Peronismo without Peron Ten Years after the Fall (1955-1965)

Author(s): Peter Ranis

Source: Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Jan., 1966), pp. 112-128
Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165217 .
Accessed: 09/05/2014 00:24

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to Journal of Inter-American Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PETERRANIS
Department of Government
University of New Mexico

PeronismoWithoutPeron
Ten YearsAfter the Fall (1955-1965)

rT HE PERSISTENCEof peronista political power remains the es-

sential political concern of post-Peron Argentina. This dilem-
ma has never been resolved and its presence affects any
approximation of social and political integration. As contemporary
peronismo responds to an apparent psycho-social void that has not
been filled by any other party or movement, the alternatives today are
as they were ten years ago: to allow the peronistas legal political status,
to integrate them into existing political parties, or to permanently iso-
late them. The astounding peronista successes in the March 1965
Congressional elections favor the first solution to this now historical
problem.
Between December 1964 and August 1965, under a Fulbright
research grant, I undertook a study of the problems and challenges
of Argentine political development with special emphasis on parties
and politics. The study was an extension of my doctoral research on
Argentina undertaken at New York University. In Argentina my re-
search centered upon a detailed six-page questionnaire which was con-
ducted with over seventy-five members of the 1963-1965 National
Chamber of Deputies. The deputies were asked to comment on their
(1) social background, (2) psycho-political affinities toward political
opposition, (3) political perceptions of the role of parties and the
various means available to as well as the goals of the Argentine
political community and (4) issue orientation toward contemporary
problems such as peronismo, petroleum, the military, inflation and

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 PER6N(1955-1965)
PeronismoWITHOUT 113

the role of labor as an organized force. Complementaryinterviews

were also held with leading political figures from ex-presidentArturo
Frondizi to peronista youth leaders. Labor leaders, businessmen,in-
tellectualsand newspapermenwere also consulted.
With few exceptions,the Argentineswho were interviewedwere
eloquent and critical and proved to be a valuable source of infor-
mation. Along with their constant preoccupationwith the state of
the economy, they focussed upon the role and destiny of peronismo
in Argentina,the subject to which the present article is addressed.
Peronismo erupted as a popular nationalistmovement with cor-
poratistovertonesat a time when its more militant-racistpredecessors
were being defeatedin WesternEurope. It received its major support
not only from the unskilled, newly-migratedurban working classes'
but from the military,ecclesiasticaland industrialsectors of Argentine
society.2 The era of Juan Per6n was one of persistent denial of in-
tellectualfreedom,spasmodicinjectionsof class antagonismand popular
demagoguery,and the circumscriptionand deprivationof normalsocial
patternsof behavior.3Concomitantly,however, came the recognition
and satisfactionof many of labor's objectives.
Under the dictatorship,income was more equitably distributed
than either before or after that decade.4 Salaries for workers were
generallyraised, securities attained and other fringe benefits assured.
This contributed,by and large, to the integrationof the workingclass
as one of the social bargainingfoci. The worker, as it has often
been said, stopped thinkingof himself as a social outcast. He became
"accepted,recognizedand even exalted by the State."5 The relative
economic and psychologicaladvantagesto the worker, made possible
by Argentina'sgrowing income from the increased beef and wheat
exports during World War II and through the period of the Korean
War,substantiallyinvigorateda large popularperonistafollowingwhich

1 Alberto Ciria, Partidos y poder en la Argentina moderna 1930-46 (Buenos Aires:

Jorge Alvarez, 1964), pp. 312-20.
2 Torcuato S. Di Tella, Gino Germani, Jorge Graciarena, et al, Argentina, sociedad
de masas (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1965), p. 281.
3 See the effects of peronista legislation on social life in the well documented El
Libro Negro de la segunda tirania (Buenos Aires, 1958). These documents were publish-
ed under the auspices of the Office of the Vice President during the Aramburu Pro-
visional Government.
4 Antonio Cafiero, Cinco anos despues (Buenos Aires, 1961). The author concen-
trates on the distribution of income as well as on the heightened consumption levels of
basic goods.
5 Juan Jose Sebreli, Buenos Aires, vida cotidiana y alienacion (Buenos Aires:
Siglo Veinte, 1964), p. 183.

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
114 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES

continues an unprecedented display of loyalty to a long-overturned

dictatorship.
However, the undue emphasis on distribution negatively affected
economic development. There were no efforts made to effect any
structural changes in the economy, no basis was laid for viable heavy
industry and the country's infrastructure-its roads, electrical power
and communications networks-was neglected.6 Neither the sources of
employment nor the development of the country's natural resources
(i.e., oil and steel) were fully utilized within the context of an indus-
trial base.7 Here lies the initial reason for the upward inflationary
spiral that has gone unchecked by successive governments.
In its ambition to regain once again the absolute majoritarian
status it commanded during the Peron dictatorship, post-Per6n pero-
nismo has mainly acted as an aggregating type of party. Because it
has been necessary throughout practically the whole last decade to
receive the blessings of the military, the peronistas have found it
advantageous to participate in elections in combination with one or
another recognized party.

Peronismo's historical chronology has been mainly that of a pro-

scribed party. In 1958, after two years of political suppression under
General Aramburu's Provisional Government, it chose, as a second
best alternative, the support of Arturo Frondizi.8 In 1960 it returned
to its 1957 posture of opposition and cast blank protest ballots. In
1962 the Uni6n Popular, the party most closely representing pero-
nismo, was allowed to run, though its subsequent victory was later
nullified. In 1963, the peronistas again chose abstention. By 1965 the
Uni6n Popular was finally allowed to compete in Congressional elec-
tions and to take its deputy seats. Throughout these uncertain times,
the peronistas have demonstrated a great deal of self-discipline and
moderation. Even in 1962, when overt, and in 1963, when more
subtle means were used to prevent peronista electoral successes, they
retained a sense of presence and calm. They continued to constitute
a party which was certain of its support and political future, and
assuredly unwilling to precipitate a massive campaign aimed at its
very existence. With the legalization of the Uni6n Popular in the

6 Marcos Merchensky, Las corrientes ideoldgicas en la historia argentina (Buenos

Aires: Concordia, 1961), pp. 226-27.
7 Ibid., p. 230.
8 For fuller treatment of the peronista-Frondizi alliance see Alfredo Galletti, La
politica y los partidos (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1961), pp. 241 ff.

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Peronismo WITHOUT
PERON(1955-1965) 115

March 1965 elections, peronismo, by its self-imposed discipline, finally

gained its sought-for recognition.
Until the elections of March 1965, post-Peron governments have
emphasized electoral gimmicks, political suppression and psychological
warfare vis-a-vis peronismo. Though governmental methods have had
temporary successes in terms of denying peronismo any policy voice in
the last decade, the real failure has been in neither allowing the
peronistas a share in the political process nor absorbing them within
more acceptable parties. Thus the limits, to date, of government be-
havior have ranged from the entire proscription of peronista and neo-
peronista parties (those parties that are not directly beholden to Per6n's
choice of electoral policy) to the acceptance in 1965 of peronista
candidates for deputy seats in the National Congress.9
Occasional peronista uprisings throughout the country in many
instances have reaffirmed the government's determination to pursue
the cause of "peronista pacification." As La Nacion editorialized:
In September 1955 there were victors and victims. The re-
sentmentof the defeated has been channelizedinto a vengeful
counter-revolution.... In 1955 there were only peronistas
and anti-peronistas.Blood was spilled by the victors, and for
the vanquished this fundamental division has not lost its
force and meaning.10
Argentine governments, under military pressures, have thus viewed
peronismo as a vengeful force to be treated with the greatest caution.
When the Uni6n Popular scored impressive legislative and guberna-
torial victories in March 1962, the military intervened and eventually
forced the nullification of the elections. With their electoral successes
nullified, on December 28, 1962, two leaders of the peronista move-
ment's trade union and political sections spoke. Andres Framini, who
had won the governorship of Buenos Aires province before the army
intervention, stated:
There will be a revolution . . . If blood flows-too bad
... we must all be agreed that the leaders must stay united
and make that clear to all our enemies ....
This is why I say we must be prepared for anything. It
might look as if they are going to let us go to the polls but I
don't believe it. The way out for the people must be found-
in whatsoeverfield it may be.

9 The Partido Justicialista (the name of Per6n's movement), which has continually
attempted to co-ordinate all peronista-oriented parties, has failed to be recognized by
any post-Per6n government, including that of Illia.
10 La Nacion (Buenos Aires), December 5, 1960, p. 6.

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
116 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES

Raul Matera, who until the March nullification had stood for a mod-
erate approach, said:
There is no longer a hardlineand a softline with the Peron-
ist movement. We are all Justicialists;we are all companions
mobilized for combat. Anyone who does not understandthis
does not understand the times in which we are living, nor
the movement to which we belong. We want a way out by
means of elections.
We do not want the country to pay the price in blood or
destruction.We want a peaceful way out through elections
and we are fighting for that. We say this in all seriousness
and with responsibility.Then nobody will be able to say that
Justicialismrepudiatedor rejected elections or sought to be
proscribed.1
Thus not only does repudiation of the peronista vote drive the move-
ment to extremes but it appears to unify it as well.
As the result of an army coup in September 1962, a more liberal
"legalist" faction of the military gained ascendancy over the "inter-
ventionist" faction which opposed an eventual return to civilian gov-
ernment. Therefore when smaller neo-peronista provincial parties
achieved representation in 1963 (including two governorships), there
was no observable reaction from the military. Having tasted electoral
victory without government intervention, the neo-peronista parties have
found it increasingly difficult to give up their political autonomy for
the uncertainties of a provocative, Per6n-directed movement that in-
vites military resistance. The Union Popular, on the other hand, as
the representative of peronismo, had not sufficiently demonstrated that
it was no longer under Per6n's control, and thus was allowed to present
candidates for national deputy seats and provincial legislative and
municipal offices only. In the presidential and gubernatorial elections,
the peronistas were obliged to vote for electors representing the newly
formed Frente Nacional y Popular in which the Uni6n Popular par-
ticipated along with several other parties. An accumulation of gov-
ernment electoral restrictions during the last month prior to the July
1963 elections eventually forced the Frente to withdraw its candidate
list and advocate a policy of abstention.
The confusion and frustration caused by peronista failures at
either co-ordination or success in the July 1963 elections served again
to emphasize certain peronista divisions elsewhere described as parlia-
mentarianism versus revolution:

11 Buenos Aires Herald, December 29, 1962, p. 6.

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Peronismo WITHOUT
PER6N (1955-1965) 117

Justicialismohas two fundamentalbranches:the strong and

solid trade unionism, and the politicians, fluctuating and
divided between the "blank voters" and the neo-peronistas
of July 7 [1963]. Andres Framini has tried to give the Justi-
cialista reorganizationa total character,embracingas well the
labor branch whose strategic and tactical management has
been under the handlingof Vandor ....
Framinihas just launched a declarationthat contains three
importantpoints: (1) the disowning of the July 1963 elec-
tions; (2) the expropriationof the largest estates and holdings
of the oligarchy without indemnification,that is to say, the
call for a violent social revolution;and (3) the mobilization
of the oligarchy without indemnification,that is to say, the
objectives or, in other words, the exhortation to workers'
agitationagainstthe government....
The divergentdoctrinesof Augusto Vandor,open to a leftist
liberalism of the British Labor style, and that of Framini,
seduced once again by Marxist language, coincide in one
point. Both, with distinct character, constitute classical ver-
sions of the national problem and, for the present, imply an
abandonment of the central pretension of the justicialista
doctrine: the interpretationand representationof the national
will.12
Under the Radical (UCRP) administration of President Arturo
Illia, elected in July 1963, the Ministry of the Interior has repealed
many of the repressive decree laws instituted during the Guido interim
government (March 1962-July 1963) as well as the severe espionage
and "social dissolution" decrees, many of which remained in force
since 1956.

Generally it can be said that between 1955 and 1965, peronismo

as a political force has gradually become more moderate and concil-
iatory. It has, however, solidified and flourished in opposition and has
received consistent support from a great sector of the masses. A general
aura has developed around it as peronismo remained at first persecuted,
later branded as illegitimate, and finally (by 1965) permitted to compete
only under strict and confined conditions. Throughout the past decade a
strong mythology has emerged concerning the downtrodden, "benighted"
peronista spokesman of the peoples' will. Because of the accumulation
of the shortcomings of the Aramburu (1955-1958) and Frondizi (1958-
1962) administrations, the peronistas have received growing solid sup-
port and general compassion from many persons in academic and

12 "Lucha por el poder y desviaciones doctrinarias," Comentarios, I, No. 2

(November 1, 1963), 6.

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1-18 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES

intellectual circles.13 Also Per6n in exile has continued to wield his

influence successfully. His political posture has fed on the illegality of
his movement which has made of him a martyr in his role as an
effective charismatic leader.14

Today's Argentine political dislocations and institutional crises

still revolve about the historic and contemporary role of the pero,
nista phenomena. As Gino Germani describes it:
The Argentine political tragedy resides in the fact that the
integration of the popular masses was initiated under the
banner of a totalitarianismthat achieved proportionally,in
its way, a certain experience of political and social participa-
tion in immediate and personal aspects in the life of the
worker. It nullified at the same time the political organization
and the basic rights that constitute the unsubstitutablepillars
of any genuine democracy.The immediatetask to be realized
consists of achieving that same experience, but attainingit in
a manner which is indissolvablefrom the theory and practice
of democracyand liberty.15
The inability of any subsequent government to provide these psychic
and tangible benefits has led to the undiminished strength of pero-
nismo in contemporary affairs. The failure to supersede peronista dog-
ma has resulted in a kind of myth perpetuation. As Di Tella states
this case:
Peronistascontinuallyenjoy more and more the sympathies
of certain social strata of public opinion which visualize them
not as the destroyers of yesterday's public liberties, but as
today's persecuted.16
As the March 1965 Congressional elections approached, the
USCRP government centered its electoral campaign in the political
arena. Its members emphasized that they had brought domestic peace
and political democracy to Argentina. The former referred to the
absence of military interventions, state-of-siege conditions and pop-

13 See, for example, the poems of sociologist Dario Canton, La saga del peronismo
(Buenos Aires: Ancora, 1964).
14 See Irving L. Horowitz's paper on Party Charisma: A Comparative Analysis of
Political Practices and Principles in Third World Nations (Buenos Aires: Instituto Di
Tella, 1964), p. 6.
15 Gino Germani. Politica y sociedad en una epoca de transicioni de la sociedad
tradicional a la sociedad de masas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 1963), p. 252.
16 Torcuato S. Di Tella, "La situaci6n argentina," Cuadernos Americanos, CXXIV,
No. 5 (September/October 1962), 55.

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 PER6N (1955-1965)
Peronismo WITHOUT 11.9

ular general strikes.'7 The latter concerned the right granted the
Uni6n Popular and many neo-peronista parties to participate in the
March elections and the absence of political and labor prisoners.

Contrary to what might have been expected, the failure of Pe-

r6n's attempt to return to Argentina in December 1964 succeeded in
the calming of the pre-election atmosphere. The peronista anti-govern-
ment fervor was surprisingly short-lived as the peronistas made an all-
out effort to achieve legal recognition and thus sought to avoid an-
tagonizing the government. Before the 1965 Congressional elections,
the movement had shown signs of an increasing neo-peronista ten-
dency, to which in the 1962 election Per6n himself gave credence by
supporting, after the fact, the most peronista-oriented of all the neo-
peronista parties, the Union Popular. By 1963, the other neo-peronistas
had reached a momentum of their own which resulted in a disobedi-
ence to Per6n's call for blank votes and a new-fledged neo-peronista
representation in Congress.
The neo-peronista representation in Congress has appeared will-
ing to accept democratic norms and to soft-pedal, though not to dis-
card, the necessity of Per6n's return to Argentina. Privately, perhaps,
many feel Peron's return would only upset their own new-found posi-
tions of legality and representation, but publicly it remains an electoral
requisite to eulogize Peron. Meanwhile, the "hardline" urban-centered,
syndical peronistas advocated abstention up to the March 1965 elections.
The Uni6n Popular, which since 1962 has become increasingly peronis-
ta, by 1965 became the recognized peronista party in the country, while
the neo-peronistas were centered in such groupings as the Movimiento
Popular Mendocino, Partido de Tres Banderas, Partido de la Justicia
Social, Acci6n Popular (San Luis), Partido Laborista and Partido
Blanco.
The peronistas, now legitimized as the Uni6n Popular, cam-
paigned vaguely on several issues concerning labor and nationaliza-
tion of public services, but mainly they hankered after the "good old
days," decried present conditions and demanded a universal amnesty
for all former peronista leaders and all those who had been politically
exiled. This amnesty should cover all Argentines from the fall of

17 On December 2, 1964, Per6n made an attempt to reach Argentine soil via Iberia
Airlines but was held up and returned by Brazilian authorities 48 hours after landing in
Rio de Janeiro. When Per6n's abortive return became public knowledge, the General
Confederation of Labor (CGT) staged a two-day general strike on December 17 and
18. The response was less than 50% successful, one of the least happy examples of
peronista-worker solidarity in a decade.

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
120 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES

Per6n through the inauguration of Illia in October 1963.

Generally, the peronistas, due no doubt to their high degree of
self-discipline and moderation, were given new freedom in the UCRP
attempts at national conciliation. On October 17 of 1963 and 1964
an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 peronistas held legally authorized
meetings to commemorate Juan Per6n's release from imprisonment
in 1945 and actual assumption of de facto power over an incipient
social-economic agglomeration. Another giant rally was tolerated two
nights before the March 1965 election. Peronista political activity,
rights of political association, and the freedom to organize for political
purposes within the labor unions were sanctioned.
The present government has taken Argentina farther along the
path of political reconciliation. Its policies have been those of de-
emphasizing ideological distinctions and stressing inter-party coopera-
tion within an essentially "Radical" framework.
The March 1965 elections, which had at stake ninety-nine Cham-
ber of Deputy seats, more than half of that lower but all important
Chamber, demonstrated a polarization of votes unknown since the
days of the Per6n and anti-Per6n vote of 1946-1955. The figures
represent support of the UCRP as the only alternative to a huge
peronista vote. Both parties benefited from the presence of the other,
though in ideology they are not polar opposites.

MARCH 1965 CONGRESSIONALELECTIONS

Per Cent Seats Total
Parties Votes (rounded) Won Seats
Uni6n Popular (peronista) 2,828,698 31% 36 36
UCRP 2,676,853 30 34 69
Neo-peronistas 620,225 7 8 16
MID (Frondizi) 587,790 7 7 16
Federationof Center Parties 476,009 5 4 10
UCRI 411,827 5 1 10
ProgressiveDemocrats (PDP) 288,568 3 3 9
ChristianDemocrats (PDC) 248,868 3 0 4
UDELPA 183,863 2 0 5
Argentine Socialists (PSA) 181,034 2 1 4
Democratic Socialists (PSD) 172,295 2 0 2
Provincial and Local Parties 269,724 3 5 11
99 192

The Uni6n Popular received 31% of the vote which was the
most outstanding example of peronista popular support since the dic-

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Peronismo WITHOUT
PER6N (1955-1965) 121

tatorshipof Per6n. It did notably well in Buenos Aires Province, the

Federal Capital and C6rdoba Province, the three most heavily pop-
ulated electoral districts. The neo-peronistas continued their inroads
on the nationalelectorateand demonstrateda consistencyby receiving
7% of the vote (as they did in 1963). Thus the combined pero-
nista-neo-peronista vote hovers about 38%.18 The governing UCRP
received 30% of the vote and Frondizi's MID'9 7%. All other
parties reached new lows of 5% or less.
Due to the Guido government'srupture of legal processes in
1962, the newly-elected 1963 Chamber of Deputies drew lots to
determinewhich half of the Chamberhad a 4-year term and which
a 2-year term office. Hereafter all deputies will serve the constitu-
tionally-guaranteedterm of 4 years. Thus the UCRP, with 37 dep-
uties contesting,won 34 seats to reduce its 72-member bloc to 69.
Its members however, still clearly constitute the leading faction in
Congresssince they control 25 of 46 Senate seats not in question in
this election. The peronistaUnion Popular has spurted from no rep-
resentation to a 36-member bloc. The neo-peronistas, who had 8 re-
maining deputies, won 8 new seats, thereby maintaining their 16
deputies and giving the combined neo-peronista and peronista repre-
sentationa strong 52-memberparliamentarybloc. As a result the two
largestblocs-the UCRP and the peronistas-account for 121 deputies
of the 192-memberlower Chamber. The only other party to have
a sizable number of deputies is MID with 16.
Thus the UCRP increased its percentage of 25% of the vote
in 1963 to 30% in 1965. The peronista Uni6n Popular went from
a 17% blank vote to a Congressionalrepresentationof 31% and
the neo-peronistasremained at 7%. Aramburu'sUDELPA20 and
Allende's UCRI21 suffered irreparablelosses, decreasingtheir repre-
sentationto less than 5% each. Some of the smaller parties (Argen-
tine Socialists, Christian Democrats, Democratic Socialists, Progres-
sive Democrats) were similarly emasculated.
Thus, despite the use of proportionalrepresentationin Argen-
tina, there has been a considerablestep taken toward a bi-party sys-

18 Although in the Chamber of Deputies the various groups have acted as one bloc,
the 1965 elections gave evidence of the interesting phenomenon in several rural provinces
of a neo-peronista - peronista competition at the polls.
19 Frondizi's newly-formed (1964) party Movimiento de Integraci6n y Desarrollo.
20 General and former President Pedro Aramburu's own party vehicle founded
originally for the 1963 election.
21 That part of Frondizi's own original UCRI which refused to join in his support
of the 1963 peronista-inclusive Frente Nacional y Popular.

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
122 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES

tem with perhaps a third force mobilizing on the conservativeside

of the political spectrum.There has been a noticeable consolidation
of the left and the protest,anti-governmentvotes into the ranks of the
peronistas. On the other hand, the UCRP has managed to receive
votes from the decline of the center and traditionalparties, many of
the latter voting for the governmentmerely out of fear of the pero-
nistas gaining too strong an entry into the political arena. For many
voters it was a question of voting against the governmentor against
the peronistas. The major parties fed these anxieties and therefore
the voters were hesitant to "waste"votes on other parties.
Specifically,the election for deputies was held in 18 out of 22
provinces and the Federal Capital (five provinces had deputies who
had all, by lot, drawn 4-year terms). The neo-peronistas, with their
rural-basedstrengthsince 1963, won in six of the smaller provinces,
the largest of which was Tucumanwith close to 250,000 votes cast
there. The UCRP followed, winning in five provinces, the most im-
portant of which are the Federal Capital of Buenos Aires and Santa
Fe, two of the four largest voting districts. The other two prizes
went to the peronistaswho counted among the three provinceswhere
they were victoriousthe provincesof Buenos Aires (the largest vote
nucleus and far and away the most significantArgentine province),
and C6rdoba.One of the big surprisesof the election was the victory
of the peronistasin C6rdoba,the traditionalUCRP province of Pres-
ident Illia. The four remainingprovincessaw the Federationof Center
(conservative) and provincialparties achieve first place.
In general, a fairly clear picture emergesin the aftermathof the
1965 elections. In the urban areas of Argentina UCRI voters made
a remarkablyconsistent switch to MID. Thus Frondizi remains the
inheritorof the bulk of the old UCRI of 1958-1962. Many UDELPA,
ProgressiveDemocrat and Democratic Socialist votes went into the
UCRP column while Argentine Socialist, Christian Democrat and
formerblank votes also added to the peronistatally. The Conservative
partieswithstoodthe Radical-peronistaonslaughtand maintainedtheir
small but consistentfollowing, absorbingUDELPA votes in the prov-
ince of Mendoza.
Severalmulti-partyprovincesbecame for the first time two-party
in orientation,the confrontationusually being between the UCRP and
the peronistas or neo-peronistas. This, now readily seen, polarization
correspondsto a traditionalArgentine reality. Despite the enormous
personalismand exuberantindividualismpresent in Argentinepolitics,
certain preponderanttendencies continue to hold precedence.Before

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Peronismo WITHOUTPER6N (1955-1965) 123

1945 it was the Conservative-Radical polarization. With the advent of

Peron's dictatorship there evolved a basic competition between pero-
nismo and the traditional Radicalism.

When peronismo was proscribed between 1955 and 1962, a pleth-

ora of smaller sectors of political opinion organized into parties to
fill the power and representational vacuum. With the partial return
of peronismo in 1962 and 1963 and its remarkable demonstration of
power in 1965, the Argentine political configuration has demonstrated
the resiliency of historic polarization. Thus Argentina increasingly
shows signs of adapting itself toward a dual power-centered political
society despite an electoral system that would tend to foster a multi-
party proliferation. Rather than any electoral system it is apparent
that personalism, political proscription of peronista parties and socio-
economic conditions are the more relevant factors in determining
party proliferation.
The 1965 elections again reiterated the inescapable fact that
peronismo is not only a force completely in its own right but that
neither the Radical nor the Socialist groupings can begin to absorb
the peronista masses.22 Thus the peronista "presence" continues to
influence the political picture overwhelmingly not only in the area
of party tactics and political feasibility but in policy changes and in
institutional engineering.

Since the 1965 elections the peronistas have been extremely care-
ful to maintain a sense of harmony within Argentina's political struc-
ture. The party has co-operated in the Chamber of Deputies, it has
conferred informally with the military hierarchy, and it has tried to
convince various business groups and diplomatic circles of its non-
revolutionary character. Moreover, to ease political tensions, the pe-
ronistas have tentatively decided to adopt the denomination of Union
Popular as the exclusive and only organization to represent peronismo
in the country.23 Thus they would reject, for an indefinite period,
any attempts to compete under the doctrinaire Justicialista label which
has continuously been outlawed since 1955. What this has amounted
to has been the loss of a skirmish over a name but the winning of

22 Much Argentine political literature is devoted to conjecturing about what con-

stitutes peronismo, how to give the peronistas a socialist content, how to capture the
laboring masses, how to infiltrate the General Confederation of Labor, etc. See Torcuato
S. Di Tella's Socialismo en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez, 1965) and El
sistema politico argentino y la clase obrera (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1964).
23 Confirmado, I, No. 6 (Buenos Aires, June 11, 1965), 7.

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
124 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES

a major political battle which has left intact the fundamentalcriteria

of peronismo.
The peronistas have three visible factions. The first and most
importantis the syndicalistsection which is dominatedby leaders of
the powerful metallurgicaland textile unions. This gives the party
great mass supportat its commandas well as vast resourcesfrom the
funds of the General Confederationof Labor (CGT) whose leader-
ship is completely in peronista hands.24 It is the richest, largest and
most influentialof the sectors. Its membersare the "hard-line"pero-
nistas within the movement,men who would like to recoverfor them-
selves the benefits of the peronista decade and who, as individuals,
suffered under the post-Per6n military repressions and interventions
into the CGT. These are, by and large, unswerving,diehardperonis-
tas. The basis for this group's strength unquestionablylies in the
GreaterBuenos Aires belt of industrialtowns just outside the Capital
and within the province of Buenos Aires.
The second group is made up of the so-called political pero-
nistas, or those politicianswhose grass-rootssupportcomes from such
urban areas as the Capital and the cities of C6rdoba and Rosario
(Santa Fe province). These are generally not trade unionists but
usually middle-classprofessionals,essentially lawyers, who constitute
the preponderanceof intellectualleadershipbetween the syndicalists
and neo-peronistas.This sector counts as well on the support of
disenchantedformer internationalsocialists, academiciansand ideal-
ists of one or another variety.
The third and most controversialgroup has given rise to the
movementknown as neo-peronismo.It is essentiallya rural,provincial-
ly-based, moderate, nationalistically-orientedgrouping of peronistas.
They constitutethat element of peronismo that is not ideologicallywell-
anchoredand which could move in a variety of directions-running
the gamutof the political spectrum.They certainlyare the least class-
conscious part of the movement and have received the blessings of
some traditionally anti-peronista sectors of society. Their leadership
encompassesmiddle-classelements and even includes many an aris-
tocratic name. This group has achieved preponderantpositions of
strengthin the provincesof Mendoza, Tucuman,Chaco, Jujuy, Salta,
Neuquen and San Juan.

24 The CGT puts out an annual report which describes its leadership, membership
and program, identifying thereby its peronista strength, affiliations and goals. Memoria y
Balance 1963-64 (Buenos Aires: CGT, 1964).

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Peronismo WITHOUT
PERON(1955-1965) 125

Though in 1963 and 1965 the neo-peronistas ran their own

tickets, it appears quite certain that the great majority will be ab-
sorbed into one vast Union Popular by the 1967 gubernatorial and
congressional elections. Ideologically there are no distinctions deep
enough to render the party divided. Peronismo avoids an overt class-
bound ideological framework which would inhibit flexibility and since
1965, as the leading opposition party in the Chamber of Deputies, it
has demonstrated an at least apparent cohesion in the selection of
the bloc's officers, its parliamentary plan of action and its public
pronouncements.
The syndicalist wing subscribes to an economic policy that ad-
vocates nationalization of the banking system, a greater preponderance
of the CGT within officialdom, a freeze on prices and rents, a mam-
moth urban renewal program and a large-scale land reform. In the
political arena it proposes a universal amnesty for all exiled or "re-
tired" political and military leaders-which, of course, includes Juan
Peron. The other two factions find this program in consonance with
their general views. They, however, will probably have to wield their
influence in restraining possible syndicalist parliamentary walkouts,
personality assaults on other deputies and inflammatory statements
that could only create tension among the military under whose watch-
ful eye all must serve. After years in opposition, the staunchly rigid
syndicalists may find that they functioned better in that atmosphere.
The neo-peronistas with some limited parliamentary experience are,
however, making their influence felt. Meanwhile the political peronistas
provide the cement for this larger commitment to parliamentary so-
lutions. Thus each one of these three identifiable sectors has poten-
tialities of aggregating other political party nuclei. For example there
is evidence that in the 1965 elections the peronistas attracted Argen-
tine Socialists, Christian Democratic and UCRI votes, no doubt be-
cause of the particular political appeal of the syndicalists, political
peronistas and neo-peronistas respectively. Of course, as a party, the
Uni6n Popular has given indication of an aggregative nature when
in 1963 it represented the essential bloc within the conglomeration
of parties that made up the Frente Nacional y Popular.
Juan Peron still represents the single most important cog within
the peronista movement.25 He remains de jure leader if not in de facto
control of the movement's day-to-day policies and decisions. Should
a peronista-sponsored amnesty law be passed, the way would be open

25 Jose S. Campobassi et al, Los partidos pollticos (Buenos Aires, 1963), p. 101.

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
126 JOURNAL OF INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES

for Per6n's return to Argentina. All things being equal it is unlikely

that Per6n will want to return to the country and more unlikely that
he relishes the thought of taking over direct command of the movement
he once founded but with which it is increasingly difficult for him to
remain in close communication.
Though not all peronista elements are privately convinced that
Peron's reappropriation of leadership would be in the best interest
of the party, the syndicalists are unanimous in their belief that he
should have the option given him by a grateful political movement.
The political peronistas would probably go along with this, although
they certainly doubt Per6n's desire to return as well as his efficacy
as leader. This group sees him more as a possible elder statesman
than as a leader of policy decisions. The neo-peronistas have, in the
past, shown a marked coolness to Per6n's return to the councils of
the party though they argue for his right to return to Argentine soil
as a private citizen. They are the authors of the phraseology of "Pe-
ronismo without Per6n."
According to Juan Per6n's own words, he seems deliberately to
be lessening his grip on the peronista organization:
Since 1955 when I was overthrownby a coalition of do-
mestic and internationalinterests, I have had no other Pre-
occupation than to institutionalize our movement. These
elections (March 1965), in which I have not in the least
intervened, have made evident that peronismo can manage
alone and sustain itself.
Profoundlyrenovatingmovementswhich achievea true rev-
olution are initially gregarious and even personalistic. Of
them, Napoleon once said, "Man is all, men are nothing."But
eventually when a certain degree of development has been
achieved, the time arrives when it must be understood that
man cannot conquertime and that it is betterto dependon the
organization,which is the only thing that can. For that reason,
since my overthrow, I have dedicated myself to the task of
changingthe personalinto the institutional.But as this cannot
be simply changed,for there is often human resistance,I have
resorted to a gradual process by which I have retained the
conduct of a certain part in my hands, while allowing the
other sectors to be conducted by the elected authorities of
the party. Slowly I have handed over the total leadershipto
these specific organizations and this election (March 1965)
has been entirelyconducted by them.26
Per6n, by way of this document, makes increasingly clear his

26 Primera Plana, III, No. 134 (June 1, 1965), 16.

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Peronismo WITHOUT
PER6N (1955-1965) 127

desire to disengage himself slowly from a movement which is itself

rapidly developing an autonomous pattern of political behavior. Though
Per6n may be self-consciously laying the groundwork for his own
declining influence, by giving verbal basis for his own demise he
can assure himself the historical place of a leader who foresaw the
need to institutionalize a movement which he founded.
However, 1965 still finds him pursuing a policy of ruling by
dividing his blessings among the three factions of the party. Cautiously
avoiding giving his preference to one or another, he maintains all
three breathlessly competing for his benediction. He has proven to
be a master of ambivalent communiques designed to keep in doubt
his definitive predilections. By this long-range form of political en-
gineering and by his truly great mass popularity, Per6n has kept the
movement within the range of his veto, if not control.
With internal party developments, electoral campaigns and varying
relationships to Per6n absorbing goodly amounts of energy, the party
has not yet developed its issue orientations. This has, however, not
hurt the party as it continues to adapt itself pragmatically to the con-
temporary circumstances. Its ill-defined ideological position has per-
mitted it to strengthen its avocation for power, which is second to
none. Although at present it is still essentially a workers' movement,
the party certainly had, and thus would like to recoup, the support
of the middle sectors, the clergy and the army, all of which, in some
degree and for some time, supported peronismo as a government.27
As of the present, the peronistas still receive the bulk of their support
from those who cast a negative vote against existing institutions and
economic policies.
Mid-1965 finds the peronistas in the throes of reaffirming the
need for assuring a unified national movement based on a mutual
tolerance of local provincial divergencies, but agreed on general na-
tional policies. The leading peronista parties are making an all-out
effort to co-ordinate their people into a national mass party with an
organizational base firm enough to survive even the death of Per6n.
The peronistas have proven continually that they have the votes. In
the succeeding months they will attempt to persuade the military hier-
archies and business interests of their general capacity to lead and
their ability to respond to social pressures from every legitimate sector

27 For an excellent analysis of the army, church, unions, industrialists, land-owners

and politicians as historical and contemporary Argentine elites see Jose Luis de Imaz's
important study Los que mandan (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1964).

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
128 JOURNALOF INTER-AMERICAN
STUDIES

of society. The prime test will be the all-important gubernatorial elec-

tion of Buenos Aires in 1967 which will go a long way in ascertaining
the willingness of the military to allow a peronista candidate to run
for the presidency in 1969.
There is little doubt that peronismo plans to put its most moderate
candidates forward for these important posts. It appears evident from
an analysis of the 1963-65 period that it has decided to take the
slow, but safer, route to political representation and possible victory
rather than to make one grand and spectacular, but uncertain and
possibly even convulsive, bid for political power.

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Fri, 9 May 2014 00:24:26 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions