Legal Ethics Case Digests

Introduction

Aguirre vs. Rana

Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice
of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.

Attorneys - Practice of law means any activity in or out of court which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience; To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which
are usually performed by members of the legal profession.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of
good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this
privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public
trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law
simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that the respondent
passed the bar examinations is immaterial.

Facts: Edwin L. Rana passed the bar examinations in 2001 and was scheduled to take his oath on May
22, 2001. The day before his oath taking, the complainant Donna Aguirre filed against Rana for petition
for denial of admission to the Bar and charged the respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

Aguirre alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May
2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Mandaon, Masbate, filed
pleadings and signed the pleading as counsel.

The Court allowed Rana to take the oath taking to sign the roll of attorneys until he is cleared of the
charges against him. The Office of the Bar Confidant was tasked to investigate and its findings disclosed
that the respondent actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as counsel for the
candidate.

Issue: W/N Rana should be admitted to the Bar?

Ruling: No. The records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan before he took the
lawyers oath. In Cayetano vs. Monsod it ruled that a practice of law means any activity in or out of court
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience; to engage in
the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession

Clearly, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the
MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer.

Cayetano vs. Monsod

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.”

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Atty. Monsod has worked as a lawyer in the law office of his father (1960-1963); an operations officer with
the World Bank Group (1963-1970); Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank (1970-1986); legal or
economic consultant on various companies (1986); Secretary General of NAMFREL (1986); member of
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987); National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and member of the
quasi-judicial Davide Commission (1990).

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the COMELEC.On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent posseses the required qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Monsod possessed the required qualification. In the case of
Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is
whether in or out of court. As such, the petition is dismissed.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine
Bar.
SO ORDERED.

Cruz vs Cabrera

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the
heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone
even contemptuous language.

All lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are
devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.
Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honourably and
fairly. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.

Facts: In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley
Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Cruz alleges that he is a
fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions against his neighbours;
he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases he met Cabrera who acted as the counsel of his
neighbors. In the Pasay City RTC branch presided by Judge Cuerdo, there were heated exchange
between the complainant and the respondent.

Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of compelling the court to ask complainant
whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent
knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior
cases; respondent’s imputations of complainant’s misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice
to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was
handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka
muna!” were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule,
incriminate and discredit the complainant before the public.

Issue: W/N Atty. Cabrera violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for misconduct?

Ruling: No. We hold that respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna” does not
amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such single outburst,
though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a
product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment during an argument between them.
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain
obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves
honorably and fairly. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty.Stanley Cabrera for misconduct
in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however,
admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an officer of the court.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz vs. Mina - Law Student Practice Rule

Law Student Practice Rule

As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138,a law student may appear,
as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

Facts: Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor,
where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En
Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an
agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior
conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent
in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

Issue: Whether the petitioner, a law student,may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party litigant.

Ruling: Yes. Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose,
or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of
an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon 84 SCRA 554 , August 03, 1978 - Imposition of the Membership Dues

Bar Integration;Attorneys;Disbarment;Payment of membership dues; Integration of the Bar, its

concept and purpose. An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must
belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated
Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of
the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of
which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.

Constitutionality and validity of Bar integration sustained by explicit grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court under Art. X of the 1973Constitution resting the Court with plenary power in all
cases regarding admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Facts: The respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll
of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rules of
Court 139-A and the provisions of Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of the IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense
that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a consequence of this, compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes the above provisions of the Rules of Court and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal
force and effect.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his membership fee to the
IBP and be disbarred for not paying his dues.

Held: 1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared
by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. But, assuming that the
questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.

2. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) —
from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the
fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives
and purposes of integration.

3. Whether the practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s right to practice law before the courts
of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the
fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty
may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. But it must be
emphasized that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to
the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such
are legion.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues, He can file
a notice so that he can be exempted from paying the IBP Membership dues

The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population,and this requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition
sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.

It is quite apparent that the IBP fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is
exempt—the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in
the IBP remains, regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is
engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At
most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar
of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have
been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.

Facts: Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of
P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Phil. Civil Service then
migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC
prohibits him to practice his law profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The
compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a
lawyer. His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes to the
deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.

ISSUE: WON inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for IBP annual
membership.

RULING: The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of regulatory measure by
the State, which is a necessary consequence for being a member of the Philippine Bar. The compulsory
requirement to pay the fees subsists for as long as one remains to be a member regardless whether one
is a practicing lawyer or not. Thus, his petition for exemption from paying his IBP membership fee dues is
denied.

Santos, Jr. vs. Llamas 322 SCRA 529 , January 20, 2000 - Membership Dues

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Integrated Bar of the Philippines;Senior Citizens;

A lawyer can engage in the practice of law only bypaying his Integrated Bar of the Philippines dues, and it
doesn't matter that his practice is “limited”; The exemption from payment of income tax granted to senior
citizens by Republic Act No. 7432does not include payment of membership or association dues.

Legal Ethics
;
Attorneys
;
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
;
Senior Citizens
;
A lawyer can engage in the practice of law only bypaying his Integrated Bar of the Philippines dues, and it
does notmatter that his practice is “limited”; The exemption from paymentof income tax granted to senior
citizens by Republic Act No. 7432 does not include payment of membership or association dues.
—
Inaccordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in thepractice of law only by paying his dues,
and it does not matterthat his practice is “limited.” While it is true that R.A. No. 7432,§4 grants senior
citizens “exemption from the payment ofindividual income taxes: provided, that their annual
taxableincome does not exceed the poverty level as determined by theNational Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for thatyear,” the exemption does not include payment of membership
orassociation dues.

A lawyer’s failure to pay his IntegratedBar of the Philippines dues and his misrepresentation in the
pleadings be filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty.—
Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and hismisrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of
one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is
appropriate.

A lawyer, by indicating “Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Rizal 259060” in his pleadings, thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid hisIntegrated Bar of the Philippines due, is
guilty of violating theCode of Professional Responsibility.
—
By indicating “IBP-Rizal259060” in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts
that he had paid his IBP dues to the RizalChapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility which provides: Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.CANON 7—A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION,AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.CANON 10—A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule
10.01—A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

FACTS: This is a complaint against respondent for misrepresentation and non-payment of IBP
membership dues. For years, the respondent does not indicate proper PTR no. in his practice of the law
profession. Now of old age, he contends that he is engaged in the limited practice of his profession and
as a senior citizen, he is exempt from paying taxes and membership dues with the IBP.
ISSUE: WON the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of law
and violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING: No. He is not exempt since Rule 139-A requires all IBP members to pay the annual fee and
failure thereof for 6 months merits suspension of the membership and for 1 year becomes a ground for
removal of the member’s name from the Rolls of Attorney regardless one is a practicing lawyer or not. His
non-renewal of his PTR is a misrepresentation to the public and the courts that he has paid his dues
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall
he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin M.Dacanay

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public interest
that it is both a power and a duty of the State (throughthis Court) to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
the highest degree of morality,faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar
of thePhilippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law.

The loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines—the
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners—except when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225; A Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if
he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225, but, although he is also deemed never to have terminated
his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Facts: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the
Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

Issue: Whether petitioner may still resume practice?

Ruling: Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In
other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country
but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:
● the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;
● the payment of professional tax;
● the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update
him of legal developments and
● the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.

Alawi vs. Alauya 268 SCRA 628 , February 24, 1997

Integrated Bar of the Philippines; The title of“attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the BarExaminations, have been admitted to
the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines and remain members thereof in good standing, and itis they only who
are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Facts: Ashary Alauya transacted with Sophia Alawi to avail of a contract for the purchase of one housing
unit from EB Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd., a real estate and housing company. Shortly thereafter Alauya
wrote to the company expressing his intent to render the contract void ab initio.

Several correspondences ensued, all of which were signed by Alauya as ATTY. ASHARY M. ALAUYA.
Alauya is a member of the Sharia Bar and for that matter he is a counselor-at-law. Alauya claims that he
does not use the title of counselor-at-law for fear of being mistaken as a local legislator, i.e. councilor.
Hence, he affixed the title of attorney before his name.

Alawi filed a verified complaint against Alauya, alleging, among others, that Alawi usurped the title of an
attorney which is reserved only for the members of the Philippine Bar.

Issue: Whether or not Alauya's membership in the Sharia Bar endows him the title of an attorney

Held: No. Alauya is hereby reprimanded for usurping the title of an attorney reserved for those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and had successfully passed the bar
examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in
good standing.

Persons who passed the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Bar and may only practice law
before a Sharia Court, Alauya's disinclination to use the title of counselor-at-law does not warrant his use
of the title of an attorney.
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc. 223 SCRA 378 , June 17, 1993 - Practice of Law by paralegal is limited.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,which requires the application of law, legal
procedures,knowledge, training and experience.

When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law.One
who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney
and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation
regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice
of law.One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of statute, and receives pay for it, is, to
that extent, practicing law.

Lawyers may not advertise their services or expertise. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of ProfessionalEthics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to
indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph tobe published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has
been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation.

Facts: The petitioner contends that the advertisements reproduced by the respondents are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, to which as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed
and offended by the following advertisements:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call:521-0767,
LEGAL 5217232,5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Force Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van
O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7,
1977.

ISSUE:Whether or not, the advertised services offered by the Legal Clinic, Inc., constitutes practice of law
and whether the same are in violation of the Code of Professional responsibility

RULING: The advertisement of the respondent is covered in the term practice of law as defined in the
case of Cayetano vs. Monsod. There is a restricted concept and limited acceptance of paralegal services
in the Philippines. It is allowed that some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been
permitted with a limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable
services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefore.
Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. Canon 3.01 adds that he is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of
the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business (Canon 3.04).

The Canons of Professional Ethics, before the adoption of the CPR, had also warned that lawyers should
not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which
the lawyer have been engaged of concerning the manner of the conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation.

There are existing exceptions under the law on the rule prohibiting the advertisement of a lawyer’s
services. However, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, the court found and held that the same definitely do not
and conclusively cannot fall under any of the exceptions.

The respondent’s defense with the case of Bates vs. State Bar applies only when there is an exception to
the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial
consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be
charged for the specific services.

No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates
case contains a proviso that the exceptions stand therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until
it is implemented by such authority in that state.”

The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and
purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.

Canon 1- 3

In the Matter of JAMES JOSEPH HAMM

Arizona Supreme Court No. SB-04-0079-M
211 Ariz 458, 123 p.3d 652, 2005

Petitioners: James Hamm

Petition: To review the recommendation provided by Committee on Character and Fitness (the
Committee) denying the Petitioner’s application for admission to the State Bar of Arizona (the Bar).

NOT YET FULLY REHABILITATED BECAUSE HE DID NOT TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY AND
PINNING THE CRIME TO HIS ACCOMPLICES.
UPRIGHT CHARACTER -

FACTS:

Hamm, the Petitioner, was sentenced to life in prison for one-count of first degree murder to which he pled
guilty. Prior to serving his sentence, Hamm had been separated from his wife with whom he had a son
and had supported himself by selling and using marijuana, other drugs and drinking alcohol.

The crime for which Hamm was sentenced to life imprisonment is for the murder of Morley and Well, who
were killed by Hamm along with two accomplices, Garland Wells and Bill Reeser. The three robbed and
killed Morley and Well by shooting them with a gun and leaving their bodies lying in the dessert.

While in prison, Hamm exhibited good conduct and became a model prisoner which earned him a
conditioned parole. Hamm was released after serving nearly seventeen years in prison. From conditioned
parole, Hamm absolutely discharged on December 2001.

While on parole, Hamm graduated from the Arizona State University College of Law. In July 1999, Hamm
passed the Arizona bar examination and, in 2004, filed his Character and Fitness Report with the
Committee.

In its report, the Committee stated that, in reaching its conclusions, it considered the following:

• Hamm’s unlawful conduct, which included the commission of two violent “execution style”
murders and his testimony as to the facts surrounding the murders
• Hamm’s omissions on his Application and his testimony in explaining his failure to disclose all
required information.
• Hamm’s neglect of his financial responsibilities and/or violation of a longstanding child support
court order and his testimony as to his failure to comply with the court order.
• Hamm’s mental or emotional instability impairing his ability to perform the functions of an attorney
including his testimony as to any diagnosis and treatment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Hamm can be admitted to the Bar.

HELD: No, the Supreme Court decided that Hamm failed to prove his burden that he is of good moral
character on the following grounds:

Hamm failed to show rehabilitation from past criminal conduct by not accepting full responsibility for
serious criminal misconduct - Staples’ murder although he accepted responsibility for the death of Morley.

Hamm was not completely up-front in his testimony to the murder of which he claims that he only
intended to rob and not to kill. This is contrary to the facts – he accepted the gun and brings it with him in
the car, shot Morley without attempting robbery and shot hit again to ensure he is dead and shot Staples
when he attempted to escape.

Hamm’s failure to fulfill his long overdue obligation to support his child who he was aware existed.
Hamm’s failure to disclose the incident involving him and his wife, Donna, when he submitted his
application to the Committee. This incident gave rise to Hamm being questioned by the law enforcers
which should have been reflected by Hamm in the application – Question 25.

Hamm’s act of quoting lines from Supreme Courts’ decision and use the same in the introduction for his
petition.
Soriano vs. Dizon 480 SCRA 1 , January 25, 2006

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to
uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character. In the instant
case,the respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated
homicide.

Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness of depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,modesty, or good morals.

We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is
an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes
at least common honesty

No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness

Because they are vanguards of the lawand the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the

FACTS: Atty Manuel Dizon was driving under the influence of alcohol along Abanao st. in Baguio city
when a taxi overtook him. Enraged, Dizon tailed the taxi, pulled it over and berated and threatened
Roberto Soriano, the taxi driver. To stop the aggression, Soriano opened his door which caused Dizon to
fall to the pavement. Soriano tried to help Dizon up but had to punch Dizon because he was going to
punch him. Soriano prevented another attempt by Dizon to hit him. Dizon went back to his car to get his
gun, the handle wrapped in a handkerchief. Dizon shot Soriano who was then picking up Dizon
Eyeglasses to return it to him. After shooting Soriano, Dizon sped off with his car and left him to die on the
street. The bullet hit Soriano in the neck and lacerated his carotid artery. According to the doctors who
treated Soriano, he would have easily died if not for the timely medical assistance. Nevertheless,the left
side of Soriano's body was paralyzed, leaving him unable to drive anymore.

A complaint for Frustrated Homicide was filed against Dizon by Soriano. Dizon was eventually found guilty
but was allowed probation. One of the conditions of the probation is the payment of the civil liabilities.
Four years after the judgment was rendered, Dizon has not yet fulfilled his civil obligation to Soriano. A
Complaint-Affidavit for disbarment was filed by Soriano before the Commission on BarDiscipline (CBD) of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Dizon was declared in default and an ex-parte hearing was
held.

The Commissioner of the CBD recommended to the IBP the disbarment of Dizon for violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. The IBP adopted the recommendation of the Commissioner and sent its resolution to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:

1.Whether the crime committed by Atty Dizon involved moral turpitude.

2.Whether Atty Dizon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, warranting his disbarment

Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Commissioner that the frustrated homicide
committed by Atty Dizon was attended by moral turpitude. The Court defined moral turpitude as
everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,
vileness of depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general,contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.Atty Dizon exhibited moral
turpitude when he shot a taxi driver for no valid reason. His act did not constitute self-defense. In fact, he
was the aggressor. It was him who first tried to punch the other.

Soriano was merely defending himself and fending off the aggression when he counterpunched
Dizon.Furthermore, the trial court also ruled that the crime was committed with treachery. Dizon shot
Sorianowhen he was not in a position to defend himself. Soriano was picking up Dizon's eyeglasses
which fell on the road when Dizon fell to return it to him when he was shot. Furthermore, Dizon tried to
escape punishment by wrapping the handle of his gun in a handkerchief. He intended not to leave
fingerprints on the gun he used.

2nd Issue: The Supreme Court also ruled that there was indeed a violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 provides that lawyers must obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.

Atty Dizon was in violation of the law because he was in illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm. He
also failed to obey the lawful orders of the trial court when he failed to settle his civil liabilities, a condition
for the grant of the probation.Atty Dizon also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.

Dizon tried to reach an out-of-court settlement with the family of Soriano but when the negotiations failed,
he instead made it look like it was the family who approached him to get a referral to a neurosurgeon. In
addition, Dizon fabricated a story saying that it was Soriano and two other persons who mauled him.
According to three doctors, there was no proof of assault on Soriano.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude mayrelate, not to the exercise of the profession of
lawyers, butcertainly to their good moral character.

Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for
their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may
be justified in suspending or removing them from that office.

Dispositive Position: WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON ishereby DISBARRED, and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of thisDecision be entered in his
record as a member of the Bar;and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Barof the
Philippines, and on the Office of the CourtAdministrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
IRRI vs NLRC - homicide in relation to employment. Illegal dismissal involving moral turpitude.

Facts: In 1977, it hired private respondent Nestor B. Micosa as laborer and was bounded by IRRI’s Policy
of An employer who has been convicted of a (sic) criminal offense involving moral turpitude may be
dismissed from the service.’

On February 6, 1987, Micosa stabbed to death one Reynaldo Ortega inside a beer house in Los Baños,
Laguna and was found guilty. During the pendency of the criminal case, Micosa voluntarily applied for
inclusion in IRRI’s Special Separation Program. However, on January 9, 1990, IRRI’s Director General,
Klaus L. Lampe expressed deep regret that he had to disapprove Micosa’s application for separation
because of IRRI’s desire to retain the skills and talents that persons like him possess, his employment
was approved by the Director General.

However, IRRI’s Human Resource Head wrote Micosa urging him to resign letter insisting that the crime
for which he was convicted involves moral turpitude and informing him that he is thereby charged of
violating IRRI’s Personnel Manual. Micosa did not resign and insisted that his acts were of self defense.
However, he was illegally dismissed by IRRI, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the acts of Micosa involves moral turpitude.

Held: No, the acts of Micosa does not automatically involve moral turpitude. It is evident that Moral
turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing citing In Re Basa and Tak Ng v. Republic as everything which
is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. However, it is
important to note that only the Supreme Court has the power to determine whether a crime involves moral
turpitude.

In the case at bar, IRRI failed to recognize the significance of the facts that show Micosa’s intention was
not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of
the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any
aggravating circumstances demonstrate that Micosa’s character and intentions were not inherently vile,
immoral or unjust. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every
known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.

It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which
must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.

TOTALITY OF FACTS AND NOT THE DESIGNATION OF CRIME THAT WILL DETERMINE
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE
Linsangan vs. Tolentino 598 SCRA 133 , September 04, 2009 - Violation of Code of Professional
Responsibiity

Facts: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services. Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients to transfer legal representation and offered financial assistance. To induce them to
hire their services, he persistently called them and sent text messages.

To support his allegations, complainants presented sworn affidavit attesting that the paralegal tried to
prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent's services
instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.

Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labiano’s calling card which appears as follows:

FRONT
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO LAW OFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano Paralegal

BACK
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS ABROAD.

Issue: W/N Tolentino violated the provisions under Code of Professional Responsibility?

Ruling. Yes, Atty. Tolentino violated provisions under CPR. Canon 3 of the CPR provides that A LAWYER
IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED
AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS. Lawyers are reminded that to allow a
lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the
public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every
member of the bar is called.
Rule 2.03 provides A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED
PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS where lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers and

Rule 1.03 where it provides A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST,
ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN’S CAUSE This rule proscribes
“ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business byan attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.

Complainant presented substantial evidence (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same
persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited
legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.Although respondent initially denied knowing
Labianoin his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing. Through Labiano’s actions,
respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the
strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.

considering these violations, Tolentino was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year and is
STERNLY WARNED.

Teves vs. Commission on Elections 587 SCRA 1 , April 28, 2009

Facts:
· Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros
Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections.
· Respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is
prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991.
· Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office.
· The COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member of
House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.
· Upon MR, COMELEC en banc denied the motion saying that since petitioner lost in the last 14 May
2007 congressional elections, it thereby rendered the instant MR moot and academic.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.

Ruling:

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer;
2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he
either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited
from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.

Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is
when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited
from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.
· In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary
or financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of
1991.
o The evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia,
Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question.
o Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he
would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they
remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be
presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
o Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of
the LGC of 1991.

However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved
moral turpitude.

Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness of depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,modesty, or good morals.

A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered.
Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.

The Court clarified that not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that
"as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the
foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral
turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not.

Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or
not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the
act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.

Consequently, considering all circumstances, the Court held that petitioner’s conviction does not
involve moral turpitude.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal
with the activity as it sees fit.

Zari vs. Flores

Facts: Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI City Court of Quezon City, recommended the
dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court, on
grounds of moral turpitude by his conviction of libel, persistent attempts to unduly influence the
complainant amounting to undue interest in cases pending before Branch VI and gross discourtesy to
superior officers as manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified use of strong and contemptuous
language in addressing the City Judges.

Issue: Whether or not respondent’s acts on libel constitute moral turpitude?

Whether or not he should be suspended in office?

Held: No, the Supreme Court seems to imply that libel is not a crime involving moral turpitude and his
acts of libel does not automatically constitute moral turpitude. The mere filing of an information for libel, or
serious slander, against a municipal officer is not a ground for suspending him from office, as such
offenses do not necessarily involve moral turpitude.

While it is true that moral turpitude has been defined as including any act done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals. Some of the particular crimes which have been held to involve moral
turpitude are adultery, concubinage, rape,bigamy, arson and libel.

It implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not
merely be mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not
its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.

Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in the fact of their being positively prohibited.

In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10, 1969, the
respondent stated that I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have no administrative,
criminal or police record. This claim is not true because the respondent had been convicted of libel in
Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence dated April 28,
1967.

This prevarication in a sworn statement is a ground for serious disciplinary action. That in his
accomplished Civil Service Form No. 212 which was subscribed and sworn to, the respondent admits
having acted as counsel for three companies; and that the giving of legal advice by notaries and others
who are not admitted to the practice of law is dangerous to the welfare of the community, because such
persons have not demonstrated their capacity by submitting to examinations lawfully established in the
practice of law.

The respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others as reflected in his letter
toJudge Minerva C. Genovea, then Executive Judge of the City Court of Quezon City which contains
defamatory and uncalled for language

The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending in Branch VI of the City Court
of Quezon City, presided by the complainant, show that the respondent had exerted undue influence in
the disposition of the cases mentioned therein.

Respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is dismissed as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the City Court of
Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with prejudice to reinstatement in the national
and local governments, as well as, in any government instrumentality or agency including government
owned or controlled corporations.
17. Barrientos vs. Daarol 218 SCRA 30 , January 29, 1993 - open full text

FACTS:
Complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college student, and was about 20 years and 7 months old
during the time (July-October 1975) of her relationship with respondent, while respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol is married, 41 years old at the time of the said relationship. Respondent is married to Romualda A.
Sumaylo with whom be has a son, and that said respondent had been separated from his wife for about
16 years at the time of his relationship with complainant.

Respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for quite sometime. He courted complainant, and
after a week of courtship, complainant accepted respondent's love on July 7, 1973; that in the evening of
August 20, 1973, complainant with her parents' permission was respondent's partner during the Chamber
of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at about 10:00 o'clock that evening,
they left the place but before going home, they went to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the
jeep at the beach, where there were no houses around; that after the usual preliminaries, they
consummated the sexual act and at about midnight they went home; that after the first sexual act,
respondent used to have joy ride with complainant which usually ended at the airport where they used to
make love twice or three times a week; that as a result of her intimate relations, complainant became
pregnant. He assured that he will marry the complainant.

That after a conference among respondent, complainant and complainant's parents, it was agreed that
complainant would deliver her child in Manila, where she went with her mother on October 22, 1973 by
boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and, stayed with her brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong,
Manila; that respondent visited her there on the 26th, 27th and 28th of October 1973, and again in
February and March 1974; that later on complainant decided to deliver the child in Cebu City in order to
be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went there in April 1974 and her sister took her to the Good Shepherd
Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby girl at the Perpetual
Succor Hospital in Cebu City and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that about the last week of June 1974
she went home to Dipolog City; that during her stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the respondent
defrayed some of her expenses; that she filed an administrative case against respondent with the
National Electrification Administration; which complaint, however, was dismissed; and then she instituted
the present disbarment proceedings against respondent.

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20,1975, complainant Victoria C. Barrientos seeks
thedisbarment of respondent Transfiguracion Daarol, member of the Philippine Bar, on grounds of deceit
and grossly immoral conduct

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Daarol is grossly immora and should be disbarred?

HELD: Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed love and marriage to
complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor, knowing that he did not have the required legal capacity.
Respondent then succeeded in having carnal relations with complainant by deception, made her
pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the child.
Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.

By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has
amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the
Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules ofCourt) is in order.
Good moral character is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138,Rules of
Court) and is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification which all lawyers
must possess otherwise, a lawyer may either be suspended or disbarred.

as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting
those moral standards.
18. Narag vs. Narag 291 SCRA 451 , June 29, 1998

Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law,but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar. Thus,good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. Hence,
when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.

Immoral conduct is that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference
to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.

FACTS: Atty. Dominador Narag was alleged to have abandoned his family for his paramour who was
once his student in tertiary level. The administrative complaint of disbarment was filed by her wife, Mrs.
Julieta Narag. Respondent filed motion to dismiss because allegedly the complainant fabricated the story
as well as the love letters while under extreme emotional confusion arising from jealousy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Narag committed a grossly immoral conduct and violatied of CPR

HELD: Atty. Dominador Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to refute the testimony
given against him and it was proved that his actions were of public knowledge and brought disrepute and
suffering to his wife and children. Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of
every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral
integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law. (Canons 1&7, Rule
7.03, Code of Ethics for Lawyers) It is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a
continuing qualification for all members. Hence when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct,
he may be suspended or disbarred.

Grossly immoral means it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be

reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency.

As a lawyer, one must not only refrain from adulterous relationships but must not behave in a way that
scandalizes the public by creating a belief that he is flouting those moral standards

WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
fromthe Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be in the personal record of Respondent
Narag; and furnished to allcourts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,and the Office
of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
19. Royong vs. Oblena 7 SCRA 859 , April 30, 1963 - Disbarment of Oblena because of illicit affairs
- open full text

Facts: The respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and bench was charged with rape which
resulted to pregnancy by Josefina Royong. Ariston Oblena admitted that he had illicit relations with the
complainant and had a successful carnal relationship with her while living an adulterous life with her
common law wife who was married to another man.

The Solicitor General later found out that the respondent is not guilty of rape but is complained a case of
misconduct charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to
the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles maintaining
illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of
public confidence and unfit andunsafe to manage the legal business of others, and prayingthat this Court
render judgment ordering “the permanent removal of the respondent x x x from his office as a lawyerand
the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys.”

Issue: Whether or not Oblena should be disbarred because he does not possess good moral
character?

Ruling: Yes, Oblena should be disbarred. The Court ruled that the continued possession of a fair private
and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in
the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment
even though the statutes do not specify that as ground for disbarment.

As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good
moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known.

Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to
the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed
to have accused to his utatus, did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment
that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
Ui vs. Bonifacio

Adm. Case No. 3319, June 8, 2000

Facts:

Complainant Lesli Ui found out that her husband Carlos Ui was carrying out an illicit relationship with
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot two children. Hence, a complaint for disbarment was
filed by complainant against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the
complainant’s husband.

It is respondent’s contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married
abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil status, she cut off all
her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her.

Issue:

Whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred
from the practice of law.

Held:

The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, was
dismissed.

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty.Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew
andbelieved him to be single. Respondent fell in love with himand they got married and as a result of such
marriage, shegave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of thetrue civil status of Carlos Ui, she
left him.

All the facts taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it
was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community.

Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it
must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal
profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the
mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites
for admission to the practice of law are:

● he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

● a resident thereof;
● at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
● a person of good moral character
● he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
● possess the required educational qualifications; and
● pass the bar examinations

Teves vs. Commission on Elections 587 SCRA 1 , April 28, 2009

Facts:
· Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros
Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections.
· Respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is
prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991.
· Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office.
· The COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member of
House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.
· Upon MR, COMELEC en banc denied the motion saying that since petitioner lost in the last 14 May
2007 congressional elections, it thereby rendered the instant MR moot and academic.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.
Ruling:

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general.

The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer;
2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he
either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited
from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.

Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is
when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited
from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.
· In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary
or financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of
1991.
o The evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia,
Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question.
o Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he
would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they
remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be
presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
o Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of
the LGC of 1991.

However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved
moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be
considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral
but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.

The Court clarified that not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that
"as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the
foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral
turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not.

Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or
not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the
act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.

Consequently, considering all circumstances, the Court held that petitioner’s conviction does not
involve moral turpitude.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal
with the activity as it sees fit.

Kenneth R. Mariano v. Atty. Jose N. Laki, A.C. 11978, Sept 25, 2018 (Canon 1, 16, 11) - annulment
case which did not materialize lawyer lied.

Facts: On January 7, 2009, Mariano alleged that he approached Atty. Laki to engage his legal services for
the filing of a petition for annulment of his marriage. Atty. Laki then informed him to prepare the amount of
P160,000.00, representing a package deal for his professional fee, docket fee and expenses for the
preparation and filing of the petition, subject to an advance payment of P50,000.00. Mariano expressed
surprise over the huge amount that Atty. Laki was asking, thus, the latter assured him that he could
secure a favorable decision even without Mariano's personal appearance since he will file the petition for
annulment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac which is presided by a "friendly judge" and is
known to be receptive to annulment cases.

Mariano proceeded to pay the requested amount by Atty. Laki. For almost a year thereafter, Mariano
followed up with Atty. Laki the status of the petition. Several attempts of reaching Atty. Laki but to no
success. These then prompted Mariano to instead demand the return of his money considering that it was
apparent that Atty. Laki failed to fulfill his duty as lawyer to file the petition for annulment. Mariano filed the
instant disbarment complaint against Atty. Laki for dishonesty, unprofessional conduct and violations of
the CPR.

Issue: W/N Atty. Laki violated CPR?

Ruling: Yes, In the instant case, first, Atty. Laki received money from his client for the purpose of fling a
petition but he failed to do so; second, after his failure to render legal service despite the receipt of
acceptance fee, he also unjustifiably refused to return the money he received; third, he grossly
disrespected the IBP by ignoring its directives to file his answer to the complaint and appear at the
mandatory hearings; and lastly, Atty. Laki maligned the Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases
are won, not on the merits, but through close ties with the judges.

The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin every lawyer to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. Lawyers are prohibited from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and are mandated to serve their clients with
competence and diligence. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity
which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity
of the profession.

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code provides that "[lawyers] shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, lawyers become guardians of the law and indispensable
instruments for the orderly administration of justice. As such, they can be disciplined for any conduct, in
their professional or private capacity, which renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.

FERNANDO A. FLORA III , complainant, vs. ATTY. GIOVANNI A. LUNA ,

Respondent. - lawyer lied for accepting attorney fees when it can be settled in the barangay.
Facts: Flora alleged that he engaged the legal services of respondent relative to certain criminal
cases for grave threats, grave coercion, grave oral defamation and unjust vexation
which he intended to file against an Indian national. Respondent charged the complainant 43 500 pesos
which constitutes the acceptance fee and appearance fee. However, it did not materialize as the
complaint can be settled in the barangay. By reason of this he demanded the return of his money as there
is no filing of petition which materialized, Luna got angry and indicated that the amount he asked are not
enough for the services he offered. Hence, an administrative complaint was filed against him to which he
was required to respond by the IBP. No response was provided by Atty. Luna.

Issue: Whether or not his acts violated the CPR?

Held: Yes. In the case, The respondent received from complainant the amount of P43,500.00 as payment
for his supposed legal services. But, as it turned out, no actual case was filed in court, for they were
settled at the barangay level. Therefore, and as the IBP-CBD had correctly pointed out, there was no
reason at all for respondent to retain the money, or even ask for it in the first place, because during the
mediation proceedings at the barangay, the parties need not be represented by lawyers.

It was improper for respondent to have obtained the payment of legal fees simply because there was no
need for his services at the barangay level where the appearance of lawyers is not required. That
respondent insisted on collecting the fees was not only absurd, but also unjust.

Lawyers are reminded by Canon 1 that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Angelito Cabalida v. Atty Solomon A Lobrido, Jr. and Danny L. Pondevilla, A.C. 7972 Oct 3, 2018
(Canon 1, 18, Rule 18.03, Rule 8.02)

Petitioner Angelito Cabalida believes that he had been wronged by both respondents-lawyers on account
of which he lost a piece of real estate property. Cabalida availed the legal services of herein respondent
Atty. Solomon Lobrido (Atty. Lobrido) for purposes of representing him in a civil action for Ejectment
against Alpiere and Salili. For their part, Alpiere and Salili availed the legal services of herein respondent
Atty. Danny L. Pondevilla. Cabalida asserts in his complaint that respondents colluded to dispossess him
of his property. Atty. Pondevilla was already a member of Lobrido's law firm as early as their initial
meeting for the amicable settlement of Civil Case No. 30337.

In the said meeting, respondents convinced Cabalida that the best course of action for him was to obtain
a loan in order to come up with P250,000.00 as payment to Alpiere. This was made even after the
respondents learned that Cabalida was in communication with a prospective buyer who was willing to
purchase the property for P1,300,000.00.

The complaint also provides that Atty. Lobrido did not assist Cabalida when he entered into the
Memorandum of Agreement. Atty. Lobrido also made it appear that his withdrawal as counsel was due to
Cabalida's insistence when it was Atty. Lobrido himself who advised Cabalida to look for a new counsel as
his work was already over. Thus, Cabalida claims that the unethical acts of respondents clearly violated
the Code of Ethics.

Respondents took advantage of their knowledge of the law as against him who was not even a high
school graduate. On the other hand, Atty. Lobrido denies that Atty. Pondevilla joined his law firm as early
as the initial meeting for the amicable settlement of Civil Case No. 30337. Atty. Lobrido also avers that he
was not consulted nor was a privy to the Memorandum of Agreement. He learned of the Memorandum of
Agreement only after it was submitted to the MTCC. Finally, Atty. Lobrido states that Cabalida consented
to his withdrawal as counsel because it was for reasons of propriety since Atty. Pondevilla was about to
join their law firm. Atty. Lobrido has not kept track of the case thereafter. Atty. Pondevilla professed that
the idea of mortgaging the property came from Cabalida and his brokers. As to the circumstances
surrounding the Memorandum of Agreement, Atty. Pondevilla avers that Cabalida fully understood its
contents and that it has been notarized by another lawyer.

Finally, Atty. Pondevilla claims that he joined Atty. Lobrido's law office only after he withdrew as counsel of
Alpiere and Salili. Comm. Reyes recommended that both respondents be meted a penalty of six (6)
months suspension for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP Board of Governors
reversed and dismissed the case. Cabalida filed a Motion for Reconsideration and prayed for a harsher
penalty of suspension or disbarment with payment of damages amounting to PhP1,000,000.00. IBP
denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the Board of Governors of the IBP gravely erred in exonerating respondents despite the
commission of acts violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (YES)

RULING: After a thorough review of the records, the Court adopts the findings of Comm. Reyes but
modifies the penalty to be imposed on one of the respondents. At the outset, the records do not support
Cabalida's allegations that respondents colluded to deprive him of his property. Cabalida failed to
convince that respondents were colleagues as early as the initial meeting for the amicable settlement.

While Cabalida fully recounted his encounter with Pondevilla which led to the creation of the Trust
Agreement and the Memorandum of Agreement, the participation of Atty. Lobrido has always been
narrated vaguely. Cabalida also submitted an envelope bearing the office address of Atty. Lobrido which
included Atty. Pondevilla as one of the partners. The envelope is however dated April 13, 2009 which is
almost three years after Atty. Lobrido withdrew as Cabalida's counsel. No conflict of interest can thus be
attributed to respondents during this period. The MTCC Order dated May 17, 2006 however bares the
participation of the respondents in the Memorandum of Agreement.

It is a fundamental rule that official duty is presumed to have been performed regularly, thus it is
presumed that the aforementioned court order has been furnished accordingly to Atty. Lobrido. Atty.
Lobrido's bare denial of knowledge of the negotiations for and the submission of the Memorandum of
Agreement must fail. His failure to represent Cabalida in the negotiations for the Memorandum of
Agreement shows gross neglect and indifference to his client's cause. Hence, there was abject failure to
observe due diligence.

Atty. Lobrido has therefore violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon
18.03. The Court fully adopts the findings of Comm. Reyes that Atty. Lobrido failed to render proper legal
assistance to his client and imposes upon him six (6) months suspension from the practice of law. On the
other hand, the MTCC Order also reflects that Atty. Pondevilla prepared the Memorandum of Agreement.

The uncontroverted facts of the decision of the MTCC dated September 17, 2007 further suggests that
Atty. Pondevilla actively participated in the negotiation of the Memorandum of Agreement. Atty.
Pondevilla's participation in the negotiation for the Memorandum of Agreement ensued when he relayed
Alpiere's terms to Cabalida. The same terms that Pondevilla relayed to Cabalida were then it faithfully
stated in the Memorandum of Agreement. Thus, Pondevilla cannot dilute his role in the creation of the
Memorandum of Agreement to that of a spectator. The notary public's presence also does not remedy the
situation especially that his obligation is only towards ensuring the authenticity and due execution of the
instrument. Atty. Pondevilla knew that Atty. Lobrido was Cabalida's counsel thus he should have, at the
very least, given notice to Atty. Lobrido prior to submission of the Memorandum of Agreement to court.
Atty. Pondevilla's actions violated Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
negotiated with Cabalida without consulting Atty. Lobrido. This failure of Atty. Pondevilla, whether by
design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of a canon of professional ethics and in utter
disregard of a duty owing to a colleague.

For these infractions, the Court imposes upon Atty. Pondevilla a penalty of six months suspension from
the practice of law in line with jurisprudence. On another point, by his admissions, Atty. Pondevilla was
engaged in the practice of law while also employed as a City Legal Officer. Atty. Pondevilla thus engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law, in violation of Section 7 (b) (2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, in relation to
Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of 1986, which prohibits government officials or employees from
engaging in the private practice of their profession unless: 1) they are authorized by their department
heads, and 2) that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions. A penalty of
another six months suspension from the practice of law is further imposed on Atty. Pondevilla, thus
bringing his suspension to a period of one year.
AAA v. Atty. Antonio N. Delos Reyes, A.C.10021, 10022, Sept 18, 2018 (Canon 1 and 7) - gross
immoral conduct - SO MANY FEELS IN THIS CASE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Facts: Before the Court are two administrative complaints filed by complainant AAA seeking the
disbarment of respondent Atty. Antonio De Los Reyes (respondent Atty. De Los Reyes) on the grounds of
sexual harassment and gross immoral conduct. AAA claims that respondent Atty. De Los Reyes violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility when he committed acts which are unlawful, dishonest, immoral
and deceitful which warrant his disbarment.

Issue: The issue in this case is whether or not respondent Atty. De Los Reyes committed acts amounting
to sexual harassment and gross immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which would warrant his disbarment.

Held: In the Report and Recommendation dated June 6, 2011, the CBD-IBP Commissioner found
respondent Atty. De Los Reyes guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended the penalty of one (1) year suspension. The Investigating Commissioner opined that there
was no indication that AAA was not telling the truth, and that she acceded to the numerous incidents of
sexual intercourse because of fear of reprisals or consequences if she refused.
Olazo vs. Tinga

Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga
(respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged with violating Rule
6.02,1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting
interests.

Facts: Olazo filed a sales application covering a parcel of land which was segregated and declared open
for dispositio pursuant to Proclamation no 172. The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of
Lands and the respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the
Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondent’s district includes the areas
covered by the proclamations.

The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02

In the complaint, the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and
as a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales
application because of his personal interest over the subject land, prevails upon the complainant’s father
to accept money as payment of the respondent’s alleged rights over the subject land and brokered to
transfer rights between the complainant’s father and the respondent’s deceased wife’s nephew.

The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

The second charge involves another parcel of land belonging to the complainant’s brother where he
alleged that the respondent persuaded Manuel Olazo, the father to direct Manuel Olazo, the brother to
convey his rights to the nephew of the respondent and met with them for the purpose of nullifying the
conveyance of rights. The respondent in this regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he
was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

The Third Charge Violation of Rule 1.01

The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in
the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
alleged that during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the
complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for
deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their conflicting claims and their respective
supporting documents were before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This
office ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis of the
decision of the Secretary of the DENR.

Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
since the provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law to
engage in private law practice and to those who, though prohibited from engaging in the practice
of law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are in the active practice of law. In this
regard, the respondent had already completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the Committee
on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.

Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting
applications of the complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were not
submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was still a member.

Issue: W/N the respondent’s actions constitute a breach of standard ethical conduct by practicing law
after his separation from the government service.

Held:

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in
the discharge of his duties as a government official. He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only
when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. Since public office is a public trust, the
ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the standards for those in
private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public
accountability.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the
government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene"
which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the proceeding.
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the sales application
covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed
to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law.