
position, contention regarding non-compliance of provisions of Section 42 is clearly
without substance.
15. Now comes the question whether there was non-compliance of Section 50 of the
Act.
16. A bare reading of Section 50 shows that it only applies in case of personal search
of a person. It does not extend to search of a vehicle or a container or a bag, or
premises. (See Kalama Tumba v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. MANU/SC/0662/1999
: 2000CriL J507 , The State of Punjab v . Baldev Singh MANU/SC/0981/1999 :
1999CriL J3672 , Gurbax Singh v . State of Haryana MANU/SC/0083/2001 :
2001CriL J1166 . The language of Section 50 is implicitly clear that the search has to
be in relation to a person as contrasted to search of premises, vehicles or articles.
This position was settled beyond doubt by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh's
case (supra). Above being the position, the contention regarding non-compliance of
Section 50 of the Act is also without any substance.
17. Coming to the plea that there was reduction in weight of the samples sent for
analysis and there was tampering, it has to be noted that this aspect has also been
considered by the trial court which has recorded the reasons for rejecting the same.
It has been noted that the seals were intact and there was no tampering. The view
has been endorsed by the High Court. On considering the reasoning indicated that
there was very minimal and almost ignorable variation in right, we find no reason to
interfere with the findings.
1 8 . The other plea which was emphasized was the alleged statement of accused
Goyal Nath that he alone was in possession of the contraband bags. The plea centers
round a statement of search witness PW-1, who stated that Goyal Nath told him that
contraband articles belonged to him. The statement was made totally out of context
and no credence can at all be attached to the statement. The accused Goyal Nath in
his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short
the 'Code') did not state that he was alone in possession of the contraband articles.
On the contrary, he stated that he did not know anything about the alleged seizure.
19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to
the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record
is that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle and as noted by the Trial
Court they were known to each other and it has not been explained or shown as to
how they travelled together from the same destination in a vehicle which was not a
public vehicle.
20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20
appears in Chapter IV of the Act which relates to offence for possession of such
articles. It is submitted that in order to make the possession illicit, there must be a
conscious possession.
21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with requisite mental
element, i.e. conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the
nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.
2 2 . The expression 'possession' is a polymorphous term which assumes different

colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different
backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in Superintendent & Remembrancer
of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja and Ors.MANU/SC/0266/1979 :
1979CriL J1390 , to work out a completely logical and precise definition of
"possession" uniformly applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes.
23. The word 'conscious' means awareness about a particular fact. It is a state of
mind which is deliberate or intended.
2 4 . As noted in G unwantlal v . The State of M.P. MANU/SC/0130/1972 :
1972CriL J1187 possession in a given case need not be physical possession but can
be constructive, having power and control over the article in case in question, while
the person whom physical possession is given holds it subject to that power or
control.
25. The word 'possession' means the legal right to possession (See Health v. Drown
(1972) (2) All ER 561. In an interesting case it was observed that where a person
keeps his fire arm in his mother's flat which is safer than his own home, he must be
considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness 1976
(1) All ER 844.
26. Once possession is established the person who claims that it was not a conscious
possession has to establish it, because how he came to be in possession is within his
special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position
because of presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section
54 where also presumption is available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles.
27. In the factual scenario of the present case not only possession but conscious
possession has been established. It has not been shown by the accused-appellants
that the possession was not conscious in the logical background of Sections 35 and
54 of the Act.
28. In fact the evidence clearly establishes that they knew about transportation of
charas, and each had a role in the transportation and possession with conscious
knowledge of what they are doing. The accused-appellant Manjit Singh does not
stand on a different footing merely because he was a driver of the vehicle. The logic
applicable to other accused-appellants also applies to Manjit Singh.
2 9 . Therefore, the presumption available by application of logic flowing from
Sections 35 and 54 of the Act clearly applies to the facts of the present case. The
judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court suffer from no infirmity to warrant
interference. The appeals deserve dismissal, which we direct.

MANU/SC/1686/2009
Equivalent Citation: 2010 (68) AC C 837, JT2009(12)SC 409, 2010(1)N.C .C .105, (2009)44OC R663, 2009(4)RC R(C riminal)342,
2009(12)SC ALE561, (2009)10SC C 632, [2009]14SC R289, 2010(1)UC 429

Appellants: Om Prakash
Vs.
Respondent: State of Rajasthan
H.S. Bedi and Aftab Alam, JJ.
Case Category:
NDPS ACT
ORDER
1. The appellant was convicted under Sections 8/18, 8/20(B)(ii) and 8/20(B)(i) of
the Narcotic Drugs Psychotropic Substances Act and sentenced to 10 years R.I. and
fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- and in default thereof to undergo R.I. For two years. He is
before us by way of special leave.
2. The prosecution story is as under:
On 11th September, 1999 at about 7.00 a.m., PW.11 Ram Chander, SHO,
Kotwali Fatehpur and several other police officials raided the house allegedly
belonging to the appellant to arrest Pankaj his son in some criminal matter,
and as they approached his residence, they saw the appellant who was
present attempting to run away. He was however apprehended and the house
entered and searched and a huge quantity of Charas, opium and Gaanja were
recovered from under a mattress in a newly constructed room. The S.H.O.
sent information to the Superintendent of police, Seekar and completed the
other formalities relating to the search & seizure. Several independent
witnesses were also called to countersign the search memos. The contraband
recovered was sent to the Malkhana and thereafter for analysis to the
Laboratory and a report was duly received. On completion of the
investigation the appellant was charged for the offences above-mentioned
and as he pleaded innocence, he was brought to trial.
3. The prosecution in support of its case examined 14 witnesses in all; the primary
ones being PW.3 and 13, said to be independent witnesses to the search and seizure,
PW.12 an Engineer from the Department of Telecommunication and PW.14 from the
Electricity Department to identify the house as belonging to the appellant, and the
investigating officer, PW.11 Ram Chander. The trial Court recorded a finding that the
ownership and possession of the contraband in question had been proved beyond
doubt, in the light of the fact that the witnesses had deposed that the recovery had
been made from the house belonging to and in possession of the appellant and that
the samples of the contraband had been properly sealed and kept in proper custody

prosecution case more particularly as Rajesh was declared hostile as he did not
support the prosecution.
7 . A bare perusal of the evidence aforementioned would reveal that the ownership
and possession of the house and the place of recovery is uncertain. As a matter of
fact PW.3 has categorically stated that the house from where the recovery had been
made belonged to one Durga Bhanji and not to the appellant. Even assuming for a
moment that the house did belong to the appellant and was in his possession, the
prosecution was further required to show the appellant had exclusive possession of
the contraband as a very large number of persons including the appellant and five of
his brothers, their children and their parents were living therein. Admittedly, there is
no evidence as to the appellants exclusive possession. In this situation we find that
the judgment cited by the learned Counsel that is Mohd. A. Khan's case fully supports
the plea on behalf of the appellant, we observe that in addition to the ocular
evidence, the prosecution had also put on record a document pertaining to the
ownership of the house, but despite this, the Court held as under:
The prosecution did not bother to produce any independent evidence to
establish that the appellant was the owner of the flat in question by
producing documents from concerned Registrar's office or by examining the
neighbors. No statement has been made by the prosecution that in spite of
the efforts taken by them, they could not produce the document or examine
the neighbors to prove the ownership of the appellant relating to the flat in
question. It is relevant to note here that two independent witnesses attested
the panchnama. Only one of them was examined as P.W.5 who did not
support the prosecution version and therefore was treated as hostile. In this
case except the retracted statements of the appellant to connect the appellant
with the house in question, no other independent evidence is available to
sustain the finding of the learned Special Judge extracted in the beginning
and confirmed by the High Court.
8. To our mind the afore-quoted observations clearly support Mr. Bhatti's argument.
We find that there is no evidence on record to prove the appellant's ownership and
possession of the premises and the contraband in question.
9. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the judgments of the Courts below are set aside
and the appellant acquitted. He is said to be in custody. He is directed to be released
forthwith.

MANU/SC/0296/2011
Equivalent Citation: 2011(3)AC R2408(SC ), 2011(2)C LJ(SC )167, 2011C riLJ2296, JT2011(3)SC 392, 2011(3)KC C RSN310, 2011(I)OLR(SC )1043,
2011(2)RC R(C riminal)337, 2011(3)SC ALE495, (2011)11SC C 653, [2011]2SC R642

Appellants: Bhola Singh
Vs.
Respondent: State of Punjab
H.S. Bedi and C.K. Prasad, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Triloki Nath Razdan, Smriti Razdan and P.P.N.
Razdan, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: Kuldeep Singh, K.K. Pandey and H.S. Sandhu, Advs.
Case Category:
NDPS ACT
ORDER
1. We have heard the learned Counsel for the State.
2. This appeal by way of special leave arises out of the following facts:
On 22nd November, 1999 PW.6-Sub-Inspector Manohar Singh along with
other police officials was present on the bridge over the seepage drain near
village Akkanwali. One Janak Raj, was also along with them. At about 7.00
a.m. Truck No. RJ-31 G-0859 driven by accused Bansi Lal came from the side
of village Akkanwali. The truck was stopped on the signal of Sub-Inspector
Manohar Singh and on enquiry the Driver disclosed his name as Bansi Lal
son of Neki Ram, resident of Mira Khan Ki Dhani, Village Maur Bingar, Police
Station, Fatehabad. Three other persons namely Nirbhai Singh, Gora Singh
and Gurmit Singh were found sitting on the bags which were lying in the
body of the truck. It also came to the notice of the Sub-Inspector that Gora
Singh and Gurmit Singh were the brothers-in-law of Nirbhai Singh.
3. An offer under Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (
hereinafter called the 'Act') was made to the accused. They opted to be searched in
the presence of a Gazetted Officer. DSP Baljit Singh (PW.1) was then requested to
reach the spot. The truck was thereafter searched and 16 bags of poppy husk each
containing 30 kg. were found in the truck. Samples etc. were taken and sent to the
laboratory for analysis which opined that the contraband was indeed poppy husk. It
also transpired during the investigation that Bhola Singh, the Appellant before us,
was a co-owner of the truck. He along with others was accordingly charged for an
offence punishable under Section 15 of the Act whereas Bhola Singh and Bansi Lal

not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of
probability.:
While dealing with the question of possession in terms of
Section 54 of the Act and the presumption raised under
Section 35, this Court in Noor Aga v. State of Punjab and
Anr. MANU/SC/2913/2008 : (2008) 16 SCC 417while
upholding the constitutional validity of Section 35 observed
that as this Section imposed a heavy reverse burden on an
accused, the condition for the applicability of this and other
related sections would have to be spelt out on facts and it
was only after the prosecution had discharged the initial
burden to prove the foundational facts that Section 35 would
come in to play. Applying the facts of the present case to the
cited one, it is apparent that the initial burden to prove that
the Appellant had the knowledge that the vehicle he owned
was being used for transporting Narcotics still lay on the
prosecution, as would be clear from the word "knowingly",
and it was only after the evidence proved beyond reasonable
doubt that he had the knowledge would the presumption
under Section 35 arise. Section 35 also presupposes that the
culpable mental state of an accused has to be proved as a
fact beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its
existence is established by a preponderance of probabilities.
We are of the opinion that in the absence of any evidence
with regard to the mental state of the Appellant no
presumption under Section 35 can be drawn. The only
evidence which the prosecution seeks to rely on is the
Appellant's conduct in giving his residential address in
Rajasthan although he was a resident of Fatehabad in
Haryana while registering the offending truck cannot by any
stretch of imagination fasten him, with the knowledge of its
misuse by the driver and others. We accordingly allow the
appeal, set aside the judgments of the Courts below and
order the Appellant's acquittal. His bail bonds shall stand
discharged.

MANU/GJ/0801/1998
Equivalent Citation: 1999GLH(1)246
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT

Appellants: Jinabhai Kalabhai Rajput
Vs.
Respondent: State of Gujarat
J.N. Bhatt and Arunkumar Kantilal Trivedi, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Jivanlal G. Shah, Sr. Counsel and P.J. Bhatt
For Respondents/Defendant: B.D. Desai, Addl. Public Prosecutor
JUDGMENT
J.N. Bhatt, J.
1 . The appellant-original accused in a Sessions Case No. 41 of 1991 has been
convicted of an offence punishable under S. 20(b)(ii) of the Narcotic Drugs &
Psychotropic Substances Act (N.D.P.S. Act), and has been sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rupees One Lakh, and, in default, to
undergo, rigorous imprisonment for three years. By virtue of the impugned judgment
and order dated, 03-10.1992, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Bhavnagar, which is questioned before us in this appeal under Section 374(2) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Code).
2 . Whether on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution, the appellant-accused
could be said to be in exclusive and conscious possession of the contraband articles
namely charas weighing 50 grams and 600 milligrams found from the suitcase
recovered from the house of accused by the raiding party on 07-12-1990?
3. Whether the provision of Section 42 of the N.D.P.S. Act had been complied or not?
4. Whether the conviction of the appellant-accused recorded by the Trial Court for the
offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii) of the N.D.P.S. Act is legal and justified?
5. The aforesaid contentions raised before us are required to be examined in the light
of the relevant facts and the proposition of law. Therefore, we propose to highlight a
skeleton project of material facts.
6 . Upon receipt of an intimation and information by the Police Sub-Inspector of
Prohibition Branch of Bhavnagar Police Station that accused Rajput Jinabhai Kalabhai
has illegally preserved and kept contraband articles like charas. The raid was affected
in presence of panchas on 7.12.1990. A preliminary panchnama was drawn by calling
two panchas at the Police Station, (1) Rajesh Jivabhai, (2) Chhotubhai Amarsinh were
the Panchas. After following usual and necessary procedure, the raiding party left for

11. The reliance was placed by the Trial Court on the decision of this Court rendered
in the State of Gujarat v. Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri and also on the decision of
the Apex Court - A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court-28. The principle laid down in the said
decision is that the reliance on the evidence of the police officer can be made if their
evidence is found trustworthy and dependable. It is, further clearly, held that their
evidence cannot be distrusted or discarded merely because a witness is a police
officer. Therefore, the settled proposition of law is that the evidence of the police
officer can be accepted without corroboration if it radiates an imprinting of truth.
12. However, the question is whether prosecution has successfully established nexus
between the accused and the illegal charas. In another words, could it be said
without doubt that from the evidence of the police officer relied on by the prosecution
and accepted by the Trial Court, it could be concluded that the illegal charas
belonged to the accused only and he was in possession. The contraband articles
charas from the rose suitcase which was beneath a big trunk (patara is Bag) from the
house of the accused as per the evidence of the police officer. The evidence of the
police officer was accepted by the Trial Court at its face value and came to conclude
that the illegal charas was possessed of by the accused since it was found from the
suitcase in the house of the accused. Apart from the challenge to the fact of the
ownership of the house, it is, clearly, admitted by the Police Sub-Inspector Mr.
Kanubhai N. Patel (Exh. 16) in his evidence that the said house was in the name of
the father of the accused and the accused was residing with other members in the
family. Even when the raiding party made the raid, the doors of the house were
opened. In this context, the challenge made by the defence that the prosecution has
not, successfully, proved without any doubt that the said contraband charas was
found from the exclusive possession of the accused merits serious consideration.
13. After having examined the facts and circumstances and the evidence of the police
officers on which the reliance made by the prosecution and which is accepted by the
Trial Court, it has not been established beyond doubt that the accused was possessed
of the illegal charas found from the suitcase. It may be possessed by him or it may
not be possessed by him. What is requirement of the law is it must prove and not
may be. There is a wide distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. This important
aspect has not been properly appreciated by the Trial Court.
14. The statutory presumption incorporated under Section 35 and Section 54 of the
N.D.P.S. Act would be attracted only when first important part of the possession of
the contraband articles by the accused is established without doubt. Section 54
provides statutory presumption of culpable state of the accused. Looking to the
seriousness nature of the offence of drug trafficking which effects the society at
large, designely and devisedly, the Parliament in its wisdom has provided two
statutory presumption under Section 35 and Section 54 of the N.D.P.S. Act. The
culpable mental state shows the intention, knowledge or motive which, at times, may
be difficult, to establish, and therefore, under Section 35 presumption of the culpable
mental state of the accused is provided for. With the result, in any prosecution for an
offence under the provision of N.D.P.S. Act, which means culpable state of mind of
the accused. The Court is empowered to presume the existence of such mental state
of an accused. Of course that presumption would come into play only after the link
between the illegal or contraband drug or articles and the accused is established
without doubt. Again it is a presumption, therefore, it will always be open to the
accused to prove that the statutory presumption of culpable mental state of mind of
the accused was not in existence in a particular given case. Since we have found that
the prosecution has not been, successfully able to prove that the illegal charas was

MANU/SC/8543/2006
Equivalent Citation: 2006(3)AC R3150(SC ), 2006(2)ALD(C ri)872, 2006 (Suppl.) AC C 141, 2009 (Suppl.) AC C 563, 2007(1)ALT(C ri)84,
C LT(2007)Supplement471, 2007C riLJ20, II(2006)DMC 757SC , [2007(1)JC R293(SC )], JT2006(9)SC 50, 2006(10)SC ALE190, (2006)10SC C 681,
[2006]Supp(8)SC R156, [2006]148STC 638(SC )

Appellants: Trimukh Maroti Kirkan
Vs.
Respondent: State of Maharashtra
G.P. Mathur and R.V. Raveendran, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Sudhanshu S. Choudhari and Naresh Kumar, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: V.N. Raghupathy, Adv.
Case Category:
CRIMINAL MATTERS - APPEAL UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SUPREME COURT
(ENLARGEMENT OF JURISDICTION) ACT
JUDGMENT
G.P. Mathur, J.
1. Trimukh Maroti Kirkan has filed this appeal against the judgment and order dated
27.7.2005 of Aurangabad Bench of Bombay High Court by which the appeal filed by
State of Maharashtra was allowed and the order dated 21.4.1997 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nanded was set aside and the appellant was
convicted under Section 302 IPC and was sentenced to imprisonment for life and a
fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default to undergo six months RI. By the same judgment
and order, the appeal filed by the appellant challenging his conviction under Section
498A IPC and the sentence of two years RI and a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default to
undergo RI for three months was dismissed.
2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the deceased Revata @ Tai daughter
of Dattarao resident of village Umatwadi was married to the appellant Trimukh Maroti
Kirkan (for short 'Trimukh') nearly seven years before the incident which took place
on 4.11.1996 in village Kikki. Maroti Kamaji Kirkan (for short 'Maroti') is the father
and Nilawatibhai Maroti Kirkan (for short 'Nilawati') is the mother of the appellant
Trimukh and they are residents of village Kikki. The appellant who is the husband and
Maroti and Nilawati used to ill-treat the deceased Revata and used to harass her on
account of non- payment of Rs.25,000/- by her parents for the purpose of purchasing
a tempo for the appellant. Whenever, the deceased Revata came to her parental
home, she used to disclose to her family members the ill- treatment and harassment
meted out to her. She came to her parental home at the time of Panchami festival in
the year 1996 and stayed there for about 15 days. During this period also she
disclosed that on account of non-fulfilment of demand of Rs.25,000/- by her father,

also told about the said fact to her neighbour PW.5 Girjabai of village Kikki.
V. After the death of Revata the appellant and his parents informed some
persons in the village as also the family members of the deceased that she
had died on account of snake bite.
VI. When PW.1, PW.2, PW.3 and PW.4 reached the house of the accused in
village Kikki, they found the body of the deceased in a sitting posture with
her back taking support from the wall. PW.14 Devichand, Assistant Sub-
Inspector of Police also found the body in the same position.
VII. The post-mortem examination revealed that Revata had died due to
asphyxia as a result of strangulation and not on account of snake bite.
VIII. Certain recoveries like chappal of the deceased, broken pieces of
bangles were made at the pointing out of the appellant. A shoe was also
recovered at his pointing out.
9. In the case in hand there is no eye-witness of the occurrence and the case of the
prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence. The normal principle in a case based on
circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is
sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established; that those
circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt
of the accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so
complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human
probability the crime was committed by the accused and they should be incapable of
explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and
inconsistent with his innocence.
1 0 . The demand for dowry or money from the parents of the bride has shown a
phenomenal increase in last few years. Cases are frequently coming before the
Courts, where the husband or in-laws have gone to the extent of killing the bride if
the demand is not met. These crimes are generally committed in complete secrecy
inside the house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence.
No member of the family, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to
depose against another family member. The neighbours, whose evidence may be of
some assistance, are generally reluctant to depose in Court as they want to keep
aloof and do not want to antagonize a neighbourhood family. The parents or other
family members of the bride being away from the scene of commission of crime are
not in a position to give direct evidence which may inculpate the real accused except
regarding the demand of money or dowry and harassment caused to the bride. But, it
does not mean that a crime committed in secrecy or inside the house should go
unpunished.
11. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances
where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the
time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the
prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle
of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the Courts. A Judge
does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished.
A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public
duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution 1944 AC 315 quoted with
approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh MANU/SC/0585/2003
: 2003CriL J3892 ). The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead

MANU/SC/0230/2013
Equivalent Citation: 2013(1)AC R985, AIR2013SC 2878, 2013(3)AJR310, 2013 (81) AC C 938, 2013C riLJ2729, 2013(3)JC C 1799,
JT2013(10)SC 463, 2013-2-LW(C rl)276, 2013(2)RC R(C riminal)338, 2013(3)SC ALE341, (2014)12SC C 444, [2013]4SC R192

Appellants: Joydeb Patra and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: State of West Bengal
A.K. Patnaik and S.J. Mukhopadhaya, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Sumant Bhardwaj, Vivekanand Mishra, Archana
Pathak Dave, Ajit Kumar Gupta, K.K. Shukla, Ankita Chaudhary, Manoj Kumar and
Mridula Ray Bhardwaj, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: Bijan Kumar Ghosh and Avijit Bhattacharjee, Advs.
Case Category:
CRIMINAL MATTERS - MATTERS RELATING TO HARASSMENT, CRUELTY TO WOMAN
FOR DOWRY, DOWRY DEATH, EVE-TEASING, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ETC.
ORDER
A.K. Patnaik, J.
1. This is an appeal against the judgment dated 28.07.2006 of the Division Bench of
the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 397 of 1988.
2 . The facts very briefly are that Madhabi Patra @ Khendi got married to Joydeb
Patra, the Appellant No. 1 herein. Through the marriage she got a daughter. She
again became pregnant and when she was carrying the pregnancy for nine months, a
ceremonial function called 'Sadh' was arranged on 18th Baisak, 1393 B.S. After taking
food, Madhabi fell ill and her condition deteriorated quickly and she died late in the
night. According to the prosecution, Madhabi (the deceased) had died because poison
was administered to her with the food by the Appellants. Accordingly, after
investigation, a charge-sheet was filed and the Appellant No. 1 and his father, brother
(Appellant No. 2), sister (Appellant No. 3) and mother (Appellant No. 4) were tried
and convicted under Section 302/34, Indian Penal Code The accused persons filed
Criminal Appeal No. 397 of 1988 before the High Court of Calcutta but by the
impugned judgment, the High Court maintained the conviction of the Appellants.
3 . We are told that the father of the Appellant No. 1 died when the appeal was
pending before the High Court and Appellant No. 3 died during the pendency of the
appeal before this Court.
4 . We have heard learned Counsel for the Appellants and learned Counsel for the
State at length and we find that the conviction of the Appellants is solely based on

death of the deceased obviously took place under very mysterious circumstances and
when the medical facilities were very near to the place of occurrence, the Appellants
should have availed the medical facilities but have not done so and this conduct of
the Appellants has given scope to the prosecution to believe that they were guilty of
the offence under Section 302/34, Indian Penal Code
8 . We are afraid, we cannot accept this submission of Mr. Ghosh. This Court has
repeatedly held that the burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt is on the prosecution and it is only when this burden is discharged that the
accused could prove any fact within his special knowledge under Section 106 of the
Indian Evidence Act to establish that he was not guilty. In Sucha Singh v. State of
Punjab MANU/SC/0190/2001 : (2001) 4 SCC 375, this Court held:
We pointed out that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not intended to
relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases where prosecution
has succeeded in proving facts for which a reasonable inference can be
drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by
virtue of special knowledge regarding such facts failed to offer any
explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference.
Similarly, in Vikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/8721/2006 : (2006) 12 SCC
306, this Court reiterated:
Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act does not relieve the prosecution to
prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. Only when the prosecution case
has been proved the burden in regard to such facts which was within the
special knowledge of the accused may be shifted to the accused for
explaining the same. of course, there are certain exceptions to the said rule,
e.g., where burden of proof may be imposed upon the accused by reason of
a statute.
9 . As the prosecution has not been able to discharge its burden of establishing
beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased died due to poisoning, in our view, the
trial court and the High Court could not have held the Appellants guilty just because
the Appellants have not been able to explain under what circumstances the deceased
died.
10. We accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the
High Court as well as the judgment of the Trial Court and direct that the bail bonds of
the Appellants will stand discharged.

MANU/SC/0167/1973
Equivalent Citation: AIR1973SC 2622, 1973C riLJ1783, (1973)2SC C 793, (1973)SC C (C ri)1033, [1974]1SC R489

Appellants:Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent:State of Maharashtra
H.R. Khanna, P. Jaganmohan Reddy and V.R. Krishna Iyer, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: V.C. Parashar, Adv
For Respondents/Defendant: S.B. Wad and S.P. Nayar, Advs.
JUDGMENT
V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.
1. The murder of an old man in broad day light occurred on 26th September, 1966,
on a country road in Satara District and about seven years later the fluctuating
fortunes of the two young persons charged with the crime are being finally set at
rest. One of the misfortunes of our criminal process, which stultifies penal justice, is
the counter-productive course of trial and appeal and appeal, "at each remove a
lengthening chain". The facts of the case have been set out fairly fully in the
judgments of the High Court and the Trial Court and for the purposes of this appeal it
is sufficient to set out the story in its broad essentials.
2 . The venue of the offence lies on a cart track connecting the villages of Bibi and
Ghadgewadi. The dramatis personae are P.W. 8. Sita Ram, a somewhat consequential
man of village Kadamwadi, his quondum servant, the deceased Hariba, the alleged
assailants (accused) Shivaji and Lalasaheb, the eye-witness Vilas (P.W. 5) who is the
Assistant Gram Sewak of the area, and others cast in lesser roles. There were some
disputes between the 2nd accused and P.W. 8. Kadamwadi the place of residence of
these two persons, is a little to the north of Ghadgewadi. About a mile to the south of
Ghadgewadi is Bibi which is 4 furlongs further south of Kadamwadi. This topography
is not very relevant except to follow the arguments accepted by the trial judge. The
quarrel between P.W. 8 and the second accused had been fostering since 1959
leading to reports to the police about threatened violence and a criminal case which
ended in the acquittal of latter. There was no love lost between P.W. 8 and the first
accused either. For P.W. 10 (Bhagwan), one of the sons of the former, and his father-
in-law who is a close relation of the first accused, were not on terms for reasons
divergently given by the accused and Sita Ram blaming each other. Thus it is more or
less the admitted case, and both the courts have found it established, that the
accused and P.W. 8 were mutually at loggerheads during the relevant time. The
deceased was in the service of P.W. 8 for a long while and although about 10 or 12
years ago he had left the service, his loyalty lasted all the time with the result that
whenever Sita Ram requisitioned him he readily responded. In a sense it is common

not make out any intelligent explanation and the 'blood' testimony takes the crime
closer to the accused. However, we are not inclined to rely over much on this
evidentiary circumstance, although we should emphasise how this inadvertence of the
trial court had led to a relevant fact being argued as unavailable to the prosecution.
Great care is expected of Sessions Judges who try grave cases to collect every
incriminating circumstance and put it to the accused even though at the end of a long
trial the Judge may be a little fagged out.
17. The first accused also had made a statement leading to the discovery of a hunter
with a lead-ball from a pit in the field of his uncle Bobade (vide Panchnama Ext. 14).
P.W. 3, the Panch witness speaks to this effect. The High Court has relied on this
evidence with which we agree. After all a hunter with a lead-ball is not something
ordinarily found in fields or wells or in houses. The conclusion that emerges from
these discoveries is that the apparel, of the second accused and the weapons
recovered establish some nexus between the crime and the appellants. We are aware
that by themselves they are inconclusive but in conjunction with other facts they may
have efficacy.
18. Some attempt was made to show that the many injuries found on the person of
the deceased and the manner of their infliction as deposed to by the eye-witnesses
do not tally. There is no doubt that substantially the wounds and the weapons and
the manner of causation run congruous. Photographic pasteurization of blows and
Kicks and hits and strikes in an attack cannot be expected from witnesses who are
not fabricated and little turns on indifferent incompatibilities. Efforts to harmonise
humdrum details betray police tutoring, not rugged truthfulness.
19. Now let us sum up the whole case in the light of the evidence we have found to
be of worth. We must observe that even if a witness is not reliable, he need not be
false and even if the Police have trumped up one witness or two or has embroidered
the story to give a credible look to their case that cannot defeat justice if there is
clear and unimpeachable evidence making out the guilt of the accused. Certainly, it is
a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a
court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and
divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. Informing ourselves of these
important principles we analyse the evidence found good by us. In our view there is
only one eye-witness, P.W. 5, Vilas. Even if the case against the accused hangs on
the evidence of a single eye-witness it may be enough to sustain the conviction given
sterling testimony of a competent, honest man, although as a rule of prudence courts
call for corroboration. It is a platitude to say that witnesses have to be weighed and
not counted since quality matters more than quantity in human affairs. We are
persuaded that the PW 5 is a witness for truth but in view of the circumstances that
he is interested, we would still want corroboration in this case to reassure ourselves.
And that we have in this case.
20. The earlier discussion leaves unscathed the dying declaration and incriminating
discoveries and the only question is whether they are sufficient to reinforce the
essential facts bearing on the appellants' direct involvement in the crime. The
accused, we feel convinced, are reasonably proved to have murdered Heriba. But
counsel argues that no animus against the victim has been made out and motiveless
malignity militates against natural human conduct . Proof of motive satisfies the
judicial mind about the likelihood of the authorship but its absence only demands
deeper forensic search and cannot undo the effect of evidence otherwise sufficient
Motives of men are often subjective, submerged and unamenable to easy proof that

MANU/SC/0111/1984
Equivalent Citation: AIR1984SC 1622, 1984(86)BOMLR536, 1984C riLJ1738, 1984(2)SC ALE445, (1984)4SC C 116, [1985]1SC R88

Appellants: Sharad Birdhichand Sarda
Vs.
Respondent: State of Maharashtra
A. Vardarajan, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and Sabyasachi Mukherjee, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Ram Jethmalani, M.S. Ganesh, F.N. Ranka and Rani
Jethmalani, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: K.G. Bhagat,Additional Solicitor General, M.N. Shroff and
U.A. Jadhavrao, Advs.
JUDGMENT
1 . This is rather an unfortunate case where a marriage arranged and brought about
through the intervention of common friends of the families of the bride and
bridegroom though made a good start but ran into rough weather soon thereafter.
The bride, Manju, entertained high hopes and aspirations and was not only hoping
but was anxiously looking forward to a life full of mirth and merriment, mutual love
and devotion between the two spouses. She appears to be an extremely emotional
and sensitive girl and at the very behest cherished ideal dreams to be achieved after
her marriage, which was solemnised, on Feb. 11, 1902 between her and the
appellant, Sharad Birdhichand Sarda. Soon after the marriage, Manju left for her new
marital home and started residing with the appellant in Takshila Apartments at Pune.
Unfortunately, however, to her utter dismay and disappointment she found that the
treatment of her husband and his parents towards her was cruel and harsh and her
cherished dreams seem to have been shattered to pieces. Despite this shocking state
of affairs she did not give in and kept hoping against hope and being of a very noble
and magnanimous nature she was always willing to forgive and forget. As days
passed by, despite her most laudable attitude she found that "things were not what
they seem" and to quote her own words "she was treated in her husband's house as a
labourer or as an unpaid maid-servant". She was made to do all sorts of odd jobs
and despite her protests to her husband nothing seems to have happened. Evan so,
Manju had such a soft and gentle frame of mind as never to complain to her parents-
in-law, not even to her husband except sometimes. On finding things unbearable, she
did protest, and expressed her feelings in clearest possible terms, in a fit of utter
desperation and frustration, that he hated her. Not only this, when she narrated her
woeful tale to her sister Anju in the letters Written to her (which would be dealt with
in a later part of the judgment), she took the abundant care and caution of requesting
Anju not to reveal her sad plight to her parents lest they, may get extremely upset,
worried and distressed.

149. The High Court has referred to some decisions of this Court and tried to apply
the ratio of those cases to the present case which, as we shall show, are clearly
distinguishable. The High Court was greatly impressed by the view taken by some
Courts, including this Court, that a false defence or a false plea taken by an accused
would be an additional link in the various chain of circumstantial evidence and seems
to suggest that since the appellant had taken false plea that would be conclusive,
taken along with other circumstances, to prove the case. We might, however,
mention at the outset that this is not what this Court has said. We shall elaborate this
aspect of the matter a little later.
150. It is well settled that the prosecution, must stand or fall on its own legs and it
cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence. This is trite law and no
decision has taken a contrary view. What some cases have held is only this: where
various links in a chain are in themselves complete, then a false plea or a false
defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the Court. In other words,
before using the additional link it must be proved that all the links in the chain are
complete and do not suffer from any infirmity. It is not the law that where there is
any infirmity on lacuna in the prosecution case, the same could be cured or supplied
by a false defence or a plea which is not accepted by a Court.
151. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would like to cite
a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal
case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic
decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/0037/1952 :
1953CriL J129 . This case has been Uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a
large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail v. State
of Uttar Pradesh : (1969)3SCC198 and Ramgopal v State of Maharashtra
MANU/SC/0168/1971 : 1972CriL J473 . It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J.
has laid down in Hanumant's case (at pp. 345-46 of AIR) (supra):
It is well to remember that in cases where tile evidence is of a circumstantial
nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
should in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so
established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so
far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show
that within all human probability the act must have been done by the
accused.
152. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must
be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances
concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a
grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or
should be proved as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v.
State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0167/1973 : 1973CriL J1783 where the

following observations were made:
certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not
merely may be guilty before a Court can convict, and the mental
distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague
conjectures from sure conclusions.
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of
the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any
other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty.
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be
proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused.
153. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the
proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.
154. It may be interesting to note that as regards the mode of proof in a criminal
case depending on circumstantial evidence, in the absence of a corpus delicti, the
statement of law as to proof of the same was laid down by Gresson, J. (and
concurred by 3 more Judges) in The King v. Horry (1952) NZLR 111, thus:
Before he can be convicted, the fact of death should be proved by such
circumstances as render the commission of the crime morally certain and
leave no ground for reasonable doubt : the circumstantial evidence should be
so cogent and compelling as to convince a jury that upon no rational
hypothesis other than murder can the facts be accounted for.
1 5 5 . Lord Goddard slightly modified the expression 'morally certain' by 'such
circumstances as render the commission of the crime certain'.
156. This indicates the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that a case can be
said to be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence and no person can
be convicted on pure moral conviction. Horry's case (supra) was approved by this
Court in Anant Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay MANU/SC/0043/1959 :
1960CriL J682 . Lagu's case as also the principles enunciated by this Court in
Hanumant's case (supra) have been uniformly and consistently followed in all later
decisions of this Court without any single exception. To quote a few cases --Tufail's
c a s e : (1969)3SCC198 (supra). Ramgopal's case MANU/SC/0168/1971 :
1972CriL J473 (supra). Chandrakant Nyalchand Seth v. State of Bombay (Criminal
Appeal No. 120 of 1957 decided on 19-2-1958), Dharambir Singh v. State of Punjab
(Criminal Appeal No. 98 of 1958 decided on 4-11-1958). There are a number of other
cases where although Hanumant's case has not been expressly noticed but the same
principles have been expounded and reiterated, as in Naseem Ahmed v. Delhi
Administration MANU/SC/0138/1973 : 1974CriL J617 , Mohan Lal Pangasa v. State of
U. P. MANU/SC/0425/1974 : 1974CriL J800 , Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of
Maharashtra MANU/SC/0211/1980 : 1981CriL J325 and M. G. Agarwal v. State of

MANU/SC/0162/2012
Equivalent Citation: 2012AC R2160, AIR2012SC 1552, 2013(2)AJR287, 2012 (77) AC C 992, 2012(4)B.L.J.66, (2012)3C ALLT49(SC ),
2012C riLJ1883, 2012(1)C rimes330(SC ), 2012(1)C rimes330(SC ), 2012(2)J.L.J.R.80, 2012(2)JLJ1(SC ), 2012MLJ(C rl)848, 2012(2)N.C .C .18,
2012(2)RC R(C riminal)558, 2012(3)SC ALE195, (2012)4SC C 289, 2012(1)UC 727, 2013(1)UC 727

Criminal Appeal Nos. 113-114 of 2010
Appellants: Brajendrasingh
Vs.
Respondent: State of Madhya Pradesh
A.K. Patnaik and Swatanter Kumar, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Chanchal Kumar Ganguli and Chatanya Siddharth,
Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: S.K. Dubey, Sr. Adv., C.D. Singh, Sakshi Kakkar and
Kusumanjali Sharma, Advs.
Case Category:
CRIMINAL MATTERS - MATTERS RELATING TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
JUDGMENT
Swatanter Kumar, J.
1 . The present appeals are directed against the judgment of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore, confirming the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence of imposition of extreme penalty of death by the Trial Court.
2 . The disaster that can flow from unchastity of a woman and the suspicions of a
man upon the character of his wife cannot be more pathetically stated than the facts
emerging from the present case.
As per the case of the prosecution, a man suspecting his wife of having illicit
relations with his neighbor, killed his three young children, namely, Varsha, Lokesh
and Mayank, who were asleep, sprinkled kerosene oil on his wife and put her on fire.
However, when called upon to make a statement under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, Code of Criminal Procedure.), the accused
rendered the following explanation:
There was illicit relationship between my wife, the deceased Aradhna and
Liladhar, when on 27.02.2005 I came from the factory, at that time it was
11.00 - 11.30 O'clock at night, there was no fixed time coming and going
from the factory. When I came to my house the door of the house was
opened. My wife was not at the house and then I searched her here and
there. I heard her voice in the house of Liladhar Tiwari, the voice of male

boys who told her that somebody had killed Aradhna and her three children. Upon
hearing this, she fell unconscious. This witness was declared hostile and was
subjected to cross-examination by the prosecution. Witness PW7, Veerendra Singh,
who is the husband of PW5 and brother of the present Appellant, also made a similar
statement. PW10, Liladhar Tiwari, was also examined and he stated that he was
residing in the same building in one room. When his children and wife used to go to
village, he used to live alone in that room. According to him, the Police had come to
his house at about 2.00 O'clock in the night, knocked at his door and informed him
about the murder. He stated that wife of the accused used to inquire from him
whenever he came late, "brother today you have come late" and I used to reply that
because of heavy work I was late. PW12 is Dr. Shakir Ali who had performed post
mortem examination upon the body of Aradhna and noticed various injuries on her
body. According to him, both the lungs were having less blood and two portions of
the heart were empty of blood. The upside down Carotid artery was incised. The
membrane of the intestines was healthy. The liver, spleen and kidney all were blood
less and all the injuries were ante mortem and fatal. According to the doctor, the
cause of death was shock which had resulted from excessive hemorrhage. Post
mortem upon the other dead bodies was also performed by this witness and the
cause of death was common. The incised wound of Lokesh was 1" x 1/2" x 2" below
the jaw which resulted in excessive bleeding and death. PW16 is the Sub-Inspector in
the Police Station, Industrial Area, Dewas. He, as already noticed, had recorded his
statement at the Police Station and had conducted the investigation. He had prepared
the site plan and seized the knife Exhibit P12. It is with the help of these witnesses
that the prosecution has attempted to prove its case but the foundation of this case
was laid on the basis of the information given by the Appellant-accused himself. The
statements of these witnesses have to be examined in light of the FIR, Exhibit P27, as
well as the statement of the accused made under Section 313 Code of Criminal
Procedure. But for Exhibit P27, it would have been difficult for the prosecution to
demonstrate as to who was responsible for committing the murder of the three young
children. To this extent, it is a case purely of circumstantial evidence.
16. There is no doubt that it is not a case of direct evidence but the conviction of the
accused is founded on circumstantial evidence. It is a settled principle of law that the
prosecution has to satisfy certain conditions before a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained. The circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established and should also be
consistent with only one hypothesis, i.e. the guilt of the accused. The circumstances
should be conclusive and proved by the prosecution. There must be a chain of events
so complete so as not to leave any substantial doubt in the mind of the Court.
Irresistibly, the evidence should lead to the conclusion inconsistent with the
innocence of the accused and the only possibility that the accused has committed the
crime. To put it simply, the circumstances forming the chain of events should be
proved and they should cumulatively point towards the guilt of the accused alone. In
such circumstances, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the
incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the
innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. Furthermore, the rule
which needs to be observed by the Court while dealing with the cases of
circumstantial evidence is that the best evidence must be adduced which the nature
of the case admits. The circumstances have to be examined cumulatively. The Court
has to examine the complete chain of events and then see whether all the material
facts sought to be established by the prosecution to bring home the guilt of the
accused, have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It has to be kept in mind that
all these principles are based upon one basic cannon of our criminal jurisprudence

MANU/SC/1098/2018
Equivalent Citation: 2018(3)AC R2811, AIR2018SC 4683, 2019 (1) ALT (C rl.) 86 (A.P.), IV(2018)C C R414(SC ), 2019C riLJ262,
2018(4)C rimes435(SC ), 2018(3)N.C .C .564, 2018(3)N.C .C .541, 2018(13)SC ALE278, (2018)10SC C 753, 2019 (3) SC J 524

Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 260 of 2018 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India)
Appellants: Romila Thapar and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: Union of India (UOI) and Ors.
Dipak Misra, C.J.I., A.M. Khanwilkar and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appearing Parties: Tushar Mehta, Maninder Singh, ASG, Abhishek Manu Singhvi,
Rajeev Dhawan, Amarendra Sharan, Harish Salve, Anand Grover, Sr. Advs., Prashant
Bhushan, Vrinda Grover, Amit Bhandari, Avishkar Singhvi, Susan Abraham, D. Suresh,
Soutik Banerjee, Ratna A., Cheryl D'souza, Madhur Bhartiya, Ankit Grewal, Nidhi Ram,
Harinder Neel, O. Kuttan, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Kanu Agrawal, Manan
Popli, Ranvijay Singh, Shantanu Sharma, Rajeev Ranjan, R. Bala, Rajat Nair, Prabhas
Bajaj, Swati Ghildiyal, Sachin Sharma, Devanshi Singh, Palak Mahajan, Diksha Rai,
Nihal Singh Rathod, Tripti Tandon, Nehmat Kaur, Jagdish Meshram, Paras Nath Singh,
Sangeeta Madan, Jitendra Ashok, Aakarsh Kamra, Abhishek Kumar and Shiv Sagar
Tiwari, Advs.
Case Category:
LETTER PETITION AND PIL MATTER - WRIT PETITIONS (CRIMINAL) AND WRIT
PETITIONS FILED AS PIL PERTAINING TO CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS/PROSECUTION
JUDGMENT
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. Five illustrious persons in their own field have filed this petition on 29th August,
2018 complaining about the high-handed action of the Maharashtra Police in raiding
the homes and arresting five well known human rights activists, journalists,
advocates and political worker, with a view to kill independent voices differing in
ideology from the party in power and to stifle the honest voice of dissent. They
complain that the five activists, namely, Gautam Navalakha, Sudha Bharadwaj,
Varavara Rao, Arun Ferreira and Vernon Gonsalves were arrested on 28th August,
2018 from their homes at New Delhi, Faridabad, Mumbai, Thane and Hyderabad,
respectively, without any credible material and evidence against them justifying their
arrest, purportedly in connection with FIR No. 0004/2018 dated 8th January, 2018
registered with Police Station Vishram Bagh, Pune City. This action was to silence the
dissent, stop people from helping the poor and downtrodden and to instill fear in the
minds of people and was a motivated action to deflect people's attention from real
issues. The Petitioners have made it clear in their petition that they were seriously
concerned about the erosion of democratic values and were approaching this Court

5 4 . This Court, as a constitutional adjudicator, has been entrusted with the
jurisdiction Under Article 32 to secure the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Part
III of the Constitution. While the discipline of the law of criminal procedure must at
all times be kept in view, it cannot be gainsaid that the protection of fundamental
liberties is a subject so integral to democratic constitutional values that technicalities
should not be allowed to override the cause of substantive justice. The court must
undoubtedly tread with circumspection for in the guise of seeking access to its wide
jurisdiction Under Article 32, the normal remedies under the criminal law should not
be displaced. Again, as the court has repeatedly emphasised, public interest litigation
should not become a weapon for settling political scores or of pursuing extraneous
ends. In the present case, we have no manner of doubt that the initiation of the
proceedings Under Article 32 is not motivated by extraneous reasons. The law is not
a respecter of social, economic or political status and every litigant who seeks access
to justice has to be treated evenly. Here we have five citizens who have invoked the
jurisdiction of this Court in extraordinary circumstances where they claim that a
group of human rights activists has been targeted by the state police. Each of those
five individuals has joined in these proceedings.
55. Over the course of the last decade, the jurisdiction of this Court has evolved
Under Article 32 to order the constitution of a SIT. In National Human Rights
Commission v. State of Gujarat, MANU/SC/0713/2009 : (2009) 6 SCC 342 a SIT
was constituted in a matter involving a serious element of communal disharmony.
Further directions were issued by this Court for regular status reports to be filed by
the SIT (NHRC v. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/0713/2009 : (2009) 6 SCC 767). In
Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0711/2011 : (2011) 8 SCC 1 this
Court observed that in several instances in the past, when the issues were of a
complex nature, yet requiring the intervention of the Court, SITs were ordered to be
constituted to enable the Court, the Union government and other organs of the state
to fulfil their constitutional obligations. In Common Cause v. Union of India,
MANU/SC/0065/2017 : (2017) 3 SCC 501 the test for the constitution of a SIT was a
prima facie abuse of power and authority by the Director of the Central Bureau of
Investigation to scuttle an investigation and enquiries into coal block allocations. In
Sunita Devi v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0114/2018 : (2018) 3 SCC 664 an
independent and impartial SIT was constituted where it was found that the
investigation into the murder of a family was lackadaisical and the real culprits had
not been put to trial. These instances indicate the diversity of settings in which this
Court has ordered the constitution of SITs. Decisional flexibility in the exercise of this
jurisdiction meets exigencies which arise in unforeseen situations, warranting the
intervention of this Court Under Article 142. While the Court does not determine the
course of the investigation, it acts as a watchdog to ensure that a fair and impartial
investigation takes place. A fair and independent investigation is crucial to the
preservation of the Rule of law and, in the ultimate analysis to liberty itself.
56. Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant,
has sought to urge that a SIT has been constituted in cases where there is an
allegation against the political class in power, so that the investigation is not derailed
by those who are capable of intercepting it. Such a construction, in my view, would
restrict the width and ambit of the jurisdiction which has advisedly been entrusted to
this Court by the framers of the Constitution. The fact that in a particular case, a SIT
was ordered to be constituted in a situation where there was an allegation of
interference with the investigation by the political establishment is not a reason to
confine the exercise of the jurisdiction only to such cases. In the rights discourse,
violations of law and transgressions of human rights arise in myriad situations which

MANU/SC/0268/2010
Equivalent Citation: 2010(2)AC R1645(SC ), AIR2010SC 2352, 2010ALLMR(C ri)1627(SC ), 2010(2)C rimes154(SC ), JT2010(4)SC 107,
2010(2)RC R(C riminal)692, 2010(4)SC ALE1, (2010)6SC C 1, [2010]4SC R103, 2010(3)UJ1650

Criminal Appeal Nos. 157, 179 and 224 of 2007
Appellants:Sidhartha Vashisht
Vs.
Respondent:State (NCT of Delhi)
P. Sathasivam and Swatanter Kumar, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appearing Parties: Gopal Subramanium, S.G., Ram Jethmalani and P.H. Parekh,
Sr. Advs., Harish Ghai, Lata Krishnamurthy, P.R. Mala, Saurabh Ajay Gupta, Bansuri
Swaraj, Pranav Diesh, Tarannum Cheema, Mazag Andrabi, Somanadri Goud,
Bhupinder Ghai, Nitin T., E.R. Kumar, Lalit Chauhan, M. Andrabi, Rukhmini Bobde,
Rajat N., Sameer Parekh,Parekh & Co., Nitin Sangra, Gaurav Agrawal, Sachin Dev
Sharma, Sanjeev Manan, Dinesh Sharma, Hakikat Yadav, Ranbir Yadav, Jay Kishor
Singh, Shweta Mazumdar, Shyam B. Namdar, Subramonium Prasad, B.D. Vivek, Balaji
Srinivasan, P. Kakra, Madhusmita Bora, Charudatta Mahindrakar, T.V.S. Raghavendra
Sreyas, Mukul Gupta, Satyaram, Ambuj Agrawal, Nikhil Nayyar, Rajat Katyal, Tanmay
Mehta, Vibhor Garg, Sangram Singh, Anand Verma, Anagha Narayan, Advs. and
Mamta Kalra, Intervenor-in-Person
Case Category:
CRIMINAL MATTERS - APPEAL UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SUPREME COURT
(ENLARGEMENT OF JURISDICTION) ACT
JUDGMENT
P. Sathasivam, J.
1 . These statutory appeals are filed under Section 2(a) of the Supreme Court
(Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 and under Section 379 of
the Criminal Procedure Code against the final judgment and order dated
18/20.12.2006 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 193 of 2006
whereby the High Court reversed the order of acquittal dated 21.02.2006 passed by
the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, in Sessions Case No. 105 of 2001 and convicted
Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma (appellant in Crl. A. No. 179 of 2007) under
Section 302, 201/120B IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced him to
undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 IPC together with a
fine of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid to the family of the victim and in default of payment
of fine, to undergo further imprisonment for three years and also sentenced him to
undergo imprisonment for four years for the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act
with a fine of Rs. 2000/- and in default to further undergo imprisonment for three
months. He was further sentenced to undergo imprisonment for four years for the
offence under Section 201/120B IPC together with a fine of Rs. 2,000 and, in default,

approval only to a report which is result of faithful and fruitful investigation. The
Court is not to accept the report which is contra legem but to conduct judicious and
fair investigation and submit a report in accordance with Section 173 of the Code
which places a burden and obligation on the State Administration. The aim of
criminal justice is two-fold. Severely punishing and really or sufficiently preventing
the crime. Both these objects can be achieved only by fair investigation into the
commission of crime, sincerely proving the case of the prosecution before the Court
and the guilty is punished in accordance with law.
83. Historically but consistently the view of this Court has been that an investigation
must be fair and effective, must proceed in proper direction in consonance with the
ingredients of the offence and not in haphazard manner. In some cases besides
investigation being effective the accused may have to prove miscarriage of justice but
once it is shown the accused would be entitled to definite benefit in accordance with
law. The investigation should be conducted in a manner so as to draw a just balance
between citizen's right under Articles 19 and 21 and expensive power of the police to
make investigation. These well established principles have been stated by this Court
in the case of Sasi Thomas v. State and Ors. (2007) 2 SCC (Criminal) 72, State
Inspector of Police v. Surya Sankaram Karri (2006) 3 SCC (Criminal) 225 and
T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala MANU/SC/0365/2001 : (2001) 6 SCC 181. In
Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/8189/2008 : AIR 2009 SC 984
this Court specifically stated that a concept of fair investigation and fair trial are
concomitant to preservation of fundamental right of accused under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. We have referred to this concept of judicious and fair
investigation as the right of the accused to fair defence emerges from this concept
itself. The accused is not subjected to harassment, his right to defence is not unduly
hampered and what he is entitled to received in accordance with law is not denied to
him contrary to law.
84. It is pertinent to note here that one of the established canons of just, fair and
transparent investigation is the right of defence of an accused. An accused may be
entitled to ask for certain documents during the course of enquiry/trial by the Court.
Let us examine the extent of this right of an accused in light of the statutory
provisions and the manner in which the law has developed under the criminal
jurisprudence. To understand this concept in its right perspective we must notice the
scheme under the provisions of Section 170 to 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
All these provisions fall under Chapter XII of the Code which deals with, information
of the police and their powers to investigate. The power of the police to investigate
freely and fairly is well recognized and codified in law. In terms of Section 170, the
investigating officer when satisfied that sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds
exist he shall forward accused under custody to a Magistrate along with such
weapons or articles which may be necessary to be produced before the Court. Section
172 of the Code has a meaningful bearing on the entire investigation by a police
officer. It is mandatory for him to maintain a diary under this chapter where he shall
enter day-by-day proceedings in the investigation carried out by him. He is expected
to mention time of events and his departure, reporting back and closing of the
investigation, the place/places he visited and the statements he recorded during
investigation. The statement of the witness is recorded during the investigation under
Section 161 shall be inserted in that diary. A Criminal Court is empowered under
Section 172(2) to send for the diaries and they could be used by the Court but not as
evidence in the case but to aid it in such inquiry for trial. However, Sub-section 3 of
the same Section provides that neither the accused nor his agents shall be entitled to
call for such diaries, nor they are entitled to see them but it is only where the police

MANU/SC/0017/2013
Equivalent Citation: 2013(1)AC R670, 2013I AD (S.C .) 405, AIR2013SC 1000, 2013(1)ALD(C ri)582, 2013 (81) AC C 1, 2013(1)C LJ(SC )106,
2013C riLJ1011, 2013(1)C rimes254(SC ), 2013(1)C rimes254(SC ), JT2013(1)SC 338, 2013(1)RC R(C riminal)869, 2013(1)SC ALE242,
(2013)10SC C 192, [2013]3SC R1, 2013(1)UC 95

Criminal Appeal No. 31 of 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9190 of 2011)
Appellants: Hema
Vs.
Respondent: State, thr. Inspector of Police, Madras
P. Sathasivam, Ranjan Gogoi and V. Gopala Gowda, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: S. Prabhakaran, S. Palanikumar, P. Soma Sundaram,
Raja Kumar, R.S. Krishna Kumar and K.S. Mahadevan, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: Harin P. Raval, ASG, Shriniwas Khalap, Anando
Mukherjee, Prakriti Purnima, B.V. Balaram Das and Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs.
Case Category:
CRIMINAL MATTERS - MATTERS RELATING TO PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT
JUDGMENT
P. Sathasivam, J.
1. Leave granted.
2 . This appeal is directed against the final judgment and common order dated
29.04.2011 passed by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal
(MD) No. 37 of 2004 whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the
Appellant herein (A-5 therein) while confirming the judgment dated 28.07.2004,
passed by the Court of Principal Special Judge for CBI Cases, Madurai.
3. Brief facts:
a) According to the prosecution, during the year 1992, the Appellant herein
(A-5), along with other accused persons (A-1 to A-4 therein) had entered
into a criminal conspiracy to cheat the Regional Passport Office, Trichy in
order to obtain passports on the basis of creating ante-dated passport
applications with duplicate file numbers, so as to make them appear as old
cases, accompanied by forged enclosures such as police verification
certificates etc. In pursuance of the said conspiracy, A-2 being the Lower
Division Clerk in the Regional Passport Office, Trichy fraudulently received
and processed 42 forged passport applications filed by one Goodluck Travels,
Trichy run by A-3 with the assistance of A-4 and A-5 (the Appellant herein)
and made false endorsement of reference numbers, fee certifications etc. and
A-1, being the Superintendent of the Regional Passport Office, Trichy, by

forged. He further submitted that the prosecution has failed to exhibit the FSL report
with regard to the impression of seals of M. Os 1 to 3 alleged to have been recovered
by the prosecution at the instance of A-3 despite the same were being sent by Shri
Madavanan (PW-30), Inspector of Police. According to him, the specimen signatures
of Shri Natarajan (PW-16), DSP, and R. Muniyandi (PW-29), Sub-Inspector of Police,
have not been sent to the hand writing expert for his opinion. Further, the seal and
specimen signature of attesting officer, viz., Dr. Muthu (PW-18) were not collected by
the CBI to prove that the seal and specimen signature were forged. There is no
document or indication found in Exh. P-3 to P-43 to show that they were sent by M/s
Goodluck Travels to the Passport Office at Trichy. Finally, he submitted that inasmuch
as the certificates issued by the Village Administrative Officers that the applicants
were not the residents of the place mentioned in the application form, their reports
have no legal sanctity in the absence of certification by the Tahsildar.
6 . Mr. Rawal, learned ASG appearing for the CBI, met all the contentions. He
submitted that the claim that parallel proceedings by the District Crime Branch (DCB)
and the CBI, though not urged before the trial Court, High Court and even in the
grounds of appeal, however, there is no legal basis for such claim. Even otherwise,
according to him, if there is any defect in the investigation, the accused cannot be
acquitted on this ground. By taking us through the evidence relied on by the
prosecution, findings by the trial Court and the High Court, learned ASG submitted
that in view of concurrent decision of two courts, in the absence of any perversity,
interference by this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 is not warranted.
Discussion:
7 . With regard to the main objection as to parallel proceedings as claimed by Mr.
Prabhakaran, learned Counsel for the Appellant, as stated earlier, this objection was
not raised either before the trial Court or before the High Court and even in the
grounds of appeal before this Court, however, considering the fact that we are
dealing with a matter pertaining to criminal prosecution, we heard the counsel on this
aspect. He pointed out that the first FIR dated 09.02.1993 was registered at the
instance of the complaint by Shri V.A. Britto, Passport Officer, Trichy. The said FIR
has been marked as Exh. P-214. He also pointed out that the second FIR, at the
instance of the Special Police Establishment, Madras Branch, was lodged on
11.05.1993 against three persons, namely, (1) P. Durai, Superintendent, Passport
Office, Trichy (2) P.M. Rajendran, LDC, Passport Office, Trichy and (3) M/s Goodluck
Travels, Thiruvadanai, Ramanad District, Tamil Nadu. By taking us through the said
reports, particularly, the second FIR, the counsel for the Appellant has pointed out
that the said report proceeds on the basis of credible information from a reliable
source. The same was entertained and registered as R.C. No. 21(A)/93 by S.
Arulnadu, Inspector of Police, SPE:CBI:ACB:Madras. By pointing out these details, it
is contended by the counsel for the Appellant that the course adopted by the
prosecution in examining certain persons by the DCB, namely, the State Police and
the remaining persons by the CBI is not permissible.
8 . It is settled law that not only fair trial, but fair investigation is also part of
constitutional rights guaranteed under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
Accordingly, investigation must be fair, transparent and judicious and it is the
immediate requirement of rule of law. As observed by this Court in Babubhai v.
State of Gujarat and Ors., MANU/SC/0643/2010 : 2010 (12) SCC 254, the
Investigating Officer cannot be permitted to conduct an investigation in a tainted and
biased manner. It was further observed that where noninterference of the Court

MANU/SC/0643/2010
Equivalent Citation: 2011(1)AC R496(SC ), 2010(2)ALD(C ri)866, (2011)52GLR1(SC ), JT2010(9)SC 177, 2010(4)RC R(C riminal)311,
RLW2010(4)SC 2990, 2010(8)SC ALE519, (2010)12SC C 254, [2010]10SC R651, 2010(3)UC 1410, 2010(8)UJ3896

Criminal Appeal No. 1599 of 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2077 of 2010) and
Criminal Appeal Nos. 1600-1605 of 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 3235-3240 of
2010)
Appellants: Babubhai and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: State of Gujarat and Ors.
P. Sathasivam and B.S. Chauhan, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appearing Parties: Uday Umesh Lalit, P.S. Narasimha, R.K. Abhichandani and C.
Aryama Sundaram, Sr. Advs., Tushar Mehta, AAG, Ankur Chawla, Rahul Pratap and
Jayant Mohan, Advs. For COAC, Vimal Chandra S. Dave, Laxmi Abichandani, Sunil
Patel, Hemantika Wahi, Meensha Lovkumar, Nupur, Sushil Kumar Jain, Puneet Jain,
Rohini Musa, Abhishek Gupta, Zafar Inayat, Anandh Kannan, P.K. Dey, Anirudh
Sharma, A.K. Sharma, V.K. Biju, D.R. Bhatt, Dinesh Kumar Garg and Keshav C.
Thakur, Advs.
Case Category:
CRIMINAL MATTERS - MATTERS FOR/AGAINST QUASHING OF CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
JUDGMENT
B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. Leave granted.
2 . These appeals and other connected appeals have been preferred against the
judgment and order dated 22.12.2009 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad,
passed in Special Criminal Application Nos. 1675/2008, 1679/2008 with Crl. Misc.
Application Nos. 8249/2009, 8361/2009, 8363/2009 and 7687/2009.
3 . Facts and circumstances giving rise to the present cases are that on 7.7.2008,
some altercation took place between members of the Bharwad and the Koli Patel
communities over the plying of rickshaws in the area surrounding Dhedhal village of
Distt. Ahmedabad, Gujarat. The Bharwad community had been preventing the Koli
Patels from running their rickshaws in the said area.
On the next day, i.e. on 8.7.2008, case No. C.R. No. I- 154/2008, was registered at
17:30 hours in the Bavla Police Station under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 332,
333, 436 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as "IPC") read
with Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 (for short "BP Act") and Sections 3,
7 of Prevention of Damages of Public Property Act, 1984 (for short "1984 Act") for an

25. The investigation into a criminal offence must be free from objectionable features
or infirmities which may legitimately lead to a grievance on the part of the accused
that investigation was unfair and carried out with an ulterior motive. It is also the
duty of the Investigating Officer to conduct the investigation avoiding any kind of
mischief and harassment to any of the accused. The Investigating Officer should be
fair and conscious so as to rule out any possibility of fabrication of evidence and his
impartial conduct must dispel any suspicion as to its genuineness. The Investigating
Officer "is not to bolster up a prosecution case with such evidence as may enable the
court to record conviction but to bring out the real unvarnished truth". (Vide R.P.
Kapur v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0086/1960 : AIR 1960 SC 866;Jamuna
Chaudhary and Ors. v. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0119/1973 : AIR 1974 SC 1822
and Mahmood v. State of U.P. MANU/SC/0154/1975 : AIR 1976 SC 69).
26. I n State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma MANU/SC/0542/1992 : AIR 1991 SC 1260,
this Court has held as under:
Investigation is a delicate painstaking and dextrous process. Ethical conduct is
absolutely essential for investigative professionalism.... Therefore, before
countenancing such allegations of mala fides or bias it is salutary and an
onerous duty and responsibility of the court, not only to insist upon making
specific and definite allegations of personal animosity against the Investigating
Officer at the start of the investigation but also must insist to establish and
prove them from the facts and circumstances to the satisfaction of the
court.... Malice in law could be inferred from doing of wrongful act
intentionally without any just cause or excuse or without there being
reasonable relation to the purpose of the exercise of statutory power.... The
word 'personal liberty' (under Article 21 of the Constitution) is of the widest
amplitude covering variety of rights which goes to constitute personal liberty
of a citizen. Its deprivation shall be only as per procedure prescribed in the
Code and the Evidence Act conformable to the mandate of the Supreme Law,
the Constitution. The investigator must be alive to the mandate of Article 21
and is not empowered to trample upon the personal liberty arbitrarily.... An
Investigating Officer who is not sensitive to the constitutional mandates may
be prone to trample upon the personal liberty of a person when he is actuated
by mala fides.
2 7 . I n Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Meghalaya and Ors.
MANU/SC/0641/2000 : AIR 2000 SC 3275, this Court considered a large number of
its earlier judgments to the effect that investigating agencies are guardians of the
liberty of innocent citizens. Therefore, a heavy responsibility devolves on them of
seeing that innocent persons are not charged on an irresponsible and false
implication. There cannot be any kind of interference or influence on the investigating
agency and no one should be put through the harassment of a criminal trial unless
there are good and substantial reasons for holding it. Cr.P.C. does not recognize
private investigating agency, though there is no bar for any person to hire a private
agency and get the matter investigated at his own risk and cost. But such an
investigation cannot be treated as investigation made under law, nor can the evidence
collected in such private investigation be presented by Public Prosecutor in any
criminal trial. Therefore, the court emphasised on independence of the investigating
agency and deprecated any kind of interference observing as under:
The above discussion was made for emphasising the need for official
investigation to be totally extricated from any extraneous influence.... All

MANU/SC/0857/2018
Equivalent Citation: AIR2018SC 3853, 2019 (1) ALD(C rl.) 696 (SC ), 2018 (104) AC C 977, 2018(4)BomC R(C ri)644, IV(2018)C C R543(SC ),
2019C riLJ420, 2018(3)C rimes218(SC ), 2018(3)J.L.J.R.393, 2018(4)JC C 228, 2018(3)JKJ3[SC ], 2018 (4) KHC 387, 2018(3)KLT852, 2018-2-
LW(C rl)596, 2018(4)MLJ(C rl)244, 2018(3)N.C .C .220, 2018(II)OLR485, 2018(3)PLJR419, (2018)192PLR450, 2018(4)RC R(C riminal)101,
2018(9)SC ALE663, 2018 (10) SC J 540, 2018(3)UC 1611

Appellants: Mohan Lal
Vs.
Respondent: The State of Punjab
Ranjan Gogoi, R. Banumathi and Navin Sinha, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Sujoy Mandal, Karunesh
Kumar Shukla and Narmada Singh, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: Jaspreet Gogia and Mandakini Singh, Advs.
Case Category:
NDPS ACT
JUDGMENT
Navin Sinha, J.
1 . The Appellant assails his conviction Under Section 18 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred as "the NDPS Act"),
sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-
(Rupees one lakh only), with a default stipulation.
2 . An F.I.R. was lodged on 03.02.1997 by PW-1, Chand Singh, Sub-Inspector of
Balianwali Police Station, that while on patrol duty, he was accompanied by Darshan
Singh, Sarpanch and Assistant Sub-Inspector Balwinder Singh. The witness
entertained doubts about the Appellant upon seeing him. PW-4, Shri Rajinder N.
Dhoke, IPS, a gazetted officer, was called and the Appellant was searched, leading to
recovery of 4 kg of opium in a bag carried by him. The consent memo, Exhibit-PB
was signed by Darshan Singh and PW-1. The seized opium was separated into a
sample of 20 gm. and 3kg 980 gm. The specimen seal was prepared by PW-1 and
after use, the seal was handed over to ASI, Balwinder Singh. "Ruqa" was prepared by
PW-1 and forwarded to Balianwali Police Station. PW-3, Assistant Sub-Inspector,
Darshan Singh registered the formal F.I.R. and handed over investigation to PW-1.
Upon conclusion of investigation, the Appellant was charge-sheeted, put on trial, and
convicted.
3. Sh. Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the
NDPS Act being a stringent law carrying a reverse burden of proof, there had to be

the Malkhana-in-Charge?
2 9 . Were the samples sent to the designated laboratory for analysis and
report within 72 hours of seizure?
In Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, MANU/SC/2913/2008 : (2008) 16 SCC 417, under
the NDPS Act, it was held:
91. The logical corollary of these discussions is that the guidelines such as
those present in the Standing Order cannot be blatantly flouted and
substantial compliance therewith must be insisted upon for so that sanctity of
physical evidence in such cases remains intact. Clearly, there has been no
substantial compliance with these guidelines by the investigating authority
which leads to drawing of an adverse inference against them to the effect
that had such evidence been produced, the same would have gone against
the prosecution.
1 0 . Unlike the general principle of criminal jurisprudence that an Accused is
presumed innocent unless proved guilty, the NDPS Act carries a reverse burden of
proof Under Sections 35 and 54. But that cannot be understood to mean that the
moment an allegation is made and the F.I.R. recites compliance with statutory
procedures leading to recovery, the burden of proof from the very inception of the
prosecution shifts to the Accused, without the prosecution having to establish or
prove anything more. The presumption is rebuttable. Section 35 (2) provides that a
fact can be said to have been proved if it is established beyond reasonable doubt and
not on preponderance of probability. The stringent provisions of the NDPS Act, such
as Section 37, the minimum sentence of ten years, absence of any provision for
remission, do not dispense with the requirement of the prosecution to establish a
prima facie case beyond reasonable doubt after investigation, only after which the
burden of proof shall shift to the Accused. The case of the prosecution cannot be
allowed to rest on a preponderance of probabilities.
1 1 . A fair trial to an Accused, a constitutional guarantee Under Article 21 of the
Constitution, would be a hollow promise if the investigation in a NDPS case were not
to be fair or raises serious questions about its fairness apparent on the face of the
investigation. In the nature of the reverse burden of proof, the onus will lie on the
prosecution to demonstrate on the face of it that the investigation was fair, judicious
with no circumstances that may raise doubts about its veracity. The obligation of
proof beyond reasonable doubt will take within its ambit a fair investigation, in
absence of which there can be no fair trial. If the investigation itself is unfair, to
require the Accused to demonstrate prejudice will be fraught with danger vesting
arbitrary powers in the police which may well lead to false implication also.
Investigation in such a case would then become an empty formality and a farce. Such
an interpretation therefore naturally has to be avoided.
12. That investigation in a criminal offence must be free from objectionable features
or infirmities which may legitimately lead to a grievance on part of the Accused was
noticed in Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, MANU/SC/0643/2010 : (2010) 12 SCC
254 as follows:
32. The investigation into a criminal offence must be free from objectionable
features or infirmities which may legitimately lead to a grievance on the part
of the Accused that investigation was unfair and carried out with an ulterior
motive. It is also the duty of the investigating officer to conduct the

14. In a criminal prosecution, there is an obligation cast on the investigator not only
to be fair, judicious and just during investigation, but also that the investigation on
the very face of it must appear to be so, eschewing any conduct or impression which
may give rise to a real and genuine apprehension in the mind of an Accused and not
mere fanciful, that the investigation was not fair. In the circumstances, if an
informant police official in a criminal prosecution, especially when carrying a reverse
burden of proof, makes the allegations, is himself asked to investigate, serious
doubts will naturally arise with regard to his fairness and impartiality. It is not
necessary that bias must actually be proved. It would be illogical to presume and
contrary to normal human conduct, that he would himself at the end of the
investigation submit a closure report to conclude false implication with all its
attendant consequences for the complainant himself. The result of the investigation
would therefore be a foregone conclusion.
15. The discussion in the present case may not be understood as confined to the
requirements of a fair investigation under the NDPS Act only carrying a reverse
burden of proof. Baldev Singh (supra) related to a prosecution Under Section 165A
of the Indian Penal Code. Nonetheless, it observed that if the informant were to be
made the investigating officer, it was bound to reflect on the credibility of the
prosecution case. Megha Singh (supra) concerned a prosecution under the Terrorist
and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985. It was held that the Head Constable
being the complainant himself could not have proceeded with the investigation and it
was a practice, to say the least, which should not be resorted to so that there may
not be any occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation. Rajangam (supra)
was a prosecution under the NDPS Act, an objection was taken that PW-6 who
apprehended the Accused could not have investigated the case. Upholding the
objection, relying on Megha Singh (supra) the Accused was acquitted. The view
taken by the Madras High Court in Balasundaran v. State, MANU/TN/0675/1999 :
1999 (113) ELT 785 (Mad.), was also noticed as follows:
1 6 . Learned Counsel for the Appellants also stated that P.W. 5 being the
Inspector of Police who was present at the time of search and he was the
investigating officer and as such it is fatal to the case of the prosecution.
P.W. 5, according to the prosecution, was present with PWs 3 and 4 at the
time of search. In fact, P.W. 5 alone took up investigation in the case and he
had examined the witnesses. No doubt the successor to P.W. 5 alone had
filed the charge sheet. But there is no material to show that he had examined
any other witness. It therefore follows that P.W. 5 was the person who really
investigated the case. P.W. 5 was the person who had searched the
Appellants in question and he being the investigation officer, certainly it is
not proper and correct. The investigation ought to have been done by any
other investigating agency. On this score also, the investigation is bound to
suffer and as such the entire proceedings will be vitiated.
1 6 . Bhaskar Ramappa Madar (supra) concerned a prosecution Under Section
304B, Indian Penal Code which also carries a reverse burden of proof. The Trial Court
held that the investigating officer who was also the complainant could not have
investigated, and on that ground, held the prosecution to be tainted. The acquittal
was reversed by the High Court. In appeal, this Court declined to interfere with the
conviction. After referring to Bhagwan Singh (supra) and Megha Singh (supra), it
was observed that the principles laid down therein had to be confined to the facts of
the said cases and that the matter would have to be decided on the facts of each case
without any universal generalisation.

MANU/SC/0133/1978
Equivalent Citation: AIR1978SC 597, (1978)2C ompLJ62(SC ), (1978)1SC C 248, [1978]2SC R621

Writ Petition No. 231 of 1977
Appellants:Maneka Gandhi
Vs.
Respondent:Union of India (UOI) and Ors.
M. Hameedullah Beg, C.J., N.L. Untwalia, P.N. Bhagwati, P.S. Kailasam, S. Murtaza
Fazal Ali, V.R. Krishna Iyer and Y.V. Chandrachud, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Madan Bhatia and D. Goburdhan, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: S.V. Gupte, Attorney General, Soli J. Sorabjee,
Additional Sol. Genl. Of Indian, R.N. Sachthey and K.N. Bhat, Advs.
(ii) Right of dignity - right to live is not merely confined to physical existence - it
includes within its ambit right to live with human dignity.
(iii) Inter-relationship - principle of reasonableness provided under Article 14 must

apply to procedure as contemplated under Article 21 - Article 21 controlled by Article
19 also - in case a law does not infringe Article 21 even then it has to meet
challenges of Articles 14 and 19.
(iv) Post-decisional hearing - petitioner's passport impounded and not given pre-
decisional notice and hearing - Government contended that rule audi alteram partem
must be excluded because it may have frustrated very purpose of impounding
passport - concept of post-decisional hearing developed to maintain balance between
administrative efficiency and fairness to individual - Court stressed that fair
opportunity of being heard following immediately Order impounding passport would
satisfy mandate of natural justice.
JUDGMENT
M. Hameedullah Beg, C.J.
1 . The case before us involves questions relating to basic human rights. On such
questions I believe that multiplicity of views giving the approach of each member of
this Court is not a disadvantage if it clarifies our not infrequently differing
approaches. It should enable all interested to appreciate better the significance of our

21 and read it in a narrow and restricted sense so as to exclude those attributes of
personal liberty which are specifically dealt with in Article 19. We do not think that
this would be a correct way of interpreting the provisions of the Constitution
conferring fundamental rights. The attempt of the court should be to expand the
reach and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than attenuate their meaning and
content by a process of judicial construction. The wave length for comprehending the
scope and ambit of the fundamental rights has been set by this Court in R. C.
Cooper's case and our approach in the interpretation of the fundamental rights must
now be in tune with this wave length. We may point out even at the cost of repetition
that this Court has said in so many terms in R. C Cooper's case that each freedom has
(different dimensions and there may be overlapping between different fundamental
rights and therefore it is not a valid argument to say that the expression 'personal
liberty' in Article 21 must be so interpreted as to' avoid overlapping between that
article and Article 19(1). The expression 'personal liberty' in Article 21 is of the
widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal
liberty of man and some of them have been raised to the status of distinct
fundamental rights and given additional protection under Article 19, Now, it has been
held by this Court in Satwant Singh's case that 'personal liberty' within the meaning
of Article 21 includes within its ambit the right to go abroad and consequently no
person can be deprived of this right except according to procedure prescribed by law.
Prior to the enactment of the Passports Act, 1967, there was no law regulating the
right of a person to go abroad and that was the reason why the order of the Passport
Officer refusing to issue passport to the petitioner in Satwant Singh's case was struck
down as invalid. It will be seen at once from the language of Article' 21 that the
protection it secures is a limited one. It safeguards the right to go abroad against
executive interference which is not supported by law; and law here means 'enacted
law' or 'State Law'. Vide A. K. Gopalan's case. Thus, no person can be deprived of his
right to go abroad unless there is a law made by the State prescribing the procedure
for so depriving him and the deprivation is effected strictly in accordance with such
procedure. It was for this reason, in order to comply with the requirement of Article
21, that Parliament enacted the Passports Act, 1967 for regulating the right to go
abroad. It is clear from the provisions of the Passports Act, 1967 that is lays down
the circumstances under which a passport may be issued or refused or cancelled or
impounded and also prescribes a procedure for doing so, but the question is whether
that is sufficient compliance with Article 21. Is the prescription of some sort of
procedure enough or must the procedure comply with any particular requirements?
Obviously, procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable. This indeed was
conceded by the learned Attorney General who with his usual candour frankly stated
that it was not possible for him to contend that any procedure howsoever arbitrary,
oppressive or unjust may be prescribed by the law. There was some discussion in A.
K. Gopalan's case in regard to the nature of the procedure required to be prescribed
under Article 21 and at least three of the learned Judges out of five expressed
themselves strongly in favour of the view that the procedure cannot be any arbitrary,
fantastic or oppressive procedure. Fazal Ali, J., who was in a minority, went to the
farthest limit in saying that the procedure must include the four essentials set out in
Prof. Willi's book on Constitutional Law, namely, notice, opportunity to be heard,
impartial tribunal and ordinary course of procedure. Patanjali Sastri, J. did not go as
far as that but he did say that "certain basic principles emerged as the constant
factors known to all those procedures and they formed the core of the procedure
established by law." Mahajan, J., also observed that Article 21 requires that "there
should be some form of proceeding before a person can be condemned either in
respect of his life or his liberty" and "it negatives the idea of fantastic, arbitrary and

MANU/SC/0466/1995
Equivalent Citation: AIR1995SC 2339, 1995C riLJ3988, 1997(2)RC R(C riminal)3, (1996)11SC C 709

Appellants:Megha Singh
Vs.
Respondent: State of Haryana
G.N. Ray and Faizanuddin, JJ.
JUDGMENT
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 16th February, 1987 passed by
the Additional Judge, Designated Court Bhiwani at Sirsa in Terrorist Act Case No. 76
of 1986. The appellant was tried under Section 6(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as TADA) and Section 25 of
the Arms Act, 1959 on the basis of FIR No. dated 19th September, 1985 lodged in the
Police Station Baragudha. It is the prosecution case that on 29th September, 1985
Head Constable Siri Chand (P.W. 3) and Constable Bhup Singh (P.W. 2) and other
police personnel were present on the Kacha route connecting village Faggu with
village Rohan. At about 12-00 noon the accused was spotted while coming from the
side of village Rohan. As the accused after seeing the police party tried to cross
through the field, the police party became suspicious and he was intercepted and the
Head Constable Siri Chand, P.W. 3 thereafter searched the person of the accused and
on search a country made pistol Ex. P. 1 was recovered from the right dub of his
chadar and three live cartridges Exts. P2 to P4 were also recovered from the right
side pocket of his shirt. The said pistol and the cartridges were possessed by the
accused without any valid licence. After recovery of the said pistol and the cartridges
the same were seized wide recovery memo Ex. PC and a rukka Ex.PD with regard to
the recovery was prepared and sent to the police station on the basis of which FIR
Ex. PD/1 was recorded by Sub-Inspector of Police Charanjit Singh. The prosecution
case was sought to be proved by the said Head Constable Siri Chand (PW-3) and
Bhup Singh (P.W. 2). No independent witness was examined to support the
prosecution case.
2. The accused has, however, stated that he was falsely implicated in the case at the
instance of local M.L. A. But it may be noted that he had not led any independent
witness to support such contention. It may be stated here that about the recovery of
the said pistol and the cartridges there are discrepancies in the depositions of the
said two witnesses. While PW-2 Bhip Singh stated that the pistol was recovered from
the right dub of the chadar, PW-3 Siri Chand stated that the said pistol was recovered
from the left dub of the chadar. On the question of the number of cartridges stated to
have been recovered from the accused, there is also discrepancy. PW-2 stated that
two cartridges were recovered from the pocket of the shirt of the accused but PW-3
Siri Chand stated three cartridges were recovered from the accused. The learned
Judge, however, held that since the police patrol party on suspicion apprehended the
accused, there was no question of taking any independent witness for the purpose of

such apprehension and search. The learned Judge has also held that although there
was discrepancy in the depositions of P.Ws. 2 and 3 about the recovery of the pistol
and the cartridges such discrepancy according to the learned Judge was not material
and the depositions given by the police personnel were not required to be discarded,
because they were not personally interested in the prosecution of the accused. The
learned Judge convicted the accused under Section 25 of the Arms Act and Section
6(1) of the TADA and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year.
3. The learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that admittedly at 12-00 noon
on the village road the appellant was apprehended by the police and it was only
natural that some villagers would remain present but the prosecution chose not to
examine any independent witness to corroborate the prosecution case. The learned
Counsel in his fairness has submitted that although the evidence given by the police
personnel cannot be discarded as a matter of rule but the rule of prudence requires
that the prosecution case should stand corroborated by an independent witness when
such evidence can easily be available so as to lend credence to the prosecution case.
He has also submitted that both the witnesses of the prosecution were police
personnel and they were examined shortly after the arrest of the accused. In such
circumstances, there should not have been any discrepancy about the number of
cartridges alleged to have been recovered from the accused and the place from where
the pistol was recovered from the person of the accused. It has been submitted by
the learned Counsel that such discrepancy only points out that the said police
personnel were not actually present at the time of search and seizure but a false case
was initiated against the appellant and precisely for the said reason the discrepancy
arose.
4 . After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to us that
there is discrepancy in the depositions of the P.Ws. 2 and 3 and in the absence of any
independent corroboration such discrepancy does not inspire confidence about the
reliability of the prosecution case. We have also noted another disturbing feature in
this case. PW-3, Siri Chand, head Constable arrested the accused and on search being
conducted by him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the accused. It was
on his complaint a formal first information report was lodged and the case was
initiated. He being complainant should not have proceeded with the investigation of
the case. But it appears to us that he was not only the complainant in the case but he
carried on with the investigation and examined witnesses under Section 161, Cr.P.C.
Such practice, to say the least, should not be resorted to so that there may not be
any occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation.
5 . In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we allow this appeal and set aside the
conviction and sentence passed against the appellant.

MANU/SC/0959/2011
Equivalent Citation: 2011(3)AC R3059(SC ), AIR2011SC 3114, 2011 (75) AC C 232, 2011C riLJ4399, 2012(1)JC C 108, JT2011(9)SC 279,
2011(4)KC C RSN474, 2011 (4) KLT(SN) 61, 2011(4)RC R(C riminal)389, RLW2011(4)SC 2868, 2011(8)SC ALE272, (2011)8SC C 300,
[2011]11SC R907, 2011(3)UC 1685, 2011(3)UC 1685

Appellants:Rafiq Ahmed
Vs.
Respondent:State of U.P.
B.S. Chauhan and Swatanter Kumar, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: R. Anand Padmanabhan, Prithviraj B.N. and G.
Ramakrishna Prasad, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: T.N. Singh, Rajeev Dubey, Kamlendra Mishra and
Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, Advs.
JUDGMENT
Swatanter Kumar, J.
1 . Fine distinctions of law, if discerning, should normally be recognized and
permitted to operate in their respective fields. With the development of criminal
jurisprudence, the law has recognized the concept of cognate charges besides
alternative charges. The differentiation between the offences from the same family in
contradistinction to the offences falling in different categories have persuaded the
courts to apply the principle of 'cognate offences' and punish the offender of a less
grave offence because the offence of greater gravity has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. This principle is to be applied keeping in view the facts and
circumstances of a given case and notwithstanding the fact that no charge for such
less grave offence had been framed against the offender. In the case in hand, we are
concerned with a similar question which arises from the following facts:
All the five accused, namely, Rafiq Ahmad, Ahsan, Imamuddin, Arun Kumar
and Yashwant Singh, according to the prosecution, in the intervening night of
30th September, 1977 and 1st October, 1977 committed dacoity in
Ambassador Car No. UPS 7293 belonging to Rafiq Ahmad. While the car was
going on the pucca road from Nehtaur to Dhampur within the jurisdiction of
thana Nehtaur, the accused had committed the murder of Jagdish Prasad @
Jagdish Chandra @ Jagdish Babu and thereafter thrown his body in a
sugarcane field of one Ikrar Ahmad situated in Village Kashmiri, thana
Nehtaur with the intention of screening themselves from punishment for
committing any offence. Shri Krishna Garg, uncle of the deceased was
carrying on the wholesale business of sugar, Khandsari, flour, food grains
etc. under the name of M/s. Badri Prasad Sunder Lal in Mohalla Bari Mandi,
Dhampur (Bijnor). This firm had branches in the name of 'Garg Brothers'.

reasoning is abandoned.
2. A preconceived judgment formed without a factual basis; a strong bias
19. When we speak of prejudice to an accused, it has to be shown that the accused
has suffered some disability or detriment in the protections available to him under
the Indian criminal jurisprudence. It is also a settled canon of criminal law that this
has occasioned the accused with failure of justice. One of the other cardinal
principles of criminal justice administration is that the courts should make a close
examination to ascertain whether there was really a failure of justice or whether it is
only a camouflage, as this expression is perhaps too pliable. With the development of
law, Indian courts have accepted the following protections to and rights of the
accused during investigation and trial:
(a) The accused has the freedom to maintain silence during investigation as
well as before the Court. The accused may choose to maintain silence or
make complete denial even when his statement under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure is being recorded, of course, the Court would be
entitled to draw inference, including adverse inference, as may be
permissible to it in accordance with law;
(b) Right to fair trial
(c) Presumption of innocence (not guilty)
(d) Prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
2 0 . Prejudice to an accused or failure of justice, thus, has to be examined with
reference to these aspects. That alone, probably, is the method to determine with
some element of certainty and discernment whether there has been actual failure of
justice. 'Prejudice' is incapable of being interpreted in its generic sense and applied
to criminal jurisprudence. The plea of prejudice has to be in relation to investigation
or trial and not matters falling beyond their scope. Once the accused is able to show
that there is serious prejudice to either of these aspects and that the same has
defeated the rights available to him under the criminal jurisprudence, then the
accused can seek benefit under the orders of the Court.
21. Right to fair trial, presumption of innocence until pronouncement of guilt and the
standards of proof, i.e., the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt
are the basic and crucial tenets of our criminal jurisprudence. The Courts are required
to examine both the contents of the allegation of prejudice as well as its extent in
relation to these aspects of the case of the accused. It will neither be possible nor
appropriate to state such principle with exactitude as it will always depend on the
facts and circumstances of a given case. Therefore, the Court has to ensure that the
ends of justice are met as that alone is the goal of criminal adjudication.
Thus, wherever a plea of prejudice is raised by the accused, it must be examined with
reference to the above rights and safeguards, as it is the violation of these rights
alone that may result in weakening of the case of the prosecution and benefit to the
accused in accordance with law.
During conduct of trial, framing of a charge is an important function of the court.
Sections 211 to 224 of Chapter XVII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 have
been devoted by the Legislature to the various facets of framing of charge and other

MANU/SC/0094/1975
Equivalent Citation: AIR1976SC 985, 1976C riLJ713, (1976)1SC C 15, 1975(7)UJ680

Appellants:Bhagwan Singh
Vs.
Respondent:The State of Rajasthan
P.N. Bhagwati, R.S. Sarkaria and Y.V. Chandrachud, JJ.
Counsels:
For Respondents/Defendant: H.R. Khanna and M.N. Shroff, Advs.
JUDGMENT
P.N. Bhagwati, J.
1. This appeal by special leave is directed against an order passed by the High Court
of Rajasthan confirming the conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant
by the Special Judge, Bharatpur, under Section 165A of the Indian Penal Code.
2. The incident giving rise to the prosecution against the appellant took place within
an area in the State of Rajasthan lying within a 10 mile belt along the border of that
State adjoining the State of Uttar Pradesh. There was at the material time, in force,
Rajasthan Foodgrains Restrictions on Border Movements) Order 1959 which imposed
a ban on transport of foodgrains to any place within the area of this 10 mile belt from
any place outside that area except under and in accordance with a permit issued by
the State Government or by any officer authorised by that Government in this behalf.
This order was issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and
any contravention of this provision was punishable under Section 7 of that Act. The
prosecution case was that on the night between 13th and 14th November 1966, Head
Constable Ram Singh and four other police constables, viz., Kishan Singh, Fateh
Singh, Hira Lal and Sunder Singh, all attached to police station Sawar, were on
patrolling duty in the area of the 10 mile belt with a view to preventing smuggling of
grains from Rajasthan to Uttar Pradesh. They were at a place about 5 or 6 furlongs
away from the border on the way leading from Village Bilothi in Rajasthan to Village
Nagla Khoobi in Uttar Pradesh when at about 5 a.m. in the morning of 14th November
1966 they noticed that a cart driven by the buffaloes was coming from, the side of
Bilothi and proceeding in the direction of Nagla Khoobi. The cart was loaded with six
bags of gram weighing about 14 to 15 maunds. One Ram Raj was driving the cart
while the appellant was sitting in the cart on the bags of gram. Head Constable Ram
Singh and his companions stopped the cart and checked it and on finding that it
carried six bags of gram, Head Constable Ram Singh asked the appellant to produce
the permit for transport but the appellant could not produce any such permit. The
appellant entrusted Head Constable Ram Singh to let him go and offered to pay him a
bribe of Rs. 40 or Rs. 50. Head Constable Ram Singh refused to accept the bribe
whereupon the appellant took out a bundle of currency notes of Rs. 510 from the

the appellant and Ram Raj. The learned Special judge accepted the evidence led on
behalf of the prosecution and almost ignoring the evidence of Ramji Lal who had
deposed in favour of the appellant and Ram Raj, held that the prosecution against the
appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant was guilty of an
offence under Section 165A of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Special judge
accordingly convicted the appellant under Section 165A and sentenced him to suffer
rigorous imprisonment for four months and to pay a fine of Rs. 100 or in default of
payment of fine, to suffer further imprisonment for 15 days. Ram Raj was, however,
more fortunate, as the learned Special judge took the view that there was no
evidence to show that he had taken any part in the offer of bribe to Head Constable
Ram Singh and he was accordingly acquitted by the learned Special Judge. The
Appellant being aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence passed against
him, preferred an appeal to the High Court of Rajasthan. The High Court, however,
agreed with the view taken by the Special Judge and dismissed the appeal. Hence,
the present appeal with special leave obtained from this Court.
5 . Now, ordinarily this Court does not interfere with concurrent findings of fact
reached by the trial Court and the High Court on an appreciation of the evidence. But
this is one of those rare and exceptional cases where we find that several important
circumstances have not been taken into account by the trial Court and the High Court
and that has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice calling for interference from
this Court. We may first refer to a rather disturbing feature of this case. It is indeed
such an unusual feature that it is quite surprising that it should have escaped the
notice of the trial Court and the High Court. Herd Constable Ram Singh was the
person to whom the offer of bribe was alleged to have been made a by the appellant
and he was the informant or complainant who lodged the first information Report for
taking action against the appellant. It is difficult to understand how in these
circumstances Head Constable Ram Singh could undertake investigation of the case.
How could the complainant himself be the investigator? In fact, Head Constable Ram
Sing., being an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, was not
authorised to investigate the case but we do not attach any importance to that fact,
as that may not affect the validity of the conviction. The infirmity which we are
pointing out is not an infirmity arising from investigation by an officer not authorised
to do so, but an infirmity arising from investigation by a Head Constable who was
himself the person to whom the bribe was alleged to have been offered and who
lodged the first information Report as informant or complainant. This is an infirmity
which is bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case.
6. Then again, it may be noted that the entire case of the prosecution rests solely on
the testimony of Head Constable Ram Singh and four other police Constables. There
is not a single independent witness to depose to the offer of bribe by the appellant.
The bundle of currency notes of Rs. 510 was, according to the prosecution, seized by
Head Constable Ram Singh under a seizure memo Ex, P-1 but the only persons who
signed as Panch witnesses to this seizure were Head Constable Ram Singh and his
subordinate police constables. Head Constable Ram Singh did not make any effort to
get independent respectable witnesses in whose presence the seizure could be made.
The time when the seizure was made was, according to the prosecution, a little after
5 a. m. in the morning. Head Constable Ram Singh could have easily sent one of the
four police constables accompanying him to a nearby village in order to get some
independent respectable witnesses. If, for any reason that was not possible, he could
have been taken the appellant and Ram Raj together with the cart to the police
station and there, made a seizure memo in the presence of independent respectable
parch witnesses. In fact, according to the statement made by the appellant in his

which was with him and offered it by way of bribe to Head Constable Ram Singh. It is
a little unusual that even though Head Constable Ram Singh refused to accept any
bribe, the appellant should have persisted in giving bribe and then also, not just
raised the amount of bribe from Rs. 40/- or Rs. 50 to Rs. 100/- or Rs. 200/- but
taken out the entire bundle of currency notes with him and offered it to head
Constable Ram Singh. The entire story sounds unnatural and we would hesitate
considerably before founding a conviction upon it.
8 . It appears that the trial Court and the High Court failed to notice the above
circumstances which throw considerable doubt on the prosecution case against the
appellant. We are not at all satisfied that the evidence led on behalf of the
prosecution excludes reasonable doubt in regard to the guilt of the appellant. Since
the prosecution case against the appellant cannot be said to be free from reasonable
doubt, was must acquit the appellant of the offence charged against him.
9. We, accordingly, allow the appeal set aside the conviction and sentence recorded
against the appellant and acquit the appellant of the offence under Section 165A of
the Indian Penal Code.

MANU/UP/1660/2010
Equivalent Citation: 2011(2)AC R1249, 2010(10)ADJ852
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Appellants: Ramjan
Vs.
Respondent: State of U.P.
B.K. Narayana, J.
JUDGMENT
B.K. Narayana, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the appellant and learned A.G.A. for the State.
2 . This appeal has been filed by the appellant, Ramjan against the Judgment and
order dated 13.1.2010 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, F. T. C. No. 1,
Siddhartha Nagar convicting the appellant under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of N.D.P.S. Act,
1985 and sentencing him to undergo 10 years' R. I. and fine of Rs. 1,00000/- (One
Lac Only) and in default of payment of fine further R. I. of two years.
3 . Prosecution case in brief is that on 7.11.2008 Sub-Inspector, Imanwal Singh
received information from Mukhbir Khas that one person was brining Nepali Charas
from Krishna Nagar Bazar, Nepal to Barhni Bazar, India, whereupon Sub-Inspector,
Imanwal Singh along with Lans Nayak No. 8657229 Hardev Singh and No.
050333501 Guard Sunil Kumar, B. Company Barhni Headquarter, Gorakhpur reached
Barhni Bazar where 8847378 Nayak Mahesh Prabhar and 070091511 Guard Ashok
Ghosh were already on duty in Lane No. 2 Barhni Bazar. At about 16.00 hours one
person wearing dark blue jacket was seen walking towards Barhni Bazar from Krishna
Nagar Bazar, Nepal and as soon as the said person reached near the no-mans' land,
Guard Ashok Ghosh stopped him whereupon he became perplexed and attempted to
run away but he was caught. Upon enquiry he disclosed that he was carrying Nepali
Charas and his name was Ramjan, S/o Nanku and he was R/o village-Nai Sarai, P. S.-
Hasanganj, Tehsil-Hasanganj, district-Unnao, U. P. The appellant was given an offer
of being searched before a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer, which he declined and he
insisted that he may be searched by members of police patrol party which had
apprehended him. The members of police party after searching each other, searched
the appellant which yielded recovery of eight bars of Charas tied by a white plastic
and brown colour tape which were kept in a white and black colour striped cloth
stitched by a green colour thread which the appellant had wrapped around his body
and concealed under the shirt and jacket which he was wearing. Guard Sunil Kumar
procured a scale and upon actual measurement the weight of eight bars recovered
from the person of the appellant was found to be four kg. The appellant failed to
show that he had any authority to posses the Charas which was recovered from him
and which was above the commercial quantity. Thereafter he was formally arrested.
The recovered Charas together with the cloth in which it was wrapped, was seized.

there was no compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 50(1) by the
officer who has searched the appellant and recovered illicit Charas from him and as
such the illicit contraband articles recovered from the person of the appellant during
a search conducted in violation of the safeguards provided under Section 50(1) of
N.D.P.S. Act, could not have been used as evidence of proof of unlawful possession
of the contraband articles against the appellant and on the basis of such illegal
recovery, appellant could not have been convicted for the offence punishable under
Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of N.D.P.S. Act.
1 9 . Another interesting aspect of the matter which renders the recovery of
contraband articles from the appellant as alleged by the prosecution suspicious, is the
fact that although the applicant was apprehended and searched at a public place and
during day-time but there is no independent witness of the recovery. The prosecution
witnesses have attempted to explain the said omission by saying that several passers
by were stopped but they refused to be witnesses of the recovery. It is strange that
the empowered officer did not make any effort to note down the names and
addresses of the persons whom he approached for witnessing the recovery. This
omission on the part of the empowered officer has further rendered the prosecution
case extremely doubtful.
20. Unexplained delay of more than twenty hours in lodging the first information
report against the applicant although the distance between the place of occurrence
and police station is hardly seven Kms. further strengthens the suspicion that the
applicant has falsely been implicated in the present case.
2 1 . The judgment of lower appellant court is also liable to be set-aside on the
ground that the recovered contraband articles which were allegedly recovered from
the appellant were never produced before the trial court, although P. W. 1 attempted
to prove that the sealed contraband articles which were produced before the court,
were the same which were recovered from the appellant but in his own statement he
has admitted that the Case Crime Number mentioned on the seal of the packet
containing contraband articles allegedly recovered from the appellant and which were
produced before the trial Court, was 45 of 2008 whereas the number of the case
which was registered against the appellant on the basis of the recovery memo (Ext.
Ka 1) was Case Crime No. 830 of 2008 under Section 8/20 of N.D.P.S. Act.
2 2 . Thus, from the above it is apparent that the contraband articles which were
produced before the trial Court were recovered in some other criminal case and and
had no connection with the present case. In my opinion, the prosecution has totally
failed to prove that the contraband articles produced before the court were the same,
which were recovered from the appellant. Hence the finding of the court below that
four Kg. illicit Charas was recovered from the person as the appellant, is without any
evidence and is accordingly set aside.
2 3 . Although the learned A.G.A. advanced elaborate arguments but he could not
satisfy the Court that there has been any compliance with the mandatory requirement
of Section 50(1) of N. D. P. S. Act and the contraband articles which were produced
in the trial Court, were the same which were allegedly recovered from the appellant.
24. For the aforesaid reasons the conviction of the appellant under Section 20(b)(ii)
(C) of N.D.P.S. Act, cannot be sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The
conviction and sentence imposed vide Judgment dated 13.1.2010 is set aside. The
appellant is acquitted. The appellant who is in jail, shall be released forthwith.

MANU/GH/0098/2008
Equivalent Citation: 2008(2)GLT121
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI (AGARTALA BENCH)

Appellants: Ranabir Bhowmik
Vs.
Respondent: State of Tripura
P.K. Musahary, J.
JUDGMENT
P.K. Musahary, J.
1. The accused petitioner being convicted under Section 42 of the Indian Forest Act,
1927 and sentenced to suffer R.I. for two months by the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala in C.R. 388 of 2001 preferred an appeal before the
learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. The said criminal appeal No.
47(3)/2001 was dismissed by the judgment dated 8.8.2002. Being aggrieved, the
instant criminal revision petition has been filed challenging the aforesaid judgment
dated 6.7.01 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura and also
the judgment dated 8.8.02 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura,
Agartala.
Heard Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. R.C. Debnath,
learned P.P. In-charge for the respondent.
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 2.2.2001, at around 6.30 a.m., while the
complainant, Sri Bul Bul Das, Forester being accompanied by other staff of the Forest
Department was on circuit duty at Chakmaghat area, found the accused petitioner,
namely, Ranabir Bhowmik, proceeding towards Teliamura from Chakmaghat driving
an auto rickshaw loaded with some sawn timber. The accused petitioner drove away
the auto rickshaw at high speed without responding to his signal and suddenly it
dashed against the vehicle of the complainant. The auto rickshaw was detained
immediately by the complainant and his staff on the spot and on search they
recovered some sawn gamair timber from the auto rickshaw. As the accused
petitioner could not show any transit for carrying the timber, the complainant seized
twelve pieces of gamair timber including auto rickshaw together with keys in
presence of the witnesses by preparing a seizure list. The seized timber had no
hammer mark of the Forest Department. An offence report was prepared in which it
was stated that by transporting timber in an unauthorized manner, the accused
petitioner has contravened the Forest law and caused loss of Government royalty to
the tune of Rs. 20,000/- approximately. It was stated in the offence report that the
seized auto rickshaw was dealt with separately under the provision of Section 52A of
the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Accordingly, the complainant launched prosecution
against the accused petitioner for contravention of the provisions of Section 26(1)
and 42 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and cognizance of offence was taken under
Section 42 of the said Act.

material exhibits are the same set of timbers alleged to have been seized from the
possession of the accused petitioner.
1 4 . It is not the rule that the prosecution must prove its case by adducing
independent witness only and evidence of official/police personnel who seized certain
articles/materials should not be believed. But it is the accepted principle that the
prosecution whenever conducts search and seizure would call upon some
independent and respectable people of the locality to witness the search and seizure.
Situation would be different if no local person is willing to turn up or hostile to the
police/officials and in that case, there would be no ground to disbelieve the evidence
of the police/officials and to act upon their evidence. In this case, it is found that
Forest officials did not make any attempt to take assistance of local people to witness
the aforesaid seizure. There is no evidence on record that the local people were not
willing to become witness or they were hostile to the officials at the time of
conducting the search and seizure.
15. The Apex Court in the case of Sahib Singh v. State of Punjab as reported in
MANU/SC/0611/1997 : 1997CriL J2978, held that before conducting a search the
police officer concerned is required to call upon some independent and respectable
people of the locality to witness the search and if no attempt is made by the police
officer concerned to join with him some persons of the locality who were admittedly
available to witness the recovery, it would affect the weight of evidence of the police
officer, though not its admissibility. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot
Sandhu as reported in MANU/SC/0465/2005 : 2005CriL J3950, the Apex Court also
held that in absence of independent witnesses during seizure operations investigating
officer's evidence need not always be disbelieved but it requires closer scrutiny.
Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on
record, this Court is of considered opinion that the prosecution has left many
shadows of doubt in conducting the case and it has failed to prove its case beyond
any shadow of reasonable doubt. I consider that on the basis of such standard of
evidence, no conviction and sentence could be recorded against the accused
petitioner. The impugned conviction and sentence passed by the learned Trial Court
and upheld by the learned Appellate Court below are liable to be interfered with and
quashed. Accordingly, the same are quashed. This petition is allowed. The accused
petitioner be set at liberty forthwith if his further detention is not required in
connection with any other case.
1 6 . Before parting with the record, I would simply point out that the concerned
learned C.J.M., West Tripura District, Agartala, left the substance of accusation
recorded by him under Section 251 Cr.P.C. unsigned and the same remained
unnoticed by the learned Sessions Judge also, on which the defence, of course,
raised no question.
Send down the L.C.R.

MANU/PH/1943/1997
Equivalent Citation: 1997(3)C rimes55(P&H)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

Crl. Revision No. 597 of 1987
Appellants: Sadhu Singh
Vs.
Respondent: State of Punjab
V.S. Aggarwal, J.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: O.P. Hoshiarpuri, Advocate
For Respondents/Defendant: M.S. Gill, Advocate
JUDGMENT
V.S. Aggarwal, J.
1. The learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Amritsar held the petitioner guilty of the
offence punishable under Section 9 of the Opium Act. The petitioner was sentenced to
undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 2-1/2 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. In
default of payment of fine, he was directed to undergo further rigorous imprisonment
for three months. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order of sentence passed by
the trial Court, the petitioner preferred an appeal in the Court of Sessions. Learned
Addl. Sessions Judge, Amritsar on 14-5-1987 dismissed the appeal. Hence, the
present revision petition.
2 . The relevant facts are that on 9-3-1983, a nakabandi was held on Majitha Road
by-pass in the area of Ganda Singhwala by Sub Inspector Kartar Singh. He was
assisted by ASI Harbans Singh and other police officials. There were certain members
of the detective staff with Sub Inspector Kartar Singh. At about 6.00 A.M. the
petitioner was seen coming from the side of Milk Plant Verka. On seeing the police
party, he tried to retreat his steps. This aroused suspicion in the mind of Sub
Inspector Kartar Singh. The petitioner was apprehended. The person of the petitioner
was searched. 10 Kilograms opium wrapped in a glazed paper was recovered. The
same had been placed in a gunny bag flung over the shoulder of the petitioner. Sub
Inspector Kartar Singh took a sample of 10 grams opium. The sample and rest of the
opium were converted into two separate parcels. Both the packets were sealed and
taken into possession. Vide recovery memo, ruqa was sent to the Police Station on
basis of which formal First Information Report was registered. Subsequently, sample
was sent for chemical analysis. On receipt of the report that it was opium, the challan
under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was submitted against the
petitioner.
3 . The defence of the petitioner put forward in his statement under Section 313 of
the Criminal Procedure Code was that he has falsely been implicated. His contention
was that he had a quarrel with the police in Azad Hotel near Amritsar bus-stand. As a

result of that he has falsely been implicated.
4. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner high-lighted the
fact that no public witness had joined and in the absence of public witness, the case
of the prosecution is suspicious. He further argued that there was tampering with the
case property. Representative sample was sent after 3 months of the alleged recovery
having been effected.
5 . In a criminal trial, it is for the prosecution to establish its case beyond all
reasonable doubts. It is for the prosecution to travel the entire distance from may
have to must have. If the prosecution appears to be improbable or lacks credibility
the benefit of doubt necessarily has to go to the accused.
6. In the present case, the State examined two witnesses namely, Harbans Singh ASI
who appeared as P.W. 1 and Kartar Singh P.W. 2. Both the witnesses supported the
prosecution version in terms of the recovery of opium from the person of the
petitioner, but there was no public witness who had joined. It is not necessary in
such recoveries that public witnesses must be joined, but attempt must be made to
join the public witnesses. There can be cases when public witnesses are reluctant to
join or are not available. All the same, the prosecution must show a genuine attempt
having been made to join a public witness or that they were not available. A stereo-
type statement of non-availability will not be sufficient particularly when at the
relevant time, it was not difficult to procure the services of public witness. This
reflects adversely on the prosecution version.
7. Not only that, sample was sent after three months of the alleged recovery having
been made. There is no explanation as to why more than three months took place for
sending the sample. The Malkhana Moharrir in his affidavit has simply stated that the
sample and the case property was not tampered with. The argument, that delay
should not prove fatal in the present case, must fail. This is for the reasons that the
said Malkhana Moharrir had not been tendered for cross-examination. In addition to
that, both official witnesses contradict each other as to whom seal after use was
given. According to ASI Harbans Singh, seal was handed over to Head Constable
Darshan Singh while Inspector Kartar Singh P.W. 2 stated that after use seal was
given to ASI Harbans Singh. These facts assume importance keeping in view that the
sample was retained in the Malkhana for a very long time. Chances of the property,
therefore, to be tampered with could not be ruled out. Keeping in view the facts
mentioned above, petitioner is, therefore, entitled to benefit of doubt.
8 . For these reasons, revision petition is accepted. The judgment and order of
sentence passed by the trial Court and the judgment of the learned Addl. Sessions
Judge are set aside. Petitioner is acquitted awarding him the benefit of doubt.

MANU/SC/2913/2008
Equivalent Citation: 2010 (71) AC C 575, 2008(56)BLJR2254, 2008GLH(3)43, JT2008(7)SC 409, 2008(3)RC R(C riminal)633, (2008)16SC C 417

Criminal Appeal No. 1034 of 2008 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5597 of 2006)
Appellants: Noor Aga
Vs.
Respondent: State of Punjab and Ors.
S.B. Sinha and V.S. Sirpurkar, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Tanu Bedi, D.P. Singh, Sanjay Jain, Rajat Vohra,
Prayanat Singh, Rachna Golchha and Sunil Roy, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: Vikas Sharma and B.V. Balaram Das, Advs for B. Krishna
Prasad, Kuldeep Singh and A.K. Mehta Advs.
Case Category:
NDPS ACT
JUDGMENT
S.B. Sinha, J
1. Leave granted.
INTRODUCTION
2 . Several questions of grave importance including the constitutional validity of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short "the Act"), the
standard and extent of burden of proof on the prosecution vis-a-vis accused are in
question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 9.06.2006
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Criminal Appeal No. 810-SB of
2000 whereby and whereunder an appeal filed by the applicant against the judgment
of conviction and sentence dated 7.6.2000 under Section 22 and 23 of the Act has
been dismissed.
PROSECUTION CASE
3. Appellant is an Afghan national.
4 . He was arrested and later on prosecuted under Sections 22 and 23 of the Act
allegedly for carrying 1 kg 400 grams of heroin as a member of crew of Ariana
Afghan Airlines.
5. Appellant arrived at Raja Sansi Airport at about 6 p.m. on 1.08.1997. He presented
himself before the authorities under the Customs Act, 1962 (for short "the Customs
Act") for customs clearance. He was carrying a carton with him said to be containing

reasonable doubt' would be more onerous. A heightened scrutiny test would be
necessary to be invoked. It is so because whereas, on the one hand, the court must
strive towards giving effect to the parliamentary object and intent in the light of the
international conventions, but, on the other, it is also necessary to uphold the
individual human rights and dignity as provided for under the UN Declaration of
Human Rights by insisting upon scrupulous compliance of the provisions of the Act
for the purpose of upholding the democratic values. It is necessary for giving effect
to the concept of 'wider civilization'. The courts must always remind itself that it is a
well settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that more serious the offence, the
stricter is the degree of proof. A higher degree of assurance, thus, would be
necessary to convict an accused. In State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh
MANU/SC/0981/1999 : 1999CriLJ3672 , it was stated:
It must be borne in mind that severer the punishment, greater has to be the
care taken to see that all the safeguards provided in a statute are
scrupulously followed.
[See also Ritesh Chakravarty v. State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/4301/2006 :
2006(9)SCALE644 ]
83. It is also necessary to bear in mind that superficially a case may have an ugly
look and thereby, prima facie, shaking the conscience of any court but it is well
settled that suspicion, however high may be, can under no circumstances, be held to
be a substitute for legal evidence.
84. Sections 35 and 54 of the Act, no doubt, raise presumptions with regard to the
culpable mental state on the part of the accused as also place burden of proof in this
behalf on the accused; but a bare perusal the said provision would clearly show that
presumption would operate in the trial of the accused only in the event the
circumstances contained therein are fully satisfied. An initial burden exists upon the
prosecution and only when it stands satisfied, the legal burden would shift. Even
then, the standard of proof required for the accused to prove his innocence is not as
high as that of the prosecution. Whereas the standard of proof required to prove the
guilt of accused on the prosecution is "beyond all reasonable doubt" but it is
'preponderance of probability' on the accused. If the prosecution fails to prove the
foundational facts so as to attract the rigours of Section 35 of the Act, the actus reus
which is possession of contraband by the accused cannot be said to have been
established.
85. With a view to bring within its purview the requirements of Section 54 of the Act,
element of possession of the contraband was essential so as to shift the burden on
the accused. The provisions being exceptions to the general rule, the generality
thereof would continue to be operative, namely, the element of possession will have
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
86. Whether the burden on the accused is a legal burden or an evidentiary burden
would depend on the statute in question. The purport and object thereof must also be
taken into consideration in determining the said question. It must pass the test of
doctrine of proportionality. The difficulties faced by the prosecution in certain cases
may be held to be sufficient to arrive at an opinion that the burden on the accused is
an evidentiary burden and not merely a legal burden. The trial must be fair. The
accused must be provided with opportunities to effectively defend himself. In
Sheldrake v. Director of Public Prosecutions (2005) 1 All ER 237 in the following

3rd Issue P

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

3rd Issue P

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

MANU/PH/0252/2007

Equivalent Citation: (2007)147PLR122, 2007(3)RC R(C riminal)1040

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

22-10-2020 (Page 1 of 3) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

22-10-2020 (Page 2 of 3) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

25-10-2020 (Page 1 of 4) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

25-10-2020 (Page 3 of 4) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

25-10-2020 (Page 4 of 4) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

22-10-2020 (Page 1 of 11) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

22-10-2020 (Page 5 of 11) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

22-10-2020 (Page 1 of 16) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

22-10-2020 (Page 6 of 16) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

22-10-2020 (Page 1 of 6) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

22-10-2020 (Page 5 of 6) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

© Manupatra Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

22-10-2020 (Page 6 of 6) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

22-10-2020 (Page 1 of 3) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

© Manupatra Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

22-10-2020 (Page 3 of 3) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

23-10-2020 (Page 1 of 3) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

© Manupatra Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

23-10-2020 (Page 3 of 3) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT

23-10-2020 (Page 1 of 6) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

23-10-2020 (Page 3 of 6) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

23-10-2020 (Page 1 of 11) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

23-10-2020 (Page 6 of 11) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

23-10-2020 (Page 1 of 3) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

23-10-2020 (Page 3 of 3) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

23-10-2020 (Page 1 of 12) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

23-10-2020 (Page 11 of 12) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

23-10-2020 (Page 1 of 65) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

23-10-2020 (Page 42 of 65) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

23-10-2020 (Page 43 of 65) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

23-10-2020 (Page 1 of 12) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

23-10-2020 (Page 6 of 12) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

23-10-2020 (Page 1 of 37) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

23-10-2020 (Page 28 of 37) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

23-10-2020 (Page 1 of 79) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

23-10-2020 (Page 52 of 79) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

23-10-2020 (Page 1 of 12) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

23-10-2020 (Page 3 of 12) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

23-10-2020 (Page 1 of 13) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

23-10-2020 (Page 10 of 13) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

23-10-2020 (Page 1 of 9) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

23-10-2020 (Page 4 of 9) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

23-10-2020 (Page 6 of 9) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA