The problem

with experts
(and those
who do not
listen to them)
Alexia Gaudeul
Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Winter Semester 2020-2021
Outline

FOCUS OF THIS THE CONTEXT: A THE DIAGNOSIS: LACK THE CAUSES: WHY DO
PRESENTATION AND TECHNOCRATIC OF TRUST IN EXPERTS PEOPLE NOT TRUST IN
DEFINITION OF TERMS SOCIETY. EXPERTS?
No view from nowhere:
Know who is talking!
• There is no “view from nowhere” (Nagel, 1989,
Sugden, 2018)
• I am a behavioral economist, with good knowledge of
decision-making research and the literature on judge-
adviser systems.
• I will deal mainly with advice in economic decision
making
• I will speak mainly about behavioral issues in the
relation expert-advisee.
• Other people dealing with the same topic may speak
about other things.
• But I try to include everything relevant to the topic…
Definition of
terms: Experts
• Someone with extensive
knowledge, experience and skill in
solving problems in a specific
domain.
• This is a seminar in economics, so
we will speak about government
policy advisers, managers,
economists, product and credit-
rating agencies, financial analysts,
etc…
• But experts also include academics
in all fields, doctors, mechanics,
engineers, nutritionists, sport
coaches, etc…
 • Belief in knowledge, reliability, honesty, fairness and
benevolence of someone or of an institution.
• In our context, trust will be shown by seeking
information from, listening and following the
Definition of advice of someone.
terms: Trust • Without trust, a lot of economic activity is just not
possible, e.g. when giving money for something,
you must trust you will get a good in exchange.
 General references
I recommend two books to get a broad
overview of the problem with experts.
Neither book is perfect, some of their
assertions are exaggerated or wrong.
Together however, they provide a balanced
picture.

Nichols, T. M. (2017). The Death of Expertise: The Campaign against

Established Knowledge and Why it Matters. Oxford University Press, USA.
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-death-of-expertise-
9780190865979

Freedman, D. H. (2010). Wrong: Why experts keep failing us—and how to

know when not to trust them. Little, Brown and Company.
https://www.littlebrown.com/titles/david-h-
freedman/wrong/9780316087919/
CONTEXT: A TECHNOCRATIC
SOCIETY
A technocratic society
Why do we need experts?
What do experts provide?
A technocratic society
• Prominent role of experts in a
technocratic society (Saint-Simon, 1817)
• Decision-makers selected on the basis of their
expertise in specific areas of decision-making.
• Belief in the merit of…
• applying scientific method to administration
and policy making.
• finding technological solutions to societal
problems.
• Related to:
• Bureaucratic state (Max Weber, 1922)
• Managerial society (James Burnham, 1941)
• Post-industrial economy (Daniel Bell, 1974,
Alain Touraine, 1971).
Why do we need experts?

Experts needed in many areas because of

• complexity of the operation of modern States and large companies,

• complicated technology,
• lack of experience with infrequent, remote, specialized decisions.

What people want from experts (Stehr and Grundmann, 2011)

• Reduction in uncertainty about the future.

• Reduction in complexity of problems
• Advice that is transparent and easy to understand.
• Simple and direct solutions.
• Reassurance, legitimization and support (Dalal & Bonaccio, 2010).
Why do we need trust in experts?

Many claims made by experts are unverifiable by those outside

their field of expertise.

Mistakes and lies by experts One may never convincingly prove the
expert lied (credence goods, Dulleck &
may not be found out and Kerschbamer, 2006; Dulleck, Kerschbamer,
punished. & Sutter, 2011, Balafoutas et al., 2013).

For an abuse to be exposed, we “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” (Juvenal,

c.110, O'Neill, 2002)
need to trust that “someone” is Other experts, media, police, auditors,
keeping experts accountable. regulatory authorities…
DIAGNOSIS: LOW TRUST IN
EXPERTS
Unpopular rule by experts
Low trust in a range of experts
Rise of populist parties
Decision-makers often do not seek or follow expert advice
Rule by experts is not popular

Rule by experts is However, still

not popular (Pew preferred to
Research Center, dictatorship or
October, 2017) military rule…
Rule by experts is not popular
Low trust in
institutions and their
leaders.

• 2018 Edelman Trust Barometer for

Germany
• 40% of Germans trust
Government, Media, Business,
NGOs.
• Lowest ratings for journalists,
government officials and
regulators, business leaders.
• Only technical and academic
experts are more likely to be
trusted than “a person like
yourself”.
 • Trump in the US, AfD in Germany, National Front in France,
Northern League and Five Star Movement in Italy, UK
Independence Party in the UK.
Rise of populist • Populists have low trust in institutions
parties and • Oppose “the popular will” with the rule of “the cosmopolitan
liberal elite“ (Canovan, 1999, Oliver & Rahn, 2016).
disinformation. • “The people of this country have had enough of experts”
(Conservative MP Michael Gove during Brexit campaign)
• Diffusion of conspiracy theories (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009).
Distrust of science

• Spread of distrust in scientific

recommendations
• On climate change
• On vaccination
• On genetically modified
organisms
• On nutrition
• On evolution

(Van der Linden & Lewandowsky,

2015, Nichols, 2017, Rutjens et
al. 2018)
THE PROBLEMS WITH
EXPERTS
Wrong predictions, ex-post or ex-ante.
Consensual or conflicting advice
Biased or neutral advice
Inapplicable and unwelcome advice
Failures of regulatory institutions: a
few examples
2008–2009 2011–2015 2018
Financial crisis (Crotty, 2009, Roth, Plagiarism in doctoral dissertations. Diesel emissions tests (VW)
2009)
Bad regulatory oversight, under-
estimated systemic risk, biased
credit rating agencies and auditors
(Sikka, 2009, White, 2010)

Greek Financial Crisis

Loss of trust in European institutions Fraud in organ transplants.

2010–2014 2013
Other failures of advising by experts

Economic policy seen to

benefit large banks, large Misleading financial
corporations and the advice (Mullainathan,
wealthy (Pew Research Noeth & Schoar, 2012)
Center, 2015)
Deceptive and confusing
Replication crisis in the
offers (Gabaix & Laibson,
social sciences (Open
2006, Ellison & Ellison,
Science Collaboration,
2009, Gaudeul & Sugden,
2015, Camerer et al,
2012, Heidhues et al.,
2018)
2016)
Wrong predictions
Even correct Predictions are often spelled out as an average.
predictions WILL The outcome is generally not the average
be wrong ex-post.
 Disappointment (Gul, 1991).

Failure to educate E.g. financial advice on investments, house buying, borrowing.

people about
uncertainty
(Tauritz, 2012)

Overconfident Failure in anticipating extent of uncertainty in prediction: calibration

experts (Angner,
2006)

Failure to Wrong models, wrong assumptions, misdirected research (Colander et al, Ch. 13 in Lanteri
anticipate issues & Vromen, 2014)
e.g. diesel engines, nuclear plants, insecticides, asbestos, opioid prescriptions, lead in paint,
etc...
 Wrong predictions
Probability

Correct distribution
ex-ante

Values
25
 Wrong predictions
Over-confident
prediction
Probability

Correct distribution
ex-ante

Values
26
 Wrong predictions
Over-confident
prediction

Biased
Probability

Correct distribution prediction

ex-ante

Values
27
 Wrong predictions
Over-confident
prediction

Biased
Probability

Correct distribution prediction

ex-ante

Unpredicted,
“impossible” result

Values
28
Consensual or conflicting advice

Problem when experts conflict

• Generates uncertainty and thus anxiety (Carleton, 2016).

• E.g. “wicked problems” without clear solutions, such as
immigration, climate protection, diets, fitness, addictions.

Problem when experts agree

• Herding (Banerjee, 1992).

• This leads to lack of responsiveness to new information &
slow response to crises and citizens’ concerns.
Biased advice
Biased, self-serving advice
E.g. medical doctors sponsored by
pharmaceutical firms (Thompson,
1993),
E.g. financial products biased towards
high-commission products (Oehler and
Kohlert, 2009, Mullainathan et al.,
2012, Anagol & Sarkar, 2017)
Perception of bias leads
people to discount advice
(Choo, 1964)
This leads to even more biased advice
(Chung & Harbaugh, 2018).
e.g. warning of catastrophe in case of
Brexit (“project Fear”)...
The impossibility of neutral advice
• Because experts differ
from most people
(Sapienza & Zingales,
2013).
• Because experts may be
paid by different people
than those they advise 
conflicts of interests.
Inapplicable and unwelcome advice

Unhelpful and unrealistic advice that is difficult to follow

• E.g. drive slower, stop using plastic, do not look at your investments…
• E.g. nutrition (Kearney & McElhone, 1999), medication adherence
(Brown & Bussel, 2011), education of kids, vaccination, politics,
climate change.

Unwelcome, unsolicited advice (Fitzsimons & Lehmann,

2004, Sugden, 2016)
•  Information avoidance (Golman, Hagmann and Loewenstein,
2017)
THE PROBLEMS WITH
THOSE WHO RECEIVE
ADVICE

Even the best advice is only as good as the person you give it to.
What experts can offer is not what
people want
What decision-makers What a good adviser offers
• “People tend to select want
experts that offer them
what they want, not what Certainty Uncertainty
would actually help
Control over decisions Delegation of decisions
them.”
• From an economist point Simple solutions Complex plans of actions
of view, this is Understandable advice Specialized technical
provocative. knowledge
• Why? Because
economists generally Personally adapted General recommendations
believe people know best solutions
what they need. Confirmation of beliefs New information
Support for own Alternative possibilities
decisions
Quick results Long term plans
People do not get the information
they need

Overconfidence: Not taking advice when you need it,

ignoring advice when you get it, giving uninformed
advice

Information avoidance: Not getting information that

you know you will not like.
 Overconfidence and advice taking
Seek advice Do not seek advice Do not seek advice Actual accuracy
Level of and need it and need it and do not need it
expertise
(accuracy) Beliefs about
accuracy

Accuracy
of adviser

Individuals

Dunning-Kruger effect and its effect on advice taking.

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 • “explaining without regard to the fact that
the explainee knows more than the
Mansplaining explainer, often done by a man to a
woman” (Lily Rothman)
People ignore information they get

Reactance: Getting information or Motivated beliefs: If information

advice that you do not like can lead contradicts your interests, you will
you to reject it. find ways to ignore it.
Conspiracy
theories

• Are conspiracy theories overly

simple or complex?
• Can we rely on Ockham’s razor?
• No need for complicated
explanations if there is a simpler
one that works.
• But how do you define
simplicity? By the number of
variables needed?
• Next slide: Example from
science, how simplicity is not
always a sign of truth.
Conspiracy
theories
(Mark
Lombardi)
The link between simplicity and truth
• E.g. Ptolemaic model of sun revolving around earth +
circular orbits, was easily compatible with observations
for a while.
• Then it became more complicated to reconcile this with
observations  circular orbits around points on a circle.
• Copernicus et al. found an alternative model that worked with
earth revolving around the sun.
• But this model only became “simpler” once ellipsoidal orbits were
allowed.
People cannot deal with
information they get

Gullibility : Many people lack the intellectual

apparatus to evaluate the credibility of evidence
presented to them.

Inflexibility in habits: A lot of our behavior is

automatic, driven by the context. This is very difficult
to change, even when you want to.
Summary of causes
Problems with those giving information and Problems with those receiving information
advice and advice
• Distant • Overconfident
• Conflicted • Inflexible
• Suspicious • Unreceptive
• Wrong • Resistant
• Undemocratic • Paranoid
• Conformist • Selective
• Overconfident • Gullible
• Inapplicable
 Solutions to a
“wicked” problem
What can be done to
promote trust in experts?
• A “wicked problem” (Rittel & Webber, 1973)
• Whichever way you try to solve the
issue, you make it worse in another
way.
• Many conflicting objectives:
1. Project authority and confidence
and yet make aware of uncertainty.
2. Be neutral and yet have experience.
3. Give personal advice and yet reach
many.
4. Change behavior and yet respect
preferences of advisee.
Possible solutions

• Better selection of good experts.

• Communicating and educating about uncertainty
(Tauritz, 2012)
• Changing the way advice is given.
• Accessible
• Personal
• Effective
Better selection of good experts
Track adviser accuracy over
time (McCoun, 2015)
Imposing standards in terms
of how the advice is to be
given
Education in how to identify
good experts
Possibly based on the “wisdom of
crowds”  ratings, such as for
professors and for doctors
But easily gamed, low incentives…
But disclaimers, for example, get
overseen, cf. investment advice
disclaimers.
But people are notably bad at this;
how can you know someone knows
little if you know nothing?
References
Better selection of good experts
Explain that
• not following the advice does not necessarily mean doing badly.
• following advice does not necessarily lead to doing well.

Making aware of expert biases

• Even though advisers do not recognize own bias (Sah, 2012)
• Even though advisees do not correct for bias (De Meza et al, 2010, Ismayilov &
Potters, 2013)

Encourage seeking second opinions

• Sah & Loewenstein, 2015
• Aggregate advice from different sources.
Communicating uncertainty

People trust confident • Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001,
advisers more than Peterson & Pitz, 1988; Zarnoth & Sniezek, 1997
those who admit • Therefore, experts who admit uncertainty are not
uncertainty followed.

However, advisers who

project confidence and
• Tenney et al, 2007, Tenney, Spellman & McCoun,
are wrong are punished 2008
more than those who
are less confident.
Communicating uncertainty
Communicating uncertainty
• Slovic, P. 1987. “Perception of Risk.” Science 236 (4799):
280–85. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.3563507.
• Put risks in context, e.g. compare a new risk to an old
risk,
• For example, saying that the infection fatality rate of COVID is
between 0.5 and 1% in Western countries may lead people to
make wrong inferences, because some see this as a low
number.
• More than malaria (0.3%) or seasonal influenza (flu, 0.1%).
• Less than Spanish flu (3%?) or cholera (50% if untreated, 1%
with proper rehydration).
Help in making inferences
• (Gigerenzer 1996)  help physicians make correct
inferences from data by
• a) presenting probas as frequencies
• b) relying on “fast and frugal”, and generally correct,
heuristics
• Gigerenzer, Gerd. 1996. “The Psychology of Good Judgment:
Frequency Formats and Simple Algorithms.” Medical Decision Making
16 (3): 273–80.
Making advice accessible and
personal

In person advice is • E.g. behavioral counseling to quit smoking (Orleans et al,

more likely to be taken 1991), promoting adherence to long-term therapies
up. (Sabate, World Health Organization, 2003).

However giving advice • So personal advice is available only to the rich, or for
in person is time- problems that can be solved quickly.
consuming. • Not for the poor, very costly for behavioral issues.

Possible solution: Robo- • Issue: Algorithm aversion: People think they know better
advisers with than the machine (Önkal et al, 2009, Dietvorst, Simmons
automated advice & Massey, 2015, 2016)
Making advice more effective

Address wrong Explain reasons Explain why Give advice Nudges

beliefs and for the advice intuition is gradually
biases of the wrong?
advisee
People are often (Tzioti et al, 2014) Example: Minimize difference Influence action
overconfident and Diversifying, not between advice and without explaining
overvalue their own always best ex- what the person reasons.
initial judgments post… already believes
(Gardner & Berry, Example: Winner's
1995; Harvey & curse, why not bid
Fischer, 1997). what one believes
the good to be
worth?
SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSION
 Summary
Experts need to recognize and consider:

• their own limitations and

• the limitations of the recipients of their advice.

Experts must also be aware of the need to

maintain a balance between conflicting goals

• be neutral and be involved.

• be precise and convey uncertainty.
• suggest improvements but consider the goals and limitations of the
advisee.
• personalize advice, but also automate it.

58
 Conclusion
Confidence in experts is important in a liberal democracy.

• But a degree of distrust may be needed to discipline the experts (MacCoun,

2015).

Towards a more populist form of democracy.

• Participations outside the scientific community in scientific debates.

• It is necessary to further define the rules and methods in this more public
debate.
• Need for better demarcation between...
• scientific evidences.
• social implications.
• political solutions.

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