The Beginning of Happiness

or composition) if the culture uses it as a score (or notation or composition). If

we are to enjoy and value these scores, we should find a way of explaining them
on their own terms, just as we have ways of explaining Pictures at an Exhibition or
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. This leads us to the performer and the question
of a happy performance.

the third approach: the pursuit of happiness

So far I have shown the general physical features that we find in the fixed score,
its typology. Is the piece written in text or graphic notation, or is it a mixture
of the two? What does the piece specify that the performer must do, and what
does it suggest that the performer do? I will look at other elements later in the
case studies. We have looked at the (linguistic) transmission of the musical idea
from composer to performer and to the listener, as well as the division between
them. What does the composer supply, what does the performer take in, and
what does she add to the score? Now we shall examine musical possibilities
from the point of the performer, again using linguistics.10
J. L. Austin famously distinguished between constative utterances (state-
ments of fact) and performative utterances (statements of intent) (Austin
1975, 6∏.).11 Austin characterised constative statements as “true” (I live in
Leicester, England) or “false” (I was born on Mars), and performative state-
ments as “happy” (achievable: I will eat dinner tonight) and “unhappy” (possi-
ble or likely failure: I will lose five kilos by next week) (Austin 1975, 3, 13–15).12
The score itself is constative (everything on it exists), but most of its content is
performative (stating what the performer should do, such as “play a crotchet
A440”), as is its indeterminacy (implying what the performer may do, such as
“rubato”). Austin’s original formulation was seen to be limited when applied
to language,13 but music is a different form of communication than language.
A score does not engage in debate or ask questions, so there is little need for
Austin’s subclasses of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary utter-
ances. I will therefore only examine performative utterances in the score and
their performances as relatively happy or unhappy outcomes.
Indeterminate music is ideal for the application of “happiness.” Different
performances of a piece may show a familial identity in audition; despite the
different environmental sounds in each performance, 4’33” remains the “silent
piece.” Other pieces may sound completely different in each performance.
Some scores (especially symbolic scores such as Four Systems) allow a small

10 Word Events: Perspectives on Verbal Notation (2012), ed. John Lely and James Saunders, appeared too late for
detailed consideration here, but its first chapter (the most relevant to the discussion here) presents a
static grammar of the compositions, with features of scores related to parts of speech. This composi-
tional approach (adapted in part from a grammar guide for lawyers) ignores the role that performance
plays in the musical idea and identity of a text piece.
11 Lawrence Kramer referred to these utterances as a division between “modern” and “postmodern” musi-
cology, and to “meaning” in common-practice music, but he did little else with them (Kramer 1995, 11;
2011, 83).
12 Kramer used “successful or unsuccessful” (Kramer 1990, 7).
13 Keith Graham called it “stultifying” (1977, 1–2).

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