PFRL#12 19

Assignment No.
12 – CivRev PERFAM
[94]
G.R. No. 183965 September 18, 2009
JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE NGO CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution
dated 25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 24, which
granted the demurrer to evidence of respondent Jose Ngo Chua, resulting in the dismissal
of Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB.
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a Petition 1 for the
issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent. The Complaint was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 24.
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit
relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had two children, namely,
petitioner and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended to Irene when the latter was giving
birth to petitioner on 27 April 1959, and instructed that petitioner’s birth certificate be filled
out with the following names: "ALFREDO F. SURPOSA" as father and "IRENE DUCAY" as
mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s father, and Ducay was the
maiden surname of Irene’s mother. Respondent financially supported petitioner and Allan.
Respondent had consistently and regularly given petitioner allowances before she got
married. He also provided her with employment. When petitioner was still in high school,
respondent required her to work at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his family.
She was later on able to work at the Gaisano- Borromeo Branch through respondent’s
efforts. Petitioner and Allan were introduced to each other and became known in the
Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children. During petitioner’s wedding,
respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative, and it was the
latter who acted as father of the bride. Respondent’s relatives even attended the baptism
of petitioner’s daughter.2
In his Answer3 to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003, respondent denied that he had
an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter.4 Hearings then ensued
during which petitioner testified that respondent was the only father she knew; that he took
care of all her needs until she finished her college education; and that he came to visit her
on special family occasions. She also presented documentary evidence to prove her claim
of illegitimate filiation. Subsequently, on 27 March 2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to
Evidence5 on the ground that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had already been barred by res judicata in Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24.
Page 1 of 486
Assignment No. 12 – CivRev PERFAM
It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27 October
2003, petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of
illegitimate affiliation against respondent. It was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 8830-
CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 9. Petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a
Compromise Agreement in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, which was approved by
RTC-Branch 9 in a Decision6 dated 21 February 2000. The full contents of said Decision
reads:
Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the parties on February 18,

2000, praying that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, the terms and
conditions of which follows:
"1. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that there
is no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one
hand and [herein respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration,
admission or acknowledgement is concurred with petitioner’s brother Allan, who
although not a party to the case, hereby affixes his signature to this pleading and
also abides by the declaration herein.
2. As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner and her brother’s (Allan)
civil, monetary and similar claims but without admitting any liability, [respondent]
JOSE NGO CHUA hereby binds himself to pay the petitioner the sum of TWO
MILLION PESOS (₱2,000,000.00) and another TWO MILLION PESOS
(₱2,000,000.00) to her brother, ALLAN SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother
hereby acknowledge to have received in full the said compromise amount.
3. Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they have absolutely no
more claims, causes of action or demands against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA,
his heirs, successors and assigns and/or against the estate of Catalino Chua, his
heirs, successors and assigns and/or against all corporations, companies or
business enterprises including Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino Realty
Investment and Development Corporation where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or
CATALINO NGO CHUA may have interest or participation.
4. [Respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all counterclaim or counter-

demand with respect to the subject matter of the present petition.
5. Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a judgment for the
permanent dismissal with prejudice of the captioned petition. [Respondent] also
asks for a judgment permanently dismissing with prejudice his counterclaim."
Finding the said compromise agreement to be in order, the Court hereby approves the
same. Judgment is rendered in accordance with the provisions of the compromise
agreement. The parties are enjoined to comply with their respective undertakings
embodied in the agreement.7
Page 2 of 486
With no appeal having been filed therefrom, the 21 February 2000 Decision of RTC-Branch
9 in Special Proceeding 8830-CEB was declared final and executory.
Petitioner filed on 15 April 2008 her Opposition8 to respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence in

Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. Thereafter, RTC-Branch 24 issued its now assailed
Resolution dated 25 June 2008 in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, granting
respondent’s Demurrer.
RTC-Branch 24 summarized the arguments of respondent and petitioner in the Demurrer

and Opposition, respectively, as follows:
This is to resolve the issues put across in the Demurrer to the Evidence submitted to this
Court; the Opposition thereto; the Comment on the Opposition and the Rejoinder to the
Comment.
xxxx
1. The instant case is barred by the principle of res judicata because there was a
judgment entered based on the Compromise Agreement approved by this multiple-
sala Court, branch 09, on the same issues and between the same parties.
2. That such decision of Branch 09, having attained finality, is beyond review,
reversal or alteration by another Regional Trial Court and not even the Supreme
Court, no matter how erroneous.
3. Judicial Admissions or admission in petitioner’s pleadings to the effect that there

is no blood relationship between petitioner and respondent, which is a declaration
against interest, are conclusive on her and she should not be permitted to falsify.
4. That the Certificate of Live Birth showing that petitioner’s father is Alfredo
Surposa is a public document which is the evidence of the facts therein stated,
unless corrected by judicial order.
5. After receiving the benefits and concessions pursuant to their compromise

agreement, she is estopped from refuting on the effects thereof to the prejudice of
the [herein respondent].
The summary of the Opposition is in this wise:
1. That the illegitimate filiation of petitioner to respondent is established by the

open, and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
2. The Demurrer to the evidence cannot set up the affirmative grounds for a Motion
to Dismiss.
3. The question on the civil status, future support and future legitime can not be
subject to compromise.
Page 3 of 486
4. The decision in the first case does not bar the filing of another action asking for
the same relief against the same defendant.9
Taking into consideration the aforementioned positions of the parties, RTC-Branch 24 held
that:
Looking at the issues from the viewpoint of a judge, this Court believes that its hands are
tied. Unless the Court of Appeals strikes down the Compromise Judgment rendered by
Branch 09 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, this Court will not attempt to vacate,
much more annul, that Judgment issued by a co-equal court, which had long become final
and executory, and in fact executed.
This court upholds the Policy of Judicial Stability since to do otherwise would result in
patent abuse of judicial discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The defense of lack of
jurisdiction cannot be waived. At any rate, such is brought forth in the Affirmative Defenses
of the Answer.
This Court, saddled with many cases, suffers the brunt of allowing herein case involving
same parties to re-litigate on the same issues already closed.10
In the end, RTC-Branch 24 decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to the Evidence is hereby given due
course, as the herein case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.11
RTC-Branch 24 denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration12 in a Resolution13 dated 29

July 2008.
Petitioner then filed the instant Petition raising the following issues for resolution of this
Court:
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments predicated upon a
compromise agreement on cases enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines;
II
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the parties herein before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 09 of Cebu City effectively bars the filing of the present
case.14
At the outset, the Court notes that from the RTC Resolution granting respondent’s
Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner went directly to this Court for relief. This is only proper,
given that petitioner is raising pure questions of law in her instant Petition.a1f
Page 4 of 486
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Clearly, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision or final order or resolution
of the trial court on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact
exists, on the other hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood
of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the
correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.15
The central issue in this case is whether the Compromise Agreement entered into between
petitioner and respondent, duly approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21
February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata in Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB still pending before RTC-Branch 24.1avvphi1
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well- regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the
common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2)
the hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause, nemo
debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.16
For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering
it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment
or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action.17
It is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, previously before RTC-Branch 9,

and Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, presently before RTC-Branch 24, were both
actions for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation filed by petitioner against
respondent. Hence, there is apparent identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action between the two cases. However, the question arises as to whether the other
elements of res judicata exist in this case.
The court rules in the negative.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a

litigation or put an end to one already commenced.18 In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico
v. Republic,19 the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res
judicata. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits.
Page 5 of 486
It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a compromise agreement must
comply with the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the
contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c)
cause of the obligation that is established. And, like any other contract, the terms and
conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public policy and public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public
policy is null and void, and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It
produces no legal effect at all.20
In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls attention to Article 2035 of the Civil Code,
which states:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February

2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status
and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for
petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent,
respondent would pay petitioner and Allan ₱2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it
was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived
away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent.
Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and
respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
Advincula v. Advincula21 has a factual background closely similar to the one at bar.

Manuela Advincula (Manuela) filed, before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo, Civil
Case No. 3553 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel Advincula (Manuel). On
motion of both parties, said case was dismissed. Not very long after, Manuela again
instituted, before the same court, Civil Case No. 5659 for acknowledgment and support,
against Manuel. This Court declared that although Civil Case No. 3553 ended in a
compromise, it did not bar the subsequent filing by Manuela of Civil Case No. 5659, asking
for the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was an action for acknowledgement,
affecting a person’s civil status, which cannot be the subject of compromise.
Page 6 of 486
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and
filiation of a child.22 Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must
be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.23
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February
2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered
operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective
prestations.24
Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise Agreement, in its
Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already made said
contract valid and legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-
Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal. RTC-Branch 9 had no authority to approve and give
effect to a Compromise Agreement that was contrary to law and public policy, even if said
contract was executed and submitted for approval by both parties. RTC-Branch 9 would
not be competent, under any circumstances, to grant the approval of the said Compromise
Agreement. No court can allow itself to be used as a tool to circumvent the explicit
prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. The following quote in Francisco v.
Zandueta25 is relevant herein:
It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as such,
jurisdiction in a matter which is excluded by the laws of the land. In such a case the
question is not whether a competent court has obtained jurisdiction of a party triable before
it, but whether the court itself is competent under any circumstances to adjudicate a claim
against the defendant. And where there is want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter, a
judgment is void as to all persons, and consent of parties can never impart to it the vitality
which a valid judgment derives from the sovereign state, the court being constituted, by
express provision of law, as its agent to pronounce its decrees in controversies between its
people. (7 R. C. L., 1039.)
A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any
right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of
execution based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing that can be treated as an
outlaw and slain on sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.26
In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not barred by res
judicata, since RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision dated 21
February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondent’s
Compromise Agreement, which was contrary to law and public policy; and, consequently,
the Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, being null and
void for having been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without jurisdiction, could not have
attained finality or been considered a judgment on the merits.
Page 7 of 486
Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise Agreement
between petitioner and respondent is void for being contrary to law and public policy, the
admission petitioner made therein may still be appreciated against her in Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch 24 is only reminded that while petitioner’s
admission may have evidentiary value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack
of filiation.27
Proceeding from its foregoing findings, the Court is remanding this case to the RTC-Branch
24 for the continuation of hearing on Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB, more
particularly, for respondent’s presentation of evidence.
Although respondent’s pleading was captioned a Demurrer to Evidence, it was more

appropriately a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
Demurrer to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which is

reproduced in full below:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. – After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of
his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and
the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the
right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the
defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if
plaintiff's evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is
an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to
dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.28
The Court has recently established some guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence
should be granted, thus:
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff's evidence together with such inferences and
conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the
defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise
sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his
favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to
make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to
support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff's
evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.29
The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether petitioner has

been able to show that she is entitled to her claim, and it is incumbent upon RTC-Branch
24 to make such a determination. A perusal of the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-
Branch 24 in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB shows that it is barren of any discussion
on this matter. It did not take into consideration any of the evidence presented by
Page 8 of 486
petitioner. RTC-Branch 24 dismissed Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB on the sole
basis of res judicata, given the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, approving the Compromise Agreement between
petitioner and respondent. Hence, the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24
should be deemed as having dismissed Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on the ground
of res judicata rather than an adjudication on the merits of respondent’s demurrer to
evidence. Necessarily, the last line of Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court should not
apply herein and respondent should still be allowed to present evidence before RTC-
Branch 24 in Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB.
It must be kept in mind that substantial justice must prevail. When there is a strong
showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the
Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice. The
Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation
of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be
mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely
why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take backseat
against substantive rights, and not the other way around.30
WhereforE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 24, in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB is REVERSED and
set aside. This case is ordered REMANDED to the said trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with the ruling of the Court herein. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 9 of 486
[95]
G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and
care, including appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth. 1 In case of assault
on his rights by those who take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will
rise in his defense with the single-minded purpose of upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa
Almonte, and a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on
December 29, 1989.2 After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresa’s parents in
Fairview, Quezon City.3 Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth
to Jose Gerardo.4
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa’s relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On

December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled
on the ground of bigamy.5 He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on
December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled.6 Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola
Heights, Quezon City.7
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however,
averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all.8
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when
she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It
declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was
awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.9
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She
held him responsible for the ‘bastardization’ of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration
of the above decision "INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the … decision which grant(ed)
to the petitioner so-called ‘visitation rights’… between the hours of 8 in the morning to
12:00 p.m. of any Sunday."10 She argued that there was nothing in the law granting
"visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child."11 She further
maintained that Jose Gerardo’s surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte,
her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s
surname.
Page 10 of 486
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of
‘Concepcion’ as Jose Gerardo’s surname.
Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresa’s
motion and made the following observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to hurt the other,
something they should never do if they want to assure the normal development and well-
being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs a father,
especially as he is a boy, who must have a father figure to recognize – something that the
mother alone cannot give. Moreover, the Court believes that the emotional and
psychological well-being of the boy would be better served if he were allowed to maintain
relationships with his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on this matter, the
Court invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise known as the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, to wit:
"In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration."
WHEREFORE, the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby

DENIED.12
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling of the
trial court granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued use of
Gerardo’s surname (Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had already been
declared illegitimate and should therefore use her surname (Almonte). The appellate court
denied the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.13
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a
putative father visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed the
"best interest of the child" policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that "[a]t bottom, it
(was) the child’s welfare and not the convenience of the parents which (was) the primary
consideration in granting visitation rights a few hours once a week."14
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mother’s
surname motu proprio. The child, represented by the mother, should file a separate
proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the
correction in the civil registry.15
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the
appellate court. She also filed a motion to set the case for oral arguments so that she could
better ventilate the issues involved in the controversy.
Page 11 of 486
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the appellate
court resolved the motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and held that
Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first
marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable – established by the evidence in this case – that the appellant
[Ma. Theresa] was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful
marriage with the appellee [Gerardo] since the so-called "marriage" with the latter was
void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who had established these facts. In other words,
[Ma. Theresa] was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was
born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo – under the law – is the
legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario
Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent
‘marriage’ between [Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the child of
the legitimate and existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164,
Family Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither
custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose
his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal basis (even supposing the child to be
his illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the existing
marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible rapproachment
between the married couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate
relationship.16
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
that Jose Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate
showing that he was born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were
married:
We are not unaware of the movant’s argument that various evidence exist that appellee
and the appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the
same vein, We cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family Code mandates:
"The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress." (underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of
his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the
supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the legitimate or
illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be
compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his status for the
information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed
father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is. 17 (Emphasis
supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the
same was denied.18 Hence, this appeal.
Page 12 of 486
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.19 Article 164 of the Family Code
is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.20
As a guaranty in favor of the child21 and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the
Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.22 We
explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals23 :
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is
based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is
grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)24 of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in
law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa’s husband Mario or, in a
proper case,25 his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to
his wife.26 Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or,
in exceptional cases, his heirs.27 Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void
from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right
to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly
during the period of conception.28 To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166
(1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no
access that could have enabled the husband to father the child.29 Sexual intercourse is to
be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted
by evidence to the contrary.30
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical
impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child.31
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make
marital intimacy impossible.32 This may take place, for instance, when they reside in
different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of
conception.33 Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it
appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison regulations.34
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview,
Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and
Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence
at all was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these
Page 13 of 486
circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was
certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption
should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here.
Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage
between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa’s statement in her answer35 to the petition for annulment of
marriage36 that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was
never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on her.
Gerardo’s argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresa’s statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son
with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by the
mother that her child is illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article
167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy
of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never
an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred
absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario.
She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to
Jose Gerardo’s conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital
intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the
impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa’s statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself
a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. 37 A mother has no
right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. 38 Hence, Ma. Theresa is not
permitted by law to question Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she
had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. 39 The proscription
is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the
intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.40
Gerardo’s insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial
court and in the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and
Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That
was, in effect, an agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that
stipulation, then it would be tantamount to allowing the mother to make a declaration
Page 14 of 486
against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial of filiation of the child by
persons other than her husband. These are the very acts from which the law seeks to
shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child.41 Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit
his defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate is misplaced. It has no

evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court.
The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally
offered.42
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his
birth.43 Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the
filiation of a child,44 as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is
necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of
a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is sought to be
established.45
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not
be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases,
his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and
uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained

therein.46 As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by
more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness
of the statements made therein by the interested parties. 47 Between the certificate of birth
which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardo’s illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive
presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy,
the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the
best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose
Gerardo’s illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the child’s interests at heart. The
law, reason and common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to the
child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He
is entitled to bear the surnames of both his father and mother, full support and full
inheritance.48 On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the surname and be
under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim support only from a more
limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate counterpart.49 Moreover
(without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the eyes of society, a
‘bastard’ is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state,
the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his interest.
Page 15 of 486
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble between the
very persons who were passionately declaring their concern for him. The paradox was that
he was made to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is that an
innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these proceedings
began. He is now almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of incessant
bickering. The law now comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy which has unfairly
hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father
Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on
surnames.50 A person’s surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs
and is passed on from parent to child.51 Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on
Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardo’s name and effecting the corrections of the entries in
the civil register regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed out in a separate
proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family

Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such
visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each other’s
company. There being no such parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no
legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Child’s Welfare Paramount. – In all questions regarding the care, custody,
education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests
of the child shall be a primary consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation
and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection
to those of tender years.52 Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one,
even their own parents, to the end that their eventual development as responsible citizens
Page 16 of 486
and members of society shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony.
This is especially significant where, as in this case, the issue concerns their filiation as it
strikes at their very identity and lineage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January 10,
1996 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Page 17 of 486
[3]
G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951
MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas as guardian ad litem, and

MARIA DUEÑAS, plaintiffs,
vs.
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant.
Reyes and Dy-Liaco for appellants.

Tible, Tena and Borja for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad

litem, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the recovery of
the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talacop,
Calabanga, Camarines Sur.
The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria
Dueñas; that Emiliano Andal died on September 24, 1942; that Emiliano Andal was the
owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis
Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the
former; that Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the land from 1938 up to 1942,
when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the abnormal situation then prevailing,
entered the land in question.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano Andal the
legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in question; (b)
declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the
costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law
are involved.
It appears undisputed that the land in question was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to her son
Emiliano Andal by virtue of a donation propter nuptias she has executed in his favor on the
occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueñas. If the son born to the couple is deemed
legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If otherwise, then the land
should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to succeed him under
the law. The main issue, therefore, to be determined hinges on the legitimacy of Mariano
Andal in so far as his relation to Emiliano Andal is concerned. The determination of this
issue much depends upon the relationship that had existed between Emiliano Andal and
his wife during the period of conception of the child up to the date of his birth in connection
with the death of the alleged father Emiliano Andal.
The following facts appear to have been proven: Emiliano Andal became sick of
tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his
house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse
Page 18 of 486
that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he could hardly move and
get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix,
and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of 1943. Since May,
1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife.
On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even
attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was given the
name of Mariano Andal. Under these facts, can the child be considered as the legitimate
son of Emiliano?
Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:
Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the
celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically impossible for
the husband to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred and twenty
days of the three hundred next preceding the birth of the child.
Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943,
that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been
born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This
presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the
husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding
the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to prove that it was physically impossible for
Emiliano to have such access? Is the fact that Emiliano was sick of tuberculosis and was
so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed sufficient to overcome this
presumption?
Manresa on this point says:
Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence during the
initial period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable,
and (3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through
corrupt violation of prison regulations. Manresa, 492-500, Vol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo
Tolentino in his book "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1,
p.90)."
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial period
of conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and
September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth
of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to show that during
that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still living under the marital roof. Even if
Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit
intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his
wife. We admit that Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then
was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from bed, his feet were swollen and
Page 19 of 486
his voice hoarse. But experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse.
There are cases where persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in
the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. As an author
has said, "the reputation of the tuberculosis towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is
probably dependent more upon confinement to bed than the consequences of the
disease." (An Integrated Practice of Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202). There is neither
evidence to show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and
incurable, nor was there evidence that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy
under the Civil Code in favor of the child has not, therefore, been overcome.
We can obtain the same result viewing this case under section 68, par. (c) of Rule 123, of
the Rules of Court, which is practically based upon the same rai'son d'etre underlying the
Civil Code. Said section provides:
The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not impotent, is indisputably
presumed to be legitimate, if not born within one hundred eighty days immediately
succeeding the marriage, or after the expiration of three hundred days following its
dissolution.
We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had
access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within
three (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other
presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. We have also seen that this
presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or naturally
impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such proof. The
fact that Maria Dueñas has committed adultery can not also overcome this presumption
(Tolentino's Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 92).
In view of all the foregoing, we are constrained to hold that the lower court did not err in
declaring Mariano Andal as the legitimate son of the spouses Emiliano Andal and Maria
Dueñas.
Page 20 of 486
[4]
G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by

respondent Court of Appeals on June 30, 19951 which affirmed the Order of December 3,
1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, granting herein private
respondent's Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence filed in Civil Case No. Q-88-1054 pending
therein.
The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein
petitioners against herein private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land
with a house and apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and
which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and
nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of
petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5,
1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin
Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973,
hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving
spouse, Martin, executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial
Settlement2 adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of Martin Guerrero. On January 2,
1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and
thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter's name.
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action
for reconveyance on November 2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of
the property in question by right of representation.
At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were presented by both parties for
resolution:
(1) whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are the nephew and
niece of the late Teodora Dezoller;
Page 21 of 486
(2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by right of
representation from the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller;
(3) whether or not defendant (herein private respondent) must reconvey the
reserved participation of the plaintiffs to the estate of the late Teodora
Dezoller under Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court which was duly
annotated on the title of the defendant;
(4) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages, moral and
exemplary, plus attorney's fees for the willful and malicious refusal of
defendant to reconvey the participation of plaintiffs in the estate of Teodora
Dezoller, despite demands and knowing fully well that plaintiffs are the niece
and nephew of said deceased; and
(5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation can be considered
as conjugal property of the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero.3
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness,
with the following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation to their father
and their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes
Dezoller; certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes
Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero;
certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits
of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of
Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga
attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the
marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero.4 Petitioners thereafter rested their
case and submitted a written offer of these exhibits to which a Comment5 was filed by
herein private respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground

that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero
in accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further averred that the testimony of
petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and
aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum
of proof required under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish filiation. Also, the
certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental is merely proof of the alleged destruction of the records referred to therein, and
the joint affidavit executed by Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar certifying to the date, place
of birth and parentage of herein petitioners is inadmissible for being hearsay since the
affiants were never presented for cross-examination.6
On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence
and dismissing the complaint for reconveyance.7
Page 22 of 486
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary
evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture,
and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation.
Hence, this appeal.
We find for petitioners.
The bone of contention in private respondent's demurrer to evidence is whether or not

herein petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family
Code to establish legitimacy and filiation. There are two points for consideration before
us: first is the issue on petitioner's legitimacy, and second is the question regarding their
filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken

separately and independently of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy
nor even of pedigree. It is important to note, however, that the rulings of both lower courts
in the case are basically premised on the erroneous assumption that, in the first place, the
issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in an action for reconveyance, and, in the
second place, that herein petitioners have the onus probandi to prove their legitimacy and,
corollarily, their filiation. We disagree on both counts.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably
overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption
of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing
reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.8 And well settled
is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually fixes a civil

status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period
limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a

collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an
independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly
expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: "The contest
of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other
way is void." This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and
171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to
impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the husband or
his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
Page 23 of 486
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status
conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer
be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a
child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It
also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such
child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be
facts occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may still be
easily available.
xxx xxx xxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is
the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity
of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity
or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in
exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn legitimacy;
that would amount to an insult to his memory.9
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes
Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is
aside, of course, from the further consideration that private respondent is not the proper
party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently
continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of proof
rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but
on private respondent who is disputing the same. This fact alone should have been
sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on
the demurrer to evidence. It would have delimited the issues for resolution, as well as the
time and effort necessitated thereby.
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the
presumption exists does not have to introduce evidence to establish that fact, and in any
litigation where that fact is put in issue, the party denying it must bear the burden of proof
to overthrow the presumption. 10 The presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear
that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. 11 And in
order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it operates must adduce
substantial and credible evidence to the contrary.12
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, 13 and unless or until it
is rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support
a finding or decision. 14 Perforce, a presumption must be followed if it is uncontroverted.
This is based on the theory that a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed,
and unless the fact thus established prima facie by the legal presumption of its truth is
disproved, it must stand as proved. 15
Page 24 of 486
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to
overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect
impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the
evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice and admissions, relieve the proponent
from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are thereby considered as
duly proved.
II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding petitioner's relationship with
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, whose estate is the subject of the present controversy,
requires a more intensive and extensive examination.
Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon

Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various certifications
from the civil registrar, a family picture, and several joint affidavits executed by third
persons all of which she identified and explained in the course and as part of her
testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is
Teodora's niece. 16 Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is
admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3)
that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the
suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen
thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for
analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in
evidence sufficiently corroborated the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in
her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is
necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
American jurisdiction has it that a distinction must be made as to when the relationship of
the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said
declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:
One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through,
but not from, the declarant and to establish the admissibility of a declaration
regarding claimant's pedigree, he may not do by declarant's own statements
as to declarant's relationship to the particular family. The reason is that
declarant's declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving nature.
Accordingly there must be precedent proof from other sources that declarant
is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of the particular family;
otherwise the requirement to admissibility that declarant's relationship to the
common family must appear is not met. But when the party claiming seeks
Page 25 of 486
to establish relationship in order to claim directly from the declarant or the
declarant's estate, the situation and the policy of the law applicable are quite
different. In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in
controversy, that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is
admissible without other proof of the fact of relationship. While the nature of
the declaration is then disserving, that is not the real ground for its
admission. Such declarations do not derive their evidential value from that
consideration, although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in determining the
class to which the declarations belong. The distinction we have note is
sufficiently apparent; in the one case the declarations are self-serving, in the
other they are competent from reasons of necessity. 17 (Emphasis ours.)
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a
relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the
declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be
proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. 18 As
an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the
declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the
declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the
property of some other member of the family. 19
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the
general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right
to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and
constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no
other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is rendered
competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of
justice. 20 More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and
sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the
decedent's declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the
niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one case, 21 where the subject
of the declaration is the declarant's own relationship to another person, it seems absurb to
require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which
the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the main
evidence unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result.
For while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the
rules on their admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the same may
be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection
thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. 22 It is elementary that an objection
shall
be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in
evidence, 23 otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, 24 since the right to object
is merely a privilege which the party may waive. 25
Page 26 of 486
As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., 26 it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of
evidence that a protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made
at the proper time, otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived. The proper time is
when from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the
presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a
waiver if the provisions of the law. That objection to a question put to a witness must be
made at the time the question is asked. An objection to the admission of evidence on the
ground of incompetency, taken after the testimony has been given, is too late. 27 Thus, for
instance, failure to object to parol evidence given on the stand, where the party is in a
position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto. 28
The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private respondent unreservedly
cross-examined petitioners, as the lone witness, on the documentary evidence that were
offered. At no time was the issue of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the possible
basis for objection thereto, ever raised. Instead, private respondent's counsel elicited
answers from the witness on the circumstances and regularity of her obtention of said
documents: The observations later made by private respondent in her comment to
petitioners' offer of exhibits, although the grounds therefor were already apparent at the
time these documents were being adduced in evidence during the testimony of Corazon
Dezoller Tison but which objections were not timely raised therein, may no longer serve to
rectify the legal consequences which resulted therefrom. Hence, even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of
herein private respondent's failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and
considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 29
Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is indicated that the parents of
Teodora Dezoller are Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as well as the Certificates of
Baptism of Teodora Dezoller 30 (Exhibit H) and Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit J) which both
reflect the names of their parents as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, to show that
Hermogenes Dezoller is the brother of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; and the Death
Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries wherein were made by petitioner
Corazon Dezoller Tison as his daughter, together with the Joint Affidavits of Pablo Verzosa
and Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to prove that herein petitioners are the children of
Hermogenes Dezoller — these can be deemed to have sufficiently established the
relationship between the declarant and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the
rule that a prima facie showing is sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is
required. 31 Finally, it may not be amiss to consider as in the nature of circumstantial
evidence the fact that both the declarant and the claimants, who are the subject of the
declaration, bear the surname Dezoller. 32
III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the estate of
the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased
survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive
Page 27 of 486
with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
portions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and

illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the
rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any,
under Article 1001.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or theirs children to the other half.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was
automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the
conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half
shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled to
jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his total
undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private respondent.
Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an undivided one-
fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.
All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiff's evidence
should have been, as it is hereby, denied. Nonetheless, private respondent may no longer
be allowed to present evidence by reason of the mandate under Section 1 of revised Rule
3 of the Rules of Court which provides that "if the motion is granted but on appeal the order
of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence." 33
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are declared
co-owners of the subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4)
share therein, respectively.
SO ORDERED.
Page 28 of 486
[5]
G.R. No. L-49542 September 12, 1980
ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH MEJIAS, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This petition for review seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 54618-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch
IX dismissing the action for recognition and support filed by respondent Elizabeth Mejias
against petitioner Antonio Macadangdang, and which found minor Rolando to be the
illegitimate son of petitioner who was ordered to give a monthly support of P350.00 until his
alleged son reaches the age of majority (p. 47, rec.; p. 10, ROA).
The records show that respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband
being Crispin Anahaw (pp. 61-62, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972; pp. 10-11, Brief for Respondent
[P. 198, rec.]) She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang
sometime in March, 1967 (p. 38, t.s.n., June 7, 1972 in CC No. 109). She also alleges that
due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967 (p. 63, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). On
October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to a
baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December
24,1967 (Annex "A", List of Exhibits).
The records also disclose that on April 25, 1972, respondent (then plaintiff) filed a
complaint for recognition and support against petitioner (then defendant) with the Court of
First Instance of Davao, Branch IX. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 263 (p. 1,
ROA).
Defendant (now petitioner) Macadangdang filed his answer on June 30, 1972, opposing
plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal (p. 3, ROA).
On August 9, 1972, the lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order
formalizing certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which both parties agreed
(pp. 4, 5, and 6, ROA). Correspondingly, upon agreement of the parties, an amended
complaint was filed by plaintiff on October 17, 1972 (pp. 7,8 and 9, ROA).
In its decision rendered on February 27, 1973, the lower court dismissed the complaint,.
The decision invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and
authorities (pp. 10-18, ROA).
On April 18, 1973, plaintiff appealed the CFI decision to the Court of Appeals (p. 59, In her
appeal, appellant assigned these errors:
Page 29 of 486
1. The Honorable Trial Court erred in applying in the instant case the
provisions of Arts. 255 and 256 of the Civil Code and Secs. 4[a], 4[b] and
4[c], Rule 131, of the Revised Rules of Court (p. 18, rec.);
2. The Honorable Trial Court erred in holding that plaintiff-appellant cannot

validly question the legitimacy of her son, Rolando Macadangdang, by a
collateral attack without joining her legal husband as a party in the instant
case (p. 18, rec.).
In its decision handed down on June 2, 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's decision (p. 47, and thus declared minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son of
Antonio Macadangdang (p. 52, rec.).
On November 6, 1978, the Court of Appeals denied appellant's motions for reconsideration
for lack of merit. (p. 56, rec.).
Hence, petitioner filed this petition on January 12, 1979.
The issues boil down to:
1. Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate

issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw; and
2. Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her
child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity
to be heard.
The crucial point that should be emphasized and should be straightened out from the very
beginning is the fact that respondent's initial illicit affair with petitioner occurred sometime in
March, 1967 and that by reason thereof, she and her husband separated. This fact
surfaced from the testimony of respondent herself in the hearing of September 21, 1972
when this case was still in the lower court. The pertinent portions of her testimony are thus
quoted:
By Atty. Fernandez:
Q — What did you feel as a result of the incident where Antonio

Macadangdang used pill and took advantage of your womanhood?
A — I felt worried, mentally shocked and humiliated.
Q — If these feelings: worries, mental shock and humiliation, if

estimated in monetary figures, how much win be the amount?
A — Ten thousand pesos, sir.
Page 30 of 486
Q — And because of the incidental what happened to your
with Crispin Anahaw.
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A — We separate, sir. (pp. 61-63, T.s.n., Civil Case No. 263, Sept.
21, 1972; emphasis supplied).
From the foregoing line of questions and answers, it can be gleaned that respondent's
answers were given with spontaneity and with a clear understanding of the questions
posed. There cannot be any other meaning or interpretation of the word "incident" other
than that of the initial contact between petitioner and respondent. Even a layman would
understand the clear sense of the question posed before respondent and her categorical
and spontaneous answer which does not leave any room for interpretation. It must be
noted that the very question of her counsel conveys the assumption of an existing between
respondent and her husband.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that respondent and her husband were separated in
1965 cannot therefore be considered conclusive and binding on this Court. It is based
solely on the testimony of respondent which is self-serving. Nothing in the records shows
that her statement was confirmed or corroborated by another witness and the same cannot
be treated as borne out by the record or that which is based on substantial evidence. It is
not even confirmed by her own husband, who was not impleaded.
In the case of Tolentino vs. De Jesus (L-32797, 56 SCRA 167 [1974], this Court restated
that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on the
Supreme Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise, and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court
of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the
admission of both appellant and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and
(9) when the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of
evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record [Pioneer Insurance and Surety
Corporation vs. Yap, L-36232, December 19, 1974; Roque vs. Buan, L-22459, 21 SCRA
642 (1967); Ramos vs. Pepsi-cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, L-225533, 19
SCRA 289 (1967); emphasis supplied].
Again, in Roque vs. Buan, supra, this Court reiterated the aforestated doctrine adding four
more exceptions to the general rule. This case invoked the same ruling in the previous
case of Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company, etc., supra.
Page 31 of 486
In the recent case of Francisca Alsua-Betts, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (L-46430-31,
July 30, 1979), which petitioner aptly invokes, this Court thus emphasized:
... But what should not be ignored by lawyers and litigants alike is the more
basic principle that the "findings of fact" described as "final" or
"conclusive" are those borne out by the record or those which are based
upon substantial evidence. The general rule laid down by the Supreme
Court does not declare the absolute correctness of all the findings of fact
made by the Court of Appeals. There are exceptions to the general rule,
where we have reviewed the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals ...
(emphasis supplied).
The following provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court should be borne in mind:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than that of

the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within
the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded
the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were separately, in such a way
that access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the
conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of access
between her and her husband as set forth in article 255, the child is prima
facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic
reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this
article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy —

Page 32 of 486
(a) Children born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of
the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed legitimate.
Against presumption no evidence be admitted other than that of the physical

impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of
the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
[1] By the impotence of the husband
[2] By the fact that the husband and the wife were living separately, in such
a way that access was not possible;
[3] By the serious illness of the husband;
(b) The child shall be presumed legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
(c) Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of
the child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and
her husband as set forth above, the child is presumed legitimate, unless it
appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the
husband. For the purpose of the rule, the wife's adultery need not be proved
in a criminal case. ... (Rule 131, Rules of Court).
Whether or not respondent and her husband were separated would be immaterial to the
resolution of the status of the child Rolando. What should really matter is the fact that
during the initial one hundred twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of
the renamed child, no concrete or even substantial proof was presented to establish
physical impossibility of access between respondent and her spouse. From her very
revealing testimony, respondent declared that she was bringing two sacks of rice to Samal
for her children; that her four children by her husband in her mother's house in the said
town; that her alleged estranged husband also lived in her mother's place (p. 73, pp. 21 &
22, 64 & 65, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). It should also be noted that even during her affair with
petitioner and right after her delivery, respondent went to her mother's house in Samal for
treatment. Thus, in the direct examination of Patrocinia Avila (the boy's yaya), the following
came out:
Q — Why were you taking care of the child Rolando, where

was Elizabeth Mejias?
Page 33 of 486
A — Because Elizabeth went to her parents in Same Davao del
Norte for treatment because she had a relapse (p. 13, t.s.n., of Sept.
21, 1972).
From the foregoing and since respondent and her husband continued to live in the same
province, the fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to each other. As
has already been pointed out, respondent's self-serving statements were never
corroborated nor confirmed by any other evidence, more particularly that of her husband.
The baby boy subject of this controversy was born on October 30, 1967, only seven (7)
months after March, 1967 when the "incident" or first illicit intercourse between respondent
and petitioner took place, and also, seven months from their separation (if there really was
a separation). It must be noted that as of March, 1967, respondent and Crispin Anahaw
had already four children; hence, they had been married years before such date (t.s.n., pp.
21-22, Sept. 21, 1972). The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days
following the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged
separation between aforenamed spouses.
Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively
presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband.
The fact that the child was born a mere seven (7) months after the initial sexual contact
between petitioner and respondent is another proof that the said child was not of petitioner
since, from indications, he came out as a normal full-term baby.
It must be stressed that the child under question has no birth certificate of Baptism
(attached in the List of Exhibits) which was prepared in the absence of the alleged father
[petitioner]. Note again that he was born on October 30, 1967. Between March, 1967 and
October 30, 1967, the time difference is clearly 7 months. The baby Rolando could have
been born prematurely. But such is not the case. Respondent underwent a normal nine-
month pregnancy. Respondent herself and the yaya, Patrocinia Avila, declared that the
baby was born in the rented house at Carpenter Street, which birth was obvisouly normal;
that he was such a healthy baby that barely 5 days after his birth, he was already cared for
by said yaya when respondent became sick (pp. 28, 29 & 43, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972); and
that when he was between 15 days and 2 months of age, respondent left him to the care of
the yaya when the former left for Samal for treatment and returned only in February, 1968
(pp. 30-32, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). From the aforestated facts, it can be indubitably said
that the child was a full-term baby at birth, normally delivered, and raised normally by
the yaya. If it were otherwise or if he were born prematurely, he would have needed special
care like being placed in an incubator in a clinic or hospital and attended to by a physician,
not just a mere yaya. These all point to the fact that the baby who was born on October 30,
1967 or 7 months from the first sexual encounter between petitioner and respondent was
conceived as early as January, 1967. How then could he be the child of petitioner?
In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value
of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be
considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified — but not the veracity of the states or
Page 34 of 486
declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L-
25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus vs. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331
[1968]), this Court held that a baptismal administered, in conformity with the rites of the
Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of
the declarations and statements contained in the certificate that concern the relationship of
the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be
admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law.
The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse.
This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical
impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which
preceded the birth of the child. This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be
rebutted or refuted by only one evidence — the physical impossibility of access between
husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility of access may be caused by any of these:
1. Impotence of the husband;
2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible and
3. Serious illness of the husband.
This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in
marriage, particularly during the period of conception. Hence, proof of the physical
impossibility of such sexual union prevents the application of the presumption (Tolentino,
Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p. 513 citing Bevilaqua, Familia
p. 311).
The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled the
husband to be the father of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal
access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary;
where sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband must be taken to be the
father of the child (Tolentino, citing Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations, pp. 340-
341).
To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore, there must be physical impossibility of

access by the husband to the wife during the period of conception. The law expressly
refers to physical impossibility. Hence, a circumstance which makes sexual relations
improbable, cannot defeat the presumption of legitimacy; but it may be proved as a
circumstance to corroborate proof of physical impossibility of access (Tolentino, citing
Bonet 352; 4 Valverde 408).
Impotence refers to the inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper
function (Bouvier's Law Dictionary 514). As defined in the celebrated case of Menciano vs.
San Jose (89 Phil. 63), impotency is the physical inability to have sexual intercourse. It is
not synonymous with sterility. Sterility refers to the inability to procreate, whereas,
Page 35 of 486
impotence refers to the physical inability to perform the act of sexual intercourse. In respect
of the impotency of the husband of the mother of a child, to overcome the presumption of
legitimacy on conception or birth in wedlock or to show illegitimacy, it has been held or
recognized that the evidence or proof must be clear or satisfactory: clear, satisfactory and
convincing, irresistible or positive (S.C. — Tarleton vs. Thompson, 118 S.E. 421, 125 SC
182, cited in 10 C.J.S. 50).
The separation between the spouses must be such as to make sexual access impossible.
This may take place when they reside in different countries or provinces, and they have
never been together during the period of conception (Estate of Benito Marcelo, 60 Phil.
442). Or, the husband may be in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears
that sexual union took place through corrupt violation of or allowed by prison regulations (1
Manresa 492-500).
The illness of the husband must be of such a nature as to exclude the possibility of his
having sexual intercourse with his wife; such as, when because of a injury, he was placed
in a plaster cast, and it was inconceivable to have sexual intercourse without the most
severe pain (Tolentino, citing Commissioner vs. Hotel 256 App. Div. 352, 9 N.Y. Supp. p.
515); or the illness produced temporary or permanent impotence, making copulation
impossible (Tolentino, citing Q. Bonet 352).
Thus, in the case of Andal vs. Macaraig (89 Phil. 165), this Court ruled that just because
tuberculosis is advanced in a man does not necessarily mean that he is incapable of
sexual intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from tuberculosis can do the
carnal act even in the most crucial stage of health because then they seemed to be more
inclined to sexual intercourse. The fact that the wife had illicit intercourse with a man other
than her husband during the initial period, does not preclude cohabitation between said
husband and wife.
Significantly American courts have made definite pronouncements or rulings on the issues
under consideration. The policy of the law is to confer legitimacy upon children born in
wedlock when access of the husband at the time of conception was not impossible (N.Y.
Milone vs. Milone, 290 N.Y. S. 863, 160 Misc. 830) and there is the presumption that a
child so born is the child of the husband and is legitimate even though the wife was guilty
of infidelity during the possible period of conception (N.Y. Dieterich vs. Dieterich, 278 N.Y.
S. 645, Misc. 714; both cited in 10 C.J.S., pp. 18,19 & 20).
So firm was this presumption originally that it cannot be rebutted unless the husband was
incapable of procreation or was absent beyond the four seas, that is, absent from the
realm, during the whole period of the wife's pregnancy (10 C.J.S. p. 20).
The presumption of legitimacy of children born during wedlock obtains, notwithstanding the
husband and wife voluntarily separate and live apart, unless the contrary is shown (Ala.
Franks vs. State, 161 So. 549, 26 . App. 430) and this includes children born after the
separation [10 C.J.S. pp. 23 & 24; emphasis supplied].
Page 36 of 486
It must be stressed that Article 256 of the Civil Code which provides that the child is
presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress has been adopted for two solid reasons. First, in a
fit of anger, or to arouse jealousy in the husband, the wife may have made this declaration
(Power vs. State, 95 N.E., 660). Second, the article is established as a guaranty in favor of
the children whose condition should not be under the mercy of the passions of their
parents. The husband whose honor if offended, that is, being aware of his wife's adultery,
may obtain from the guilty spouse by means of coercion, a confession against the
legitimacy of the child which may really be only a confession of her guilt. Or the wife, out of
vengeance and spite, may declare the as not her husband's although the statement be
false. But there is another reason which is more powerful, demanding the exclusion of
proof of confession or adultery, and it is, that at the moment of conception, it cannot be
determined when a woman cohabits during the same period with two men, by whom the
child was begotten, it being possible that it be the husband himself (Manresa, Vol. I, pp.
503-504).
Hence, in general, good morals and public policy require that a mother should not be
permitted to assert the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock in order to obtain some
benefit for herself (N.Y. — Flint vs. Pierce, 136 N.Y. S. 1056, cited in 10 C.J.S. 77).
The law is not willing that the child be declared illegitimate to suit the whims and purposes
of either parent, nor Merely upon evidence that no actual act of sexual intercourse
occurred between husband and wife at or about the time the wife became pregnant. Thus,
where the husband denies having any intercourse with his wife, the child was still
presumed legitimate (Lynn vs. State, 47 Ohio App. 158,191 N.E. 100).
With respect to Article 257 aforequoted, it must be emphasized that adultery on the part of
the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is
still possible that the child is that of the husband (Tolentino, citing 1 Vera 170; 4 Borja 23-
24).
It has, therefore, been held that the admission of the wife's testimony on the point would be
unseemly and scandalous, not only because it reveals immoral conduct on her part, but
also because of the effect it may have on the child, who is in no fault, but who nevertheless
must be the chief sufferer thereby (7 Am. Jur. Sec. 21, pp. 641-642).
In the case of a child born or conceived in wedlock, evidence of the infidelity or adultery of
the wife and mother is not admissible to show illegitimacy, if there is no proof of the
husband's impotency or non-access to his wife (Iowa — Craven vs. Selway, 246 N.W. 821,
cited in 10 C.J.S. 36).
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a
child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which
the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it, in view of the moral or economic interest involved (Tolentino, citing Bevilaqua,
Familia, p. 314).
Page 37 of 486
The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock belongs only to
the alleged father, who is the husband of the mother and can be exercised only by him or
his heirs, within a fixed time, and in certain cases, and only in a direct suit brought for the
purpose (La — Ducasse vs. Ducasse, 45 So. 565, 120 La. 731; Saloy's Succ. 10 So. 872,
44 La. Ann., cited in 10 C.J.S. 77; emphasis supplied).
Thus the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain; she
can only contest the Identity of the child (La — Eloi vs. Mader, 1 Rollo. 581, 38 Am. D.
192).
Formerly, declarations of a wife that her husband was not the father of a child in wedlock
were held to be admissible in evidence; but the general rule now is that they are
inadmissible to bastardize the child, regardless of statutory provisions obviating
incompetency on the ground of interest, or the fact that the conception was antenuptial.
The rule is said to be founded in decency, morality and public policy (Wallace vs. Wallace
137 Iowa 37,114 N.W. 527,14 L.R.A. [N.S.] 544,126 Am. St. Rep. 253,15 Ann. Cas. 761,
Am. Jur. 26).
From the foregoing, particularly the testimony of respondent and her witnesses, this Court
has every reason to believe that Crispin Anahaw was not actually separated from Elizabeth
Mejias; that he was a very potent man, having had four children with his wife; that even if
he and were even separately (which the latter failed to prove anyway) and assuming, for
argument's sake, that they were really separated, there was the possibility of physical
access to each other considering their proximity to each other and considering further that
respondent still visited and recuperated in her mother's house in Samal where her spouse
resided with her children. Moreover, Crispin Anahaw did not have any serious illness or
any illness whatsoever which would have rendered him incapable of having sexual act with
his wife. No substantial evidence whatsoever was brought out to negate the aforestated
facts.
Crispin Anahaw served as a refuge after respondent's reckless and immoral pursuits or a
"buffer" after her flings. And she deliberately did not include nor present her husband in this
case because she could not risk her scheme. She had to be certain that such scheme to
bastardize her own son for her selfish motives would not be thwarted.
This Court finds no other recourse except to deny respondent's claim to declare her son
Rolando the illegitimate child of petitioner. From all indications, respondent has paraded
herself as a woman of highly questionable character. A married woman who, on first
meeting, rides with a total stranger who is married towards nightfall, sleeps in his house in
the presence of his children, then lives with him after their initial sexual contact — the
atmosphere for which she herself provided — is patently immoral and hedonistic. Although
her husband was a very potent man, she readily indulged in an instant illicit relationship
with a married man she had never known before.
Respondent had shown total lack of or genuine concern for her child (Rolando) for, even
after birth, she left him in the care of a yaya for several months. This is not the normal
instinct and behavior of a mother who has the safety and welfare of her child foremost in
her mind. The filing of this case itself shows how she is capable of sacrificing the psycho-
Page 38 of 486
social future (reputation) of the child in exchange for some monetary consideration. This is
blatant shamelessness.
It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the
responsibility and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband,
her illicit lover and above all — her own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to,
the bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching
consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would
indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during such
immoral relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be
the form of wrecking the stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on
morality.
And as between the paternity by the husband and the paternity by the paramour, all the
circumstances being equal, the law is inclined to follow the former; hence, the child is thus
given the benefit of legitimacy.
Finally, Article 220 of the Civil Code reinforces the aforesaid principle when it provides
thus:
Art. 220. In case of doubt, an presumptions favor the solidarity of the family.
Thus, every of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children the
community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their
children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of
unlawful aggression.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED JUNE 2, 1978,

AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 6, 1978 ARE HEREBY REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
SO ORDERED.
Page 39 of 486
[6]
G.R. No. 86302 September 24, 1991
CASIMIRO MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA TORING TUÑACAO, respondents.
Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr. for petitioner.
Domingo Antigua & Associates for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza,
but the latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day. The trial court believed him
and dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. The appellate court did not and
reversed the judgment of the court below. Now the issue is before us on certiorari.
The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City.
Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on
August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro
Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza
recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according her the rights
and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiffs allegations
and set up a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees.
Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that her
father was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother because
Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. When she married Valentin
Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to drive it so he could have
a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the sale to her and her
husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot
and later he gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. On
February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor at
the Mandaue City branch of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. Two years
later, Margarita Bate, Casimiro's adopted daughter, took the passbook from her, but
Casimiro ordered it returned to her after admonishing Margarita.1
Lolito Tufiacao corroborated his mother and said he considered Casimiro his grandfather
because Teopista said so. He would kiss his hand whenever they saw each other and
Casimiro would give him money. Casimiro used to invite him to his house and give him
Page 40 of 486
jackfruits. when his grandfather learned that he was living on a rented lot, the old man
allowed him to build a house on the former's land.2
Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac
Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro.
Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring because she used to
work with him in a saltbed in Opao. Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart.
Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which eventually resulted in
Brigida becoming pregnant in 1930 and giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed him
P20.00 to be given to Brigida at Teopista's baptism. Casimiro also gave him P5.00 every
so often to be delivered to Brigida.3
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father
Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. He
worked on Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would also give
him various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00 to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared
that Casimiro intended to give certain properties to Teopista.4
Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age, but Vicente Toring took the
stand to resist Teopista's claim.
Vicente, who professed to be Casimiro's only illegitimate child by Brigida Toring, declared
that Teopista's father was not Casimiro but a carpenter named Ondoy, who later
abandoned her. Vicente said that it was he who sold a lot to Teopista, and for a low price
because she was his half sister. It was also he who permitted Lolito to build a house on
Casimiro's lot. This witness stressed that when Casimiro was hospitalized, Teopista never
once visited her alleged father.5
The last statement was shared by the other defense witness, Julieta Ouano, Casimiro's
niece, who also affirmed that Vicente Toring used to work as a cook in Casimiro's boat.
She flatly declared she had never met Teopista but she knew her husband, who was a
mechanic.6
The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in Article 283 of the Civil Code, which
has been held to be applicable not only to natural children but also to spurious
children.7 The said article provides:
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as
his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
Page 41 of 486
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with
the supposed father.
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.
This article has been substantially reproduced in the Family Code as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
In his remarkably well-written decision, Judge Leoncio P. Abarquez rejected the plaintiff' s
claim that she was in continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by
the direct acts of the latter or of his family. His Honor declared:
In this particular case the established evidence is that plaintiff continuously lived
with her mother, together with her sister Paulina. Neither the plaintiff nor her
husband had come to live with the defendant. At most, only their son, Lolito
Tufiacao was allowed to construct a small house in the land of the defendant, either
by the defendant himself, as claimed by the plaintiff, or by Vicente Toring, as
claimed by the witnesses of the defendant. The defendant never spent for the
support and education of the plaintiff. He did not allow the plaintiff to carry his
surname. The instances when the defendant gave money to the plaintiff were, more
or less, off-and-on or rather isolatedly periodic. They were made at considerable
intervals and were not given directly to the plaintiff but through a third person. Thus,
while it may be conceded that: a) the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff
himself told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza that Teopista is the daughter
of the defendant; b) that Teopista calls the defendant as "Papa Miroy"; c) that
Teopista would kiss defendant's hand when she met him; d) that the defendant
gave to her and her husband the income of the passenger truck as well as the
proceeds of the sale thereof, all these acts, taken altogether, are not sufficient to
show that the plaintiff had possessed continuously the status of a recognized
illegitimate child.
Page 42 of 486
On appeal, however, the respondent courts8 disagreed and arrived at its own conclusion as
follows:
Contrary to the conclusion of the court a quo, We find that appellant has sufficiently
proven her continuous possession of such status. Although the court a quo did not
pass on the credibility of the various witnesses presented, We consider the
witnesses for the plaintiff as credible and unbiased. No proof was shown to render
them otherwise. There is no showing that Isaac and Gaudencio testified falsely.
They were disinterested parties with no axe to grind against the appellee or the
people actively acting in his behalf. In fact even the court a quo conceded to the
truthfulness of some of their testimonies.
By contrast, it continued, Vicente Toring was an interested party who was claiming to be
the sole recognized natural child of Casimiro and stood to lose much inheritance if
Teopista's claim were recognized. He had earlier filed theft charges against his own sister
and libel charges against her husband. As for Julieta Ouano, the respondent court found it
difficult to believe that she had never met Teopista although both of them have been living
in the same barangay since birth.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on August 11, 1988. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, and it was only from the opposition thereto of the private
respondent that Casimiro's counsel learned that his client had died on May 1986. He
immediately informed the respondent court build the motion for reconsideration was denied
without any substitution of parties having been effected. The said counsel, now acting for
Vicente Toring, then asked this Court to substitute the latter for the deceased Casimiro
Mendoza in the present petition.
The applicable provisions of the Rules of Court are Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3, reading
as follows:
Sec. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity or incompetency of party. —

Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it
shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death,
incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor,
guardian or other legal representative.
Sec. 17. Death of party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of
the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of
thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative
fails to appear within said time the court may order the opposing party to procure
the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be
specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The
heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
Page 43 of 486
In the early case of Masecampo vs. Masecampo,9 it was settled that:
The subsequent death of the father is not a bar to the action commenced during Ms
lifetime by one who pretended to be his natural son. It may survive against the
executor, administrator, or any other legal representative of the testate or intestate
succession.
Pursuant to the above rules and jurisprudence, we hereby allow the substitution of
Casimiro Mendoza pro haec vice and nunc pro tunc by Vicente Toring, who appears to be
the former's illegitimate son. This disposes of the private respondent's contention that the
lawyer-client relationship terminated with Casimiro's death and that Vicente has no
personality now to substitute him.
Now to the merits.
We note that both the trial court and the respondent court, in arriving at their respective
conclusions, focused on the question of whether or not Teopista was in continuous
possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza. This was
understandable because Teopista herself had apparently based her claim on this particular
ground as proof of filiation allowed under Article 283 of the Civil Code.
To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is
necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not mean
that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an
intermittent character while it continues.10 The possession of such status means that the
father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and
without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate).11 There
must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child
as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.12
With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has not been in
continuous possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza,
under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.
The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they were both
residents of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the respondent court observed, that this
could have been because defendant had a legitimate wife. However, it is not unusual for a
father to take his illegitimate child into his house to live with him and his legitimate wife,
especially if the couple is childless, as in this case. In fact, Vicente Toring, who also
claimed to be an illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived with the latter and his wife, apparently
without objection from the latter. We also note that Teopista did not use the surname of
Casimiro although this is, of course, not decisive of one's status. No less significantly, the
regularity of defendant's act of giving money to the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza
and Isaac Mendoza has not been sufficiently established. The trial court correctly
concluded that such instances were "off-and-on," not continuous and intermittent. Indeed,
the plaintiff s testimony on this point is tenuous as in one breath she said that her mother
solely spent for her education and in another that Casimiro helped in supporting her.13
Page 44 of 486
But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession
of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless
established that status by another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an
illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof
in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence
may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his
name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.14
The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told
Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the
defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light of Rule 130, Section 39, of the
Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a

person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred
before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the
places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also
facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
The statement of the trial court regarding Teopista's parentage is not entirely accurate. To
set the record straight, we will stress that it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this
question of pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he was
informed by his father Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza,
Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.15
Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
because "it is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are
apprehended from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. 16 Nevertheless,
precisely because of its nature as hearsay evidence, there are certain safeguards against
its abuse. Commenting on this provision, Francisco enumerates the following requisites
that have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be
admitted in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.
Page 45 of 486
4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in
question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.17
All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the
declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida
Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The
declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were
the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were
made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between
her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been
established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition
of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.18
The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro could have done this by deposition
if he was too old and weak to testify at the trial of the case.
If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private respondent and
her witnesses, such as the financial doles made by Casimiro to Brigida Toring, the hiring of
Teopista's husband to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro, who later sold the vehicle and
gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista and her husband, the permission he gave Lolito
Tufiacao to build a house on his land after he found that the latter was living on a rented
lot, and, no less remarkably, the joint savings account Casimiro opened with Teopista, we
can reasonably conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.
We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the other
circumstances of this case, 'reopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate
daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such. In so holding, we
give effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate children, without prejudice to the right of the
alleged parent to resist the claimed status with his own defenses, including evidence now
obtainable through the facilities of modern medicine and technology
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING

Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the illegitimate child of the late Casimiro Mendoza and
entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Page 46 of 486
[7]
G.R. No. L-48840 December 29, 1943
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ROSARIO GUEVARA and her husband PEDRO BUISON, respondent-appellees.
Primacias, Abad, Mencias & Castillo for appellant.

Pedro C. Quinto for appellees.
OZAETA, J.:
Ernesto M. Guevarra and Rosario Guevara, ligitimate son and natural daughter,
respectively, of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, are litigating here over their inheritance
from the latter. The action was commenced on November 12, 1937, by Rosario Guevara to
recover from Ernesto Guevara what she claims to be her strict ligitime as an acknowledged
natural daughter of the deceased — to wit, a portion of 423,492 square meters of a large
parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 51691 of the province of
Pangasinan, issued in the name of Ernesto M. Guervara — and to order the latter to pay
her P6,000 plus P2,000 a year as damages for withholding such legitime from her. The
defendant answered the complaint contending that whatever right or rights the plaintiff
might have had, had been barred by the operation of law.
It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will (exhibit A),
apparently with all the formalities of the law, wherein he made the following bequests: To
his stepdaughter Candida Guevara, a pair of earrings worth P150 and a gold chain worth
P40; to his son Ernesto M. Guevara, a gold ring worth P180 and all the furniture, pictures,
statues, and other religious objects found in the residence of the testator in Poblacion Sur,
Bayambang, Pangasinan; "a mi hija Rosario Guevara," a pair of earrings worth P120; to his
stepson Piuo Guevara, a ring worth P120; and to his wife by second marriage, Angustia
Posadas, various pieces of jewelry worth P1,020.
He also made the following devises: "A mis hijos Rosario Guevara y Ernesto M. Guevara y
a mis hijastros, Vivencio, Eduviges, Dionisia, Candida y Pio, apellidados Guevara," a
residential lot with its improvements situate in the town of Bayambang, Pangasinan, having
an area of 960 square meters and assessed at P540; to his wife Angustia Posadas he
confirmed the donation propter nuptias theretofore made by him to her of a portion of 25
hectares of the large parcel of land of 259-odd hectares described in plan Psu-66618. He
also devised to her a portion of 5 hectares of the same parcel of land by way of complete
settlement of her usufructurary right.1awphil.net
He set aside 100 hectares of the same parcel of land to be disposed of either by him
during his lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact Ernesto M. Guevara in order to pay all his
Page 47 of 486
pending debts and to degray his expenses and those of his family us to the time of his
death.
The remainder of said parcel of land his disposed of in the following manner:
(d). — Toda la porcion restante de mi terreno arriba descrito, de la extension

superficial aproximada de ciento veintinueve (129) hectareas setenta (70) areas, y
veiticinco (25) centiares, con todas sus mejoras existentes en la misma, dejo y
distribuyo, pro-indiviso, a mis siguientes herederos como sigue:
A mi hijo legitimo, Ernesto M. Guevara, ciento ocho (108) hectareas, ocho (8) areas
y cincuenta y cuatro (54) centiareas, hacia la parte que colinda al Oeste de las cien
(100) hectareas referidas en el inciso (a) de este parrafo del testamento, como su
propiedad absoluta y exclusiva, en la cual extension superficial estan incluidas
cuarenta y tres (43) hectareas, veintitres (23) areas y cuarenta y dos (42)
centiareas que le doy en concepto de mejora.
A mi hija natural reconocida, Rosario Guevara, veintiun (21) hectareas, sesenta y

un (61) areas y setenta y un (71) centiareas, que es la parte restante.
Duodecimo. — Nombro por la presente como Albacea Testamentario a mi hijo

Ernesto M. Guevara, con relevacion de fianza. Y una vez legalizado este
testamento, y en cuanto sea posible, es mi deseo, que los herederos y legatarios
aqui nombrados se repartan extrajudicialmente mis bienes de conformidad con mis
disposiciones arriba consignadas.
Subsequently, and on July 12, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra executed whereby he conveyed
to him the southern half of the large parcel of land of which he had theretofore disposed by
the will above mentioned, inconsideration of the sum of P1 and other valuable
considerations, among which were the payment of all his debts and obligations amounting
to not less than P16,500, his maintenance up to his death, and the expenses of his last
illness and funeral expenses. As to the northern half of the same parcel of land, he
declared: "Hago constar tambien que reconozco a mi referido hijo Ernesto M. guevara
como dueño de la mitad norte de la totalidad y conjunto de los referidos terrenos por
haberlos comprado de su propio peculio del Sr. Rafael T. Puzon a quien habia vendido
con anterioridad."
On September 27, 1933, final decree of registration was issued in land registration case
No. 15174 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and pursuant thereto original
certificate of title No. 51691 of the same province was issued on October 12 of the same
year in favor of Ernesto M. Guevara over the whole parcel of land described in the deed of
sale above referred to. The registration proceeding had been commenced on November 1,
1932, by Victorino L. Guevara and Ernesto M. Guevara as applicants, with Rosario, among
others, as oppositor; but before the trial of the case Victorino L. Guevara withdrew as
applicant and Rosario Guevara and her co-oppositors also withdrew their opposition,
thereby facilitating the issuance of the title in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara alone.
Page 48 of 486
On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra died. His last will and testament, however,
was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever
been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Whether the various legatees mentioned in
the will have received their respective legacies or have even been given due notice of the
execution of said will and of the dispositions therein made in their favor, does not
affirmatively appear from the record of this case. Ever since the death of Victorino L.
Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land
adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed of various portions
thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father.
In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and
testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions
made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter
and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171
hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will. But a little over four years after the
testor's demise, she (assisted by her husband) commenced the present action against
Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose hereinbefore indicated; and it was only during
the trial of this case that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it
probated but only to prove that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged her
as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the
inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the
will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made
by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded.
Both the trial court and the Court of appeals sustained that theory.
Two principal questions are before us for determination: (1) the legality of the procedure
adopted by the plaintiff (respondent herein) Rosario Guevara; and (2) the efficacy of the
deed of sale exhibit 2 and the effect of the certificate of title issued to the defendant
(petitioner herein) Ernesto M. Guevara.
We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara, it being in
our opinion in violation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the
last will and testament of the decedent. The Code of Civil Procedure, which was in force up
to the time this case was decided by the trial court, contains the following pertinent
provisions:
Sec. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. — No will shall

pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court
of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the
court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.
Sec. 626. Custodian of Will to Deliver. — The person who has the custody of a will
shall, within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will
into the court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
Page 49 of 486
Sec. 627. Executor to Present Will and Accept or Refuse Trust. — A person named
as executor in a will, shall within thirty days after he knows of the death of the
testor, or within thirty days after he knows that he is named executor, if he obtained
such knowledge after knowing of the death of the testor, present such will to the
court which has jurisdiction, unless the will has been otherwise returned to said
court, and shall, within such period, signify to the court his acceptance of the trust,
or make known in writing his refusal to accept it.
Sec. 628. Penalty. — A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two
proceeding sections, unless he gives a satisfactory excuse to the court, shall be
subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.
Sec. 629. Person Retaining Will may be Committed. — If a person having custody

of a will after the death of the testator neglects without reasonable cause to deliver
the same to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by the court so to do, he may
be committed to the prison of the province by a warrant issued by the court, and
there kept in close confinement until he delivers the will.
The foregoing provisions are now embodied in Rule 76 of the new Rules of Court, which
took effect on July 1, 1940.
The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the
whole world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator (section 630, C. c. P., and sections 3 and 4, Rule 77). Altho not contested
(section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the fact that the testator at the time
of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace,
and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only then
may the will be legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed
by the judge and attested by the seal of the court; and when the will devises real property,
attested copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register
of deeds of the province in which the land lies. (Section 12, Rule 77, and section 624, C. C.
P.)
It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will to
the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and
indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compel the probate of will, the law punishes a
person who neglects his duty to present it to the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000,
and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be committed to prision and kept there
until he delivers the will.
The Court of Appeals took express notice of these requirements of the law and held that a
will, unless probated, is ineffective. Nevertheless it sanctioned the procedure adopted by
the respondent for the following reasons:
The majority of the Court is of the opinion that if this case is dismissed ordering the
filing of testate proceedings, it would cause injustice, incovenience, delay, and
much expense to the parties, and that therefore, it is preferable to leave them in the
Page 50 of 486
very status which they themselves have chosen, and to decide their controversy
once and for all, since, in a similar case, the Supreme Court applied that same
criterion (Leaño vs. Leaño, supra), which is now sanctioned by section 1 of Rule 74
of the Rules of Court. Besides, section 6 of Rule 124 provides that, if the procedure
which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not specifically
pointed out by the Rules of Court, any suitable process or mode of procedure may
be adopted which appears most consistent to the spirit of the said Rules. Hence,
we declare the action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law.
Let us look into the validity of these considerations. Section 1 of Rule 74 provides as
follows:
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent

left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a
public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir
or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an
affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the
decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within
two years after the death of the decedent.
That is a modification of section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as
follows:
Sec. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings. —

Whenever all the heirs of a person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal
capacity and there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been
paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not
otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit,
without proceedings in court.
The implication is that by the omission of the word "intestate" and the use of the word
"legatees" in section 1 of Rule 74, a summary extrajudicial settlement of a deceased
person's estate, whether he died testate or intestate, may be made under the conditions
specified. Even if we give retroactive effect to section 1 of Rule 74 and apply it here, as the
Court of Appeals did, we do not believe it sanctions the nonpresentation of a will for
probate and much less the nullification of such will thru the failure of its custodian to
present it to the court for probate; for such a result is precisely what Rule 76 sedulously
provides against. Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial
partition of the estate of a decedent "without securing letter of administration." It does not
say that in case the decedent left a will the heirs and legatees may divide the estate among
themselves without the necessity of presenting the will to the court for probate. The petition
to probate a will and the petition to issue letters of administration are two different things,
altho both may be made in the same case. the allowance of a will precedes the issuance of
letters testamentary or of administration (section 4, Rule 78). One can have a will probated
without necessarily securing letters testamentary or of administration. We hold that under
Page 51 of 486
section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the
heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first
present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will.
They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to
law. Neither may they so away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate,
because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins
the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by
will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent
legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be
cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the
partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others.
In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present
litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence
and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may
those rights be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to
present it to the court for probate.
Even if the decedent left no debts and nobdy raises any question as to the authenticity and
due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in
accordance with that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court, first,
because the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or personal estate
unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court"; and, second, because the probate of a
will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any other
proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to
effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and
to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by
law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs
and legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such
an action for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the
registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action
for reinvindicacion or partition.
We therefore believe and so hold that section 1 of Rule 74, relied upon by the Court of
Appeals, does not sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent.
The case of Leaño vs. Leaño (25 Phil., 180), cited by the Court of Appeals, like section 1 of
Rule 74, sanctions the extrajudicial partition by the heirs of the properties left by a
decedent, but not the nonpresentation of a will for probate. In that case one Paulina Ver
executed a will on October 11, 1902, and died on November 1, 1902. Her will was
presented for probate on November 10, 1902, and was approved and allowed by the Court
on August 16, 1904. In the meantime, and on November 10, 1902, the heirs went ahead
and divided the properties among themselves and some of them subsequently sold and
disposed of their shares to third persons. It does not affirmatively appear in the decision in
that case that the partition made by the heirs was not in accordance with the will or that
they in any way disregarded the will. In closing the case by its order dated September 1,
Page 52 of 486
1911, the trial court validated the partition, and one of the heirs, Cunegunda Leaño,
appealed. In deciding the appeal this Court said:
The principal assignment of error is that the lower court committed an error in
deciding that the heirs and legatees of the estate of Dña. Paulina Ver had
voluntarily divided the estate among themselves.
In resolving that question this Court said:
In view of the positive finding of the judge of the lower court that there had been a
voluntary partition of the estate among the heirs and legatees, and in the absence
of positive proof to the contrary, we must conclude that the lower court had some
evidence to support its conclusion.
Thus it will be seen that as a matter of fact no question of law was raised and decided in
that case. That decision cannot be relied upon as an authority for the unprecedented and
unheard of procedure adopted by the respondent whereby she seeks to prove her status
as an acknowledged natural child of the decedent by his will and attempts to nullify and
circumvent the testamentary dispositions made by him by not presenting the will to the
court for probate and by claiming her legitime as an acknowledged natural child on the
basis of intestacy; and that in the face of express mandatory provisions of the law requiring
her to present the will to the court for probate.
In the subsequent case of Riosa vs. Rocha (1926), 48 Phil. 737, this Court departed from
the procedure sanctioned by the trial court and impliedly approved by this Court in the
Leaño case, by holding that an extrajudicial partition is not proper in testate succession. In
the Riosa case the Court, speaking thru Chief Justice Avanceña, held:
1. EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION; NOT PROPER IN TESTATE SUCCESSION. —

Section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing the heirs of a person who
dies intestate to make extrajudicial partition of the property of the deceased, without
going into any court of justice, makes express reference to intestate succession,
and therefore excludes testate succession.
2. ID.; EFFECTS OF; TESTATE SUCCESSION. — In the instant case, which is a

testate succession, the heirs made an extrajudicial partition of the estate and at the
same time instituted proceeding for the probate of the will and the administration of
the estate. When the time came for making the partition, they submitted to the court
the extrajudicial partition previously made by them, which the court approved. Held:
That for the purposes of the reservation and the rights and obligations created
thereby, in connection with the relatives benefited, the property must not be
deemed transmitted to the heirs from the time the extrajudicial partition was made,
but from the time said partition was approved by the court. (Syllabus.)
The Court of Appeals also cites section 6 of Rule 124, which provides that if the procedure
which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not specifically pointed
out by the Rules of Court, any suitable process for mode of proceeding may be adopted
Page 53 of 486
which appears most conformable to the spirit of the said Rules. That provision is not
applicable here for the simple reason that the procedure which the court ought to follow in
the exercise of its jurisdiction is specifically pointed out and prescribed in detail by Rules
74, 76, and 77 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals also said "that if this case is dismissed, ordering the filing of testate
proceedings, it would cause injustice, inconvenience, delay, and much expense to the
parties." We see no injustice in requiring the plaintiff not to violate but to comply with the
law. On the contrary, an injustice might be committed against the other heirs and legatees
mentioned in the will if the attempt of the plaintiff to nullify said will by not presenting it to
the court for probate should be sanctioned. As to the inconvenience, delay, and expense,
the plaintiff herself is to blame because she was the custodian of the will and she violated
the duty imposed upon her by sections 2, 4, and 5 of Rule 76, which command her to
deliver said will to the court on pain of a fine not exceeding P2,000 and of imprisonment for
contempt of court. As for the defendant, he is not complaining of inconvenience, delay, and
expense, but on the contrary he is insisting that the procedure prescribed by law be
followed by the plaintiff.
Our conclusion is that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the action instituted by the
plaintiff to be in accordance with law. It also erred in awarding relief to the plaintiff in this
action on the basis of intestacy of the decedent notwithstanding the proven existence of a
will left by him and solely because said will has not been probated due to the failure of the
plaintiff as custodian thereof to comply with the duty imposed upon her by the law.
It is apparent that the defendant Ernesto M. Guevara, who was named executor in said
will, did not take any step to have it presented to the court for probate and did not signify
his acceptance of the trust or refusal to accept it as required by section 3 of Rule 76
(formerly section 627 of the Code of Civil Procedure), because his contention is that said
will, insofar as the large parcel of land in litigation is concerned, has been superseded by
the deed of sale exhibit 2 and by the subsequent issuance of the Torrens certificate of title
in his favor.
II
This brings us to the consideration of the second question, referring to the efficacy of the
deed of sale exhibit 2 and the effect of the certificate of titled issued to the defendant
Ernesto M. Guevara. So that the parties may not have litigated here in vain insofar as that
question is concerned, we deem it proper to decide it now and obviate the necessity of a
new action.
The deed of sale exhibit 2 executed by and between Victorino L. Guevara and Ernesto M.
Guevara before a notary public on July 12, 1933, may be divided into two parts: (a) insofar
as it disposes of and conveys to Ernesto M. Guevara the southern half of Victorino L.
Guevara's hacienda of 259-odd hectares in consideration of P1 and other valuable
considerations therein mentioned; and (b) insofar as it declares that Ernesto M. Guevara
became the owner of the northern half of the same hacienda by repurchasing it with his
own money from Rafael T. Puzon.
Page 54 of 486
A. As to the conveyance of the southern half of the hacienda to Ernesto M. Guevara in
consideration of the latter's assumption of the obligation to pay all the debts of the
deceased, the Court of Appeals found it to be valid and efficacious because: "(a) it has not
been proven that the charges imposed as a condition is [are] less than the value of the
property; and (b) neither has it been proven that the defendant did not comply with the
conditions imposed upon him in the deed of transfer." As a matter of fact the Court of
Appeals found" "It appears that the defendant has been paying the debts left by his father.
To accomplish this, he had to alienate considerable portions of the above-mentioned land.
And we cannot brand such alienation as anomalous unless it is proven that they have
exceeded the value of what he has acquired by virtue of the deed of July 12, 1933, and
that of his corresponding share in the inheritance." The finding of the Court of Appeals on
this aspect of the case is final and conclusive upon the respondent, who did not appeal
therefrom.
B. With regard to the northern half of the hacienda, the findings of fact and of law made by
the Court of Appeals are as follows:
The defendant has tried to prove that with his own money, he bought from Rafael
Puzon one-half of the land in question, but the Court a quo, after considering the
evidence, found it not proven; we hold that such conclusion is well founded. The
acknowledgment by the deceased, Victorino L. Guevara, of the said transactions,
which was inserted incidentally in the document of July 12, 1933, is clearly belied
by the fact that the money paid to Rafael Puzon came from Silvestre P. Coquia, to
whom Victorino L. Guevara had sold a parcel of land with the right of repurchase.
The defendant, acting for his father, received the money and delivered it to Rafael
Puzon to redeem the land in question, and instead of executing a deed of
redemption in favor of Victorino L. Guevara, the latter executed a deed of sale in
favor of the defendant.
The plaintiff avers that she withdrew her opposition to the registration of the land in
the name of the defendant, because of the latter's promise that after paying all the
debt of their father, he would deliver to her and to the widow their corresponding
shares. As their father then was still alive, there was no reason to require the
delivery of her share and that was why she did not insist on her opposition, trusting
on the reliability and sincerity of her brother's promise. The evidence shows that
such promise was really made. The registration of land under the Torrens system
does not have the effect of altering the laws of succession, or the rights of partition
between coparceners, joint tenants, and other cotenants nor does it change or
affect in any other way any other rights and liabilities created by law and applicable
to unregistered land (sec. 70, Land Registration Law). The plaintiff is not, then, in
estoppel, nor can the doctrine of res judicata be invoked against her claim. Under
these circumstances, she has the right to compel the defendant to deliver her
corresponding share in the estate left by the deceased, Victorino L. Guevara.
In his tenth to fourteenth assignments of error the petitioner assails the foregoing findings
of the Court of Appeals. But the findings of fact made by said court are final and not
reviewable by us on certiorari. The Court of Appeals found that the money with which the
petitioner repurchased the northern half of the land in question from Rafael Puzon was not
Page 55 of 486
his own but his father's, it being the proceeds of the sale of a parcel of land made by the
latter to Silvestre P. Coquia. Said court also found that the respondent withdrew her
opposition to the registration of the land in the name of the petitioner upon the latter's
promise that after paying all the debts of their father he would deliver to her and to the
widow their corresponding shares. From these facts, it results that the interested parties
consented to the registration of the land in question in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara
alone subject to the implied trust on account of which he is under obligation to deliver and
convey to them their corresponding shares after all the debts of the original owner of said
land had been paid. Such finding does not constitute a reversal of the decision and decree
of registration, which merely confirmed the petitioner's title; and in the absence of any
intervening innocent third party, the petitioner may be compelled to fulfill the promise by
virtue of which he acquired his title. That is authorized by section 70 of the Land
Registration Act, cited by the Court of Appeals, and by the decision of this Court
in Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343, and the cases therein cited.
Upon this phase of the litigation, we affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
northern half of the land described in the will exhibit A and in original certificate of title No.
51691 still belongs to the estate of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara. In the event the
petitioner Ernesto M. Guevara has alienated any portion thereof, he is under obligation to
compensate the estate with an equivalent portion from the southern half of said land that
has not yet been sold. In other words, to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara still belongs
one half of the total area of the land described in said original certificate of title, to be taken
from such portions as have not yet been sold by the petitioner, the other half having been
lawfully acquired by the latter in consideration of his assuming the obligation to pay all the
debts of the deceased.
Wherefore, that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which declares in effect that
notwithstanding exhibit 2 and the issuance of original certificate of title No. 51691 in the
name of Ernesto M. Guevara, one half of the land described in said certificate of title
belongs to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara and the other half to Ernesto M. Guevara in
consideration of the latter's assumption of the obligation to pay all the debts of the
deceased, is hereby affirmed; but the judgment of said court insofar as it awards any relief
to the respondent Rosario Guevara in this action is hereby reversed and set aside, and the
parties herein are hereby ordered to present the document exhibit A to the proper court for
probate in accordance with law, without prejudice to such action as the provincial fiscal of
Pangasinan may take against the responsible party or parties under section 4 of Rule 76.
After the said document is approved and allowed by the court as the last will and testament
of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, the heirs and legatees therein named may take such
action, judicial or extrajudicial, as may be necessary to partition the estate of the testator,
taking into consideration the pronouncements made in part II of this opinion. No finding as
to costs in any of the three instances.
Page 56 of 486
[8]
G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ "AQUINO,"
represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo
City, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie)
and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of
Dominique’s parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa,
Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.1 After almost two months, or on November 2,

2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique’s parents, gave birth to her herein co-
petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital,
Antipolo City.
Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s surname Aquino, with
the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the
child’s Certificate of Live Birth,2 Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father3 (AUSF) which
she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s
father Domingo Butch Aquino.4 Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of
Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity
had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled
"AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting,
the pertinent portions of which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
I’M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20

THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.5 I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY.
DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE
BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHER’S NAME IS
DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHER’S NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS
AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx
Page 57 of 486
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN
OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS,
THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD
COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE
TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THAT’S ALL.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By letter dated November 11, 2005,7 the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul
S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie’s application for registration of the child’s name in this
wise:
7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing Rules and

Regulations of Republic Act No. 9255 ["An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the
Surname of their Father, Amending for the Purpose, Article 176 of Executive Order No.
209, otherwise Known as the ‘Family Code of the Philippines’"]) provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is
executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate
document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten instrument, the child
shall use the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following
documents:
a. AUSF8
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the filing of the
document.
c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the paternity between the
father and the child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)
Page 58 of 486
In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of
wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to
acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 –
Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity – or the Authority to Use the Surname
of the Father). (Underscoring supplied)
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint9 for injunction/registration of name against
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No.
06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the
denial of registration of the child’s name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his
deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9255,10 which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register,
or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts
to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist
of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission

of paternity in a "private handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of the above-
quoted provision of law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of summons, respondent
was declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the circumstances of her
common-law relationship with Dominique and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that
during his lifetime, he had acknowledged his yet unborn child.11 She offered Dominique’s
handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit "A") as her documentary evidence-in-
chief.12 Dominique’s lone brother, Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also testified, corroborating
Jenie’s declarations.13
By Decision14 of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack of cause of
action" as the Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of
Terms) of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and
Regulations Governing the Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines "private
handwritten document" through which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as
follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument – an instrument executed in the handwriting of the

father and duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity to the child.
(Underscoring supplied)
Page 59 of 486
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten
Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.1avvphi1
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari raising this purely
legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE

DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A
RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT"
WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS
AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHER’S
SURNAME.15 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly
require that the private handwritten instrument containing the putative father’s admission of
paternity must be signed by him. They add that the deceased’s handwritten Autobiography,
though unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph
2.2 of the Administrative Order that the admission/recognition must be "duly signed" by the
father is void as it "unduly expanded" the earlier-quoted provision of Article 176 of the
Family Code.16
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Dominique’s
handwritten Autobiography contains a "clear and unmistakable" recognition of the child’s
paternity.17
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that respondent’s
position, as affirmed by the trial court, is in consonance with the law and thus prays for the
dismissal of the petition. It further submits that Dominique’s Autobiography "merely
acknowledged Jenie’s pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child she was carrying in her
womb."18
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to
use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his
offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission
made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these
documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child’s paternity;
hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.19
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the
private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the
putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions
of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature,
thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Page 60 of 486
xxxx

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix
his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2,
Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not "unduly
expand" the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant
matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the
facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.20 Third, Jenie’s testimony
is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino
and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be
affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances
indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography
that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and
"NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."
In Herrera v. Alba,21 the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on

establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
Page 61 of 486
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130
provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him
by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member
of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family
books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to
establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of
paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant
incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New
Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of
filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of
the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by
the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be
a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various
occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student
permanent record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where
the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone,
neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominique’s
Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant
facts extant herein – that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as
Page 62 of 486
common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents’ house in Pulang-lupa,
Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4,
2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child – they sufficiently
establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique’s.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following
rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in
any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted

to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the
same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and

competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in
resolving questions affecting him.22 Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests
of the child shall be a primary consideration.23 (Underscoring supplied)
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of
the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x."24 Too, "(t)he
State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation
and other conditions prejudicial to their development."25
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to
petitioner minor child’s best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now
deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is
DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto.
Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of
Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of Births.
SO ORDERED.
Page 63 of 486
[9]
G.R. No. 165016 June 17, 2008
DOLORES MONTEFALCON & LAURENCE MONTEFALCON, petitioners,

vs.
RONNIE S. VASQUEZ, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the September 29, 2003 Decision1 and the July 19, 2004
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71944, which had reversed the May
28, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Naga City in Civil Case
No. RTC '99-4460.
The facts culled from the records are as follows.
In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint4 for acknowledgment and

support against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that
her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged
to give support to co-petitioner Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he
signed as father.5 According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as
support for Laurence since Laurence was born in 1993. Vasquez allegedly also refused to
give him regular school allowance despite repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores added
that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family.
A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in Aro-aldao, Nabua,
Camarines Sur. Vasquez's grandfather received them as Vasquez was in Manila.
Vasquez's mother returned the documents to the clerk of court, who informed the court of
the non-service of summons.6
Petitioners then filed a motion to declare Vasquez in default. The court denied it for lack of
proper service of summons.7
In 2000, the court issued an alias summons on Vasquez at "10 Int. President Garcia St.,
Zone 6, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila" upon petitioners' motion. Albeit a Taguig
deputy sheriff served it by substituted service on Vasquez's caretaker Raquel Bejer, the
sheriff's return incorrectly stated "Lazaro" as Vasquez's surname.8
Another alias summons9 was issued, also received by Bejer. The second sheriff's return
states:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on the 19th day of July 2000 the undersigned sheriff
caused the service of summons issued by the court in the above-entitled case
together with the copy of the complaint and annexes attached thereon upon
Page 64 of 486
defendant RONNIE S. VASQUEZ, by substituted service, thru his caretaker,
RAQUEL BEJER, a person of sufficient discretion, who acknowledged the receipt
thereof at No. 10 Int. President Garcia St. Zone 6, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro
Manila, as evidenced by her signature appearing at the lower portion of the original
copy of summons.
WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to the court of origin DULY

SERVED for its records and information.
Taguig for Naga City, July 19, 2000
(SGD.)
ERNESTO G. RAYMUNDO, JR.,
Deputy Sheriff
MTC BR 74
Taguig, Metro Manila10
On petitioners' motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for failure to file an
answer despite the substituted service of summons. Vasquez was furnished with court
orders and notices of the proceedings at his last known address, but these were returned
as he had allegedly moved to another place and left no new address.11
In 2001, the court granted petitioners' prayers, explaining that they had no ill-motive and
that Dolores gave a truthful testimony. The court added that Vasquez admitted the truth of
the allegations by his silence. It further explained that Laurence's certificate of live birth,
being a public document, is irrefutably a prima facie evidence of illegitimate filiation. The
trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, by preponderant evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

the plaintiffs Dolores Montefalcon and her minor child Laurence Montefalcon and
against defendant Ronnie S. Vasquez who is hereby ordered to:
1. Acknowledge plaintiff Laurence Montefalcon as his illegitimate child with Dolores

Montefalcon;
2. Give support to the said minor in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS monthly commencing on June 1, 1993, the past support for eight (8) years
in the amount of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND (P480,000.00) PESOS
less the amount of NINETEEN THOUSAND (P19,000.00) PESOS previously given,
shall be paid promptly and the monthly support of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS shall be paid not later than the end of each month beginning on July 31,
2001 and every end of the month thereafter as prayed for in the complaint; and
3. Pay the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS and THREE

THOUSAND (P3,000.00) PESOS as attorney's and appearance fees, respectively,
and litigation expenses of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS.
Page 65 of 486
SO ORDERED.12
In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed a notice of appeal to which petitioners
opposed. Appeal was granted by the court.13 Before the appellate court, he argued that the
trial court erred in trying and deciding the case as it "never" acquired jurisdiction over his
person, as well as in awarding P5,000-per-month support, which was allegedly "excessive
and exorbitant." The appellate court noted that the service of summons on Vasquez was
"defective" as there was no explanation of impossibility of personal service and an attempt
to effect personal service, and decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is GRANTED.

The appealed May 28, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City in
Civil Case No. RTC '99-4460 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.14
Petitioners argued in their motion for reconsideration15 that any attempt at personal service
of summons was needless as Vasquez already left for abroad. The appellate court,
however, denied the motion. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign two appellate court errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IN

THIS CASE WAS NOT VALIDLY SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND
COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. RTC '99-4460; AND THAT
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ANNUL[L]ING AND SETTING ASIDE THE

TRIAL COURT'S DECISION (ANNEX "B") FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.16
Petitioners justify the validity of substituted service as Vasquez had left as overseas
seafarer when the sheriff served the summons on July 19, 2000 in Taguig. Noting that
Vasquez's seaman's book indicated that he left the country on January 24, 2000 and came
back on October 12, 2000, they criticize the appellate court for anchoring its rulings on
mere technicality.
Vasquez counters that because he was abroad, service of summons should have been
personal or by publication as substituted service is proper only if a defendant is in the
country. Vasquez also added that the sheriff's return did not state that he exerted efforts to
personally serve the summons.17
Page 66 of 486
In their reply, petitioners insist that a substituted service is the normal method if one is
temporarily away from the country as personal service abroad or by publication are not
ordinary means of service.18
Simply put, the issues now for resolution are: (1) whether there is a valid substituted
service of summons on Vasquez to clothe the trial court with jurisdiction over his person;
and (2) whether he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence.
To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons must be

personal,19 or if this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service. 20 It
is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual employees. They go
back to the country once their contracts expire, and wait for the signing of another contract
with the same or new manning agency and principal if they wish. It is therefore common
knowledge that a Filipino seaman often has a temporary residence in the urban areas like
Metro Manila, where majority of the manning agencies hold offices, aside from his home
address in the province where he originates. In this case, respondent Vasquez hails from
Camarines Sur but he has lived in Taguig City when the complaint was filed. Notice may
then be taken that he has established a residence in either place. Residence is a place
where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service was made,
even though he was temporarily abroad at the time. As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez
was a Filipino resident temporarily out of the country. Hence, service of summons on him is
governed by Rule 14, Section 16 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. ─ When any action is

commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but
who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of
the Philippines, as under the preceding section. (Emphasis supplied.)
The preceding section referred to states:
SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service.─ When the defendant does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or
relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest
therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines,
service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal
service as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in
such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be
less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.
Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words "may" and "also," it is not mandatory. Other
methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the
serving officer on a defendant-seaman.
Page 67 of 486
Ideally, Vasquez must be personally served summons. But was personal service of
summons practicable? Conversely, was substituted service of summons justified?
Obviously, personal service of summons was not practicable since the defendant was
temporarily out of the country. To proceed with personal service of summons on a
defendant-seaman who went on overseas contract work ─ would not only be impractical
and futile ─ it would also be absurd.
The impossibility of prompt personal service was shown by the fact that the Naga City-
based sheriff purposely went to a barrio in Camarines Sur to serve the summons
personally on Vasquez. When service of summons failed, said sheriff ascertained the
whereabouts of Vasquez. Upon being informed that Vasquez was in Manila, the Naga
court commissioned a Taguig City-based sheriff to serve the summons. Both the Naga and
Taguig sheriffs inquired about Vasquez's whereabouts, signifying that they did not
immediately resort to substituted service. There was no undue haste in effecting
substituted service. The fact that the Naga court allowed a reasonable time to locate
Vasquez to as far as Taguig shows that there was indeed no precipitate haste in serving
the summons.
In this case, we agree that the substituted service in Taguig was valid and justified
because previous attempts were made by the sheriffs to serve the summons, but to no
avail. Diligent efforts were evidently exerted in the conduct of the concerned sheriffs in the
performance of their official duty. Also, the person who received the alias summons was of
suitable age and discretion, then residing at Vasquez's dwelling. There is no quarrel that it
was really Vasquez's residence, as evidenced by his employment contract, executed under
the supervision and authority of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA). Vasquez cannot deny that in his contract of employment and seafarer's
information sheet, both bearing POEA's letterhead, his address in Metro Manila was what
was correctly mentioned in the alias summons that Bejer received. She must have
informed Vasquez one way or another of the suit upon his return in October 2000 after
finishing his nine-month contract with Fathom Ship Management.
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that he had enough time to have the default order set
aside. The default judgment was rendered on May 28, 2001. He also had enough time to
file a motion for reconsideration. But he did nothing. The interregnum between the first but
failed attempt at personal service by the RTC of Naga City in Vasquez's place in
Camarines Sur to the final substituted service in Metro Manila by a Taguig RTC sheriff was
almost eight months, a reasonable time long enough to conclude that personal service had
failed and was futile.
Montalban v. Maximo21 offers a rational and logical solution of the issue. We held in said
case that the normal method of service of summons on one temporarily absent is by
substituted service because personal service abroad and service by publication are not
ordinary means of summoning defendants. Summons in a suit in personam against a
temporarily absent resident may be by substituted service as domiciliaries of a State are
always amenable to suits in personam therein.22
Page 68 of 486
"Residence" is the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time
when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the
time. A plaintiff is merely required to know the defendant's residence, office or regular
business place. He need not know where a resident defendant actually is at the very
moment of filing suit. He is not even duty-bound to ensure that the person upon whom
service was actually made delivers the summons to the defendant or informs him about it.
The law presumes that for him. It is immaterial that defendant does not receive actual
notice.
As well said in Montalban:
. . . A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence,
a dwelling where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him
may be directed and where he is bound to return. Where one temporarily absents
himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of one who may be reasonably expected
to act in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary to protect his interests; and
to communicate with him from time to time any incident of importance that may
affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at his
home or with his business associates information as to where he may be contacted
in the event a question that affects him crops up. If he does not do what is expected
of him, and a case comes up in court against him, he cannot in justice raise his
voice and say that he is not subject to the processes of our courts. He cannot stop
a suit from being filed against him upon a claim that he cannot be summoned at his
dwelling house or residence or his office or regular place of business.
Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable him to contest a
suit against him. There are now advanced facilities of communication. Long
distance telephone calls and cablegrams make it easy for one he left behind to
communicate with him.23
Aside from, at present, various forms of texting and short message services by the
ubiquitous cellular phones.
More importantly, the letter of the law must yield to its spirit. The absence in the final
sheriff's return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not
conclusively prove that the service is invalid. Such failure should not unduly prejudice
petitioners if what was undisclosed was in fact done. Proof of prior attempts at personal
service may have been submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident
assailing the validity of the substituted service24 had Vasquez surfaced when the case was
heard. In fact, he was declared in default. It was only when a judgment against him was
rendered by the trial court that he questioned the validity of service of summons before the
appellate court. Such failure to appear, and then later to question the court's jurisdiction
over his person, should not be taken against herein petitioners.
Between Vasquez's self-serving assertion that he only came to know of the case when his
mother told him about the trial court's decision and the sheriff's return on the substituted
service which carries a presumption of regularity, the latter is undoubtedly deserving of
more faith and credit. The sheriff's certificate of service of summons is prima
Page 69 of 486
facie evidence of the facts set out in it. Only clear and convincing evidence may overcome
its presumption of regularity. Given the circumstances in the present case, we agree that
the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty on the part of the sheriff stands.25
On the second issue, the trial court's order must also be sustained. Co-petitioner Laurence
is legally entitled to support from the respondent, and the amount of P5,000 monthly set by
the trial court is neither excessive nor unreasonable.
Article 17526 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may
be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under
Article 172,27 the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1)
through record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission of
filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned; or in default of these two, by open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child or by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Laurence's record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to

prove paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores.
He signed as father in Laurence's certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied
the data entered in it. Thus, it is a competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its
preparation. In fact, if the child had been recognized by any of the modes in the first
paragraph of Article 172, there is no further need to file any action for acknowledgment
because any of said modes is by itself a consummated act.28
As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. Petitioners were

able to prove that Laurence needs Vasquez's support and that Vasquez is capable of
giving such support. Dolores testified that she spent around P200,000 for Laurence; she
spends P8,000 a month for his schooling and their subsistence. She told the lower court
Vasquez was earning US$535 monthly based on his January 10, 2000 contract of
employment29 with Fathom Ship Management and his seafarer information sheet. 30 That
income, if converted at the prevailing rate, would be more than sufficient to cover the
monthly support for Laurence.
Under Article 195 (4)31 of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his illegitimate
child. The amount is variable. There is no final judgment thereof as it shall be in proportion
to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.32 It may be
reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to
support.33 Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family.34 Under the premises, the award of P5,000 monthly support to Laurence is
reasonable, and not excessive nor exorbitant.
In sum, we rule that the Court of Appeals erred in invalidating the substituted service of
summons and remanding the case. As there was valid substituted service of summons
under the circumstances of this case, the lower court acquired jurisdiction over his person
and correctly ordered him to pay past and present monthly support to his illegitimate child
as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses to petitioners.
Page 70 of 486
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 29, 2003 and
Resolution dated July 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71944
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 28, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19, Naga City in Civil Case No. RTC '99-4460 is hereby REINSTATED.
Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Page 71 of 486
[102]
[G.R. No. 57227. May 14, 1992.]
AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter

represented herein by the former, his mother and natural
guardian, Petitioners, v. IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas, for Petitioners.
Bienvenido D. Carriaga for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURT OF APPEALS; DUTY THEREOF IN THE EXERCISE OF

ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION. — It must be stressed at the outset that factual
findings of the trial court have only a persuasive and not a conclusive effect on
the Court of Appeals. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it is the duty
of the Court of Appeals to review the factual findings of the trial court and
rectify the errors it committed as may have been properly assigned and as
could be established by a re-examination of the evidence on record. It is the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals, not those of the trial court, that as a
rule are considered final and conclusive even on this Court (Hermon v. Hon.
Court of Appeals, Et Al., 155 SCRA 24 [1987]).
2. ID.; ID.; AS A GENERAL RULE, ONLY ERRORS OF LAWS COMMITTED

THEREOF ARE REVIEWABLE BY THE SUPREME COURT. — This being a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court will review only
errors of law committed by the Court of Appeals. It is not the function of this
Court to re-examine all over again the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties unless the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is
not supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts (Remalante v. Tibe, Et Al., 158 SCRA 138 [1988];
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 149 SCRA 97 [1987]).
3. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; AS A GENERAL RULE, MERE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE

IS NOT BY ITSELF A BASIS FOR RECOVERY; EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. — As
regards Amelita’s claim for damages which is based on Article 19 & 21 of the
Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan’s promise of marriage, she
surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals that
mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could
only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and
Page 72 of 486
mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony’s Restaurant, Amelita was
already 28 years old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan (TSN,
December 8, 1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she induced or deceived because of a
promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with
Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in
August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the months
of September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual
intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage
was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
DECISION
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision 1 dated April

30, 1981 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61552-R which dismissed
petitioner’s complaint and set aside the resolution 2 dated October 21, 1976 of
the then Court of First Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial District, amending the
dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 and ordering private
respondent Ivan Mendez: (1) to acknowledge the minor Michael Constantino as
his illegitimate child; (2) to give a monthly support of P300.00 to the minor
child, (3) to pay complainant Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as
actual and moral damages; and (4) to pay attorney’s fees in the sum of P5,000
plus costs.
It appears on record that on June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed

an action for acknowledgment, support and damages against private
respondent Ivan Mendez. The case was filed with the then CFI of Davao, 10th
Judicial District and docketed as Civil Case No. 8881. In her complaint, Amelita
Constantino alleges, among others, that sometime in the month of August,
1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony’s Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz, Manila,
where she worked as a waitress; that the day following their first meeting, Ivan
invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; that
while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita; that Amelita asked
for time to think about Ivan’s proposal; that at about 11:00 o’clock in the
evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed, that
on the pretext of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room
and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
the latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a
married man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of
September and November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of
Page 73 of 486
which Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf
ears; that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who
is the father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the
complaint; that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her
work as a waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a
monthly income of P5,000 to P8,000.00. As relief, Amelita prayed for the
recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees plus costs.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at
Tony’s Cocktail Lounge but denied having sexual knowledge or illicit relations
with her. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of
action. By way of counterclaim, he further prayed for the payment of
exemplary damages and litigation expense including attorney’s fees for the
filing of the malicious complaint.
On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed a motion for leave to amend

the complaint impleading as co-plaintiff her son Michael Constantino who was
born on August 3, 1975. In its order dated September 4, 1975, the trial court
admitted the amended complaint.
On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the amended
complaint reiterating his previous answer denying that Michael Constantino is
his illegitimate son.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision dated June 21, 1976, the
dispositive portion of which reads, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

plaintiff Amelita Constantino and against defendant Ivan Mendez, ordering the
latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and
moral damages; and, the sum of P3,000.00, as and by way of attorney’s fees.
The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion for
reconsideration. Ivan Mendez anchored his motion on the ground that the
award of damages was not supported by evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the
other hand, sought the recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino
as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.
In its resolution dated October 21, 1976, the trial court granted Amelita
Constantino’s motion for reconsideration, and amended the dispositive portion
of its decision dated June 21, 1976 to read as follows,
Page 74 of 486
viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

plaintiff Amelita Constantino and plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino, and
against defendant Ivan Mendez ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino
the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages and the sum of
P200.00 as and by way of payment of the hospital and medical bills incurred
during the delivery of plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino; to recognize as his
own illegitimate child the plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino who shall be
entitled to all the rights, privileges and benefits appertaining to a child of such
status; to give a permanent monthly support in favor of plaintiff Michael
Constantino the amount of P300.00; and the sum of P5,000.00, as and by way
of attorney’s fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this
suit.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Let this Order form part of the decision dated June 21, 1976.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the above amended decision was set aside
and the complaint was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.
Basically, the issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the Court
of Appeals committed a reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial
court and in dismissing the complaint.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the factual
findings of the trial court and in not affirming the decision of the trial court.
They also pointed out that the appellate court committed a misapprehension of
facts when it concluded that Ivan did not have sexual access with Amelita
during the first or second week of November, 1976 (should be 1974), the time
of the conception of the child.
It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of the trial court have
only a persuasive and not a conclusive effect on the Court of Appeals. In the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court of Appeals to
review the factual findings of the trial court and rectify the errors it committed
as may have been properly assigned and as could be established by a re-
examination of the evidence on record. It is the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, not those of the trial court, that as a rule are considered final and
conclusive even on this Court (Hermo v. Hon. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 155
SCRA 24 [1987]). This being a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, this Court will review only errors of law committed by the Court of
Appeals. It is not the function of this Court to re-examine all over again the
oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings of
facts of the Court of Appeals is not supported by the evidence on record or the
Page 75 of 486
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts (Remalante v. Tibe, Et Al., 158
SCRA 138 [1988]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 149 SCRA 97
[1987]).
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record,

that Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her
claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Such
conclusion based on the evaluation of the evidence on record is controlling on
this Court as the same is supported by the evidence on record. Even the trial
court initially entertained such posture. It ordered the recognition of Michael as
the illegitimate son of Ivan only when acting on the motions for
reconsideration, it reconsidered, on October 21, 1976, its earlier decision dated
June 21, 1976. Amelita’s testimony on cross-examination that she had sexual
contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or second week of November, 1974
(TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 108) is inconsistent with her response that she
could not remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in November,
1974 (Ibid, p. 106). Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second
week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on
direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with
Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 (Exhibit 6) so

that as correctly pointed out by private respondent’s counsel, citing medical
science (Williams Obstetrics, Tenth Ed., p. 198) to the effect that "the mean
duration of actual pregnancy, counting from the day of conception must be
close to 267 days", the conception of the child (Michael) must have taken place
about 267 days before August 3, 1375 or sometime in the second week of
November, 1974. While Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan
in November, 1974, nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by her own
evidence (Exh. F), the letter dated February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan
Mendez requesting for a conference, prepared by her own counsel Atty.
Roberto Sarenas to whom she must have confided the attendant circumstances
of her pregnancy while still fresh in her memory, informing Ivan that Amelita is
four (4) months pregnant so that applying the period of the duration of actual
pregnancy, the child was conceived on or about October 11, 1974.
Petitioner’s assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend (TSN, December
8, 1975, p. 65) is belied by Exhibit 2, her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez
where she revealed the reason for her attachment to Ivan who possessed
certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. She also confided that she had a
quarrel with her boyfriend because of gossips so she left her work. An order for
recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an
irritant in the family or lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. The
burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her affirmative allegations that Ivan
Page 76 of 486
is the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed.
As regards Amelita’s claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4

of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan’s promise of marriage, she
surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals that
mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could
only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and
mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony’s Restaurant, Amelita was
already 28 years old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan (TSN,
December 8, 1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a
promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with
Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in
August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the months
of September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual
intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage
was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Page 77 of 486
[2]
[G.R. No. 4275. March 23, 1909. ]
PAULA CONDE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMAN ABAYA, Defendant-

Appellant.
C. Oben, for Appellant.
L. Joaquin, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ESTATES: ACTION AGAINST EXECUTION OR ADMINISTRATIONS. — While an

estate is in the course of settlement in a special proceeding, no ordinary action
can be maintained by a person claiming to be an heir, against the executor or
administrator, for the purpose of having his rights in the estate determined.
(Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436.)
2. DISTINCTION BETWEEN RIGHTS OF ACTION BY LEGITIMATE AND BY

NATURAL CHILDREN TO COMPEL RECOGNITION. — As a general rule, the right
of action of a child to enforce recognition of its legitimacy lasts during the
lifetime of such child, but the right of a natural child to compel
acknowledgment of its status continues only during the life of the alleged
parents. The right of action for a declaration of legitimacy is transmitted to the
heirs of the child only when the latter dies during minority or while insane, or in
case the action has already been instituted. Action by a natural child can only
be brought against the heirs of the parents in the event of the death of the
parents during the minority of the child, or upon the discovery of a document,
after the death of the parents, expressly acknowledging such child. This right of
action which the law concedes to this natural child is not transmitted to his
ascendants or descendants. (Arts. 18 and 137, Civil Code.)
Per Torres, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
3. NATURAL CHILDREN; SUCCESSION AND TRANSMISSION OF RIGHTS TO

DEMAND RECOGNITION. — Although article 137 of the Civil Code contains no
disposition authorizing the transfer, in favor of the natural mother in her
capacity of heir of her natural child, of the right to judicially demand the
recognition of her child by the heirs of his late natural father; yet there is no
express provision therein that prohibits such transfer or that declares such
right to be nontransferable.
4. ID.; ID. — The relation of paternity and filiation between natural parents and
children is also of a natural character, and therefore, reciprocal intestate
succession between them is exclusively governed by articles 944 and 945 of
Page 78 of 486
the Civil Code.
5. ID.; ID. — If the right of succession granted by the law to the natural
children corresponds reciprocally to the natural father or mother in the same
cases, and if the estate includes all property, rights and obligations of a person
which do not expire at the latter’s death, it is certain that, among the rights
transferred to the natural mother by inheritance, at the time of the death of
her natural child, is the right held by such child during his lifetime to demand
his recognition as such by his natural father, should the latter still live, or by
his heirs.
6. ID.; ID. — There is no legal provision that declares the said right to demand
the recognition of a natural child to be nontransferable to the latter’s heirs, and
specially to his natural mother, nor is there any rule declaring such right
extinguished at the death of the natural child.
7. ID.; ID. — In the intestate succession of a natural child who dies during his
minority, recognized by the law in favor of his father or mother who have
acknowledged him, no limitation has been established excluding the said right
from transferable rights, nor has it been expressly declared that the above-
mentioned right to demand the recognition of the natural child is extinguished
at the latter’s death, wherefore it is necessary to admit that the mother inherits
from the natural child at his death, and that she is entitled to institute the
corresponding action.
DECISION
ARELLANO, C.J. :
From the hearing of the appeal interposed by Roman Abaya in the special
proceedings brought in the Court of First Instance of La Laguna for the
settlement of the intestate estate and the distribution of the property of
Casiano Abaya it appears:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. As antecedents: that Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya

and Sabina Labadia, died on the 6th of April 1899; that Paula Conde, as the
mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states she
had by Casiano Abaya, on the 6th of November, 1905, moved the settlement of
the said intestate succession; that an administrator having been appointed for
the said estate on the 25th of November, 1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the
said Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, the parents of the late Casiano
Abaya, came forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself
as being the nearest relative of the deceased; that this was granted by the
Page 79 of 486
court below on the 9th of January, 1906; that on the 17th of November, 1906,
Roman Abaya moved that, after due process of law, the court declare him to be
the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all other persons, especially
of Paula Conde, and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the
property of said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him; and that on
November 22, 1906, the court ordered the publication of notices for the
declaration of heirs and distribution of the property of the estate.
II. That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde, in reply to the foregoing
motion of Roman Abaya, filed a petition wherein she stated that she
acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya, but that she
considered that her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing of the
matter, and, in consequence of the evidence that she intended to present she
prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the property left by
Casiano Abaya, and that the same be adjudicated to her together with the
corresponding products thereof.
III. That the trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and oral
evidence, and the court below entered the following
judgment:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That the administrator of the estate of Casiana Abaya should recognize

Teopista and Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano Abaya; that the
petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of her children
with respect to the inheritance of their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya;
and therefore, it is hereby declared that she is the only heir to the property of
the said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the administrator, Roman
Abaya."cralaw virtua1aw library
IV. That Roman Abaya excepted to the foregoing judgment, appealed to this
court, and presented the following statement of errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. The fact that the court below found that an ordinary action for the
acknowledgment of natural children under articles 135 and 137 of the Civil
Code, might be brought in special probate proceedings.
2. The finding that after the death of a person claimed to be an

unacknowledged natural child, the mother of such presumed natural child, as
heir to the latter, may bring an action to enforce the acknowledgment of her
deceased child in accordance with articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code.
3. The finding in the judgment that the alleged continuous possession of the
deceased children of Paula Conde of the status of natural children of the late
Casiano Abaya, has been fully proven in these proceedings; and
Page 80 of 486
4. On the hypothesis that it was proper to adjudicate the property of this
intestate estate to Paula Conde, as improperly found by the court below, the
court erred in not having declared that said property should be reserved in
favor of relatives of Casiano Abaya to the third degree, and in not having
previously demanded securities from Paula Conde to guarantee the
transmission of the property to those who might fall within the reservation.
As to the first error assigned, the question is set up as to whether in special

proceedings for the administration and distribution of an intestate estate, an
action might be brought to enforce the acknowledgment of the natural child of
the person from whom the inheritance is derived, that is to say, whether one
might appear as heir on the ground that he is a recognized natural child of the
deceased, not having been so recognized by the deceased either voluntarily or
compulsory by reason of a preexisting judicial decision, but asking at the same
time that, in the special proceeding itself, he be recognized by the presumed
legitimate heirs of the deceased who claim to be entitled to the succession
opened in the special proceeding.
According to section 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure —
"If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to who the
lawful heirs of the deceased person are, or as to the distributive share to which
each person is entitled under the law, the testimony as to such controversy
shall be taken in writing by the judge, under oath and signed by witness. Any
party in interest whose distributive share is affected by the determination of
such controversy, may appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
determining such controversy to the Supreme Court, within the time and in the
manner provided in the last preceding section."cralaw virtua1aw library
This court has decided the present question in the manner shown in the case of
Juana Pimental v. Engracio Palanca (5 Phil. Rep. 436.)
The main question with regard to the second error assigned, is whether or not
the mother of a natural child now deceased, but who survived the person who,
it is claimed, was his natural father, also deceased, may bring an action for the
acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear
in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the person who is supposed to be
his natural father.
In order to decide in the affirmative the court below has assigned the following
as the only foundation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In resolving a similar question Manresa says: ’An acknowledgment can only be
demanded by the natural child and his descendants whom it shall benefit, and
should they be minors or otherwise incapacitated, such person as legally
represents them; the mother may ask it in behalf of her child so long as he is
Page 81 of 486
under her authority.’ On this point no positive declaration has been made,
undoubtedly because it was not considered necessary. A private action is in
question and the general rule must be followed. Elsewhere the same author
adds: ’It may so happen that the child dies before four years have expired after
attaining majority, or that the document supporting his petition for
acknowledgment is discovered after his death, such death perhaps occurring
after his parents had died, as is supposed by article 137, or during their
lifetime. In any case such right of action shall pertain to the descendants of the
child whom the acknowledgment may interest.’ (See Commentaries to arts.
135 and 137, Civil Code. Vol. I.) ’
The above doctrine, advanced by one of the most eminent commentators of the
Civil Code, lacks legal and doctrinal foundation. The power to transmit the right
of such action by the natural child to his descendants can not be sustained
under the law, and still less to his mother.
It is without any support in law because the rule laid down in the code is most
positive, limiting in form, when establishing the exception for the exercise of
such right of action after the death of the presumed parents, as is shown
hereafter. It is not supported by any doctrine, because up to the present time
no argument has been presented, upon which even an approximate conclusion
could be based.
Although the Civil Code considerably improved the condition of recognized

natural children, granting them rights and actions that they did not possess
under the former laws, they were not, however, placed upon the same plane as
legitimate ones. The difference that separates these two classes of children is
still great, as proven by so many articles dealing with the rights of the family
and with succession in relation to the members thereof. It may be laid down as
a legal maxim, that whatever the code does not grant to the legitimate
children, or in connection with their rights, must still less be understood as
granted to recognized natural children or in connection with their rights. There
is not a single exception in its provisions.
If legitimacy is the attribute that constitutes the basis of the absolute family
rights of the child, the acknowledgment of the natural child is, among
illegitimate ones, that which unites him to the family of the father or the
mother who recognizes him, and affords him a participation in the rights of the
family, relatively advantageous according to whether they are alone or whether
they concur with other individuals of the family of his purely natural father or
mother.
Thus, in order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code nothing is more logical
than to establish a comparison between an action to claim the legitimacy, and
one to enforce acknowledgment.
Page 82 of 486
"Art. 118. The action to claim its legitimacy may be brought by the child at any
time of its lifetime and shall be transmitted to its heirs, should it die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In such cases the heirs shall be allowed a
period of five years in which to institute the action.
"The action already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the
heirs, if it has not lapsed before then.
"Art. 137. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be
instituted only during the life of the presumed parents, except in the following
cases:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case
the latter may institute the action before the expiration of the first four years of
its majority.
"2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before
unknown, should be discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged.
"In this case the action must be instituted within the six months following the
discovery of such instrument."cralaw virtua1aw library
On this supposition the first difference that results between one action and the
other consists in that the right of action for legitimacy lasts during the whole
lifetime of the child, that is, it can always be brought against the presumed
parents or their heirs by the child itself, while the right of action for the
acknowledgment of a natural child does not last his whole lifetime, and, as a
general rule, it can not be instituted against the heirs of the presumed parents,
inasmuch as it can be exercised only during the life of the presumed parents.
With regard to the question at issue, that is, the transmission to the heirs of
the presumed parents of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to
recognize the natural filiation, there exists the most radical difference in that
the former continues during the life of the child who claims to be legitimate,
and he may demand it either directly and primarily from the said presumed
parents, or indirectly and secondarily from the heirs of the latter; while the
second does not endure for life; as a general rule, it only lasts during the life of
the presumed parents. Hence the other difference, derived as a consequence,
that an action for legitimacy is always brought against the heirs of the
presumed parents in case of the death of the latter, while the action for
acknowledgment is not brought against the heirs of such parents, with the
exception of the two cases prescribed by article 137 transcribed above.
So much for the passive transmission of the obligation to admit the legitimate
filiation, or to acknowledge the natural filiation.
Page 83 of 486
As to the transmission to the heirs of the child of the latter’s action to claim his
legitimacy, or to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation, it is seen
that the code grants it in the first case, but not the second. It contains
provisions for the transmission of the right of action which, for the purpose of
claiming his legitimacy inheres in the child, but it does not say a word with
regard to the transmission of the right to obtain the acknowledgment of the
natural filiation.
Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two above-cited articles is:
(1) That the right of action which devolves upon the child to claim his
legitimacy under article 118, may be transmitted to his heirs in certain cases
designated in the said article; (2) That the right of action for the
acknowledgment of natural children to which article 137 refers, can never be
transmitted, for the reason that the code makes no mention of it in any case,
not even as an exception.
It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct interpretation, that the
right of action to secure acknowledgment by the natural child should be
presumed to be transmitted, independently, as a rule, to his heirs, while the
right of action to claim legitimacy from his predecessor is not expressly,
independently, or, as a general rule, conceded to the heirs of the legitimate
child, but only relatively and as an exception. Consequently, the pretension
that the right of action on the part of the child to obtain the acknowledgment of
his natural filiation is transmitted to his descendants is altogether unfounded.
No legal provision exists to sustain such pretension, nor can an argument of
presumption be based on the lesser claim when there is no basis for the
greater one, and when it is only given as an exception in well-defined cases. It
is placing the heirs of the natural child on a better footing than the heirs of the
legitimate one, when, as a matter of fact, the position of a natural child is no
better than, nor even equal to, that of a legitimate child.
From the express and precise precepts of the code the following conclusions
are derived:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts
during his whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural
child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents.
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy
lasts during his whole life, he may exercise it either against the presumed
parents, or their heirs; while the right of action to secure the acknowledgment
of a natural child, since it does not last during his whole life, but depends on
that of the presumed parents, as a general rule can only be exercised against
the latter.
Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a
Page 84 of 486
personal character and pertains exclusively to him, only the child may exercise
it at any time during his lifetime. As an exception, and in three cases only, it
may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit, if he died during his
minority, or while insane, or after action had been already instituted.
An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be

exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the
event of the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second,
upon the discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the
child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was unknown
during the life of the latter.
But as such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be
exercised by him. It can not be transmitted to his descendants, or to his
ascendants.
In support of the foregoing the following authorities may be cited:chanrob1es

virtual 1aw library
Sanchez Roman, in his Treatise on Civil Law, propounds the question as to

whether said action should be considered transmissive to the heirs or
descendants of the natural child, whether he had or had not exercised it up to
the time of his death, and decides it as follows;
"There is an entire absence of legal provisions, and at most, it might be

deemed admissible as a solution, that the right of action to claim the
acknowledgment of a natural child is transmitted by analogy to his heirs on the
same conditions and terms that it is transmitted to the descendants of a
legitimate child, to claim his legitimacy, under article 118, but nothing more;
because on this point nothing warrants placing the heirs of a natural child on a
better footing than those of the legitimate child, and even to compare them
would not fail to be a strained and questionable matter, and one of great
difficulty for decision by the courts, for the simple reason that for the heirs of
the legitimate child, the said article 118 exists, while for those of the natural
child, as we have said, there is no provision in the code authorizing the same,
although on the other hand there is none that prohibits it." (Vol. V.)
Diaz Guijarro and Martinez Ruiz in their work on "The Civil Code as construed
by the supreme court of Spain," commenting upon article 137,
say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Article 118, taking into account the privileges due to the legitimacy of
children, grants them the right to claim said legitimacy during their lifetime,
and even authorizes the transmission of said right for the space of five years to
the heirs thereof, if the child die during his minority or in a state of insanity.
But as article 137 is based on the consideration that in the case of a natural
Page 85 of 486
child, ties are less strong and sacred in the eyes of the law, it does not fix such
a long and indefinite period for the exercise of the action; it limits it to the life
of the parents, excepting in the two cases mentioned in said article; and it does
not allow, as does article 118, the action to pass on to the heirs, inasmuch as,
although it does not prohibit it, and for that reason it might be deemed on
general principles of law to consent to it, such a supposition is inadmissible for
the reason that a comparison of both articles shows that the silence of the law
in the latter case is not, nor can it be, an omission, but a deliberate intent to
establish a wide difference between the advantages granted to a legitimate
child and to a natural one."cralaw virtua1aw library
(Ibid., Vol. II, 171.)
Navarro Amandi (Cuestionario del Codigo Civil) raises the question: "Can the
heirs of a natural child claim the acknowledgment in those cases wherein the
father or mother are under obligation to acknowledge" ? And
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Opinions are widely divergent. The court of Rennes held (on April 13, 1844)
that the right of investigation forms a part of the estate of the child, and along
with his patrimony is transmitted to his heirs. The affirmation is altogether too
categorical to be admissible. If it were correct the same thing would happen as
when the legitimacy of a child is claimed, and as already seen, the right of
action to demand the legitimacy is not transmitted to the heirs in every case
and as an absolute right, but under certain limitations and circumstances. Now,
were we to admit the doctrine of the court of Rennes, the result would be that
the claim for natural filiation would be more favored than one for legitimate
filiation. This would be absurd, because it can not be conceived that the
legislator should have granted a right of action to the heirs of the natural child,
which is only granted under great limitations and in very few cases to those of
a legitimate one. Some persons insist that the same rules that govern
legitimate filiation apply by analogy to natural filiation, and that in this
conception the heirs of the natural child are entitled to claim it in the cases
prescribed by article 118. The majority, however, are inclined to consider the
right to claim acknowledgment as a personal right, and consequently, not
transmissive to the heirs. Really there are not legal grounds to warrant the
transmission." (Vol. 2, 229.)
In a decision like the present one it is impossible to bring forward the argument
of analogy for the purpose of considering that the heirs of the natural child are
entitled to the right of action which article 118 concedes to the heirs of the
legitimate child. The existence of a provision for the one case and the absence
thereof for the other is a conclusive argument that inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius, and it can not be understood that the provision of law should be the
same when the same reason does not hold in the one case as in the other.
Page 86 of 486
The theory of the law of transmission is also entirely inapplicable in this case.
This theory, which in the Roman Law expressed the general rule that an heir
who did not accept an inheritance during his lifetime was incapacitated from
transmitting it to his own heirs, included at the same time the idea that if the
inheritance was not transmitted because the heir did not possess it, there
were, however, certain things which the heir held and could transmit. Such was
the law and the right to accept the inheritance, for the existing reason that all
rights, both real and personal, shall pass to the heir; quia haeres representat
defunctum in omnibus et per omnia. According to article 659 of the Civil Code,
"the inheritance includes all the property, rights, and obligations of a person,
which are not extinguished by his death." If the mother is the heir of her
natural child, and the latter, among other rights during his lifetime was entitled
to exercise an action for his acknowledgment against his father, during the life
of the latter, or after his death in some of the excepting cases of article 137,
such right, which is a portion of his inheritance, is transmitted to his mother as
being his heir, and it was so understood by the court of Rennes when it
considered the right in question, not as a personal and exclusive right of the
child which is extinguished by his death, but as any other right which might be
transmitted after his death. This right of supposed transmission is even less
tenable than that sought to be sustained by the argument of analogy.
The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all
respects superior to that of the child who claims acknowledgment as a natural
child. And it is evident that the right of action to claim his legitimacy is not one
of those rights which the legitimate child may transmit by inheritance to his
heirs; it forms no part of the component rights of his inheritance. If it were so,
there would have been no necessity to establish its transmissibility to heirs as
an exception in the terms and conditions of article 118 of the code. So that, in
order that it may constitute a portion of the child’s inheritance, it is necessary
that the conditions and the terms contained in article 118 shall be present,
since without them, the right that the child held during his lifetime, being
personal and exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule not
susceptible of transmission, would and should have been extinguished by his
death. Therefore, where no express provision like that of article 118 exists, the
right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle and
without exception, extinguished by his death, and can not be transmitted as a
portion of the inheritance of the deceased child.
On the other hand, it said right of action formed a part of the child’s
inheritance, it would be necessary to establish the doctrine that the right to
claim such an acknowledgment from the presumed natural father and from his
heirs is an absolute right of the heirs of the child, not limited by certain
circumstances as in the case of the heirs of a legitimate child; and if it is
unreasonable to compare a natural child with a legitimate one to place the
heirs of a natural child and his inheritance on a better footing than those of a
legitimate child would not only be unreasonable, but, as stated in one of the
Page 87 of 486
above citations, most absurd and illegal in the present state of the law and in
accordance with the general principles thereof.
For all of the foregoing reasons we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from
in all its parts, without any special ruling as to the costs of this instance.
Page 88 of 486
[3]
G.R. No. 124853 February 24, 1998
FRANCISCO L. JISON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the 27 April 1995
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860 1 which reversed the
decision of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City in Civil Case No.
16373.2 The latter dismissed the complaint of private respondent Monina Jison (hereafter
MONINA) for recognition as an illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco Jison (hereafter
FRANCISCO).
In issue is whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error,
which, in this instance, necessitates an inquiry into the facts. While as a general rule,
factual issues are not within the province of this Court, nevertheless, in light of the
conflicting findings of facts of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, this case falls under
an exception to this rule?3
In her complaint4 filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO
had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start
of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then
employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was
born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous,
implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his
family. MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her
education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant
(CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to
expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status
and that FRANCISCO support and treat her as such.
In his answer,5 FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with
Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in
his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then; further, he
never recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative
and special defenses, FRANCISCO contended that MONINA had no right or cause of
action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription.
He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the
malicious filing of the complaint.
Page 89 of 486
After MONINA filed her reply,6 pre-trial was conducted where the parties stipulated on the
following issues:
1. Did Francisco Jison have any sexual relation[s] with Esperanza Am[o]lar about
the end of 1945 or the start of 1946?
2. Is Monina Jison the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the

latter's own acts and those of his family?
3. Is Monina Jison barred from instituting or prosecuting the present action by

estoppel, laches and/or prescription?
4. Damages.7
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11) witnesses, namely: herself,
Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea
Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tiangson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz and Lope
Amolar.
Ruben Castellanes, Sr., a 63-year old resident of Iloilo City, testified that he had worked for
FRANCISCO for a total of six (6) years at Nelly Garden, FRANCISCO's Iloilo residence.
Towards the end of the Japanese occupation, FRANCISCO's wife suffered a miscarriage
or abortion, thereby depriving FRANCISCO of consortium; thereafter, FRANCISCO's wife
managed a nightclub on the ground floor of Nelly Garden which operated daily from 6:00
p.m. till 3:00 a.m. of the following day, thereby allowing FRANCISCO free access to
MONINA's mother, Esperanza Amolar, who was nicknamed Pansay.
Adela Casabuena, a 61-year old farmer, testified that she served as the yaya ("nanny") of
Lourdes from July 1946 up to February 1947. Although Pansay had left Nelly Garden two
(2) weeks before Adela started working for the Jisons, Pansay returned sometime in
September 1946, or about one month after she gave birth to MONINA, to ask FRANCISCO
for support. As a result, Pansay and Lilia Jison, FRANCISCO's wife, quarreled in the living
room, and in the course thereof, Pansay claimed that FRANCISCO was the father of her
baby. To which, Lilia replied: "I did not tell you to make that baby so it is your fault." During
the quarrel which lasted from 10:30 till 11:00 a.m., FRANCISCO was supposedly inside the
house listening.
Arsenio Duatin, a 77-year old retired laborer, testified that from 1947 until 1977, he worked
as FRANCISCO's houseboy at the latter's house on 12th Street, Capitol Subdivision,
Bacolod City. Arsenio met MONINA in 1967, when Felipe Lagarto, the bookkeeper at Nelly
Garden, informed Arsenio that MONINA, FRANCISCO's daughter, would arrive at Bacolod
City with a letter of introduction from Lagarto.
Initially, Arsenio identified seven (7) black-and-white photographs (Exhs. X-5 to X-11) of
MONINA,8 and as he paid for the telephone bills, he likewise identified six (6) telephone
cards (Exhs. G to L). Arsenio then declared that when MONINA arrived in Bacolod City,
she introduced herself to him as FRANCISCO's daughter. She stayed at FRANCISCO's
Page 90 of 486
house, but when the latter and his wife would come over, Arsenio would "conceal the
presence of MONINA because Mrs. Jison did not like to see her face." Once, Arsenio hid
MONINA in the house of FRANCISCO's sister, Mrs. Luisa Jison Alano, in Silay City;
another time, at the residence of FRANCISCO's cousin, Mrs. Concha Lopez Cuaycong.
Finally, Arsenio declared that the last time he saw MONINA was when she left for Manila,
after having finished her schooling at La Salle College in Bacolod City.
On re-direct and upon questions by the court, Arsenio disclosed that it was FRANCISCO
who instructed that MONINA be hidden whenever FRANCISCO and his wife were around;
that although FRANCISCO and MONINA saw each other at the Bacolod house only once,
they called each other "through long distance;" and that MONINA addressed FRANCISCO
as "Daddy" during their lone meeting at the Bacolod house and were "affectionate" to each
other. Arsenio likewise declared that MONINA stayed at FRANCISCO's Bacolod house
twice: first for a month, then for about a week the second time. On both occasions,
however, FRANCISCO and his wife were abroad. Finally, Arsenio recalled that
FRANCISCO likewise bade Arsenio to treat MONINA like his (FRANCISCO's) other
daughters.
The testimony of Zafiro Ledesma, a 74-year old banker and former mayor of Iloilo City,
initially touched on how he and his wife were related to FRANCISCO, FRANCISCO's wife
and MONINA. Zafiro first identified Exhibit R, a diagram of the family trees of the Jison and
Lopez families, which showed that former Vice-President Fernando Lopez was the first
cousin of FRANCISCO's wife, then told the court that the family of Vice-President Lopez
treated MONINA "very well because she is considered a relative . . . by reputation, by
actual perception." Zafiro likewise identified Exhibits X-13 to X-18, photographs taken at
the 14 April 1985 birthday celebration of Mrs. Fernando Lopez, which showed MONINA
with the former Vice-President and other members of the Lopez family.
Zafiro further testified that while MONINA lived with Mrs. Cuaycong, the latter paid for
some of MONINA's school needs and even asked MONINA to work in a hospital owned by
Mrs. Cuaycong; and that another first cousin of FRANCISCO's wife, a certain Remedios
Lopez Franco, likewise helped MONINA with her studies and problems, and even attended
MONINA's graduation in 1978 when she obtained a masteral degree in Business
Administration, as evidenced by another photograph (Exh. X-12). Moreover, upon
Remedios' recommendation, MONINA was employed as a secretary at Merchant
Financing Company, which was managed by a certain Danthea Lopez, the wife of another
first cousin of FRANCISCO's wife, and among whose directors were Zafiro himself, his wife
and Danthea's husband. In closing, Zafiro identified MONINA's Social Security Record
(Exh. W), which was signed by Danthea as employer and where MONINA designated
Remedios as the beneficiary.
Danthea Lopez, a 58-year old housekeeper, declared that FRANCISCO was the first
cousin of her husband, Eusebio D. Lopez; and that she came to know MONINA in the latter
part of 1965 when Remedios Franco recommended MONINA for employment at Merchant
Financing Co., which Danthea managed at that time. Remedios introduced MONINA to
Danthea "as being reputedly the daughter of Mr. Frank Jison;" and on several occasions
thereafter, Remedios made Danthea and the latter's husband understand that MONINA
was "reputedly the daughter of [FRANCISCO]" While MONINA worked at Merchant
Page 91 of 486
Financing, Danthea knew that MONINA lived with Remedios; however, in the latter part of
1966, as Remedios left for Manila and MONINA was still studying at San Agustin
University, Danthea and her husband invited MONINA to live with them. During MONINA's
6-month stay with them, she was not charged for board and lodging and was treated as a
relative, not a mere employee, all owing to what Remedios had said regarding MONINA's
filiation. As Danthea understood, MONINA resigned from Merchant Financing as she was
called by Mrs. Cuaycong, a first cousin of Danthea's husband who lived in Bacolod City.
Romeo Bilbao, a 43-year old seaman, testified that he had worked for FRANCISCO from
1969 up to 1980 at Nelly Garden in various capacities: as a procurement officer, hacienda
overseer and, later, as hacienda administrator. Sometime in May, 1971, Romeo saw and
heard MONINA ask "her Daddy" (meaning FRANCISCO) for the money he promised to
give her, but FRANCISCO answered that he did not have the money to give, then told
MONINA to go see Mr. Jose Cruz in Bacolod City. Then in the middle of September that
year, FRANCISCO told Romeo to pick up Mr. Cruz at the Iloilo pier and bring him to the
office of Atty. Benjamin Tirol. At said office, Atty. Tirol, Mr. Cruz and MONINA entered a
room while Romeo waited outside. When they came out, Atty. Tirol had papers for
MONINA to sign, but she refused. Atty. Tirol said that a check would be released to
MONINA if she signed the papers, so MONINA acceded, although Atty. Tirol intended not
to give MONINA a copy of the document she signed. Thereafter, Mr. Cruz gave MONINA a
check (Exh. Q), then MONINA grabbed a copy of the document she signed and ran
outside. Romeo then brought Mr. Cruz to Nelly Garden. As to his motive for testifying,
Romeo stated that he wanted to help MONINA be recognized as FRANCISCO'S daughter.
Rudy Tingson, a 45-year old antique dealer, testified that in 1963-1964, he was employed
by FRANCISCO's wife at the Baguio Military Institute in Baguio City; then in 1965, Rudy
worked at FRANCISCO's office at Nelly Garden recording hacienda expenses, typing
vouchers and office papers, and, at times, acting as paymaster for the haciendas. From the
nature of his work, Rudy knew the persons receiving money from FRANCISCO's office,
and clearly remembered that in 1965, as part of his job, Rudy gave MONINA her allowance
from FRANCISCO four (4) times, upon instructions of a certain Mr. Lagarto to give
MONINA P15.00 a month. Rudy likewise recalled that he first met MONINA in 1965, and
that she would go to Nelly Garden whenever FRANCISCO's wife was not around. On some
of these occasions, MONINA would speak with and address FRANCISCO as "Daddy,"
without objection from FRANCISCO. In fact, in 1965, Rudy saw FRANCISCO give
MONINA money thrice. Rudy further declared that in April 1965, FRANCISCO's office paid
P250.00 to Funeraria Bernal for the funeral expenses of MONINA's mother. Finally, as to
Rudy's motives for testifying, he told the court that he simply wanted to held bring out the
truth "and nothing but the truth," and that MONINA's filiation was common knowledge
among the people in the office at Nelly Garden.
On re-direct, Rudy declared that the moneys given by FRANCISCO's office to MONINA
were not reflected in the books of the office, but were kept in a separate book, as Mr.
Lagarto explained that FRANCISCO's wife and children "should not know [of] this." Rudy
further revealed that as to the garden "meetings" between FRANCISCO and MONINA,
Rudy saw MONINA kiss FRANCISCO on the cheek both upon arriving and before leaving,
and FRANCISCO's reaction upon seeing her was to smile and say in the Visayan dialect:
"Kamusta ka iha?" ("How are you, daughter?"); and that MONINA was free to go inside the
Page 92 of 486
house as the household staff knew of her filiation, and that, sometimes, MONINA would
join them for lunch.
Alfredo Baylosis, a 62-year old retired accountant, testified that he worked for FRANCISCO
at Central Santos-Lopez in Iloilo from 1951 up to 1961, then at Nelly Garden from 1961
until 1972. Alfredo first served FRANCISCO as a bookkeeper, then when Mr. Lagarto died
in 1967 or 1969, Alfredo replaced Mr. Lagarto as office manager.
Alfredo knew MONINA since 1961 as she used to go to Nelly Garden to claim her P15.00
monthly allowance given upon FRANCISCO's standing order. Alfredo further declared that
MONINA's filiation was pretty well-known in the office, that he had seen MONINA and
FRANCISCO go from the main building to the office, with FRANCISCO's arm on
MONINA's shoulder; and that the office paid for the burial expenses of Pansay, but this
was not recorded in the books in order to hide it from FRANCISCO's wife. Alfredo also
disclosed that the disbursements for MONINA's allowance started in 1961 and were
recorded in a separate cash book. In 1967, the allowances ceased when MONINA stopped
schooling and was employed in Bacolod City with Miller, Cruz & Co., which served as
FRANCISCO's accountant-auditor. Once, when Alfredo went to the offices of Miller, Cruz &
Co. to see the manager, Mr. Atienza, and arrange for the preparation of FRANCISCO's
income tax return, Alfredo chanced upon MONINA. When Alfredo asked her how she came
to work there, she answered that "her Daddy," FRANCISCO, recommended her, a fact
confirmed by Mr. Atienza Alfredo then claimed that Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz
& Co., was the most trusted man of FRANCISCO.
Dominador Savariz, a 55-year old caretaker, testified that he worked as FRANCISCO's

houseboy at Nelly Garden from November 1953 up to 1965. One morning in April 1954,
MONINA and her mother Pansay went to Nelly Garden and spoke with FRANCISCO for
about an hour, during which time, Dominador was vacuuming the carpet about six (6) to
seven (7) meters away. Due to the noise of the vacuum cleaner, FRANCISCO and
MONINA spoke in loud voices, thus Dominador overheard their conversation. As
FRANCISCO asked Pansay why they came, Pansay answered that they came to ask for
the "sustenance" of his child MONINA. FRANCISCO then touched MONINA's head and
asked: "How are you Hija?," to which MONINA answered: "Good morning, Daddy." After
FRANCISCO told Pansay and MONINA to wait, he pulled something from his wallet and
said to Pansay. "I am giving this for a child."
In May 1954, Dominador saw MONINA at Mr. Lagarto's office where Dominador was to get
"the day's expenses," while MONINA was claiming her allowance from Mr. Diasnes. The
next month, Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly Garden and heard in the office that MONINA
was there to get her allowance "from her Daddy." In December 1960, Dominador saw
MONINA at Nelly Garden, in the room of Don Vicente (father of FRANCISCO's wife),
where she asked for a Christmas gift "and she was calling Don Vicente, Lolo
(grandfather)." At that time, FRANCISCO and his wife were not around. Then sometime in
1961, when Dominador went to Mr. Legarto's office to get the marketing expenses,
Dominador saw MONINA once more claiming her allowance.
Dominador further testified that in February 1966, after he had stopped working for
FRANCISCO, Dominador was at Mrs. Franco's residence as she recommended him for
Page 93 of 486
employment with her sister, Mrs. Concha Cuaycong. There, he saw MONINA, who was
then about 15 years old, together with Mrs. Franco's daughter and son. Mrs. Franco
pointed at MONINA and asked Dominador if he knew who MONINA was. Dominador
answered that MONINA was FRANCISCO's daughter with Pansay, and then Mrs. Franco
remarked that MONINA was staying with her (Mrs. Franco) and that she was sending
MONINA to school at the University of San Agustin.
Lope Amolar, a 50-year old resident of Dingle, Iloilo, and the younger brother of Esperanza
Amolar (Pansay), testified that he worked for FRANCISCO as a houseboy from March to
November 1945 at Nelly Garden. Thereafter, FRANCISCO sent Lope to work at Elena
Apartments in Manila. By November 1945, Pansay was also working at Elena Apartments,
where she revealed to Lope that FRANCISCO impregnated her. Lope then confronted
FRANCISCO, who told Lope "don't get hurt and don't cause any trouble, because I am
willing to support your Inday Pansay and my child." Three (3) days after this confrontation,
Lope asked for and received permission from FRANCISCO to resign because he (Lope)
was hurt.
On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. At that time, she was 40
years old and a Central Bank Examiner. She affirmed that as evidenced by certifications
from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and baptismal certificates
(Exhs. C and D), she was born on 6 August 1946 in Barangay Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to
Esperanza Amolar (who passed away on 20 April 1965) and FRANCISCO.9 MONINA first
studied at Sagrado where she stayed as a boarder. While at Sagrado from 1952 until 1955
(up to Grade 4), her father, FRANCISCO, paid for her tuition fees and other school
expenses. She either received the money from FRANCISCO or from Mr. Lagarto, or saw
FRANCISCO give money to her mother, or Mr. Lagarto would pay Sagrado directly. After
Sagrado, MONINA studied in different schools,10 but FRANCISCO continuously answered
for her schooling.
For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the University of Iloilo, but she later
dropped due to an accident which required a week's hospitalization. Although FRANCISCO
paid for part of the hospitalization expenses, her mother shouldered most of them. In 1963,
she enrolled at the University of San Agustin, where she stayed with Mrs. Franco who paid
for MONINA's tuition fees. However, expenses for books, school supplies, uniforms and
the like were shouldered by FRANCISCO. At the start of each semester, MONINA would
show FRANCISCO that she was enrolled, then he would ask her to canvass prices, then
give her the money she needed. After finishing two (2) semesters at University of San
Agustin, as evidenced by her transcript of records (Exh. Z showing the FRANCISCO was
listed as Parent/Guardian [Exh. Z-1], she transferred to "De Paul College," just in front of
Mrs. Franco's house, and studied there for a year. Thereafter, MONINA enrolled at
Western Institute of Technology (WIT), where she obtained a bachelor's degree in
Commerce in April 1967. During her senior year, she stayed with Eusebio and Danthea
Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said couple. She passed the CPA board exams in 1974,
and took up an M.B.A. at De La Salle University as evidenced by her transcript (Exh. AA),
wherein FRANCISCO was likewise listed as "Guardian" (Exhs. AA-1 and AA-2).
MONINA enumerated the different members of the household staff at Nelly Garden, to wit:
Luz, the household cook; the houseboys Silvestre and Doming; the housemaid Natang; the
Page 94 of 486
yaya of the adopted triplets, Deling; the yaya of Lolo Vicente, Adelina; and others.
MONINA likewise enumerated the members of the office staff (Messrs. Baylosis, Lagarto,
Tingson, Diasnes, Jalandoni, Supertisioso, Doroy, and other), and identified them from a
photograph marked as Exhibit X-2. She then corroborated the prior testimony regarding
her employment at Merchant Financing Co., and her having lived at Hotel Kahirup and at
Mrs. Cuaycong's residence in Bacolod City, while working at the hospital owned by Mrs.
Cuaycong.
MONINA further testified that in March 1968, she went to Manila and met FRANCISCO at
Elena Apartments at the corner of Romero and Salas Streets, Ermita. She told
FRANCISCO that she was going for a vacation in Baguio City with Mrs. Franco's mother,
with whom she stayed up to June 1968. Upon her return from Baguio City, MONINA told
FRANCISCO that she wanted to work, so the latter arranged for her employment at Miller
& Cruz in Bacolod City. MONINA went to Bacolod City, was interviewed by Mr. Jose Cruz,
a partner at Miller & Cruz, who told her she would start working first week of September,
sans examination. She resigned from Miller & Cruz in 1971 and lived with Mrs. Cuaycong
at her Forbes Park residence in Makati. MONINA went to see FRANCISCO, told him that
she resigned and asked him for money to go to Spain, but FRANCISCO refused as she
could not speak Spanish and would not be able find a job. The two quarreled and
FRANCISCO ordered a helper to send MONINA out of the house. In the process, MONINA
broke many glasses at the pantry and cut her hand, after which, FRANCISCO hugged her,
gave her medicine, calmed her down, asked her to return to Bacolod City and promised
that he would giver her the money.
MONINA returned to Bacolod City by plane, using a Filipinas Orient Airways plane ticket
(Exh. M) which FRANCISCO gave. She called Mr. Cruz, then Atty. Tirol, as instructed by
Mr. Cruz. These calls were evidenced by PLDT long distance toll card (Exhs. G to L), with
annotations at the back reading; "charged and paid under the name of Frank L. Jison" and
were signed by Arsenio Duatin (Exhs. G-1 to L-1). PLDT issued a certification as to the
veracity of the contents of the toll cards (Exh. BB). Likewise introduced in evidence was a
letter of introduction prepared by Mr. Cruz addressed to Atty. Tirol, on MONINA's behalf
(Exh. N).
MONINA also declared that Atty. Tirol then told her that she would have to go to Iloilo and
sign a certain affidavit, before Mr. Cruz would turn over the money promised by
FRANCISCO. She went to Atty. Tirol's office in Iloilo, but after going over the draft of the
affidavit, refused to sign it as it stated that she was not FRANCISCO's daughter. She
explained that all she had agreed with FRANCISCO was that he would pay for her fare to
go abroad, and that since she was a little girl, she knew about her illegitimacy. She started
crying, begged Atty. Tirol to change the affidavit, to which Atty. Tirol responded that he was
also a father and did not want this to happen to his children as they could not be blamed
for being brought into the world. She then wrote a letter (Exh. O) to FRANCISCO and sent
it to the latter's Forbes Park residence (Bauhinia Place) by JRS courier service (Exhs. O-5
to O-7). MONINA subsequently met FRANCISCO in Bacolod City where they discussed
the affidavit which she refused to sign. FRANCISCO told her that the affidavit was for his
wife, that in case she heard about MONINA going abroad, the affidavit would "keep her
peace."
Page 95 of 486
MONINA then narrated that the first time she went to Atty. Tirol's office, she was
accompanied by one Atty. Fernando Divinagracia, who advised her that the affidavit (Exh.
P)11 would "boomerang" against FRANCISCO "as it is contrary to law." MONINA returned
to Bacolod City, then met with Atty. Tirol once more to reiterate her plea, but Atty. Tirol did
not relent. Thus, on the morning of 20 or 21 September 1971, she signed the affidavit as
she was jobless and needed the money to support herself and finish her studies. In
exchange for signing the document, MONINA received a Bank of Asia check for
P15,000.00 (Exh. Q), which was less than the P25,000.00 which FRANCISCO allegedly
promised to give. As Atty. Tirol seemed hesitant to give her a copy of the affidavit after
notarizing it, MONINA merely grabbed a copy and immediately left.
MONINA then prepared to travel abroad, for which purpose, she procured letters of
introduction (Exhs. S and T) from a cousin, Mike Alano (son of FRANCISCO's elder sister
Luisa); and an uncle, Emilio Jison (FRANCISCO's elder brother), addressed to another
cousin, Beth Jison (Emilio's daughter), for Beth to assist MONINA. Exhibit S contained a
statement (Exh. S-1) expressly recognizing that MONINA was FRANCISCO's daughter.
Ultimately though, MONINA decided not to go abroad, opting instead to spend the
proceeds of the P15,000.00 check for her CPA review, board exam and graduate studies.
After finishing her graduate studies, she again planned to travel abroad, for which reason,
she obtained a letter of introduction from former Vice President Fernando Lopez addressed
to then United States Consul Vernon McAnnich (Exh. V).
As to other acts tending to show her filiation, MONINA related that on one occasion, as
FRANCISCO's wife was going to arrive at the latter's Bacolod City residence, FRANCISCO
called Arsenio Duatin and instructed Arsenio to hide MONINA. Thus, MONINA stayed with
Mrs. Luisa Jison for the duration of the stay of FRANCISCO's wife. MONINA also claimed
that she knew Vice President Fernando Lopez and his wife, Mariquit, even before starting
to go to school. Thus, MONINA asked for a recommendation letter (Exh. U) from Mrs.
Mariquit Lopez for possible employment with Mrs. Rosario Lopez Cooper, another second
cousin of FRANCISCO. In Exhibit U, Mrs. Lopez expressly recognized MONINA as
FRANCISCO's daughter. As additional proof of her close relationship with the family of
Vice President Lopez, MONINA identified photographs taken at a birthday celebration on
14 April 1985.
MONINA finally claimed that she knew the three (3) children of FRANCISCO by wife,
namely, Lourdes, Francisco, Jr., (Junior) and Elena, but MONINA had met only Lourdes
and Junior. MONINA's testimony dealt lengthily on her dealings with Junior and the two (2)
occasions when she met with Lourdes. The last time MONINA saw FRANCISCO was in
March 1979, when she sought his blessings to get married.
In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge Romeo Callejo
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48. As additional witnesses, FRANCISCO
presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iñigo Supertisioso, Lourdes Ledesma, Jose
Cruz and Dolores Argenal.
FRANCISCO declared that Pansay's employment ceased as of October, 1 1944, and that
while employed by him, Pansay would sleep with the other female helpers on the first floor
of his residence, while he, his wife and daughter slept in a room on the second floor. At
Page 96 of 486
that time, his household staff was composed of three (3) female workers and two (2) male
workers. After Pansay left in October 1944, she never communicated with him again,
neither did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly denied having had sexual
relations with Pansay and disavowed any knowledge about MONINA's birth. In the same
vein, he denied having paid for MONINA's tuition fees, in person or otherwise, and
asserted that he never knew that Mr. Lagarto paid for these fees. Moreover, FRANCISCO
could not believe that Lagarto would pay for these fees despite absence of instructions or
approval from FRANCISCO. He likewise categorically denied that he told anyone, be it
Danthea Lopez, Zafiro Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong or Remedios Franco, that MONINA
was his daughter.
FRANCISCO also disclosed that upon his return from the United States in 1971, he fired
Alfredo Baylosis upon discovering that Alfredo had taken advantage of his position during
the former's absence. FRANCISCO likewise fired Rudy Tingson and Romeo Bilbao, but did
not give the reasons therefor.
Finally, FRANCISCO denied knowledge of MONINA's long distance calls from his Bacolod
residence; nevertheless, when he subsequently discovered this, he fired certain people in
his office for their failure to report this anomaly. As regards the caretaker of his Bacolod
residence, FRANCISCO explained that since MONINA lived at Mrs. Cuaycong's residence,
the caretaker thought that he could allow people who lived at the Cuaycong residence to
use the facilities at his (FRANCISCO's) house.
Nonito Jalandoni, bookkeeper and paymaster at Nelly's Garden from 1963 up to 1974, then
from 1980 up to 1986, the assistant overseer of Hacienda Lopez, testified that he did not
know MONINA; that he learned of her only in June 1988, when he was informed by
FRANCISCO that MONINA had sued him; and that he never saw MONINA at Nelly's
Garden, neither did he know of any instructions for anyone at Nelly's Garden to give money
to MONINA.
Teodoro Zulla, FRANCISCO's bookkeeper and paymaster from 1951 up to 1986, testified
that FRANCISCO dismissed Alfredo Baylosis due to certain unspecified discrepancies; and
that he never saw MONINA receive funds from either Mr. Lagarto or Mr. Baylosis. Upon
questions from the trial court, however, Teodoro admitted that he prepared vouchers for
only one of FRANCISCO's haciendas, and not vouchers pertaining to the latter's personal
expenses.
Iñigo Supertisioso testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at Nelly's Garden from 1964 up
to 1984 as a field inspector, paymaster, cashier and, eventually, officer-in-charge (OIC). He
confirmed Alfredo Baylosis' dismissal due to these unspecified irregularities, then denied
that FRANCISCO ever ordered that MONINA be given her allowance. Likewise, Iñigo
never heard FRANCISCO mention that MONINA was his (FRANCISCO's) daughter.
Lourdes Ledesma, FRANCISCO's daughter, testified that she saw (but did not know)
MONINA at the Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, on the occasion of the birth of Lourdes' first
son, Mark. Over lunch one day, Lourdes' aunt casually introduced Lourdes and MONINA to
each other, but they were referred to only by their first names. Then sometime in 1983 or
1984, MONINA allegedly went to Lourdes' house in Sta. Clara Subdivision requesting for a
Page 97 of 486
letter of introduction or referral as MONINA was then job-hunting. However, Lourdes did
not comply with the request.
Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., testified that MONINA worked at Miller & Cruz
from 1968 up to 1971, however, he did not personally interview her before she was
accepted for employment. Moreover, MONINA underwent the usual screening procedure
before being hired. Jose recalled that one of the accountants, a certain Mr. Atienza,
reported that MONINA claimed to be FRANCISCO's daughter. Jose then told Mr. Atienza
to speak with MONINA and see if he (Mr. Atienza) could stop her from spreading this
rumor. Mr. Atienza reported that he spoke with MONINA, who told him that she planned to
leave for the United States and needed P20,000.00 for that purpose, and in exchange, she
would sign a document disclaiming filiation with FRANCISCO. Thus, Jose instructed Mr.
Atienza to request that MONINA meet with Jose, and at that meeting, MONINA confirmed
Mr. Atienza's report. Jose then informed Atty. Tirol, FRANCISCO's personal lawyer, about
the matter.
Atty. Tirol told Jose to send MONINA and her lawyer to his (Atty. Tirol's) office in Iloilo.
Jose then wrote out a letter of introduction for MONINA addressed to Atty. Tirol Jose
relayed Atty. Tirol's message to MONINA through Mr. Atienza, then later, Atty. Tirol told
Jose to go to Iloilo with a clerk for P15,000.00 Jose complied, and at Atty. Tirol's office,
Jose saw MONINA, Atty. Tirol and his secretary reading some documents. MONINA then
expressed her willingness to sign the document, sans revisions. Jose alleged that he drew
the P15,000.00 from his personal funds, subject to reimbursement from and due to an
understanding with FRANCISCO.
Dolores Argenal, a househelper at Nelly Garden from May 1944 up to May 1946, testified
that she knew that Pansay was Lourdes' nanny; that Lourdes slept in her parents' room;
that she had not seen FRANCISCO give special treatment to Pansay; that there was no
"unusual relationship" between FRANCISCO and Pansay, and if there was any, Dolores
would have easily detected it since she slept in the same room as Pansay. Dolores further
declared that whenever FRANCISCO's wife was out of town, Pansay would bring Lourdes
downstairs at nighttime, and that Pansay would not sleep in the room where FRANCISCO
slept. Finally, Dolores declared that Pansay stopped working for FRANCISCO and his wife
in October, 1944.
The reception of evidence having been concluded, the parties filed their respective
memoranda.
It need be recalled that Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr. presided over trial up to 21 October
1986, thereby hearing only the testimonies of MONINA's witnesses and about half of
MONINA's testimony on direct examination. Judge Norberto E. Devera, Jr. heard the rest
of MONINA's testimony and those of FRANCISCO's witnesses.
In its decision of 12 November 199012 the trial court, through Judge Devera, dismissed the
complaint with costs against MONINA. In the opening paragraph thereof, it observed:
Page 98 of 486
This is a complaint for recognition of an illegitimate child instituted by plaintiff
Monina Jison against defendant Francisco Jison. This complaint was filed on March
13, 1985 at the time when plaintiff, reckoned from her death of birth, was already
thirty-nine years old. Noteworthy also is the fact that it was instituted twenty years
after the death of plaintiff's mother, Esperanza Amolar. For the years between
plaintiff's birth and Esperanza's death, no action of any kind was instituted against
defendant either by plaintiff, her mother Esperanza or the latter's parents. Neither
had plaintiff brought such an action against defendant immediately upon her
mother's death on April 20, 1965, considering that she was then already nineteen
years old or, within a reasonable time thereafter. Twenty years more had to
supervene before this complaint was eventually instituted.
The trial court then proceeded to discuss the four issues stipulated at pre-trial, without,
however, summarizing the testimonies of the witnesses nor referring to the testimonies of
the witnesses other than those mentioned in the discussion of the issues.
The trial court resolved the first issue in the negative, holding that it was improbable for
witness Lope Amolar to have noticed that Pansay was pregnant upon seeing her at the
Elena Apartments in November 1945, since Pansay was then only in her first month of
pregnancy; that there was no positive assertion that "copulation did indeed take place
between Francisco and Esperanza;" and that MONINA's attempt to show opportunity on
the part of FRANCISCO failed to consider "that there was also the opportunity for
copulation between Esperanza and one of the several domestic helpers admittedly also
residing at Nelly's Garden at that time." The RTC also ruled that the probative value of the
birth and baptismal certificates of MONINA paled in light of jurisprudence, especially when
the misspellings therein were considered.
The trial court likewise resolved the second issue in the negative, finding that MONINA's
evidence thereon "may either be one of three categories, namely: hearsay evidence,
incredulous evidence, or self-serving evidence." To the first category belonged the
testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis, whose knowledge of MONINA's
filiation was based, as to the former, on "utterances of defendant's wife Lilia and Esperanza
allegedly during the heat of their quarrel," while as to the latter, Alfredo's conclusion was
based "from the rumors going [around] that plaintiff is defendant's daughter, front his
personal observation of plaintiff's facial appearance which he compared with that of
defendant's and from the way the two (plaintiff and defendant) acted and treated each
other on one occasion that he had then opportunity to closely observe them together." To
the second category belonged that of Dominador Savariz, as:
At each precise time that Esperanza allegedly visited Nelly's Garden and allegedly
on those occasions when defendant's wife, Lilia was in Manila, this witness was
there and allegedly heard pieces of conversation between defendant and
Esperanza related to the paternity of the latter's child. . .
The RTC then placed MONINA's testimony regarding the acts of recognition accorded her
by FRANCISCO's relatives under the third category, since the latter were never presented
as witnesses, for which reason the trial court excluded the letters from FRANCISCO's
relatives (Exhs. S to V).
Page 99 of 486
As to the third issue, the trial court held that MONINA was not barred by prescription for it
was of "the perception . . . that the benefits of Article 268 accorded to legitimate children
may be availed of or extended to illegitimate children in the same manner as the Family
Code has so provided;" or by laches, "which is [a] creation of equity applied only to bring
equitable results, and . . . addressed to the sound discretion of the court [and] the
circumstances [here] would show that whether plaintiff filed this case immediately upon the
death of her mother Esperanza in 1965 or twenty years thereafter in 1985, . . . there seems
to be no inequitable result to defendant as related to the situation of plaintiff."
The RTC ruled, however, that MONINA was barred by estoppel by deed because of the
affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2) which she signed "when she was already twenty-five years, a
professional and . . . under the able guidance of counsel."
Finally, the RTC denied FRANCISCO's claim for damages, finding that MONINA did not file
the complaint with malice, she having been "propelled by an honest belief, founded on
probable cause."
MONINA seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 32860) and
sought reversal of the trial court's decision on the grounds that:
THE TRIAL COURT WAS ERRONEOUSLY PREDISPOSED TO ADJUDGE THIS

CASE AGAINST APPELLANT DUE TO ITS MISPERCEPTION THAT
APPELLANT'S DELAY IN FILING HER COMPLAINT WAS FATAL TO HER CASE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE TESTIMONIES OF

APPELLANT'S WITNESSES AS TAILOR-MADE, INADEQUATE AND
INCREDIBLE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

THE CERTIFIED COPIES OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY
APPELLANT AS PART OF HER EVIDENCE.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REQUIREMENT THAT A WITNESS TO THE

ACTUAL ACT O COPULATION BETWEEN THE APPELLEE AND APPELLANT'S
MOTHER SHOULD HAVE POSITIVELY TESTIFIED TO SAID EFFECT.
Page 100 of 486

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE DULY
IDENTIFIED NOTES AND LETTER OF THE RELATIVES OF THE APPELLEE AS
HEARSAY.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVIT

(EXH. P) SERVED AS A BAR AGAINST HER CLAIM FOR RECOGNITION
INSTEAD OF REINFORCING SAID CLAIM.13
Expectedly, FRANCISCO refuted these alleged errors in his Appellee's Brief.14
In its decision of 27 April 1995,15 the Court of Appeals initially declared that as no vested or
acquired rights were affected, the instant case was governed by Article 175, in relation to
Articles 172 and 173, of the Family Code.16 While the Court of Appeals rejected the
certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle, Iloilo (Exhs. E and F) as
FRANCISCO did not sign them, said court focused its discussion on the other means by
which illegitimate filiation could be proved, i.e., the open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child or, by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws, such as "the baptismal certificate of the child, a judicial admission, a family
bible wherein the name of the child is entered, common reputation respecting pedigree,
admission by silence, testimonies of witnesses . . ."17 To the Court of Appeals, the "bottom
line issue" was whether or not MONINA established her filiation as FRANCISCO's
illegitimate daughter by preponderance of evidence, as to which issue said court found:
[N]ot just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record to prove that

[MONINA] is the illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] and that she had
continuously enjoyed such status by direct acts of [FRANCISCO] and/or his
relatives.
In so ruling, the Court of Appeals observed that the testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela
Casabuena and Dominador Savariz were already sufficient to establish MONINA's filiation:
As adverted to earlier, the trial court discredited Lope Amolar's testimony by saying
that Lope could not have detected Esperanza's pregnant state in November, 1945
since at that point in time [sic] she was still in the initial stage of pregnancy.
Apparently, the trial court paid more emphasis on the date mentioned by Lope
Amolar than on the tenor and import his testimony. As . . . Lope . . . was asked
about an incident that transpired more than 41 years back, [u]nder the
circumstances, it is unreasonable to expect that Lope could still be dead right on
the specific month in 1945 that [he] met and confronted his sister. At any rate, what
is important is not the month that they met but the essence of his testimony that his
sister pointed to their employer [FRANCISCO] as the one responsible for her
pregnancy, and that upon being confronted, [FRANCISCO] assured him of support
for Esperanza and their child. It would appear then that in an attempt to find fault
with Lope's testimony, the trial court has fallen oblivious to the fact that even
[FRANCISCO], in his deposition, did not deny that he was confronted by Lope
Page 101 of 486

about what he had done to Esperanza during which he unequivocally
acknowledged paternity by assuring Lope of support for both Esperanza and their
child.
The Court of Appeals further noted that Casabuena and Savariz "testified on something
that they personally observed or witnessed," which matters FRANCISCO "did not deny or
refute." Finally, said court aptly held:
Taking into account all the foregoing uncontroverted testimonies

. . . let alone such circumstantial evidence as [MONINA's] Birth Certificates . . . and
Baptismal Certificates which invariably bear the name of [FRANCISCO] as her
father, We cannot go along with the trial court's theory that [MONINA's] illegitimate
filiation has not been satisfactorily established.
x x x x x x x x x
Significantly, [MONINA's] testimony finds ample corroboration from [FRANCISCO's]

former employees, Arsenio Duatin, Rudy Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis. . . .
x x x x x x x x x
Carefully evaluating appellant's evidence on her enjoyment of the status of an

illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] vis-a-vis [FRANCISCO's] controversion
thereof, We find more weight in the former. The positive testimonies of [MONINA]
and [her] witnesses . . . all bearing on [FRANCISCO's] acts and/or conduct
indubitably showing that he had continuously acknowledged [MONINA] as his
illegitimate daughter have not been succeessfully [sic] refuted. In fact,
[FRANCISCO] himself, in his deposition, only casually dismissed [MONINA's]
exhaustive and detailed testimony as untrue, and with respect to those given by
[MONINA's] witnesses, he merely explained that he had fired [them] from their
employment. Needless to state, [FRANCISCO's] vague denial is grossly inadequate
to overcome the probative weight of [MONINA's] testimonial evidence.
Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court . . .
does not hold sway in the face of [MONINA's] logical explanation that she at first did
agree to sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she
promptly complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that the
affidavit was only for the consumption of his spouse . . . Further, the testimony of
Jose Cruz concerning the events that led to the execution of the affidavit . . . could
not have been true, for as pointed out by [MONINA] she signed the affidavit . . .
almost five months after she had resigned from the Miller, Cruz & Co. . . .
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been
uncalled for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO] or his lawyer to have secured
[MONINA's] sworn statement . . . On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the
said affidavit at the cost of P15,000. [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to
conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA] . . .
Page 102 of 486

In fine, We hold that [MONINA's] filiation as [FRANCISCO's] illegitimate daughter
has been conclusively, established by the uncontroverted testimonies of Lope
Amolar, Adela Casabuena and Dominador Savariz to the effect that appellee
himself had admitted his paternity of the appellee, and also by the testimonies of
appellant; Arsenio Duatin, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis
unerringly demonstrating that by his own conduct or overt acts like sending
appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and
lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado Corazon de Jesus, defraying appellant's
hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the
funeral expenses of appellant's mother, acknowledging appellant's paternal
greetings and calling appellant his "Hija" or child, instructing his office personnel to
give appellant's monthly allowance, recommending appellant for employment at the
Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying for
her long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his
apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant to use his
surname in her scholastic and other records (Exhs. Z, AA, AA-1, to AA-5, W & W-
5), appellee had continuously recognized appellant as his illegitimate daughter.
Added to these are the acts of [FRANCISCO's] relatives acknowledging or treating
[MONINA] as [FRANCISCO's] daughter (Exh. U) or as their relative (Exhs. T & V).
On this point, witness Zafiro Ledesma, former Mayor of Iloilo City, whose spouse
belongs to the Lopez clan just like [FRANCISCO], testified that [MONINA) has been
considered by the Lopezes as a relative. He identified pictures of the appellee in the
company of the Lopezes (Exhs X-16 & X-17). Another witness, Danthea H. Lopez,
whose husband Eusebio Lopez is appellee's first cousin, testified that appellant was
introduced to her by appellee's cousin, Remedios Lopez Franco, as the daughter of
appellee Francisco Jison, for which reason, she took her in as [a] secretary in the
Merchant's Financing Corporation of which she was the manager, and further
allowed her to stay with her family free of board and lodging. Still on this aspect,
Dominador Savariz declared that sometime in February, 1966 appellee's relative,
Ms. Remedios Lopez Franco pointed to appellant as the daughter of appellee
Francisco Jison.
Finally, the Certifications of the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle (Exhs E and F) as
well as [MONINA's] Baptismal Certificates (Exhs C & D) which the trial court
admitted in evidence as part of [MONINA's] testimony, may serve as circumstantial
evidence to further reinforce [MONINA's] claim that she is [FRANCISCO's]
illegitimate daughter by Esperanza Amolar.
True it is that a trial judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded

great respect on appeal. But the rule admits of certain exceptions. One such
exception is where the judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who
heard the witnesses testify. [citations omitted] The other is where the trial court had
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the
case. [citations omitted] In the present case, both exceptions obtain. All of
[MONINA's] witnesses . . . whose testimonies were not given credence did not
testify before the judge who rendered the disputed judgment . . .
Page 103 of 486

The Court of Appeals then decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE
and another one is hereby entered for appellant Monina Jison, declaring her as the
illegitimate daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, and entitled to all rights and
privileges granted by law.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution
of 29 March 1996,18 FRANCISCO filed the instant petition. He urges us to reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, alleging that said court committed errors of law:
I.
. . . IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING

PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF PETITIONER,
CONSIDERING [THE] IMPOSSIBILITY OF SEXUAL CONTACT BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MOTHER AT THE TIME
CONCEPTION WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE OCCURRED.
II.
. . . IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING CONSIDERING THAT

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF PATERNITY AND
FILIATION IS NOT CLEAR AND CONVINCING.
III.
. . . IN GIVING CREDENCE TO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY

THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS EVIDENCE OF FILIATION CONSIDERING
THAT THE SAME ARE HEARSAY, SELF-SERVING AND CANNOT BIND THE
PETITIONER UNDER THE BASIC RULES OF EVIDENCE.
IV.
. . . IN INTERPRETING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SWORN STATEMENT

(EXH. "P" /EXH. "2") IN A MANNER NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH THE RULINGS
OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
V.
. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE LONG AND UNEXPLAINED DELAY IN THE

FILING OF THE PRESENT PATERNITY SUIT AS EQUIVALENT TO LACHES.
Page 104 of 486

As regards the first error, FRANCISCO insists that taking into account the second
paragraph of MONINA's complaint wherein she claimed that he and Pansay had sexual
relations "by about the end of 1945 or the start of 1946," it was physically impossable for
him and Pansay to have had sexual contact which resulted in MONINA's birth, considering
that:
The normal period of human pregnancy is nine (9) months. If as claimed by private
respondent in her complaint that her mother was impregnated by FRANCISCO "at
the end of 1945 or the start of 1946", she would have been born sometime in late
September or early October and not August 6, 1946 . . . The instant case finds
factual and legal parallels in Constantino vs. Mendez,19 thus: . . .
FRANCISCO further claims that his testimony that Pansay was no longer employed by him
at the time in question was unrebutted, moreover, other men had access to Pansay during
the time of or even after her employment by him.
As to the second error, FRANCISCO submits that MONINA's testimonial evidence is

"shaky, contradictory and unreliable," and proceeds to attack the credibility of her
witnesses by claiming, in the main, that: (a) Lope Amolar could not have
detected Pansay pregnancy in November 1945 when they met since she would have been
only one (1) month pregnant then; (b) Dominador Savariz did not in fact witness the
meeting between FRANCISCO, Pansay and MONINA; (c) Zafiro Ledesma had an ulterior
motive in testifying for MONINA as he owned a bank in Iloilo which was then under Central
Bank supervision and MONINA was the Bank Examiner assigned to Iloilo; and (d) Danthea
Lopez was not related to him by blood and whatever favorable treatment MONINA
received from Danthea was due to the former's employment at Merchants' Financing
Company and additional services rendered at Kahirup Hotel; besides Danthea admitted
that she had no personal knowledge as to the issue of paternity and filiation of the
contending parties, hence Sections 39 and 4020 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court did not
come into play. FRANCISCO likewise re-echoes the view of the trial court as regards the
testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis.
FRANCISCO further asserts that MONINA's testimony that he answered for her schooling
was self-serving and uncorroborated by any receipt or other documentary evidence; and
assuming he did, such should be interpreted as a manifestation of kindness shown towards
the family of a former household helper.
Anent the treatment given by his relatives to MONINA as his daughter, FRANCISCO points
to the fact that Pansay was the former laundrywoman of Mrs. Franco; MONINA resided
with the families of Eusebio Lopez and Concha Cuaycong because she was in their
employ at Kahirup Hotel and Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, respectively; MONINA failed to
present Mrs. Franco, Eusebio Lopez and Mrs. Cuaycong; and MONINA's employment at
the accounting firm of Miller, Cruz & Co. was attributable to her educational attainment,
there being absolutely no evidence to prove that FRANCISCO ever facilitated her
employment thereat. Hence, in light of Baluyot v. Baluyot,21 the quantum of evidence to
prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence, not merely a preponderance thereof,
was not met.
Page 105 of 486

With respect to the third assigned error, FRANCISCO argues that the Court of Appeals'
reliance on the certifications of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and Baptismal
Certificates (Exhs. C and D) as circumstantial evidence is misplaced. First, their
genuineness could not be ascertained as the persons who issued them did not testify.
Second, in light of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,22 the contents of the baptismal certificates
were hearsay, as the data was based only on what was told to the priest who solemnized
the baptism, who likewise was not presented as a witness. Additionally, the name of the
father appearing therein was "Franque Jison," which was not FRANCISCO's name. Third,
in both Exhibits E and F, the names of the child's parents were listed as "Frank Heson" and
"Esperanza Amador" (not Amolar). FRANCISCO further points out that in Exhibit F, the
status of the child is listen as "legitimate," while the father's occupation as "laborer." Most
importantly, there was no showing that FRANCISCO signed Exhibits E and F or that he
was the one who reported the child's birth to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. As to
MONINA's educational records, FRANCISCO invokes Bañas v. Bañas23 which recognized
that school records are prepared by school authorities, not by putative parents, thus
incompetent to prove paternity. And, as to the photographs presented by MONINA,
FRANCISCO cites Colorado v. Court of Appeals,24 and further asserts that MONINA did
not present any of the persons with whom she is seen in the pictures to testify thereon;
besides these persons were, at best, mere second cousins of FRANCISCO. He likewise
assails the various notes and letters written by his relatives (Exhs. S to V) as they were not
identified by the authors. Finally, he stresses that MONINA did not testify as to the
telephone cards (Exhs. G to L) nor did these reveal the circumstances surrounding the
calls she made from his residence.
Anent the fourth assigned error, FRANCISCO contends that the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of MONINA's affidavit of 21 September 1971 ran counter to Dequito
v. Llamas,25 and overlooked that at the time of execution, MONINA was more than 25
years old and assisted by counsel.
As to the last assigned error, FRANCISCO bewails the Court of Appeals' failure to consider
the long and unexplained delay in the filing of the case.
In her comment, MONINA forcefully refuted FRANCISCO's arguments, leading

FRANCISCO to file his reply thereto.
On 20 November 1996, we gave due course to this petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda, which they subsequently did.
A painstaking review of the evidence and arguments fails to support petitioner.
Before addressing the merits of the controversy, we first dispose of preliminary matters
relating to the applicable law and the guiding principles in paternity suits. As to the former,
plainly, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209) governs the present
controversy. As correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, Uyguangco26 served as a judicial
confirmation of Article 256 of the Family Code27 regarding its retroactive effect unless there
be impairment of vested rights, which does not hold true here, it appearing that neither the
putative parent nor the child has passed away and the former having actually resisted the
latter's claim below.
Page 106 of 486
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children.
Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established, thus:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final

judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a

private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall

be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate

child; or
This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the Civil Code.
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph.
which MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the evidence mentioned in the first
paragraph, a "high standard of proof"28 is required. Specifically, to prove open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as
his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be
attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in
all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.29
By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular
length of time.30
The foregoing standard of proof required to establish one's filiation is founded on the
principle that an order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so that it must be
issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.31
The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general rules on evidence,
in light of the burden of proof in civil cases, i.e., preponderance of evidence, and the
shifting of the burden of evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative
of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of
proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out
a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to
Page 107 of 486
controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of
plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's. The concept of "preponderance of
evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is
offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.32
With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant controversy.
FRANCISCO's arguments in support of his first assigned error deserve scant

consideration. While it has been observed that unlawful intercourse will not be presumed
merely from proof of an opportunity for such indulgence, 33 this does not favor FRANCISCO.
Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances, the only witnesses to the felony are the
participants in the sexual act themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether
sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victim's or mother's word,
as against the accused's or putative father's protestations. In the instant case, MONINA's
mother could no longer testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she had, unfortunately,
passed away long before the institution of the complaint for recognition. But this did not
mean that MONINA could no longer prove her filiation. The fact of her birth and her
parentage may be established by evidence other than the testimony of her mother. The
paramount question then is whether MONINA's evidence is coherent, logical and natural. 34
The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge of Pansay "by about the end
of 1945." We agree with MONINA that this was broad enough to cover the fourth quarter of
said year, hence her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be attributed to sexual relations
between FRANCISCO and MONINA's mother. In any event, since it was established that
her mother was still in the employ of FRANCISCO at the time MONINA was conceived as
determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact between FRANCISCO and MONINA's
mother was not at all impossible, especially in light of the overwhelming evidence, as
hereafter shown, that FRANCISCO fathered MONINA, has recognized her as his daughter
and that MONINA has been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as
FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter.
We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her
narration of circumstances and events that occurred through the years, concerning her
relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses,
overwhelmingly established the following facts:
1) FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived at the time when her
mother was in the employ of the former;
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and
conduct which the Court of Appeals took pains to enumerate, thus:
[L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school
uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado de
Jesus, defraying appellant's hospitalization expenses, providing her
Page 108 of 486

with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of
appellant's mother, acknowledging appellant's paternal greetings
and calling appellant his "Hija" or child, instructing his office
personnel to give appellant's monthly allowance, recommending
appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her long
distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her long distance
telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his
apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing
appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and other records
(Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-5) . . .
3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the
years publicly, 35 spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.36
Accordingly, in light of the totality of the evidence on record, the second assigned error
must fail.
There is some merit, however, in the third assigned error against the probative value of
some of MONINA's documentary evidence.
MONINA's reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar concerning her
birth (Exhs. E and F) is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue of
paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation
of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the
paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person. 37 Simply put, if the
alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying the information
himself, the inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the
mere certificate by the registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary
acknowledgment on the latter's part.38 In like manner, FRANCISCO's lack of participation in
the preparation of the baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D) and school records (Exhs. Z
and AA) renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity, the former being
competent merely to prove the administration of the sacrament of baptism on the date so
specified.39 However, despite the inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove the
paternity, they may be admitted as part of MONINA's testimony to corroborate her claim
that FRANCISCO spent for her education.
We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates issued by
the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates may be taken as circumstantial
evidence to prove MONINA's filiation. Since they are per se inadmissible in evidence as
proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to
prove the same.
As to Exhibits "S," "T," "U" and "V," the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO's
relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez,
respectively, allegedly attesting to MONINA's filiation, while their due execution and
authenticity are not in issue,40 as MONINA witnessed the authors signing the documents,
nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these documents may not be
Page 109 of 486
admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to
testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and MONINA shown by
evidence other than the documents in question.41 As to the admissibility of these
documents under Rule 130, Section 40, however, this requires further elaboration.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or

tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree
of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries
in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits
and the like may be received as evidence of pedigree. (emphasis supplied)
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the
first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the
documents in question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness
stand; and the section containing the second underscored phrase. What must then be
ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as private documents, fall within the scope of the
clause "and the like" as qualified by the preceding phrase "[e]ntries in family bibles or other
family books or charts, engravings on rights [and] family portraits,"
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this
provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly
known as "family possessions," or those articles which represent, in effect, a family's joint
statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. 42 These have been described as
objects "openly exhibited and well known to the family,"43 or those "which, if preserved in a
family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition." 44 Other examples of these objects
which are regarded as reflective of a family's reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are
inscriptions on tombstones,45 monuments or coffin plates.46
Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family possessions" as

discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may
these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common
reputation,47 it having been observed that:
[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general
repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in
community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. . . .
[Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by
reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is
marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community.48
Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits "S" to "V," inclusive, may, in like manner as
MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her
claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his daughter.
Page 110 of 486

We now direct our attention to MONINA's 21 September 1971 affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2),
subject of the fourth assigned error, where she attests that FRANCISCO is not her father.
MONINA contends that she signed it under duress, i.e., she was jobless, had no savings
and needed the money to support herself and finish her studies. Moreover, she signed
Exhibit P upon the advice of Atty. Divinagracia that filiation could not be waived and that
FRANCISCO's ploy would "boomerang" upon him. On the other hand, FRANCISCO
asserts that full credence should be afforded Exhibit P as MONINA was already 25 years
old at the time of its execution and was advised by counsel; further, being a notarized
document, its genuineness and due execution could not be questioned. He relies on the
testimony of Jose Cruz, a partner at the accounting firm of Miller & Cruz, who declared that
he intervened in the matter as MONINA was spreading rumors about her filiation within the
firm, which might have had deleterious effects upon the relationship between the firm and
FRANCISCO.
On this issue, we find for MONINA and agree with the following observations of the Court
of Appeals:
Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court . . .
does not hold sway in the face of [MONINA's] logical explanation that she at first did
agree to sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she
promptly complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that the
affidavit was only for the consumption of his spouse . . .
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been
uncalled for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO] of his lawyer to have secured
[MONINA's] sworn statement . . . On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the
said affidavit at the cost of P15,000. [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to
conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA] . . .
Indeed, if MONINA were truly not FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter, it would have been
unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that MONINA denounce
her filiation. For as clearly established before the trial court and properly appreciated by the
Court of Appeals, MONINA had resigned from Miller & Cruz five (5) months prior to the
execution of the sworn statement in question, hence negating FRANCISCO's theory of the
need to quash rumors circulating within Miller & Cruz regarding the identity of MONINA's
father. Hence, coupled with the assessment of the credibility of the testimonial evidence of
the parties discussed above, it is evident that the standard to contradict a notarial
document, i.e. clear and convincing evidence and more than merely preponderant, 49 has
been met by MONINA
Plainly then, the burden of evidence fully shifted to FRANCISCO.
Two (2) glaring points in FRANCISCO's defense beg to be addressed: First, that his
testimony was comprised of mere denials, rife with bare, unsubstantiated responses such
as "That is not true," "I do not believe that," or "None that I know." In declining then to lend
credence to FRANCISCO's testimony, we resort to a guiding principle in adjudging the
credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his statements, laid down as early as 1921:
Page 111 of 486

The experience of courts and the general observation of humanity teach us that the
natural limitations of our inventive faculties are such that if a witness undertakes to
fabricate and deliver in court a false narrative containing numerous details, he is
almost certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements which can be
readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the falsity of his message.
For this reason it will be found that perjurers usually confine themselves to the
incidents immediately related to the principal fact about which they testify, and
when asked about collateral facts by which their truthfulness could be tested, their
answers not infrequently take the stereotyped form of such expressions as "I don't
know" or "I don't remember." . . .50
Second, the reasons for the dismissals of Tingson, Baylosis and Savariz were unspecified
or likewise unsubstantiated, hence FRANCISCO's attempt to prove ill-motive on their part
to falsely testify in MONINA's favor may not succeed. As may be gleaned, the only detail
which FRANCISCO could furnish as to the circumstances surrounding the dismissals of his
former employees was that Baylosis allegedly "took advantage of his position" while
FRANCISCO was in the United States. But aside from this bare claim, FRANCISCO's
account is barren, hence unable to provide the basis for a finding of bias against
FRANCISCO on the part of his former employees.
As to FRANCISCO's other witnesses, nothing substantial could be obtained either. Nonito

Jalandoni avowed that he only came to know of MONINA in June 1988; 51 that during his
employment at Nelly Garden from 1963 up to 1974, he did not recall ever having seen
MONINA there, neither did he know of any instructions from FRANCISCO nor Mr. Lagarto
(FRANCISCO's office manager before passing away) regarding the disbursement of
MONINA's allowance.52 Teodoro Zulla corroborated Jalandoni's testimony regarding not
having seen MONINA at Nelly Garden and MONINA's allowance; declared that Alfredo
Baylosis was dismissed due to discrepancies discovered after an audit, without any further
elaboration, however; but admitted that he never prepared the vouchers pertaining to
FRANCISCO's personal expenses, merely those intended for one of FRANCISCO's
haciendas.53 Then, Iñigo Superticioso confirmed that according to the report of a certain
Mr. Atienza, Baylosis "was dismissed by Mr. Jison for irregularities," while Superticioso was
informed by FRANCISCO that Tingson was dismissed for loss of confidence. Superticioso
likewise denied that MONINA received money from FRANCISCO's office, neither was
there a standing order from FRANCISCO to release funds to her.54
It is at once obvious that the testimonies of these witnesses for FRANCISCO are likewise
insufficient to overcome MONINA's evidence. The former merely consist of denials as
regards the latter's having gone to Nelly Garden or having received her allowance from
FRANCISCO's office, which, being in the form of negative testimony, necessarily stand
infirm as against positive testimony;55 bare assertions as regards the dismissal of Baylosis;
ignorance of FRANCISCO's personal expenses incapable of evincing that FRANCISCO
did not provide MONINA with an allowance; or hearsay evidence as regards the cause for
the dismissals of Baylosis and Tingson. But what then serves as the coup de grace is that
despite Superticioso's claim that he did not know MONINA,56 when confronted with Exhibit
H, a telephone toll ticket indicating that on 18 May 1971, MONINA called a certain "Eñing"
Page 112 of 486

at FRANCISCO's office, Superticioso admitted that his nickname was "Iñing" and that there
was no other person named "Iñing" in FRANCISCO's office.57
All told, MONINA's evidence hurdled "the high standard of proof" required for the success
of an action to establish one's illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions
regarding "open and continuous possession'' or "any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws;" moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by more than mere
preponderance of evidence.
The last assigned error concerning laches likewise fails to convince. The essential
elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in
asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendant's conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complaint would assert the right
in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complaint, or the suit is not held barred. 58 The last element is the origin of
the doctrine that sale demands apply only where by reason of the lapse of time it would be
inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.59
As FRANCISCO set up, laches as an affirmative defense, it was incumbent upon him to
prove the existence of its elements. However, he only succeeded in showing MONINA's
delay in asserting her claim, but miserably failed to prove the last element. In any event, it
must be stressed that laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of state claims, and is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. There is no
absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according to its
particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and
injustice.60 Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate,
MONINA filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A
denial then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 27 April 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860 is
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Page 113 of 486

[4]
G.R. No. 96053 March 3, 1993
JOSEFINA TAYAG, RICARDO GALICIA, TERESITA GALICIA, EVELYN GALICIA,

JUAN GALICIA, JR. and RODRIGO GALICIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALBRIGIDO LEYVA, respondents.
Facundo T. Bautista for petitioners.
Jesus T. Garcia for private respondent.
MELO, J.:
The deed of conveyance executed on May 28, 1975 by Juan Galicia, Sr., prior to his
demise in 1979, and Celerina Labuguin, in favor of Albrigido Leyva involving the undivided
one-half portion of a piece of land situated at Poblacion, Guimba, Nueva Ecija for the sum
of P50,000.00 under the following terms:
1. The sum of PESOS: THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) is HEREBY

acknowledged to have been paid upon the execution of this agreement;
2. The sum of PESOS: TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) shall be paid within

ten (10) days from and after the execution of this agreement;
3. The sum of PESOS: TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) represents the

VENDORS' indebtedness with the Philippine Veterans Bank which is hereby
assumed by the VENDEE; and
4. The balance of PESOS: TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND (P27,000.00.)

shall be paid within one (1) year from and after the execution of this
instrument. (p. 53, Rollo)
is the subject matter of the present litigation between the heirs of Juan Galicia, Sr. who
assert breach of the conditions as against private respondent's claim anchored on full
payment and compliance with the stipulations thereof.
The court of origin which tried the suit for specific performance filed by private respondent
on account of the herein petitioners' reluctance to abide by the covenant, ruled in favor of
the vendee (p. 64, Rollo) while respondent court practically agreed with the trial court
except as to the amount to be paid to petitioners and the refund to private respondent are
concerned (p. 46, Rollo).
Page 114 of 486

There is no dispute that the sum of P3,000.00 listed as first installment was received by
Juan Galicia, Sr. According to petitioners, of the P10,000.00 to be paid within ten days
from execution of the instrument, only P9,707.00 was tendered to, and received by, them
on numerous occasions from May 29, 1975, up to November 3, 1979. Concerning private
respondent's assumption of the vendors' obligation to the Philippine Veterans Bank, the
vendee paid only the sum of P6,926.41 while the difference the indebtedness came from
Celerina Labuguin (p. 73, Rollo). Moreover, petitioners asserted that not a single centavo
of the P27,000.00 representing the remaining balance was paid to them. Because of the
apprehension that the heirs of Juan Galicia, Sr. are disavowing the contract inked by their
predecessor, private respondent filed the complaint for specific performance.
In addressing the issue of whether the conditions of the instrument were performed by
herein private respondent as vendee, the Honorable Godofredo Rilloraza, Presiding Judge
of Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region stationed at Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, decided to uphold private respondent's theory on the basis of constructive fulfillment
under Article 1186 and estoppel through acceptance of piecemeal payments in line with
Article 1235 of the Civil Code.
Anent the P10,000.00 specified as second installment, the lower court counted against the
vendors the candid statement of Josefina Tayag who sat on the witness stand and made
the admission that the check issued as payment thereof was nonetheless paid on a
staggered basis when the check was dishonored (TSN, September 1, 1983, pp. 3-4; p. 3,
Decision; p. 66, Rollo). Regarding the third condition, the trial court noted that plaintiff
below paid more than P6,000.00 to the Philippine Veterans Bank but Celerina Labuguin,
the sister and co-vendor of Juan Galicia, Sr. paid P3,778.77 which circumstance was
construed to be a ploy under Article 1186 of the Civil Code that "prematurely prevented
plaintiff from paying the installment fully" and "for the purpose of withdrawing the title to the
lot". The acceptance by petitioners of the various payments even beyond the periods
agreed upon, was perceived by the lower court as tantamount to faithful performance of
the obligation pursuant to Article 1235 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the trial court noted
that private respondent consigned P18,520.00, an amount sufficient to offset the remaining
balance, leaving the sum of P1,315.00 to be credited to private respondent.
On September 12, 1984, judgment was rendered:
1. Ordering the defendants — heirs of Juan Galicia, to execute the Deed of

Sale of their undivided ONE HALF (1/2) portion of Lot No. 1130, Guimba
Cadastre, covered by TCT No. NT-120563, in favor of plaintiff Albrigido
Leyva, with an equal frontage facing the national road upon finality of
judgment; that, in their default, the Clerk of Court II, is hereby ordered to
execute the deed of conveyance in line with the provisions of Section 10,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court;
2. Ordering the defendants, heirs of Juan Galicia, jointly and severally to pay
attorney's fees of P6,000.00 and the further sum of P3,000.00 for actual and
compensatory damages;
Page 115 of 486

3. Ordering Celerina Labuguin and the other defendants herein to surrender
to the Court the owner's duplicate of TCT No. NT-120563, province of
Nueva Ecija, for the use of plaintiff in registering the portion, subject matter
of the instant suit;
4. Ordering the withdrawal of the amount of P18,520.00 now consigned with

the Court, and the amount of P17,204.75 be delivered to the heirs of Juan
Galicia as payment of the balance of the sale of the lot in question, the
defendants herein after deducting the amount of attorney's fees and
damages awarded to the plaintiff hereof and the delivery to the plaintiff of
the further sum of P1,315.25 excess or over payment and, defendants to
pay the cost of the suit. (p. 69, Rollo)
and following the appeal interposed with respondent court, Justice Dayrit with whom
Justices Purisima and Aldecoa, Jr. concurred, modified the fourth paragraph of the decretal
portion to read:
4. Ordering the withdrawal of the amount of P18,500.00 now consigned with

the Court, and that the amount of P16,870.52 be delivered to the heirs of
Juan Galicia, Sr. as payment to the unpaid balance of the sale, including the
reimbursement of the amount paid to Philippine Veterans Bank, minus the
amount of attorney's fees and damages awarded in favor of plaintiff. The
excess of P1,649.48 will be returned to plaintiff. The costs against
defendants. (p. 51, Rollo)
As to how the foregoing directive was arrived at, the appellate court declared:
With respect to the fourth condition stipulated in the contract, the period
indicated therein is deemed modified by the parties when the heirs of Juan
Galicia, Sr. accepted payments without objection up to November 3, 1979.
On the basis of receipts presented by appellee commencing from August 8,
1975 up to November 3, 1979, a total amount of P13,908.25 has been paid,
thereby leaving a balance of P13,091.75. Said unpaid balance plus the
amount reimbursable to appellant in the amount of P3,778.77 will leave an
unpaid total of P16,870.52. Since appellee consigned in court the sum of
P18,500.00, he is entitled to get the excess of P1,629.48. Thus, when the
heirs of Juan Galicia, Sr. (obligees) accepted the performance, knowing its
incompleteness or irregularity and without expressing any protest or
objection, the obligation is deemed fully complied with (Article 1235, Civil
Code). (p. 50, Rollo)
Petitioners are of the impression that the decision appealed from, which agreed with the
conclusions of the trial court, is vulnerable to attack via the recourse before Us on the
principal supposition that the full consideration of the agreement to sell was not paid by
private respondent and, therefore, the contract must be rescinded.
Page 116 of 486

The suggestion of petitioners that the covenant must be cancelled in the light of private
respondent's so-called breach seems to overlook petitioners' demeanor who, instead of
immediately filing the case precisely to rescind the instrument because of non-compliance,
allowed private respondent to effect numerous payments posterior to the grace periods
provided in the contract. This apathy of petitioners who even permitted private respondent
to take the initiative in filing the suit for specific performance against them, is akin to waiver
or abandonment of the right to rescind normally conferred by Article 1191 of the Civil Code.
As aptly observed by Justice Gutierrez, Jr. in Angeles vs. Calasanz (135 SCRA 323 [1985];
4 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Twelfth Ed. [1989], p. 203:
. . . We agree with the plaintiffs-appellees that when the defendants-

appellants, instead of availing of their alleged right to rescind, have
accepted and received delayed payments of installments, though the
plaintiffs-appellees have been in arrears beyond the grace period mentioned
in paragraph 6 of the contract, the defendants-appellants have waived, and
are now estopped from exercising their alleged right of rescission . . .
In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Sarandi (5 CAR (25) 811; 817-818; cited in
4 Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Seventh Ed. [1987], pp. 212-213) a similar opinion was
expressed to the effect that:
In a perfected contract of sale of land under an agreed schedule of

payments, while the parties may mutually oblige each other to compel the
specific performance of the monthly amortization plan, and upon failure of
the buyer to make the payment, the seller has the right to ask for a
rescission of the contract under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, this shall be
deemed waived by acceptance of posterior payments.
Both the trial and appellate courts were, therefore, correct in sustaining the claim of private
respondent anchored on estoppel or waiver by acceptance of delayed payments under
Article 1235 of the Civil Code in that:
When the obligee accepts the performance, knowing its incompleteness or

irregularity, and without expressing any protest or objection, the obligation is
deemed fully complied with.
considering that the heirs of Juan Galicia, Sr. accommodated private respondent by
accepting the latter's delayed payments not only beyond the grace periods but also during
the pendency of the case for specific performance (p. 27, Memorandum for petitioners; p.
166, Rollo). Indeed, the right to rescind is not absolute and will not be granted where there
has been substantial compliance by partial payments (4 Caguioa, Comments and Cases
on Civil Law, First Ed. [1968] p. 132). By and large, petitioners' actuation is susceptible of
but one construction — that they are now estopped from reneging from their commitment
on account of acceptance of benefits arising from overdue accounts of private respondent.
Now, as to the issue of whether payments had in fact been made, there is no doubt that
the second installment was actually paid to the heirs of Juan Galicia, Sr. due to Josefina
Page 117 of 486

Tayag's admission in judicio that the sum of P10,000.00 was fully liquidated. It is thus
erroneous for petitioners to suppose that "the evidence in the records do not support this
conclusion" (p. 18, Memorandum for Petitioners; p. 157, Rollo). A contrario, when the court
of origin, as well as the appellate court, emphasized the frank representation along this line
of Josefina Tayag before the trial court (TSN, September l, 1983, pp. 3-4; p. 5, Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 13339, p. 50, Rollo; p. 3, Decision in Civil Case No. 681-G, p. 66, Rollo),
petitioners chose to remain completely mute even at this stage despite the opportunity
accorded to them, for clarification. Consequently, the prejudicial aftermath of Josefina
Tayag's spontaneous reaction may no longer be obliterated on the basis of estoppel
(Article 1431, Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129; Section 2(a), Rule 131, Revised Rules on
Evidence).
Insofar as the third item of the contract is concerned, it may be recalled that respondent
court applied Article 1186 of the Civil Code on constructive fulfillment which petitioners
claim should not have been appreciated because they are the obligees while the proviso in
point speaks of the obligor. But, petitioners must concede that in a reciprocal obligation like
a contract of purchase, (Ang vs. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 286 [1989]; 4 Paras, supra,
at p. 201), both parties are mutually obligors and also obligees (4 Padilla, supra, at p. 197),
and any of the contracting parties may, upon non-fulfillment by the other privy of his part of
the prestation, rescind the contract or seek fulfillment (Article 1191, Civil Code). In short, it
is puerile for petitioners to say that they are the only obligees under the contract since they
are also bound as obligors to respect the stipulation in permitting private respondent to
assume the loan with the Philippine Veterans Bank which petitioners impeded when they
paid the balance of said loan. As vendors, they are supposed to execute the final deed of
sale upon full payment of the balance as determined hereafter.
Lastly, petitioners argue that there was no valid tender of payment nor consignation of the
sum of P18,520.00 which they acknowledge to have been deposited in court on January
22, 1981 five years after the amount of P27,000.00 had to be paid (p. 23, Memorandum for
Petitioners; p. 162, Rollo). Again this suggestion ignores the fact that consignation alone
produced the effect of payment in the case at bar because it was established below that
two or more heirs of Juan Galicia, Sr. claimed the same right to collect (Article 1256, (4),
Civil Code; pp. 4-5, Decision in Civil Case No. 681-G; pp. 67-68, Rollo). Moreover,
petitioners did not bother to refute the evidence on hand that, aside from the P18,520.00
(not P18,500.00 as computed by respondent court) which was consigned, private
respondent also paid the sum of P13,908.25 (Exhibits "F" to "CC"; p. 50, Rollo). These two
figures representing private respondent's payment of the fourth condition amount to
P32,428.25, less the P3,778.77 paid by petitioners to the bank, will lead us to the sum of
P28,649.48 or a refund of P1,649.48 to private respondent as overpayment of the
P27,000.00 balance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED with the slight modification of Paragraph 4 of the dispositive thereof
which is thus amended to read:
4. ordering the withdrawal of the sum of P18,520.00 consigned with the

Regional Trial Court, and that the amount of P16,870.52 be delivered by
private respondent with legal rate of interest until fully paid to the heirs of
Page 118 of 486
Juan Galicia, Sr. as balance of the sale including reimbursement of the sum
paid to the Philippine Veterans Bank, minus the attorney's fees and
damages awarded in favor of private respondent. The excess of P1,649.48
shall be returned to private respondent also with legal interest until fully paid
by petitioners. With costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Page 119 of 486

[5]
G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,
vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the July 24,
2012 Decision1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period
of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already
married to someone else.3 Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis
(on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999).4 The children were not
expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in
the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande
left for the United States with her two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent
Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of
Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity
of the children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent
Antonio, ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the
children can be promoted if they are under the sole parental authority and physical custody
of [respondent Antonio]."6 Thus, the court a quo decreed the following:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants [Antonio’s] prayer
for recognition and the same is hereby judicially approved. x x x Consequently, the Court
forthwith issues the following Order granting the other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:
a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the entry
of the name of [Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned minors in their
respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change and/or
annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from
Grande to Antonio;
Page 120 of 486

b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with [Grande]
over the persons of their minor children, Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick
Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the parties’ minor
children Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande who shall stay with
[Antonio’s] residence in the Philippines from Monday until Friday evening and to
[Grande’s] custody from Saturday to Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and custody of minors

Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the days covered
by the Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed minors
outside of the country, without the written consent of the other and permission from
the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children Andre Lewis
Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the amount of ₱30,000 per month at the rate
of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande].7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied
by the trial court in its Resolution dated November 22, 2010 8 for being pro forma and for
lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the
RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole
custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.9 In resolving the appeal, the appellate
court modified in part the Decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is
MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati
City are DIRECTED to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of Jerard Patrick
and Andre Lewis, in their respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in
the Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre
Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue
hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and may only take the
children out upon the written consent of [Grande]; and
Page 121 of 486

d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of ₱30,000.00 per month at the rate
of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the father’s recognition
of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over them
absent the most compelling of reasons.10 Since respondent Antonio failed to prove that
petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely affected the welfare of the children or
rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole parental
custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition
made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with
the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the
children of the surname "ANTONIO."11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order considering that not
only did Antonio express his willingness to give support, it is also a consequence of his
acknowledging the paternity of the minor children.12 Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no
reason to deprive respondent Antonio of his visitorial right especially in view of the
constitutionally inherent and natural right of parents over their children.13
Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change
of the minors’ surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this
Court via the present petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family Code––as
amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive language––may
not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname
without the consent of their mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the
application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this
modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall
remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which now reads:
Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been
Page 122 of 486

expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child
shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case
his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may
use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of
the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary
public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court 15 is enough to establish the paternity
of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental
custody, and an official declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother,
then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be
unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal
basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of
their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner)
who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be
taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation.16 Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use his
surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity,
one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that
an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon
the illegitimate children.
Page 123 of 486

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are
to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s surnames, this Court has,
time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best
interest of the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a
legitimate child to continue using the surname of her mother rather than that of her
legitimate father as it serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her
from using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v.
Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even allowed the
use of a surname different from the surnames of the child’s father or mother. Indeed, the
rule regarding the use of a child’s surname is second only to the rule requiring that the
child be placed in the best possible situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice of an

illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s name to his
identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or
illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those
who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against
such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper
remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied
with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate
court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition
sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change
his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always
recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever
recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s
intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the
way of the reunification of mother and son. (Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the father’s
surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,21 which states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is
executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate
document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child shall use the
surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following documents:
Page 124 of 486

xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the
surname of the father upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of
the Surname of the Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the
surname of the father upon submission of a public document or a private handwritten
instrument supported by the documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she has
reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in a separate instrument duly
notarized.
xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the
Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register of
Births.
xxxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or
in a separate public document or in a private handwritten document, the public document
or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Live Birth and the Register of Births as
follows:
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new surname)
pursuant to RA 9255."
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and Register of
Births shall not be changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the public
document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper
annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live Birth and the Register of Births as
follows:
Page 125 of 486

"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is hereby changed
from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255." (Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a

legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a
statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The
implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage,
as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a
discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the
former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative
issuance — an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.
Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity in law

and/or the construction is clearly erroneous.23 What is more, this Court has the
constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and declare as void the rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial bodies24 when found contrary to statutes
and/or the Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the IRR of RA
9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their father’s
surname upon the latter’s recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear,
unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate
father’s surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on
the surnames by which they will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged thirteen
(13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their names
changed to "Antonio."26 However, since these letters were not offered before and evaluated
by the trial court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or
against petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the children's
choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
Page 126 of 486

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of
which shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is
MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre
Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue
hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week, and may only take
the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]:
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of ₱30,000.00 per month at the rate
of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and
d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri,

Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by the
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Page 127 of 486

[6]
Republic Act No. 9225
Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE

FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress

Assembled:
Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens
of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate

or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine
citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to
all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
Page 128 of 486

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior
to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance
to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of
which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in

the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held

unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain
valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations

inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following
its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.
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REPUBLIC ACT 8552
Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Tenth Congress
Fourth Special Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Wednesday the eleventh day of February, nineteen
hundred and ninety-eight.
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8552]
AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES AND POLICIES ON THE DOMESTIC ADOPTION

OF FILIPINO CHILDREN AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:
ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.”
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. –
(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure that every child remains under the
care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding and
security towards the full and harmonious development of his/her personality. Only when
such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or adoption within the child’s
extended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated person be considered.
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall
be the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United
Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN Declaration on Social and Legal
Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to
Foster Placement and Adoption, Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague Convention
on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. Toward
this end, the State shall provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or
adoption for every child who is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned.
(c) It shall also be a State policy to:
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(i) Safeguard the biological parent(s) from making hurried decisions to relinquish his/her
parental authority over his/her child;
(ii) Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological parent(s);
(iii) Protect adoptive parent(s) from attempts to disturb his/her parental authority and
custody over his/her adopted child.
Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be administratively or

judicially declared so as to establish the status of the child as “legally available for
adoption” and his/her custody transferred to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or to any duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency,
which entity shall be authorized to take steps for the permanent placement of the child;
(iv) Conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a positive

environment for adoption;
(v) Ensure that sufficient capacity exists within government and private sector agencies to
handle adoption inquiries, process domestic adoption applications, and offer adoption-
related services including, but not limited to, parent preparation and post-adoption
education and counseling; and
(vi) Encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the child’s identity and culture in
his/her native land, and only when this is,not available shall intercountry adoption be
considered as a last resort.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall be
defined as:
(a) “Child” is a person below eighteen (18) years of age.
(b) “A child legally available for adoption” refers to a child who has been voluntarily or
involuntarily committed to the Department or to a duly licensed and accredited child-placing
or child-caring agency freed of the parental authority of his/her biological parent(s) or
guardian or adopters) in case of rescission of adoption.
(c) “Voluntarily committed child” is one whose parent(s) knowingly and willingly

relinquishes parental authority to the Department.
(d) “Involuntarily committed child” is one whose parent(s), known or unknown, has been
permanently and judicially deprived of parental authority due to abandonment; substantial,
continuous, or repeated neglect; abuse; or incompetence to discharge parental
responsibilities.
(e) “Abandoned child”, refers to one who has no proper parental care or guardianship or
whose parent(s) has deserted him/her for a period of at least six (6) continuous months
and has been judicially declared as such.
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(f) “Supervised trial custody” is a period of time within which a social worker oversees the
adjustment and emotional readiness of both adopter(s) and adoptee in stabilizing their filial
relationship.
(g) “Department” refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
(h) “Child-placing agency” is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the Department to
provide comprehensive child welfare services including, but not limited to, receiving
applications for adoption, evaluating the prospective adoptive parents, and preparing the
adoption home study.
(i) “Child-caring agency” is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the Department that
provides twenty four (24)-hour residential care services for abandoned, orphaned,
neglected, or voluntarily committed.
(j) “Simulation of birth’ is the tampering of the civil registry making it appear in the birth
records that a certain child was born to a person who is not his/her biological mother,
causing such child to lose his/her true identity and status.
ARTICLE II
PRE-ADOPTION SERVICES
SEC. 4. Counseling Services. – The Department shall provide the services of licensed
social workers to the following:
(a) Biological Parent(s) – Counseling shall be provided to the parent(s) before and after the
birth of his/her child. No binding commitment to an adoption plan shall be permitted before
the birth of his/her child. A period of six (6) months shall be allowed for the biological
parent(s) to reconsider any decision to relinquish his/her child for adoption before the
decision becomes irrevocable. Counseling and rehabilitation services shall also be offered
to the biological parent(s) after he/she has relinquished his/her child for adoption.
Steps shall be taken by the Department to ensure that no hurried decisions are made and
all alternatives for the child’s future and the implications of each alternative have been
provided.
(b) Prospective Adoptive Parent(s) – Counseling sessions, adoption fora and seminars,
among others, shall be provided to prospective adoptive parent(s) to resolve possible
adoption issues and to prepare him/her for effective parenting.
(c) Prospective Adoptee – Counseling sessions shall be provided to ensure that he/she
understands the nature and effects of adoption and is able to express his/her,views on
adoption in accordance with his/her age and level of maturity.
SEC. 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). – It shall be the duty of the Department or the
child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to
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locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered
as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be
declared abandoned.
SEC. 6. Support Services. – The Department shall develop a pre-adoption program which
shall include, among others, the abovementioned services.
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of
good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude,
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years
older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in
keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until
the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has’been certified by his/her diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to
adopt in his/her country, and mat his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her
country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements on
residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country may be
waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/ daughter of the other; or
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(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
However, that the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter
of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
SEC. 8. Who May Be Adopted. – The following may be adopted:
(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially
declared available for adoption;
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of

legitimacy;
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently
considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority;
(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings

shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s).
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. – After being properly counseled
and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written
consent of the following to the’ adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
adopters) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living
with said adopter and the latter’s spouse, if any; and
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or be adopted.
ARTICLE IV
PROCEDURE
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SEC. 10. Hurried Decisions. – In all proceedings for adoption, the court shall require proof
that the biological parent(s) has been properly counseled to prevent him/her from making
hurried decisions caused by strain or anxiety to give up the child, and to sustain that all
measures to strengthen die family have been exhausted and that any prolonged stay of me
child in his/her own home will be inimical to his/her welfare and interest.
SEC. 11. Case Study. – No petition for adoption shall be set for hearing unless a licensed
social worker of the Department, the social service office of the local government unit, or
any child-placing or child-caring agency has made a case study of the adoptee, his/her
biological parent(s), as well as the adopter(s), and has submitted the report and
recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition.
At the time of preparation of the adoptee’s case study, the concerned social worker shall
confirm with the Civil Registry the real identity and registered name of the adoptee. If the
birth of the adoptee was not registered with the Civil Registry, it shall be the
responsibility of the concerned social worker to ensure that the adoptee is registered.
The case study on the adoptee shall establish that he/she is legally available for adoption
and that the documents to support this fact are valid and authentic. Further, the case study
of die adopter(s) .shall ascertain his/her genuine intentions and mat the adoption is in the
best interest of the child.
The Department shall intervene on behalf of the adoptee if it finds, after the conduct of me
case studies, that the petition should be denied. The case studies and other relevant
documents and records pertaining to me adoptee and the adoption shall be preserved by
the Department.
SEC. 12. Supervised Trial Custody. – No petition for adoption shall be finally granted until
the adopters) has been given by the court a supervised trial custody period for at least six
(6) months wiuiin which the parties are expected to adjust psychologically and emotionally
to each other and establish a bonding relationship. During said period, temporary parental
authority shall be vested in the adopter(s).
The court may motu proprio or upon motion of any party reduce the trial period if it finds
the same to be in the best interest of the adoptee, stating the reasons for the reduction of
the period. However, for alien adopters), he/she must complete the six (6)-month trial
custody except for those enumerated in Sec. 7 (b) (i) (ii) (iii).
If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the prospective adopter(s)
through a pre-adoption placement authority issued by the Department, the prospective
adopter(s) shall enjoy all the benefits to which biological parent(s) is entitled from the date
the adoptee is placed with the prospective adopter(s).
SEC. 13. Decree of Adoption. – If, after the publication of the order of hearing has been
complied with, and no opposition has been interposed to the petition, and after
consideration of the case studies, me qualifications of the adopter(s), trial custody report
and the evidence submitted, the court is convinced that the petitioners are qualified to
Page 135 of 486

adopt, and that the adoption would redound to me best interest of the adoptee, a decree of
adoption shall be entered which shall be effective as of the date die original petition was
filed. This provision shall also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies before the issuance of me
decree of adoption to protect the interest of the adoptee. The decree shall state the name
by which the child is to be known.
SEC. 14. Civil Registry Record. – An amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the
Civil Registry, as required by the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the
child of the adopters) by being registered with his/her surname. The original certificate of
birth shall be stamped “cancelled” with the annotation of the issuance of an amended birth
certificate in its place and shall be sealed in the civil registry records. The new birth
certificate to be issued to the adoptee shall not bear any notation that it is an amended
issue.
SEC. 15. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records. – All hearings in adoption

cases shall be confidential and shall not be open to the public. All records, books, and
papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department, or any other
agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly
confidential.
If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for
purposes connected with or arising out of the adoption and will be for the best interest of
the adoptee, the court may merit the necessary information to be released, restricting the
purposes for which it may be used.
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. – Except n cases where the biological parent is the spouse of
the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be
severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. – The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and
obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and
support in keeping with the means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. – In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee
shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.
However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on
testamentary succession shall govern.
ARTICLE VI
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
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SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. – Upon petition of the adoptee, with the
assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is
incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following
grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the
adopters) despite having undergone counseling”; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c)
sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental
obligations.
Adoption, being in fhe best interest of the child, shall not bee subject to rescission by the
adopters). However, the adopters) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided, in
Article 919 of the Civil Code.
SEC. 20. Effects of Rescission. – If the petition is granted, the parental authority of the
adoptee’s biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations
of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the
adoptee and restore his/her original birth certificate.
Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of
judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be
respected.
All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the penalties
imposable under me Penal Code if the criminal acts are properly proven.
Provided, further, That the application for correction of the birth registration and petition for
adoption shall be filed within five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act and completed
thereafter: Provided, finally, That such person complies with the procedure as specified in
Article IV of this Act and other requirements as determined by the Department.
ARTICLE VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 23. Adoption Resource and Referral Office. – There shall be established an Adoption
Resources and Referral Office under the Department with the following functions: (a)
monitor the existence, number, and flow of children legally available for adoption and
prospective adopters) so as to facilitate their matching; (b) maintain a nationwide
information and educational campaign on domestic adoption; (c) keep records of adoption
proceedings; (d) generate resources to help child-caring and child-placing agencies and
foster homes maintain viability; and (e) do policy research in collaboration with the
Intercountry Adoption Board and other concerned agencies. The office shall be manned by
adoption experts from the public and private sectors.
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SEC. 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within six (6) months .from the
promulgation of this Act, the Department, with the Council for the Welfare of Children, the
Office of Civil Registry General, the Department of Justice} .Office of the Solicitor General,
and two (2) private individuals representing child-placing and child-caring agencies shall
formulate the necessary guidelines to make the provisions of this Act operative.
SEC. 25. Appropriations. – Such sum as may be necessary for the implementation of the
provisions of this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations Act of the year
following its enactment into law and thereafter.
SEC. 26. Repealing Clause. – Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order,
letter of instruction, administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary to, or inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, modified, or amended accordingly.
SEC. 27. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is held invalid or

unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and subsisting.
SEC. 28. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its
complete publication in any newspaper of general circulation or in the Official Gazette.
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REPUBLIC ACT 8043
Republic Act 8043: The Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995
“AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES TO GOVERN INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION OF

FILIPINO CHILDREN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”
Section 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995.”
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide
every neglected and abandoned child with a family that will provide such child with love
and care as well as opportunities for growth and development. Towards this end, efforts
shall be exerted to place the child with an adoptive family in the Philippines. However,
recognizing that inter-country adoption may be considered as allowing aliens not presently
allowed by law to adopt Filipino children if such children cannot be adopted by qualified
Filipino citizens or aliens, the State shall take measures to ensure that inter-country
adoptions are allowed when the same shall prove beneficial to the child’s best interests,
and shall serve and protect his/her fundamental rights.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act. the term:
(a) Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child

by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad where the petition is filed,
the supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of adoption is issued outside the
Philippines.
(b) Child means a person below fifteen (15) years of age unless sooner emancipated by
law.
(c) Department refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development of the
Republic of the Philippines.
(d) Secretary refers to the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
(e) Authorized and accredited agency refers to the State welfare agency or a licensed
adoption agency in the country of the adopting parents which provide comprehensive
social services and which is duly recognized by the Department.
(f) Legally-free child means a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed
to the Department, in accordance with the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
(g) Matching refers to the judicious pairing of the adoptive child and the applicant to
promote a mutually satisfying parent-child relationship.
(h) Board refers to the Inter-country Adoption Board.
ARTICLE II
THE INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION BOARD
Sec. 4. The Inter-Country Adoption Board. — There is hereby created the Inter-Country
Adoption Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board to act as the central authority in
matters relating to inter-country adoption. It shall act as the policy-making body for
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purposes of carrying out the provisions of this Act, in consultation and coordination with the
Department, the different child-care and placement agencies, adoptive agencies, as well
as non-governmental organizations engaged in child-care and placement activities. As
such, it shall:
(a) Protect the Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or any other
practice in connection with adoption which is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the
child;
(b) Collect, maintain, and preserve confidential information about the child and the
adoptive parents;
(c) Monitor, follow up, and facilitate completion of adoption of the child through
authorized and accredited agency;
(d) Prevent improper financial or other gain in connection with an adoption and deter
improper practices contrary to this Act;
(e) Promote the development of adoption services including post-legal adoption;
(f) License and accredit child-caring/placement agencies and collaborate with them in
the placement of Filipino children;
(g) Accredit and authorize foreign adoption agency in the placement of Filipino children
in their own country; and
(h) Cancel the license to operate and blacklist the child-caring and placement agency or
adoptive agency involved from the accreditation list of the Board upon a finding of violation
of any provision under this Act.
Sec. 5. Composition of the Board. — The Board shall be composed of the Secretary of
the Department as ex officio Chairman, and six (6) other members to be appointed by the
President for a nonrenewable term of six (6) years: Provided, That there shall be appointed
one (1) psychiatrist or psychologist, two (2) lawyers who shall have at least the
qualifications of a regional trial court judge, one (1) registered social worker and two (2)
representatives from non-governmental organizations engaged in child-caring and
placement activities. The members of the Board shall receive a per diem allowance of One
thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) for each meeting attended by them: Provided,
further, That no compensation shall be paid for more than four (4) meetings a month.
Sec. 6. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board shall have the following
powers and functions:
(a) to prescribe rules and regulations as it may deem reasonably necessary to carry out
the provisions of this Act, after consultation and upon favorable recommendation of the
different agencies concerned with the child-caring, placement, and adoption;
(b) to set the guidelines for the convening of an Inter-country Adoption Placement
Committee which shall be under the direct supervision of the Board;
(c) to set the guidelines for the manner by which selection/matching of prospective
adoptive parents and adoptive child can be made;
(d) to determine a reasonable schedule of fees and charges to be exacted in connection
with the application for adoption;
(e) to determine the form and contents of the application for inter-country adoption;
(g) to institute systems and procedures to prevent improper financial gain in connection
with adoption and deter improper practices which are contrary to this Act;
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(h) to promote the development of adoption services, including post-legal adoption
services,
(i) to accredit and authorize foreign private adoption agencies which have demonstrated
professionalism, competence and have consistently pursued non-profit objectives to
engage in the placement of Filipino children in their own country: Provided, That such
foreign private agencies are duly authorized and accredited by their own government to
conduct inter-country adoption: Provided, however, That the total number of authorized
and accredited foreign private adoption agencies shall not exceed one hundred (100) a
year;
(j) to take appropriate measures to ensure confidentiality of the records of the child, the
natural parents and the adoptive parents at all times;
(k) to prepare, review or modify, and thereafter, recommend to the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Memoranda of Agreement respecting inter-country adoption consistent
with the implementation of this Act and its stated goals, entered into, between and among
foreign governments, international organizations and recognized international non-
governmental organizations;
(l) to assist other concerned agencies and the courts in the implementation of this Act,
particularly as regards coordination with foreign persons, agencies and other entities
involved in the process of adoption and the physical transfer of the child; and
(m) to perform such other functions on matters relating to inter-country adoption as may
be determined by the President.
ARTICLE III
PROCEDURE
Sec. 7. Inter-Country Adoption as the Last Resort. — The Board shall ensure that all
possibilities for adoption of the child under the Family Code have been exhausted and that
inter-country adoption is in the best interest of the child. Towards this end, the Board shall
set up the guidelines to ensure that steps will be taken to place the child in the Philippines
before the child is placed for inter-country adoption: Provided, however, That the maximum
number that may be allowed for foreign adoption shall not exceed six hundred (600) a year
for the first five (5) years.
Sec. 8. Who May be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-
country adoption. In order that such child may be considered for placement, the following
documents must be submitted to the Board:
(a)Child study;

(b)Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
(c)Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents;
(d)Medical evaluation /history;
(e)Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and
(f)Recent photo of the child.
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Sec. 9. Who May Adopt. — An alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may
file an application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child if he/she:
(a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than
the child to be adopted, at the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature
of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent:
(b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption;
(c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority
under his national laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited
counselor in his/her country;
(d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law;
(f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary
moral values and example to all his children, including the child to be adopted;
(g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations
issued to implement the provisions of this Act;
(h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose
government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is
allowed under his/her national laws; and
(i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and
in other applicable Philippine laws.
Sec. 10. Where to File Application. — An application to adopt a Filipino child shall be
filed either with the Philippine Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the child, or with
the Board, through an intermediate agency, whether governmental or an authorized and
accredited agency, in the country of the prospective adoptive parents, which application
shall be in accordance with the requirements as set forth in the implementing rules and
regulations to be promulgated by the Board.
The application shall be supported by the following documents written and officially
translated in English.
(a) Birth certificate of applicant(s);

(b) Marriage contract, if married, and divorce decree, if applicable;
(c) Written consent of their biological or adoptive children above ten (10) years of age, in
the form of sworn statement;
(d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation by a duly licensed physician and
psychologist;
(e) Income tax returns or any document showing the financial capability of the
applicant(s);
(f) Police clearance of applicant(s);
(g) Character reference from the local church/minister, the applicant’s employer and a
member of the immediate community who have known the applicant(s) for at least five (5)
years; and
(h) Recent postcard-size pictures of the applicant(s) and his immediate family;
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The Rules of Court shall apply in case of adoption by judicial proceedings.
Sec. 11. Family Selection/Matching. — No child shall be matched to a foreign adoptive

family unless it is satisfactorily shown that the child cannot be adopted locally. The
clearance, as issued by the Board, with the copy of the minutes of the meetings, shall form
part of the records of the child to be adopted. When the Board is ready to transmit the
Placement Authority to the authorized and accredited inter-country adoption agency and all
the travel documents of the child are ready, the adoptive parents, or any one of them, shall
personally fetch the child in the Philippines.
Sec. 12. Pre-adoptive Placement Costs. — The applicant(s) shall bear the following
costs incidental to the placement of the child;
(a) The cost of bringing the child from the Philippines to the residence of the applicant(s)
abroad, including all travel expenses within the Philippines and abroad; and
(b) The cost of passport, visa, medical examination and psychological evaluation
required, and other related expenses.
Sec. 13. Fees, Charges and Assessments. — Fees, charges, and assessments collected
by the Board in the exercise of its functions shall be used solely to process applications for
inter-country adoption and to support the activities of the Board.
Sec. 14. Supervision of Trial Custody. — The governmental agency or the authorized
and accredited agency in the country of the adoptive parents which filed the application for
inter-country adoption shall be responsible for the trial custody and the care of the child. It
shall also provide family counseling and other related services. The trial custody shall be
for a period of six (6) months from the time of placement. Only after the lapse of the period
of trial custody shall a decree of adoption be issued in the said country a copy of which
shall be sent to the Board to form part of the records of the child.
During the trial custody, the adopting parent(s) shall submit to the governmental agency or
the authorized and accredited agency, which shall in turn transmit a copy to the Board, a
progress report of the child’s adjustment. The progress report shall be taken into
consideration in deciding whether or not to issue the decree of adoption.
The Department of Foreign Affairs shall set up a system by which Filipino children sent
abroad for trial custody are monitored and checked as reported by the authorized and
accredited inter-country adoption agency as well as the repatriation to the Philippines of a
Filipino child whose adoption has not been approved.
Sec. 15. Executive Agreements. — The Department of Foreign Affairs, upon

representation of the Board, shall cause the preparation of Executive Agreements with
countries of the foreign adoption agencies to ensure the legitimate concurrence of said
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countries in upholding the safeguards provided by this Act
ARTICLE IV
PENALTIES
Sec. 16. Penalties. —
(a) Any person who shall knowingly participate in the conduct or carrying out of an illegal
adoption, in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be punished with a penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine
of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), but not more than Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200.000), at the discretion of the court. For purposes of this Act, an adoption is
illegal if it is effected in any manner contrary to the provisions of this Act or established
State policies, its implementing rules and regulations, executive agreements, and other
laws pertaining to adoption. Illegality may be presumed from the following acts:
(1)consent for an adoption was acquired through, or attended by coercion, fraud,
improper material inducement;
(2)there is no authority from the Board to effect adoption;
(3)the procedures and safeguards placed under the law for adoption were not complied
with; and
(4)the child to be adopted is subjected to, or exposed to danger, abuse and exploitation.
(b)Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to the confidentiality and
integrity of records, documents and communications of adoption applications, cases and
processes shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and one (1)
day to two (2) years, and/or a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000), but not
more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000), at the discretion of the court.

A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under
this Article shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit any of the acts
herein enumerated.
Acts punishable under this Article, when committed by a syndicate or where it involves two
or more children shall be considered as an offense constituting child trafficking and shall
merit the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any of the unlawful acts defined under this Article.Penalties as are herein
provided shall be in addition to any other penalties which may be imposed for the same
acts punishable under other laws, ordinances, executive orders, and proclamations.
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Sec. 17. Public Officers as Offenders. — Any government official, employee or
functionary who shall be found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this Act, or who
shall conspire with private individuals shall, in addition to the above-prescribed penalties,
be penalized in accordance with existing civil service laws, rules and regulations: Provided,
That upon the filing of a case, either administrative or criminal, said government official,
employee or functionary concerned shall automatically suffer suspension until the
resolution of the case.
ARTICLE V
FINAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 18. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — The Inter-country Adoption Board, in
coordination with the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Department of Foreign Affairs,
and the Department of Justice, after due consultation with agencies involved in child-care
and placement, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the
provisions of this Act within six (6) months after its effectivity.
Sec. 19. Appropriations. — The amount of Five million pesos (P5,000,000) is hereby
appropriated from the proceeds of the Lotto for the initial operations of the Board and
subsequently the appropriations of the same shall be included in the General
Appropriations Act for the year following its enactment
Sec. 20. Separability Clause — If any provision, or part hereof is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the provision not otherwise affected, shall
remain valid and subsisting.
Sec. 21. Repealing Clause. — Any law, decree, executive order, administrative order or
rules and regulations contrary to, or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
Sec. 22. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: June 7, 1995
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REPUBLIC ACT 9523

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Fourteenth Congress
Second Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eight day of July, two thousand
eight.
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9523]
AN ACT REQUIRING THE CERTIFICATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL

WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT (DSWD) TO DECLARE A “CHILD LEGALLY
AVAILABLE FOR ADOPTION” AS A PREREQUISITE FOR ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS,
AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
8552, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT OF 1998, REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 8043, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION ACT OF
1995, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 603, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CHILD AND
YOUTH WELFARE CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State that
alternative protection and assistance shall be afforded to every child who is abandoned,
surrendered, or neglected. In this regard, the State shall extend such assistance in the
most expeditious manner in the interest of full emotional and social development of the
abandoned, surrendered, or neglected child.
It is hereby recognized that administrative processes under the jurisdiction of the

Department of Social Welfare and Development for the declaration of a child legally
available for adoption of abandoned, surrendered, or neglected children are the most
expeditious proceedings for the best interest and welfare of the child.
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(1) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) is the agency charged to

implement the provisions of this Act and shall have the sole authority to issue the
certification declaring a child legally available for adoption.
(2) Child refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or a person over eighteen
(18) years of age but is unable to fully take care of himself/herself or protect himself/herself
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from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of physical or mental
disability or condition.
(3) Abandoned Child refers to a child who has no proper parental care or guardianship, or
whose parent(s) have deserted him/her for a period of at least three (3) continuous
months, which includes a foundling.
(4) Neglected Child refers to a child whose basic needs have been deliberately unattended
or inadequately attended within a period of three (3) continuous months. Neglect may
occur in two (2) ways:
(a) There is physical neglect when the child is malnourished, ill-clad, and without proper
shelter. A child is unattended when left by himself/herself without proper provisions and/or
without proper supervision.
(b) There is emotional neglect when the child is maltreated, raped, seduced, exploited,
overworked, or made to work under conditions not conducive to good health; or is made to
beg in the streets or public places; or when children are in moral danger, or exposed to
gambling, prostitution, and other vices.
(5) Child Legally Available for Adoption refers to a child in whose favor a certification was
issued by the DSWD that he/she is legally available for adoption after the fact of
abandonment or neglect has been proven through the submission of pertinent documents,
or one who was voluntarily committed by his/her parent(s) or legal guardian.
(6) Voluntarily Committed Child is one whose parent(s) or legal guardian knowingly and
willingly relinquished parental authority to the DSWD or any duly accredited child-
placement or child-caring agency or institution.
(7) Child-caring agency or institution refers to a private non-profit or government agency

duly accredited by the DSWD that provides twenty-four (24) hour residential care services
for abandoned, neglected, or voluntarily committed children.
(8) Child-placing agency or institution refers to a private non-profit institution or government

agency duly accredited by the DSWD that receives and processes applicants to become
foster or adoptive parents and facilitate placement of children eligible for foster care or
adoption.
(9) Petitioner refers to the head or executive director of a licensed or accredited child-

caring or child-placing agency or institution managed by the government, local government
unit, nongovernmental organization, or provincial city, or municipal Social Welfare
Development Officer who has actual custody of the minor and who files a certification to
declare such child legally available for adoption, or, if the child is under the custody of any
other individual, the agency or institution does so with the consent of the child’s custodian.
(10) Secretary refers to the Secretary of the DSWD or his duly authorized representative.
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(11) Conspicuous Place shall refer to a place frequented by the public, whereby the notice
of the petition shall be posted for information of any interested person.
(12) Social Case Study Report (SCSR) shall refer to a written report of the result of an
assessment conducted by a licensed social worker as to the socio-cultural economic
condition, psychosocial background, current functioning and facts of abandonment or
neglect of the child. The report shall also state the efforts of social worker to locate the
child’s biological parents/relatives.
SEC. 3. Petition. — The petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn
to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. It shall contain facts necessary
to establish the merits of the petition and shall state the circumstances surrounding the
abandonment or neglect of the child.
The petition shall be supported by the following documents:
(1) Social Case Study Report made by the DSWD, local government unit, licensed or
accredited child-caring or child-placing agency or institution charged with the custody of the
child;
(2) Proof that efforts were made to locate the parent(s) or any known relatives of the child.
The following shall be considered sufficient:
(a) Written certification from a local or national radio or television station that the case was
aired on three (3) different occasions;
(b) Publication in one (1) newspaper of general circulation;
(c) Police report or barangay certification from the locality where the child was found or a
certified copy of a tracing report issued by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC),
National Headquarters (NHQ), Social Services Division, which states that despite due
diligence, the child’s parents could not be found; and
(d) Returned registered mail to the last known address of the parent(s) or known relatives,
if any.
(3) Birth certificate, if available; and
(4) Recent photograph of the child and photograph of the child upon abandonment or
admission to the agency or institution.
SEC. 4. Procedure for the Filing of the Petition. — The petition shall be filed in the regional
office of the DSWD where the child was found or abandoned.
The Regional Director shall examine the petition and its supporting documents, if sufficient
in form and substance and shall authorize the posting of the notice of the petition in
conspicuous places for five (5) consecutive days in the locality where the child was found.
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The Regional Director shall act on the same and shall render a recommendation not later
than five (5) working days after the completion of its posting. He/she shall transmit a copy
of his/her recommendation and records to the Office of the Secretary within forty-eight (48)
hours from the date of the recommendation.
SEC. 5. Declaration of Availability for Adoption. — Upon finding merit in the petition, the
Secretary shall issue a certification declaring the child legally available for adoption within
seven (7) working days from receipt of the recommendation.
Said certification, by itself, shall be the sole basis for the immediate issuance by the local
civil registrar of a foundling certificate. Within seven (7) working days, the local civil
registrar shall transmit the foundling certificate to the National Statistics Office (NSO).
SEC. 6. Appeal. — The decision of the Secretary shall be appealable to the Court of
Appeals within five (5) days from receipt of the decision by the petitioner, otherwise the
same shall be final and executory.
SEC. 7. Declaration of Availability for Adoption of Involuntarily Committed Child and

Voluntarily Committed Child. — The certificate declaring a child legally available for
adoption in case of an involuntarily committed child under Article 141, paragraph 4 (a) and
Article 142 of Presidential Decree No. 603 shall be issued by the DSWD within three (3)
months following such involuntary commitment.
In case of voluntary commitment as contemplated in Article 154 of Presidential Decree No.

603, the certification declaring the child legally available for adoption shall be issued by the
Secretary within three (3) months following the filing of the Deed of Voluntary Commitment,
as signed by the parent(s) with the DSWD.
Upon petition filed with the DSWD, the parent(s) or legal guardian who voluntarily
committed a child may recover legal custody and parental authority over him/her from the
agency or institution to which such child was voluntarily committed when it is shown to the
satisfaction of the DSWD that the parent(s) or legal guardian is in a position to adequately
provide for the needs of the child: Provided, That, the petition for restoration is filed within
three (3) months after the signing of the Deed of Voluntary Commitment.
SEC. 8. Certification. — The certification that a child is legally available for adoption shall
be issued by the DSWD in lieu of a judicial order, thus making the entire process
administrative in nature.
The certification, shall be, for all intents and purposes, the primary evidence that the child
is legally available in a domestic adoption proceeding, as provided in Republic Act No.
8552, and in an inter-country adoption proceeding, as provided in Republic Act No. 8043.
SEC. 9. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — The DSWD, together with the Council for
Welfare of Children, Inter-Country Adoption Board, two (2) representatives from licensed or
accredited child-placing and child-caring agencies or institutions, National Statistics Office,
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and Office of the Civil Registrar, is hereby tasked to draft the implementing rules and
regulations of this Act within sixty (60) days following its complete publication.
Upon effectivity of this Act and pending the completion of the drafting of the implementing
rules and regulations, petitions for the issuance of a certification declaring a child legally
available for adoption may be filed with the regional office of the DSWD where the child
was found or abandoned.
SEC. 10. Penalty. — The penalty of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) shall be imposed on any person, institution, or
agency who shall place a child for adoption without the certification that the child is legally
available for adoption issued by the DSWD. Any agency or institution found violating any
provision of this Act shall have its license to operate revoked without prejudice to the
criminal prosecution of its officers and employees.
Violation of any provision of this Act shall subject the government official or employee
concerned to appropriate administrative, civil and/or criminal sanctions, including
suspension and/or dismissal from the government service and forfeiture of benefits.
SEC. 11. Repealing Clause. — Sections 2 (c) (iii), 3 (b), (e), and 8 (a) of Republic Act No.
8552, Section 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 8043, Chapter 1 of Titles VII and VIII of Presidential
Decree No. 603, and any law, presidential decree, executive order, letter of instruction,
administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed, modified, or amended accordingly.
SEC. 12. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this Act is held invalid or

unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and subsisting.
SEC. 13. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its complete
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation or in the Official Gazette.
Approved.
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A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC

Supreme Court
Manila
RULE ON ADOPTION
A. DOMESTIC ADOPTION
SECTION 1. Applicability of the Rule. – This Rule covers the domestic adoption of Filipino
children.
SEC. 2. Objectives. – (a) The best interests of the child shall be the paramount
consideration in all matters relating to his care, custody and adoption, in accordance with
Philippine laws, the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN
Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of
Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption, Nationally and
Internationally, and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation
in Respect of Inter-country Adoption.
(b) The State shall provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or
adoption for every child who is a foundling, neglected, orphaned, or abandoned. To this
end, the State shall:
(i) ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his parents and is
provided with love, care, understanding and security for the full and harmonious
development of his personality. Only when such efforts prove insufficient and no
appropriate placement or adoption within the child’s extended family is available shall
adoption by an unrelated person be considered.
(ii) safeguard the biological parents from making hasty decisions in relinquishing their
parental authority over their child;
(iii) prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his biological parents;
(iv) conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a positive

environment for adoption;
(v) ensure that government and private sector agencies have the capacity to handle
adoption inquiries, process domestic adoption applications and offer adoption-related
services including, but not limited to, parent preparation and post-adoption education and
counseling;
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(vi) encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the child’s identity and culture in his
native land, and only when this is not available shall inter-country adoption be considered
as a last resort; and
(vii) protect adoptive parents from attempts to disturb their parental authority and custody
over their adopted child.
Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be administratively or

judicially declared so as to establish the status of the child as “legally available for
adoption” and his custody transferred to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or to any duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency,
which entity shall be authorized to take steps for the permanent placement of the child.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Rule:
(a) “Child” is a person below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the filing of the
petition for adoption.
(b) “A child legally available for adoption” refers to a child who has been voluntarily or
involuntarily committed to the Department or to a duly licensed and accredited child-placing
or child-caring agency, freed of the parental authority of his biological parents, or in case of
rescission of adoption, his guardian or adopter(s).
(c) “Voluntarily committed child” is one whose parents knowingly and willingly relinquish
parental authority over him in favor of the Department.
(d) “Involuntarily committed child” is one whose parents, known or unknown, have been
permanently and judicially deprived of parental authority over him due to abandonment;
substantial, continuous or repeated neglect and abuse; or incompetence to discharge
parental responsibilities.
(e) “Foundling” refers to a deserted or abandoned infant or child whose parents, guardian
or relatives are unknown; or a child committed to an orphanage or charitable or similar
institution with unknown facts of birth and parentage and registered in the Civil Register as
a “foundling.”
(f)”Abandoned child” refers to one who has no proper parental care or guardianship or
whose parents have deserted him for a period of at least six (6) continuous months and
has been judicially declared as such.
(g) “Dependent child” refers to one who is without a parent, guardian or custodian or one
whose parents, guardian or other custodian for good cause desires to be relieved of his
care and custody and is dependent upon the public for support.
(h) “Neglected child” is one whose basic needs have been deliberately not attended to or
inadequately attended to, physically or emotionally, by his parents or guardian.
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(i) “Physical neglect” occurs when the child is malnourished, ill-clad and without proper
shelter.
(j) “Emotional neglect” exists when a child is raped, seduced, maltreated, exploited,
overworked or made to work under conditions not conducive to good health or made to beg
in the streets or public places, or placed in moral danger, or exposed to drugs, alcohol,
gambling, prostitution and other vices.
(k) “Child-placement agency” refers to an agency duly licensed and accredited by the
Department to provide comprehensive child welfare services including, but not limited to,
receiving applications for adoption, evaluating the prospective adoptive parents and
preparing the adoption home study report.
(1) “Child-caring agency” refers to an agency duly licensed and accredited by the
Department that provides 24-hour residential care services for abandoned, orphaned,
neglected or voluntarily committed children.
(m) “Department” refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
(n) “Deed of Voluntary Commitment” refers to the written and notarized instrument
relinquishing parental authority and committing the child to the care and custody of the
Department executed by the child’s biological parents or in their absence, mental
incapacity or death, by the child’s legal guardian, to be witnessed by an authorized
representative of the Department after counseling and other services have been made
available to encourage the biological parents to keep the child.
(o) “Child Study Report” refers to a study made by the court social worker of the child’s
legal status, placement history, psychological, social, spiritual, medical, ethno-cultural
background and that of his biological family needed in determining the most appropriate
placement for him.
(p) “Home Study Report” refers to a study made by the court social worker of the
motivation and capacity of the prospective adoptive parents to provide a home that meets
the needs of a child.
(q) “Supervised trial custody” refers to the period of time during which a social worker
oversees the adjustment and emotional readiness of both adopters and adoptee in
stabilizing their filial relationship.
(r) “Licensed Social Worker” refers to one who possesses a degree in bachelor of science
in social work as a minimum educational requirement and who has passed the government
licensure examination for social workers as required by Republic Act No. 4373.
(s) “Simulation of birth” is the tampering of the civil registry to make it appear in the birth
records that a certain child was born to a person who is not his biological mother, thus
causing such child to lose his true identity and status.
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(t) “Biological Parents” refer to the child’s mother and father by nature.
(u) “Pre-Adoption Services” refer to psycho-social services provided by professionally-

trained social workers of the Department, the social services units of local governments,
private and government health facilities, Family Courts, licensed and accredited child-
caring and child-placement agencies and other individuals or entities involved in adoption
as authorized by the Department.
(v) “Residence” means a person’s actual stay in the Philippines for three (3) continuous
years immediately prior to the filing of a petition for adoption and which is maintained until
the adoption decree is entered. Temporary absences for professional, business, health, or
emergency reasons not exceeding sixty (60) days in one (1) year does not break the
continuity requirement.
(w) “Alien” refers to any person, not a Filipino citizen, who enters and remains in the
Philippines and is in possession of a valid passport or travel documents and visa.
SEC. 4. Who may adopt. – The following may adopt:
(1) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of
good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; who
is emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years
older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his children in
keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of a 16-year difference between the
age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of
the adoptee or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
(2) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above-stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines, that he. has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous
years prior to the filing of the petition’ for adoption and maintains such residence until the
adoption decree is entered, that he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular office
or any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his country,
and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted
child. Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt in his country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4) degree of
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse.
(3) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his financial accountabilities.
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Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate chili of one spouse by the other spouse; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child: Provided, however, That the
other spouse has signified his consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the illegitimate child of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
SEC. 5. Who may be adopted. – The following may be adopted:
(1) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been voluntarily committed to
the Department under Articles 154, 155 and 156 of P.D. No. 603 or judicially declared
available for adoption;
(2) The legitimate child of one spouse, by the other spouse;
(3) An illegitimate child, by a qualified adopter to raise the status of the former to that of
legitimacy;
(4) A person of legal age regardless of civil status, if, prior to the adoption, said person has
been consistently considered and treated by the adopters as their own child since minority;
(5) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or
(6) A child whose biological or adoptive parents have died: Provided, That no proceedings

shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parents.
(7) A child not otherwise disqualified by law or these rules.
SEC. 6. Venue. – The petition for adoption shall be filed with the Family Court of the
province or city where the prospective adoptive parents reside.
SEC. 7. Contents of the Petition. – The petition shall be verified and specifically state at the
heading of the initiatory pleading whether the petition contains an application for change of
name, rectification of simulated birth, voluntary or involuntary commitment of children, or
declaration of child as abandoned, dependent or neglected.
1) If the adopter is a Filipino citizen, the petition shall allege the following:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
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(b) That the petitioner is of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights; is
of good moral character; has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; is
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children; is at least sixteen (16) years
older than the adoptee, unless the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee or is the
spouse of the adoptee’s parent; and is in a position to support and care for his children in
keeping with the means of the family and has undergone pre-adoption services as required
by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8552.
2) If the adopter is an alien, the petition shall allege the following:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) Sub-paragraph 1(b) above;
(c) That his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines;
(d) That he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his country and his government
allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child and reside there permanently
as an adopted child; and
(e) That he has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to
the filing of the petition and he maintains such residence until the adoption decree is
entered.
The requirements of certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his country and of
residency may be waived if the alien:
(i) is a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth degree of
(ii) seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse;
or
(iii) is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his spouse a relative
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse.
3) If the adopter is the legal guardian of the adoptee, the petition shall allege that
guardianship had been terminated and the guardian had cleared his financial
accountabilities.
4) If the adopter is married, the spouse shall be a co-petitioner for joint adoption except if:
(a) one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other, or
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(b) if one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child and the other spouse signified
written consent thereto, or
(c) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
5) If the adoptee is a foundling, the petition shall allege the entries which should appear in
his birth certificate, such as name of child, date of birth, place of birth, if known; sex, name
and citizenship of adoptive mother and father, and the date and place of their marriage.
6) If the petition prays for a change of name, it shall also state the cause or reason for the
change of name.
In all petitions, it shall be alleged:
(a) The first name, surname or names, age and residence of the adoptee as shown by his
record of birth, baptismal or foundling certificate and school records.
(b) That the adoptee is not disqualified by law to be adopted.
(c) The probable value and character of the estate of the adoptee.
(d) The first name, surname or names by which the adoptee is to be known and registered
in the Civil Registry.
A certification of non-forum shopping shall be included pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Sec. 8. Rectification of Simulated Birth. – In case the petition also seeks rectification of a
simulated of birth, it shall allege that:
(a) Petitioner is applying for rectification of a simulated birth;
(b) The simulation of birth was made prior to the date of effectivity of Republic Act No.
8552 and the application for rectification of the birth registration and the petition for
adoption were filed within five years from said date;
(c) The petitioner made the simulation of birth for the best interests of the adoptee; and
(d) The adoptee has been consistently considered and treated by petitioner as his own
child.
SEC. 9. Adoption of a foundling, an abandoned, dependent or neglected child. – In case

the adoptee is a foundling, an abandoned, dependent or neglected child, the petition shall
allege:
(a) The facts showing that the child is a foundling, abandoned, dependent or neglected;
Page 157 of 486

(b) The names of the parents, if known, and their residence. If the child has no known or
living parents, then the name and residence of the guardian, if any;
(c) The name of the duly licensed child-placement agency or individual under whose care
the child is in custody; and
(d) That the Department, child-placement or child-caring agency is authorized to give its
consent.
SEC. 10. Change of name. – In case the petition also prays for change of name, the title or
caption must contain:
(a) The registered name of the child;
(b) Aliases or other names by which the child has been known; and
(c) The full name by which the child is to be known.
SEC. 11. Annexes to the Petition. – The following documents shall be attached to the
petition:
A. Birth, baptismal or foundling certificate, as the case may be, and

school records showing the name, age and residence of the adoptee;
B. Affidavit of consent of the following:
1. The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

2. The biological parents of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the child-
placement agency, child-caring agency, or the proper government instrumentality
which has legal custody of the child;
3. The legitimate and adopted children of the adopter and of the adoptee, if any, who
are ten (10) years of age or over;
4. The illegitimate children of the adopter living with him who are ten (10) years of age
or over; and
5. The spouse, if any, of the adopter or adoptee.
C. Child study report on the adoptee and his biological parents;
D. If the petitioner is an alien, certification by his diplomatic or consular office or any

appropriate government agency that he has the legal capacity to adopt in his country and
that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his own adopted child
unless exempted under Section 4(2);
E. Home study report on the adopters. If the adopter is an alien or residing abroad but
qualified to adopt, the home study report by a foreign adoption agency duly accredited by
the Inter-Country Adoption Board; and
Page 158 of 486

F. Decree of annulment, nullity or legal separation of the adopter as well as that of the
biological parents of the adoptee, if any.
SEC. 12. Order of Hearing. – If the petition and attachments are sufficient in form and
substance, the court shall issue an order which shall contain the following:
(1) the registered name of the adoptee in the birth certificate and the names by which the
adoptee has been known which shall be stated in the caption;
(2) the purpose of the petition;
(3) the complete name which the adoptee will use if the petition is granted;
(4) the date and place of hearing which shall be set within six (6) months from the date of
the issuance of the order and shall direct that a copy thereof be published before the date
of hearing at least once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province or city where the court is situated; Provided, that in case of
application for change of name, the date set for hearing shall not be within four (4) months
after the last publication of the notice nor within thirty (30) days prior to an election.
The newspaper shall be selected by raffle under the supervision of the Executive Judge.
(5) a directive to the social worker of the court, the social service office of the local
government unit or any child-placing or child-caring agency, or the Department to prepare
and submit child and home study reports before the hearing if such reports had not been
attached to the petition due to unavailability at the time of the filing of the latter; and
(6) a directive to the social worker of the court to conduct counseling sessions with the
biological parents on the matter of adoption of the adoptee and submit her report before
the date of hearing.
At the discretion of the court, copies of the order of hearing shall also be furnished the
Office of the Solicitor General through the provincial or city prosecutor, the Department and
the biological parents of the adoptee, if known.
If a change in the name of the adoptee is prayed for in the petition, notice to the Solicitor
General shall be mandatory.
SEC. 13. Child and Home Study Reports. – In preparing the child study report on the
adoptee, the concerned social worker shall verify with the Civil Registry the real identity
and registered name of the adoptee. If the birth of the adoptee was not registered with the
Civil Registry, it shall be the responsibility of the social worker to register the adoptee and
secure a certificate of foundling or late registration, as the case may be.
The social worker shall establish that the child is legally available for adoption and the
documents in support thereof are valid and authentic, that the adopter has sincere
intentions and that the adoption shall inure to the best interests of the child.
Page 159 of 486
In case the adopter is an alien, the home study report must show the legal capacity to
adopt and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child
in the absence of the certification required under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8552.
If after the conduct of the case studies, the social worker finds that there are grounds to
deny the petition, he shall make the proper recommendation to the court, furnishing a copy
thereof to the petitioner.
SEC. 14. Hearing. – Upon satisfactory proof that the order of hearing has been published
and jurisdictional requirements have been complied with, the court shall proceed to hear
the petition. The petitioner and the adoptee must personally appear and the former must
testify before the presiding judge of the court on the date set for hearing.
The court shall verify from the social worker and determine whether the biological parent
has been properly counseled against making hasty decisions caused by strain or anxiety to
give up the child; ensure that all measures to strengthen the family have been exhausted;
and ascertain if any prolonged stay of the child in his own home will be inimical to his
welfare and interest.
SEC. 15. Supervised Trial Custody. – Before issuance of the decree of adoption, the court
shall give the adopter trial custody of the adoptee for a period of at least six (6) months
within which the parties are expected to adjust psychologically and emotionally to each
other and establish a bonding relationship. The trial custody shall be monitored by the
social worker of the court, the Department, or the social service of the local government
unit, or the child-placement or child-caring agency which submitted and prepared the case
studies. During said period, temporary parental authority shall be vested in the adopter.
The court may, motu propria or upon motion of any party, reduce the period or exempt the
parties if it finds that the same shall be for the best interests of the adoptee, stating the
reasons therefor.
An alien adopter however must complete the 6-month trial custody except the following:
a) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
b) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse; or
c) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse
the latter’s relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity.
If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the prospective adopter
through a pre-adoption placement authority issued by the Department, the court shall order
that the prospective adopter shall enjoy all the benefits to which the biological parent is
entitled from the date the adoptee is placed with him.
Page 160 of 486

The social worker shall submit to the court a report on the result of the trial custody within
two weeks after its termination.
SEC. 16. Decree of Adoption. – If the supervised trial custody is satisfactory to the parties
and the court is convinced from the trial custody report and the evidence adduced that the
adoption shall redound to the best interests of the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be
issued which shall take effect as of the date the original petition was filed even if the
petitioners die before its issuance.
The decree shall:
A. State the name by which the child is to be known and registered;
B. Order:
1) the Clerk of Court to issue to the adopter a certificate of finality upon expiration of the
15-day reglementary period within which to appeal;
2) the adopter to submit a certified true copy of the decree of adoption and the certificate of
finality to the Civil Registrar where the child was originally registered within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the certificate of finality. In case of change of name, the decree shall be
submitted to the Civil Registrar where the court issuing the same is situated.
3) the Civil Registrar of the place where the adoptee was registered:
a. to annotate on the adoptee’s original certificate of birth the decree of adoption within

thirty (30) days from receipt of, the certificate of finality;
b. to issue a certificate of birth which shall not bear any notation that it is a new or
amended certificate and which shall show, among others, the following: registry
number, date of registration, name of child, sex, date of birth, place of birth, name and
citizenship of adoptive mother and father, and the date and place of their marriage, when
applicable;
c. to seal the original certificate of birth in the civil registry records which can be opened
only upon order of the court which issued the decree of adoption; and
d. to submit to the court issuing the decree of adoption proof of compliance with all the
foregoing within thirty days from receipt of the decree. If the adoptee is a foundling, the
court shall order the Civil Registrar where the foundling was registered, to annotate the
decree of adoption on the foundling certificate and a new birth certificate shall be ordered
prepared by the Civil Registrar in accordance with the decree.
SEC. 17. Book of Adoptions. – The Clerk of Court shall keep a book of adoptions showing
the date of issuance of the decree in each case, compliance by the Civil Registrar with
Section 16(B)(3) and all incidents arising after the issuance of the decree.
Page 161 of 486

SEC. 18. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records. – All hearings in adoption
cases, after .compliance with the jurisdictional requirements shall be confidential and shall
not be open to the public. All records, books and papers relating to the adoption cases in
the files of the court, the Department, or any other agency or institution participating in the
adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential.
If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for
security reasons or for purposes connected with or arising out of the adoption and will be
for the best interests of the adoptee, the court may, upon proper motion, order the
necessary information to be released, restricting the purposes for which it may be used.
SEC. 19. Rescission of Adoption of the Adoptee. – The petition shall be verified and filed
by the adoptee who is over eighteen (18) years of age, or with the assistance of the
Department, if he is a minor, or if he is over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated,
by his guardian or counsel.
The adoption may be rescinded based on any of the following grounds committed by the
adopter:
1) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter despite having undergone
counseling;
2) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
3) sexual assault or violence; or
4) abandonment or failure to comply with parental obligations. Adoption, being in the best
interests of the child, shall not be subject to
rescission by the adopter. However, the adopter may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
SEC. 20. Venue. – The petition shall be filed with the Family Court of the city or province
where the adoptee resides.
SEC. 21. Time within which to file petition. – The adoptee, if incapacitated, must file the
petition for rescission or revocation of adoption within five (5) years after he reaches the
age of majority, or if he was incompetent at the time of the adoption, within five (5) years
after recovery from such incompetency.
SEC. 22. Order to Answer. – The court shall issue an order requiring the adverse party to
answer the petition within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof. The order and
copy of the petition shall be served on the adverse party in such manner as the court may
direct.
Page 162 of 486

SEC. 23. Judgment. ~ If the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall
render judgment ordering the rescission of adoption, with or without costs, as justice
requires.
The court shall order that the parental authority of the biological parent of the adoptee, if
known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a
minor or incapacitated and declare that the reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter
and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
The court shall further declare that successional rights shall revert to its status prior to
adoption, as of the date of judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to
judicial rescission shall be respected.
It shall also order the adoptee to use the name stated in his original birth or foundling
certificate.
The court shall further order the Civil Registrar where the adoption decree was registered
to cancel the new birth certificate of the adoptee and reinstate his original birth or foundling
certificate.
SEC. 24. Service of Judgment. – A certified true copy of the judgment together with a
certificate of finality issued by the Branch Clerk of the Court which rendered the decision in
accordance with the preceding Section shall be served by the petitioner upon the Civil
Registrar concerned within thirty (30) days from receipt of the certificate of finality. The Civil
Registrar shall forthwith enter the rescission decree in the register and submit proof of
compliance to the court issuing the decree and the Clerk of Court within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the decree.
The Clerk of Court shall enter the compliance in accordance with Section 17 hereof.
SEC. 25. Repeal. – This supersedes Rule 99 on Adoption and Rule 100 of the Rules of
Court.
B. INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION
SEC. 26. Applicability. – The following sections apply to i adoption of Filipino children by

foreign nationals and Filipino citizens permanently residing abroad.
SEC. 27. Objectives. – The State shall:
a) consider inter-country adoption as an alternative means of child care, if the child cannot
be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot, in any suitable manner, be cared for
in the Philippines;
b) ensure that the child subject of inter-country adoption enjoys the same protection
accorded to children in domestic adoption; and
Page 163 of 486

c) take all measures to ensure that the placement arising therefrom does not result in
improper financial gain for those involved.
SEC. 28. Where to File Petition. – A verified petition to adopt a Filipino child may be filed
by a foreign national or Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad with the Family Court
having jurisdiction over the place where the child resides or may be found.
It may be filed directly with the Inter-Country Adoption Board
SEC. 29. Who may be adopted. – Only a child legally available for domestic adoption may
be the subject of inter-country adoption.
SEC. 30. Contents of Petition. – The petitioner must allege:
a) his age and the age of the child to be adopted, showing that he is at least twenty-seven
(27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be adopted at the
time of application, unless the petitioner is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted
or the spouse of such parent, in which case the age difference does not apply;
b) if married, the name of the spouse who must be joined as co-petitioner except when the
adoptee is a legitimate child of his spouse;
c) that he has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental
authority under his national laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an
accredited counselor in his country;
d) that he has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
e) that he is eligible to adopt under his national law;
f) that he can provide the proper care and support and instill the necessary moral values
and example to all his children, including the child to be adopted;
g) that he agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child, as embodied under Philippine laws
and the U. N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and
regulations issued to implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 8043;
h) that he comes from a country with which the Philippines has diplomatic relations and
whose government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that
adoption of a Filipino child is allowed under his national laws; and
i) that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in this
Rule, in Republic Act No. 8043 and in all other applicable Philippine laws.
SEC. 31. Annexes. – The petition for adoption shall contain the following annexes written
and officially translated in English:
Page 164 of 486

a) Birth certificate of petitioner;
b) Marriage contract, if married, and, if applicable, the divorce decree, or judgment

dissolving the marriage;
c) Sworn statement of consent of petitioner’s biological or adopted children above ten (10)
years of age;
d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation of the petitioner certified by a duly

licensed physician and psychologist;
e) Income tax returns or any authentic document showing the current financial capability of
the petitioner;
f) Police clearance of petitioner issued within six (6) months before the filing of the
petitioner;
g) Character reference from the local church/minister, the petitioner’s employer and a
member of the immediate community who have known the petitioner for at least five (5)
years;
h) Full body postcard-size pictures of the petitioner and his immediate family taken at least
six (6) months before the filing of the petition.
SEC. 32. Duty of Court. – The court, after finding that the petition is sufficient in form and
substance and a proper case for inter-country adoption, shall immediately transmit the
petition to the Inter-Country Adoption Board for appropriate action.
SEC. 33. Effectivity. – This Rule shall take effect on August 22, 2002 following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Page 165 of 486

[1]
G.R. No. L-6294 June 28, 1954
In the matter of the adoption of the minor MARCIAL ELEUTARIO RESABA. LUIS
SANTOS-YÑIGO and LIGIA MIGUEL DE SANTOS-YÑIGO, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for appellant.
Abelardo S. Fernando for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On June 24, 1952, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga by Luis
Santos-Yñigo and his wife for the adoption of a minor named Marcial Eleuterio Resaba. It
is alleged that the legitimate parents of said minor have given their consent to the adoption
in a document which was duly signed by them on March 20, 1950, and that since then
petitioners had reared and cared for the minor as if he were their own. It is likewise alleged
that petitioners are financially and morally able to bring up and educate the minor.
By order of the court, copy of the petition was served on the Solicitor General who, in due
time, filed a written opposition on the ground that petitioners have two legitimate children, a
boy and a girl, who are still minors, and as such they are disqualified to adopt under the
provisions of the new Civil Code.
The court granted the petition holding that, while petitioners have two legitimate children of
their own, yet said children were born after the agreement for adoption was executed by
petitioners and the parents of the minor. The court found that said agreement was
executed before the new Civil Code went into effect and while the petition may not be
granted under this new Code, it may be sanctioned under the old because it contains no
provision which prohibits adoption in the form and manner agreed upon by the parties.
From this decision, the Solicitor General took the present appeal.
The errors assigns by the Solicitor General are:
The lower court erred in granting the petition to adopt in violation of the provisions
of paragraph 1, article 335, new Civil Code.
II
The lower court erred in giving Exhibit "A", the agreement to adopt, a binding effect.
Page 166 of 486

There is merit in the contention that the petition should not be granted in view of the
prohibition contained in article 335, paragraph 1, of the new Civil Code. This article
provides that persons who have legitimate children cannot adopt, and there is no doubt
about its application because the petition was filed on June 24, 1952 and at that time
petitioners had two legitimate children, one a boy born on November 12, 1950 and the
other, a girl born on April 13, 1952. This case therefore comes squarely within the
prohibition. This prohibition is founded on sound moral grounds. The purpose of adoption is
to afford to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one by
creating, through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by
blood relationship. This purpose reject the idea of adoption by persons who have children
of their own, for, otherwise, conflicts, friction, and differences may arise resulting from the
infiltration of foreign element into a family which already counts with children upon whom
the parents can shower their paternal love and affection (2 Manresa, 6th ed., 108-109).
This moral consideration must have influenced the framers of the new Civil Code when
they reiterated therein this salutary provision.
But it is contended, this prohibition in the new Civil Code cannot have application to the
present case because, to do so , as it is now attempted, would impair the acquired right of
petitioners over the adopted child in violation of the transitory provisions of article 2252 of
said Code. It is pointed out that petitioners reared and took care of the child, since
February 24, 1950, and on March 20, 1950 they and the parents of the child executed the
adoption agreement in accordance with the Rules of Court, and since these rules do not
forbid adoption to persons who have legitimate children, that agreement shall be given full
effect in the manner as any contract which is not contrary to law, morals and public order.
We find no merit in this contention. While the adoption agreement was executed at the time
when the law applicable to adoption is Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that rule does
not prohibit persons who have legitimate children from adopting, we cannot agree to the
proposition that such agreement has the effect of establishing the relation of paternity and
filiation by fiction of law without the sanction of court. The reason is simple. Rule 100 has
taken the place of Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure (sections 765-772,
inclusive), which in turn replaced the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code on adoption.
(Articles 173-180.) As was stated in one case, said chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure
"appears to be a complete enactment on the subject of adoption, and may thus be
regarded as the expression of the whole law thereof. So viewed, that chapter must be
deemed to have repealed the provisions of the Civil Code on the matter." (In re adoption of
Emiliano Guzman, 73 Phil., 51.) Now, said rule expressly provides that a person desiring to
adopt a minor shall present a petition to the court of first instance of the province where he
resides (section 1). This means that the only valid adoption in this jurisdiction is that one
made through court, or in pursuance of the procedure laid down by the rule, which shows
that the agreement under consideration can not have the effect of adoption as now
pretended by petitioners.
Some members of the Court have advanced the opinion that, notwithstanding the
enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure or the adoption of the present Rules of Court
concerning adoption, those provisions of the Spanish Civil Code that are substantive in
nature cannot be considered as having been impliedly repealed, such as the one providing
that a person who has a legitimate child is prohibited to adopt (article 74). But the majority
Page 167 of 486
is of the opinion that the repeal is complete as declared by this Court in the case of In
re adoption of Emiliano Guzman, supra. At any rate, this matter is not now of any
consequence considering the fact that when the adoption agreement was executed the
petitioners had not yet any legitimate child. Their children where born subsequent to that
agreement.
We are sympathetic to the plea of equity of counsel considering the fact that petitioners
had taken custody of the child and had reared and educated him as their own much prior to
the approval of the new Civil Code and that all this was done with the consent of the
natural parents to promote the welfare and happiness of the child, but the inexonerable
mandate of the law forbids us from adopting a different course of action. Our duty is to
interpret and apply the law as we see it in accordance with sound rules of statutory
construction.
The order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.
Page 168 of 486

[2]
G.R. No. L-36309 November 26, 1973
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF THE MINOR LUIS ALBERTO MARTIN DE

SANTOS, FREDERICK WILLIAM MALKINSON and ANA MARIE DE SANTOS
MALKINSON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the JUVENILE and DOMESTIC
RELATIONS COURT OF MANILA, respondent.
De Santos, Balgos and Perez for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Solicitor Alicia V. Sempio-Diy for
respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this appeal from the dismissal orders of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, the Court, in reversing, reaffirms the established jurisprudence based on the plain
language of the codal provision that alienage by itself does not disqualify a foreigner from
adopting a Filipino child and that our Civil Code "only disqualifies from being adopters
those aliens that are either (a) non-residents or (b) who are residents but the Republic of
the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their government." Neither does our
Civil Code require that both adopter and adopted be of the same nationality.
On October 13, 1972, petitioners-spouses filed with respondent court their verified petition
to adopt the minor Luis Alberto Martin de Santos, who was born a Filipino citizen in Madrid,
Spain on August 4, 1969, the acknowledged natural child of petitioner Ana Marie de
Santos Malkinson who alone his parents extended him recognition.
Petitioners-spouses averred that since their marriage on March 6, 1972, the said child who
owns no property has been living with them under their care and custody at their residence
at No. 1443 Jose P. Laurel Street, Manila; that petitioner Frederick William Malkinson is an
American citizen,1 gainfully employed as a seaman with an average yearly income of US
$7,000-$8,000, while his co-petitioner spouse is a Filipino citizen and a property owner in
the Philippines; and that it is to the best interest of the child that he be adopted by
petitioners-spouses who possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
such legal adoption.
Judge Vicente M. Santiago, Jr. then on detail with respondent court issued his order of
October 18, 1972 giving due course to the petition and setting it for hearing on January 8,
1973 and directed that appropriate notices be sent to the Solicitor General and the
Page 169 of 486

Director, Bureau of Child and Youth Welfare, Department of Social Welfare and publication
of the order be made.
Upon respondent judge's return to her court after her leave of absence, she issued her
order of November 22, 1972, stating that upon a review of the petition wherein "it is alleged
that petitioner husband is an alien while the child sought to be adopted is a citizen of this
country" respondent court was of the opinion that "the petition, for that reason, is not
sufficient in substance, and the same cannot be given course" and ordered that "the
petition filed herein will be ordered dismissed after the lapse of 30 days from petitioners'
receipt of notice hereof unless, within said period, proper proceedings are instituted before
the Supreme Court for the purpose of questioning the correctness of this Order."
Petitioners moved for reconsideration on the ground that no law prohibits a resident alien,
who is not a citizen of a country without diplomatic relations with the Philippines and is not
otherwise legally disqualified, from adopting a Filipino, and respondent court denied the
same under its order of December 18, 1972.
Hence, the present appeal by certiorari from respondent court's dismissal orders.
Respondent judge thus ordered the dismissal of the petition on the basis of her known view
that "a Filipino could not adopt an alien and vice versa;" hence, since petitioner husband is
an alien while the child sought to be adopted is a Filipino, she decreed that the petition
cannot be given due course. While aware of the controlling doctrine enunciated by this
Court in the Therkelsen2 and Cathey3 adoption cases that alienage by itself does not
disqualify a foreigner from adopting a Filipino child and that the Philippine Civil Code "only
disqualifies from being adopters those aliens that are either (a) non-residents or (b) who
are residents but the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their
government"4 respondent court felt that Justice J.B.L. Reyes' statement in Therkelsen as to
its non-exposition of its reasons for dismissal of the petition therein as set aside by this
Court left the way open for a review and restudy of the controlling precedents.
Respondent court thus once again as in Therkelsen ordered dismissal of the petition solely
on the ground of alienage of the petitioner husband, maintaining inter alia that Article 334
the Civil Code (which provides that "Every person of age, who is in full possession of his
civil rights, may adopt") "cannot be accepted literally. If Scaevola 5 is correct, it should be
construed as not permitting a citizen to adopt an alien, or vice versa;" "that the prohibitions
contained in Article 335 (4) an (5) of the Code should be construed as aimed at the
adoption of aliens by other aliens, and not at the adoption by an alien of a Filipino;" "that an
alien who has adopted a Filipino child cannot be expected, by precept and example, to
imbue the adopted with love of the Philippines and veneration for Filipino national heroes"
(under Article 358 of the Civil Code) and that "solidarity of a family cannot be achieved if
we hold the view that a Filipino child can be adopted by an alien."
Petitioners-spouses therefrom urge that under the clear and plain language of the Civil
Code and the Court's express rulings in Therkelsen and Cathey, petitioner husband as an
America resident not suffering from any legal disqualification may jointly with his
co-petitioner Filipino wife legally adopt the latter's acknowledged natural child.
Page 170 of 486

The Solicitor General in a manifestation in lieu of appellee's brief dated October 26, 1973
stated that "with all due respect to the opinion and reasons of the respondent judge for
wanting the above ruling to be reexamined and restudied by this Honorable Court,
undersigned counsel not only feel bound by said ruling but also honestly believe that the
same, is the correct, proper, and reasonable interpretation of our law on adoption; as a
matter of fact, in said cases of Therkelsen and Cathey, undersigned counsel were also
impelled by reason and the law to place themselves on the side of appellants in asking for
the reversal of the orders of the same respondent judge in said cases holding that an alien
cannot adopt a Filipino," and joined petitioners in praying for reversal of respondent court's
dismissal orders.
Petitioners-spouses' appeal must be sustained on the strength of the controlling doctrine

enunciated in the cited cases.
In Cathey, Justice Jose P. Bengzon ruled for a unanimous Court that "(A)s this Court
pointed out through Mr. J.B.L. Reyes in Uggi Therkelsen v. Republic, L-21951, November
27, 1964: "the present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only disqualifies from being
adopters aliens that are either (a) non-residents or (b) who are residents but the Republic
of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their government. Outside of
these two cases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting
under our laws." " The Court thus held therein that "(P)etitioner Robert H. Cathey though
an American citizen, is a resident alien entitled to remain in the Philippines, as his
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (Exhibit D) shows. He is legally married to Helen Olalia
and presently is the administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Construction office at Clark Air
Base with an annual compensation of $6,295.00 and has P25,000 worth of personal
properties in the Philippines. As petitioners spouses have no child of their own, they wish
to adopt Bertha Ann Rivera and thus make her their heir. The welfare of the child being
the paramount consideration under the law (Art. 363, New Civil Code), the child now
sought to be adopted being virtually unwanted by her own mother, who, by the way, has
seven other children to feed (Tsn of May 2, 1963, p. 11), We see no reason why the
adoption should not be granted."
In Therkelsen, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had occasion to discuss respondent court's contrary
view and to reject for a unanimous Court its imposition of an additional
requisite not imposed by the Civil Code that both adopter and adopted be of the same
nationality in this wise:
The court a quo denied the adoption sought, saying:
"In Sp. Proc No. D-00011 adoption of Benigno Lim, this Court
has had occasion rule that a Filipino cannot adopt an alien
(Chinese) minor about 19 years old. The adoption would not
confer Philippine citizenship on the Chinese, but could
definitely legalize his stay in this country. It was also stated
that conversely, an alien cannot adopt a Filipino unless the
adoption would make the Filipino minor a citizen of the alien's
country. As petitioner husband in this case is a Danish
subject it has to be held that he cannot legally adopt the
Page 171 of 486
minor Charles Joseph Blancaflor Weeks, whose citizenship is
of this country following that of his natural mother."
If we understand the decision correctly, the adoption was denied solely

because the same would not result in the loss of the minor's Filipino
citizenship and the acquisition by him of the citizenship of his adopter.
Unfortunately, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court did not expound
the reasons for its opinion; but it is clear that, if pursued to its logical
consequences, the judgment appealed from would operate
to impose a further prerequisite on adoptions by aliens beyond those
required by law. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief, the
present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only disqualifies from being
adopters those aliens that are either (a) non-residents or (b) who are
residents but the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations
with their government. Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself alone
does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a person under our law.
Petitioners admittedly do not fall in either class.
The criterion adopted by the Court a quo would demand as a condition for

the approval of the adoption that the process should result in the acquisition,
by the person adopted, of the alien citizenship of the adopting parent. This
finds no support in the law, for, as observed by this Court in Ching Leng vs.
Galang, G.R. No. L-11931, promulgated on 27 October 1958, the citizenship
of the adopter is a matter political, and not civil, in nature, and the ways in
which it should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the Civil Code. It is not
within the province of our civil law to determine how or when citizenship in a
foreign state is to be acquired. The disapproval of the adoption of an alien
child in order to forestall circumvention of our exclusion laws does not
warrant denial of the adoption of a Filipino minor by qualified alien adopting
parents, since it is not shown that our public policy would be thereby
subverted.
The Court finds no justification for deviating or departing from the established doctrine.
Whatever may be the merit of respondent court's views as above-cited, they go into the
wisdom or policy of the statute which are beyond the Court's domain. 6 The Civil Code
provisions on adoption are quite plain and clear and are free from any ambiguity. Under
such circumstances, there is no room for construction, the law is controlling and the clear
task of the judiciary is to apply the law as it is.7
If alienage alone of the adopter or of the adopted were to be a disqualification, it is

inconceivable that the lawmakers would not have so explicitly provided, considering that in
Article 335 of the Code non-resident aliens and resident aliens with whose government the
Philippines has broken diplomatic relations are the only two classes of aliens expressly
disqualified and prohibited to adopt while in Article 339 only an alien with whose state our
government has broken diplomatic relations is expressly disqualified and prohibited to be
adopted. Inclusio unius exclusio alterius. This is but in consonance with the liberal concept
that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care
Page 172 of 486
and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of
the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.8
Finally, aside from the above decisive consideration that under the plain language of the
law alienage by itself does not disqualify a foreigner such as petitioner-husband from
adopting a Filipino child, the Solicitor General further enumerated correctly various other
factors that show the merit of the petition below, viz, that petitioner wife as the natural
mother is expressly authorized under Article 338, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code to adopt
her natural child and raise its status to that of a legitimate child, 9 that under paragraph (3)
of the same article, petitioner-husband as the step-father is likewise expressly authorized
to adopt his stepchild, and that the adoption sought would strengthen the family solidarity
of petitioners-spouses and the child, because the child after adoption, would have its status
of a natural child of petitioner wife and a step-child of petitioner-husband raised to that of
legitimate child of both petitioners with all the rights an duties appertaining thereto, as
provided in Article 341 of the Civil Code.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed dismissal orders of November 22 and December 18, 1972
are hereby set aside and respondent court is directed to give due course to the petition in
accordance with the previous order of October 18, 1972 and to reset the hearing thereof at
the earliest practicable date. In view of the established jurisprudence covering the case,
this decision shall be immediately executory upon promulgation.
Page 173 of 486

[3]
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO,

REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband,
CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit
from their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right,
asserting if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976.
Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine
years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia,
Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C.
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate
estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13
of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents'
lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the
couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional
Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil
Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit
Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of
practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,

1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their
Page 174 of 486
legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27,
1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by
right of representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil Case
No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as
established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their
estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its
own decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364),
the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are
disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno
and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the
respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners
and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the private
respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted
because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of
adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from
adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who
cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children,
or natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in
a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul
the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a
legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by
denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the
decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in
1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was
seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified
Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should
Page 175 of 486

have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although
Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days
before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have
notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew
the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the
revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not
one of those provided by law for the revocation or rescission of an
adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of the
plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding
to the present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge
cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the
adopting parents were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of
the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct
proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists,
whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding,
for a presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is
thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman
on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence,

2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts

and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot
be considered void merely because the fact needed to show
statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial
determination of some particular fact, such as the
abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be
essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of
adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional
validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon proper
evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere
error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination
must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be
collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of
Page 176 of 486

adopted children would always be uncertain, since the
evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and
might be regarded with different effect by different tribunals,
and the adoption might be held by one court to have been
valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no
avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as
affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a
formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article
265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners
stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be
refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was
understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of
Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of
course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts.
Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court
of Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be
sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for
partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this
purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It
actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil
status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper
parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a

collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter
of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the
exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following
Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and
other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they
should come from different marriages.
Page 177 of 486

An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the
same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children
and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his
collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to
leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for
their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions
of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of

which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not
by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one who the person represented would have
succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children
who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the
latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father
in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted
above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived,
which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed
to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include
the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the
adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either
party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children
and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their
exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the
petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the
right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other
private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
Page 178 of 486

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.
Page 179 of 486

[4]
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural
parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents
with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for
damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed
[Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted
and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura
had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-
T before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was
grunted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the
result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the
action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the
mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent
natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the 15-
day reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January
1988. It appearing, however, that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of
Page 180 of 486
Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court — that notice of the motion shall be given to all
parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that said
notice shall state the time and place of hearing — both motions were denied by the trial
court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of appeal.
In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court dismissed the notice at appeal, this time
ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22
December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition

for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision dated 3 December 1987
and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses
Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their
minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues:
(1) whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the
instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even
through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the effects of
adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as
to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their
adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with
the biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration
filed before the trial court, not having complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule
41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and
hence did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held
that the motions, not having contained a notice of time and place of hearing, had become
useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary period. 1 As in fact
repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the service of the motion on the
opposing counsel indicating the time and place of hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant. Petition, and in order that
substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of
technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having
been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary
period for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the

policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The
rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid technical sense, rules
of procedure are used only to help secure not override, substantial justice. if
d technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their aim would be
defeated. 4
Page 181 of 486

2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of
the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives
with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious

liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a
person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by
others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus,
parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities
of parents — their parental authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by
the Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether

of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect — and our
Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to cases in which the
person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on
the contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend that liability, without
regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the
negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a
legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or
limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has
elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined
exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to
Page 182 of 486

the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having
failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise
due care in the selection and control of one's agent or servants, or in the
control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct. 7 (Emphasis Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with
them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil
Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child
living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in
their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon
parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of
the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only
presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when
parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of
the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual
custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of
adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental
authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the
petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The
Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for
Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the

Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and
the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is
qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody
period has been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be
promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which
shall be effective he date the original petition was filed. The decree shall
state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in
relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Page 183 of 486

Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the
adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the
time the Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental
liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the
minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise
supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this
rule:
Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage
caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the
civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite
that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents
sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of
their unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively
transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air
rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the
decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time
when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child.
Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where
such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted
child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively
lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that
they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at
the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would
be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
Page 184 of 486

differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control
at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above.
Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally granted

unless and until the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised
trial custody period of at least six months to assess their adjustment and
emotional readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial custody,
parental authority shall be vested in the adopting parents. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting
parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child
during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet
begun or bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case,
actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents,

were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the
dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already
before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE
COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R.
No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before
the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This
Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Page 185 of 486

[5]
[G.R. No. L-26476. August 31, 1970.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR SANTIAGO

SEÑERES, DR. FERNANDO P. HOFILEÑA, and CORAZON DE GUIA-
HOFILEÑA, Petitioners-Appellants, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellee.
Hector Hofileña for Petitioners-Appellants.
Solicitor General for Oppositor-Appellee.
DECISION
DIZON, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
in Special Proceedings No. G-00100 dismissing the petition filed by the therein
petitioners — hereinafter referred to as appellants — for the adoption of the
minor Santiago Señeres.
The following facts are not disputed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioners are husband and wife. The husband is a physician and a professor of
Pediatrics and Mental Hygiene at the University of Santo Tomas; engaged in
the practice of medicine since 1948 and he and his wife, have an annual
income of around P18,000.00. They own not only the house where they live in
Manila but also own residential and agricultural lands in Occidental Negros.
They are childless, but on September 6, 1962, they filed a petition with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila for the adoption of the minors
Lourdes and Reynaldo Yusay, children of Dr. Eduardo G. Yusay and Eva
Hofileña-Yusay. On November 14, 1962 the abovenamed Court granted the
petition in a decision that has long become executory.
On March 23, 1966 appellants filed with the same Court a similar petition for
the adoption of another minor named Santiago Señeres born on May 11, 1961
to appellants’ housemaid, Veronica E. Señeres and a certain Felix Lisondra.
Since birth said minor had been and has until now remained in the care of
appellants who had become so much attached to him that they finally decided
to adopt him in accordance with law, with the full consent of the minor’s
Page 186 of 486
mother.
After the required publication had been accomplished and notices served in
accordance with law to the Office of the Solicitor General and the Chief, Office
of Child Welfare, Social Welfare Administration, the case was set for hearing
and evidence was presented. Thereafter, the lower court rendered the appealed
decision dismissing the petition upon the ground that the provisions of Article
335, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code prohibits the intended adoption because
appellants had already previously adopted the two minors mentioned
heretofore. In the present appeal, therefore, the sole question to be resolved is
whether or not a person who already has an adopted child may still legally
adopt another.
Article 335, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code upon which the appealed decision is
based reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 335. The following cannot adopt:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or

natural children by legal fiction;."
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute
clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise
the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be
the subject of statutory interpretation (2 Sutherland Statutory Construction,
3rd Ed., Section 4502, p. 316).
Similarly well known is the rule that words and phrases used in law which have
acquired a precise legal meaning are to be understood in their proper technical
sense unless it plainly appears that they were not so used by the Legislature
(Black Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., p. 182).
The words used in Article 335(1) of the Civil Code in enumerating the persons
who "cannot adopt" appear to be clear and unambiguous and have a clearly
defined meaning in law.
"Legitimate children" are those conceived during the marriage and, in certain
cases, those conceived before but born during the marriage (4 Castan, 6th Ed.,
p. 6; Article 255, Civil Code).
"Legitimated children" are those originally natural children but later considered
as legitimate by virtue of their recognition by both parents and the latters’
subsequent marriage (4 Castan, supra; Article 271, Civil Code).
"Natural Children" are children "born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment
Page 187 of 486
to marry each other" (Article 269, Civil Code). On the other hand,
"acknowledged natural children" are natural children duly acknowledged or
recognized by the father and mother jointly, or by only one of them (Article
276, Civil Code).
Finally, "natural children by legal fiction" are "children conceived or born of

marriages which are void from the beginning" (Article 289, Civil Code).
That "adopted children" do not fall within the meaning of anyone of the above
kinds of descendants seems to be clear. As a matter of fact, the Office of the
Solicitor General, instead of filing a brief for the Republic of the Philippines as
appellee in this case submitted for the record the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"M A N I F E S T A T I O N
COMES NOW oppositor-appellee, through the undersigned counsel, and to this

Honorable Court respectfully states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. That on March 23, 1961, a petition for adoption was filed with the Juvenile &
Domestic Relations Court;
2. That on June 1, 1966, a decision was rendered by the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court, dismissing the petition on the ground that the petitioners has
already an adopted child and therefore can no longer legally adopt another;
3. That the Republic of the Philippines is the oppositor-appellee in this appeal

interposed by Dr. Fernando P. Hofileña and Corazon de Guia-Hofileña from said
decision of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court;
4. That upon a careful study of the issues raised and discussed in petitioners-
appellants’ brief and taking into account on the following commentaries, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘May a person who has an adopted child still adopt another? This article does
not prevent him from doing so’. — (Capistrano, Civil Code of the Philippines
1950 ed. Vol. 1, p, 305; Francisco, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated and
Commented, 1953 ed. Vol. 1, p 876).
‘A person with an adopted child may still adopt.’ — (Padilla, Civil Law, Civil
Code Annotated 1961 ed. Vol. I, p. 855).
‘The law says that if you have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children or natural children by legal fiction, you cannot adopt. By implication
therefore those who have adopted children may adopt.’ (Paras, Civil Code of
the Philippines, Annotated, 1965 ed. Vol. I, p. 612).
Page 188 of 486
‘It should be noted that the fact that a person has illegitimate children, who are
not natural, or adopted children, does disqualify him further from another
child.’ (Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1953 ed. Vol. 1, p. 639).
‘Under the doctrine, however, of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the
illegitimate children, who are spurious, and adopted children not having been
mentioned in the enumeration, it is submitted that a person who has an
illegitimate spurious child or an adopted child can still adopt.’ (Coquia,
Comments and Cases on Civil Law, 1959 ed. Vol. 1, p. 399).
we deem it unnecessary to submit oppositor-appellee’s brief, and on the basis

of petitioners-appellants’ pleading, we are submitting this case for decision.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court consider

this case submitted without oppositor-appellee’s brief.
Manila, Philippines, March 14, 1967."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is clear from the foregoing manifestation that the Office of the Solicitor
General agrees with the views expressed by the distinguished commentators
cited therein to the effect that a person who has already an adopted child may
still adopt another.
Reasons for the law to the above effect may perhaps be found in these
considerations: the persons who, in accordance with the provisions of Article
335(1) of the Civil Code, can not adopt are related by blood with the children
whose existence prevents them from adopting any other child; the provision
took into account the need to save or protect the successional or hereditary
rights of living children related to them by blood; upon the other hand, the
adoption of a minor child does not create or establish blood relationship
between him and the adopter; neither does the adopted child become the
legitimate or legitimated or natural child of the adopter, nor does he become a
natural chi]d of the latter by legal fiction; adoption is, undoubtedly, a mere act
of generosity on the part of the adopter and should not prevent the adopting
parent or parents from carrying out another act of generosity by adopting
another child. True, an adopted child acquires successional rights by virtue of
his adoption but it is plain to see that such right is not based on the same
consideration — blood relationship — that sustains the successional right of
children in relation to their natural parents.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and set aside and, as a
result, judgment is rendered allowing appellants to adopt the minor Santiago
Señeres as prayed for in their petition. Without costs.
Page 189 of 486

[6]
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
HERBERT CANG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA
CLAVANO, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on
the ground that the latter has abandoned them? The answer to this interesting query,
certainly not one of first impression, would have to be reached, not solely on the basis of
law and jurisprudence, but also the hard reality presented by the facts of the case.
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree of adoption issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14,2 in Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, "In the Matter
of the Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all
surnamed Cang, Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, petitioners."
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973,
begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23,
1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed.
Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital
affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite 3 with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Cebu 4 which rendered a decision5 approving the joint manifestation of the Cang
spouses providing that they agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed and board."
They further agreed:
(c) That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a

monthly support of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00)
effective from the date of the filing of the complaint. This shall
constitute a first lien on the net proceeds of the house and lot
jointly owned by the parties situated at Cinco Village,
Mandaue City;
Page 190 of 486

(d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any contract
or agreement with any person or persons, natural or juridical
without the written consent of the husband; or any
undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires husband's consent
as the parties are by this agreement legally separated; 6
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before
the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce
decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving
"rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places" to petitioner. 7
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American
citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00
to P20,000.00 a month8 a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines for his children's
expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria
Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special
Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith
signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging
that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; that her brothers
and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the
children; that because she would be going to the United States to attend to a family
business, "leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-
seeking venture abroad;" and that her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights" over
the children for the following reasons:
1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter into any
contract without the written consent of her husband;
2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the United
States and had been transferring from one place to another to avoid
detection by Immigration authorities, and
3. Her husband had divorced her.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while
his finances were "too meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience, allow
anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children."
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over
his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving
Page 191 of 486

custody of their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect,
relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred
to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to
petitioner.
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of
adoption with a dispositive portion reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of the minors

Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the petitioner-
spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is hereby
granted and approved. These children shall henceforth be known and called
as Keith D. Clavano, Charmaine D. Clavano and Joseph Anthony D.
Clavano respectively. Moreover, this Decree of Adoption shall:
(1) Confer upon the adopted children the same rights and
duties as though they were in fact the legitimate children of
the petitioners;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature, of

the children; and,
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a copy of this
Decree of Adoption for registration purposes.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the lower court was "impelled" by these reasons:
(1) The Cang children had, since birth, developed "close filial
ties with the Clavano family, especially their maternal uncle,"
petitioner Ronald Clavano.
(2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless and, with
their printing press, real estate business, export business and
gasoline station and mini-mart in Rosemead, California,
U.S.A., had substantial assets and income.
(3) The natural mother of the children, Anna Marie,

nicknamed "Menchu," approved of the adoption because of
her heart ailment, near-fatal accident in 1981, and the fact
that she could not provide them a secure and happy future as
she "travels a lot."
Page 192 of 486

(4) The Clavanos could provide the children moral and
spiritual direction as they would go to church together and
had sent the children to Catholic schools.
(5) The children themselves manifested their desire to be

adopted by the Clavanos — Keith had testified and
expressed the wish to be adopted by the Clavanos while the
two younger ones were observed by the court to have
"snuggled" close to Ronald even though their natural mother
was around.
On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner to rest on "a very
shaky foundation" because of its findings that:
(1) Petitioner was "morally unfit to be the father of his

children" on account of his being "an improvident father of his
family" and an "undisguised Lothario." This conclusion is
based on the testimony of his alleged paramour, mother of
his two sons and close friend of Anna Marie, Wilma Soco,
who said that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife in
the very house of the Cangs in Opao, Mandaue City.
(2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that were of

"comparatively recent dates" were "attempts at verisimilitude"
as these were joint deposits the authenticity of which could
not be verified.
(3) Contrary to petitioner's claim, the possibility of his

reconciliation with Anna Marie was "dim if not nil" because it
was petitioner who "devised, engineered and executed the
divorce proceedings at the Nevada Washoe County court."
(4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, petitioner "is now

an alien from the standpoint of Philippine laws" and therefore,
how his "new attachments and loyalties would sit with his
(Filipino) children is an open question."
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social Worker in her
Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as follows:
Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And
abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified by statute
as a ground for dispensing with his consent to its (sic) adoption (Re Cozza,
163 Cal. 514 P. 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]). Indeed, in such case, adoption
will be allowed not only without the consent of the parent, but even against
his opposition (Re McKeag, 141 Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039, 99 Am. St. Rep. 80;
Re Camp. 131 Gal. 469,63 P. 736, 82 Am. St. Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis,
Page 193 of 486

83 Colo. 346, 265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170 Iowa, 561, 153 N.W.
160, citing R.C.L.; Steams v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349; 97 Am. St.
Rep. 441; Wilson v. Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439, 93 Am. St. Rep. 564;
Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo, 173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep.
17.) 9
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that
it would be in the best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption
was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not
have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and
Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption
did not present as witness the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development who made the case study report required by law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:
Art. 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural
parents of the child to be adopted. It has been held however that the
consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary (Dayrit
vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729; Santos vs. Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The
question therefore is whether or not oppositor may be considered as having
abandoned the children. In adoption cases, abandonment connotes any
conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental duties and relinquish
parental claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform the natural
and legal obligations which parents owe their children (Santos vs.
Ananzanso, supra), or the withholding of the parent's presence, his care
and the opportunity to display voluntary affection. The issue of
abandonment is amply covered by the discussion of the first error.
Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the

children and has in fact even maintained bank accounts in their names. His
duty to provide support comes from two judicial pronouncements. The first,
the decision in JD-707 CEB, supra, obliges him to pay the children
P1,000.00 a month. The second is mandated by the divorce decree of the
Nevada, U.S.A. Federal Court which orders him to pay monthly support of
US$50.00 for each child. Oppositor has not submitted any evidence to show
compliance with the decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has submitted 22
cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45) drawn in the children's names
totalling $2,126.98. The last remittance was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45).
His obligation to provide support commenced under the divorce decree on
May 5, 1982 so that as of October 6, 1987, oppositor should have made 53
remittances of $150.00, or a total of $7,950.00. No other remittances were
shown to have been made after October 6, 1987, so that as of this date,
oppositor was woefully in arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. And
since he was totally in default of the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the inevitable
conclusion is oppositor had not really been performing his duties as a father,
contrary to his protestations.
Page 194 of 486
True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three accounts in
different banks, as follows —
Acct. No. Date Opened Balance Name of Bank
———— —————— ———— ——————
1) 118-606437-4 July 23, 1985 $5,018.50 Great Western Savings,
Oct. 29, 1987 Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.
2) 73-166-8 March 5, 1986 3,129.00 Matewan National Bank
Oct. 26, 1987 of Williamson, West
Virginia, U.S.A.
3) 564-146883 December 31, 1986 2,622.19 Security Pacific National
Oct. 29, 1987 Bank, Daly City, Cal.,
U.S.A.
The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositor's name as
trustee for Charmaine Cang and Joseph Anthony Cang, respectively. In
other words, the accounts are operated and the amounts withdrawable by
oppositor himself and it cannot be said that they belong to the minors. The
second is an "or" account, in the names of Herbert Cang or Keith Cang.
Since Keith is a minor and in the Philippines, said account is operable only
by oppositor and the funds withdrawable by him alone.
The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed in his offer of
evidence "the aim and purpose of providing for a better future and security
of his family."10
Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He emphasized that
the decree of legal separation was not based on the merits of the case as it was based on
a manifestation amounting to a compromise agreement between him and Anna Marie. That
he and his wife agreed upon the plan for him to leave for the United States was borne out
by the fact that prior to his departure to the United States, the family lived with petitioner's
parents. Moreover, he alone did not instigate the divorce proceedings as he and his wife
initiated the "joint complaint" for divorce.
Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his children was
belied by the award to him of custody over the children in Civil Case No. JD-707. He took
exception to the appellate court's findings that as an American citizen he could no longer
lay claim to custody over his children because his citizenship would not take away the fact
Page 195 of 486
that he "is still a father to his children." As regards his alleged illicit relationship with another
woman, he had always denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD-707 and the instant
adoption case. Neither was it true that Wilma Soco was a neighbor and family friend of the
Clavanos as she was residing in Mandaue City seven (7) kilometers away from the
Clavanos who were residents of Cebu City. Petitioner insisted that the testimony of Wilma
Soco should not have been given weight for it was only during the hearing of the petition
for adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother of Ronald, came to know her and went to her
residence in Iligan City to convince her to be a witness for monetary considerations. Lastly,
petitioner averred that it would be hypocritical of the Clavanos to claim that they could love
the children much more than he could. 11
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this Court,
alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written
consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
Art. 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides —
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The written consent of the

following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or,

over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian of

the Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed child
placement agency under whose care the child may be;
(3) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the

adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 91
amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As thus
amended, Article 31 read:
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The written consent of the

following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or

over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after

receiving counselling and appropriate social services from
the Ministry of Social Services and Development or from a
duly licensed child-placement agency;
Page 196 of 486

(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any
duly licensed child-placement agency under whose care and
legal custody the child may be;
(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the

adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court. 12 As such, when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25,
1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive
Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code
which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family
Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As amended by the
Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads:
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be
necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or

the proper government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or

over, of the adopting parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the

adopting parents, if living with said parent and the latter's
spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be

adopted. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law,
the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its
validity. Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as
follows:
Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. — There shall be filed with the petition

a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age
or over and not incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if any, and by each
of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or
has not abandoned the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan
Page 197 of 486
asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper
officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such persons; but
if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its
father to the adoption shall not be required. (Emphasis supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural
parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the
requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the
child 13 or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of the parents or one of the
parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption
from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court
treats the procedural aspect of adoption. Thus, the Court declared:
. . . . The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to

adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition
should contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give
information to those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a
pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer
jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all
facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. 14
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the
petition for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the
petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the
natural father as follows:
3. That the children's mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V. CLAVANO,

has given her express consent to this adoption, as shown by Affidavit of
Consent, Annex "A". Likewise, the written consent of Keith Cang, now 14
years of age appears on page 2 of this petition; However, the father of the
children, Herbert Cang, had already left his wife and children and had
already divorced the former, as evidenced by the xerox copy of the
DECREE OF DIVORCE issued by the County of Washoe, State of Nevada,
U.S.A. (Annex "B") which was filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long
after he abandoned his family to live in the United States as an illegal
immigrant. 15
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written
consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since
abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which
our statutes and jurisprudence 16 dispense with the requirement of written consent to the
adoption of their minor children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a
proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent
is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon, failure of the
Page 198 of 486
oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his
child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court. 17 This
Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary
evidence submitted by the parties. 18 However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it
has the authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it that
these do not conform to the evidence on record. 19
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court has held that the exceptions to the rule that
factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal are the following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate
facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion 21 on the issue of
whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the
adoption unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce
utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a ban." The
emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control
of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or
claim one's rights or interests. 22 In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the
act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect
or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents
owe their children." 23
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as
to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. 24 While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and
legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send
packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Page 199 of 486

Petitioner's testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of
the following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children:
1. Exh. 1 — a 4-page updated letter of Menchu (Anna Marie) addressed to

"Dear Bert" on a C. Westates Carbon Phil. Corp. stationery. Menchu stated
therein that it had been "a long time since the last time you've heard from
me excluding that of the phone conversation we've had." She discussed
petitioner's intention to buy a motorbike for Keith, expressing apprehension
over risks that could be engendered by Keith's use of it. She said that in the
"last phone conversation" she had with petitioner on the birthday of "Ma,"
she forgot to tell petitioner that Keith's voice had changed; he had become a
"bagito" or a teen-ager with many "fans" who sent him Valentine's cards.
She told him how Charmaine had become quite a talkative "almost dalaga"
who could carry on a conversation with her angkong and how pretty she
was in white dress when she won among the candidates in the Flores de
Mayo after she had prayed so hard for it. She informed him, however, that
she was worried because Charmaine was vain and wont to extravagance as
she loved clothes. About Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she told petitioner that
the boy was smart for his age and "quite spoiled" being the youngest of the
children in Lahug. Joeton was mischievous but Keith was his idol with whom
he would sleep anytime. She admitted having said so much about the
children-because they might not have informed petitioner of "some
happenings and spices of life" about themselves. She said that it was "just
very exciting to know how they've grown up and very pleasant, too, that
each of them have (sic) different characters." She ended the letter with the
hope that petitioner was "at the best of health." After extending her regards
"to all," she signed her name after the word "Love." This letter was mailed
on July 9, 1986 from Cebu to petitioner whose address was P.O. Box 2445,
Williamson, West Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).
2. Exh. 2 — letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery with golden print of
"a note from Menchu" on the left upper corner. Anna Marie stated that "we"
wrote to petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984 and that Keith and Joeton were very
excited when petitioner "called up last time." She told him how Joeton would
grab the phone from Keith just so petitioner would know what he wanted to
order. Charmaine, who was asleep, was so disappointed that she missed
petitioner's call because she also wanted something that petitioner should
buy. Menchu told petitioner that Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener,
light-colored T-shirts for her walking shorts and a (k)nap sack. Anna Marie
informed petitioner that the kids were growing up and so were their needs.
She told petitioner to be "very fatherly" about the children's needs because
those were expensive here. For herself, Anna Marie asked for a subscription
of Glamour and Vogue magazines and that whatever expenses he would
incur, she would "replace" these. As a postscript, she told petitioner that
Keith wanted a size 6 khaki-colored "Sperry topsider shoes."
3. Exh. 3 — an undated note on a yellow small piece of paper that reads:
Page 200 of 486

Dear Herbert,
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful one.
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. It's nice to be thought of
at X'mas. Thanks again.
Sincere
Menchu
4. Exh. 4 — a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of Jose

Clavano, Inc. addressed to "Dear Dad." Keith told his father that they tried to
tell their mother "to stay for a little while, just a few weeks after classes
start(s)" on June 16. He informed petitioner that Joeton would be in Kinder I
and that, about the motorbike, he had told his mother to write petitioner
about it and "we'll see what you're (sic) decision will be." He asked for
chocolates, nuts, basketball shirt and shorts, rubber shoes, socks,
headband, some clothes for outing and perfume. He told petitioner that they
had been going to Labug with their mother picking them up
after Angkong or Ama had prepared lunch or dinner. From her aerobics, his
mother would go for them in Lahug at about 9:30 or 10:00 o'clock in the
evening. He wished his father "luck and the best of health" and that they
prayed for him and their other relatives. The letter was ended with "Love
Keith."
5. Exh. 5 — another undated long letter of Keith. He thanked his father for
the Christmas card "with $40.00, $30.00 and $30.00" and the "card of
Joeton with $5.00 inside." He told petitioner the amounts following his
father's instructions and promise to send money through the mail. He asked
his father to address his letter directly to him because he wanted to open his
own letters. He informed petitioner of activities during the Christmas season
— that they enjoyed eating, playing and giving surprises to their mother. He
apprised him of his daily schedule and that their mother had been closely
supervising them, instructing them to fold their blankets and pile up their
pillows. He informed petitioner that Joeton had become very smart while
Charmaine, who was also smart, was very demanding of their mother.
Because their mother was leaving for the United States on February 5, they
would be missing her like they were missing petitioner. He asked for his
"things" and $200.00. He told petitioner more anecdotes about Joeton like
he would make the sign of the cross even when they would pass by
the Iglesia ni Cristo church and his insistence that Aquino was not dead
because he had seen him on the betamax machine. For Keith, Charmaine
had become "very maldita" who was not always satisfied with her dolls and
things but Joeton was full of surprises. He ended the letter with "Love your
son, Keith." The letter was mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).
Page 201 of 486

6. Exh. 6 — an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked petitioner for the
bathing suit, key chain, pencil box, socks, half shirt, pencil sharpener and
$50.00. She reminded him of her birthday on January 23 when she would
turn 9 years old. She informed him that she wore size 10 and the size of her
feet was IM. They had fun at Christmas in Lahug but classes would start on
January 9 although Keith's classes had started on January 6. They would
feel sad again because Mommy would be leaving soon. She hoped
petitioner would keep writing them. She signed, "Love, Charmaine."
7. Exh . 7 — an undated letter of Keith. He explained to petitioner that they

had not been remiss in writing letters to him. He informed him of their trip to
Manila — they went to Malacañang, Tito Doy Laurel's house, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the executive house, Tagaytay for three days and Baguio for
one week. He informed him that he got "honors," Charmaine was 7th in her
class and Joeton had excellent grades. Joeton would be enrolled in Sacred
Heart soon and he was glad they would be together in that school. He asked
for his "reward" from petitioner and so with Charmaine and Joeton. He
asked for a motorbike and dollars that he could save. He told petitioner that
he was saving the money he had been sending them. He said he missed
petitioner and wished him the best. He added that petitioner should call
them on Sundays.
8. Exh. 8 — a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but apparently written by
the latter. She asked for money from petitioner to buy something for the
school and "something else." She, promised not to spend so much and to
save some. She said she loved petitioner and missed him. Joeton said "hi!"
to petitioner. After ending the letter with "Love, Joeton and Charmaine," she
asked for her prize for her grades as she got seventh place.
9. Exh. 9 — undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner that he had been
writing him; that he would like to have some money but he would save them;
that he learned that petitioner had called them up but he was not around;
that he would be going to Manila but would be back home May 3; that his
Mommy had just arrived Thursday afternoon, and that he would be the
"official altar boy." He asked petitioner to write them soon.
10. Exh. 10 — Keith thanked petitioner for the money he sent. He told
petitioner that he was saving some in the bank and he was proud because
he was the only one in his group who saved in the bank. He told him that
Joeton had become naughty and would claim as his own the shirts sent to
Keith by petitioner. He advised petitioner to send pants and shirts to Joeton,
too, and asked for a pair of topsider shoes and candies. He informed
petitioner that he was a member of the basketball team and that his mom
would drive for his group. He asked him to call them often like the father of
Ana Christie and to write them when he would call so that they could wait for
it. He informed petitioner that they had all grown bigger and heavier. He
hoped petitioner would be happy with the letter that had taken him so long to
write because he did not want to commit any mistakes. He asked petitioner
Page 202 of 486
to buy him perfume (Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner, added that the
latter should buy something for Mommy.
11. Exh. 11 — a Christmas card "For My Wonderful Father" dated October

8, 1984 from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
12. Exh. 12 — another Christmas card, "Our Wish For You" with the year '83
written on the upper right hand corner of the inside page, from Keith,
Charmaine and Joeton.
13. Exh. 13 — a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had written him even
when their Mom "was there" where she bought them clothes and shoes.
Keith asked petitioner for $300.00. Because his mother would not agree to
buy him a motorbike, he wanted a Karaoke unit that would cost P12,000.00.
He informed petitioner that he would go to an afternoon disco with friends
but their grades were all good with Joeton receiving "stars" for excellence.
Keith wanted a bow and arrow Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He expressed his
desire that petitioner would come and visit them someday.
14. Exh. 14 — a letter of Keith with one of the four pages bearing the date
January 1986. Keith told his father that they had received the package that
the latter sent them. The clothes he sent, however, fitted only Keith but not
Charmaine and Joeton who had both grown bigger. Keith asked for grocery
items, toys and more clothes. He asked, in behalf of his mother, for low-
heeled shoes and a dress to match, jogging pants, tights and leotards that
would make her look sexy. He intimated to petitioner that he had grown
taller and that he was already ashamed to be asking for things to buy in the
grocery even though his mother had told him not to be shy about it.
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A.
showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts
for the benefit of his children. 25 Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to
the children from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the courts
below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial support but also
the emotional exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the
courts below emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the
fact that, as regards the bank deposits, these were "withdrawable by him alone." Simply
put, the courts below attached a high premium to the prospective adopters' financial status
but totally brushed aside the possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and
psychological well-being of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt. However, his
seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his testimony is contradicted by his
feelings towards his father as revealed in his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to
conclude that Keith's testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for
Page 203 of 486

adoption that would certainly have engendered confusion in his young mind as to the
capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
The courts below emphasized respondents' emotional attachment to the children. This is
hardly surprising for, from the very start of their young lives, the children were used to their
presence. Such attachment had persisted and certainly, the young ones' act of snuggling
close to private respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their emotional
detachment from their father. Private respondents, being the uncle and aunt of the
children, could not but come to their succor when they needed help as when Keith got sick
and private respondent Ronald spent for his hospital bills.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a
person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than
his natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, 26 the Court awarded custody of a
minor illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead
of to his affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to go
with his mother. The Court said:
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private
respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that
petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children
according to her means.
In Celis v. Cafuir 27 where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether to award
custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster mother, this Court said:
This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived
mother and son of the beautiful associations and tender, imperishable
memories engendered by the relationship of parent and child. We should
not take away from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child
even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to poverty and lack of means; so
that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride and a sense of
satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her
dreams of her little boy come true. We should not forget that the relationship
between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child
turns out to be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for
him, said parents might yet count and appraise (sic) all that they have done
and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and even
rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into their hearts
and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who never counts the cost
and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her associations with her
child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and blood count. . . . .
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court stated that "(I)n ascertaining the welfare and
best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into
account all relevant considerations." Thus, in awarding custody of the child to the father,
the Court said:
Page 204 of 486

A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least,
her counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a
mother separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a,
result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than the
feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While the
bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either
parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if
deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than
that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other
feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration. (Emphasis supplied) 29
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over
his children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account the
physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. 30 The
conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary
support other than his inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly
affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had so emotionally
abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were
given to adopting parents. The letters he received from his children prove that petitioner
maintained the more important emotional tie between him and his children. The children
needed him not only because he could cater to their whims but also because he was a
person they could share with their daily activities, problems and triumphs.
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond petitioner's "meager"
financial support to ferret out other indications on whether petitioner had in fact abandoned
his family. The omission of said courts has led us to examine why the children were
subjected to the process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that bound them to
their father. To our consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact that the welfare
of the children was not exactly the "paramount consideration" that impelled Anna Marie to
consent to their adoption.
In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the children in the
country, as she was wont to travel abroad often, was a problem that would naturally
hamper her job-seeking abroad. In other words, the adoption appears to be a matter of
convenience for her because Anna Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her
children. 31 In his testimony, private respondent Ronald swore that Anna Marie had been
out of the country for two years and came home twice or three times, 32 thereby manifesting
the fact that it was she who actually left her children to the care of her relatives. It was bad
enough that their father left their children when he went abroad, but when their mother
followed suit for her own reasons, the situation worsened. The Clavano family must have
realized this. Hence, when the family first discussed the adoption of the children, they
decided that the prospective adopter should be Anna Marie's brother Jose. However,
because he had children of his own, the family decided to devolve the task upon private
respondents. 33
Page 205 of 486

This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children. A
businessman, private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between Cebu and Manila
while his wife, private respondent Maria Clara, is an international flight
stewardess. 34 Moreover, private respondent Ronald claimed that he could "take care of the
children while their parents are away," 35 thereby indicating the evanescence of his
intention. He wanted to have the children's surname changed to Clavano for the reason
that he wanted to take them to the United States as it would be difficult for them to get a
visa if their surname were different from his. 36 To be sure, he also testified that he wanted
to spare the children the stigma of being products of a broken home.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald, his sister
Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the inescapable conclusion that they just
wanted to keep the children away from their father. One of the overriding considerations for
the adoption was allegedly the state of Anna Marie's health — she was a victim of an
almost fatal accident and suffers from a heart ailment. However, she herself admitted that
her health condition was not that serious as she could still take care of the children. 37 An
eloquent evidence of her ability to physically care for them was her employment at the
Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles 38 — she could not have been employed if her health
were endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos' attempt at depriving petitioner of
parental authority apparently stemmed from their notion that he was an inveterate
womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed fear that her children would "never be at ease
with the wife of their father." 39
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a womanizer and father
to the sons of Wilma Soco. 40 As to whether he was telling the truth is beside the point.
Philippine society, being comparatively conservative and traditional, aside from being
Catholic in orientation, it does not countenance womanizing on the part of a family man,
considering the baneful effects such irresponsible act visits on his family. Neither may the
Court place a premium on the inability of a man to distinguish between siring children and
parenting them. Nonetheless, the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with a
paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that petitioner was
necessarily an unfit father. 41 Conventional wisdom and common human experience show
that a "bad" husband does not necessarily make a "bad" father. That a husband is not
exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a
father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children. 42 Petitioner has
demonstrated his love and concern for his children when he took the trouble of sending a
telegram 43 to the lower court expressing his intention to oppose the adoption immediately
after learning about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the case and to testify
about his love for his children and his desire to unite his family once more in the United
States. 44
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide by the agreement
with his wife on the support of the children. Petitioner was an illegal alien in the United
States. As such, he could not have procured gainful employment. Private respondents
failed to refute petitioner's testimony that he did not receive his share from the sale of the
conjugal home, 45 pursuant to their manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal
separation case. Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale
redounded to the benefit of his family, particularly his children. The proceeds may not have
Page 206 of 486
lasted long but there is ample evidence to show that thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by
his agreement with his wife and sent his family money, no matter how "meager."
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries
out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted
child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit
and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and
perspective. The Court's position, should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to
extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. 46 The discretion
to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child
but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child. 47
In this regard, this Court notes private respondents' reliance on the

manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie which became
the basis of the decree of legal separation. According to private respondents'
counsel, 48 the authority given to Anna Marie by that decree to enter into contracts as a
result of the legal separation was "all embracing" 49 and, therefore, included giving her sole
consent to the adoption. This conclusion is however, anchored on the wrong premise that
the authority given to the innocent spouse to enter into contracts that obviously refer to
their conjugal properties, shall include entering into agreements leading to the adoption of
the children. Such conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis as private respondents' apparent
reliance on the decree of legal separation for doing away with petitioner's consent to the
adoption.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal
separation did not, of necessity; deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of
placing the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: ". . . in case of
legal separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated
by the court." In awarding custody, the court shall take into account "all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit."
If should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse the
"exercise" of parental authority. Having custody of the child, the innocent spouse shall
implement the sum of parental rights with respect to his rearing and care. The innocent
spouse shall have the right to the child's services and earnings, and the right to direct his
activities and make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health and
religion. 50
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the joint exercise of

which is vested by the law upon the parents, 51 as
. . . a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as
the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their hearts and senses.
As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of
rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare
of the minor."
Page 207 of 486
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated

children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company. 52 (Emphasis supplied)
As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely
deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in the
legal separation case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on the
basis of the agreement of the spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a

compromise, 53 there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner was
such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody of his children or that
there are grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the
legal separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children
from Anna Marie back to petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna
Marie's motion for reconsideration thereon. The Clavano family also vehemently objected
to the transfer of custody to the petitioner, such that the latter was forced to file a contempt
charge against them. 54
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid
reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. In the instant case
for adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to
warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is
one of the effects of a decree of adoption. 55 But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption
in this case precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the
courts below on the issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a
misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled in Tenchavez v.
Escaño 56 that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is
not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an
American citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen,
the divorce has no legal effect.
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of established

customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of Appeals, 57 a case involving
the visitorial rights of an illegitimate parent over his child, the Court expressed the opinion
that:
Page 208 of 486
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care
for their children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best interest
and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the
parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are
estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and
feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law not
the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and
imminent threat to the well being of the child.
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code, there has been a
pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so much on the need of
childless couples for a child, as on the paramount interest, of a child who needs the love
and care of parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the
Family Code, the discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043
on Intercountry,
Adoption 58 and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the domestic adoption of
Filipino children. 59
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as the following
policies in the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998":
(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and
custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care,
understanding and security towards the full and harmonious
development of his/her personality. 60
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of

a child, his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration
in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations
(UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child. 61
(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from

his/her biological parent(s). 62
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child, the government and its officials are duty bound to comply with its mandates.
Of particular relevance to instant case are the following provisions:
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents .
. . to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the
child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the
rights recognized in the present Convention. 63
States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one
or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both
parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best
interests. 64
Page 209 of 486

A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to
maintain on a regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances personal
relations and direct contacts with both parents . . . 65
States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to
provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child. 66
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes
with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best
interests of the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary
right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of
parents vis-à-vis that of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they
must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible.
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are now of
legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority. For sure,
they shall be endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is
not to state that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and
best interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition
for adoption was filed. 67 Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required
consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not
abandoned them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Page 210 of 486

[7]
G.R. No. L-23828 February 28, 1966
PAULINA SANTOS and AURORA SANTOS, petitioners,

vs.
GREGORIA ARANZANSO and DEMETRIA VENTURA, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for the petitioners.

Eulogio Rafael for the respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was filed by Simplicio Santos
and Juliana Reyes in the Court of First Instance of Manila on June 4, 1949. 1 Paulina
Santos was then 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old. The petition, which was
under oath, alleged inter alia, that the whereabouts of the minors' nearest of kin,
particularly their parents, were unknown; that since the outbreak of the war said minors
have been abandoned by their respective parents; and that for years, since their infancy,
said children have continuously been in petitioners' care and custody. A guardian ad
litem Crisanto de Mesa, was thereafter appointed for the minors. Said guardian ad
litem forthwith gave his written consent to the adoption. Paulina Santos, being over
fourteen years of age, likewise gave her written consent thereto.2
After due publication and hearing, the adoption court (CFI) rendered on August 25, 1949 a
decision, hereunder quoted in full:
This is a petition for the adoption of the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora
Santos Reyes by the spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana R. Santos. After due
publication in the "National Weekly", a newspaper of general circulation in the City
of Manila, once a week for three consecutive weeks, the case was then set for trial.
The office of the Solicitor General was duly notified of the petition and at the
hearing did not offer any objection.1äwphï1.ñët
From the evidence presented at the hearing, it appears that the petitioners have
been married for the past twenty-seven years and have no children of their own.
They desire to adopt the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes,
both of whom are and for years have been living under their care and custody; that
the former, since she was barely three months old has already been taken care of
by them up to the present time, and the latter has been cared for since she was
only fifteen days old. Paulina Santos Reyes is now seventeen years old and has
given her consent to the adoption as shown by her signature at the foot of the
petition. She ratified the same in open Court. Both parents of the minors have long
been unheard from and in spite of diligent efforts of the petitioners to locate them,
they could not be found. The consent to the adoption has been given by the
guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. The petitioners are both proprietors and
Page 211 of 486

have substantial income, more than enough to support and educate the minors.
The Court is of the opinion that this adoption will be for the best interest and welfare
of the minors.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the petition of the spouses Simplicio
Santos and Juliana R. Santos to adopt the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and
Aurora Santos Reyes and in accordance with Rule 100 of the Rules of Court in the
Philippines, hence forth, the minors are freed from all legal obligations to their
natural parents and are, to all legal intents and purposes the children of the
petitioners.
NOW, ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, August 25, 1949.
No appeal was taken from the aforesaid decision.
Subsequently — eight years later — on October 21, 1957, Juliana Reyes died, in Manila,
without testament. On November 25, 1957 Simplicio Santos filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. 3 In
said petition he stated among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he,
as surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of age,
respectively. In the same petition, he asked that he be appointed administrator of the
estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the deceased, filed on January 2,
1958 an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator. For her grounds she
asserted that Simplicio Santos" marriage to the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus
void: and that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was likewise void ab
initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not
abandoned them. An answer to the opposition was filed by Simplicio Santos on March 7,
1958 and oppositor Aranzanso filed a reply thereto on March 17, 1958.
Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise that she is the first cousin of the deceased Juliana
Reyes and adding that she is the mother of the child Paulina Santos, filed on March 19,
1959 an opposition to the petition of Simplicio Santos to be named administrator, and,
moreover, thereunder adopted, as her own, the pleadings filed by Gregoria Aranzanso.
By order of April 6, 1959, the Court of First Instance decided the point in dispute, ruling that
the validity of the adoption in question could not be assailed collaterally in the intestate
proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 34354). From the order Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria
Ventura appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In its decision, promulgated on September 14, 1964, the Court of Appeals reversed the
appealed order, finding instead that the adoption was null and void ab initio due to the
absence of consent thereto by the natural parents of the minor children, which it deemed a
jurisdictional defect still open to collateral attack.
Page 212 of 486

After denial of their motion for reconsideration by the Court of Appeals, Paulina Santos and
Aurora Santos appealed to this Court by way of petition for review, filed on November 18,
1964, to which due course was given. Five months after submission of this case for
decision — or on October 14, 1965 — petitioners herein filed a petition for preliminary
injunction, and later, on October 26, 1965, a supplemental petition therefor, to stop the trial
court from allowing Gregorio Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura, as well as of two other
persons, namely, Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, to intervene in the settlement proceedings
or to withdraw cash advances from the estate.
It was alleged in the petition and supplemental petition for preliminary injunction that on
September 22, 1965 the probate court issued an order allowing Gregoria Aranzanso and
Demetria Ventura to intervene in the settlement proceedings of Juliana Reyes' estate (Sp.
Proc. No. 34354); that on October 2, 1965 said court issued an order allowing, on previous
motions therefor, withdrawal of the sum of P7,000 each, under bond, to all the
parties, including Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura; that on October 7, 1965 two
strangers to the proceedings — the aforesaid sisters Consuelo and Pacita Pasion — filed a
motion, stating that they are also first cousins of the decedent and praying that an order be
issued allowing them to withdraw the sum of P7,000 each under bond; that on October 13,
1965 the same Pasion sisters filed a supplemental motion in the same proceedings praying
that their motion of October 7 be treated as a motion to intervene; that on October 18, 1965
the probate court issued an order allowing the Pasion sisters to intervene in the settlement
proceedings and allowing them to withdraw under bond the sum of P7,000 each from the
funds of the estate.
On November 4, 1965 respondents, together with Consuelo and Pacita Pasion — who
thereby submitted themselves to this Court's jurisdiction and stated that they, "for purposes
of expediency, are also denominated respondents" — filed their "Comment", as required by
this Court, opposing the aforesaid petition for preliminary injunction. On November 15,
1965 this Court granted the prayer for preliminary injunction and the writ was issued upon
posting of a bond of P5,000 on November 20, 1965. Respondents however moved for
reconsideration or modification thereof on November 23, 1965, stating inter alia that they
would now be precluded from taking part in the scheduled hearing for settlement of the
accounts of the special administratrix (Araceli A. Pilapil). On November 26, 1965 we
ordered modification of the preliminary injunction, so that on November 29, the writ was
modified so as to enjoin the probate court, until further orders: (1) from hearing and/or
approving the settlement of special administratrix's accounts; (2) from allowing any sale,
disposition or disbursement of the estate except when essential for strictly maintenance
purposes; and (3) from allowing respondents, Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura,
or Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, or any of them, to receive any advance, cash or otherwise,
from the funds of the intestate estate.
The principal issue on the merits in this appeal is whether respondents-oppositors

Aranzanso and Ventura, could assail in the settlement proceedings the adoption decree in
favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos. In sustaining their right to make such a collateral
attack, the respondent Court of Appeals rested as abovementioned on the premise that
failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the
adoption void ab initio. In its view, said consent was not properly dispensed with, not only
because the evidence adduced in the adoption proceedings was insufficient to support a
Page 213 of 486
finding that the parents had abandoned the children, but also since the adoption court
fatally omitted to expressly and specifically find that such abandonment in fact occurred.
In this regard it should be stated that the Court of Appeals completely relied on American
jurisprudence and authorities to the effect that parental consent to the adoption is a
jurisdictional requisite (E.g., 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children, Section 45[a] p. 435; Whetmore
vs. Fratello, 282 P2d 667, 670). The point to remember, however, is that under our law on
the matter, consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite:
SEC. 3. Consent to adoption.—There shall be filed with the petition a written

consent to the adoption signed by the child if over fourteen years of age and not
incompetent, and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or
hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child, or if there are no such
parents by the general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is in
the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person,
by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such
person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its
father to the adoption shall not be required. (Rule 100, Old Rules of Court.)4
Stated otherwise, if the natural parents have abandoned their children, consent to the
adoption by the guardian ad litem suffices. This brings as to the question whether in the
proceedings at bar the Court of Appeals can still review the evidence in the adoption case
and conclude that it was not sufficiently established therein that the parents of Paulina and
Aurora Santos had abandoned them.
First of all, it is not quite accurate to say that the adoption court made no determination of
the fact of abandonment. As quoted earlier, it is stated in the decision of the adoption court,
that:
From the evidence presented at the hearing it appears that the petitioners have
been married for the past twenty-seven years and have no children of their own.
They desire to adopt the minors Paulina Santos [y] Reyes and Aurora Santos [y]
Reyes, both of whom are and for years have been living under their care and
custody; that the former, since she was barely three months old has already been
taken care of by them up to the present time, and the latter has been cared for
since she was only fifteen days old. Paulina Santos [y] Reyes is now seventeen
years old. . . . Both parents of the minors have long been unheard from and in spite
of diligent efforts of the petitioners to locate them, they could not be found. The
consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the
Court. . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Abandonment — under persuasive American rulings — imports "any conduct on the part of
the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child". It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children." (2 Am. Jur. 2d,
Adoption, Sec. 32, pp. 886-887.) It can thus readily be seen that altho the CFI judgment
approving the adoption does not use the word "abandoned", its findings sufficiently contain
a set of facts and circumstances which truly constitutes a finding of abandonment.
Page 214 of 486
Coming now to the power of the Court of Appeals to review in this case the finding of
abandonment made by the adoption court, we find that even under American jurisprudence
— relied upon, as stated, by said Court — the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction
of an inferior or special tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to be established
before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral
attack upon its order (In re McKaeg's Estate, 141 Cal. 403, 74 Pac. 1039, 1040; In
re Camp's Estate, 131 Cal. 469, 63 Pac. 736).
Anent this point the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series,
Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof
is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact
needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of
some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption,
may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this
does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be
determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth; a
mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until
reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the
rule, the status of adopted children would always be uncertain, since the evidence
might not be the same at all investigations, and might be regarded with different
effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have
been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail.
Freeman on Judgments says the same thing:
In general, therefore, where the right of the court to assume jurisdiction of a cause
and proceed to judgment depends upon the ascertainment of facts in pais and the
court retains jurisdiction it thereby impliedly adjudges that the requisite jurisdictional
facts exist and having found such facts in favor of jurisdiction, its decision in this
respect, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral
proceedings, for a presumption arises in such cases, when the validity of the
judgment is attacked, that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven. . . . . (Vol.
I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720.)
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, construing a statute akin to our law in this regard, said
in Parsons vs. Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N.W. 147, 148:
The statute to be considered is section 4022, Rev. St. 1878, which reads as follows:
"No such adoption shall be made without the written consent of the living parents of
such child unless the court shall find that one of the parents has abandoned the
child or gone to parts unknown." Thus it will be seen that upon the fact being
established that the living parent has abandoned his child, he is deemed by the
statute to have thereby relinquished all parental right to be consulted in respect to
the child's welfare, and his consent to the adoption is therefore dispensed with. The
term "abandon" obviously means no more than neglect or refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their
Page 215 of 486
children. The fact of abandonment, judicially determined, was essential to the
jurisdiction; not essential that it should be determined on proper evidence,
necessarily, or in accordance with the truth, because mere error in that regard does
not affect jurisdicition. If jurisdiction be obtained to determine a fact, its
determination wrong or on insufficient or improper evidence is immaterial oh the
question of legal right to proceed judicially to the next step. That is deemed to be
elementary... A judicial determination may be contrary to conclusive evidence, or
legal evidence, or without any evidence, yet cannot be impeached for want of
jurisdiction. Van Fleet, Coll. Attack, Secs. 663, 665. That rule applies to all judicial
proceedings. . . . .
It follows, therefore, that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing, under a collateral attack,
the determination of the adoption court that the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had
abandoned them. This is so even if such fact of abandonment is deemed jurisdictional, a
point which we need not — and do not — rule upon in this case.
For the same reason, it is not in point to argue here that Simplicio Santos in fact concealed
the adoption proceedings from the natural parents, thereby rendering the judgment
obtained therein null and void or being secured by extrinsic fraud. The rule is well
recognized that a judgment can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud only in a
separate action brought for that purpose; not by way of collateral attack (Gomez vs.
Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717; Ramos vs. Mañalac, 89 Phil. 270).
Anent the alleged lack of notice of the adoption proceedings on the natural parents, suffice
it to mark that adoption is a proceeding in rem5 and that constructive notice, such as the
publication duly made as aforesaid, is enough where the residence of the parents is
unknown (2 Am. Jur., 2d, Adoption, Sec. 56, p. 906). Notice, moreover, is not required in
adoption cases in regard to the abandoning parent (Parsons vs. Parsons, supra).
Assuming that Simplicio Santos was not validly married to Juliana Reyes, it will not make
any difference as far as the right of respondents to intervene in the intestate proceedings is
concerned. Juliana Reyes should then be deemed to have filed the petition for adoption as
a person whose status is single, not married. The defect would then lie only as to Simplicio
Santos, who, as allegedly married to another person (a point that we do not decide in this
case), could not adopt without joining his wife in the petition. 6 It being the estate of Juliana
Reyes that is the subject matter of the settlement proceedings, the flaw, if any, would not
affect the consideration of the right of Paulina and Aurora Santos to succeed as adopted
children of Juliana Reyes, to the exclusion of respondents.
It must not be forgotten that the philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote the
welfare of the child. Accordingly, the modern trend is to encourage adoption (Prasnik vs.
Republic, 5 O.G. 1942) and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote
that objective.
From 2 Corpus Juris Secundum 375-376 we quote:
Page 216 of 486

Accordingly, as the main purpose of adoption statutes is the promotion of the
welfare of children, bereft of the benefits of the home and care of their real parents,
wherever possible without doing violence to the terms of the statute, such a
construction should be given adoption laws as will sustain, rather than defeat, this
purpose.
Although, as against the interests of the child, the proceedings must be strictly in
accordance with the statute, there is a tendency on the part of the courts, however,
where the adoption has been fully consummated, to construe the statute with a
reasonable degree of liberality, to the end that the assumed relationship and the
intention of the parties be upheld, particularly as against strangers to the
proceedings collaterally attacking them . . . .
From all the foregoing it follows that respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and Ventura and
those who, like them (Pasion sisters), claim an interest in the estate of Juliana Reyes as
alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of
the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first cousins
(Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption
must be — as in the instant case — considered valid.
Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the order of the
probate court a quo sustaining the adoption, dated April 6, 1959, is affirmed. Respondents
Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura as well as Consuelo and Pacita Pasion are
declared without right to intervene as heirs in the settlement of the intestate estate of
Juliana Reyes. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is dissolved, except insofar as
it enjoins the intervention or allowance of withdrawals of properly from the estate by
Gregoria Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, in the concept of
heirs, as to which it is hereby made permanent. No costs. So ordered.
Page 217 of 486

[1]
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among
others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; 2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga
Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that
he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her
surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption,
thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the
absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive
parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be
adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the
minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioner’s care
and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough
compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth,

Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be
the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar
concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
Page 218 of 486
SO ORDERED."4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration 5 praying
that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as
her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her
natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from
having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for
every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or
initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of
the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5)
permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s surname) avoids the
stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not
opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural
mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the
latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship
or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family
Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will
be before the surname of the mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –
Page 219 of 486

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word
or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and,
also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as
public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2)
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or
family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from
parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate
the use of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he
may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously
married woman, or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall
principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as
‘Mrs.’
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall
resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume
her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her
former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Page 220 of 486

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still
living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged
to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct
male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name –
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise
known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is
silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted
above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname
of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the

adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of
the adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding
the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint
Page 221 of 486
Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the
suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the
surname and that of the child because the father’s surname indicates the family to
which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the father’s
surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of
the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother,
how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point
is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and
permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Article 364,
which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself
precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso
Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since the mother’s surname is Enrile but
everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez
and his mother’s surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect
that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may
use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane
stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in
the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that
the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice
Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because there are so many
traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second given name and
the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the
Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of
Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
Page 222 of 486

surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The
Committee approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname
of the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only
expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname
of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child –
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. 15 It is a juridical act, a
proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which
results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 16 The modern trend is to consider adoption
not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act
which endows the child with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989,
when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed
with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor
the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and
Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled
to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code
and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted
that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on
adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in
the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house
built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides
for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls
Page 223 of 486

them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow
Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her
continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption –
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. 25 The interests and welfare of
the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the
scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by
some way of interpreting the law."28
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father,
like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the
sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her
middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of
adoption.
SO ORDERED.
Page 224 of 486

[2] Mariategui v. CA (different escra number from the title according to the list)
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and
PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario
Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del
Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116;
8). During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife,
Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children, namely:
Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by
her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all
surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife,
Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May 8,
1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930.
They had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February
16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941
(Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he
was still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are
described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate
(Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).
Page 225 of 486

On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely,
Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the
Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration
proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court
issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828
was issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered
owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which
separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian
and Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163
together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father, Lupo
Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of
the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for
partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial
partition dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas,
Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the complaint as
unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs although they
acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the
parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record on Appeal,
p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on
Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of
action and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one for
recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by
the trial court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads:
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil
Code cited by counsel for the defendants are of erroneous application to this
case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were
dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:
The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or

recognition of their continuous enjoyment and possession of status of
children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain either
premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp.
67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court
committed an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui
Page 226 of 486

and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are not
legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance . . . "
(Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children
and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina
(children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui;
directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who eventually
acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor,
and for the shares, of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third persons
are not prejudiced otherwise the said adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair
market value of their shares; and directing all the parties to submit to the lower court a
project of partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui after payment of taxes, other
government charges and outstanding legal obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court on
December 7, 1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription
barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui,
and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for
recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate. The resolution of
these issues hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of
the complaint filed by the private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased
spouses Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui
had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the latter, in turn,
have continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their
relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate
succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record on
Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be declared as children and heirs
of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of
the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is
principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private
respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased.
Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature of an action
filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of
action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted
under the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the
relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint,
although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1
Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
Page 227 of 486
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of
Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are
legitimate children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about
1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto
who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he
and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal."
The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the
community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between
Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in
lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and
that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85
SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado
v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA
439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the
following rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of

marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to
that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order
of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in
Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such
relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be
admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven.
However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar
must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have
been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only
Page 228 of 486
two classes of children — legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various
types of illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA
656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth
certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends
to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the
two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in
evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the
status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in
substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided, these
are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite
the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's
death in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the
admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners
herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents
are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation
prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case.
Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing
of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked,
have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of
an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by
the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing
Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-
owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand
partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA
55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action
for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the
extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in
their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made by
petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the
subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet
Page 229 of 486

set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs.
C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners,
except the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and
convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This
allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never
successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge
of their relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners
fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui.
According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria
del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property left by their deceased father
and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry because they will get
some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house where he
now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462
[1988]), the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have

been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation,
in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-
ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other
co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has
been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of

title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not
furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of
registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a
universal notice of title.
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs
prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents
discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence,
prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents
commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had
registered in their names the lots involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
Page 230 of 486

SO ORDERED.
Page 231 of 486

[2] 204 SCRA 337
G.R. No. 90627 November 29, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAMON LAO y RICARDO, EDILBERTO RAJEL y LAGUERTA, ALFREDO DELIZO y
SALCEDO, ALEJANDRO JOVILLANO y PASUPIL, RUMOLITO PALERMO y UTALIA,
GERRY MERELO y VILLANUEVA and ROBERTO DIVINO y CABRERA, defendants-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The seven (7) defendants have appealed the decision of Regional Trial Court, Fourth
Judicial Region, Branch 54, Lucena City, finding them guilty of the murder of their fellow
prisoner, Norberto Reynoso, and sentencing each of them suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the seven (7) accused,
namely: ROBERTO DIVINO, ALFREDO DELIZO, EDILBERTO RAJEL, GERRY
MERELO, RAMON LAO, ALEJANDRO JOVILLANO AND RUMOLITO PALERMO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, punishable under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the qualifying aggravating circumstances of
treachery and abuse of superior strength present, and herein sentences each of
them to imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA (LIFE IMPRISONMENT), with
all the accessory penalties provided by law. Furthermore, said accused are ordered
to pay the heirs of the victim Norberto Reynoso, jointly and severally, the sum of
P30,000.00 for the death of said victim, and to reimburse the said heirs the amount
of P3,450.00 for the expenses incurred during the funeral/burial services of the
deceased Norberto Reynoso. (p. 17, Decision, Annex A, Appellants' Brief.)
The facts as found by the trial court are the following:
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of May 21, 1986, a drinking spree was taking
place among the inmates of Cell No. 3 in the Lucena City Jail (p. 4, tsn, November
11, 1986). Amidst the merry-making there was also singing led by Norberto
Reynoso, who was accompanied on the guitar by another inmate (p. 3, tsn, Aug. 7,
1986). As often happens in many a drinking session where alcoholic spirits go wild,
trouble erupted. Thus, at a given signal from appellant Lao, appellant Divino first
and then followed by the others assaulted the victim, Norberto Reynoso. Thus,
appellants Divino, Rajel, Delizo, Jovellano and Merelo took turns in boxing and
kicking Reynoso (p. 4, tsn, August 7, 1986). As Reynoso reeled groggy from the
Page 232 of 486
punches and kicks he fell down on a "tarima" (Prison bunk), from where appellants
Gerry Merelo pulled him up and dragged him towards the cell door. Merelo tried to
prop him up preparatory to succeeding blows. Reynoso shouted for help and a
prison guard responded and tried to pacify the group. After warning the inmates of
Cell 3 to stop the commotion, the guard left. At this point, appellant Gerry Merelo
again pulled Reynoso to a corner of the cell while the other appellants pushed a
"tarima" against the cell door to block entry into the cell. Then, appellant Ramon
Lao clearly ordered, "Patayin na si Reynoso." (p. 3, tsn, July 31, 1986). With this
signal, appellants closed in for the kill. Co-appellant Jovellano picked up a piece of
wood, about a foot long and seven centimeters in diameter (Exhibit A) and hurdled
it at Reynoso who was hit at the left arm. Gerry Merelo picked up the piece of wood
and also hurled it at Reynoso who was hit at the head near the left ear. Ramon Lao
boxed and kicked Reynoso. Then co-appellant Rumolito Palermo got hold of the
piece of wood and hurled it at Reynoso who was lying on the floor on his side hitting
him on the left arm. After that, Gerry Merelo again got the piece of wood and with it
hit Reynoso on the left side of the head. Meantime, Rumolito Palermo took a
stainless "patalim" or crudely-fashioned knife, bound one end of it with a piece of
cloth and thereafter stabbed Reynoso at the back, hitting the latter near the spinal
column. (pp. 4-5, tsn, July 31, 1986.)
Alarmed by the commotion in Cell 3, several police officers rushed thereat. They
sensed trouble inside and tried to enter the cell but could not, as the entrance was
blocked by the "tarima." In their attempts to subdue and quell the rioting inmates of
Cell 3, the police resorted to the use of hacksaws with which they cut the iron bars.
After this, they were able to bring out some of the inmates. The rest of the inmates
including all the appellants, still refused to come out despite repeated pleas to do so
coming from the police and even the Mayor of Lucena City. Finally, the police threw
tear gas bombs inside the cell and with this tactic they were able to eventually flush
out all the inmates of Cell 3 (p. 3, tsn, December 16, 1985).
A post-mortem examination of Reynoso revealed the following; injuries, some of

them fatal, which he sustained at the hands of appellants:
1. presence of hematona 3 contusion of the right eye closed;
2. presence of hematoma 3 contusion of the left eye;
3. lacerated wd. 4 cm. x 1 cm. x 1.6 cm. over the right eyebrow;
4. lacerated wd. 3 cm. x 1 cm. x 1.5 cm. over the right parietal region of the skull;
5. lacerated wd. 5.5 cm. x 1 cm. x 1 cm. x 1.5 over the left parietal region of the
skull & laceration of the left ear 10 cm. with depressed fracture of the mustoid
region of the left ear;
6. stabbed wd. 1 cm. x 1 cm. x 3 cm. over the left side of the vertebral column 22
cm. distance for the nape of the neck;
Page 233 of 486

7. stabbed wd. 1 cm. x 1 cm. 1.5 cm over the spinal column lumbar area 32 cm. for
the nape of the neck.
x x x x x x x x x
With the exception of appellant Divino, who admitted his direct participation in the
killing of Reynoso, the other appellants, although admitting their presence at the
scene of the crime when it happened denied their guilt with the following claims or
excuses:
a) Appellant Jovellano claimed that he could not have assaulted Reynoso because
the latter was his "Kumpadre";
b) Appellant Delizo claimed that as a relatively new tenant in Cell 3, it was unlikely
for him to get involved in any trouble;
c) Appellants Rajel, Palermo and Merelo stated that they were all asleep when the
killing occurred; and
d) Appellant Lao claimed that he did not participate in the killing but tried to pacify
the troublemakers.
Appellants testified further that their cellmates Elson Tan, Rico Labagis, Bernardo
Amarillas and Rolando Perez, all prosecution witnesses, were actually the killers of
Reynoso. (pp. 89-95, Rollo.)
The accused have appealed insisting that the trial court erred in finding them guilty of the
crime charged.
As the appeal merely raises in issue the credibility of the various witnesses, the rule in this
regard is that the factual findings of the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses and to assess their credibility, is entitled to the highest degree
of respect. (People vs. Patag, 144 SCRA 542; People vs. Guardo, 156 SCRA 152.)
We find no reason to disturb the trial court's finding that:
Their version of the incident could not be given any credence, firstly because their
testimonies are contradictory in many material points, aside from being vague and
general. Furthermore, their participation in assaulting the deceased becomes clear
considering the fact that they were all identified by the prosecution witnesses, and
after all sorts of persuasion had been exerted by the authorities for them to come
out voluntarily, they refused to do so and had to be extracted out of cell No. 3.
On the other hand, Edilberto Rajel, Roberto Divino, Ramon Lao, and Gerry Merelo
testified that they did not see anything because having been in a drinking spree,
they were fast asleep. Gerry Merelo even testified that he did not know anything,
but only awoke to find out that he was already transferred to Cell No. 6. Again, their
Page 234 of 486
versions of the incident could not be given credence, because in the first place,
upon ocular inspection of Cell No. 3, the Court found out that it is a very small cell
which is only about three meters by eight meters in size, more or less, and the
"tarima" where the inmates sleep occupied practically about two-thirds of the floor
area. Any occupant of Cell No. 3. therefore, would have been readily awakened by
any unusual noise or commotion; and any such occupant could see what was
happening anywhere he may have been at the time the incident occurred. (p.
57, Rollo.)
Against the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of the accused-appellants, the

latter's simple denial of their participation in the commission of the crime or their pretense
that they were not aware that it happened may not prevail (People vs. Sabado, 168 SCRA
681).
The crime committed was murder, qualified by treachery, for the appellants, numbering
seven, attacked their lone victim while he was gaily singing, with no inkling whatsoever that
he would be attacked. He was unarmed. The appellants were armed with a wooden club
and a knife as they took turns in savagely beating and stabbing him in different parts of his
body. And, knowing the futility of fighting back, Reynoso made no attempt to defend
himself, hence, his attackers incurred no risk at all to themselves in the execution of the
crime. Furthermore, to assure that Reynoso would neither escape nor be rescued, the
appellants barricaded the door of the prison cell where they killed him in obedience to
Lao's command: 'Patayin na si Reynoso (People vs. Rojas, 147 SCRA 169)'. (p.
100, Rollo.)
The presence of a conspiracy was clearly established. The appellants were animated by
one and the same purpose: to kill Reynoso (People vs. Manlolo, 169 SCRA 394) and they
were united in its execution (People vs. Pagaduan, 29 SCRA 54). The question as to who
dealt the fatal blow on their victim is of no consequence for it is settled that when a
conspiracy exists, the act of one is the act of all (People vs. Muñoz, 170 SCRA 107).
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, abuse of superior strength was not a qualifying
circumstance in the commission of the murder for it was absorbed by treachery (People vs.
Dela Cruz, 147 SCRA 359).
The presence of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism under Art. 160,
Revised Penal Code (committing a crime while still serving sentence for another) should
have been considered, but it would not have affected the penalty imposable on the
accused in this case for the maximum imposable penalty under the Constitution (reclusion
perpetua) had already been imposed on each of them by the trial court.
A heavier penalty, such as death, may not be imposed under the 1987 Constitution no
matter how heinous the crime might be, or how many aggravating circumstances may have
attended its commission.
We are unable to conclude this decision without a word concerning the criminally lax,
negligent and inept administration of the Lucena City Jail at the time of this bloody incident
Page 235 of 486

in May 1986, and perhaps up to this time. The cold-blooded murder of the inmate, Norberto
Reynoso, would not have happened if the warden and jail guards had been strict in
prohibited the entry of liquor into the prison cells. By allowing the inmates to have access
to alcohol, the prison administration encouraged rowdy, drunken and violent behavior
among the inmates, which, in this case, culminated in the murder of one of the prisoners.
The prison guard who went to investigate Reynoso's cries for help was either afraid or
stupid, or himself too drunk to do his duty. Seeing that the appellants were battering
Reynoso, the guard should have known that Reynoso's life was in danger. He should have
called the warden and other guards to help him (if he could not do it alone) to quell the
commotion and remove Reynoso from the cell. Instead of simply warning Reynoso's
attackers to stop beating him, the guard should have remained at the scene to see to it that
his order was obeyed. By failing to do that, he indirectly contributed to the death of the
inmate, Reynoso.
In view of the foregoing, the Court resolved to refer this matter to the Honorable Secretary
of Justice for appropriate administrative action against the jail warden and the recreant
prison guards on duty to improve the administration of the Lucena City Jail and to avoid a
repetition of this unfortunate occurrence not only in that jail but in all prisons and detention
centers throughout the country.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is affirmed except that the indemnity for the death
of the victim, following recent decisions of this Court, is hereby increased to P50,000.
Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Page 236 of 486

[3]
G.R. No. L-22523 September 29, 1967
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA.

LUIS E. SANTOS, JR. and EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
A. E. Dacanay for petitioners-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee.
ANGELES, J.:
An appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, in Special
Proceeding No. 0001, dismissing the petition instituted by the spouses Luis R. Santos, Jr.
and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza.
The issue before Us is, whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger brother.
The trial court dismissed the petition reasoning thus:
A critical consideration in this case is the fact that the parents of the minor to be
adopted are also the parents of the petitioner-wife. The minor, therefore, is the
latter's legitimate brother.
In this proceeding, the adoption will result in an incongruous situation where the
minor Edwin Villa, a legitimate brother of the petitioner-wife, will also be her son. In
the opinion of the court, that incongruity not neutralized by other circumstances
absent herein, should prevent the adoption.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision but the same was denied. Hence, this
appeal.
The facts are not disputed.
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on January 8, 1963,
praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their (petitioner's)
son by adoption. Evidence was presented that the order setting the case for hearing has
been duly published, Exhibit A. There having been no opposition registered to the petition,
the petitioners were permitted to adduce their evidence.
It was established that the petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the
City of Manila. They were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their
Page 237 of 486
own. They do not have a child of their own blood. Neither spouse has any legitimate,
legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, or natural child by legal fiction, nor has
any one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Edwin Villa y
Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are the
common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos,
Jr., is a lawyer, with business interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA
electric plant, and is the general manager of Medry Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of
Bearen Enterprises. His income is approximately P600.00 a month. His co-petitioner-wife,
is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly earning of about P300.00.
It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza was born on May 22, 1958, Exhibit C. He
was a sickly child since birth. Due to the child's impairing health his parents entrusted him
to the petitioners who reared and brought him up for the years thereafter, and as a result,
there developed between the petitioners and the child, a deep and profound love for each
other. The natural parents of the minor testified that they have voluntarily given their
consent to the adoption of their son by the petitioners, and submitted their written consent
and conformity to the adoption, and that they fully understand the legal consequences of
the adoption of their child by the petitioners.
We are not aware of any provision in the law, and none has been pointed to Us by the
Office of the Solicitor General who argues for the State in this case, that relatives, by blood
or by affinity, are prohibited from adopting one another. The only objection raised is the
alleged "incongruity" that will result in the relation of the petitioner-wife and the adopted, in
the circumstance that the adopted who is the legitimate brother of the adopter, will also be
her son by adoption. The theory is, therefore, advanced that adoption among people who
are related by nature should not be allowed, in order that dual relationship should not
result, reliance being made upon the views expressed by this Court in McGee vs. Republic.
L-5387, April 29, 1954, 94 Phil. 820.1awphîl.nèt
In that case, an American citizen, Clyde E. McGee married to a Filipina by whom he had
one child, instituted a proceeding for the adoption of two minor children of the wife had by
her first husband. The lower court granted the petition of McGee to adopt his two minor
step-children. On appeal by the State. We reversed the decision. We said:
The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation where

none existed before. Where therefore the relationship of parent and child already
exists whether by blood or by affinity as in the case of illegitimate and step-children,
it would be unnecessary and superfluous to establish and super impose another
relationship of parent and child through adoption. Consequently, an express
authorization of law like article 338 is necessary, if not to render it proper and legal,
at least, to remove any and all doubt on the subject matter. Under this view, article
338 may not be regarded as a surplusage. That may have been the reason why in
the old Code of Civil Procedure, particularly its provisions regarding adoption,
authority to adopt a step-child by a step-father was provided in section 766
notwithstanding the general authorization in section 765 extended to any inhabitant
of the Philippines to adopt a minor child. The same argument of surplusage could
plausibly have been advanced as regards section 766, that is to say, section 766
was unnecessary and superfluous because without it a step-father could adopt a
Page 238 of 486
minor step-child anyway. However, the inserting of section 766 was not entirely
without reason. It seems to be an established principle in American jurisprudence
that a person may not adopt his own relative, the reason being that it is
unnecessary to establish a relationship where such already exists (the same
philosophy underlying our codal provisions on adoption). So some states have
special laws authorizing the adoption of relatives such as a grandfather adopting a
grandchild and a father adopting his illegitimate or natural-child.
Notwithstanding the views thus expressed, a study of American precedents would reveal
that there is a variance in the decisions of the courts in different jurisdictions regarding, the
matter of adoption of relatives. It cannot be stated as a general proposition that the
adoption of a blood relative is contrary to the policy of the law, for in many states of the
Union, no restriction of that sort is contained in the statutes authorizing adoption, although
laws of other jurisdiction expressly provide that adoption may not take place within persons
within a certain degree of relationship (1 Am. Jur. 628-629). Courts in some states hold
that in the absence of express statutory restriction, a blood relationship between the parties
is not a legal impediment to the adoption of one by the other, and there may be a valid
adoption where the relation of parent and child already exists by nature (2 Am. Jur. 2d
869). Principles vary according to the particular adoption statute of a state under which any
given case is considered. It would seem that in those states originally influenced by the civil
law countries where adoption originated, the rules are liberally construed, while in other
states where common law principles predominate, adoption laws are more strictly applied
because they are regarded to be in derogation of the common law.
Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has
been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not among those prohibited from
adopting. Article 339 of the same code names those who cannot be adopted, and the
minor child whose adoption is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law.
Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or
mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the
step-father or stepmother. This last article is, of course, necessary to remove all doubts
that adoption is not prohibited even in these cases where there already exist a relationship
of parent and child between them by nature. To say that adoption should not be allowed
when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in these cases
enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far
removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the
policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of
paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to
provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to
encourage the adoption of such children by person who can properly rear and educate
them (In re Havsgord's Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378).
With respect to the objection that the adoption in this particular case will result in a dual
relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the
adopting elder sister, that fact alone should not prevent the adoption. One is by nature,
while the other is by fiction of law. The relationship established by the adoption is limited to
the adopting parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly
provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the
Page 239 of 486
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which
they may have after the adoption except that the law imposes certain impediments to
marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as
descendants of the adopter (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. I, 1960 Ed., p. 652, citing 1
Oyuelos 284; Perez, Gonzales and Castan; 4-11 Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff 177; Muñoz P.
104). So even considered in relation to the rules on succession which are in pari materia,
the adoption under consideration would not be objectionable on the ground alone of the
resulting relationship between the adopter and the adopted. Similar dual relationships also
result under our law on marriage when persons who are already related, by blood or by
affinity, marry each other. But as long as the relationship is not within the degrees
prohibited by law, such marriages are allowed notwithstanding the resulting dual
relationship. And as We do not find any provision in the law that expressly prohibits
adoption among relatives, they ought not to be prevented.
For all the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the
petition for the adoption of the subject minor, granted. No pronouncement as to costs.
Page 240 of 486

[4]
[ G. R. No. L- 10028, May 23, 1958 ]
HIPOLITA ALMACEN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. TEODORO N. BALTAZAR,

DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
ENDENCIA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering
the defendant-appellant to pay plaintiff-appellee a monthly support of P50.00 beginning
with the month of August, 1955. Despite the meagre amount involved in the case, it was
brought to this Court on appeal because the appellant only raised questions of law.
The facts of the case as found by the lower court are as follows: that plaintiff and defendant
were legally married on March 24, 1923; that in 1937, plaintiff committed adultery with one
named Jose Navarro, a cousin of defendant; that prior to the infidelity of the wife, the
defendant himself has not been loyal to her, he having been once confined at the hospital
suffering from venereal disease; that the defendant separated from the plaintiff after the
latter's infidelity and while estranged from her he lived maritally with another woman by
the name of Lourdes Alvarez; that after their separation there has been a reconciliation
between them or at least a condonation by defendant of the acts committed by the wife as
shown by the fact that he has been sending her money for her support; that husband and
wife were in pari delicto and, therefore, defendant is bound to support the plaintiff because
he has likewise been unfaithful to her.
Appellant contends that the lower court erred:
1. in not taking plaintiff's adulterous act of infidelity as defense against her claim for
support and in not exempting him from the obligation to give such support; and
2. in finding that the evidence on record was sufficient to establish a condonation of

plaintiff's adulterous act and reconciliation between plaintiff and defendant.
As to the first assignment of error, we find that by the provisions of Art. 303 of the new
Civil Code, the obligation to support shall cease "when the recipient has committed some
act which gives rise to disinheritance;" that under Art. 921 (k) of the same Code, a spouse
may be disinherited when she has given cause for legal separation," and under Art. 97, one
of the causes for legal separation is "adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on the
part of the husband", as defined in the Penal Code. Accordingly, if the plaintiff was the only
one who committed adultery which is a good cause for disinheritance and legal separation,
defendant's theory would seem to be correct; but, in the present case, we agree with the
lower court's ruling that defendant is still bound to support his wife, firstly, because
plaintiff and defendant were both guilty of infidelity and before the filing of the action they
had a reconciliation or, at least, defendant had pardoned plaintiff's unfaithfulness, for
which reason we may apply Art. 922 of the aforesaid Code which provides that "a
subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter
Page 241 of 486
of the right to disinherit, aid renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been
made;" secondly, the law on support (Title IX, Book I, Arts. 290-304, Civil Code) contains
no provision squarely applicable to the present case in which both parties had committed
infidelity, neither is there any provision to the effect that when both spouses committed
marital offenses against one another, one can no longer ask support from the other; thirdly,
there is the general principle that when two persons acted in bad faith, they should be
considered as having acted in good faith, which principle may be applied to the instant case
to the effect that plaintiff and defendant being in pari delicto, the latter cannot claim the
adultery of the former as defense to evade the obligation to give her support.
As to the second assignment of error, we find it also groundless, for the lower court
declared that there has been a condonation by the defendant of the acts committed by the
wife because of the latter's testimony and documentary evidence submitted (Exhibits A, B,
C, F and J), which show that the defendant had given money to the plaintiff on several
occasions through third persons and, in our opinion, such evidence is really sufficient to
show condonation or reconciliation between plaintiff and defendant, for had there been no
condonation of plaintiff's infidelity and no reconciliation between her and defendant, the
latter would not certainly have given any amount of money for her support.
Defendant argues, however, that he and plaintiff never resumed their conjugal relationship
and, therefore, there has been no legal condonation of the acts of the erring wife; but it
cannot be disputed that the act of giving money to an erring wife and the fact proven in the
case that no action was taken against her before the courts of justice are sufficient to
establish forgiveness amounting to condonation, for "condonation is the forgiveness of one
of the married parties of an offense which he knows the other has committed against the
other." (Words & Phrases 8A, pp. 19-20} At any rate, pardon or condonation does not
require sexual intercourse and it may be express or implied.
"Wherefore, finding no errors in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed
with costs against the defendant.
Page 242 of 486

[5]

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014
FE FLORO VALINO, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA
TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, and LEAH
ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Challenged in this petition is the October 2, 2006 Decision 1 and the May 9, 2008
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61613, which reversed the
October 1, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City (RTC)
which ruled that petitioner Fe Floro Valino (Valino) was entitled to the remains of the
decedent.
The Facts:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law
Office, married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955. The couple
had two (2) sons, Florante and Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters, Rosario, Victoria and
Maria Teresa; and one (1) adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.
The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually
separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they
decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to
provide financial support to Rosario and their children (respondents).
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United
States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around,
Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano.
When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and
requested that she delay the interment for a few days but her request was not heeded. The
remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the
Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.
Page 243 of 486

Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before
he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes,
respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano
be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in
Novaliches, Quezon City.
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for
more than twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout the time
they were together, he had introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife.
Although they were living together, Valino admitted that he never forgot his obligation to
support the respondents. She contended that, unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty.
Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill. She also claimed
that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the
United States. According to Valino, it was Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his remains be
interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought by
respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
Decision of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the
counterclaim of Valino after it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.
The RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew
very well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. Taking into
consideration the fact that Rosario left for the United States at the time that he was fighting
his illness, the trial court concluded that Rosario did not show love and care for him.
Considering also that it was Valino who performed all the duties and responsibilities of a
wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that he wished to be buried in
the Valino family mausoleum.4
In disposing of the case, the RTC noted that the exhumation and the transfer of the body of
Atty. Adriano to the Adriano family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in
Novaliches, Quezon City, would not serve any useful purpose and so he should be spared
and respected.5 Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have
the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise directed
respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains of the decedent
in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In reaching said determination, the CA explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was
entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the
New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of
Page 244 of 486

the appellate court that the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the
right to make arrangements for the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still
entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time
of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact.
Like the RTC, however, the CA did not award damages in favor of respondents due to the
good intentions shown by Valino in giving the deceased a decent burial when the wife and
the family were in the United States. All other claims for damages were similarly dismissed.
The Sole Issue
The lone legal issue in this petition is who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the
remains of Atty. Adriano.
The Court’s Ruling
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 6 of the Family Code,
specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the
deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be
in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of
descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred.
In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right. [Emphases supplied]
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall
devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without
the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305. [Emphases supplied]
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Page 245 of 486

Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate duty of burying the
body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall
devolve upon the persons herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon
the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary
expenses;
x x x x. [Emphases supplied]
From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and
duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s
common law partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez,7 a petition for habeas corpus was
filed by the brothers and sisters of the late Vitaliana Vargas against her lover, Tomas
Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter forcibly took her and confined her in his residence. It
appearing that she already died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy, Tomas
Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction and claimed the right
to bury the deceased, as the common-law husband.
In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial court continued to have jurisdiction over the
case notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As to the claim of Tomas Eugenio, Sr.
that he should be considered a "spouse" having the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements for his common-law wife, the Court ruled:
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are
present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests
which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-
ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage
with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying
Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art.
188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of
Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted, however, that with respect to 'spouse,' the same
must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The
Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But
this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of
Page 246 of 486

the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring
to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not
a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her
lifetime.8 [Emphases supplied]
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that
she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died
has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced,
expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her
deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any
other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear
and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. 9 While
there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was
still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not, opens
the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an
undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for
the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the service and view the
remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the
morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents
immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request,
but to no avail.
Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail
pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valino’s own testimony that it was Atty. Adriano’s
wish to be buried in their family plot is being relied upon heavily. It should be noted,
however, that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila
Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such claim. Considering
that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in the Adriano family plot
in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of Atty. Adriano was
unclear and undefinite. Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it
is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to
have been created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty.
Adriano.
Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was unavailable to bury her
husband when she died, she had already renounced her right to do so. Verily, in the same
vein that the right and duty to make funeral arrangements will not be considered as having
been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury
the remains of her deceased husband should not be readily presumed to have been
exercised, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and
voluntary intent of the deceased to that end. Should there be any doubt as to the true intent
of the deceased, the law favors the legitimate family. Here, Rosario’s keenness to exercise
the rights and obligations accorded to the legal wife was even bolstered by the fact that
she was joined by the children in this case.
Page 247 of 486

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the
Valino family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the same. Article 307 of
the Civil Code provides:
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In
the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the
funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person
obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of the
family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of the
funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained
earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in
Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code. Even if Article 307 were to be
interpreted to include the place of burial among those on which the wishes of the deceased
shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an eminent authority on civil law,
commented that it is generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of the
deceased should be established by some form of testamentary disposition. 10 As Article 307
itself provides, the wishes of the deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be
inferred lightly, such as from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last remaining
days with Valino. It bears stressing once more that other than Valino’s claim that Atty.
Adriano wished to be buried at the Valino family plot, no other evidence was presented to
corroborate it.
At any rate, it should be remembered that the wishes of the decedent with respect to his
funeral are not absolute. As Dr. Tolentino further wrote:
The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be contrary
to law. They must not violate the legal and reglamentary provisions concerning funerals
and the disposition of the remains, whether as regards the time and manner of disposition,
or the place of burial, or the ceremony to be observed.11 [Emphases supplied]
In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by Article
305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and subject the same to
those charged with the right and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the
remains of their loved-one. As aptly explained by the appellate court in its disquisition:
The testimony of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino that it was the oral wish of Atty.
Adriano Adriano that he be interred at the Floro family’s mausoleum at the Manila Memorial
Park, must bend to the provisions of the law. Even assuming arguendo that it was the
express wish of the deceased to be interred at the Manila Memorial Park, still, the law
grants the duty and the right to decide what to do with the remains to the wife, in this case,
plaintiff-appellant Rosario D. Adriano, as the surviving spouse, and not to defendant-
appellee Fe Floro Valino, who is not even in the list of those legally preferred, despite the
fact that her intentions may have been very commendable. The law does not even
consider the emotional fact that husband and wife had, in this case at bench, been
separated-in-fact and had been living apart for more than 30 years.12
Page 248 of 486

As for Valino’s contention that there is no point in exhuming and transferring the remains of
Atty. Adriano, it should be said that the burial of his remains in a place other than the
Adriano family plot in Novaliches runs counter to the wishes of his family. It does not only
violate their right provided by law, but it also disrespects the family because the remains of
the patriarch are buried in the family plot of his live-in partner.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of man.
However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for
the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who
have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those
obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the dead
body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer it
to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This
is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the
corpse from third persons.13
All this notwithstanding, the Court finds laudable the acts of Valino in taking care of Atty.
Adriano during his final moments and giving him a proper burial. For her sacrifices, it would
indeed be unkind to assess actual or moral damages against her. As aptly explained by the
CA:
The trial court found that there was good faith on the part of defendant-appellee Fe Floro
Valino, who, having lived with Atty. Adriano after he was separated in fact from his wife,
lovingly and caringly took care of the well-being of Atty. Adriano Adriano while he was alive
and even took care of his remains when he had died.
On the issue of damages, plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to actual damages.

Defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino had all the good intentions in giving the remains of
Atty. Adriano a decent burial when the wife and family were all in the United States and
could not attend to his burial. Actual damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in
recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be recoverable, they must not only be capable
of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. In this case at
bench, there was no iota of evidence presented to justify award of actual damages.
Plaintiffs-appellants are not also entitled to moral and exemplary damages.1âwphi1 Moral

damages may be recovered only if the plaintiff is able to satisfactorily prove the existence
of the factual basis for the damages and its causal connection with the acts complained of
because moral damages although incapable of pecuniary estimation are designed not to
impose a penalty but to compensate for injury sustained and actual damages suffered. No
injury was caused to plaintiffs-appellants, nor was any intended by anyone in this case.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if claimant is able to
establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Unfortunately, neither of the requirements to sustain an award for either of these damages
would appear to have been adequately established by plaintiffs-appellants.
As regards the award of attorney's fees, it is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as
an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsel's fees are not to be
awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees
Page 249 of 486
under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification,
without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to
speculation and conjecture. In this case, we have searched but found nothing in plaintiffs-
appellants' suit that justifies the award of attorney's fees.14
Finally, it should be said that controversies as to who should make arrangements for the
funeral of a deceased have often aggravated the bereavement of the family and disturbed
the proper solemnity which should prevail at every funeral. It is for the purpose of
preventing such controversies that the Code Commission saw it best to include the
provisions on "Funerals."15
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
We will all die. But what may matter to many of us is how we live and how our life is kept in
the memories of those we leave behind. This case is not about whether a common-law wife
has more rights over the corpse of the husband than the latter's estranged legal spouse.
This case is about which between them knows his wishes.
Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the ponencia in denying this petition.
I vote to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 2, 2006 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 61613, which directs petitioner Fe to have the remains of Atty. Lope Adriano
exhumed, and orders respondents to transfer, transport, and inter, at their expense, the
remains of the decedent from Manila Memorial Park to the family plot in Holy Cross
Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City. I vote to sustain the decision dated October 1,
1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77 in Civil Case No. Q-93-15288,
dismissing respondents' complaint for damages.
I disagree with the position that in the determination of how Atty. Adriano should be buried,
"the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the
surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano,"1 in accordance with Article 3052 of the Civil Code in
relation to Article 1993 of the Family Code.
I am of the opinion that Article 305 should only be considered when, first, the deceased left
no explicit instructions on how he wishes to be interred, and second, when none among
the deceased’s surviving relations are willing to make the funeral arrangements and a
conflict arises. In these situations, the conflict must be settled according to the order of
preference stated in Article 199. In any other case, it should be the express wishes of the
deceased which should take precedence.
This view, in fact, is embodied in Article 307 of the Civil Code, which states:
Page 250 of 486
Article 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased.
In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the
funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person
obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of the
family. (Emphasis supplied)
It is the ponencia’s opinion that the wishes of the deceased contemplated in Article 307
only governs the "form of the funeral" and that the duty and, more specifically, the right to
make arrangements for the funeral remains with the persons specified in Article 305 in
relation to Article 199. It is my submission, however, that Article 307 should be interpreted
to mean that the right to determine one’s funeral, including the right to determine how and
where one wishes to be buried, remains with the deceased, and it is only in the absence of
his express wishes, or in the absence of his religious beliefs and affiliations, or if there is
doubt as to his wishes, that other persons may assume the right to decide the funeral
arrangements.
This right, like other rights pointed out by the ponencia,4 must not be considered waived or
renounced except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and
voluntary intent to that end. There is neither indication nor have there been any allegations
that Atty. Adriano did not freely and voluntarily relay his last wishes to his common-law
wife, petitioner Fe. Atty. Adriano, therefore, did not waive his right to determine where he
should be buried, in favor of the persons indicated in Article 305 in relation to Article 199.
Accordingly, it was improper to cite in the ponencia Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Judge Velez. 5 In
Eugenio, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. claimed the right to bury his common-law wife, arguing that
he should be considered a "spouse" under Article 305 in relation to Article 199. The
assertion led this court to expound on the interpretation of Article 305 in relation to Article
199 and conclude that:
x x x. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally "married" in
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are
present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests
which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-
ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage
with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying
Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art.
188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of
Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to 'spouse', the same
must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses…)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of
Page 251 of 486
theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The
Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But
this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of
the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring
to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not
a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her
lifetime.6
In the present case, petitioner Fe has not asserted that she be considered a "spouse"
under Article 305 in relation to Article 199 with the right and the duty to make funeral
arrangements for Atty. Adriano. What she asserts is that she was Atty. Adriano’s constant
companion for a long time who was constantly by his side, showing him the love and
devotion as a wife would have, who took care of him in his final moments and gave him a
proper burial. As such, there is a presumption that she would be in the best position to
relay his final wishes.
The trial court in its decision dated October 1, 1998 reached the same conclusion, thus:
Atty. Lope Adriano’s wish was established at the trial and shown in the following testimony
of the defendant, to wit:
"ATTY. PIZARRAS:
Madam witness, what was the wish of Atty. Lope Adriano regarding his burial?
WITNESS:
He wanted to be buried at Manila Memorial.
Q: Why do you say that?
A: We have discussed it long before.
Q: When did you first discuss this?
A: The first time we went to Manila Memorial. He wanted that his lawn type lot be upgraded
to estate type. He doesn’t want that people will step on his grave.
Q: What happened to this request if his lawn type lot to be upgraded to estate type?
A: It did not take long. I had it upgraded."
(TSN, May 7, 1997, pp. 4-5; underscoring supplied)
This crucial fact remained unrefuted.
Page 252 of 486

Moreover, considering the very, very long time that the defendant and the deceased lived
like husband and wife prior to his death, it can be reasonably assumed that it is the
defendant who really knows the wishes of the deceased. And it appears that it was the
express wish of the deceased that he be interred at the Manila Memorial Park.7
The ponencia also noted there was "animosity" between Atty. Adriano and respondents
when he was still alive. He and his legal spouse, respondent Rosario, have been
separated-in-fact for more than thirty (30) years, and he has not been in contact with his
children, the other respondents, for about the same period of time. They did not even visit
him when he fell ill and was on his deathbed; it was only after he died that they came,
asserting their rights to his remains.
It is unfortunate that the ponencia would rather uphold the wishes of his estranged family
rather than give the deceased his final request. Part of life is the ability to control how one
wishes to be memorialized, and such right should remain with the deceased. It is only
when the deceased has not left any express instructions that the right is given to the
persons specified under the law.
Given the circumstances, the remains of Atty. Adriano should remain in the Floro family
mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
The law reaches into much of our lives while we live. It constitutes and frames most of our
actions. But at the same time, the law also grants us the autonomy or the space to define
who we are. Upon our death, the law does not cease to respect our earned autonomy.
Rather, it gives space for us to speak through the agency of she who may have sat at our
bedside as we suffered through a lingering illness.
I am of the view that it is that love and caring which should be rewarded with the honor of
putting us in that place where we mark our physical presence for the last time and where
we will be eternally remembered.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition should be GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 61613, reversing the October 1, 1998 decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 77, Quezon City, must be SET ASIDE.
Page 253 of 486

[6]
G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner-appellant,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA, respondents-
appellees.
ROMERO, J.:
In this petition for review, we are asked to overturn the decision of the Court of
Appeals1 granting custody of six-year old Leouel Santos, Jr. to his maternal grandparents
and not to his father, Santos, Sr. What is sought is a decision which should definitively
settle the matter of the care, custody and control of the boy.
Happily, unlike King Solomon, we need not merely rely on a "wise and understanding
heart," for there is man's law to guide us and that is, the Family Code.
The antecedent facts giving rise to the case at bench are as follows:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession,
were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who
was born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had
been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's
parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital
bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do
so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work.
Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in
the United States proved futile. Private respondents claim that although abroad, their
daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through
deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him
away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
Page 254 of 486

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward
Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as
respondent.2
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same
day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and
Ofelia Bedia.3
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. 4 In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's
5 6
order. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner now brings the
instant petition for review for a reversal of the appellate court's decision.
The Court of Appeals erred, according to petitioner, in awarding custody of the boy to his
grandparents and not to himself. He contends that since private respondents have failed to
show that petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable father, substitute parental authority granted
to the boy's grandparents under Art. 214 of the Family Code is inappropriate.
Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by the private respondents in having custody
over the boy, are flimsy and insufficient to deprive him of his natural and legal right to have
custody.
On the other hand, private respondents aver that they can provide an air-conditioned room
for the boy and that petitioner would not be in a position to take care of his son since he
has to be assigned to different places. They also allege that the petitioner did not give a
single centavo for the boy's support and maintenance. When the boy was about to be
released from the hospital, they were the ones who paid the fees because their daughter
and petitioner had no money. Besides, Julia Bedia Santos, their daughter, had entrusted
the boy to them before she left for the United States. Furthermore, petitioner's use of
trickery and deceit in abducting the child in 1990, after being hospitably treated by private
respondents, does not speak well of his fitness and suitability as a parent.
The Bedias argue that although the law recognizes the right of a parent to his child's
custody, ultimately the primary consideration is what is best for the happiness and welfare
of the latter. As maternal grandparents who have amply demonstrated their love and
affection for the boy since his infancy, they claim to be in the best position to promote the
child's welfare.
The issue to be resolved here boils down to who should properly be awarded custody of
the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority.
Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby
parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the
extent required by the latter' s needs.7 It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law
grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and development,
as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. 8 As
Page 255 of 486

regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum
of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."9
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. 10 The right attached to parental authority,
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution. 11 When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not
constitute a renunciation of parental authority. 12 Even if a definite renunciation is manifest,
the law still disallows the same. 13
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-
bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company. 14 The child's welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions
concerning his care and custody. 15
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their
common children. 16 In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall
continue exercising parental authority. 17 Only in case of the parents' death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. 18 The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother of the
minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is
present. Not only are they physically apart but are also emotionally separated. There has
been no decree of legal separation and petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of the
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has failed. 19
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award
custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under
Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only
when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him,
has not been successfully shown by private respondents.
The Court of Appeals held that although there is no evidence to show that petitioner
(Santos Sr.) is "depraved, a habitual drunkard or poor, he may nevertheless be considered,
as he is in fact so considered, to be unsuitable to be allowed to have custody of minor
Leouel Santos Jr." 20
The respondent appellate court, in affirming the trial court's order of October 8, 1990,
adopted as its own the latter's observations, to wit:
From the evidence adduced, this Court is of the opinion that it is to be (sic)
best interest of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr. that he be placed under the
care, custody, and control of his maternal grandparents the petitioners
herein. The petitioners have amply demonstrated their love and devotion to
their grandson while the natural father, respondent herein, has shown little
interest in his welfare as reflected by his conduct in the past. Moreover the
Page 256 of 486

fact that petitioners are well-off financially, should be carefully considered in
awarding to them the custody of the minor herein, lest the breaking of such
ties with his maternal grandparents might deprive the boy of an eventual
college education and other material advantages (Consaul vs. Consaul, 63
N.Y.S. 688). Respondent had never given any previous financial support to
his son, while, upon the other hand, the latter receives so much bounty from
his maternal grandparents and his mother as well, who is now gainfully
employed in the United States. Moreover, the fact that respondent, as a
military personnel who has to shuttle from one assignment to another, and,
in these troubled times, may have pressing and compelling military duties
which may prevent him from attending to his son at times when the latter
needs him most, militates strongly against said respondent. Additionally, the
child is sickly and asthmatic and needs the loving and tender care of those
who can provide for it. 21
We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental

authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.,
particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private
respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate
father is still preferred over the grandparents. 22 The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor,
particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to
support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor son
from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission,
should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's custody.
While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism,
it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against
him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts
to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between
parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and for
the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in
uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are
still the natural guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority,
care and custody over their children merely because of the normal consequences of their
duties and assignments, such as temporary separation from their families.
Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
Private respondents' attachment to the young boy whom they have reared for the past
three years is understandable. Still and all, the law considers the natural love of a parent to
outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be
unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a fact which
has not been proven here.
The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by private respondents as grandparents
should not be seen as incompatible with petitioner' right to custody over the child as a
Page 257 of 486
father. Moreover, who is to say whether the petitioner's financial standing may improve in
the future?
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
dated April 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution dated November 13, 1992 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody over the minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to his
legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr.
SO ORDERED.
Page 258 of 486

[7]
G.R. No. 131286 March 18, 2004
JOSE LAM, petitioner,
vs.
ADRIANA CHUA, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 dated June 11,
1997 and the Resolution dated October 27, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV.
No. 51107, entitled, "Adriana Chua, Petitioner-Appellee vs. Jose Lam, Respondent-
Appellant."
The case commenced on March 11, 1994 upon the filing of a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and Jose were married on
January 13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam; Jose
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose
became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to go
home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the
conjugal partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal properties, she
was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and
the separation of present and future properties; said agreement was approved by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28, 1994;
they had long been separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of their
child will be with her, subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage
between her and Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the
support of their child, John Paul.
Summons was duly served on Jose Lam on March 22, 1994. Despite the lapse of fifteen
days after service of summons, no responsive pleading was filed by him. Hence, the trial
court issued an Order dated April 13, 1994, directing Asst. City Prosecutor Bonifacio
Barrera to conduct an investigation for determination whether or not there was collusion
between the parties and to submit his report thereon. On April 28, 1994, Asst. City
Prosecutor Barrera filed his Report stating that "there seems to be no collusion between
the parties".2
The trial court then set the case for hearing. The lone witness was Adriana herself. She
testified that her marriage with Jose was arranged by her parents in the traditional Chinese
way; that her married life was abnormal because Jose very seldom came home, never
worked for a living and instead kept asking for money from her to buy his sports cars; that
she was also the one spending for all the expenses of their only child, John Paul. 3 After her
Page 259 of 486

testimony, counsel for Adriana formally offered the documentary evidence. No evidence
was presented regarding the amount of support needed by John Paul or the capacity of
Jose to give support.
On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open4 on the ground that she was
able to secure additional new evidence which were significant, material and indispensable.
On July 6, 1994, the trial court granted the motion to re-open the case and held a hearing
for the reception of additional evidence. The Pasay RTC admitted into evidence the
Marriage Contract dated May 25, 1977 between Jose and one Celia Santiago, and another
Marriage Contract dated May 6, 1982 between Jose and one Evan Lock, 5 showing that
Jose had been married twice before he married Adriana in 1984.
On August 4, 1994, the Pasay RTC rendered its Decision 6 the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares the marriage between
petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam null and void for being bigamous by
nature. The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Office of the Civil Registrar
General are hereby ordered to cancel the marriage between Adriana Chua and Jose Lam
celebrated on January 13, 1984 by Hon. Guillermo L. Loja of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Quezon City.
Likewise, respondent Jose Lam is hereby ordered to give a monthly support to his son
John Paul Chua Lam in the amount of ₱20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.7
On November 3, 1994, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration 8 thereof but only insofar as
the decision awarded monthly support to his son in the amount of ₱20,000.00. He argued
that there was already a provision for support of the child as embodied in the
decision9 dated February 28, 1994 of the Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to
contribute ₱250,000.00 each to a common fund for the benefit of the child, to wit:
8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties with respect to
their son. In the best interest of the child, the Second Party shall retain care and custody,
subject to visitation rights by the First Party to be exercised through mutual arrangements.
9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First Party and the
Second Party shall initially contribute ₱250,000.00 each to a common fund, to be
increased as required, to be used solely and exclusively for the benefit of their son. Said
common fund shall be managed and administered by the Second Party, subject to periodic
accounting, until the son reaches majority age.10
Jose further alleged in his motion that his contribution to the common fund had even
amounted to ₱500,000.00.
Page 260 of 486

On August 22, 1995, the Pasay RTC issued an Order denying Jose Lam’s motion for
reconsideration ruling that the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and
approved by the Makati RTC before the marriage was declared null and void ab initio by
the Pasay RTC, is of no moment and cannot limit and/or affect the support ordered by the
latter court.
Jose then appealed the Pasay RTC’s decision to the Court of Appeals, assigning only a
single error of the trial court:
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANT TO GIVE A

MONTHLY SUPPORT OF ₱20,000.00 TO HIS SON BECAUSE THIS WOULD, IN
EFFECT, REQUIRE APPELLANT TO PAY TWICE THE MONTHLY SUPPORT FOR HIS
CHILD. BESIDES, THE LOWER COURT HAS DULY ADMITTED THE FACT THAT
THERE WAS A DECISION ISSUED BY ANOTHER COURT REQUIRING APPELLANT TO
CONTRIBUTE THE AMOUNT OF ₱250,000.00 AS THE LATTER’S SHARE IN THE
COMMON FUND FOR SUPPORT OF THE CHILD, SUBJECT TO PERIODIC
ACCOUNTING AND TO BE MANAGED BY APPELLEE.11
On June 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the Pasay
RTC’s decision in all respects. Jose filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision but in
a Resolution dated October 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied the same.
Hence, Jose filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, likewise raising a single error of the appellate court, to wit:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING LEGAL QUESTIONS

OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT WHERE THEY BOUND THEMSELVES TO
CONTRIBUTE THE AMOUNT OF TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱250,000.00) TO A COMMON FUND FOR THE BENEFIT OF THEIR CHILD DOES NOT
BAR THE TRIAL COURT IN ANNULMENT CASE TO AGAIN AWARD SUPPORT IN
FAVOR OF THE CHILD.
The Pasay RTC and the Court of Appeals are both correct insofar as they ruled that the
amount of support is by no means permanent. In Advincula vs. Advincula,12 we held that
another action for support could be filed again by the same plaintiff notwithstanding the fact
that the previous case for support filed against the same defendant was dismissed. We
further held in said case that:
. . . Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that
its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is
entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his
increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as
subject to final determination.13
Page 261 of 486

Thus, there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement between him
and Adriana, as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in its decision dated February
28, 1994 in the case for voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, is a bar to
any further award of support in favor of their child John Paul. The provision for a common
fund for the benefit of their child John Paul, as embodied in the compromise agreement
between herein parties which had been approved by the Makati RTC, cannot be
considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support is always subject to
modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to
give support.
Having settled the issue on the authority of the trial court to award support for the child in
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of the child’s parents, this Court will now
discuss the propriety of the proceedings conducted by the Pasay RTC and the decision it
rendered, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Court notes four circumstances that taint the regularity of the proceedings and the
decision rendered by the trial court.
First, the only ground alleged in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
Adriana with the Pasay RTC is the psychological incapacity of Jose without any prayer for
the support of her child. Adriana presented, formally offered her evidence in support of the
petition and submitted the case for decision as of May 12, 1994.14 But on a motion to re-
open filed by her on June 23, 1994, the trial court set the case for reception of evidence on
July 6, 1994 and subsequently allowed Adriana to present evidence of two previous
marriages contracted by Jose with other women to prove that the marriage between
Adriana and Jose was null and void for being bigamous. It is only at the July 6, 1994
hearing that respondent Adriana first claimed support for John Paul when she testified in
open court.
The petition of Adriana was, in effect, substantially changed by the admission of the
additional evidence. The ground relied on for nullity of the marriage was changed from the
psychological incapacity of Jose to that of existence of previous marriages of Jose with two
different women with an additional claim for support of the child. Such substantial changes
were not reflected in the petition filed with the trial court, as no formal amendment was ever
made by Adriana except the insertion of the handwritten phrase "And for respondent to
support the child of petitioner in an amount this Honorable Court may deem just and
reasonable"15 found at the ultimate paragraph of the petition, as allowed by the Pasay RTC.
There is nothing on record to show that petitioner Jose was notified of the substantial
changes in the petition of Adriana.
Second, the Pasay RTC did not give Jose an opportunity to be present on July 6, 1994 for
the presentation of evidence by Adriana and to refute the same. Although copy of the
motion filed on June 23, 1994 with a notice of hearing on June 27, 1994 was sent to Jose,
the record does not show that he received the notice in due time; neither does the record
show that he was notified of the subsequent hearing held on July 6, 1994 where Adriana
presented the marriage certificates and claimed for the support of their child sans the
presence of Jose.
Page 262 of 486

Third, the records do not show that petitioner was sent a copy of the Order dated July 6,
1994 wherein the trial court granted the Urgent Motion to Re-Open of respondent Adriana
and forthwith allowed her to present her evidence to prove that petitioner herein contracted
previous marriages with different women.
Fourth, the evidence presented by respondent regarding her claim for support for John
Paul is glaringly insufficient and cannot be made a valid basis upon which the Pasay RTC
could have determined the monthly amount of ₱20,000.00 for the support to be given to
John Paul by petitioner Jose.
A party who has been declared in default is entitled to service of substantially amended or
supplemental pleadings.16 Considering that in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage or
annulment of marriage, there can be no default pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the
Revised Rules of Court17 in relation to Article 48 of the Family Code, 18 it is with more
reason that petitioner should likewise be entitled to notice of all proceedings.
Furthermore, the lower courts are reminded of the ruling of the Court in Asian
Transmission Corporation vs. Canlubang Sugar Estates,19 to wit:
It is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power
to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is
decided beyond them is coram non-judice and void. Therefore where a court enters a
judgment or awards relief beyond the prayer of the complaint or the scope of its
allegations the excessive relief is not merely irregular but is void for want of
jurisdiction, and is open to collateral attack.
The appellate court also ruled that a judgment of a court upon a subject within its general
jurisdiction, but which is not brought before it by any statement or claim of the parties, and
is foreign to the issues submitted for its determination, is a nullity. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is a serious error for the trial court to have rendered
judgment on issues not presented in the pleadings as it was beyond its jurisdiction to do
so. The amendment of the petition to reflect the new issues and claims against Jose was,
therefore, indispensable so as to authorize the court to act on the issue of whether the
marriage of Jose and Adriana was bigamous and the determination of the amount that
should have been awarded for the support of John Paul. When the trial court rendered
judgment beyond the allegations contained in the copy of the petition served upon Jose,
the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and deprived petitioner Lam of due
process.
Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Adriana and Jose for being
bigamous is concerned, the decision rendered by the Pasay RTC could be declared as
invalid for having been issued beyond its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, considering that Jose,
did not assail the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana in his motion for
reconsideration which he filed with the Pasay RTC. In the petitions he filed in the Court of
Appeals and with us, he likewise did not raise the issue of jurisdiction of the Pasay RTC to
receive evidence and render judgment on his previous marriages with other woman which
Page 263 of 486

were not alleged in the petition filed by Adriana. Petitioner Jose is estopped from
questioning the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana and therefore, the Court
will not undo the judgment of the Pasay RTC declaring the marriage of Adriana and Jose
null and void for being bigamous. It is an axiomatic rule that while a jurisdictional question
may be raised at any time, this, however, admits of an exception where estoppel has
supervened.20
Consequently, the Court will only resolve the lone issue raised by Jose in the present
petition for review on certiorari which is the award of support for his child, John Paul.
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be
awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and
the necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code,
to wit:
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph
shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond
the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or
to and from place of work.
Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 21 and 196,22 shall
be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the
recipient.
Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or
increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the
recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented
before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are
jointly obliged to support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family
Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation of the child.
In this case, the only evidence presented by respondent Adriana regarding her claim for
support of the child is her testimony, which is quoted below in verbatim:
Atty. Lorbes:
Q - After discovering that your husband had contracted two valid marriages prior to
your marriage, how do you feel about it?
A - I felt it is unfair to my life.

Page 264 of 486
Q - Considering the bigamous marriage contract by your husband with you, what do
you want to request to the Honorable Court?
A - I want to request the Court that the respondent be ordered to support my little
boy.
Court:
Q - How much support do you want?
A - ₱20,000.00 to ₱25,000.00
Q - Is there a prayer for support?
Atty. Lorbes:
A - None, Your Honor.
Court:
Get the original copy of the complaint, add and sign it for the support of the boy.
A - Yes, Your Honor.23
Evidently, such testimony does not establish the amount needed by the child nor the
amount that the parents are reasonably able to give.
We take note of the Compromise Agreement, approved by and embodied in the decision of
the Makati RTC, portions of which read as follows:
8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties with respect to
their son. In the best interest of the child, the Second Party shall retain care and custody,
subject to visitation rights by the First Party to be exercised through mutual arrangements.
9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First Party and the
Second Party shall initially contribute ₱250,000.00 each to a common fund, to be
increased as required, to be used solely and exclusively for the benefit of their son. Said
common fund shall be managed and administered by the Second Party, subject to periodic
accounting, until the son reaches majority age.
WHEREFORE, finding the aforequoted agreement to be in order, and not being contrary to
law, morals or public policy, the same is hereby APPROVED. Accordingly, the conjugal
partnership of gains existing between the said spouses is dissolved and a decree of
complete separation is established in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 6 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. The parties are hereby enjoined to faithfully comply with
the conditions of their Agreement as embodied in this petition and the same shall, as
Page 265 of 486

between the parties, be deemed to be a decision and/or award in the matters treated in the
aforesaid settlement.
Let a copy of this petition as well as the foregoing Decision be recorded in the proper local
civil registries and registries of property at the expense of the herein petitioners pursuant to
Article 139 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
GIVEN this 28th day of February, 1994 at Makati, Metro Manila.24
The matter of support is a question that may be raised and threshed out before the Makati
RTC as it was the court that approved the Compromise Agreement, or before the Pasay
RTC where the petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is filed. In the
interest of orderly administration of justice, the Court deems it proper that the issue on
support should be resolved by the Pasay RTC where the claim for support of the child was
initiated by Adriana.
The trial court’s action of merely ordering in open court during the July 6, 1994 hearing that
a prayer for support be written and inserted in the petition filed by respondent Adriana does
not constitute proper amendment and notice upon petitioner Jose. Consequently, herein
petitioner Jose was deprived of due process when the trial court proceeded to hear the
case on a motion to re-open and render judgment without giving Jose the requisite notice
and the opportunity to refute the new claim against him.
Verily, the manner by which the trial court arrived at the amount of support awarded to
John Paul was whimsical, arbitrary and without any basis.
Such being the case, the Court has no other recourse but to reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals and Pasay RTC insofar as the award of support is concerned and order
the remand of the case to Pasay RTC for further proceedings as to the issue regarding
support.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 51107, dated June 11, 1997 and
October 27, 1997, dismissing the appeal and denying the motion for reconsideration,
respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE but only insofar as the award of support in favor of
John Paul Chua Lam is concerned. The Decision dated August 4, 1994 and the Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109), dated August 22, 1995, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for being null and void, likewise only insofar as the matter on
support is concerned.
Let the records of Civil Case No. 94-0331 be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City (Branch 109) which is DIRECTED to reopen the trial of Civil Case No. 94-0331
with respect to the claim of Adriana Chua against Jose Lam for the support of John Paul
Chua Lam and conduct hearings for further reception of evidence for the proper
Page 266 of 486

determination of the proper amount of support to be awarded to the child John Paul Chua
Lam.
SO ORDERED.
Page 267 of 486

[8]
G.R. No. L-48219 February 28, 1979
MANUEL J. C. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court, Quezon City, COURT OF APPEALS and CELIA ILUSTRE-REYES, respondents.
Eriberto D. Ignacio for petitioner.
Gonzalo D. David for private respondent.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
06928-SP entitled "Manuel J. C. Reyes, petitioner, versus, The Hon. Leonor Ines-
Luciano as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (Quezon City) and Celia
Ilustre-Reyes, Respondents", dismissing the petition to annul the order of the respondent
Judge directing the petitioner to give support pendente lite to his wife, Celia Ilustre-Reyes,
private respondent herein, in the amount of P40,000.00 a month.1
The private petitioner, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Quezon City a complaint dated June 3, 1976 against her husband, Manuel J. C.
Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that the defendant had attempted to kill plaintiff.
The pertinent allegations of the complaint are:
6.8 On March 10, 1976, defendant went to V. Ilustre and attacked plaintiff.
He pummeled her with fist blows that floored her, then held her head and,
with intent to kill, bumped it several times against the cement floor. When
she ran upstairs to her father for protection, he pushed her at the stairway of
13 flights and she fell sliding to the ground floor. Determined to finish her off,
he again gave her a strong swing at her abdomen which floored her half
unconscious. Were it not for plaintiff's father, he would have succeeded
killing her;
6.9. On May 26, 1976, although on May 11 previous she ceased holding
office with defendant at Bel-Air Apartments elsewhere adverted to, she went
thereto to get her overnight bag. Upon seeing her, defendant yelled at her to
get out of the office. When he did not mind him, he suddenly doused her
with a glass of grape juice, kicked her several times that landed at her back
and nape, and was going to hit her with a steel tray as her driver, Ricardo
Mancera, came due to her screams for help. For fear of further injury and for
life, she rushed to Precinct 5 at united Nations Avenue, Manila Metropolitan
Police, for assistance and protection;2
Page 268 of 486
The plaintiff asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children. The defendant,
petitioner herein, opposed the application for support pendente lite on the ground that his
wife had committed adultery with her physician.
The application for support pendente lite was set for hearing and submitted for resolution
on the basis of the pleadings and the documents attached thereto by the parties.
The respondent Judge issued an order dated March 15, 1977 granting plaintiff's prayer for
alimony pendente lite in the amount of P5,000.00 a month commencing from June 1976.3
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to
support during the pendency of the case, and, alleging that even if she entitled, the amount
awarded was excessive. The respondent Judge reduced the amount from P5,000.00 to
P44,00.00 a month in an order dated June 17, 1977.4
Manuel J. C. Reyes filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals dated July 25, 1977
asking that the order granting support pendente lite to private respondent. Celia Ilustre-
Reyes, be annulled on the ground that the respondent Judge, Leonor Ines-Luciano, had
committed a grave abuse of discretion or that said order be modified inasmuch as the
amount awarded as support pendente lite is excessive.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because:
Considering the plight of the wife during the pendency of the case for legal
separation and that the husband appears to be financially capable of giving
the support, We believe that the petitioner has not presented a clear case of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent in issuing the
questioned orders. We see no compelling reason to give it due course.5
The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeal committed the following error:
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN A MANNER

AMOUNTING IT CAN ERROR OF LAW AND A DEPARTURE FROM THE
ACCEPTED NORMS LAID DOWN BY THIS HON. COURT IN THE CASES
WE SHALL LATER ON DISCUSS, IN REFUSING TO GIVE DUE COURSE
TO THE ORIGINAL PETITION FOR certiorari HEREIN AGAINST
RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES, AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDERS FOR
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE ANNEXES "F" AND "H" OF THIS PETITION
WHEN HELD THAT RESPONDENT-APPELLEE JUDGE DID NOT
COMMIT ANY ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING SAID ORDERS, FOR
THE REASONS THAT:
A. IN ACTIONS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION THE WIFE IS ENTITLED TO

SUPPORT FROM THE HUSBAND DESPITE THE FACT THAT A CASE
FOR ADULTERY HAD BEEN FILED BY THE HUSBAND AGAINST HER;
AND
Page 269 of 486

B. IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE, IT
IS ENOUGH THAT THE COURT ASCERTAIN THE KIND AND AMOUNT
OF EVIDENCE EVEN BY AFFIDAVITS ONLY OR OTHER
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE APPEARING IN THE RECORDS.6
It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support however, the
alleged adultery of wife must be established by competent evidence. The allegation that
the wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right receive support pendente
lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained wig defeat the action.7
In the instant case, at the hearing of the application for support pendente lite before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court presided by the respondent Judge, Hon. Leonor
Ines-Luciano the petitioner did not present any evidence to prove the allegation that his
wife, private respondent Celia Ilustre-Reyes, had committed adultery with any person.
The petitioner has still the opportunity to adduce evidence on the alleged adultery of his
wife when the action for legal separation is heard on the merits before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City. It is to be noted however, that as pointed out by
the respondents in their comment, the "private respondent was not asking support to be
taken from petitioner's personal funds or wherewithal, but from the conjugal property—
which, was her documentary evidence ...". 8 It is, therefore, doubtful whether adultery will
affect her right to alimony pendente lite. In Quintana vs. Lerma,9 the action for support was
based on the obligation of the husband to support his wife.
The contention of the petitioner that the order of the respondent Judge granting the private
respondent support pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month is not supported by
the allegations of the complaint for legal separation and by competent evidence has no
merit.
The complaint or legal separation contains allegations showing that on at least two
occasions the defendant, petitioner herein, had made attempts to kill the private
respondent. Thus it is alleged that on March 10, 1976, the defendant attacked plaintiff,
pummeled her with fist blows that floored her, held her head and with intent to kill, bumped
it several times against the cement floor and when she ran upstairs to her father for
protection, the petitioner pushed her at the stairway of thirteen (13) flights and she fell
sliding to the ground floor and defendant gave her a strong swing at her abdomen which
floored her half unconscious and were it not for plaintiff's father, defendant would have
succeeded in killing her. 10 It is also alleged that on May 26, 1976, the defendant doused
Celia Ilustre-Reyes with a glass of grape juice, kicked her several times at her back and
nape and was going to hit her with a steel tray if it were not for her driver who came due to
her creams for help." 11
In fixing the amount of monthly support pendente lite of P4,000,00, the respondent judge
did not act capriciously and whimsically. When she originally fixed the amount of P5,000.00
a month, the respondent Judge considered the following:
Page 270 of 486

On record for plaintiff's cause are the following: that she and defendant were
married on January 18, 1958; that she is presently unemployed and without
funds, thus, she is being supported by her father with whom she resides:
that defendant had been maltreating her and Cried to kill her; that all their
conjugal properties are in the possession of defendant who is also
president, Manager and Treasurer of their corporation namely:
1. Standard Mineral Products, which was incorporated on February 9, 1959:

presently with paid-in capital of P295,670.00; assets and liabilities of
P757,108.52; Retained Earnings of P85,654.61: and majority stockholder is
defendant;
2. Development and Technology Consultant Inc. incorporated on July 12,

1971, with paid-in capital of P200,000.00; Assets and liabilities of
P831,669.34; defendant owns 99% of the stocks; and last Retained
Earnings is P98,879.84.
3. The Contra-Prop Marine Philippines, Inc. which was incorporated on

October 3, 1975, with paid-in capital of P100,000 defendant owns 99% of
the stocks.
To secure some of the of said Agreement of Counter-Guaranty Mortgage

with Real Estate, and Real Estate Mortgage were undertaken by plaintiff of
their properties outside of other accommodations; and that she needs of
P5,000.00 a month for her support in accordance with their station in life. 12
The amount of support pendente lite was reduced to P4,000.00 inasmuch as the children

are in the custody of the petitioner and are being supported by him.
It is thus seen that the respondent judge acted with due deliberation before fixing the
amount of support pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month.
In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is not necessary to go

fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and
amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the
application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the
resolution to be entered. Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application
for support pendente lite. 13 It is enough the the facts be established by affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in the record. 14
The private respondent has submitted documents showing that the corporations controlled
by the petitioner have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of the Ministry of
Public Highways.
Considering the high cost of living due to inflation and the financial ability of the petitioner
as shown by the documents of record, We find that the amount of P4,000.00 a month
granted by the respondent Judge as alimony pendente lite to the private respondent is not
Page 271 of 486

excessive. There is no showing that the respondent Judge has committed a grave abuse of
discretion in granting said support.
In a resolution dated July 31, 1978, this Court issued a temporary restraining order
effective immediately against the enforcement of the lower court's order giving support
pendente lite to private respondent in the sum of P4,000.00 monthly commencing June
1976 and in lieu thereof to allow such support only to the extent of P1,000.00 a month. 15
Later the petitioner was required to pay the support at the rate of P1,000.00 a month which
had accumulated since June 1976 within ten (10) days from notice of the resolution:16
The private respondent acknowledged on November 20, 1978 having received from the
petitioner, through his counsel a check in the amount of P30,000.00 as payment of support
for the period from June 1976 to November 1978 or thirty (30) months at P1,000.00 a
month in compliance with the resolution of this Court dated October 9, 1978.
In view of the foregoing, the support of P4,000.00 should be made to commence or, March
1, 1979.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby denied and the decision of the Council of
Appeals sought to be reviewed is affirmed with the modification that the support pendente
lite at the rate of Four Thousand Pesos (P4.000.00) a month should commence from
March 1, 1979 without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 272 of 486

[9]
G.R. No. 182353 June 29, 2010
ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and ROSALINDA

TABUGO, Petitioners,
vs.
JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S. MIRANDA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367, which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 221, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-95-22889.
The facts, as found by the CA, follow:
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph College’s
[SJC’s] premises, the class to which [respondent Jayson Val Miranda] belonged was
conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the
tutelage of [petitioner] Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee of
[petitioner] SJC. The adviser of [Jayson’s] class is x x x Estefania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured
it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who
was the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment
by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of
his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that instance, the
compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit [Jayson’s] eye and
the different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, [Jayson’s]
eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery
and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court, [Jayson’s]
wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, [Jayson’s] mother, who
was working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent ₱36,070.00 for her fares
and had to forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the
amount of at least ₱40,000.00.
Then, too, [Jayson] and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and
wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to [petitioners’] fault and failure to exercise
the degree of care and diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be
held liable for moral damages. Also, [Jayson] sent a demand letter to [petitioners] for the
payment of his medical expenses as well as other expenses incidental thereto, which the
latter failed to heed. Hence, [Jayson] was constrained to file the complaint for damages.
Page 273 of 486
[Petitioners], therefore, should likewise compensate [Jayson] for litigation expenses,
including attorney’s fees.
On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and Tabugo] alleged
that [Jayson] was a grade six pupil of SJC in the school year 1994-1995. On November 17,
1994, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, the class to which [Jayson] belong[s] was conducting
a science experiment under the guidance and supervision of Tabugo, the class science
teacher, about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings by combining these elements in a
test tube and heating the same. Before the science experiment was conducted, [Jayson]
and his classmates were given strict instructions to follow the written procedure for the
experiment and not to look into the test tube until the heated compound had cooled off.
[Jayson], however, a person of sufficient age and discretion and completely capable of
understanding the English language and the instructions of his teacher, without waiting for
the heated compound to cool off, as required in the written procedure for the experiment
and as repeatedly explained by the teacher, violated such instructions and took a
magnifying glass and looked at the compound, which at that moment spurted out of the
test tube, a small particle hitting one of [Jayson’s] eyes.
Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and thereafter transferred
to St. Luke’s Medical Center for treatment. At the hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson],
the latter cried and apologized to his teacher for violating her instructions not to look into
the test tube until the compound had cooled off.
After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for discharge and an eye test showed
that his vision had not been impaired or affected. In order to avoid additional hospital
charges due to the delay in [Jayson’s] discharge, Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jayson’s] father,
requested SJC to advance the amount of ₱26,176.35 representing [Jayson’s] hospital bill
until his wife could arrive from abroad and pay back the money. SJC acceded to the
request.
On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through counsel, wrote SJC a
letter demanding that it should shoulder all the medical expenses of [Jayson] that had been
incurred and will be incurred further arising from the accident caused by the science
experiment. In a letter dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for SJC, represented by Sr.
Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school cannot accede to the demand
because "the accident occurred by reason of [Jayson’s] failure to comply with the written
procedure for the experiment and his teacher’s repeated warnings and instruction that no
student must face, much less look into, the opening of the test tube until the heated
compound has cooled.3
Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jayson’s father, on Jayson’s behalf,
sued petitioners for damages.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, to wit:
Page 274 of 486

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Jayson] and
against [petitioners]. This Court orders and holds the [petitioners] joint[ly] and solidarily
liable to pay [Jayson] the following amount:
1. To pay [Jayson] the amount of ₱77,338.25 as actual damages; However,

[Jayson] is ordered to reimburse [petitioner] St. Joseph College the amount of
₱26,176.36 representing the advances given to pay [Jayson’s] initial hospital
expenses or in the alternative to deduct said amount of ₱26,176.36 from the
₱77,338.25 actual damages herein awarded by way of legal compensation;
2. To pay [Jayson] the sum of ₱50,000.00 as mitigated moral damages;
3. To pay [Jayson] the sum of ₱30,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees;
4. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA. However, as previously adverted to, the CA
affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 221 dated September 6, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against
[petitioners].51avvphi1
Undaunted, petitioners appealed` by certiorari to this Court, adamant that the CA

grievously erred, thus:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE

PROXIMATE CAUSE OF JAYSON’S INJURY WAS HIS OWN ACT OF LOOKING AT THE
HEATED TEST TUBE BEFORE THE COMPOUND HAD COOLED IN COMPLETE
DISREGARD OF INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN PRIOR TO THE EXPERIMENT.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT, IN LIGHT OF THE

RULING IN THE CASE OF ST. MARY’S COLLEGE V. WILLIAM CARPITANOS, x x x
JAYSON’S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PEEKING INTO THE TEST TUBE WAS
IN FACT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY FOR WHICH THE PETITIONERS
SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF

ACTUAL DAMAGES DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF TO SUPPORT THE SAME.
IV. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES TO

[JAYSON].
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF

ATTORNEY’S FEES TO [JAYSON].
Page 275 of 486
VI. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITIONERS’
COUNTERCLAIM.6
We find no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower courts that petitioners
were "negligent since they all failed to exercise the required reasonable care, prudence,
caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the students."
Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered
conclusive between the parties.7 A review of such findings by this Court is not warranted
except for highly meritorious circumstances when: (1) the findings of a trial court are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) a lower court’s inference
from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the appellate court go
beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) the
findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are
based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on
record.8 None of the foregoing exceptions which would warrant a reversal of the assailed
decision obtains in this instance.
Yet, petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was his own
negligence in disregarding the instructions given by Tabugo prior to the experiment and
peeking into the test tube. Petitioners invoke our ruling in St. Mary’s Academy v.
Carpitanos9 which absolved St. Mary’s Academy from liability for the untimely death of its
student during a school sanctioned activity, declaring that "the negligence of petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident."
We are not convinced.
Contrary to petitioners’ assertions, the lower courts’ conclusions are borne out by the
records of this case. Both courts correctly concluded that the immediate and proximate
cause of the accident which caused injury to Jayson was the sudden and unexpected
explosion of the chemicals, independent of any intervening cause. The assailed Decision
of the CA quotes with favor the RTC decision, thus:
In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the negligence of [Jayson] was the proximate
cause of the latter’s injury. We find that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
negligence of [Jayson] when he curiously looked into the test tube when the chemicals
suddenly exploded which caused his injury, but the sudden and unexpected explosion of
the chemicals independent of any intervening cause. [Petitioners] could have prevented
the mishap if they exercised a higher degree of care, caution and foresight. The court a
quo correctly ruled that:
"All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are liable for negligence because all of them
are responsible for exercising the required reasonable care, prudence, caution and
foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the students. The individual [petitioners] are
Page 276 of 486

persons charged with the teaching and vigilance over their students as well as the
supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Based on the facts presented before this
Court, these [petitioners] were remiss in their responsibilities and lacking in the degree of
vigilance expected of them. [Petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo was inside the
classroom when the class undertook the science experiment although [Jayson] insisted
that said [petitioner] left the classroom. No evidence, however, was presented to establish
that [petitioner] Tabugo was inside the classroom for the whole duration of the experiment.
It was unnatural in the ordinary course of events that [Jayson] was brought to the school
clinic for immediate treatment not by [petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by
somebody else. The Court is inclined to believe that [petitioner] subject teacher Tabugo
was not inside the classroom at the time the accident happened. The Court is also
perplexed why none of the other students (who were eyewitnesses to the incident) testified
in Court to corroborate the story of the [petitioners]. The Court, however, understands that
these other students cannot testify for [Jayson] because [Jayson] is no longer enrolled in
said school and testifying for [Jayson] would incur the ire of school authorities. Estefania
Abdan is equally at fault as the subject adviser or teacher in charge because she exercised
control and supervision over [petitioner] Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her
obligation to insure that nothing would go wrong and that the science experiment would be
conducted safely and without any harm or injury to the students. [Petitioner] Sr. Josephini
Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine of command responsibility because the
other individual [petitioners] were under her direct control and supervision. The negligent
acts of the other individual [petitioners] were done within the scope of their assigned tasks.
xxxx
"The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph
College will not exculpate it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of
inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening
process for hiring) and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured
environment for conducting dangerous experiments. [Petitioner] school is still liable for the
wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full information on the nature
of dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and
injury to students. The fact that there has never been any accident in the past during the
conduct of science experiments is not a justification to be complacent in just preserving the
status quo and do away with creative foresight to install safety measures to protect the
students. Schools should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety
instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide protective gears and
devices to shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
"Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or university itself,
although an educational institution may be held liable under the principle of RESPONDENT
SUPERIOR. It has also been held that the liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or
negligence of its employees is primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not
conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the negligent employee."10
Under the foregoing circumstances, we are hard pressed to disturb the findings of the
RTC, which the CA affirmed.
Page 277 of 486

Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo specifically instructed her
students, including Jayson, at the start of the experiment, not to look into the heated test
tube before the compound had cooled off. Petitioners would allocate all liability and place
all blame for the accident on a twelve (12)-year-old student, herein respondent Jayson.
We disagree.
As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the concurrent
failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of
the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree
of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers.
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special
parental authority on the following persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside
the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
Petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care and caution is
demonstrated by the following:
1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to its
students although it had full information on the nature of dangerous science
experiments conducted by the students during class;
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students who
conduct experiments in class;
3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, specifically
goggles, to shield students from expected risks and dangers; and
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class
conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident involving Jayson
occurred. In any event, the size of the class—fifty (50) students— conducting the
experiment is difficult to monitor.
Page 278 of 486
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by insisting that
petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science class not to look directly into the
heated compound. Neither does our ruling in St. Mary’s preclude their liability in this case.
Unfortunately for petitioners, St. Mary’s is not in point. In that case, respondents thereat
admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was a
mechanical defect and not the recklessness of the minor, James Daniel II, in driving the
jeep. We held, thus:
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause
of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of
James Daniel II. x x x.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to
drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was
driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of
the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the
minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened
the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.11
In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the mishap which
happened during the science experiment was foreseeable by the school, its officials and
teachers. This neglect in preventing a foreseeable injury and damage equates to neglect in
exercising the utmost degree of diligence required of schools, its administrators and
teachers, and, ultimately, was the proximate cause of the damage and injury to Jayson. As
we have held in St. Mary’s, "for petitioner [St. Mary’s Academy] to be liable, there must be
a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the
injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident."12
As regards the contributory negligence of Jayson, we see no need to disturb the lower
courts’ identical rulings thereon:
As earlier discussed, the proximate cause of [Jayson’s] injury was the explosion of the
heated compound independent of any efficient intervening cause. The negligence on the
part of [petitioner] Tabugo in not making sure that the science experiment was correctly
conducted was the proximate cause or reason why the heated compound exploded and
injured not only [Jayson] but his classmates as well. However, [Jayson] is partly
responsible for his own injury, hence, he should not be entitled to recover damages in full
but must likewise bear the consequences of his own negligence. [Petitioners], therefore,
should be held liable only for the damages actually caused by their negligence.13
Page 279 of 486

Lastly, given our foregoing ruling, we likewise affirm the lower courts’ award of actual and
moral damages, and grant of attorney’s fees. The denial of petitioners’ counterclaim is also
in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68367 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Page 280 of 486

[10]
G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a

businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private
respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was
born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both
girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher
J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to
Villar's legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to
go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back
the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next
school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at Angeles City, rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor

of the petitioner and against the respondent:
1. the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T. David is hereby given to

the natural mother, the herein petitioner Daisie T. David;
2. respondent is hereby ordered to give a temporary support of P3,000.00 a

month to the subject minor Christopher J. T. David, Christine David and
Cathy Mae David to take effect upon the finality of this decision; and
Page 281 of 486

3. to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding:
We agree with the respondent-appellant's view that this is not proper in

a habeas corpus case.
Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may
be decided in a habeas corpus case contemplate a situation where the
parents are married to each other but are separated. This is so because
under the Family Code, the father and mother have joint parental authority
over their legitimate children and in case of separation of the parents there
is need to determine rightful custody of their children. The same does not
hold true in an adulterous relationship, as in the case at bar, the child born
out of such a relationship is under the parental authority of the mother by
express provision of the law. Hence, the question of custody and support
should be brought in a case singularly filed for the purpose. In point of fact,
this is more advisable in the case at bar because the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the other minor children of the petitioner-appellee
and respondent-appellant and, therefore, cannot properly provide for their
support.
Admittedly, respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he being a very rich

businessman; whereas, petitioner-appellee depends upon her sisters and
parents for support. In fact, he financially supported petitioner-appellee and
her three minor children. It is, therefore, for the best interest of Christopher J
that he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent-
appellant until the issue on custody and support shall have been determined
in a proper case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and a

NEW ONE ENTERED dismissing the petition for habeas corpus in Special
Proceeding No. 4489.
Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision.
Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty,
or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the
custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each
other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it
cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the case of Salvaña v. Gaela,1 it was
held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the
Page 282 of 486

custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of
her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception,
his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than
the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is
under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of
such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated
from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an
illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her
rightful custody of her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under
Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."3
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the
custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support
them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000
to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She augments her
income by working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly
income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can
personally attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up
for time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the
support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and
concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind
the Filipino family and have made it what it is.
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent
promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a
decent living and is able to support her children according to her means.
The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to give temporary support to petitioner
in the amount of P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action for support, after finding
that private respondent did not give any support to his three children by Daisie, except the
meager amount of P500.00 a week which he stopped giving them on June 23, 1992. He is
a rich man who professes love for his children. In fact he filed a motion for the execution of
the decision of the Court of Appeals, alleging that he had observed his son "to be
physically weak and pale because of malnutrition and deprivation of the luxury and
amenities he was accustomed to when in the former custody of the respondent." He
prayed that he be given the custody of the child so that he can provide him with the "proper
care and education."
Page 283 of 486

Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of
support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed
willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be
conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code,
a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance
fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is
entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven
years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from
the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's
custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed
preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect
the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and
here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child.
Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support
for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent
is ORDERED to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the
herein petitioner, and to give him temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending
the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Page 284 of 486

[11]
G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner,
vs.
MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of
that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive
her of custody, absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such
authority and care.
The Case
The Petition for Review1 before the Court seeks to reverse and set aside the August 28,
2002 Decision2 and the December 11, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
SP No. 69400.4 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel

shall have custody over the child Michael Kevin Pineda until he reaches ten (10)
years of age. Once the said child is beyond ten (10) years of age, the Court allows
him to choose which parent he prefers to live with pursuant to Section 6, Rule 99 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The petitioner, Joey D. Briones,
shall help support the child, shall have visitorial rights at least once a week, and
may take the child out upon the written consent of the mother.
"Acting on the petitioner’s ‘Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order’, and finding it
to be without merit, the same is DENIED."5
The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of the case in this wise:
"On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus
against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain
custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
"On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P.
Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.
Page 285 of 486

"A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the
respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin
Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
"The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son
with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as
evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married
to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan.
"The petitioner further alleges that on November 4, 1998 he caused the minor child
to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to
school. In the school year 2000-2001, the petitioner enrolled him at the nursery
school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City, where he finished the
nursery course.
"According to the petitioner, his parents, who are both retired and receiving monthly
pensions, assisted him in taking care of the child.
"On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to
the house of the petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the
minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation
at the SM Department store. They promised him that they will bring him back in the
afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring
him back as promised by them.
"The petitioner went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza,

Tuguegarao City but he was informed that the child is with the latter’s mother at
Batal Heights, Santiago City. When he went there, respondent Francisca P. Miguel
told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is with her daughter at Tuguegarao City.
"He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to
locate his son and to bring him back to him, but all his efforts were futile.
"Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City which was docketed as SPC No. 2711. However, the
said case was withdrawn ex-parte.
"The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to
him as his biological father and [as] he has demonstrated his capability to support
and educate him.
"On May 6, 2002, the respondents filed their Comment, in compliance with the May
2, 2002 Resolution of this Court.
"In their Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies the allegation of the
petitioner that he was the one who brought their child to the Philippines and stated
that she was the one who brought him here pursuant to their agreement.
Page 286 of 486

"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel likewise denies petitioner’s allegation that
respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who took the
child from the petitioner or the latter’s parents. She averred that she was the one
who took Michael Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when she returned to the
Philippines and that the latter readily agreed and consented.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that sometime in October 2001, the petitioner
was deported from Japan under the assumed name of Renato Juanzon when he
was found to have violated or committed an infraction of the laws of Japan. She
further stated that since the time the petitioner arrived in the Philippines, he has not
been gainfully employed. The custody of the child, according to respondent Loreta
P. Miguel was entrusted to petitioner’s parents while they were both working in
Japan. She added that even before the custody of the child was given to the
petitioner’s parents, she has already been living separately from the petitioner in
Japan because the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with another
woman until his deportation.
"She likewise stated in her Comment that her marriage to a Japanese national is for
the purpose of availing of the privileges of staying temporarily in Japan to pursue
her work so she could be able to send money regularly to her son in the Philippines.
She further stated that she has no intention of staying permanently in Japan as she
has been returning to the Philippines every six (6) months or as often as she could.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given to
her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Applying Article 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family Code, the CA awarded the custody of
Michael Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother, Respondent Loreta P. Miguel. While
acknowledging that petitioner truly loved and cared for his son and considering the trouble
and expense he had spent in instituting the legal action for custody, it nevertheless found
no compelling reason to separate the minor from his mother. Petitioner, however, was
granted visitorial rights.
Hence, this Petition.6
Issue
In his Memorandum, petitioner formulated the "ultimate" issue as follows: "x x x [w]hether
or not [he], as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own
child in the absence of the mother who is away."7
Page 287 of 486

The Petition has no merit. However, the assailed Decision should be modified in regard to
its erroneous application of Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Sole Issue
Who Should Have Custody of the Child?
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor child. He
insists, however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan
and during the period that she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the
minor, such that the mother would have custody when she is in the country. But when she
is abroad, he -- as the biological father -- should have custody.
According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she is abroad, she
cannot take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is that she lives most of the
time in Japan, as evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28,
2001,8 granting to her sister temporary custody over the minor.
At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is
studying,9 thus rendering petitioner’s argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas Corpus
was pending before the CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for a Hold
Departure Order,"10 alleging therein that respondents were preparing the travel papers of
the minor so the child could join his mother and her Japanese husband. The CA denied the
Motion for lack of merit.11
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the
Philippines12 explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall
be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits
paternity.13
Previously, under the provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children were generally
classified into two groups: (1) natural, whether actual or by legal fiction; and (2) spurious,
whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit.14 A natural child is one born outside a lawful
wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other.15 On the other hand, a spurious child is one born of
parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to marry each other on account of
certain legal impediments.16
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was
vested in the father or the mother recognizing them.17 If both acknowledge the child,
authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was
awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter
case, parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother.18
Page 288 of 486

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated
in the Family Code.19 Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those
who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself
gives them legitimate status.20
Article 54 of the Code provides these exceptions: "Children conceived or born before the
judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become
final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the
subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate."
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under
one category, without any distinction between natural and spurious.21 The concept of
"natural child" is important only for purposes of legitimation. 22 Without the subsequent
marriage, a natural child remains an illegitimate child.
Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under the Family Code) child, as there is
nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to
marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier
explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother,
Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his father’s recognition of him.
David v. Court of Appeals23 held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father
could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child.
The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it
follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the
minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child;24 in such a case,
the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.25
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole
parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him.26 She has the right to
keep him in her company.27 She cannot be deprived of that right,28 and she may not even
renounce or transfer it "except in the cases authorized by law."29
Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds
cause to order otherwise.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole
parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of
custody to someone else.30 In the past, the following grounds have been considered ample
justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or
abandonment,31 unemployment, immorality,32 habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease.
Page 289 of 486

Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling factor, 33 we
hold that the CA did not err in awarding care, custody, and control of the child to
Respondent Loreta. There is no showing at all that she is unfit to take charge of him.
We likewise affirm the visitorial right granted by the CA to petitioner. In Silva v. Court of
Appeals,34 the Court sustained the visitorial right of an illegitimate father over his children in
view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their
children.35 Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost,
their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor
the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-
being of the child.
However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This
provision contemplates a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each
other, but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they
are living separately de facto. In the present case, it has been established that petitioner
and Respondent Loreta were never married. Hence, that portion of the CA Decision
allowing the child to choose which parent to live with is deleted, but without disregarding
the obligation of petitioner to support the child.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with

the MODIFICATION that the disposition allowing the child, upon reaching ten (10) years of
age, to choose which parent to live with is DELETED for lack of legal basis. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Page 290 of 486

[12]
G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002
ST. MARY'S ACADEMY, petitioner,

vs.
WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES
DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals as well as

the resolution denying reconsideration, holding petitioner liable for damages arising from
an accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the
public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William
Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and
his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva
and St. Mary’s Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
"On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its
decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"‘WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the following

manner:
1. Defendant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs
William Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following sums of money:
a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S.
Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages incurred by plaintiffs for

burial and related expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorney’s fees;
Page 291 of 486

d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral damages; and to pay
costs.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are
hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated in the event of
insolvency of principal obligor St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City;
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort and
who was under special parental authority of defendant St. Mary’s Academy, is ABSOLVED
from paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged against defendants St.
Mary’s Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents;
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim

not being in order as earlier discussed in this decision, is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED."’ (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206)."
"From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St.
Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-
1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin,
along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant
Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City.
The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same
school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep
turned turtle.
"Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident."2
In due time, petitioner St. Mary’s academy appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.3
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual
damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto.4
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Mary’s Academy filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.5
Hence, this appeal.6
The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages
for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages
against the petitioner.
Page 292 of 486
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Mary’s Academy liable for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos under Articles 2187 and 2198 of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was
negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor
students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority
over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its
administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.
This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and
responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students
outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.9
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those
exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision,
instruction, or custody.10
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.11
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the
‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done;
the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it
consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.’"12
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the
documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the
recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio
Page 293 of 486

Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased
Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator who
stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that
caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause
of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of
James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents’ reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that
"those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally
and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor"
was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to
drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was
driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of
the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the
minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened
the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.
"The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred."13
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident,
petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in
the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.14 In this case, the
proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of the
Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must
be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorney’s fees as part of damages is the exception
rather than the rule.15 The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of
Page 294 of 486

the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification.16 Thus, the grant of
attorney’s fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent
Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact.1âwphi1 We have held that the
registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle
was being driven on the highways or streets."17 Hence, with the overwhelming evidence
presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred
because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but
the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals18 and that of the trial court.19 The Court remands the case to the trial court for
determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Mary’s Academy,
Dipolog City.
No costs.
Page 295 of 486

[13]
REPEAT CASE
Assignment No. 14 – 3rd case
Page 296 of 486

[14]
Repeat case from same assignment – case no. 7
Page 297 of 486

[15]
G.R. No. L-48219 February 28, 1979
MANUEL J. C. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court, Quezon City, COURT OF APPEALS and CELIA ILUSTRE-REYES, respondents.
Eriberto D. Ignacio for petitioner.
Gonzalo D. David for private respondent.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
06928-SP entitled "Manuel J. C. Reyes, petitioner, versus, The Hon. Leonor Ines-
Luciano as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (Quezon City) and Celia
Ilustre-Reyes, Respondents", dismissing the petition to annul the order of the respondent
Judge directing the petitioner to give support pendente lite to his wife, Celia Ilustre-Reyes,
private respondent herein, in the amount of P40,000.00 a month.1
The private petitioner, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Quezon City a complaint dated June 3, 1976 against her husband, Manuel J. C.
Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that the defendant had attempted to kill plaintiff.
The pertinent allegations of the complaint are:
6.8 On March 10, 1976, defendant went to V. Ilustre and attacked plaintiff.
He pummeled her with fist blows that floored her, then held her head and,
with intent to kill, bumped it several times against the cement floor. When
she ran upstairs to her father for protection, he pushed her at the stairway of
13 flights and she fell sliding to the ground floor. Determined to finish her off,
he again gave her a strong swing at her abdomen which floored her half
unconscious. Were it not for plaintiff's father, he would have succeeded
killing her;
6.9. On May 26, 1976, although on May 11 previous she ceased holding
office with defendant at Bel-Air Apartments elsewhere adverted to, she went
thereto to get her overnight bag. Upon seeing her, defendant yelled at her to
get out of the office. When he did not mind him, he suddenly doused her
with a glass of grape juice, kicked her several times that landed at her back
and nape, and was going to hit her with a steel tray as her driver, Ricardo
Mancera, came due to her screams for help. For fear of further injury and for
life, she rushed to Precinct 5 at united Nations Avenue, Manila Metropolitan
Police, for assistance and protection;2
Page 298 of 486
The plaintiff asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children. The defendant,
petitioner herein, opposed the application for support pendente lite on the ground that his
wife had committed adultery with her physician.
The application for support pendente lite was set for hearing and submitted for resolution
on the basis of the pleadings and the documents attached thereto by the parties.
The respondent Judge issued an order dated March 15, 1977 granting plaintiff's prayer for
alimony pendente lite in the amount of P5,000.00 a month commencing from June 1976.3
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to
support during the pendency of the case, and, alleging that even if she entitled, the amount
awarded was excessive. The respondent Judge reduced the amount from P5,000.00 to
P44,00.00 a month in an order dated June 17, 1977.4
Manuel J. C. Reyes filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals dated July 25, 1977
asking that the order granting support pendente lite to private respondent. Celia Ilustre-
Reyes, be annulled on the ground that the respondent Judge, Leonor Ines-Luciano, had
committed a grave abuse of discretion or that said order be modified inasmuch as the
amount awarded as support pendente lite is excessive.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because:
Considering the plight of the wife during the pendency of the case for legal
separation and that the husband appears to be financially capable of giving
the support, We believe that the petitioner has not presented a clear case of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent in issuing the
questioned orders. We see no compelling reason to give it due course.5
The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeal committed the following error:
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN A MANNER

AMOUNTING IT CAN ERROR OF LAW AND A DEPARTURE FROM THE
ACCEPTED NORMS LAID DOWN BY THIS HON. COURT IN THE CASES
WE SHALL LATER ON DISCUSS, IN REFUSING TO GIVE DUE COURSE
TO THE ORIGINAL PETITION FOR certiorari HEREIN AGAINST
RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES, AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDERS FOR
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE ANNEXES "F" AND "H" OF THIS PETITION
WHEN HELD THAT RESPONDENT-APPELLEE JUDGE DID NOT
COMMIT ANY ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING SAID ORDERS, FOR
THE REASONS THAT:
A. IN ACTIONS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION THE WIFE IS ENTITLED TO

SUPPORT FROM THE HUSBAND DESPITE THE FACT THAT A CASE
FOR ADULTERY HAD BEEN FILED BY THE HUSBAND AGAINST HER;
AND
Page 299 of 486

B. IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE, IT
IS ENOUGH THAT THE COURT ASCERTAIN THE KIND AND AMOUNT
OF EVIDENCE EVEN BY AFFIDAVITS ONLY OR OTHER
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE APPEARING IN THE RECORDS.6
It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support however, the
alleged adultery of wife must be established by competent evidence. The allegation that
the wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right receive support pendente
lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained wig defeat the action.7
In the instant case, at the hearing of the application for support pendente lite before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court presided by the respondent Judge, Hon. Leonor
Ines-Luciano the petitioner did not present any evidence to prove the allegation that his
wife, private respondent Celia Ilustre-Reyes, had committed adultery with any person.
The petitioner has still the opportunity to adduce evidence on the alleged adultery of his
wife when the action for legal separation is heard on the merits before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City. It is to be noted however, that as pointed out by
the respondents in their comment, the "private respondent was not asking support to be
taken from petitioner's personal funds or wherewithal, but from the conjugal property—
which, was her documentary evidence ...". 8 It is, therefore, doubtful whether adultery will
affect her right to alimony pendente lite. In Quintana vs. Lerma,9 the action for support was
based on the obligation of the husband to support his wife.
The contention of the petitioner that the order of the respondent Judge granting the private
respondent support pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month is not supported by
the allegations of the complaint for legal separation and by competent evidence has no
merit.
The complaint or legal separation contains allegations showing that on at least two
occasions the defendant, petitioner herein, had made attempts to kill the private
respondent. Thus it is alleged that on March 10, 1976, the defendant attacked plaintiff,
pummeled her with fist blows that floored her, held her head and with intent to kill, bumped
it several times against the cement floor and when she ran upstairs to her father for
protection, the petitioner pushed her at the stairway of thirteen (13) flights and she fell
sliding to the ground floor and defendant gave her a strong swing at her abdomen which
floored her half unconscious and were it not for plaintiff's father, defendant would have
succeeded in killing her. 10 It is also alleged that on May 26, 1976, the defendant doused
Celia Ilustre-Reyes with a glass of grape juice, kicked her several times at her back and
nape and was going to hit her with a steel tray if it were not for her driver who came due to
her creams for help." 11
In fixing the amount of monthly support pendente lite of P4,000,00, the respondent judge
did not act capriciously and whimsically. When she originally fixed the amount of P5,000.00
a month, the respondent Judge considered the following:
Page 300 of 486

On record for plaintiff's cause are the following: that she and defendant were
married on January 18, 1958; that she is presently unemployed and without
funds, thus, she is being supported by her father with whom she resides:
that defendant had been maltreating her and Cried to kill her; that all their
conjugal properties are in the possession of defendant who is also
president, Manager and Treasurer of their corporation namely:
1. Standard Mineral Products, which was incorporated on February 9, 1959:

presently with paid-in capital of P295,670.00; assets and liabilities of
P757,108.52; Retained Earnings of P85,654.61: and majority stockholder is
defendant;
2. Development and Technology Consultant Inc. incorporated on July 12,

1971, with paid-in capital of P200,000.00; Assets and liabilities of
P831,669.34; defendant owns 99% of the stocks; and last Retained
Earnings is P98,879.84.
3. The Contra-Prop Marine Philippines, Inc. which was incorporated on

October 3, 1975, with paid-in capital of P100,000 defendant owns 99% of
the stocks.
To secure some of the of said Agreement of Counter-Guaranty Mortgage

with Real Estate, and Real Estate Mortgage were undertaken by plaintiff of
their properties outside of other accommodations; and that she needs of
P5,000.00 a month for her support in accordance with their station in life. 12
The amount of support pendente lite was reduced to P4,000.00 inasmuch as the children

are in the custody of the petitioner and are being supported by him.
It is thus seen that the respondent judge acted with due deliberation before fixing the
amount of support pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month.
In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is not necessary to go

fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and
amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the
application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the
resolution to be entered. Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application
for support pendente lite. 13 It is enough the the facts be established by affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in the record. 14
The private respondent has submitted documents showing that the corporations controlled
by the petitioner have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of the Ministry of
Public Highways.
Considering the high cost of living due to inflation and the financial ability of the petitioner
as shown by the documents of record, We find that the amount of P4,000.00 a month
granted by the respondent Judge as alimony pendente lite to the private respondent is not
Page 301 of 486

excessive. There is no showing that the respondent Judge has committed a grave abuse of
discretion in granting said support.
In a resolution dated July 31, 1978, this Court issued a temporary restraining order
effective immediately against the enforcement of the lower court's order giving support
pendente lite to private respondent in the sum of P4,000.00 monthly commencing June
1976 and in lieu thereof to allow such support only to the extent of P1,000.00 a month. 15
Later the petitioner was required to pay the support at the rate of P1,000.00 a month which
had accumulated since June 1976 within ten (10) days from notice of the resolution:16
The private respondent acknowledged on November 20, 1978 having received from the
petitioner, through his counsel a check in the amount of P30,000.00 as payment of support
for the period from June 1976 to November 1978 or thirty (30) months at P1,000.00 a
month in compliance with the resolution of this Court dated October 9, 1978.
In view of the foregoing, the support of P4,000.00 should be made to commence or, March
1, 1979.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby denied and the decision of the Council of
Appeals sought to be reviewed is affirmed with the modification that the support pendente
lite at the rate of Four Thousand Pesos (P4.000.00) a month should commence from
March 1, 1979 without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 302 of 486

[16]
G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 of the 27 May 2005 Decision2 and 2 August 2005
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Office of the President, which in turn affirmed the decision of
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs denying petitioner’s request to revert to the use of her
maiden name in her replacement passport.
The Facts
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport
was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza,
the following entries appear in her passport: "Rallonza" as her surname, "Maria Virginia" as
her given name, and "Remo" as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her
passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport
with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a
request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.
Petitioner’s request having been denied, Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III, representing
petitioner, wrote then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siason expressing a similar
request.
On 28 August 2000, the DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota, denied the
request, stating thus:
This has reference to your letter dated 17 August 2000 regarding one Ms. Maria Virginia V.
Remo who is applying for renewal of her passport using her maiden name.
This Office is cognizant of the provision in the law that it is not obligatory for a married
woman to use her husband’s name. Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application
only if the married name has not been used in previous application. The Implementing
Rules and Regulations for Philippine Passport Act of 1996 clearly defines the conditions
when a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of
annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remo’s case does not meet
any of these conditions.4 (Emphasis supplied)
Page 303 of 486
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was denied in a letter
dated 13 October 2000.5
On 15 November 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President.
On 27 July 2004, the Office of the President dismissed the appeal6 and ruled that Section
5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 "offers no
leeway for any other interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or
declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for
passport purposes." The Office of the President further held that in case of conflict between
a general and special law, the latter will control the former regardless of the respective
dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general law, it should yield to RA 8239.
On 28 October 2004, the Office of the President denied the motion for reconsideration.7
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
In its Decision of 27 May 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the
ruling of the Office of the President. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the resolution dated July
27, 2004, and the order dated October 28, 2004 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case
No. 001-A-9344 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution
dated 2 August 2005.
Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
The Court of Appeals found no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code9 and Section
5(d) of RA 8239.10 The Court of Appeals held that for passport application and issuance
purposes, RA 8239 limits the instances when a married woman applicant may exercise the
option to revert to the use of her maiden name such as in a case of a divorce decree,
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage. Since there was no showing that petitioner's
marriage to Francisco Rallonza has been annulled, declared void or a divorce decree has
been granted to them, petitioner cannot simply revert to her maiden name in the
replacement passport after she had adopted her husband’s surname in her old passport.
Hence, according to the Court of Appeals, respondent was justified in refusing the request
of petitioner to revert to her maiden name in the replacement passport.1avvphi1
The Issue
Page 304 of 486
The sole issue in this case is whether petitioner, who originally used her husband’s
surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the
replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a married woman,
Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife,
such as "Mrs."
We agree with petitioner that the use of the word "may" in the above provision indicates
that the use of the husband’s surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. This
has been settled in the case of Yasin v. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court.11
In Yasin,12 petitioner therein filed with the Shari’a District Court a "Petition to resume the
use of maiden name" in view of the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to
another woman. In ruling in favor of petitioner therein, the Court explained that:
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her
husband’s name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband’s full name or by adding
her husband’s surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370,
Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of
death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee
need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her
maiden name as use of her former husband’s is optional and not obligatory for her
(Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When petitioner married her
husband, she did not change her but only her civil status. Neither was she required to
secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law
requires it. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband
in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code.13 She is therefore allowed to
use not only any of the three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name
upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is
married because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil
Page 305 of 486

status. Further, this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames
indicate descent.14
In the present case, petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting and who opted to use her
husband’s surname in her old passport, requested to resume her maiden name in the
replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from using her maiden name.
Petitioner cites Yasin as the applicable precedent. However, Yasin is not squarely in point
with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is
already married to another woman, petitioner’s marriage remains subsisting. Another point,
Yasin did not involve a request to resume one’s maiden name in a replacement passport,
but a petition to resume one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution of one’s marriage.
The law governing passport issuance is RA 8239 and the applicable provision in this case
is Section 5(d), which states:
Sec. 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. — No passport shall be issued to an

applicant unless the Secretary or his duly authorized representative is satisfied that the
applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied with the following requirements: x x x
(d) In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced or widowed or whose marriage
has been annulled or declared by court as void, a copy of the certificate of marriage, court
decree of separation, divorce or annulment or certificate of death of the deceased spouse
duly issued and authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That
in case of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration of marriage as void, the woman
applicant may revert to the use of her maiden name: Provided, further, That such divorce is
recognized under existing laws of the Philippines; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
argues that the highlighted proviso in Section 5(d) of RA 8239 "limits the instances when a
married woman may be allowed to revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport."
These instances are death of husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage.
Significantly, Section 1, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8239
provides:
The passport can be amended only in the following cases:
a) Amendment of woman’s name due to marriage;
b) Amendment of woman’s name due to death of spouse, annulment of marriage or

divorce initiated by a foreign spouse; or
c) Change of surname of a child who is legitimated by virtue of a subsequent

marriage of his parents.
Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case outside of the
purview of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married woman may revert
to the use of her maiden name), she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement
Page 306 of 486

passport.15 This prohibition, according to petitioner, conflicts with and, thus, operates as an
implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner is mistaken. The conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and Section 5(d)
of RA 8239 is more imagined than real. RA 8239, including its implementing rules and
regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her
passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the DFA allows a married woman who applies
for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required
to adopt her husband's surname.16
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s
surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s
surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an
authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using
her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously
using her maiden name.17
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport,
she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in
Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3)
annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists,
she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a
married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the
severance of the marriage.
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a
special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of
Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in
statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law,18 thus:
[I]t is a familiar rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary
repugnancy between a general and a special law or provision, the latter will control the
former without regard to the respective dates of passage.19
Moreover, petitioner’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an
implied repeal is disfavored. T he apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws
should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be effective.20 For a law to
operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must
be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act.21 This petitioner failed to
establish.1avvphi1
The Court notes that petitioner would not have encountered any problems in the
replacement passport had she opted to continuously and consistently use her maiden
name from the moment she was married and from the time she first applied for a Philippine
passport. However, petitioner consciously chose to use her husband’s surname before, in
her previous passport application, and now desires to resume her maiden name. If we
allow petitioner’s present request, definitely nothing prevents her in the future from
Page 307 of 486

requesting to revert to the use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in
one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official
documents,22 cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in
the records of passport holders will arise. Thus, for passport issuance purposes, a married
woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage subsists, may not change her family name at
will.
The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport
applicant’s constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and
maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from
it23 as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The
holder is merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid and the same may not be
surrendered to any person or entity other than the government or its representative.24
As the OSG correctly pointed out:
[T]he issuance of passports is impressed with public interest. A passport is an official

document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries. It is issued by the Philippine government to its citizens requesting other
governments to allow its holder to pass safely and freely, and in case of need, to give
him/her aid and protection. x x x
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, it is within respondent’s competence to regulate any
amendments intended to be made therein, including the denial of unreasonable and
whimsical requests for amendments such as in the instant case.25
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 27 May 2005 Decision and 2
August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710.
SO ORDERED.
Page 308 of 486

Assignment 16 SAME CASES FROM THIS ASSIGNMENT NO. 15
1. Sayson v. Court of Appeals 209 SCRA 518

2. Lam v. Chua 426 SCRA 29
3. Reyes v. Luciano 88 SCRa 803
4. Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs 614 SCRA 281
Page 309 of 486

[1]
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1,
2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed
the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem,
docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the
instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18)
months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son
in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00
more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines,
respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan,
Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife
established a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality
of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support
from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph
Page 310 of 486
E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also
submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein
respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof,
states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately
deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a
fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic
abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order
against respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted
bail.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which
respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the
protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the
instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the
dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute
an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this
case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional
liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so
makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the
Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s
nationality."24
Page 311 of 486

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in
the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since
the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in
regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he
cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless
it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support
tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a
parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima
faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition
despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with
the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, 28 which lays down the
instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme
Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition
with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation
was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise
only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of
appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error
under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby
judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of
appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court
only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)
Page 312 of 486

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted,
and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response
thereto concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts,
i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions
punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties.
The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive
ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases.
Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only
waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case,
considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail
over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious.
Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is
imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation
to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce
decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from
complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis
presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated
topetitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the
New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since
Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words,
insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies
to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights
and duties.36
Page 313 of 486

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-
Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is
obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties
are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even
when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s
son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant
obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to
support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law. 40 In the present case, respondent hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either
before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of
Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is
the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands
as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the
instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a

foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the
nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by
respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after
the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the
Page 314 of 486

second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is
specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent
states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not
punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of
America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the
jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not
find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one
or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is
still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to
be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to

support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
Page 315 of 486

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support
topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman
or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or
her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or
child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or
effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support
legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient
financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find

strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to
Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal
laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and
sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to
treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of
respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such,
Page 316 of 486

our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is
likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that
there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal
liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime 52 under Section 24 of
R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe
in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10)
years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the
crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s
child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the
truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this
issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct
further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
Page 317 of 486

[2]
G.R. No. 145587 October 26, 2007
EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELEAZAR S. GRAN, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the October 18, 2000 Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 56120 which affirmed the January 15, 1999
Decision3 and September 30, 1999 Resolution4 rendered by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) (Third Division) in POEA ADJ (L) 94-06-2194, ordering Expertise
Search International (ESI), EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. (EDI), and Omar Ahmed Ali
Bin Bechr Est. (OAB) jointly and severally to pay Eleazar S. Gran (Gran) the amount of
USD 16,150.00 as unpaid salaries.
The Facts
Petitioner EDI is a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of Overseas Filipino

Workers (OFWs).5 ESI is another recruitment agency which collaborated with EDI to
process the documentation and deployment of private respondent to Saudi Arabia.
Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by ESI to work for
OAB, in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.6
It appears that OAB asked EDI through its October 3, 1993 letter for curricula vitae of
qualified applicants for the position of "Computer Specialist."7 In a facsimile transmission
dated November 29, 1993, OAB informed EDI that, from the applicants' curricula
vitae submitted to it for evaluation, it selected Gran for the position of "Computer
Specialist." The faxed letter also stated that if Gran agrees to the terms and conditions of
employment contained in it, one of which was a monthly salary of SR (Saudi Riyal)
2,250.00 (USD 600.00), EDI may arrange for Gran's immediate dispatch.8
After accepting OAB's offer of employment, Gran signed an employment contract 9 that
granted him a monthly salary of USD 850.00 for a period of two years. Gran was then
deployed to Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on February 7, 1994.
Upon arrival in Riyadh, Gran questioned the discrepancy in his monthly salary—his
employment contract stated USD 850.00; while his Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA) Information Sheet indicated USD 600.00 only. However, through the
assistance of the EDI office in Riyadh, OAB agreed to pay Gran USD 850.00 a month.10
Page 318 of 486
After Gran had been working for about five months for OAB, his employment was
terminated through OAB's July 9, 1994 letter,11 on the following grounds:
1. Non-compliance to contract requirements by the recruitment agency primarily on

your salary and contract duration.
2. Non-compliance to pre-qualification requirements by the recruitment agency[,]

vide OAB letter ref. F-5751-93, dated October 3, 1993.12
3. Insubordination or disobedience to Top Management Order and/or instructions

(non-submittal of daily activity reports despite several instructions).
On July 11, 1994, Gran received from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00 representing
his final pay, and on the same day, he executed a Declaration13 releasing OAB from any
financial obligation or otherwise, towards him.
After his arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint, on July 21, 1994, against
ESI/EDI, OAB, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, and Western Guaranty
Corporation with the NLRC, National Capital Region, Quezon City, which was docketed as
POEA ADJ (L) 94-06-2194 for underpayment of wages/salaries and illegal dismissal.
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
In his February 10, 1998 Decision,14 Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday, to whom Gran's case
was assigned, ruled that there was neither underpayment nor illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter reasoned that there was no underpayment of salaries since according to
the POEA-Overseas Contract Worker (OCW) Information Sheet, Gran's monthly salary
was USD 600.00, and in his Confirmation of Appointment as Computer Specialist, his
monthly basic salary was fixed at SR 2,500.00, which was equivalent to USD 600.00.
Arbiter Caday also cited the Declaration executed by Gran, to justify that Gran had no
claim for unpaid salaries or wages against OAB.
With regard to the issue of illegal dismissal, the Labor Arbiter found that Gran failed to
refute EDI's allegations; namely, (1) that Gran did not submit a single activity report of his
daily activity as dictated by company policy; (2) that he was not qualified for the job as
computer specialist due to his insufficient knowledge in programming and lack of
knowledge in ACAD system; (3) that Gran refused to follow management's instruction for
him to gain more knowledge of the job to prove his worth as computer specialist; (4) that
Gran's employment contract had never been substituted; (5) and that Gran was paid a
monthly salary of USD 850.00, and USD 350.00 monthly as food allowance.
Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter decided that Gran was validly dismissed from his work due
to insubordination, disobedience, and his failure to submit daily activity reports.
Thus, on February 10, 1998, Arbiter Caday dismissed Gran's complaint for lack of merit.
Page 319 of 486
Dissatisfied, Gran filed an Appeal15 on April 6, 1998 with the NLRC, Third Division.
However, it appears from the records that Gran failed to furnish EDI with a copy of his
Appeal Memorandum.
The Ruling of the NLRC
The NLRC held that EDI's seemingly harmless transfer of Gran's contract to ESI is actually
"reprocessing," which is a prohibited transaction under Article 34 (b) of the Labor Code.
This scheme constituted misrepresentation through the conspiracy between EDI and ESI in
misleading Gran and even POEA of the actual terms and conditions of the OFW's
employment. In addition, it was found that Gran did not commit any act that constituted a
legal ground for dismissal. The alleged non-compliance with contractual stipulations
relating to Gran's salary and contract duration, and the absence of pre-qualification
requirements cannot be attributed to Gran but to EDI, which dealt directly with OAB. In
addition, the charge of insubordination was not substantiated, and Gran was not even
afforded the required notice and investigation on his alleged offenses.
Thus, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision and rendered a new one, the
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is SET ASIDE. Respondents Expertise

Search International, Inc., EDI Staffbuilders Int'l., Inc. and Omar Ahmed Ali Bin
Bechr Est. (OAB) are hereby ordered jointly and severally liable to pay the
complainant Eleazar Gran the Philippine peso equivalent at the time of actual
payment of SIXTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY US DOLLARS
(US$16,150.00) representing his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract.
SO ORDERED.16
Gran then filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment17 on March 29, 1999 with the NLRC
and petitioner receiving a copy of this motion on the same date.18
To prevent the execution, petitioner filed an Opposition19 to Gran's motion arguing that the
Writ of Execution cannot issue because it was not notified of the appellate proceedings
before the NLRC and was not given a copy of the memorandum of appeal nor any
opportunity to participate in the appeal.
Seeing that the NLRC did not act on Gran's motion after EDI had filed its Opposition,
petitioner filed, on August 26, 1999, a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC Decision
after receiving a copy of the Decision on August 16, 1999.20
The NLRC then issued a Resolution21 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,

ratiocinating that the issues and arguments raised in the motion "had already been amply
discussed, considered, and ruled upon" in the Decision, and that there was "no cogent
reason or patent or palpable error that warrant any disturbance thereof."
Page 320 of 486

Unconvinced of the NLRC's reasoning, EDI filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
Petitioner claimed in its petition that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
giving due course to the appeal despite Gran's failure to perfect the appeal.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA subsequently ruled on the procedural and substantive issues of EDI's petition.
On the procedural issue, the appellate court held that "Gran's failure to furnish a copy of his
appeal memorandum [to EDI was] a mere formal lapse, an excusable neglect and not a
jurisdictional defect which would justify the dismissal of his appeal."22 The court also held
that petitioner EDI failed to prove that private respondent was terminated for a valid cause
and in accordance with due process; and that Gran's Declaration releasing OAB from any
monetary obligation had no force and effect. The appellate court ratiocinated that EDI had
the burden of proving Gran's incompetence; however, other than the termination letter, no
evidence was presented to show how and why Gran was considered to be incompetent.
The court held that since the law requires the recruitment agencies to subject OFWs to
trade tests before deployment, Gran must have been competent and qualified; otherwise,
he would not have been hired and deployed abroad.
As for the charge of insubordination and disobedience due to Gran's failure to submit a
"Daily Activity Report," the appellate court found that EDI failed to show that the
submission of the "Daily Activity Report" was a part of Gran's duty or the company's policy.
The court also held that even if Gran was guilty of insubordination, he should have just
been suspended or reprimanded, but not dismissed.
The CA also held that Gran was not afforded due process, given that OAB did not abide by
the twin notice requirement. The court found that Gran was terminated on the same day he
received the termination letter, without having been apprised of the bases of his dismissal
or afforded an opportunity to explain his side.
Finally, the CA held that the Declaration signed by Gran did not bar him from demanding
benefits to which he was entitled. The appellate court found that the Declaration was in the
form of a quitclaim, and as such is frowned upon as contrary to public policy especially
where the monetary consideration given in the Declaration was very much less than what
he was legally entitled to—his backwages amounting to USD 16,150.00.
As a result of these findings, on October 18, 2000, the appellate court denied the petition to
set aside the NLRC Decision.
Hence, this instant petition is before the Court.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
Page 321 of 486

I. WHETHER THE FAILURE OF GRAN TO FURNISH A COPY OF HIS APPEAL
MEMORANDUM TO PETITIONER EDI WOULD CONSTITUTE A
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT AND A DEPRIVATION OF PETITIONER EDI'S RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS AS WOULD JUSTIFY THE DISMISSAL OF GRAN'S APPEAL.
II. WHETHER PETITIONER EDI HAS ESTABLISHED BY WAY OF SUBSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE THAT GRAN'S TERMINATION WAS JUSTIFIABLE BY REASON OF
INCOMPETENCE. COROLLARY HERETO, WHETHER THE PRIETO VS. NLRC
RULING, AS APPLIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, IS APPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
III. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED BY WAY OF SUBSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE THAT GRAN'S TERMINATION WAS JUSTIFIABLE BY REASON OF
INSUBORDINATION AND DISOBEDIENCE.
IV. WHETHER GRAN WAS AFFORDED DUE PROCESS PRIOR TO

TERMINATION.
V. WHETHER GRAN IS ENTITLED TO BACKWAGES FOR THE UNEXPIRED

PORTION OF HIS CONTRACT.23
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit except with respect to Gran's failure to furnish EDI with his Appeal
Memorandum filed with the NLRC.
First Issue: NLRC's Duty is to Require Respondent to Provide Petitioner a Copy of

the Appeal
Petitioner EDI claims that Gran's failure to furnish it a copy of the Appeal Memorandum
constitutes a jurisdictional defect and a deprivation of due process that would warrant a
rejection of the appeal.
This position is devoid of merit.
In a catena of cases, it was ruled that failure of appellant to furnish a copy of the

appeal to the adverse party is not fatal to the appeal.
In Estrada v. National Labor Relations Commission,24 this Court set aside the order of the
NLRC which dismissed an appeal on the sole ground that the appellant did not furnish the
appellee a memorandum of appeal contrary to the requirements of Article 223 of the New
Labor Code and Section 9, Rule XIII of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Also, in J.D. Magpayo Customs Brokerage Corp. v. NLRC, the order of dismissal of an
appeal to the NLRC based on the ground that "there is no showing whatsoever that a copy
of the appeal was served by the appellant on the appellee"25 was annulled. The Court
ratiocinated as follows:
Page 322 of 486
The failure to give a copy of the appeal to the adverse party was a mere formal
lapse, an excusable neglect. Time and again We have acted on petitions to review
decisions of the Court of Appeals even in the absence of proof of service of a copy
thereof to the Court of Appeals as required by Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of
Court. We act on the petitions and simply require the petitioners to comply
with the rule.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
The J.D. Magpayo ruling was reiterated in Carnation Philippines Employees Labor Union-

FFW v. National Labor Relations Commission,27 Pagdonsalan v. NLRC,28 and in Sunrise
Manning Agency, Inc. v. NLRC.29
Thus, the doctrine that evolved from these cases is that failure to furnish the adverse party
with a copy of the appeal is treated only as a formal lapse, an excusable neglect, and
hence, not a jurisdictional defect. Accordingly, in such a situation, the appeal should not be
dismissed; however, it should not be given due course either. As enunciated in J.D.
Magpayo, the duty that is imposed on the NLRC, in such a case, is to require the
appellant to comply with the rule that the opposing party should be provided with a
copy of the appeal memorandum.
While Gran's failure to furnish EDI with a copy of the Appeal Memorandum is excusable,
the abject failure of the NLRC to order Gran to furnish EDI with the Appeal Memorandum
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The records reveal that the NLRC discovered that Gran failed to furnish EDI a copy of the
Appeal Memorandum. The NLRC then ordered Gran to present proof of service. In
compliance with the order, Gran submitted a copy of Camp Crame Post Office's list of
mail/parcels sent on April 7, 1998.30 The post office's list shows that private respondent
Gran sent two pieces of mail on the same date: one addressed to a certain Dan O. de
Guzman of Legaspi Village, Makati; and the other appears to be addressed to Neil B.
Garcia (or Gran),31 of Ermita, Manila—both of whom are not connected with petitioner.
This mailing list, however, is not a conclusive proof that EDI indeed received a copy of the
Appeal Memorandum.
Sec. 5 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure (1990) provides for the proof and completeness of
service in proceedings before the NLRC:
Section 5.32 Proof and completeness of service.—The return is prima facie proof of

the facts indicated therein. Service by registered mail is complete upon receipt
by the addressee or his agent; but if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the
post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service
shall take effect after such time. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, if the service is done through registered mail, it is only deemed complete when the
addressee or his agent received the mail or after five (5) days from the date of first notice
of the postmaster. However, the NLRC Rules do not state what would constitute proper
proof of service.
Page 323 of 486

Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, provides for proofs of service:
Section 13. Proof of service.—Proof of personal service shall consist of a written

admission of the party served or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of
the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of
service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of
the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If
service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and
registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be
filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the
unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given
by the postmaster to the addressee (emphasis supplied).
Based on the foregoing provision, it is obvious that the list submitted by Gran is not
conclusive proof that he had served a copy of his appeal memorandum to EDI, nor is it
conclusive proof that EDI received its copy of the Appeal Memorandum. He should have
submitted an affidavit proving that he mailed the Appeal Memorandum together with the
registry receipt issued by the post office; afterwards, Gran should have immediately filed
the registry return card.
Hence, after seeing that Gran failed to attach the proof of service, the NLRC should not
have simply accepted the post office's list of mail and parcels sent; but it should have
required Gran to properly furnish the opposing parties with copies of his Appeal
Memorandum as prescribed in J.D. Magpayo and the other cases. The NLRC should
not have proceeded with the adjudication of the case, as this constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
The glaring failure of NLRC to ensure that Gran should have furnished petitioner EDI a
copy of the Appeal Memorandum before rendering judgment reversing the dismissal of
Gran's complaint constitutes an evasion of the pertinent NLRC Rules and established
jurisprudence. Worse, this failure deprived EDI of procedural due process guaranteed by
the Constitution which can serve as basis for the nullification of proceedings in the appeal
before the NLRC. One can only surmise the shock and dismay that OAB, EDI, and ESI
experienced when they thought that the dismissal of Gran's complaint became final, only to
receive a copy of Gran's Motion for Execution of Judgment which also informed them that
Gran had obtained a favorable NLRC Decision. This is not level playing field and absolutely
unfair and discriminatory against the employer and the job recruiters. The rights of the
employers to procedural due process cannot be cavalierly disregarded for they too have
rights assured under the Constitution.
However, instead of annulling the dispositions of the NLRC and remanding the case for
further proceedings we will resolve the petition based on the records before us to avoid a
protracted litigation.33
The second and third issues have a common matter—whether there was just cause for
Gran's dismissal—hence, they will be discussed jointly.
Page 324 of 486

Second and Third Issues: Whether Gran's dismissal is justifiable by reason of
incompetence, insubordination, and disobedience
In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the OFW, the
local recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are governed by the employment
contract. A contract freely entered into is considered law between the parties; and hence,
should be respected. In formulating the contract, the parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.34
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi
Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for
termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci
intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to
the termination of the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to
be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a
foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.35
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus,
the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play.36 Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is
not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. 37 Thus, we apply
Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.
Petitioner EDI claims that it had proven that Gran was legally dismissed due to
incompetence and insubordination or disobedience.
This claim has no merit.
In illegal dismissal cases, it has been established by Philippine law and jurisprudence that
the employer should prove that the dismissal of employees or personnel is legal and just.
Section 33 of Article 277 of the Labor Code38 states that:
ART. 277. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS39
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right
to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and
without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the
employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a
written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford
the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance
of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and
Page 325 of 486

Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the
right of the workers to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a
complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause shall rest on the employer. x x x
In many cases, it has been held that in termination disputes or illegal dismissal cases, the
employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal is for just and valid causes; and
failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified and therefore
illegal.40 Taking into account the character of the charges and the penalty meted to an
employee, the employer is bound to adduce clear, accurate, consistent, and convincing
evidence to prove that the dismissal is valid and legal.41 This is consistent with the principle
of security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution and reinforced by Article 277 (b) of
the Labor Code of the Philippines.42
In the instant case, petitioner claims that private respondent Gran was validly dismissed for
just cause, due to incompetence and insubordination or disobedience. To prove its
allegations, EDI submitted two letters as evidence. The first is the July 9, 1994 termination
letter,43 addressed to Gran, from Andrea E. Nicolaou, Managing Director of OAB. The
second is an unsigned April 11, 1995 letter 44 from OAB addressed to EDI and ESI, which
outlined the reasons why OAB had terminated Gran's employment.
Petitioner claims that Gran was incompetent for the Computer Specialist position because
he had "insufficient knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of [the] ACAD
system."45 Petitioner also claims that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to insubordination
or disobedience because he continually failed to submit the required "Daily Activity
Reports."46 However, other than the abovementioned letters, no other evidence was
presented to show how and why Gran was considered incompetent, insubordinate, or
disobedient. Petitioner EDI had clearly failed to overcome the burden of proving that Gran
was validly dismissed.
Petitioner's imputation of incompetence on private respondent due to his "insufficient

knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of the ACAD system" based only on the
above mentioned letters, without any other evidence, cannot be given credence.
An allegation of incompetence should have a factual foundation. Incompetence may be

shown by weighing it against a standard, benchmark, or criterion. However, EDI failed to
establish any such bases to show how petitioner found Gran incompetent.
In addition, the elements that must concur for the charge of insubordination or willful
disobedience to prosper were not present.
In Micro Sales Operation Network v. NLRC, we held that:
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, the following twin
elements must concur: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful,
that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated
Page 326 of 486

must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain
to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.47
EDI failed to discharge the burden of proving Gran's insubordination or willful

disobedience. As indicated by the second requirement provided for in Micro Sales
Operation Network, in order to justify willful disobedience, we must determine whether the
order violated by the employee is reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and
pertains to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. In the case at bar,
petitioner failed to show that the order of the company which was violated—the submission
of "Daily Activity Reports"—was part of Gran's duties as a Computer Specialist. Before the
Labor Arbiter, EDI should have provided a copy of the company policy, Gran's job
description, or any other document that would show that the "Daily Activity Reports" were
required for submission by the employees, more particularly by a Computer Specialist.
Even though EDI and/or ESI were merely the local employment or recruitment agencies
and not the foreign employer, they should have adduced additional evidence to
convincingly show that Gran's employment was validly and legally terminated. The burden
devolves not only upon the foreign-based employer but also on the employment or
recruitment agency for the latter is not only an agent of the former, but is also solidarily
liable with the foreign principal for any claims or liabilities arising from the dismissal of the
worker.48
Thus, petitioner failed to prove that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to

incompetence, insubordination, or willful disobedience.
Petitioner also raised the issue that Prieto v. NLRC,49 as used by the CA in its Decision, is
not applicable to the present case.
In Prieto, this Court ruled that "[i]t is presumed that before their deployment, the petitioners
were subjected to trade tests required by law to be conducted by the recruiting agency to
insure employment of only technically qualified workers for the foreign principal." 50 The CA,
using the ruling in the said case, ruled that Gran must have passed the test; otherwise, he
would not have been hired. Therefore, EDI was at fault when it deployed Gran who was
allegedly "incompetent" for the job.
According to petitioner, the Prieto ruling is not applicable because in the case at hand,

Gran misrepresented himself in his curriculum vitae as a Computer Specialist; thus, he was
not qualified for the job for which he was hired.
We disagree.
The CA is correct in applying Prieto. The purpose of the required trade test is to weed out
incompetent applicants from the pool of available workers. It is supposed to reveal
applicants with false educational backgrounds, and expose bogus qualifications. Since EDI
deployed Gran to Riyadh, it can be presumed that Gran had passed the required trade test
and that Gran is qualified for the job. Even if there was no objective trade test done by EDI,
it was still EDI's responsibility to subject Gran to a trade test; and its failure to do so only
Page 327 of 486

weakened its position but should not in any way prejudice Gran. In any case, the issue is
rendered moot and academic because Gran's incompetency is unproved.
Fourth Issue: Gran was not Afforded Due Process
As discussed earlier, in the absence of proof of Saudi laws, Philippine Labor laws and
regulations shall govern the relationship between Gran and EDI. Thus, our laws and rules
on the requisites of due process relating to termination of employment shall apply.
Petitioner EDI claims that private respondent Gran was afforded due process, since he
was allowed to work and improve his capabilities for five months prior to his
termination.51 EDI also claims that the requirements of due process, as enunciated
in Santos, Jr. v. NLRC,52 and Malaya Shipping Services, Inc. v. NLRC,53 cited by the CA in
its Decision, were properly observed in the present case.
This position is untenable.
In Agabon v. NLRC,54 this Court held that:
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the
employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity
to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a
notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an
opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the
decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under
Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of
Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his
separation.
Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2) notices before
their employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice to apprise the employees of their
fault, and (2) a second notice to communicate to the employees that their employment is
being terminated. In between the first and second notice, the employees should be given a
hearing or opportunity to defend themselves personally or by counsel of their choice.55
A careful examination of the records revealed that, indeed, OAB's manner of dismissing
Gran fell short of the two notice requirement. While it furnished Gran the written notice
informing him of his dismissal, it failed to furnish Gran the written notice apprising him of
the charges against him, as prescribed by the Labor Code. 56 Consequently, he was denied
the opportunity to respond to said notice. In addition, OAB did not schedule a hearing or
conference with Gran to defend himself and adduce evidence in support of his defenses.
Moreover, the July 9, 1994 termination letter was effective on the same day. This shows
that OAB had already condemned Gran to dismissal, even before Gran was furnished the
termination letter. It should also be pointed out that OAB failed to give Gran the chance to
be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a representative in accordance with
Article 277 of the Labor Code. Clearly, there was no intention to provide Gran with due
process. Summing up, Gran was notified and his employment arbitrarily terminated on the
Page 328 of 486

same day, through the same letter, and for unjustified grounds. Obviously, Gran was not
afforded due process.
Pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Agabon,57 an employer is liable to pay nominal
damages as indemnity for violating the employee's right to statutory due process. Since
OAB was in breach of the due process requirements under the Labor Code and its
regulations, OAB, ESI, and EDI, jointly and solidarily, are liable to Gran in the amount of
PhP 30,000.00 as indemnity.
Fifth and Last Issue: Gran is Entitled to Backwages
We reiterate the rule that with regard to employees hired for a fixed period of employment,
in cases arising before the effectivity of R.A. No. 804258 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act) on August 25, 1995, that when the contract is for a fixed term and the
employees are dismissed without just cause, they are entitled to the payment of their
salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their contract. 59 On the other hand, for
cases arising after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042, when the termination of employment is
without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%)
per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term whichever is less.60
In the present case, the employment contract provides that the employment contract shall
be valid for a period of two (2) years from the date the employee starts to work with the
employer.61 Gran arrived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and started to work on February 7,
1994;62 hence, his employment contract is until February 7, 1996. Since he was illegally
dismissed on July 9, 1994, before the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042, he is therefore entitled to
backwages corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract, which was equivalent to
USD 16,150.
Petitioner EDI questions the legality of the award of backwages and mainly relies on the
Declaration which is claimed to have been freely and voluntarily executed by Gran. The
relevant portions of the Declaration are as follows:
I, ELEAZAR GRAN (COMPUTER SPECIALIST) AFTER RECEIVING MY FINAL

SETTLEMENT ON THIS DATE THE AMOUNT OF:
S.R. 2,948.00 (SAUDI RIYALS TWO THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT ONLY)
REPRESENTING COMPLETE PAYMENT (COMPENSATION) FOR THE

SERVICES I RENDERED TO OAB ESTABLISHMENT.
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT OAB EST. HAS NO FINANCIAL OBLIGATION IN MY

FAVOUR AFTER RECEIVING THE ABOVE MENTIONED AMOUNT IN CASH.
Page 329 of 486

I STATE FURTHER THAT OAB EST. HAS NO OBLIGATION TOWARDS ME IN
WHATEVER FORM.
I ATTEST TO THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THIS STATEMENT BY AFFIXING MY

SIGNATURE VOLUNTARILY.
SIGNED.
ELEAZAR GRAN
Courts must undertake a meticulous and rigorous review of quitclaims or waivers, more
particularly those executed by employees. This requirement was clearly articulated by
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Land and Housing Development Corporation v.
Esquillo:
Quitclaims, releases and other waivers of benefits granted by laws or contracts in

favor of workers should be strictly scrutinized to protect the weak and the
disadvantaged. The waivers should be carefully examined, in regard not only
to the words and terms used, but also the factual circumstances under which
they have been executed.63 (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court had also outlined in Land and Housing Development Corporation,
citing Periquet v. NLRC,64 the parameters for valid compromise agreements, waivers, and
quitclaims:
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement
was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on
the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is
only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting
or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that
the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that
the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of
what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding
undertaking. (Emphasis supplied.)
Is the waiver and quitclaim labeled a Declaration valid? It is not.
The Court finds the waiver and quitclaim null and void for the following reasons:
1. The salary paid to Gran upon his termination, in the amount of SR 2,948.00, is
unreasonably low. As correctly pointed out by the court a quo, the payment of SR 2,948.00
is even lower than his monthly salary of SR 3,190.00 (USD 850.00). In addition, it is also
very much less than the USD 16,150.00 which is the amount Gran is legally entitled to get
from petitioner EDI as backwages.
2. The Declaration reveals that the payment of SR 2,948.00 is actually the payment for
Gran's salary for the services he rendered to OAB as Computer Specialist. If the
Page 330 of 486

Declaration is a quitclaim, then the consideration should be much much more than the
monthly salary of SR 3,190.00 (USD 850.00)—although possibly less than the estimated
Gran's salaries for the remaining duration of his contract and other benefits as employee of
OAB. A quitclaim will understandably be lower than the sum total of the amounts and
benefits that can possibly be awarded to employees or to be earned for the remainder of
the contract period since it is a compromise where the employees will have to forfeit a
certain portion of the amounts they are claiming in exchange for the early payment of a
compromise amount. The court may however step in when such amount is unconscionably
low or unreasonable although the employee voluntarily agreed to it. In the case of the
Declaration, the amount is unreasonably small compared to the future wages of Gran.
3. The factual circumstances surrounding the execution of the Declaration would show that
Gran did not voluntarily and freely execute the document. Consider the following
chronology of events:
a. On July 9, 1994, Gran received a copy of his letter of termination;
b. On July 10, 1994, Gran was instructed to depart Saudi Arabia and required to
pay his plane ticket;65
c. On July 11, 1994, he signed the Declaration;
d. On July 12, 1994, Gran departed from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and
e. On July 21, 1994, Gran filed the Complaint before the NLRC.
The foregoing events readily reveal that Gran was "forced" to sign the Declaration and
constrained to receive the amount of SR 2,948.00 even if it was against his will—since he
was told on July 10, 1994 to leave Riyadh on July 12, 1994. He had no other choice but to
sign the Declaration as he needed the amount of SR 2,948.00 for the payment of his ticket.
He could have entertained some apprehensions as to the status of his stay or safety in
Saudi Arabia if he would not sign the quitclaim.
4. The court a quo is correct in its finding that the Declaration is a contract of adhesion
which should be construed against the employer, OAB. An adhesion contract is contrary to
public policy as it leaves the weaker party—the employee—in a "take-it-or-leave-it"
situation. Certainly, the employer is being unjust to the employee as there is no meaningful
choice on the part of the employee while the terms are unreasonably favorable to the
employer.66
Thus, the Declaration purporting to be a quitclaim and waiver is unenforceable under

Philippine laws in the absence of proof of the applicable law of Saudi Arabia.
In order to prevent disputes on the validity and enforceability of quitclaims and waivers of
employees under Philippine laws, said agreements should contain the following:
1. A fixed amount as full and final compromise settlement;

Page 331 of 486
2. The benefits of the employees if possible with the corresponding amounts, which the
employees are giving up in consideration of the fixed compromise amount;
3. A statement that the employer has clearly explained to the employee in English, Filipino,
or in the dialect known to the employees—that by signing the waiver or quitclaim, they are
forfeiting or relinquishing their right to receive the benefits which are due them under the
law; and
4. A statement that the employees signed and executed the document voluntarily, and had
fully understood the contents of the document and that their consent was freely given
without any threat, violence, duress, intimidation, or undue influence exerted on their
person.
It is advisable that the stipulations be made in English and Tagalog or in the dialect known

to the employee. There should be two (2) witnesses to the execution of the quitclaim who
must also sign the quitclaim. The document should be subscribed and sworn to under oath
preferably before any administering official of the Department of Labor and Employment or
its regional office, the Bureau of Labor Relations, the NLRC or a labor attaché in a foreign
country. Such official shall assist the parties regarding the execution of the quitclaim and
waiver.67 This compromise settlement becomes final and binding under Article 227 of the
Labor Code which provides that:
[A]ny compromise settlement voluntarily agreed upon with the assistance of the

Bureau of Labor Relations or the regional office of the DOLE, shall be final and
binding upon the parties and the NLRC or any court "shall not assume jurisdiction
over issues involved therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there
is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud,
misrepresentation, or coercion.
It is made clear that the foregoing rules on quitclaim or waiver shall apply only to labor
contracts of OFWs in the absence of proof of the laws of the foreign country agreed upon
to govern said contracts. Otherwise, the foreign laws shall apply.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 18, 2000 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
56120 of the Court of Appeals affirming the January 15, 1999 Decision and September 30,
1999 Resolution of the NLRC
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc.

shall pay the amount of PhP 30,000.00 to respondent Gran as nominal damages for non-
compliance with statutory due process.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 332 of 486

[3]
[G.R. No. 133876. December 29, 1999.]
BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA, Petitioner, v. AMERICAN REALTY

CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Does a mortgage-creditor waive its remedy to foreclose the real estate

mortgage constituted over a third party mortgagor’s property situated in the
Philippines by filing an action for the collection of the principal loan before
foreign courts?chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court are the decision 1 of public respondent Court of
Appeals in CA G. R. CV No. 51094, promulgated on 30 September 1997 and its
resolution, 2 dated 22 May 1998, denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking and

financing institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, organized
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, United
States of America while private respondent American Realty Corporation (ARC)
is a domestic corporation.
Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), on the other hand, is a limited

liability company organized and existing under the laws of England.
As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on several occasions granted three
major multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans to the following corporate
borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El Challenger S.A. and
(3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A. (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"borrowers"), all of which are existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private Respondent. 3
Due to the default in the payment of the loan amortizations, BANTSA and the
corporate borrowers signed and entered into restructuring agreements. As
additional security for the restructured loans, private respondent ARC as third
party mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages, 4 dated 17 February
1983 and 20 July 1984, over its parcels of land including improvements
thereon, located at Barrio Sto. Cristo, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which
Page 333 of 486
are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-
78762 and T-78763.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Eventually, the corporate borrowers defaulted in the payment of the

restructured loans prompting petitioner BANTSA to file civil actions 5 before
foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division,

Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2098) against Liberian Transport Navigation
S.A, Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping
Company S.A., Eddie Navigation Corp., S.A., Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua and
Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua on June 17, 1992.
b) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial

Court (1992-Folio No. 2245) against El Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping
Company S.A., Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua & Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua on
July 2, 1992;chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
c) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court (Action No.

4039 of 1992) against Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A.,
Espriona Shipping Company S.A. Pacific Navigators Corporation, Eddie
Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering (Edyship) Co., Inc., Aurelio
Katipunan Litonjua, Jr. and Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua on November 19,
1992; and
d) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court (Action No.

4040 of 1992) against Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A.,
Espriona Shipping Company, S.A., Pacific Navigators Corporation, Eddie
Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering (Edyship) Co., Jr. and Eduardo
Katipunan Litonjua on November 21, 1992."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the civil suits instituted before the foreign courts, private respondent ARC,
being a third party mortgagor, was not impleaded as party-defendant.
On 16 December 1992, petitioner BANTSA filed before the Office of the

Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines, an application for extrajudicial
foreclosure 6 of real estate mortgage.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 22 January 1993, after due publication and notice, the mortgaged real
properties were sold at public auction in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, with
Integrated Credit and Corporation Services Co. (ICCS) as the highest bidder for
the sum of Twenty Four Million Pesos (P24,000,000.00). 7
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig Regional Trial
Court, Branch 159, an action for damages 8 against the petitioner, for the
Page 334 of 486
latter’s act of foreclosing extrajudicially the real estate mortgages despite the
pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the principal
loan.
In its answer 9 petitioner alleged that the rule prohibiting the mortgagee from
foreclosing the mortgage after an ordinary suit for collection has been filed, is
not applicable in the present case, claiming that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a) The plaintiff, being a mere third party mortgagor and not a party to the
principal restructuring agreements, was never made a party defendant in the
civil cases filed in Hongkong and England;
"b) There is actually no civil suit for sum of money filed in the Philippines since
the civil actions were filed in Hongkong and England. As such, any decisions
(sic) which may be rendered in the abovementioned courts are not (sic)
enforceable in the Philippines unless a separate action to enforce the foreign
judgments is first filed in the Philippines, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Revised Rules of Court.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
"c) Under English Law, which is the governing law under the principal
agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by filing civil
actions for sums of money."cralaw virtua1aw library
On 14 December 1993, private respondent filed a motion for suspension 10 of

the redemption period on the ground that "it cannot exercise said right of
redemption without at the same time waiving or contradicting its contentions in
the case that the foreclosure of the mortgage on its properties is legally
improper and therefore invalid."cralaw virtua1aw library
In an order 11 dated 28 January 1994, the trial court granted the private
respondent’s motion for suspension after which a copy of said order was duly
received by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On 07 February 1994, ICCS, the purchaser of the mortgaged properties at the

foreclosure sale, consolidated its ownership over the real properties, resulting
to the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-18627, T-186272, T-
186273, T-16471 and T-16472 in its name.
On 18 March 1994, after the consolidation of ownership in its favor, ICCS sold
the real properties to Stateland Investment Corporation for the amount of
Thirty Nine Million Pesos (P39,000,000.00). 12 Accordingly, Transfer Certificate
of Title Nos. T-187781(m), T-187782(m), T-187783(m), T-16653P(m) and T-
16652P(m) were issued in the latter’s name.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision 13 in favor of private respondent
Page 335 of 486
ARC dated 12 May 1993, the decretal portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the filing in foreign

courts by the defendant of collection suits against the principal debtors
operated as a waiver of the security of the mortgages. Consequently, the
plaintiff’s rights as owner and possessor of the properties then covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78762, T-78763, T-78760 and T-
78761, all of the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Philippines, were
violated when the defendant caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgages constituted thereon.
"Accordingly, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the following
sums, all with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint
up to the date of actual payment:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1) Actual or compensatory damages in the amount of Ninety Nine Million

Pesos (P99,000,000.00);chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
"2) Exemplary damages in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00);

and
"3) Costs of suit.
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision of the lower
court prompting petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration which the
appellate court denied.
Hence, the instant petition for review 14 on certiorari where herein petitioner

BANTSA ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following assignment of
errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals disregarded the doctrines laid down by this
Hon. Supreme Court in the cases of Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court docketed as G.R. No. 74730 promulgated on August 25, 1989
and Philippine Commercial International Bank v. IAC, 196 SCRA 29 (1991
case), although said cases were duly cited, extensively discussed and
specifically mentioned, as one of the issues in the assignment of errors found
on page 5 of the decision dated September 30, 1997.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
2. The Hon. Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
awarded the private respondent actual and exemplary damages totalling
P171,600,000.00, as of July 12, 1998 although such huge amount was not
Page 336 of 486
asked nor prayed for in private respondent’s complaint, is contrary to law and
is totally unsupported by evidence (sic).
In fine, this Court is called upon to resolve two main issues:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
1. Whether or not the petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the
principal debtors for the recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a
waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.
2. Whether or not the award by the lower court of actual and exemplary
damages in favor of private respondent ARC, as third-party mortgagor, is
proper.
The petition is bereft of merit.
First, as to the issue of availability of remedies, petitioner submits that a waiver

of the remedy of foreclosure requires the concurrence of two requisites: an
ordinary civil action for collection should be filed and subsequently a final
judgment be correspondingly rendered therein.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
According to petitioner, the mere filing of a personal action to collect the

principal loan does not suffice; a final judgment must be secured and obtained
in the personal action so that waiver of the remedy of foreclosure may be
appreciated. To put it differently, absent any of the two requisites, the
mortgagee-creditor is deemed not to have waived the remedy of foreclosure.
We do not agree.
Certainly, this Court finds petitioner’s arguments untenable and upholds the
jurisprudence laid down in Bachrach 15 and similar cases adjudicated
thereafter, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may

institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real
action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the
two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no
means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an
election to bring a personal action will leave open to him all the properties of
the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged
property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues his remedy
against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still
give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the
properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again
open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is
complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to
Page 337 of 486
the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under
his right of election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff
to bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or
successively another action against the mortgaged property, would result not
only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice (Soriano v. Enriques, 24 Phil.
584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio v. San Agustin, 25 Phil., 404),
but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place
of his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place
where the property lies." cralawnad
In Danao v. Court of Appeals, 16 this Court, reiterating jurisprudence

enunciated in Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Co Kim 17 and Movido v. RFC,
18 invariably held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his
security and bring, instead, an ordinary action to recover the indebtedness with
the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the debtor,
including the subject matter of the mortgage . . ., subject to the qualification
that if he fails in the remedy by him elected, he cannot pursue further the
remedy he has waived. (Emphasis ours)
Anent real properties in particular, the Court has laid down the rule that a
mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal
action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. 19
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed
alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as
a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the
filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for
foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed
elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court
of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to
be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act No. 4118.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted real estate mortgages
over its properties as security for the debt of the principal debtors. By doing so,
private respondent subjected itself to the liabilities of a third party mortgagor.
Under the law, third persons who are not parties to a loan may secure the
latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property. 20
Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction

which makes a third person who secures the fulfillment of another’s obligation
by mortgaging his own property, to be solidarily bound with the principal
obligor. The signatory to the principal contract — loan — remains to be
Page 338 of 486
primarily bound. It is only upon default of the latter that the creditor may have
recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged properties in lieu of
an action for the recovery of the amount of the loan. 21
In the instant case, petitioner’s contention that the requisites of filing the
action for collection and rendition of final judgment therein should concur, is
untenable.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
Thus, in Cerna v. Court of Appeals, 22 we agreed with the petitioner in said

case, that the filing of a collection suit barred the foreclosure of the
mortgage:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A mortgagee who files a suit for collection abandons the remedy of foreclosure
of the chattel mortgage constituted over the personal property as security for
the debt or value of the promissory note when he seeks to recover in the said
collection suit."cralaw virtua1aw library
". . . When the mortgagee elects to file a suit for collection, not foreclosure,
thereby abandoning the chattel mortgage as basis for relief, he clearly
manifests his lack of desire and interest to go after the mortgaged property as
security for the promissory note . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Contrary to petitioner’s arguments, we therefore reiterate the rule, for clarity

and emphasis, that the mere act of filing of an ordinary action for collection
operates as a waiver of the mortgage-creditor’s remedy to foreclose the
mortgage. By the mere filing of the ordinary action for collection against the
principal debtors, the petitioner in the present case is deemed to have elected
a remedy, as a result of which a waiver of the other necessarily must arise.
Corollarily, no final judgment in the collection suit is required for the rule on
waiver to apply.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Hence, in Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 23 a case

relied upon by petitioner, supposedly to buttress its contention, this Court had
occasion to rule that the mere act of filing a collection suit for the recovery of a
debt secured by a mortgage constitutes waiver of the other remedy of
foreclosure.
In the case at bar, petitioner BANTSA only has one cause of action which is
non-payment of the debt. Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for
its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner then may opt to exercise only one of two
remedies so as not to violate the rule against splitting a cause of action.
As elucidated by this Court in the landmark case of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v.
Icarangal. 24
"For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single

Page 339 of 486
cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the
recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the
creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the
foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the
non-payment of the debt, and for that reason, they constitute a single cause of
action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the
latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same
obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single
breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rules above stated,
cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of
the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If
he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint.
By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or
successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage,
we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of
contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and
oppression to the debtor." chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals for allegedly disregarding the
doctrine enunciated in Caltex, wherein this High Court relaxed the application
of the general rules to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the present case, however, we shall not follow this rule to the letter but
declare that it is the collection suit which was waived and/or abandoned. This
ruling is more in harmony with the principles underlying our judicial system. It
is of no moment that the collection suit was filed ahead, what is determinative
is the fact that the foreclosure proceedings ended even before the decision in
the collection suit was rendered. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Notably, though, petitioner took the Caltex ruling out of context. We must
stress that the Caltex case was never intended to overrule the well-entrenched
doctrine enunciated in Bachrach, which to our mind still finds applicability in
cases of this sort. To reiterate, Bachrach is still good law.
We then quote the decision 25 of the trial court, in the present case,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The aforequoted ruling in Caltex is the exception rather than the rule, dictated
by the peculiar circumstances obtaining therein. In the said case, the Supreme
Court chastised Caltex for making." . . a mockery of our judicial system when it
initially filed a collection suit then, during the pendency thereof, foreclosed
extrajudicially the mortgaged property which secured the indebtedness, and
still pursued the collection suit to the end." Thus, to prevent a mockery of our
judicial system", the collection suit had to be nullified because the foreclosure
proceedings have already been pursued to their end and can no longer be
undone.
Page 340 of 486
x x x
"In the case at bar, it has not been shown whether the defendant pursued to
the end or are still pursuing the collection suits filed in foreign courts. There is
no occasion, therefore, for this court to apply the exception laid down by the
Supreme Court in Caltex, by nullifying the collection suits. Quite obviously, too,
the aforesaid collection suits are beyond the reach of this Court. Thus the only
way the court may prevent the spector of a creditor having "plural redress for a
single breach of contract" is by holding, as the Court hereby holds, that the
defendant has waived the right to foreclose the mortgages constituted by the
plaintiff on its properties originally covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
T-78759, T-78762, T-78760 and T-78761." (RTC Decision pp., 10-11)
In this light, the actuations of Caltex are deserving of severe criticism, to say
the least. 26
Moreover, petitioner attempts to mislead this Court by citing the case of PCIB
v. IAC. 27 Again, petitioner tried to fit a square peg in a round hole. It must be
stressed that far from overturning the doctrine laid down in Bachrach, this
Court in PCIB buttressed its firm stand on this issue by
declaring:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"While the law allows a mortgage creditor to either institute a personal action
for the debt or a real action to foreclosure the mortgage, he cannot pursue
both remedies simultaneously or successively as was done by PCIB in this
case." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
x x x
"Thus, when the PCIB filed Civil Case No. 29392 to enforce payment of the 1.3
million promissory note secured by real estate mortgages and subsequently
filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, it violates the rule against splitting
a cause of action."cralaw virtua1aw library
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the

expediency of filing four civil suits before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned
the remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgages constituted over the
properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private respondent ARC.
Moreover, by filing the four civil actions and by eventually foreclosing
extrajudicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules against
splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our statute
books.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In Bachrach, this Court resolved to deny the creditor the remedy of foreclosure
Page 341 of 486
after the collection suit was filed, considering that the creditor should not be
afforded "plural redress for a single breach of contract." For cause of action
should not be confused with the remedy created for its enforcement. 28
Notably, it is not the nature of the redress which is crucial but the efficacy of
the remedy chosen in addressing the creditor’s cause. Hence, a suit brought
before a foreign court having competence and jurisdiction to entertain the
action is deemed, for this purpose, to be within the contemplation of the
remedy available to the mortgagee-creditor. This pronouncement would best
serve the interest of justice and fair play and further discourage the noxious
practice of splitting up a lone cause of action.
Incidentally, BANTSA alleges that under English Law, which according to

petitioner is the governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the
mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions for
sums of money. 29
We rule in the negative.chanrobles law library
This argument shows desperation on the part of petitioner to rivet its crumbling
cause. In the case at bench, Philippine law shall apply notwithstanding the
evidence presented by petitioner to prove the English law on the matter.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in

our jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law
must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. 30 Thus, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. 31 This is what
we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter
were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, Et. Al. v. Sy-
Gonzales, 32 said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order
shall not be applied. 33
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and

those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. 34
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle
imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of
Page 342 of 486
action.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent —
"If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others."cralaw virtua1aw library
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is
the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that
is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 35
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
As to the second pivotal issue, we hold that the private respondent is entitled
to the award of actual or compensatory damages inasmuch as the act of
petitioner BANTSA in extrajudicially foreclosing the real estate mortgages
constituted a clear violation of the rights of herein private respondent ARC, as
third-party mortgagor.
Actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary

loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation and the same
must be proved, otherwise if the proof is flimsy and non-substantial, no
damages will be given. 36 Indeed, the question of the value of property is
always a difficult one to settle as valuation of real property is an imprecise
process since real estate has no inherent value readily ascertainable by an
appraiser or by the court. 37 The opinions of men vary so much concerning the
real value of property that the best the courts can do is hear all of the
witnesses which the respective parties desire to present, and then, by carefully
weighing that testimony, arrive at a conclusion which is just and equitable. 38
In the instant case, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals for relying heavily on
the valuation made by Philippine Appraisal Company. In effect, BANTSA
questions the act of the appellate court in giving due weight to the appraisal
report composed of twenty three pages, signed by Mr. Lauro Marquez and
submitted as evidence by private Respondent. The appraisal report, as the
records would readily show, was corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Reynaldo
Flores, witness for Private Respondent.
On this matter, the trial court observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The record herein reveals that plaintiff-appellee formally offered as evidence

the appraisal report dated March 29, 1993 (Exhibit J, Records, p. 409),
consisting of twenty three (23) pages which set out in detail the valuation of
the property to determine its fair market value (TSN, April 22, 1994, p. 4), in
Page 343 of 486
the amount of P99,986,592.00 (TSN, ibid., p. 5), together with the
corroborative testimony of one Mr. Reynaldo F. Flores, an appraiser and
director of Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc. (TSN, ibid., p. 3). The latter’s
testimony was subjected to extensive cross-examination by counsel for
defendant-appellant (TSN, April 22, 1994, pp. 6-22)." 39
In the matter of credibility of witnesses, the Court reiterates the familiar and
well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should be
respected. 40 The time-tested jurisprudence is that the findings and
conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge of
respect for the reason that trial courts have the advantage of observing the
demeanor of witnesses as they testify. 41
This Court will not alter the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses, principally because they are in a better position to assess the same
than the appellate court. 42 Besides, trial courts are in a better position to
examine real evidence as well as observe the demeanor of witnesses. 43
Similarly, the appreciation of evidence and the assessment of the credibility of

witnesses rest primarily with the trial court. 44 In the case at bar, we see no
reason that would justify this Court to disturb the factual findings of the trial
court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with regard to the award of actual
damages.
In arriving at the amount of actual damages, the trial courts justified the award
by presenting the following ratiocination in its assailed decision 45 , to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Indeed, the Court has its own mind in the matter of valuation. The size of the
subject real properties are (sic) set forth in their individual titles, and the Court
itself has seen the character and nature of said properties during the ocular
inspection it conducted. Based principally on the foregoing, the Court makes
the following observations:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The properties consist of about 39 hectares in Bo. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan, which is (sic) not distant from Metro Manila — the biggest
urban center in the Philippines — and are easily accessible through well-paved
roads;
"2. The properties are suitable for development into a subdivision for low cost
housing, as admitted by defendant’s own appraiser (TSN, May 30, 1994, p.
31);
"3. The pigpens which used to exist in the property have already been
demolished. Houses of strong materials are found in the vicinity of the property
(Exhs. 2, 2-1 to 2-7), and the vicinity is a growing community. It has even
Page 344 of 486
been shown that the house of the Barangay Chairman is located adjacent to
the property in question (Exh. 27), and the only remaining piggery (named
Cherry Farm) in the vicinity is about 2 kilometers away from the western
boundary of the property in question (TSN, November 19, p.
3);chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"4. It will not be hard to find interested buyers of the property, as indubitably
shown by the fact that on March 18, 1994, ICCS (the buyer during the
foreclosure sale) sold the consolidated real estate properties to Stateland
Investment Corporation, in whose favor new titles were issued, i.e., TCT Nos.
T-187781(m); T-187782(m), T-187783(m); T-16653P(m) and T-166521(m) by
the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan (sic), Bulacan;
"5. The fact that ICCS was able to sell the subject properties to Stateland
Investment Corporation for Thirty Nine Million (P39,000,000.00) Pesos, which
is more than triple defendant’s appraisal (Exh. 2) clearly shows that the Court
cannot rely on defendant’s aforesaid estimate (Decision, Records, p.
603)."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is a fundamental legal aphorism that the conclusions of the trial judge on the
credibility of witnesses command great respect and consideration especially
when the conclusions are supported by the evidence on record. 46 Applying the
foregoing principle, we therefore hold that the trial court committed no
palpable error in giving credence to the testimony of Reynaldo Flores, who
according to the records, is a licensed real estate broker, appraiser and director
of Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc. since 1990. 47 As the records show,
Flores had been with the company for 26 years at the time of his
testimony.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Of equal importance is the fact that the trial court did not confine itself to the
appraisal report dated 29 March 1993, and the testimony given by Mr.
Reynaldo Flores, in determining the fair market value of the real property.
Above all these, the record would likewise show that the trial judge in order to
appraise himself of the characteristics and condition of the property, conducted
an ocular inspection where the opposing parties appeared and were duly
represented.
Based on these considerations and the evidence submitted, we affirm the ruling
of the trial court as regards the valuation of the property —
". . . a valuation of Ninety Nine Million Pesos (P99,000,000.00) for the 39-
hectare properties (sic) translates to just about Two Hundred Fifty Four Pesos
(P254.00) per square meter. This appears to be, as the court so holds, a better
approximation of the fair market value of the subject properties. This is the
amount which should be restituted by the defendant to the plaintiff by way of
actual or compensatory damages . . ." 48
Page 345 of 486
Further, petitioner ascribes error to the lower court for awarding an amount
allegedly not asked nor prayed for in private respondent’s complaint.
Notwithstanding the fact that the award of actual and compensatory damages
by the lower court exceeded that prayed for in the complaint, the same is
nonetheless valid, subject to certain
qualifications.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
On this issue, Rule 10, Section 5 of the Rules of Court is

pertinent:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.

— When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary
to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be
made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure
to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is
objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by
the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do
so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of
substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a
continuance to enable the amendment to be made."cralaw virtua1aw library
The jurisprudence enunciated in Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. v. Asociacion de

Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. 49 citing Northern Cement Corporation v.
Intermediate Appellate Court 50 is enlightening:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There have been instances where the Court has held that even without the
necessary amendment, the amount proved at the trial may be validly awarded,
as in Tuazon v. Bolanos (95 Phil. 106), where we said that if the facts shown
entitled plaintiff to relief other than that asked for, no amendment to the
complaint was necessary, especially where defendant had himself raised the
point on which recovery was based. The appellate court could treat the
pleading as amended to conform to the evidence although the pleadings were
actually not amended. Amendment is also unnecessary when only clerical error
or non substantial matters are involved, as we held in Bank of the Philippine
Islands v. Laguna (48 Phil. 5). In Co Tiamco v. Diaz (75 Phil. 672), we stressed
that the rule on amendment need not be applied rigidly, particularly where no
surprise or prejudice is caused the objecting party. And in the recent case of
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals (113 SCRA 556), we held that
where there is a variance in the defendant’s pleadings and the evidence
adduced by it at the trial, the Court may treat the pleading as amended to
conform with the evidence.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Page 346 of 486

"It is the view of the Court that pursuant to the above-mentioned rule and in
light of the decisions cited, the trial court should not be precluded from
awarding an amount higher than that claimed in the pleading notwithstanding
the absence of the required amendment. But it is upon the condition that the
evidence of such higher amount has been presented properly, with full
opportunity on the part of the opposing parties to support their respective
contentions and to refute each other’s evidence.
"The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to the evidence adduced

during trial does not preclude an adjudication by the court on the basis of such
evidence which may embody new issues not raised in the pleadings, or serve
as a basis for a higher award of damages. Although the pleading may not have
been amended to conform to the evidence submitted during trial, judgment
may nonetheless be rendered, not simply on the basis of the issues alleged but
also on the basis of issues discussed and the assertions of fact proved in the
course of trial. The court may treat the pleading as if it had been amended to
conform to the evidence, although it had not been actually so amended.
Former Chief Justice Moran put the matter in this way:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
‘When evidence is presented by one party, with the expressed or implied

consent of the adverse party, as to issues not alleged in the pleadings,
judgment may be rendered validly as regards those issues, which shall be
considered as if they have been raised in the pleadings. There is implied
consent to the evidence thus presented when the adverse party fails to object
thereto.’
"Clearly, a court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence
before it even though the relevant pleading had not been previously amended,
so long as no surprise or prejudice is thereby caused to the adverse party. Put
a little differently, so long as the basic requirements of fair play had been met,
as where litigants were given full opportunity to support their respective
contentions and to object to or refute each other’s evidence, the court may
validly treat the pleadings as if they had been amended to conform to the
evidence and proceed to adjudicate on the basis of all the evidence before
it."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the instant case, in as much as the petitioner was afforded the opportunity
to refute and object to the evidence, both documentary and testimonial,
formally offered by private respondent, the rudiments of fair play are deemed
satisfied. In fact, the testimony of Reynaldo Flores was put under scrutiny
during the course of the cross-examination. Under these circumstances, the
court acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction and committed no reversible
error in awarding actual damages the amount of which is higher than that
prayed for. Verily, the lower court’s actuations are sanctioned by the Rules and
supported by jurisprudence.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Page 347 of 486
Similarly, we affirm the grant of exemplary damages although the amount of

Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) awarded, being excessive, is subject to
reduction. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages. 51 Considering its purpose, it must be fair and
reasonable in every case and should not be awarded to unjustly enrich a
prevailing party. 52 In our view, an award of P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages in the present case qualifies the test of reasonableness.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION of the amount awarded as exemplary damages. Accordingly,
petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private respondent the sum of
P99,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary
damage and the costs of suit.cralawnad
SO ORDERED.
Page 348 of 486

[4]
July 27, 2016
G.R. No. 215723
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA

KOIKE," Petitioner
vs.
MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO
MANILA, and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1are the Decision2 dated July 31, 2014 and
the Resolution3 dated November 28, 2014, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 106 (RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying petitioner's petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26
of the Family Code.
The Facts
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki
Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City,
Philippines.4 Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January 23,
2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007.5
On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for
divorce6 before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced
on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate7 and the same was duly recorded in
the Official Family Register ofMichiyuki Koike.8
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage 9 on
file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a
petition10 for judicial recognition of ioreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry
pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code11 before the RTC,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692.
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.12 On the other hand, Doreen
presented several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/ Certificate of
Acceptance of Divorce"13 and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike"14 both issued by the
Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the
Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a document
entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila
Page 349 of 486
that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a
Certification15 issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said
divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the
Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books
entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" 16 and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009" 17 were
likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce.18
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision19 dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an
action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code,
the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 20 and 2521 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents
presented by Doreen were successfully proven to be public or official records of Japan,
she nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of her husband, particularly the
existence of the law on divorce. The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan
2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented were not duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too
that the testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and its
effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a
qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of
the laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations and divorce. It likewise did not
consider the said books as learned treatises pursuant to Section 46, 22 Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject matter was presented
and considering further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreignjudgments and law.23
Doreen's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in a Resolution25 dated November 28,

2014; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying the
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.1âwphi1
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which
addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner -
allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision
reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
Page 350 of 486

valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.26
In Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas,27the Court had the occasion to rule that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.1âwphi1 Justice
Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion
to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. 28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citation omitted)
Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by
the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven.30 Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law
on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven like any other fact.31
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well
as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls
for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the
instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition
for review.
Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual
issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received
with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions. 32 In this regard, it is
settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should
be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.33
Page 351 of 486

Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted,
the Court may refer the case to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. -x x x
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court
submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or
appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of
fact are involved shall be final.
This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an appeal
likewise "may" be dismissed when there is error irr the choice or mode of appeal.34
Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the appeal
or refer the case to the CA, the question of fact involved in the instant appeal and
substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA for further
appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure
proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a
very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime
objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the
courts.35
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is
hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception
of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in accordance with
this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Page 352 of 486

[5]
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their
relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950
evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their
conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3)
weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their
relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a
certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition
and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in
favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later
replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan
children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final
judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be
the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent
and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private
respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due
notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of
the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without
the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for
resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act
386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage
Page 353 of 486

subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial
settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it
opined that there was no showing that marriage existed between private respondent and
Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged
by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a
brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the
intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was
ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present
proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children,
except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their
respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6 partial reconsideration was granted
declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate
to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent
was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that
she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the
errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided
without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that
if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence,
on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15
February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court
for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration. 9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists
that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as
to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and, second, the issue as to
who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper hier of the decedent is one of
law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions
of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan
children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly
acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo
Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who
is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than
Page 354 of 486
petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion
for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order
requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of
heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among
others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried.
She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo
was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they
obtained. 12 Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial
court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to
ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial
evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely
applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's
decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling
in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She
prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but
failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant
private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the
finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the
Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on
their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not
supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The
doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was
decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved
that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not
merit enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's
citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court
with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the
reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of
new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she
was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the
decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner
however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her
citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted
by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case
returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
Page 355 of 486
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be
limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private
respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were
married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting
thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts.
80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit
from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be declared
in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the
same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same
transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical
causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present petition deals with declaration of
heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the
issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the
estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals

ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring
null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate
heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by
granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro,
Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed
Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court
however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should he limited to
the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the
present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 356 of 486

[6]
G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960
TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-

appellee,
vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA
BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants.
Jose D. Cortes for appellants.

Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose,
presiding, dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and
Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the
said project.
On April 24, 195 0, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding,
admitted to probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April
23, 1944 in Manila. In the said order, the court made the following findings:
According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and
therefore a citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his
properties are located. This contention in untenable. Notwithstanding the long
residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary,
and he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state
of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent
residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or
desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his
death, he was a citizen of that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or permanent
residence for him. That is his exclusive personal right.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his
death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that
his will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of
Nevada and admits the same to probate. Accordingly, the Philippine Trust
Company, named as the executor of the will, is hereby appointed to such executor
and upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00, let letters testamentary be
issued and after taking the prescribed oath, it may enter upon the execution and
performance of its trust. (pp. 26-27, R.O.A.).
It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questions on appeal. The
executor filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the
Page 357 of 486

provisions of the will, the following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the
Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for
the benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several
mining companies; (2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L.
Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the
same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock similar to those given to testator's
grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and
his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments; (4) legacies to
Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox,
P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;
It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting administration
expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-
half of all shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the
same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the
testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming
that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them.
The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan,
should be entitled to received. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the
testator. It is argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce
secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce
should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction, citing the case of Querubin vs. Querubin, 87
Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315, Cousins Hiz vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852,
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22. The court below
refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of
which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without
requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of Nevada
Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will,
dispose of all his or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with
the payment of the testator's debts.
Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a share in
the testator's estafa had already been passed upon adversely against her in an order dated
June 19, 1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol II Records, Court of First Instance), which had become
final, as Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to have appealed therefrom to question
its validity. On December 16, 1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum
of P20,000 from the funds of the estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal
property, (See pp. 294-297, Vol. I, Record, Court of First Instance), and the court in its said
error found that there exists no community property owned by the decedent and his former
wife at the time the decree of divorce was issued. As already and Magdalena C. Bohanan
may no longer question the fact contained therein, i.e. that there was no community
property acquired by the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during their converture.
Page 358 of 486

Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were
married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that
sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was
subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance
in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had
already found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C.
Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the
testator.
The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia,
who had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not
been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the forum,
should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator. Is the failure old the testator to give
his children two-thirds of the estate left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with
the laws of the forum valid?
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944,
expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this point:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of

succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and
the country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as
par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the
testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile
and his permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question
at issue is whether the estementary dispositions, especially hose for the children which are
short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not
disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will
(Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not appear that at time of the
hearing of the project of partition, the above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence,
as it was the executor's duly to do. The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be
proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules, which are as
follows:
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein,

when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have
found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan
for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled
Page 359 of 486
Nevada Laws. was introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein) counsel as Exhibits "2"
(See pp. 77-79, VOL. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said
laws presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B"
during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (se
Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted
provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are
constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the
Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such
law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary
dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been
decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of
Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property
according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of
partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Page 360 of 486

[1]
G.R. No. 128690 January 21, 1999
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC BROADCASTING CORP, VIVA
PRODUCTION, INC., and VICENTE DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., CJ.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. (hereafter
ABS-CBN) seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of 31 October 1996 and the
resolution 2 of 10 March 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44125. The
former affirmed with modification the decision 3 of 28 April 1993 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80, in Civil Case No. Q-92-12309. The latter denied the
motion to reconsider the decision of 31 October 1996.
The antecedents, as found by the RTC and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
In 1990, ABS-CBN and Viva executed a Film Exhibition Agreement (Exh.

"A") whereby Viva gave ABS-CBN an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva
films. Sometime in December 1991, in accordance with paragraph 2.4 [sic]
of said agreement stating that —.
1.4 ABS-CBN shall have the right of first refusal to the next twenty-four (24)
Viva films for TV telecast under such terms as may be agreed upon by the
parties hereto, provided, however, that such right shall be exercised by
ABS-CBN from the actual offer in writing.
Viva, through defendant Del Rosario, offered ABS-CBN, through its vice-
president Charo Santos-Concio, a list of three(3) film packages (36 title)
from which ABS-CBN may exercise its right of first refusal under the afore-
said agreement (Exhs. "1" par, 2, "2," "2-A'' and "2-B"-Viva). ABS-CBN,
however through Mrs. Concio, "can tick off only ten (10) titles" (from the list)
"we can purchase" (Exh. "3" - Viva) and therefore did not accept said list
(TSN, June 8, 1992, pp. 9-10). The titles ticked off by Mrs. Concio are not
the subject of the case at bar except the film ''Maging Sino Ka Man."
For further enlightenment, this rejection letter dated January 06, 1992 (Exh
"3" - Viva) is hereby quoted:
6 January 1992
Page 361 of 486

Dear Vic,
This is not a very formal business letter I am writing to you as I would like to
express my difficulty in recommending the purchase of the three film
packages you are offering ABS-CBN.
From among the three packages I can only tick off 10 titles we can
purchase. Please see attached. I hope you will understand my position.
Most of the action pictures in the list do not have big action stars in the cast.
They are not for primetime. In line with this I wish to mention that I have not
scheduled for telecast several action pictures in out very first contract
because of the cheap production value of these movies as well as the lack
of big action stars. As a film producer, I am sure you understand what I am
trying to say as Viva produces only big action pictures.
In fact, I would like to request two (2) additional runs for these movies as I
can only schedule them in our non-primetime slots. We have to cover the
amount that was paid for these movies because as you very well know that
non-primetime advertising rates are very low. These are the unaired titles in
the first contract.
1. Kontra Persa [sic].
2. Raider Platoon.
3. Underground guerillas
4. Tiger Command
5. Boy de Sabog
6. Lady Commando
7. Batang Matadero
8. Rebelyon
I hope you will consider this request of mine.
The other dramatic films have been offered to us before and have been
rejected because of the ruling of MTRCB to have them aired at 9:00 p.m.
due to their very adult themes.
As for the 10 titles I have choosen [sic] from the 3 packages please consider
including all the other Viva movies produced last year. I have quite an
attractive offer to make.
Page 362 of 486

Thanking you and with my warmest regards.
(S
ig
n
e
d)
C
h
ar
o
S
a
nt
os
-
C
o
nc
io
On February 27, 1992, defendant Del Rosario approached ABS-CBN's Ms.

Concio, with a list consisting of 52 original movie titles (i.e. not yet aired on
television) including the 14 titles subject of the present case, as well as 104
re-runs (previously aired on television) from which ABS-CBN may choose
another 52 titles, as a total of 156 titles, proposing to sell to ABS-CBN airing
rights over this package of 52 originals and 52 re-runs for P60,000,000.00 of
which P30,000,000.00 will be in cash and P30,000,000.00 worth of
television spots (Exh. "4" to "4-C" Viva; "9" -Viva).
On April 2, 1992, defendant Del Rosario and ABS-CBN general manager,

Eugenio Lopez III, met at the Tamarind Grill Restaurant in Quezon City to
discuss the package proposal of Viva. What transpired in that lunch meeting
is the subject of conflicting versions. Mr. Lopez testified that he and Mr. Del
Rosario allegedly agreed that ABS-CRN was granted exclusive film rights to
fourteen (14) films for a total consideration of P36 million; that he allegedly
put this agreement as to the price and number of films in a "napkin'' and
signed it and gave it to Mr. Del Rosario (Exh. D; TSN, pp. 24-26, 77-78,
June 8, 1992). On the other hand, Del Rosario denied having made any
agreement with Lopez regarding the 14 Viva films; denied the existence of a
napkin in which Lopez wrote something; and insisted that what he and
Lopez discussed at the lunch meeting was Viva's film package offer of 104
films (52 originals and 52 re-runs) for a total price of P60 million. Mr. Lopez
promising [sic]to make a counter proposal which came in the form of a
proposal contract Annex "C" of the complaint (Exh. "1"·- Viva; Exh. "C" -
ABS-CBN).
Page 363 of 486

On April 06, 1992, Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon of RBS Senior vice-
president for Finance discussed the terms and conditions of Viva's offer to
sell the 104 films, after the rejection of the same package by ABS-CBN.
On April 07, 1992, defendant Del Rosario received through his secretary, a
handwritten note from Ms. Concio, (Exh. "5" - Viva), which reads: "Here's
the draft of the contract. I hope you find everything in order," to which was
attached a draft exhibition agreement (Exh. "C''- ABS-CBN; Exh. "9" - Viva,
p. 3) a counter-proposal covering 53 films, 52 of which came from the list
sent by defendant Del Rosario and one film was added by Ms. Concio, for a
consideration of P35 million. Exhibit "C" provides that ABS-CBN is granted
films right to 53 films and contains a right of first refusal to "1992 Viva
Films." The said counter proposal was however rejected by Viva's Board of
Directors [in the] evening of the same day, April 7, 1992, as Viva would not
sell anything less than the package of 104 films for P60 million pesos (Exh.
"9" - Viva), and such rejection was relayed to Ms. Concio.
On April 29, 1992, after the rejection of ABS-CBN and following several
negotiations and meetings defendant Del Rosario and Viva's President
Teresita Cruz, in consideration of P60 million, signed a letter of agreement
dated April 24, 1992. granting RBS the exclusive right to air 104 Viva-
produced and/or acquired films (Exh. "7-A" - RBS; Exh. "4" - RBS) including
the fourteen (14) films subject of the present case. 4
On 27 May 1992, ABS-CBN filed before the RTC a complaint for specific performance with
a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against
private respondents Republic Broadcasting Corporation 5 (hereafter RBS ), Viva Production
(hereafter VIVA), and Vicente Del Rosario. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-92-12309.
On 27 May 1992, RTC issued a temporary restraining order 6 enjoining private respondents

from proceeding with the airing, broadcasting, and televising of the fourteen VIVA films
subject of the controversy, starting with the film Maging Sino Ka Man, which was scheduled
to be shown on private respondents RBS' channel 7 at seven o'clock in the evening of said
date.
On 17 June 1992, after appropriate proceedings, the RTC issued an

order 7 directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon ABS-CBN's posting of
P35 million bond. ABS-CBN moved for the reduction of the bond, 8 while private
respondents moved for reconsideration of the order and offered to put up a counterbound. 9
In the meantime, private respondents filed separate answers with counterclaim. 10 RBS

also set up a cross-claim against VIVA..
On 3 August 1992, the RTC issued an order 11 dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction
upon the posting by RBS of a P30 million counterbond to answer for whatever damages
ABS-CBN might suffer by virtue of such dissolution. However, it reduced petitioner's
Page 364 of 486

injunction bond to P15 million as a condition precedent for the reinstatement of the writ of
preliminary injunction should private respondents be unable to post a counterbond.
At the pre-trial 12 on 6 August 1992, the parties, upon suggestion of the court, agreed to
explore the possibility of an amicable settlement. In the meantime, RBS prayed for and
was granted reasonable time within which to put up a P30 million counterbond in the event
that no settlement would be reached.
As the parties failed to enter into an amicable settlement RBS posted on 1 October 1992 a
counterbond, which the RTC approved in its Order of 15 October 1992.13
On 19 October 1992, ABS-CBN filed a motion for reconsideration 14 of the 3 August and 15
October 1992 Orders, which RBS opposed. 15
On 29 October 1992, the RTC conducted a pre-trial. 16
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration, ABS-CBN filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition17 challenging the RTC's Orders of 3 August and 15 October 1992 and
praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from enforcing
said orders. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29300.
On 3 November 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order18 to enjoin
the airing, broadcasting, and televising of any or all of the films involved in the controversy.
On 18 December 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision 19 dismissing the

petition in CA -G.R. No. 29300 for being premature. ABS-CBN challenged the dismissal in
a petition for review filed with this Court on 19 January 1993, which was docketed as G.R.
No. 108363.
In the meantime the RTC received the evidence for the parties in Civil Case No. Q-192-
1209. Thereafter, on 28 April 1993, it rendered a decision 20 in favor of RBS and VIVA and
against ABS-CBN disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing,

judgments is rendered in favor of defendants and against the plaintiff.
(1) The complaint is hereby dismissed;
(2) Plaintiff ABS-CBN is ordered to pay defendant RBS the

following:
a) P107,727.00, the amount of premium paid

by RBS to the surety which issued defendant
RBS's bond to lift the injunction;
Page 365 of 486

b) P191,843.00 for the amount of print
advertisement for "Maging Sino Ka Man" in
various newspapers;
c) Attorney's fees in the amount of P1 million;
d) P5 million as and by way of moral

damages;
e) P5 million as and by way of exemplary

damages;
(3) For defendant VIVA, plaintiff ABS-CBN is ordered to pay

P212,000.00 by way of reasonable attorney's fees.
(4) The cross-claim of defendant RBS against defendant

VIVA is dismissed.
(5) Plaintiff to pay the costs.
According to the RTC, there was no meeting of minds on the price and terms of the offer.
The alleged agreement between Lopez III and Del Rosario was subject to the approval of
the VIVA Board of Directors, and said agreement was disapproved during the meeting of
the Board on 7 April 1992. Hence, there was no basis for ABS-CBN's demand that VIVA
signed the 1992 Film Exhibition Agreement. Furthermore, the right of first refusal under the
1990 Film Exhibition Agreement had previously been exercised per Ms. Concio's letter to
Del Rosario ticking off ten titles acceptable to them, which would have made the 1992
agreement an entirely new contract.
On 21 June 1993, this Court denied21 ABS-CBN's petition for review in G.R. No. 108363,
as no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision
and the case had "become moot and academic in view of the dismissal of the main action
by the court a quo in its decision" of 28 April 1993.
Aggrieved by the RTC's decision, ABS-CBN appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that
there was a perfected contract between ABS-CBN and VIVA granting ABS-CBN the
exclusive right to exhibit the subject films. Private respondents VIVA and Del Rosario also
appealed seeking moral and exemplary damages and additional attorney's fees.
In its decision of 31 October 1996, the Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC that the
contract between ABS-CBN and VIVA had not been perfected, absent the approval by the
VIVA Board of Directors of whatever Del Rosario, it's agent, might have agreed with Lopez
III. The appellate court did not even believe ABS-CBN's evidence that Lopez III actually
wrote down such an agreement on a "napkin," as the same was never produced in court. It
likewise rejected ABS-CBN's insistence on its right of first refusal and ratiocinated as
follows:
Page 366 of 486

As regards the matter of right of first refusal, it may be true that a Film
Exhibition Agreement was entered into between Appellant ABS-CBN and
appellant VIVA under Exhibit "A" in 1990, and that parag. 1.4 thereof
provides:
1.4 ABS-CBN shall have the right of first refusal to the next
twenty-four (24) VIVA films for TV telecast under such terms
as may be agreed upon by the parties hereto, provided,
however, that such right shall be exercised by ABS-CBN
within a period of fifteen (15) days from the actual offer in
writing (Records, p. 14).
[H]owever, it is very clear that said right of first refusal in favor of ABS-CBN
shall still be subject to such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties
thereto, and that the said right shall be exercised by ABS-CBN within fifteen
(15) days from the actual offer in writing.
Said parag. 1.4 of the agreement Exhibit "A" on the right of first refusal did
not fix the price of the film right to the twenty-four (24) films, nor did it specify
the terms thereof. The same are still left to be agreed upon by the parties.
In the instant case, ABS-CBN's letter of rejection Exhibit 3 (Records, p. 89)

stated that it can only tick off ten (10) films, and the draft contract Exhibit "C"
accepted only fourteen (14) films, while parag. 1.4 of Exhibit "A'' speaks of
the next twenty-four (24) films.
The offer of V1VA was sometime in December 1991 (Exhibits 2, 2-A. 2-B;
Records, pp. 86-88; Decision, p. 11, Records, p. 1150), when the first list of
VIVA films was sent by Mr. Del Rosario to ABS-CBN. The Vice President of
ABS-CBN, Ms. Charo Santos-Concio, sent a letter dated January 6, 1992
(Exhibit 3, Records, p. 89) where ABS-CBN exercised its right of refusal by
rejecting the offer of VIVA.. As aptly observed by the trial court, with the said
letter of Mrs. Concio of January 6, 1992, ABS-CBN had lost its right of first
refusal. And even if We reckon the fifteen (15) day period from February 27,
1992 (Exhibit 4 to 4-C) when another list was sent to ABS-CBN after the
letter of Mrs. Concio, still the fifteen (15) day period within which ABS-CBN
shall exercise its right of first refusal has already expired.22
Accordingly, respondent court sustained the award of actual damages consisting in the
cost of print advertisements and the premium payments for the counterbond, there being
adequate proof of the pecuniary loss which RBS had suffered as a result of the filing of the
complaint by ABS-CBN. As to the award of moral damages, the Court of Appeals found
reasonable basis therefor, holding that RBS's reputation was debased by the filing of the
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-92-12309 and by the non-showing of the film "Maging Sino
Ka Man." Respondent court also held that exemplary damages were correctly imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good in view of the filing of the complaint
despite petitioner's knowledge that the contract with VIVA had not been perfected, It also
upheld the award of attorney's fees, reasoning that with ABS-CBN's act of instituting Civil
Page 367 of 486
Case No, Q-92-1209, RBS was "unnecessarily forced to litigate." The appellate court,
however, reduced the awards of moral damages to P2 million, exemplary damages to P2
million, and attorney's fees to P500, 000.00.
On the other hand, respondent Court of Appeals denied VIVA and Del Rosario's appeal
because it was "RBS and not VIVA which was actually prejudiced when the complaint was
filed by ABS-CBN."
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, ABS-CBN filed the petition in this case,
contending that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
. . . RULING THAT THERE WAS NO PERFECTED CONTRACT BETWEEN

PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT VIVA NOTWITHSTANDING
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PETITIONER TO THE
CONTRARY.
II
. . . IN AWARDING ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES IN

FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT RBS.
III
. . . IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF

PRIVATE RESPONDENT RBS.
IV
. . . IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF RBS.
ABS-CBN claims that it had yet to fully exercise its right of first refusal over twenty-four
titles under the 1990 Film Exhibition Agreement, as it had chosen only ten titles from the
first list. It insists that we give credence to Lopez's testimony that he and Del Rosario met
at the Tamarind Grill Restaurant, discussed the terms and conditions of the second list (the
1992 Film Exhibition Agreement) and upon agreement thereon, wrote the same on a paper
napkin. It also asserts that the contract has already been effective, as the elements
thereof, namely, consent, object, and consideration were established. It then concludes
that the Court of Appeals' pronouncements were not supported by law and jurisprudence,
as per our decision of 1 December 1995 in Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 23 which cited Toyota Shaw, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 24 Ang Yu Asuncion v. Court
of Appeals, 25 and Villonco Realty Company v. Bormaheco. Inc.26
Anent the actual damages awarded to RBS, ABS-CBN disavows liability therefor. RBS
spent for the premium on the counterbond of its own volition in order to negate the
injunction issued by the trial court after the parties had ventilated their respective positions
Page 368 of 486
during the hearings for the purpose. The filing of the counterbond was an option available
to RBS, but it can hardly be argued that ABS-CBN compelled RBS to incur such expense.
Besides, RBS had another available option, i.e., move for the dissolution or the injunction;
or if it was determined to put up a counterbond, it could have presented a cash bond.
Furthermore under Article 2203 of the Civil Code, the party suffering loss or injury is also
required to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages
resulting from the act or omission. As regards the cost of print advertisements, RBS had
not convincingly established that this was a loss attributable to the non showing "Maging
Sino Ka Man"; on the contrary, it was brought out during trial that with or without the case
or the injunction, RBS would have spent such an amount to generate interest in the film.
ABS-CBN further contends that there was no clear basis for the awards of moral and
exemplary damages. The controversy involving ABS-CBN and RBS did not in any way
originate from business transaction between them. The claims for such damages did not
arise from any contractual dealings or from specific acts committed by ABS-CBN against
RBS that may be characterized as wanton, fraudulent, or reckless; they arose by virtue
only of the filing of the complaint, An award of moral and exemplary damages is not
warranted where the record is bereft of any proof that a party acted maliciously or in bad
faith in filing an action. 27 In any case, free resort to courts for redress of wrongs is a matter
of public policy. The law recognizes the right of every one to sue for that which he honestly
believes to be his right without fear of standing trial for damages where by lack of sufficient
evidence, legal technicalities, or a different interpretation of the laws on the matter, the
case would lose ground. 28 One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. 29 If
damage results front the filing of the complaint, it is damnum absque injuria. 30 Besides,
moral damages are generally not awarded in favor of a juridical person, unless it enjoys a
good reputation that was debased by the offending party resulting in social humiliation.31
As regards the award of attorney's fees, ABS-CBN maintains that the same had no factual,
legal, or equitable justification. In sustaining the trial court's award, the Court of Appeals
acted in clear disregard of the doctrines laid down in Buan v. Camaganacan 32 that the text
of the decision should state the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded; otherwise,
the award should be disallowed. Besides, no bad faith has been imputed on, much less
proved as having been committed by, ABS-CBN. It has been held that "where no sufficient
showing of bad faith would be reflected in a party' s persistence in a case other than an
erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause, attorney's fees shall not be
recovered as cost." 33
On the other hand, RBS asserts that there was no perfected contract between ABS-CBN
and VIVA absent any meeting of minds between them regarding the object and
consideration of the alleged contract. It affirms that the ABS-CBN's claim of a right of first
refusal was correctly rejected by the trial court. RBS insist the premium it had paid for the
counterbond constituted a pecuniary loss upon which it may recover. It was obliged to put
up the counterbound due to the injunction procured by ABS-CBN. Since the trial court
found that ABS-CBN had no cause of action or valid claim against RBS and, therefore not
entitled to the writ of injunction, RBS could recover from ABS-CBN the premium paid on
the counterbond. Contrary to the claim of ABS-CBN, the cash bond would prove to be
more expensive, as the loss would be equivalent to the cost of money RBS would forego in
case the P30 million came from its funds or was borrowed from banks.
Page 369 of 486
RBS likewise asserts that it was entitled to the cost of advertisements for the cancelled
showing of the film "Maging Sino Ka Man" because the print advertisements were put out
to announce the showing on a particular day and hour on Channel 7, i.e., in its entirety at
one time, not a series to be shown on a periodic basis. Hence, the print advertisement
were good and relevant for the particular date showing, and since the film could not be
shown on that particular date and hour because of the injunction, the expenses for the
advertisements had gone to waste.
As regards moral and exemplary damages, RBS asserts that ABS-CBN filed the case and
secured injunctions purely for the purpose of harassing and prejudicing RBS. Pursuant
then to Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, ABS-CBN must be held liable for such
damages. Citing Tolentino,34 damages may be awarded in cases of abuse of rights even if
the act done is not illicit and there is abuse of rights were plaintiff institutes and action
purely for the purpose of harassing or prejudicing the defendant.
In support of its stand that a juridical entity can recover moral and exemplary damages,
private respondents RBS cited People v. Manero,35 where it was stated that such entity
may recover moral and exemplary damages if it has a good reputation that is debased
resulting in social humiliation. it then ratiocinates; thus:
There can be no doubt that RBS' reputation has been debased by ABS-
CBN's acts in this case. When RBS was not able to fulfill its commitment to
the viewing public to show the film "Maging Sino Ka Man" on the scheduled
dates and times (and on two occasions that RBS advertised), it suffered
serious embarrassment and social humiliation. When the showing was
canceled, late viewers called up RBS' offices and subjected RBS to verbal
abuse ("Announce kayo nang announce, hindi ninyo naman ilalabas,"
"nanloloko yata kayo") (Exh. 3-RBS, par. 3). This alone was not something
RBS brought upon itself. it was exactly what ABS-CBN had planned to
happen.
The amount of moral and exemplary damages cannot be said to be

excessive. Two reasons justify the amount of the award.
The first is that the humiliation suffered by RBS is national extent. RBS
operations as a broadcasting company is [sic] nationwide. Its clientele, like
that of ABS-CBN, consists of those who own and watch television. It is not
an exaggeration to state, and it is a matter of judicial notice that almost
every other person in the country watches television. The humiliation
suffered by RBS is multiplied by the number of televiewers who had
anticipated the showing of the film "Maging Sino Ka Man" on May 28 and
November 3, 1992 but did not see it owing to the cancellation. Added to this
are the advertisers who had placed commercial spots for the telecast and to
whom RBS had a commitment in consideration of the placement to show
the film in the dates and times specified.
The second is that it is a competitor that caused RBS to suffer the

humiliation. The humiliation and injury are far greater in degree when
Page 370 of 486
caused by an entity whose ultimate business objective is to lure customers
(viewers in this case) away from the competition. 36
For their part, VIVA and Vicente del Rosario contend that the findings of fact of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals do not support ABS-CBN's claim that there was a perfected
contract. Such factual findings can no longer be disturbed in this petition for review under
Rule 45, as only questions of law can be raised, not questions of fact. On the issue of
damages and attorneys fees, they adopted the arguments of RBS.
The key issues for our consideration are (1) whether there was a perfected contract
between VIVA and ABS-CBN, and (2) whether RBS is entitled to damages and attorney's
fees. It may be noted that the award of attorney's fees of P212,000 in favor of VIVA is not
assigned as another error.
I.
The first issue should be resolved against ABS-CBN. A contract is a meeting of minds
between two persons whereby one binds himself to give something or to render some
service to another 37 for a consideration. there is no contract unless the following requisites
concur: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject of the
contract; and (3) cause of the obligation, which is established. 38 A contract undergoes three
stages:
(a) preparation, conception, or generation, which is the period of negotiation

and bargaining, ending at the moment of agreement of the parties;
(b) perfection or birth of the contract, which is the moment when the parties
come to agree on the terms of the contract; and
(c) consummation or death, which is the fulfillment or performance of the

terms agreed upon in the contract. 39
Contracts that are consensual in nature are perfected upon mere meeting of the minds,
Once there is concurrence between the offer and the acceptance upon the subject matter,
consideration, and terms of payment a contract is produced. The offer must be certain. To
convert the offer into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not qualify the
terms of the offer; it must be plain, unequivocal, unconditional, and without variance of any
sort from the proposal. A qualified acceptance, or one that involves a new proposal,
constitutes a counter-offer and is a rejection of the original offer. Consequently, when
something is desired which is not exactly what is proposed in the offer, such acceptance is
not sufficient to generate consent because any modification or variation from the terms of
the offer annuls the offer.40
When Mr. Del Rosario of VIVA met with Mr. Lopez of ABS-CBN at the Tamarind Grill on 2
April 1992 to discuss the package of films, said package of 104 VIVA films was VIVA's
offer to ABS-CBN to enter into a new Film Exhibition Agreement. But ABS-CBN, sent,
through Ms. Concio, a counter-proposal in the form of a draft contract proposing exhibition
Page 371 of 486

of 53 films for a consideration of P35 million. This counter-proposal could be nothing less
than the counter-offer of Mr. Lopez during his conference with Del Rosario at Tamarind
Grill Restaurant. Clearly, there was no acceptance of VIVA's offer, for it was met by a
counter-offer which substantially varied the terms of the offer.
ABS-CBN's reliance in Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of

41 42
Appeals and Villonco Realty Company v. Bormaheco, Inc., is misplaced. In these
cases, it was held that an acceptance may contain a request for certain changes in the
terms of the offer and yet be a binding acceptance as long as "it is clear that the meaning
of the acceptance is positively and unequivocally to accept the offer, whether such request
is granted or not." This ruling was, however, reversed in the resolution of 29 March
1996, 43 which ruled that the acceptance of all offer must be unqualified and absolute, i.e., it
"must be identical in all respects with that of the offer so as to produce consent or meeting
of the minds."
On the other hand, in Villonco, cited in Limketkai, the alleged changes in the revised
counter-offer were not material but merely clarificatory of what had previously been agreed
upon. It cited the statement in Stuart v. Franklin Life Insurance Co.44 that "a vendor's
change in a phrase of the offer to purchase, which change does not essentially change the
terms of the offer, does not amount to a rejection of the offer and the tender of a counter-
offer." 45 However, when any of the elements of the contract is modified upon acceptance,
such alteration amounts to a counter-offer.
In the case at bar, ABS-CBN made no unqualified acceptance of VIVA's offer. Hence, they
underwent a period of bargaining. ABS-CBN then formalized its counter-proposals or
counter-offer in a draft contract, VIVA through its Board of Directors, rejected such counter-
offer, Even if it be conceded arguendo that Del Rosario had accepted the counter-offer, the
acceptance did not bind VIVA, as there was no proof whatsoever that Del Rosario had the
specific authority to do so.
Under Corporation Code,46 unless otherwise provided by said Code, corporate powers,

such as the power; to enter into contracts; are exercised by the Board of Directors.
However, the Board may delegate such powers to either an executive committee or
officials or contracted managers. The delegation, except for the executive committee, must
be for specific purposes, 47 Delegation to officers makes the latter agents of the
corporation; accordingly, the general rules of agency as to the bindings effects of their acts
would
apply. 48 For such officers to be deemed fully clothed by the corporation to exercise a
power of the Board, the latter must specially authorize them to do so. That Del Rosario did
not have the authority to accept ABS-CBN's counter-offer was best evidenced by his
submission of the draft contract to VIVA's Board of Directors for the latter's approval. In any
event, there was between Del Rosario and Lopez III no meeting of minds. The following
findings of the trial court are instructive:
A number of considerations militate against ABS-CBN's claim that a contract

was perfected at that lunch meeting on April 02, 1992 at the Tamarind Grill.
Page 372 of 486

FIRST, Mr. Lopez claimed that what was agreed upon at the Tamarind Grill
referred to the price and the number of films, which he wrote on a napkin.
However, Exhibit "C" contains numerous provisions which, were not
discussed at the Tamarind Grill, if Lopez testimony was to be believed nor
could they have been physically written on a napkin. There was even doubt
as to whether it was a paper napkin or a cloth napkin. In short what were
written in Exhibit "C'' were not discussed, and therefore could not have been
agreed upon, by the parties. How then could this court compel the parties to
sign Exhibit "C" when the provisions thereof were not previously agreed
upon?
SECOND, Mr. Lopez claimed that what was agreed upon as the subject
matter of the contract was 14 films. The complaint in fact prays for delivery
of 14 films. But Exhibit "C" mentions 53 films as its subject matter. Which is
which If Exhibits "C" reflected the true intent of the parties, then ABS-CBN's
claim for 14 films in its complaint is false or if what it alleged in the complaint
is true, then Exhibit "C" did not reflect what was agreed upon by the parties.
This underscores the fact that there was no meeting of the minds as to the
subject matter of the contracts, so as to preclude perfection thereof. For
settled is the rule that there can be no contract where there is no object
which is its subject matter (Art. 1318, NCC).
THIRD, Mr. Lopez [sic] answer to question 29 of his affidavit testimony (Exh.
"D") states:
We were able to reach an agreement. VIVA gave us the

exclusive license to show these fourteen (14) films, and we
agreed to pay Viva the amount of P16,050,000.00 as well as
grant Viva commercial slots worth P19,950,000.00. We had
already earmarked this P16, 050,000.00.
which gives a total consideration of P36 million (P19,950,000.00 plus

P16,050,000.00. equals P36,000,000.00).
On cross-examination Mr. Lopez testified:
Q. What was written in this napkin?
A. The total price, the breakdown the known Viva movies, the
7 blockbuster movies and the other 7 Viva movies because
the price was broken down accordingly. The none [sic] Viva
and the seven other Viva movies and the sharing between
the cash portion and the concerned spot portion in the total
amount of P35 million pesos.
Now, which is which? P36 million or P35 million? This weakens ABS-CBN's
claim.
Page 373 of 486

FOURTH. Mrs. Concio, testifying for ABS-CBN stated that she transmitted
Exhibit "C" to Mr. Del Rosario with a handwritten note, describing said
Exhibit "C" as a "draft." (Exh. "5" - Viva; tsn pp. 23-24 June 08, 1992). The
said draft has a well defined meaning.
Since Exhibit "C" is only a draft, or a tentative, provisional or preparatory

writing prepared for discussion, the terms and conditions thereof could not
have been previously agreed upon by ABS-CBN and Viva Exhibit "C'' could
not therefore legally bind Viva, not having agreed thereto. In fact, Ms.
Concio admitted that the terms and conditions embodied in Exhibit "C" were
prepared by ABS-CBN's lawyers and there was no discussion on said terms
and conditions. . . .
As the parties had not yet discussed the proposed terms and conditions in
Exhibit "C," and there was no evidence whatsoever that Viva agreed to the
terms and conditions thereof, said document cannot be a binding contract.
The fact that Viva refused to sign Exhibit "C" reveals only two [sic] well that
it did not agree on its terms and conditions, and this court has no authority
to compel Viva to agree thereto.
FIFTH. Mr. Lopez understand [sic] that what he and Mr. Del Rosario agreed
upon at the Tamarind Grill was only provisional, in the sense that it was
subject to approval by the Board of Directors of Viva. He testified:
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, and after that Tamarind meeting ... the
second meeting wherein you claimed that you have the
meeting of the minds between you and Mr. Vic del Rosario,
what happened?
A. Vic Del Rosario was supposed to call us up and tell us

specifically the result of the discussion with the Board of
Directors.
Q. And you are referring to the so-called agreement which

you wrote in [sic] a piece of paper?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, he was going to forward that to the board of Directors

for approval?
A. Yes, sir. (Tsn, pp. 42-43, June 8, 1992)
Q. Did Mr. Del Rosario tell you that he will submit it to his
Board for approval?
A. Yes, sir. (Tsn, p. 69, June 8, 1992).

Page 374 of 486
The above testimony of Mr. Lopez shows beyond doubt that he knew Mr.
Del Rosario had no authority to bind Viva to a contract with ABS-CBN until
and unless its Board of Directors approved it. The complaint, in fact, alleges
that Mr. Del Rosario "is the Executive Producer of defendant Viva" which "is
a corporation." (par. 2, complaint). As a mere agent of Viva, Del Rosario
could not bind Viva unless what he did is ratified by its Board of Directors.
(Vicente vs. Geraldez, 52 SCRA 210; Arnold vs. Willets and Paterson, 44
Phil. 634). As a mere agent, recognized as such by plaintiff, Del Rosario
could not be held liable jointly and severally with Viva and his inclusion as
party defendant has no legal basis. (Salonga vs. Warner Barner [sic] ,
COLTA , 88 Phil. 125; Salmon vs. Tan, 36 Phil. 556).
The testimony of Mr. Lopez and the allegations in the complaint are clear
admissions that what was supposed to have been agreed upon at the
Tamarind Grill between Mr. Lopez and Del Rosario was not a binding
agreement. It is as it should be because corporate power to enter into a
contract is lodged in the Board of Directors. (Sec. 23, Corporation Code).
Without such board approval by the Viva board, whatever agreement Lopez
and Del Rosario arrived at could not ripen into a valid contract binding upon
Viva (Yao Ka Sin Trading vs. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 763). The
evidence adduced shows that the Board of Directors of Viva rejected Exhibit
"C" and insisted that the film package for 140 films be maintained (Exh. "7-
1" - Viva ). 49
The contention that ABS-CBN had yet to fully exercise its right of first refusal over twenty-
four films under the 1990 Film Exhibition Agreement and that the meeting between Lopez
and Del Rosario was a continuation of said previous contract is untenable. As observed by
the trial court, ABS-CBN right of first refusal had already been exercised when Ms. Concio
wrote to VIVA ticking off ten films, Thus:
[T]he subsequent negotiation with ABS-CBN two (2) months after this letter
was sent, was for an entirely different package. Ms. Concio herself admitted
on cross-examination to having used or exercised the right of first refusal.
She stated that the list was not acceptable and was indeed not accepted by
ABS-CBN, (TSN, June 8, 1992, pp. 8-10). Even Mr. Lopez himself admitted
that the right of the first refusal may have been already exercised by Ms.
Concio (as she had). (TSN, June 8, 1992, pp. 71-75). Del Rosario himself
knew and understand [sic] that ABS-CBN has lost its rights of the first
refusal when his list of 36 titles were rejected (Tsn, June 9, 1992, pp. 10-
11) 50
II
However, we find for ABS-CBN on the issue of damages. We shall first take up actual
damages. Chapter 2, Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code is the specific law on actual or
compensatory damages. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to
compensation for actual damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved. 51 The indemnification shall comprehend not only the value of the loss
Page 375 of 486
suffered, but also that of the profits that the obligee failed to obtain. 52 In contracts and
quasi-contracts the damages which may be awarded are dependent on whether the obligor
acted with good faith or otherwise, It case of good faith, the damages recoverable are
those which are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation and
which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time of the
constitution of the obligation. If the obligor acted with fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton
attitude, he shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of the obligation. 53 In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be
liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of, whether or not such damages has been foreseen or could have
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.54
Actual damages may likewise be recovered for loss or impairment of earning capacity in
cases of temporary or permanent personal injury, or for injury to the plaintiff's business
standing or commercial credit.55
The claim of RBS for actual damages did not arise from contract, quasi-contract, delict, or
quasi-delict. It arose from the fact of filing of the complaint despite ABS-CBN's alleged
knowledge of lack of cause of action. Thus paragraph 12 of RBS's Answer with
Counterclaim and Cross-claim under the heading COUNTERCLAIM specifically alleges:
12. ABS-CBN filed the complaint knowing fully well that it has no cause of
action RBS. As a result thereof, RBS suffered actual damages in the
amount of P6,621,195.32. 56
Needless to state the award of actual damages cannot be comprehended under the above
law on actual damages. RBS could only probably take refuge under Articles 19, 20, and 21
of the Civil Code, which read as follows:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for tile same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
It may further be observed that in cases where a writ of preliminary injunction is issued, the
damages which the defendant may suffer by reason of the writ are recoverable from the
injunctive bond. 57 In this case, ABS-CBN had not yet filed the required bond; as a matter of
fact, it asked for reduction of the bond and even went to the Court of Appeals to challenge
the order on the matter, Clearly then, it was not necessary for RBS to file a counterbond.
Hence, ABS-CBN cannot be held responsible for the premium RBS paid for the
counterbond.
Page 376 of 486

Neither could ABS-CBN be liable for the print advertisements for "Maging Sino Ka Man" for
lack of sufficient legal basis. The RTC issued a temporary restraining order and later, a writ
of preliminary injunction on the basis of its determination that there existed sufficient
ground for the issuance thereof. Notably, the RTC did not dissolve the injunction on the
ground of lack of legal and factual basis, but because of the plea of RBS that it be allowed
to put up a counterbond.
As regards attorney's fees, the law is clear that in the absence of stipulation, attorney's
fees may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages under any of the
circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 58
The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because
of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. 59 They are not to be
awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees
under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification.60 Even when claimant
is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still
attorney's fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be
reflected in a party's persistence in a case other than erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause. 61
As to moral damages the law is Section 1, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code.
Article 2217 thereof defines what are included in moral damages, while Article 2219
enumerates the cases where they may be recovered, Article 2220 provides that moral
damages may be recovered in breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. RBS's claim for moral damages could possibly fall only under
item (10) of Article 2219, thereof which reads:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34,
and 35.
Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for
actual injury suffered. and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. 62 The award is not
meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate then moral
suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible,
of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. 63 Trial
courts must then guard against the award of exorbitant damages; they should exercise
balanced restrained and measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion,
prejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court. 64
The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being
an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no
emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental
anguish, which call be experienced only by one having a nervous system. 65 The statement
in People v. Manero 66 and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB 67 that a corporation may
recover moral damages if it "has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social
humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On this score alone the award for damages must be set
aside, since RBS is a corporation.
Page 377 of 486
The basic law on exemplary damages is Section 5, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book IV of the
Civil Code. These are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 68 They are recoverable
in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances; 69 in quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted with gross
negligence; 70 and in contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.71
It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on contract,
quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict, Hence, the claims for moral and exemplary damages
can only be based on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
The elements of abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) the existence of a
legal right or duty, (2) which is exercised in bad faith, and (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other
provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction; while Article 21
deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements; (1) there is an act
which is legal, (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy, and (3) and it is done with intent to injure. 72
Verily then, malice or bad faith is at the core of Articles 19, 20, and 21. Malice or bad faith
implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity. 73 Such must be substantiated by evidence. 74
There is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or bad faith. It was
honestly convinced of the merits of its cause after it had undergone serious negotiations
culminating in its formal submission of a draft contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse
result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to
damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If
damages result from a person's exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria.75
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No, 44125 is hereby REVERSED except as to unappealed award
of attorney's fees in favor of VIVA Productions, Inc.1âwphi1.nêt
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 378 of 486

[2]
January 20, 2016
G.R. No. 171303
ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GEORGINA R. EN CANTO, ERNESTO G. TABUJARA, GEMINO H. ABAD and
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as
amended, which seeks to reverse and set aside the April 28, 2005 Decision1 and January
20, 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55165, 3 which reversed
the April 17, 1996 Decision4 and September 1 7, 1996 Order5 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 71, Pasig City, in Civil Case No. 58397.
The undisputed facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Plaintiff-appellant [Elizabeth L. Diaz] has been in the service of [the University of the
Philippines] U.P. since 1963. In 1987, she was an associate professor in the College of
Mass Communication (CMC). During the second semester for Academic Year (A Y) 1987-
1988, she was a full time member of the faculty and taught 12 units on full load. After 2 to 3
weeks of teaching, she applied for sick leave effective November 23, 1987 until March 1,
1988. She returned on March 2, 1988 and submitted a Report for Duty Form.
On May 3, 1988, Diaz filed a letter-application directly with U.P.'s "Office of the President
(Abueva) for sabbatical leave with pay for one (1) year effective June 1988 to May 1989,
for "rest, renewal and study." Cecilia Lazaro, Chair of the Broadcast Department, initially
recommended to CMC Dean Encanto that Diaz's sabbatical application be granted. After
they discussed the options available to the CMC, Lazaro, on May 10, 1988, recommended
instead that Diaz be granted any leave of absence she may be qualified for. In her May 2,
1988 letter, Diaz indicated her unwillingness to teach. Considering the CMC's experience
with Diaz who dropped her courses in the previous semester, Lazaro deleted Diaz's name
in the final schedule of classes for the 1st semester of A Y 1988-89 beginning June 6,
1988. Incidentally, Diaz received her salary for June 1988, indicating that her sabbatical
might be approved.
Thereafter, Encanto referred Diaz's sabbatical application to the Secretary of U.P.,

recommending its denial. When requested by (Chancellor) Tabujara, Encanto transmitted
to the former a Reference Slip together with her comments thereon. Meanwhile, Encanto
requested Ermelina Kalagayan to hold Diaz's salary effective July 1, 1988 until further
notice considering that her sabbatical application has not yet been approved and that she
Page 379 of 486
did not teach that semester. Consequently, Diaz's name was deleted in the payroll from
September 1988 to January 1989.
On July 4, 1988, Tabujara recommended instead that Diaz be granted a leave without pay
in order to enable the CMC to hire a substitute. The next day, the U.P.'s Secretary referred
to Abad, VicePresident (VP) for Academic Affairs, the fact of denial of such sabbatical
request, for his own comment/recommendation to the U.P. President. Meantime, Diaz
confessed her problems to Abad. On July 8, 1988, Abad returned the Reference Slip
indicating therein that Diaz had promised him earlier "to put down in writing, from her point
of view, the historical backdrop as it were to the latest denial of her sabbatical leave." With
comments, Abad then referred the matter to the U .P. President.
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 42 issued by the U.P. President, the Academic Policy
Coordinating Committee (APCC), on July 21, 1988, reviewed the case of Diaz. When
reminded by Abad, Diaz again promised to give the background information.
On Diaz's request to teach for that semester, AY 1988-89, the Vice Chancellor for
Academic Affairs, Edgardo Pacheco, and the HRDO Director, Atty. Pio Frago, instructed
Encanto that "Until Prof. Diaz officially reports for duty, accomplishes the Certificate of
Report for Duty, and the Dean of CMC confirms her date of actual report for duty, she is
considered absent without official leave (AWOL) for the University."
On November 8, 1988, Abad, then as OIC, issued a Memorandum to Diaz to confirm as

valid Encanto' s reason of shortage of teaching staff in denying her sabbatical. Later, he
also informed Diaz of her lack of service during the first semester of A Y 1988-89, hence,
she is not entitled to be paid and asked her to clarify her status of being on leave without
pay.
[While Diaz was able to teach during the second semester of AY 1988-89, she was not
able to claim her salaries for her refusal to submit the Report for Duty Form. 6 She received
her salaries for June to July 15, 1989, but could no longer claim her salary after July 15,
1989, when Encanto reminded the University Cashier, in a letter dated July 26, 1989, 7 that
Diaz had to "accomplish the Report for Duty Form to entitle her to salaries and make
official her return to the service of the University."8 Diaz's name was subsequently included
in the payroll starting July 1990, when she submitted a Report for Duty after her return from
compulsory summer leave.9]
xxxx
In the meantime, on January 3, 1989, Diaz filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB-00-89-0049), against Gemino H. Abad, Ernesto G. Tabujara and
Georgina R. Encanto, all officials of the University of the Philippines, for the alleged
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, involving the legality of a Report for Duty Form as a
prerequisite to the payment of her salary.
On May 4, 1989, the Ombudsman dismissed the said complaint and ruled, inter alia:
Page 380 of 486

Considering that Prof. Diaz was rightfully considered on leave without pay during the first
semester of A Y 1988-1989, to make official her return to the service of the University, it is
advised that she accomplish the Report for Duty Form which will then be the basis to
establish the date of her actual return to the service. However, if possible, the University
authorities can perhaps dispense with the requirement and pay her salaries for actual
services rendered from November 3, 1988.
Diaz's initial Petition for Certiorari in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 88834) assailing the
above-quoted Ombudsman's ruling was subsequently dismissed. She filed another Petition
(G.R. No. 89207) raising exactly the same issued found in G.R. No. 88834.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1989, Diaz instituted a complaint against the U.P., Abueva,
Encanto, Tabujara and Abad with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila praying
that the latter be adjudged, jointly and severally to pay her damages. She claimed, among
others, that [respondents] conspired together as joint tortfeasors, in not paying her salaries
from July 1, 1988 in the first semester of academic year 1988-89, for the entire period
when her sabbatical application was left unresolved, as well as the salaries she earned
from teaching in the second semester from November 1988 to May 1989. She likewise
claimed moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
On August 31, 1989, the Supreme Court En Banc dismissed Diaz's Petition in G.R. No.
89207, viz.:
It is noted that the Ombudsman found no manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence on the part of the private respondents in denying the application for
sabbatical leave of petitioner (Diaz) and in requiring her to fill up a Report for Duty Form as
a requisite for her entitlement to salary.
To the petitioner's contentions, the Ombudsman observed, among others, the following:
that, the denial of her sabbatical leave application was due to the exigencies of the service;
that petitioner was not given a teaching assignment for the first semester of A Y 1988-
1989, because she did not want to teach then; that the delay in action on her leave
application was due to petitioner's own fault for not following the usual procedures in the
processing of her application; and that there is no malice on the part of the private
respondents in requiring petitioner to accomplish the Report for Duty Form which is the
basis of the date of her actual return to the service.10 (Citations omitted.)
In a Decision dated April 1 7, 1996, the R TC ruled in favor of petitioner Diaz, the
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants:
1. Ordering defendants, except Abueva, to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the
amount of P133,665.50 representing the total unpaid salaries from July 1, 1988 to
May 31, 1989 and from July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990 to be covered by
corresponding certificate of service, with legal rate of interest from the date of this
Decision until its full payment.
Page 381 of 486

2. Ordering defendants, except the University and Abueva, to pay plaintiff, jointly
and severally, the amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages.
and severally, the amount of P60,000.00 as exemplary damages.
and severally, the reduced amount of PS0,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees.
5. Costs of suit.
The counterclaims filed by defendant Tabujara are DISMISSED.11
The RTC, ruling that a sabbatical leave is not a right but a privilege, held that petitioner
Diaz was entitled to such privilege and found that the delay in the_resolution of her
application was unreasonable and unconscionable.
However, on September 17, 1996, the RTC, in denying the Motions for Reconsideration of
the respondents in said case, also amended its earlier decision by absolving respondent
Encanto from any liability, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants:
1. Ordering defendants, except Abueva and Encanto, to pay plaintiff, jointly and
severally, the amount of P133,665.50 representing the total unpaid salaries from
July 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989 and from July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990 to be covered
by corresponding certificate of service, with legal rate of interest from the date of
this Decision until its full payment.
2. Ordering defendants, except the University, Abueva and Encanto, to pay plaintiff,
jointly and severally, the amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages.
3. Ordering defendants, except the University, Abueva and Encanto, to pay plaintiff,
jointly and severally, the amount of P60,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. Ordering defendants, except University, Abueva and Encanto, to pay plaintiff,

jointly and severally, the reduced amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's
fees.
5. Costs of suit.
The counterclaims filed by defendant Tabujara are DISMISSED.12
The RTC dismissed the claim of petitioner Diaz against respondent Encanto on the ground
that her function was purely recommendatory in nature. It held that she was not
instrumental in the unreasonable and unconscionable delay in the resolution of petitioner
Page 382 of 486

Diaz's sabbatical application as she transmitted her recommendation to Abueva within
eighteen days from her receipt of such application.13
Petitioner Diaz14 and respondents Tabujara,15 U.P., Abad16 and even Encanto17 appealed

the RTC's ruling to the Court of Appeals.
As respondent Encanto was absolved of liability by the R TC in its September 1 7, 1996

Order, the Court of Appeals admitted her Brief,18 as an incorporation to the other
respondents' Brief,19 and as a comment on petitioner Diaz's appeal.20
The respondents mainly argued that the R TC erred in holding them liable for damages
despite the absence of bad faith on their part, as held by both the Ombudsman in OMB-00-
89-0049 and the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 89207.
Petitioner Diaz, on the other hand, questioned the reversal of the R TC ruling only with
respect to the liability of respondent Encanto, in a lone assignment of error, viz.:
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING ITS ORIGINAL DECISION

WITH REGARD TO PRINCIPAL DEFENDANT GEORGINA R. ENCANTO BY
ABSOLVING HER OF LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
ELIZABETH L. DIAZ WITHOUT ALTERING IN ANY MATERIAL RESPECT
WHATSOEVER THE FINDINGS OF FACT IN THE ORIGINAL DECISION SHOWING
CLEARLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFENDANT ENCANTO FOR (I) THE
WRONGFUL DISAPPROVAL OF PLAINTIFF'S SABBATICAL APPLICATION; (II) THE
UNJUST DEPRIVATION OF SALARIES DUE THE PLAINTIFF FOR ALMOST ONE
WHOLE SEMESTER DURING WHICH HER SABBATICAL APPLICATION REMAINED
UNRESOLVED; AND (III) THE WRONGFUL WITHHOLDING OF PLAINTIFF'S EARNED
SALARIES IN THE THREE SUCCEEDING SEMESTERS DURING WHICH THE
PLAINTIFF TAUGHT WITHOUT BEING PAID.21
The Court of Appeals trimmed down the issue to whether or not respondents U.P.,
Tabujara and Abad were negligent or acted in bad faith in denying petitioner Diaz's
application for sabbatical leave and in withholding her salaries. In its Decision promulgated
on April 28, 2005, it effectively reversed the decision of the R TC, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a NEW

JUDGMENT is RENDERED, as follows: (1) defendant-appellant University of the
Philippines, through its appropriate officials, is DIRECTED to pay plaintiff-appellant
Elizabeth Diaz the sum of Twenty-One Thousand, Eight Hundred Seventy-Nine and 64/100
(P21,879.64) as unpaid salaries and allowances, and (2) the sums awarded as moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees are hereby DELETED. This is without prejudice to
the enforcement of valid rules and regulations of the University of the Philippines pertaining
to Diaz's employment status.22
Page 383 of 486

The Court of Appeals found neither negligence nor bad faith on the part of the respondents
in their denial of petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave application and in withholding her
salaries.
The Court of Appeals emphasized that a sabbatical leave is not a right which could be
demanded at will, even by petitioner Diaz who has been a veteran professor of 24 years at
U.P. Moreover, the Court of Appeals said that the eventual denial of her sabbatical leave
application was not actionable in view of the fact that (i) it would be unfair to impute
negligence to respondents in the regular discharge of their functions; and (ii) assuming that
there was delay in the resolution of her application, she herself caused such delay.23
The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner Diaz's own recalcitrance and defiance to
comply with certain documentary requirements was the reason her salaries were
withheld.24
Petitioner Diaz filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the aforementioned decision, which
was subsequently denied for lack of merit in a Resolution dated January 20, 2006.
Issues
Undaunted, petitioner Diaz is again before this Court, with the following Assignments of
Error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITHOUT DISTURBING THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF. THE TRIAL COURT BASED ON
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE REVEALING THE COMMISSION BY RESPONDENTS OF
THE TORTIOUS ACTS COMPLAINED OF BY PETITIONER IN DENYING HER
SABBATICAL LEA VE, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN IGNORING
THOSE FINDINGS AND ADOPTING AND TREATING AS VALID THE FLIMSY EXCUSES
OF RESPONDENTS TO A VOID THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTS.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON

RECORD, THAT "THERE WAS JUDICIOUS EXERCISE" BY RESPONDENTS "OF THEIR
DISCRETIONARY POWER WITH RESPECT TO THE DENIAL OF THE SUBJECT
SABBATICAL LEAVE."
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN TREATING AS LAWFUL THE WITHHOLDING OF

PETITIONER'S SALARIES, CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Page 384 of 486

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING, CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD, THAT PETITIONER "FAILED TO SHOW BY A PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE THE NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENTS SO AS TO BE ENTITLED TO THE
DAMAGES SOUGHT."
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CORRECTLY COMPUTING THE SUM OF

PETITIONER'S UNPAID AND EARNED SALARIES, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING, CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE

ON RECORD, THAT RESPONDENTS EN CANTO, TABUJARA AND ABAD ARE
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE TO PETITIONER FOR ACTUAL, MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS JOINT TORTFEASORS UNDER THE LAW.25
The issue in this case boils down to whether or not the respondents acted in bad faith
when they resolved petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave and withheld her
salaries.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on the question of bad faith on the part of the
respondents in denying petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave application and withholding of her
salaries. Bad faith, however, is a question of fact and is evidentiary.26 Thus, contrary to
petitioner Diaz's belief that " [ w ]hat is involved in this stage of the case is the legal
interpretation or the legal consequence of the material facts of this case," the resolution of
the issue at hand involves a question of fact, which the respondents rightly assert, is not
within the province of a Rule 45 petition.27 Nonetheless, the Court makes an exception in
this case especially so that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals have the same findings
of fact, but they arrived at different conclusions.28
Application for Sabbatical Leave
Petitioner Diaz's complaint29 for recovery of damages before the RTC was based on the
alleged bad faith of the respondents in denying her application for sabbatical leave vis-a-
vis Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.30
Articles 19 and 20 read as follows:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Page 385 of 486
Article 19 of the Civil Code "prescribes a 'primordial limitation on all rights' by setting
certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof."31 Abuse of right under
Article 19 exists when the following elements are present: (1) there is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.32
This Court, expounding on the concept of bad faith under Article 19, held:
Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to the
state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the
intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of
another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence; it involves a
dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to
do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.33 (Citations omitted.)
Undoubtedly, the respondents had a duty to resolve petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave
application. The crucial question is if they did so with the intention of prejudicing or injuring
petitioner Diaz.
We hold in the negative.
There is no dispute, and both the RTC and the Court of Appeals agree, that the grant of a
sabbatical leave is not a matter of right, but a privilege. Moreover, the issue of whether or
not the respondents acted in bad faith when they denied petitioner Diaz's application for
sabbatical leave has been answered several times, in separate jurisdictions.
On May 4, 1989, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution34 in Case No. OMB-0-89-0049 on

the complaint filed by petitioner Diaz against respondents Encanto, Tabujara, and Abad for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, recommending the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit. It found no manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence on the part of the respondents in their denial of petitioner Diaz's
application for sabbatical leave and in requiring her to accomplish a Report for Duty form
as a prerequisite for her entitlement to salary.
Petitioner Diaz protested the outcome of this resolution by filing a special civil action
for certiorari with this Court, on two occasions. When G.R. No. 88834 was dismissed for
non-compliance with Circular No. 1-88,35 petitioner Diaz re-filed her petition, raising exactly
the same issues, and this was docketed as G.R. No. 89207.36
On August 31, 1989, this Court issued a Resolution, 37 dismissing petitioner Diaz's petition
in G.R. No. 89207. This Court noted the Ombudsman's findings and observations and
found them to be supported by substantial evidence.
On April 28, 2005, the Court of Appeals had the same findings and held that the denial of
petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave was "a collegial decision based on UP. 's
Page 386 of 486

established rules, the grant of which is subject to the exigencies of the service, like acute
shortage in teaching staff" It added that "the UP. officials' eventual denial of [Diaz's}
application is not actionable xx x it is unfair to impute negligence to [respondents] in the
regular discharge of their official functions. "38
The Ombudsman and all three courts, starting from the R TC to this Court, have already
established that a sabbatical leave is not a right and therefore petitioner Diaz cannot
demand its grant. It does not matter that there was only one reason for the denial of her
application, as the approving authorities found that such reason was enough. Moreover,
not only the Court of Appeals but also the Ombudsman, and this Court, have ruled that the
respondents did not act in bad faith when petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave application was
denied. Those three separate rulings verily must be given great weight in the case at bar.
The Court does not find any reason to disregard those findings, especially when our own
perusal of the evidence showed no traces of bad faith or malice in the respondents' denial
of petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave. They processed her application in
accordance with their usual procedure - with more leeway, in fact, since petitioner Diaz was
given the chance to support her application when she was asked to submit a historical
background; and the denial was based on the recommendation of respondent Encanto,
who was in the best position to know whether petitioner Diaz's application should be
granted or not.
While the RTC declared that petitioner Diaz should have been granted a sabbatical leave,
it is important to note that the RTC awarded damages to petitioner Diaz merely for the
unreasonable and unconscionable delay in the resolution of her sabbatical leave
application,39 and not its denial per se. Thus, petitioner Diaz's entitlement to a sabbatical
leave should no longer be an issue in this case. This is supported by petitioner Diaz's own
action when she did not move for the reconsideration of the April 17, 1996 Decision of the
RTC for awarding her damages due only to the delay in the resolution of her sabbatical
leave application and not for its denial; and more so by the prayer in her petition to this
Court wherein she asked that the April 17, 1996 Decision of the RTC be "reinstated and
affirmed in toto."40
Nevertheless, on the question of whether or not there was bad faith in the delay of the
resolution of petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave application, the Court still rules in the
negative. "It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that
the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same."41 Petitioner Diaz
has failed to prove bad faith on the part of the respondents. There is nothing in the records
to show that the respondents purposely delayed the resolution of her application to
prejudice and injure her. She has not even shown that the delay of six months in resolving
a sabbatical leave application has never happened prior to her case. On the contrary, any
delay that occurred was due to the fact that petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical
leave did not follow the usual procedure; hence, the processing of said application took
time.42
In petitioner Diaz's petition, she criticized the Court of Appeals for imputing the cause of
delay to her, arguing that as the requirement that a sabbatical leave application be filed at
least one semester before its intended date of effectivity was only imposed in 1990, long
Page 387 of 486
after she had filed hers in 1988.43 But, precisely, this rule may have been imposed by U.P.
to address any untoward delays and to likewise provide a time frame for the approving
authorities in resolving sabbatical leave applications.
This Court understands petitioner Diaz's frustration, but she cannot keep on arguing that
the facts, as established, and which she herself does not dispute, had been
misappreciated.in different occasions.
Petitioner Diaz's Withheld Salaries
Petitioner Diaz is entitled to her withheld salaries from July 1, 1988 to October 31, 1988,
and from November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989, and July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990, upon
submission of the required documents.
The denial of petitioner Diaz's salaries during the first semester of Academic Year (AY)
1988-1989 was due to the fact that she did not teach that semester. But when respondent
Lazaro removed petitioner Diaz's name from the final schedule of teaching assignments in
CMC for the first semester of AY 1988-89, it was without petitioner Diaz's prior knowledge,
as admitted by respondent Lazaro herself, to wit:
ATTY. DIAZ: Now, did Prof. Diaz ask you to remove her from [the] schedule of classes?
LAZARO: I did it.
Q: Because you said you did it on your own?
A: Yes.
xxxx
Q: She did not [ask] you?
A: No.44
The Court, however, observes that respondent Lazaro, in so doing, did not act in bad faith
as she expected petitioner Diaz's application for leave, of whatever nature, to be granted.
As such, she did not want Diaz to have to drop the classes she was already handling once
her sabbatical leave was approved, as was the case the semester before, when petitioner
Diaz dropped her classes, three weeks into the start of the semester, when her application
for sick leave was approved, viz.:
ATTY. GUNO: You mentioned a while ago that you deleted the name of Professor Diaz
from this final schedule of classes.1âwphi1 Why did you delete it?
LAZARO: I presumed in good faith that based on the letter she sent which was routed to
me where she stated she could no longer be efficient and effective as a teacher and she
was suffering from fatigue and that she could no longer work under those circumstances, I
Page 388 of 486
felt, as a gesture of sympathy to her that this should be granted suggesting that she be
given a leave of absence of whatever kind she was qualified for and based on my previous
experience on the second semester where two to three weeks into the course she dropped
her courses, I did not want that to happen again.45
ATTY. GUNO: You also testified that because of the application for sabbatical leave and
the reasons she gave in that letter, you deleted her name in the final list of class schedule
for school year 1988-89 first semester?
LAZARO: Yes.
Q: Why did you delete her name, will you tell the Court?
A: She had applied for sabbatical leave for the whole year of 1988-89 and based on the
experience of her sick leave during the previous semester which was the second semester
of the previous school year where three (3) weeks into classes she filed for a sick leave
and did not teach, based on that experience, I did not include her name in the class list
because the same thing could happen again.46
While petitioner Diaz was not consulted about the removal of her name from the class
schedule, she did not contest such upon the belief that her application for sabbatical leave
would be approved, as in fact, she was given her salary in June 1988. As such, this Court
believes, in the interest of equity and fairness, that petitioner Diaz should be entitled to her
salary during the semester when her name was dropped from the final list of schedule of
classes, without her knowledge and consent, and while action on her application for
sabbatical leave was still pending.47
On the matter of her salaries from the second semester of A Y 1988-89 up until A Y 1989-
1990, the respondents legally withheld such, as found by the Ombudsman and the Court of
Appeals for petitioner Diaz's own refusal to comply with the documentary requirements of
U.P. Even the RTC, in its Omnibus Order of January 12, 1990, denied petitioner Diaz's
petition for mandatory injunction upon the finding that the Report for Duty Form required of
her is a basic and standard requirement that is asked from all employees of U.P. The RTC
held:
It is therefore clear that the acts sought to be enjoined [by Diaz] are in fact pursuant to the
proper observance of administrative or internal rules of the University. This Court
sympathizes with [Diaz] for not being able to receive her salaries after July 15, 1989.
However, such predicament cannot be outrightly attributable to the defendants, as their
withholding of her salaries appears to be in accordance with existing University regulations.
Apart from such reasons, this Court believes that petitioner Diaz failed to show why she
should be spared from the Report for Duty requirement, which remains a standard practice
even in other offices or institutions. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, one must show an
unquestionable right and/or blatant violation of said right to be entitled to its issuance.48
Page 389 of 486

But it cannot be denied that during the periods of November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1988 and
July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990, petitioner Diaz rendered service to U.P. for which she
should be compensated.
Given the foregoing, petitioner Diaz should be paid, as the RTC had computed, her
salaries from July l, 1988 to October 1988, the semester when petitioner Diaz's name was
dropped from the final list of schedule of classes, without her prior knowledge and consent;
and for the periods of November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989 and July 16, 1989 to May 31,
1990, for the work she rendered during said periods, but upon petitioner Diaz's
submission of the documents required by U.P.
No Payment of Other Damages
Given that the respondents have not abused their rights, they should not be held liable for
any damages sustained by petitioner Diaz. "The law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal wrong. Situations like this have
been appropriately denominated damnum absque injuria."49 Similarly, the Court cannot
grant petitioner Diaz's claim for attorney's fees as no premium should be placed on the
right to litigate. "Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to
protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where there is no sufficient
showing of bad faith in a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction
of the righteousness of his cause."50
Legal Interest Due on the Salaries Withheld
Pursuant to Nacar v. Gallery Frames,51 the applicable rate of legal interest due on

petitioner Diaz's withheld salaries - (i) from July 1, 1988 to October 31, 1988, the period
corresponding to the first semester of A Y 1988-89, when her name was removed from the
final list of class schedule without her prior knowledge and consent, less the amount she
had received in June 1988 - will be from April 17, 1996, the date of the Decision of the
RTC, up to the full satisfaction thereof, is 6% per annum; and (ii) from November 1, 1988
to May 31, 1989, and July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990, the periods when she was refused
payment of her salaries for not accomplishing a Report for Duty Form - will be from the
time petitioner Diaz submits the required Report for Duty Form up to the full satisfaction
thereof, is 6% per annum.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55165 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
University of the Philippines, through its appropriate officials, is directed to pay petitioner
Elizabeth L. Diaz her withheld salaries 1) from July 1, 1988 to October 31, 1988, with legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, computed from the date of the Decision
of the R TC on April 17, 1996 until fully paid; and 2) from November 1, 1988 to May 31,
1989 and July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum computed from the date petitioner Elizabeth L. Diaz submits the documents
required by the University of the Philippines until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Page 390 of 486

Page 391 of 486

[3]
G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993
ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN

MENDIONA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, respondents.
Puruganan, Chato, Chato & Tan for petitioners.
Lino M. Patajo, Francisco Ma. Chanco, Ananiano Desierto and Segundo Mangohig for
private respondent.
BIDIN, J.:
This petition assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in

CA-GR CV No. 14948 entitled "Eugenio S. Baltao, plaintiff-appellee vs. Albenson
Enterprises Corporation, et al, defendants-appellants", which modified the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVIII in Civil Case No. Q-40920 and ordered
petitioner to pay private respondent, among others, the sum of P500,000.00 as moral
damages and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00.
The facts are not disputed.
In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation

(Albenson for short) delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed for short) located
at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the mild steel plates which the latter ordered.
As part payment thereof, Albenson was given Pacific Banking Corporation Check No.
136361 in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks
(Rollo, p. 148).
When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed."
Thereafter, petitioner Albenson, through counsel, traced the origin of the dishonored check.
From the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Albenson discovered
that the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one
"Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry, Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade
and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was registered in the
name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon verification with the drawee bank, Pacific
Banking Corporation, Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the subject
check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao."
Page 392 of 486

After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson, through counsel, made an extrajudicial
demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed, to replace
and/or make good the dishonored check.
Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or that the signature
appearing thereon is his. He further alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and
hence, could not have transacted business with Albenson.
On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a
complaint against Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Submitted
to support said charges was an affidavit of petitioner Benjamin Mendiona, an employee of
Albenson. In said affidavit, the above-mentioned circumstances were stated.
It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III,
who manages a business establishment, E.L. Woodworks, on the ground floor of the
Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the very same business address
of Guaranteed.
On September 5, 1983, Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against

Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. In filing said information,
Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit
controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed to have
waived his right.
Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that
he had been given an opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation conducted by
Fiscal Sumaway, and that he never had any dealings with Albenson or Benjamin
Mendiona, consequently, the check for which he has been accused of having issued
without funds was not issued by him and the signature in said check was not his.
On January 30, 1984, Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of
Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. He also instructed the Trial Fiscal to
move for dismissal of the information filed against Eugenio S. Baltao. Fiscal Castro found
that the signature in PBC Check No. 136361 is not the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao. He
also found that there is no showing in the records of the preliminary investigation that
Eugenio S. Baltao actually received notice of the said investigation. Fiscal Castro then
castigated Fiscal Sumaway for failing to exercise care and prudence in the performance of
his duties, thereby causing injustice to respondent who was not properly notified of the
complaint against him and of the requirement to submit his counter evidence.
Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a
check which bounced in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for a measly amount of
P2,575.00, respondent Baltao filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its
owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.
Page 393 of 486

In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of
"E.L. Woodworks," not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President.
Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since
1975. . . . . The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III, a son of
plaintiff who had a business on the ground floor of Baltao Building located on V. Mapa
Street, that the defendants may have been dealing with . . . ." (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
The dispositive portion of the trial court 's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against

defendants ordering the latter to pay plaintiff jointly and severally:
1. actual or compensatory damages of P133,350.00;
2. moral damages of P1,000,000.00 (1 million pesos);
3. exemplary damages of P200,000.00;
4. attorney's fees of P100,000.00;
5 costs.
Defendants' counterclaim against plaintiff and claim for damages against

Mercantile Insurance Co. on the bond for the issuance of the writ of
attachment at the instance of plaintiff are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
(Rollo, pp. 38-39).
On appeal, respondent court modified the trial court's decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by reducing the

moral damages awarded therein from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 and
the attorney's fees from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00, said decision being
hereby affirmed in all its other aspects. With costs against appellants. (Rollo,
pp. 50-51)
Dissatisfied with the above ruling, petitioners Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap, and
Benjamin Mendiona filed the instant Petition, alleging that the appellate court erred in:
1. Concluding that private respondent's cause of action is not one based on

malicious prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the Civil
Code notwithstanding the fact that the basis of a civil action for malicious
prosecution is Article 2219 in relation to Article 21 or Article 2176 of the Civil
Code . . . .
2. Concluding that "hitting at and in effect maligning (private respondent)

with an unjust criminal case was, without more, a plain case of abuse of
rights by misdirection" and "was therefore, actionable by itself," and which
Page 394 of 486
"became inordinately blatant and grossly aggravated when . . . (private
respondent) was deprived of his basic right to notice and a fair hearing in
the so-called preliminary investigation . . . . "
3. Concluding that petitioner's "actuations in this case were coldly deliberate

and calculated", no evidence having been adduced to support such a
sweeping statement.
4. Holding the petitioner corporation, petitioner Yap and petitioner Mendiona

jointly and severally liable without sufficient basis in law and in fact.
5. Awarding respondents —
5.1. P133,350.00 as actual or compensatory damages, even

in the absence of sufficient evidence to show that such was
actually suffered.
5.2. P500,000.00 as moral damages considering that the

evidence in this connection merely involved private
respondent's alleged celebrated status as a businessman,
there being no showing that the act complained of adversely
affected private respondent's reputation or that it resulted to
material loss.
5.3. P200,000.00 as exemplary damages despite the fact that

petitioners were duly advised by counsel of their legal
recourse.
5.4. P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, no evidence having been

adduced to justify such an award (Rollo, pp. 4-6).
Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was one for malicious
prosecution. Citing the case of Madera vs. Lopez (102 SCRA 700 [1981]), they assert that
the absence of malice on their part absolves them from any liability for malicious
prosecution. Private respondent, on the other hand, anchored his complaint for Damages
on Articles 19, 20, and 21 ** of the Civil Code.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act
with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law,
therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the requirements
Page 395 of 486

of each provision is different, these three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the
eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it: "With this article (Article 21), combined
with articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly
broadened; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law
on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not
be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines
72).
There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not
the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and
21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.
(Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 [1989]).
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law
which do not especially provide for their own sanction (Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus,
anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty,
causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article
21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act
which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.
Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another
may be made the basis for an award of damages.
There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be
intentional. However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully",
or "negligently". The trial court as well as the respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped
these three (3) articles together, and cited the same as the bases for the award of
damages in the civil complaint filed against petitioners, thus:
With the foregoing legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21) in focus, there is
not much difficulty in ascertaining the means by which appellants' first
assigned error should be resolved, given the admitted fact that when there
was an attempt to collect the amount of P2,575.00, the defendants were
explicitly warned that plaintiff Eugenio S. Baltao is not the Eugenio Baltao
defendants had been dealing with (supra, p. 5). When the defendants
nevertheless insisted and persisted in filing a case — a criminal case no
less — against plaintiff, said defendants ran afoul of the legal provisions
(Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code) cited by the lower court and
heretofore quoted (supra).
Defendants, not having been paid the amount of P2,575.00, certainly had
the right to complain. But that right is limited by certain constraints. Beyond
that limit is the area of excess, of abuse of rights. (Rollo, pp.
44-45).
Page 396 of 486
Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not independently of each
one, could be validly made the bases for an award of damages based on the principle of
"abuse of right", under the circumstances, We see no cogent reason for such an award of
damages to be made in favor of private respondent.
Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of abuse
of right. What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a
bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent.
Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check, and yielded the
following results: from the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it was
discovered that the President of Guaranteed (the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates),
was one "Eugenio S. Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and Industry revealed
that E.L. Woodworks, against whose account the check was drawn, was registered in the
name of one "Eugenio Baltao"; verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific Banking
Corporation, revealed that the signature appearing on the check belonged to one "Eugenio
Baltao".
In a letter dated December 16, 1983, counsel for petitioners wrote private respondent
demanding that he make good the amount of the check. Counsel for private respondent
wrote back and denied, among others, that private respondent ever transacted business
with Albenson Enterprises Corporation; that he ever issued the check in question. Private
respondent's counsel even went further: he made a warning to defendants to check the
veracity of their claim. It is pivotal to note at this juncture that in this same letter, if indeed
private respondent wanted to clear himself from the baseless accusation made against his
person, he should have made mention of the fact that there are three (3) persons with the
same name, i.e.: Eugenio Baltao, Sr., Eugenio S. Baltao, Jr. (private respondent), and
Eugenio Baltao III (private respondent's son, who as it turned out later, was the issuer of
the check). He, however, failed to do this. The last two Baltaos were doing business in the
same building — Baltao Building — located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila.
The mild steel plates were ordered in the name of Guaranteed of which respondent
Eugenio S. Baltao is the president and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building. Thus,
petitioners had every reason to believe that the Eugenio Baltao who issued the bouncing
check is respondent Eugenio S. Baltao when their counsel wrote respondent to make good
the amount of the check and upon refusal, filed the complaint for violation of BP Blg. 22.
Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first
hand. Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the
hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages. The
Court will not countenance this devious scheme.
The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the latter refused to make
good the amount of the bouncing check despite demand was a sincere attempt on the part
of petitioners to find the best possible means by which they could collect the sum of money
due them. A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek
ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make
the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or
omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse
Page 397 of 486
result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the
payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).
In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild steel plates were
ordered by and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building and as part payment thereof,
the bouncing check was issued by one Eugenio Baltao. Neither had private respondent
conveyed to petitioner that there are two Eugenio Baltaos conducting business in the same
building — he and his son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that Guaranteed, which received
the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent,
petitioner acted in good faith and probable cause in filing the complaint before the
provincial fiscal.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.
Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not
make one liable for malicious prosecution. (Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
100 SCRA 602 [1980]). Still, private respondent argues that liability under Articles 19, 20,
and 21 of the Civil Code is so encompassing that it likewise includes liability for damages
for malicious prosecution under Article 2219 (8). True, a civil action for damages for
malicious prosecution is allowed under the New Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19,
20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In order that such a case can prosper,
however, the following three (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the
prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the
action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the action, the
prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by
legal malice (Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 58, [1991]).
Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on
absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights,
or on malicious prosecution. As earlier stated, a complaint for damages based on malicious
prosecution will prosper only if the three (3) elements aforecited are shown to exist. In the
case at bar, the second and third elements were not shown to exist. It is well-settled that
one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with
probable cause. "Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of
the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been
carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great
discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion,
were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried" (Que vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 137 [1989]).
The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice.
In the instant case, it is evident that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by
sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by a well-founded anxiety to
protect their rights when they filed the criminal complaint against private respondent.
Page 398 of 486
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person, that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting
a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for
malicious prosecution. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly
and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of petitioners to vex or
humiliate private respondent by instituting the criminal case against him. While petitioners
may have been negligent to some extent in determining the liability of private respondent
for the dishonored check, the same is not so gross or reckless as to amount to bad faith
warranting an award of damages.
The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of mistaken identity. It is
possible that with a more assiduous investigation, petitioners would have eventually
discovered that private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is not the "Eugenio Baltao"
responsible for the dishonored check. However, the record shows that petitioners did exert
considerable effort in order to determine the liability of private respondent. Their
investigation pointed to private respondent as the "Eugenio Baltao" who issued and signed
the dishonored check as the president of the debtor-corporation Guaranteed Enterprises.
Their error in proceeding against the wrong individual was obviously in the nature of an
innocent mistake, and cannot be characterized as having been committed in bad faith. This
error could have been discovered if respondent had submitted his counter-affidavit before
investigating fiscal Sumaway and was immediately rectified by Provincial Fiscal Mauro
Castro upon discovery thereof, i.e., during the reinvestigation resulting in the dismissal of
the complaint.
Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and
subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may
not be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously. And an adverse decision
does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Garcia vs.
Gonzales, 183 SCRA 72 [1990]).
Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed
in good faith. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum
absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).
Coming now to the claim of private respondent for actual or compensatory damages, the
records show that the same was based solely on his allegations without proof to
substantiate the same. He did not present proof of the cost of the medical treatment which
he claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous breakdown he suffered, nor did
he present proof of the actual loss to his business caused by the unjust litigation against
him. In determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or
guesswork as to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages
becomes erroneous (Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382 [1989]).
Page 399 of 486
Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in
business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation — and the same must be proved,
otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no damages will be given (Rubio vs.
Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). For these reasons, it was gravely erroneous for
respondent court to have affirmed the award of actual damages in favor of private
respondent in the absence of proof thereof.
Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or
reckless, or oppressive manner, neither may exemplary damages be awarded (Dee Hua
Liong Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Reyes, 145 SCRA 488 [1986]).
As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well-settled that the same is the exception rather
than the general rule. Needless to say, the award of attorney's fees must be disallowed
where the award of exemplary damages is eliminated (Article 2208, Civil Code; Agustin vs.
Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 375 [1990]). Moreover, in view of the fact that there was no
malicious prosecution against private respondent, attorney's fees cannot be awarded him
on that ground.
In the final analysis, there is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad
faith in the filing of the case against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of
proof of fraud and bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for
damages (Escritor, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 577 [1987]). No
damages can be awarded in the instant case, whether based on the principle of abuse of
rights, or for malicious prosecution. The questioned judgment in the instant case attests to
the propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis. Lower courts are hereby
cautioned anew against awarding unconscionable sums as damages without bases
therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs
against respondent Baltao.
SO ORDERED.
Page 400 of 486

[4]
G.R. No. 159590 October 18, 2004
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LIMITED, petitioner,

vs.
CECILIA DIEZ CATALAN, respondent.
x----------------------------x
G.R. No. 159591 October 18, 2004
HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LIMITED, petitioner,

vs.
CECILIA DIEZ CATALAN, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us are two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
separately filed by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBANK)
and HSBC International Trustee Limited (HSBC TRUSTEE). They seek the reversal of the
consolidated Decision,1 dated August 14, 2003, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP Nos. 75756 and 75757, which dismissed the petitions for certiorari of herein petitioners
assailing the Order, dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Bacolod
City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 01-11372 that denied their respective motions to dismiss the
amended complaint of respondent Cecilia Diez Catalan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On January 29, 2001, respondent filed before the RTC, a complaint for a sum of
money with damages against petitioner HSBANK, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-
11372, due to HSBANK’s alleged wanton refusal to pay her the value of five
HSBANK checks issued by Frederick Arthur Thomson (Thomson) amounting to
HK$3,200,000.00.2
On February 7, 2001, summons was served on HSBANK at the Enterprise Center, Tower I,
Ayala Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas St., Makati City.3 HSBANK filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Answer or Motion to Dismiss dated February 21, 2001.4 Then, it
filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated March 8, 2001, on the grounds that (a) the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint; (b) the RTC has not acquired
jurisdiction for failure of the plaintiff to pay the correct filing or docket fees; (c) the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the person of HSBANK; (d) the complaint does not state a cause of
action against HSBANK; and (e) plaintiff engages in forum-shopping.5
Page 401 of 486

On September 10, 2001, Catalan filed an Amended Complaint impleading petitioner HSBC
TRUSTEE as co-defendant and invoking Article 19 of the Civil Code as basis for her cause
of action.6
The Amended Complaint alleges:
Defendants HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE, doing business in the Philippines, are
corporations duly organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands with head
office at 1 Grenville Street, St. Helier Jersey, Channel Islands and with branch
offices at Level 12, 1 Queen’s Road Central, Hongkong and may be served with
summons and other court processes through their main office in Manila with
address at HSBC, the Enterprise Center, Tower 1, Ayala Avenue corner Paseo de
Roxas Street, Makati City.
Sometime in March 1997, Thomson issued five HSBANK checks payable to Catalan, to
wit:
CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT

807852 Mar. 15, 1997 $600,000.00
807853 Mar. 17, 1997 800,000.00
807854 Mar. 17, 1997 600,000.00
807855 Mar. 22, 1997 600,000.00
807856 Mar. 23, 1997 600,000.00
TOTAL $3,200,000.00
The checks when deposited were returned by HSBANK purportedly for reason of "payment
stopped" pending confirmation, despite the fact that the checks were duly funded. On
March 18, 1997, Thomson wrote a letter to a certain Ricky Sousa7 of HSBANK confirming
the checks he issued to Catalan and requesting that all his checks be cleared. On March
20, 1997, Thomson wrote another letter to Sousa of HSBANK requesting an advice in
writing to be sent to the Philippine National Bank, through the fastest means, that the
checks he previously issued to Catalan were already cleared. Thereafter, Catalan
demanded that HSBANK make good the checks issued by Thomson. On May 16, 1997,
Marilou A. Lozada, personal secretary and attorney-in-fact of Thomson, wrote a letter to
Sousa of HSBANK informing him that HSBANK’s failure to clear all the checks had
saddened Thomson and requesting that the clearing of the checks be facilitated.
Subsequently, Thomson died and Catalan forwarded her demand to HSBC TRUSTEE.
Catalan sent photocopies of the returned checks to HSBC TRUSTEE. Not satisfied, HSBC
TRUSTEE through deceit and trickery, required Catalan, as a condition for the acceptance
of the checks, to submit the original copies of the returned checks, purportedly, to hasten
payment of her claim. HSBC TRUSTEE succeeded in its calculated deception because on
Page 402 of 486

April 21, 1999, Catalan and her former counsel went to Hongkong at their own expense to
personally deliver the originals of the returned checks to the officers of HSBC TRUSTEE,
anxious of receiving the money value of the checks but HSBC TRUSTEE despite receipt of
the original checks, refused to pay Catalan’s claim. Having seen and received the original
of the checks, upon its request, HSBC TRUSTEE is deemed to have impliedly accepted
the checks. Moreover, the refusal of HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE to pay the checks is
equivalent to illegal freezing of one’s deposit. On the assurance of HSBC TRUSTEE that
her claim will soon be paid, as she was made to believe that payments of the checks shall
be made by HSBC TRUSTEE "upon sight," the unsuspecting Catalan left the originals of
the checks with HSBC TRUSTEE and was given only an acknowledgment receipt. Catalan
made several demands and after several more follow ups, on August 16, 1999, Phoenix
Lam, Senior Vice President of HSBC TRUSTEE, in obvious disregard of her valid claim,
informed Catalan that her claim is disapproved. No reason or explanation whatsoever was
made why her claim was disapproved, neither were the checks returned to her. Catalan
appealed for fairness and understanding, in the hope that HSBC TRUSTEE would act fairly
and justly on her claim but these demands were met by a stonewall of silence. On June 9,
2000, Catalan through counsel sent a last and final demand to HSBC TRUSTEE to remit
the amount covered by the checks but despite receipt of said letter, no payment was made.
Clearly, the act of the HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE in refusing to honor and pay the
checks validly issued by Thomson violates the abuse of rights principle under Article 19 of
the Civil Code which requires that everyone must act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith. The refusal of HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE to pay
the checks without any valid reason is intended solely to prejudice and injure Catalan.
When they declined payment of the checks despite instructions of the drawer, Thomson, to
honor them, coupled with the fact that the checks were duly funded, they acted in bad faith,
thus causing damage to Catalan. A person may not exercise his right unjustly or in a
manner that is not in keeping with honesty or good faith, otherwise he opens himself to
liability for abuse of right.8
Catalan prays that HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE be ordered to pay ₱20,864,000.00
representing the value of the five checks at the rate of ₱6.52 per HK$1 as of January 29,
2001 for the acts of HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE in refusing to pay the amount justly
due her, in addition to moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.9
On October 2, 2001, HSBANK filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint on the

grounds that: (a) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint since
the action is a money claim for a debt contracted by Thomson before his death which
should have been filed in the estate or intestate proceedings of Thomson; (b) Catalan
engages in forum shopping by filing the suit and at the same time filing a claim in the
probate proceeding filed with another branch of the RTC; (c) the amended complaint states
no cause of action against HSBANK since it has no obligation to pay the checks as it has
not accepted the checks and Catalan did not re-deposit the checks or make a formal
protest; (d) the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of HSBANK for improper
service of summons; and, (e) it did not submit to the jurisdiction of the RTC by filing a
motion for extension of time to file a motion to dismiss.10
Page 403 of 486

Meanwhile, on October 17, 2001, summons for HSBC TRUSTEE was tendered to the In
House Counsel of HSBANK (Makati Branch) at the Enterprise Center, Tower 1, Ayala
Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas, Makati. Without submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the
RTC, HSBC TRUSTEE filed a Special Appearance for Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint, dated October 29, 2001, questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over it. 11 HSBC
TRUSTEE alleges that tender of summons through HSBANK Makati did not confer upon
the RTC jurisdiction over it because: (a) it is a corporation separate and distinct from
HSBANK; (b) it does not hold office at the HSBANK Makati or in any other place in the
Philippines; (c) it has not authorized HSBANK Makati to receive summons for it; and, (d) it
has no resident agent upon whom summons may be served because it does not transact
business in the Philippines.
Subsequently, HSBC TRUSTEE filed a Submission, dated November 15, 2001, attaching
the Affidavit executed in Hongkong by Phoenix Lam, Senior Vice-President of HSBC
TRUSTEE, attesting to the fact that: 1) HSBC TRUSTEE has not done nor is it doing
business in the Philippines; 2) it does not maintain any office in Makati or anywhere in the
Philippines; 3) it has not appointed any agent in Philippines; and 4) HSBANK Makati has
no authority to receive any summons or court processes for HSBC TRUSTEE.12
On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss.13 The
RTC held that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action because it is an action
for damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code for the acts of unjustly refusing to honor the
checks issued by Thomson and not a money claim against the estate of Thomson; that
Catalan did not engage in forum-shopping because the elements thereof are not attendant
in the case; that the question of cause of action should be threshed out or ventilated during
the proceedings in the main action and after the plaintiff and defendants have adduced
evidence in their favor; that it acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendants because
the question of whether a foreign corporation is doing business or not in the Philippines
cannot be a subject of a Motion to Dismiss but should be ventilated in the trial on the
merits; and defendants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC setting up in
their Motions to Dismiss other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction.
HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate motions for reconsideration14 but both
proved futile as they were denied by the RTC in an Order dated December 20, 2002.15
On February 21, 2003, Catalan moved to declare HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE in
default for failure to file their answer to the amended complaint.
On March 5, 2003, HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate petitions for certiorari
and/or prohibition with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 7575616 and
75757,17 respectively.
Subsequently, HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed before the RTC separate Answers ad
cautelam, both dated March 18, 2003, as a "precaution against being declared in default
and without prejudice to the separate petitions for certiorari and/or prohibition then pending
with the CA."18
Page 404 of 486

Meanwhile, the two petitions for certiorari before the CA were consolidated and after
responsive pleadings were filed, the cases were deemed submitted for decision.
In a consolidated Decision dated August 14, 2003, the CA dismissed the two petitions for
certiorari.19 The CA held that the filing of petitioners’ answers before the RTC rendered
moot and academic the issue of the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioners; that the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter since it is one for damages
under Article 19 of the Civil Code for the alleged unjust acts of petitioners and not a money
claim against the estate of Thomson; and, that the amended complaint states a cause of
action under Article 19 of the Civil Code which could merit a favorable judgment if found to
be true. The CA noted that Catalan may have prayed for payment of the value of the
checks but ratiocinated that she merely used the value as basis for the computation of the
damages.
Hence, the present petitions.
In G.R. No. 159590, HSBANK submits the following assigned errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING

THAT THE COURT A QUO, ACTING AS AN (SIC) REGULAR COURT,
HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SEEKING TO
ORDER HSBC TRUSTEE, THE EXECUTOR OF THE DECEASED
FREDERICK ARTHUR THOMSON, TO PAY SUBJECT CHECKS ISSUED
BY THE LATE FREDERICK ARTHUR THOMSON, ADMITTEDLY IN
PAYMENT OF HIS INDEBTEDNESS TO CATALAN.
II.

THAT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT SEEK TO ORDER
HSBANK AND HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LIMITED TO PAY THE
OBLIGATION OF THE (SIC) FREDERICK ARTHUR THOMSON AS
EVIDENCED BY THE CHECKS, BUT PRAYS FOR DAMAGES
EQUIVALENT OR COMPUTED ON THE BASIS OF THE VALUE OF THE
CHECKS BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
MANDATES OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III.

THAT ALLEGATIONS IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT MAKE OUT A
CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH COULD MERIT A FAVORABLE JUDGMENT
IF FOUND TO BE TRUE, OR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HSBANK, AS
DRAWEE BANK.
Page 405 of 486

IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN

DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT CATALAN ENGAGED IN FORUM
SHOPPING BY FILING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WHILE HER
PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE SUPPOSED WILL OF THE
DECEASED FREDERICK ARTHUR THOMSON IS PENDING WITH
ANOTHER BRANCH OF THE COURT A QUO.
V.

THAT HSBANK HAD SUBMITTED TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COURT A QUO BY SUBMITTING AN ANSWER TO THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT.20
In G.R. No. 159591, HSBC TRUSTEE also assigns the foregoing first, second and fifth
errors as its own.21 In addition, it claims that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN NOT ORDERING

THE DISMISSAL OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AGAINST HSBC TRUSTEE
DESPITE THE FACT IT HAS NOT BEEN DULY SERVED WITH SUMMONS.22
HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE contend in common that Catalan has no cause of action
for abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code; that her complaint, under the guise of
a claim for damages, is actually a money claim against the estate of Thomson arising from
checks issued by the latter in her favor in payment of indebtedness.
HSBANK claims that the money claim should be dismissed on the ground of forum-
shopping since Catalan also filed a petition for probate of the alleged last will of Thomson
before RTC, Branch 48, Bacolod City, docketed as Spec. Proc No. 00-892. In addition,
HSBANK imputes error upon the CA in holding that by filing an answer to the amended
complaint, petitioners are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC.
HSBC TRUSTEE maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it for improper
service of summons.
In her Comment, Catalan insists that her complaint is one for damages under Article 19 of
the Civil Code for the wanton refusal to honor and pay the value of five checks issued by
the Thomson amounting to HK$3,200,000.00. She argues that the issue of jurisdiction has
been rendered moot by petitioners’ participation in the proceedings before the RTC.
Succinctly, the issues boil down to the following:
1) Does the complaint state a cause of action?
Page 406 of 486

2) Did Catalan engage in forum-shopping by filing the complaint for damages when
she also filed a petition for probate of the alleged last will of Thomson with another
branch of the RTC? and,
3) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE? Corollary
thereto, did the filing of the answer before the RTC render the issue of lack of
jurisdiction moot and academic?
We shall resolve the issue in seriatim.
Does the complaint state a cause of action against HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE?
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges
facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court
render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein?23 The inquiry is into the sufficiency,
not the veracity of the material allegations.24 If the allegations in the complaint furnish
sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the
defense that may be presented by the defendants.25
Catalan anchors her complaint for damages on Article 19 of the Civil Code. It speaks of the
fundamental principle of law and human conduct that a person "must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." It sets the standards which may be observed not only in
the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be held responsible.26 But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when
he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or
abuse.27 There is an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing
or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to injure another.28
Thus, in order to be liable under the abuse of rights principle, three elements must concur,
to wit: (a) that there is a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.29
In this instance, after carefully examining the amended complaint, we are convinced that
the allegations therein are in the nature of an action based on tort under Article 19 of the
Civil Code. It is evident that Catalan is suing HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE for unjustified
and willful refusal to pay the value of the checks.
HSBANK is being sued for unwarranted failure to pay the checks notwithstanding the
repeated assurance of the drawer Thomson as to the authenticity of the checks and
frequent directives to pay the value thereof to Catalan. Her allegations in the complaint that
Page 407 of 486

the gross inaction of HSBANK on Thomson’s instructions, as well as its evident failure to
inform Catalan of the reason for its continued inaction and non-payment of the checks,
smack of insouciance on its part, are sufficient statements of clear abuse of right for which
it may be held liable to Catalan for any damages she incurred resulting therefrom.
HSBANK’s actions, or lack thereof, prevented Catalan from seeking further redress with
Thomson for the recovery of her claim while the latter was alive.
HSBANK claims that Catalan has no cause of action because under Section 189 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any
part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the
holder unless and until it accepts or certifies it." However, HSBANK is not being sued on
the value of the check itself but for how it acted in relation to Catalan’s claim for payment
despite the repeated directives of the drawer Thomson to recognize the check the latter
issued. Catalan may have prayed that she be paid the value of the checks but it is
axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action, as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.30
Anent HSBC TRUSTEE, it is being sued for the baseless rejection of Catalan’s claim.
When Catalan parted with the checks as a requirement for the processing of her claim,
even going to the extent of traveling to Hongkong to deliver personally the checks, HSBC
TRUSTEE summarily disapproved her claim with nary a reason. HSBC TRUSTEE gave no
heed to Catalan’s incessant appeals for an explanation. Her pleas fell on deaf and
uncaring corporate ears. Clearly, HSBC TRUSTEE’s acts are anathema to the prescription
for human conduct enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Did Catalan engage in forum-shopping?
It has been held that forum-shopping exists where a litigant sues the same party against
whom another action or actions for the alleged violation of the same right and the
enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending, the defense of litis pendentia in one
case is a bar to the others; and, a final judgment in one would constitute res judicata and
thus would cause the dismissal of the rest.31
Thus, there is forum-shopping when there exist: a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions, b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless
of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other.32
Applying the foregoing requisites to the case before us in relation to Spec. Proc No. 00-
892, the probate proceeding brought by Catalan before RTC, Branch 48, Bacolod City, it is
obvious that forum-shopping does not exist.
There is no identity of parties. HSBANK is not a party in the probate proceeding. HSBC
TRUSTEE is only a party in the probate proceeding because it is the executor and trustee
Page 408 of 486

named in the Hongkong will of Thomson. HSBC TRUSTEE is representing the interest of
the estate of Thomson and not its own corporate interest.
With respect to the second and third requisites, a scrutiny of the entirety of the allegations
of the amended complaint in this case reveals that the rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for therein are different from those pleaded in the probate proceeding, such that a
judgment in one case would not bar the prosecution of the other case. Verily, there can be
no forum-shopping where in one proceeding a party raises a claim for damages based on
tort and, in another proceeding a party seeks the allowance of an alleged last will based on
one’s claim as an heir. After all, the merits of the action for damages is not to be
determined in the probate proceeding and vice versa. Undeniably, the facts or evidence as
would support and establish the two causes of action are not the same.33 Consequently,
HSBANK’s reliance on the principle of forum-shopping is clearly misplaced.
Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE?
The Rules of Court provides that a court generally acquires jurisdiction over a person
through either a valid service of summons in the manner required by law or the person’s
voluntary appearance in court.34
In holding that it acquired jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE, the RTC held
that both voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by setting up in their Motions
to Dismiss other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, the CA ruled
that HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE are estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the
RTC because they filed their respective answers before the RTC.
We find that both lower courts overlooked Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides that "the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance." Nonetheless, such omission does not aid HSBANK’s case.
It must be noted that HSBANK initially filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer
or Motion to Dismiss.35 HSBANK already invoked the RTC’s jurisdiction over it by praying
that its motion for extension of time to file answer or a motion to dismiss be granted. The
Court has held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer,
for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order
of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.36 Consequently, HSBANK’s expressed reservation in its Answer ad
cautelam that it filed the same "as a mere precaution against being declared in default, and
without prejudice to the Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition xxx now pending before
the Court of Appeals"37 to assail the jurisdiction of the RTC over it is of no moment. Having
earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for
additional time to file answer or motion to dismiss, HSBANK, effectively submitted
voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the RTC and is thereby estopped from asserting otherwise,
even before this Court.
Page 409 of 486

In contrast, the filing by HSBC TRUSTEE of a motion to dismiss cannot be considered a
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was a conditional appearance,
entered precisely to question the regularity of the service of summons. It is settled that a
party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court,
e.g., invalidity of the service of summons, cannot be considered to have submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court.38 HSBC TRUSTEE has been consistent in all its pleadings in
assailing the service of summons and the jurisdiction of the RTC over it. Thus, HSBC
TRUSTEE cannot be declared in estoppel when it filed an Answer ad cautelam before the
RTC while its petition for certiorari was pending before the CA. Such answer did not render
the petition for certiorari before the CA moot and academic. The Answer of HSBC
TRUSTEE was only filed to prevent any declaration that it had by its inaction waived the
right to file responsive pleadings.
Admittedly, HSBC TRUSTEE is a foreign corporation, organized and existing under the
laws of the British Virgin Islands. For proper service of summons on foreign corporations,
Section 12 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a
foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines,
service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for
that purpose, or if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by
law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
In French Oil Mill Machinery Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 39 we had occasion to rule that it
is not enough to merely allege in the complaint that a defendant foreign corporation is
doing business. For purposes of the rule on summons, the fact of doing business must first
be "established by appropriate allegations in the complaint" and the court in determining
such fact need not go beyond the allegations therein.40
The allegations in the amended complaint subject of the present cases did not sufficiently
show the fact of HSBC TRUSTEE’s doing business in the Philippines. It does not appear at
all that HSBC TRUSTEE had performed any act which would give the general public the
impression that it had been engaging, or intends to engage in its ordinary and usual
business undertakings in the country. Absent from the amended complaint is an allegation
that HSBC TRUSTEE had performed any act in the country that would place it within the
sphere of the court’s jurisdiction.
We have held that a general allegation, standing alone, that a party is doing business in
the Philippines does not make it so; a conclusion of fact or law cannot be derived from the
unsubstantiated assertions of parties notwithstanding the demands of convenience or
dispatch in legal actions, otherwise, the Court would be guilty of sorcery; extracting
substance out of nothingness.41
Besides, there is no allegation in the amended complaint that HSBANK is the domestic
agent of HSBC TRUSTEE to warrant service of summons upon it. Thus, the summons
tendered to the In House Counsel of HSBANK (Makati Branch) for HSBC TRUSTEE was
clearly improper.
Page 410 of 486

There being no proper service of summons, the RTC cannot take cognizance of the case
against HSBC TRUSTEE for lack of jurisdiction over it. Any proceeding undertaken by the
RTC is therefore null and void.42 Accordingly, the complaint against HSBC TRUSTEE
should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over it.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 159590 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals, dated August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 75757 dismissing the petition for
certiorari of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited is AFFIRMED.
The petition in G.R. No. 159591 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 75756 dismissing the petition for certiorari of the
HSBC International Trustee Limited is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 44, Bacolod City is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil
Case No. 01-11372 against the HSBC International Trustee Limited, and all its orders and
issuances with respect to the latter are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The said
Regional Trial Court is hereby ORDERED to DESIST from maintaining further proceedings
against the HSBC International Trustee Limited in the case aforestated.
SO ORDERED.
Page 411 of 486

[5]
G.R. No. 78911-25 December 11, 1987
CHARMINA B. BANAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC-Quezon City, Branch 105
and Rosario Claudia respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review and set aside the orders of the respondent
Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City dated (1) 8 January 1987 which rejected
the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
40909 to Q-40913 where respondent Rosario Claudio is the accused for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22; and (2) 31 March 1987 which denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987; and for mandamus to allow Atty.
Bustos to enter his appearance as private prosecutor in the aforestated criminal cases.
It appears that fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or
the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 40909-40913, were filed
against respondent Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and originally
assigned to Branch 84.
The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself when respondent Claudio, through
counsel, filed a petition for recuse dated May 19,1986.
The cases were re-raffled and consequently assigned on June 25, 1986 to Branch 105
which was then presided over by Judge Johnico G. Serquina
During these proceedings, respondent Claudio was finally arraigned on November 20,
1986 where she pleaded not guilty to the charges. Pre-trial was then set on January 8,
1987.
In the meantime Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. replaced Judge Serquina as presiding judge
of Branch 105.
On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting the appearance of
Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground that the charge is for the
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not provide for any civil liability or
indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against property but public order."
The petitioner, through counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated 8
January 1987 on March 10, 1987.
Page 412 of 486

Respondent Claudio filed her opposition to the motion for reconsideration on March 25,
1987.
In an order dated 31 March 1987, the respondent court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Court.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent Court acted with grave abuse of
discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor.
The respondents make capital of the fact that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the act of
knowingly issuing worthless checks as an offense against public order. As such, it is
argued that it is the State and the public that are the principal complainants and, therefore,
no civil indemnity is provided for by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which a private party or
prosecutor may intervene.
On the other hand, the petitioner, relying on the legal axiom that "Every man criminally
liable is also civilly liable," contends that indemnity may be recovered from the offender
regardless of whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 so provides.
A careful study of the concept of civil liability allows a solution to the issue in the case at
bar.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our
law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art. 100, The Revised Penal
Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a
crime he offends two entities namely ( 1) the society in which he lives in or the political
entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that
society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission. However, this rather broad and general
provision is among the most complex and controversial topics in criminal procedure. It can
be misleading in its implications especially where the same act or omission may be treated
as a crime in one instance and as a tort in another or where the law allows a separate civil
action to proceed independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it is
intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally
accepted notion that, the civil liability actually arises from the crime when, in the ultimate
analysis, it does not. While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law,
it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage
to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil
liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or
negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability
will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or
injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to
another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal
actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is
Page 413 of 486

punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another. (See
Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp. 246-247).
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to

another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the

offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a
consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to
pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime
(Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil.
692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty
party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and
indemnification for the losses. (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265).
Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered the offenses
committed against her. Not only the State but the petitioner too is entitled to relief as a
member of the public which the law seeks to protect. She was assured that the checks
were good when she parted with money, property or services. She suffered with the State
when the checks bounced.
In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, December 18, 1986) and the cases
consolidated therewith, we held that "The effects of a worthless check transcend the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touch the interests of
the community at large." Yet, we too recognized the wrong done to the private party
defrauded when we stated therein that "The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or the holder, but also an injury to the public."
Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of the check is
entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having
been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 to
leave the offended private party defrauded and empty- handed by excluding the civil
liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic
victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so, may leave the offended party unable
to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant
drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide would,
therefore, be brought to naught.
The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to 40913 is

justified not only for the protection of her interests but also in the interest of the speedy and
inexpensive administration of justice mandated by the Constitution (Section 16, Article III,
Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987). A separate civil action for the purpose would only
prove to be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the
Page 414 of 486

final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioner's
rights may be fulIy adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort t o a
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.
WHEREFORE the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court is ordered to permit
the intervention of a private prosecutor in behalf of petitioner Charmina B. Banal, in the
prosecution of the civil aspect of Criminasl Cases Nos. 40909 to 40913. The temporary
restraining order issued by this court a quo for further proceedings. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Page 415 of 486

[6]
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and
set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256
which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue
of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the
basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation
of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22)
years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at
the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a
medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August
1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition
that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the
school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private
respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the
marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the
Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the
filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated
and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a
confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing
of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live
with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in
the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to
P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as
may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
Page 416 of 486
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of
the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the
true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that
he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he
neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his
apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he
discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no
confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof,
he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has
suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00
for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,

Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic)
of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to
the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern,

Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette ,

Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a
(sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the
plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on
16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus
ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered

in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00)
pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
Page 417 of 486

3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and
private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or
questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through
machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by
him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in
accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has
abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture
and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and
expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the
evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent
Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that
she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few
days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times
and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20,
1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of
their relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs.
"A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's
family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant
told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her
during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents
thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house
and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When
plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live
together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October,
1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school,
and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her
sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-
in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some
medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and
kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could
not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That
was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and
thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain
in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod
sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him
Page 418 of 486
to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he
was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as
stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had
informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors
for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and
chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the
forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court
erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering
him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged

decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial
court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was
already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose
morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate
experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by
the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern
urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive
promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the
lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so
the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for
otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in
the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's
pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the
restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to
plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at
(sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic)
a beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when
he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter
(pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was
involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in
Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship
between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to
defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not
only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of
the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first
proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why
Page 419 of 486
plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted
defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for
Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City
for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to
Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City.
In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not
marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then,
that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and
promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order
to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-

appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to
marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him
and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are
palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy,
and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women,
coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of
our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under
Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral
damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered
him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he
raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the
case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed
any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not
professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never
maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions
and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with
such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with
Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the
subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem
upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take
four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he
does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is
now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian
Page 420 of 486
Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that
even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner
asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to
the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be
actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is
not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and
the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently
complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support
of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility
of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not
disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having
heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment
and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or
value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had
overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower
court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina
vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v.
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
(Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica
v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v.
Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
Page 421 of 486
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,);
and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts
must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the
Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry

is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led
to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many
of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are
countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury,
the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to

another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not
been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age.
Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Page 422 of 486

Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and
though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and
her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed
article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or

intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil
law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is
much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but
international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious
acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of
Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is
even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21
has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much
more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold,
that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had,
in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender
her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that
he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's
Page 423 of 486
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to.
The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article
337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of
promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of

seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger
than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as
highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance
agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then
a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found
that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed
by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if

there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not
convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and
conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in
the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than
mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S.
vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some

sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents
merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual
desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction,
par. 56) She must be induced to depart from the path of
virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and
wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect,
and which result in her person to ultimately submitting her
person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
Page 424 of 486

And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the

enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the
injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to
warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises

out of sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the
defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the
commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow
a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization
of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by
which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47
Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age,
maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to
his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of
the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual
relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did
not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made
under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing
the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently
retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been
carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due
to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960;
Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise
to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that
there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages
will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral
damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
Page 425 of 486

together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for
the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists,

notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction,
not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But
when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying
circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of
age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an
injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the

action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is
sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act
which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as
to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the
act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an
acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that
granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the
latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence,
pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra
vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The
latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or
damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor
sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a
mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25,
1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give
her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance.
(TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to
accept a proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he
harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of
the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him,
dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances
could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to
marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the
poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly
Page 426 of 486
believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able
to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of
morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can
even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of
Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent
may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the
petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is
apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she
found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar
offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that she is
merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence
of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or
where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no
action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule,
however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both
sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is
literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40
Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said
that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the
petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their
marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse
upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Page 427 of 486

[7]
G.R. No. 142943 April 3, 2002
Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING, petitioners,

vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric
service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is
personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized
representative of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
February 1, 2000 Decision1 and the April 10, 2000 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-GR SP No. 49022. The decretal portion of the said Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the challenged decision in Civil Case No. Q-95-23219 is

hereby SET ASIDE and the complaint against defendant-appellant MERALCO is
hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiffs-appellees are hereby ORDERED to pay defendant-
appellant MERALCO the differential billing of ₱193,332.00 representing the value of
used but unregistered electrical consumption."3
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
"Defendant-appellant Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a private

corporation, authorized by law to charge all persons, including the government, for
the consumption of electric power at rates duly authorized and approved by the
Board of Energy (now the Energy Regulatory Board).
"Plaintiffs-appellees Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a

house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City, which they
bought on April 7, 1994 from Ms. Carmina Serapio Santos. They alleged to be
business entrepreneurs engaged in the export of furnitures under the business
name 'Loran Industries' and recipient of the 1993 Agora Award and 1994 Golden
Shell Award. Mrs. Quisumbing is a member of the Innerwheel Club while Mr.
Quisumbing is a member of the Rotary Club, Chairman of Cebu Chamber of
Commerce, and Director of Chamber of Furniture.
Page 428 of 486

"On March 3, 1995 at around 9:00 a.m., defendant-appellant's inspectors headed
by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-the-spot inspection
of all single phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue. House no. 94 of Block 8, Lot
19 Greenmeadows Avenue owned by plaintiffs-appellees was inspected after
observing a standard operating procedure of asking permission from plaintiffs-
appellees, through their secretary which was granted. The secretary witnessed the
inspection. After the inspection, defendant-appellant's inspectors discovered that
the terminal seal of the meter was missing; the meter cover seal was deformed; the
meter dials of the meter was mis-aligned and there were scratches on the meter
base plate. Defendant-appellant's inspectors relayed the matter to plaintiffs-
appellees' secretary, who in turn relayed the same to plaintiff-appellee, Lorna
Quisumbing, who was outraged of the result of the inspection and denied liability as
to the tampering of the meter. Plaintiffs-appellees were advised by defendant-
appellant's inspectors that they had to detach the meter and bring it to their
laboratory for verification/confirmation of their findings. In the event the meter
turned out to be tampered, defendant-appellant had to temporarily disconnect the
electric services of plaintiffs-appellees. The laboratory testing conducted on the
meter has the following findings to wit:
'1. Terminal seal was missing.
'2. Lead cover seals ('90 ERB 1-Meralco 21) were tampered by forcibly
pulling out from the sealing wire.
'3. The 1000th, 100th and 10th dial pointers of the register were found out of
alignment and with circular scratches at the face of the register which
indicates that the meter had been opened to manipulate the said dial
pointers and set manually to the desired reading. In addition to this, the
meter terminal blades were found full of scratches.'
"After an hour, defendant-appellant's head inspector, E. Orlina returned to the

residence of plaintiffs-appellees and informed them that the meter had been
tampered and unless they pay the amount of ₱178,875.01 representing the
differential billing, their electric supply would be disconnected. Orlina informed
plaintiffs-appellees that they were just following their standard operating procedure.
Plaintiffs-appellees were further advised that questions relative to the results of the
inspection as well as the disconnection of her electrical services for Violation of
Contract (VOC) may be settled with Mr. M. Manuson of the Special Accounts, Legal
Service Department. However, on the same day at around 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon defendant-appellant's officer through a two-way radio instructed its
service inspector headed by Mr. Orlino to reconnect plaintiffs-appellees' electric
service which the latter faithfully complied.
"On March 6, 1995, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint for damages with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, despite the immediate
reconnection, to order defendant-appellant to furnish electricity to the plaintiffs-
appellees alleging that defendant-appellant acted with wanton, capricious,
malicious and malevolent manner in disconnecting their power supply which was
Page 429 of 486
done without due process, and without due regard for their rights, feelings, peace of
mind, social and business reputation.
"In its Answer, defendant-appellant admitted disconnecting the electric service at

the plaintiffs-appellees' house but denied liability citing the 'Terms and Conditions of
Service,' and Republic Act No. 7832 otherwise known a 'Anti-Electricity and Electric
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994.'
"After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, ruling in favor of
plaintiffs-appellees."4 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court held that Meralco (herein respondent) should have given the Quisumbing
spouses (herein petitioners) ample opportunity to dispute the alleged meter tampering.
It held that respondent had acted summarily and without procedural due process in
immediately disconnecting the electric service of petitioners. Respondent's action, ruled the
RTC, constituted a quasi delict.
The Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's ruling and dismissed the Complaint. It
held that respondent's representatives had acted in good faith when they disconnected
petitioners' electric service. Citing testimonial and documentary evidence, it ruled that the
disconnection was made only after observing due process. Further, it noted that petitioners
had not been able to prove their claim for damages. The appellate court likewise upheld
respondent's counterclaim for the billing differential in the amount of
₱193,3325 representing the value of petitioners' used but unregistered electrical
consumption, which had been established without being controverted.
Hence, this Petition.6
The Issues
In their Memorandum,7 petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
"4.1 Whether a prima facie presumption of tampering of electrical meter

enumerated under Sec. 4 (a) iv of RA 7832 (Anti-Electricity and Electric
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994) may be had despite the
absence of an ERB representative or an officer of the law?
"4.2 Whether the enumeration of instances to establish a prima facie presumption

of tampering of electrical meter enumerated under Sec. 4 (a) iv of RA 7832 (Anti-
Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994) is
exclusive?
Page 430 of 486

"4.3 What constitutes notice prior to disconnection of electricity service? Corollarily,
whether the definition of notice under Meralco v. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 243)
applies to the case at bar?
"4.4 Whether a prima facie presumption may contradict logic?
"4.5 Whether documentary proof is pre-requisite for award of damages?"8
In sum, this Petition raises three (3) main issues which this Court will address: (1) whether
respondent observed the requisites of law when it disconnected the electrical supply of
petitioners, (2) whether such disconnection entitled petitioners to damages, and (3)
whether petitioners are liable for the billing differential computed by respondent.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Compliance with Requisites of Law
Petitioners contend that the immediate disconnection of electrical service was not validly
effected because of respondent's noncompliance with the relevant provisions of RA 7832,
the "Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994." They
insist that the immediate disconnection of electrical supply may only be validly effected only
when there is prima facie evidence of its illegal use. To constitute prima facie evidence, the
discovery of the illegal use must be "personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of
the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)."
Respondent, on the other hand, points out that the issue raised by petitioners is a question
of fact which this Court cannot pass upon. It argues further that this issue, which was not
raised in the court below, can no longer be taken up for the first time on appeal. Assuming
arguendo that the issue was raised below, it also contends that petitioners were not able to
specifically prove the absence of an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of
the ERB when the discovery was made.1âwphi1.nêt
Prima facie Evidence of Illegal Use of Electricity
We agree with petitioners. Section 4 of RA 7832 states:
(a) The presence of any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima

facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, as defined in this Act, by the person
benefitted thereby, and shall be the basis for: (1) the immediate disconnection by
the electric utility to such person after due notice, x x x
x x x x x x x x x
Page 431 of 486

(viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing
circumstances, in order to constitute prima facie evidence, must be personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized
representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)."9 (Italics supplied)
Under the above provision, the prima facie presumption that will authorize immediate
disconnection will arise only upon the satisfaction of certain requisites. One of these
requisites is the personal witnessing and attestation by an officer of the law or by an
authorized ERB representative when the discovery was made.
As a rule, this Court reviews only questions of law, not of facts. However, it may pass upon
the evidence when the factual findings of the trial court are different from those of the Court
of Appeals, as in this case.10
A careful review of the evidence on record negates the appellate court's holding that "the
actions of defendant-appellant's service inspectors were all in accord with the requirement
of the law."11
Respondent's own witnesses provided the evidence on who were actually present when
the inspection was made. Emmanuel C. Orlino, the head of the Meralco team, testified:
"Q When you were conducting this inspection, and you discovered these
findings you testified earlier, who was present?
A The secretary, sir."12
"ATTY. REYES - Who else were the members of your team that conducted this
inspection at Greenmeadows Avenue on that day, March 3, 1995?
A The composition of the team, sir?
Q Yes.
A Including me, we are about four (4) inspectors, sir.
Q You were four (4)?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who is the head of this team?
A I was the head of the team, sir."13
Further, Catalino A. Macaraig, the area head of the Orlino team, stated that only Meralco
personnel had been present during the inspection:
"Q By the way you were not there at Green Meadows on that day, right?
Page 432 of 486
A Yes, sir.
Q Only Mr. Orlino and who else were there?
A Two or three of his men.
Q All members of the inspection team?
A Yes, sir."14
These testimonies clearly show that at the time the alleged meter tampering was
discovered, only the Meralco inspection team and petitioners' secretary were present.
Plainly, there was no officer of the law or ERB representative at that time. Because of the
absence of government representatives, the prima facie authority to disconnect, granted to
Meralco by RA 7832, cannot apply.
Neither can respondent find solace in the fact that petitioners' secretary was present at the
time the inspection was made. The law clearly states that for the prima facie evidence to
apply, the discovery "must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law
or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)." 15 Had the law
intended the presence of the owner or his/her representative to suffice, then it should have
said so. Embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that courts may not construe a statute
that is free from doubt.16 Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to
mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is
obeyed.17
In fact, during the Senate deliberations on RA 7832, Senator John H. Osmeña, its author,
stressed the need for the presence of government officers during inspections of electric
meters. He said:
"Mr. President, if a utility like MERALCO finds certain circumstances or situations

which are listed in Section 2 of this bill to be prima facie evidence, I think they
should be prudent enough to bring in competent authority, either the police or the
NBI, to verify or substantiate their finding. If they were to summarily proceed to
disconnect on the basis of their findings and later on there would be a court case
and the customer or the user would deny the existence of what is listed in Section
2, then they could be in a lot of trouble."18 (Italics supplied)
Neither can we accept respondent's argument that when the alleged tampered meter was
brought to Meralco's laboratory for testing, there was already an ERB representative
present.
The law says that before immediate disconnection may be allowed, the discovery of the
illegal use of electricity must have been personally witnessed and attested to by an officer
of the law or by an authorized ERB representative. In this case, the disconnection was
effected immediately after the discovery of the alleged meter tampering, which was
Page 433 of 486

witnessed only by Meralco's employees. That the ERB representative was allegedly
present when the meter was examined in the Meralco laboratory will not cure the defect.
It is undisputed that after members of the Meralco team conducted their inspection and
found alleged meter tampering, they immediately disconnected petitioners' electrical
supply. Again, this verity is culled from the testimony of Meralco's Orlina:
"A When she went inside then she came out together with Mrs. Lourdes
Quis[u]mbing at that time. We did tell our findings regarding the meter and the
consequence with it. And she was very angry with me.
Q When you say consequence of your findings, what exactly did you tell Mrs.
Quisumbing?
A We told her that the service will be temporarily disconnected and that we are
referring to our Legal Department so could know the violation, sir."19
"A Yes, sir. At that time, I referred her to Mr. Macaraig, sir.
Q What is the fist name of this supervisor?
A Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, sir.
Q Then after talking to Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, this is over the telephone, what
happened?
A The supervisor advised her that the service will be temporarily disconnected
and she has to go to our Legal Department where she could settle the VOC, sir.
Q You are talking of 'VOC,' what is this all about Mr. Orlino?
A 'VOC' is violation of contract, sir."20
As to respondent's argument that the presence of an authorized ERB representative had

not been raised below, it is clear, however, that the issue of due process was brought up
by petitioners as a valid issue in the CA. The presence of government agents who may
authorize immediate disconnections go into the essence of due process. Indeed, we
cannot allow respondent to act virtually as prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of
disconnection due to alleged meter tampering. That would not sit well in a democratic
country. After all, Meralco is a monopoly that derives its power from the government.
Clothing it with unilateral authority to disconnect would be equivalent to giving it a license
to tyrannize its hapless customers.
Besides, even if not specifically raised, this Court has already ruled that "[w]here the issues
already raised also rest on other issues not specifically presented, as long as the latter
issues bear relevance and close relation to the former and as long as they arise from
Page 434 of 486

matters on record, the Court has the authority to include them in its discussion of the
controversy as well as to pass upon them."21
Contractual Right to Disconnect

Electrical Service
Neither may respondent rely on its alleged contractual right to disconnect electrical service
based on Exhibits "10"22 and "11,"23 or on Decisions of the Board of Energy (now the
Energy Regulatory Board). The relevant portion of these documents concerns
discontinuance of service. It provides:
"The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in case the Customer is in
arrears in the payment of bills or for failure to pay the adjusted bills in those cases
where the meter stopped or failed to register the correct amount of energy
consumed, or for failure to comply with any of these terms and conditions, or in
case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company. Before disconnection is made in
case of or to prevent fraud, the Company may adjust the bill of said Customer
accordingly and if the adjusted bill is not paid, the Company may disconnect the
same. In case of disconnection, the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the former
Public Service Commission (now the Board of Energy) shall be observed. Any such
suspension of service shall not terminate the contract between the Company and
the Customer."24
Petitioners' situation can fall under disconnection only "in case of or to prevent fraud upon
the Company." However, this too has requisites before a disconnection may be made. An
adjusted bill shall be prepared, and only upon failure to pay it may the company
discontinue service. This is also true in regard to the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of
the former Public Service Commission, which requires a 48-hour written notice before a
disconnection may be justified. In the instant case, these requisites were obviously not
complied with.
Second Issue
Damages
Having ruled that the immediate disconnection effected by Meralco lacks legal, factual or
contractual basis, we will now pass upon on the right of petitioners to recover damages for
the improper disconnection.
Petitioners are asking for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision, which awarded them
actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. All these were overturned
by the CA.
As to actual damages, we agree with the CA that competent proof is necessary before our
award may be made. The appellate court ruled as follows:
Page 435 of 486

"Considering further, it is a settled rule that in order for damages to be recovered,
the best evidence obtainable by the injured party must be presented. Actual and
compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved and proved
with reasonable degree and certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation,
conjecture or guess work as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend
upon competent proof that they have been suffered and on evidence of actual
amount thereof. If the proof is flimsy and unsubstantial, no damages will be
awarded."25
Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the position
where it was before it was injured.26 They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually
sustained and susceptible of measurement.27 Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a
party is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as it has duly
proven.28
Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be
capable of proof; it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.29
Petitioners' claim for actual damages was premised only upon Lorna Quisumbing's bare
testimony as follows:
"A Actually that da[y] I was really scheduled to go to that furniture exhibit. That
furniture exhibit is only once a year.
Q What is this furniture exhibit?
A The SITEM, that is a government agency that takes care of exporters and
exclusive marketing of our products around the world. We always have that once a
year and that's the time when all our buyers are here for us to show what we had
that was exhibited to go around. So, my husband had to [fly] from Cebu to Manila
just for this occasion. So we have an appointment with our people and our buyers
with SITEM and also that evening we will have to treat them [to] dinner.
Q Whereat?
A At our residence, we were supposed to have a dinner at our residence.
Q What happened to this occasion?
A So when they disconnected our electric power we had to get in touch with
them and change the venue.
Q Which venue did you transfer your dinner for your buyers?
Page 436 of 486

A We brought them in a restaurant in Makati at Season's Restaurant. But it was
very embar[r]assing for us because we faxed them ahead of time before they came
to Manila.
Q Now as a result of this change of your schedule because of the disconnection
of the electric power on that day, Friday, what damage did you suffer?
A I cancelled the catering service and that is so much of a h[a]ssle it was so
embarras[s]ing for us.
Q Can you tell us how much amount?
A Approximately ₱50,000.00."30
No other evidence has been proffered to substantiate her bare statements. She has not
shown how she arrived at the amount of ₱50,000; it is, at best, speculative. Her self-
serving testimonial evidence, if it may be called such, is insufficient to support alleged
actual damages.
While respondent does not rebut this testimony on the expenses incurred by the spouses
in moving the dinner out of their residence due to the disconnection, no receipts covering
such expenditures have been adduced in evidence. Neither is the testimony corroborated.
To reiterate, actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. It is dependent upon competent proof of
damages that petitioners have suffered and of the actual amount thereof. 31 The award must
be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and
certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and unsubstantial proof.32 Consequently, we
uphold the CA ruling denying the grant of actual damages.
Having said that, we agree with the trial court, however, that petitioners are entitled to
moral damages, albeit in a reduced amount.
The RTC opined as follows:
"This Court agrees with the defendant regarding [its] right by law and equity to
protect itself from any fraud. However, such right should not be exercised arbitrarily
but with great caution and with due regard to the rights of the consumers. Meralco
having a virtual monopoly of the supply of electric power should refrain from taking
drastic actions against the consumers without observing due process. Even
assuming that the subject meter has had history of meter tampering, defendant
cannot simply assume that the present occupants are the ones responsible for such
tampering. Neither does it serve as a license to deprive the plaintiffs of their right to
due process. Defendant should have given the plaintiffs simple opportunity to
dispute the electric charges brought about by the alleged meter-tampering, which
were not included in the bill rendered them. Procedural due process requires
reasonable notice to pay the bill and reasonable notice to discontinue supply.
Absent due process the defendant may be held liable for damages. While this Court
Page 437 of 486

is aware of the practice of unscrupulous individuals of stealing electric curre[n]t
which causes thousands if not millions of pesos in lost revenue to electric
companies, this does not give the defendant the right to trample upon the rights of
the consumers by denying them due process."33
Article 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral damages may be recovered.
One such case34 is when the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of
property without due process of law, are violated.35
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury.36 Although incapable of pecuniary computation, such damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate results of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.37
Case law establishes the following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there is
an injury -- whether physical, mental or psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant;
(2) there is a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant;
and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of
the Civil Code.38
To reiterate, respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect petitioners' electrical

supply without observing the requisites of law which, in turn, are akin to due process. Had
respondent been more circumspect and prudent, petitioners could have been given the
opportunity to controvert the initial finding of alleged meter tampering. Said the RTC:
"More seriously, the action of the defendant in maliciously disconnecting the electric
service constitutes a breach of public policy. For public utilities, broad as their
powers are, have a clear duty to see to it that they do not violate nor transgress the
rights of the consumers. Any act on their part that militates against the ordinary
norms of justice and fair play is considered an infraction that gives rise to an action
for damages. Such is the case at bar."39
Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled in Meralco v. CA40 that respondent is required to give
notice of disconnection to an alleged delinquent customer. The Court said:
"x x x One can not deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO,
having a monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some
nearby municipalities, plays in the life of people living in such areas. Electricity has
become a necessity to most people in these areas, justifying the exercise by the
State of its regulatory power over the business of supplying electrical service to the
public, in which petitioner MERALCO is engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as
it has done through Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service
Commission, the conditions under which and the manner by which a public utility
such as MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to a delinquent customer.
Among others, a prior written notice to the customer is required before
disconnection of the service. Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort."41
Page 438 of 486

Observance of the rights of our people is sacred in our society. We cannot allow such
rights to be trifled with or trivialized. Although the Court sympathizes with respondent's
efforts to stamp out the illegal use of electricity, such action must be done only with strict
observance of the rights of our people. As has been we succinctly said: "there is a right
way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason."42
However, the amount of moral damages, which is left largely to the sound discretion of the
courts, should be granted in reasonable amounts, considering the attendant facts and
circumstances.43 Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed
to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty. 44 Moral
damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.45 They are
awarded only to obtain a means, a diversion or an amusement that will serve to alleviate
the moral suffering the injured party has undergone by reason of the defendant's culpable
action.46 They must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.47
It is clear from the records that respondent was able to restore the electrical supply of
petitioners on the same day. Verily, the inconvenience and anxiety they suffered as a result
of the disconnection was thereafter corrected. Thus, we reduce the RTC's grant of moral
damages to the more equitable amount of ₱100,000.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 48 It is
not given to enrich one party and impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or
as a negative incentive to socially deleterious actions.49 In this case, to serve an example --
that before a disconnection of electrical supply can be effected by a public utility like
Meralco, the requisites of law must be faithfully complied with -- we award the amount of
₱50,000 to petitioners.
Finally, with the award of exemplary damages, the award of attorney's fees is likewise
granted.50 It is readily apparent that petitioners needed the services of a lawyer to argue
their cause, even to the extent of elevating the matter to this Court; 51 thus, an award of
₱50,000 is considered sufficient.
Final Issue:
Billing Differential
Finally, this Court holds that despite the basis for the award of damages -- the lack of due
process in immediately disconnecting petitioners' electrical supply -- respondent's
counterclaim for the billing differential is still proper. We agree with the CA that respondent
should be given what it rightfully deserves. The evidence it presented, both documentary
and testimonial, sufficiently proved the amount of the differential.
Not only did respondent show how the meter examination had been conducted by its
experts, but it also established the amount of ₱193,332.96 that petitioners owed
respondent. The procedure through which this amount was arrived at was testified to by
Meralco's Senior Billing Computer Enrique Katipunan. His testimony was corroborated by
Page 439 of 486

documentary evidence showing the account's billing history and the corresponding
computations. Neither do we doubt the documents of inspections and examinations
presented by respondent to prove that, indeed there had been meter tampering that
resulted in unrecorded and unpaid electrical consumption.
The mere presentation by petitioners of a Contract to Sell with Assumption of

Mortgage52 does not necessarily mean that they are no longer liable for the billing
differential. There was no sufficient evidence to show that they had not been actually
residing in the house before the date of the said document. Lorna Quisumbing herself
admitted53 that they did not have any contract for electrical service in their own name.
Hence, petitioners effectively assumed the bills of the former occupants of the premises.
Finally, the CA was correct in ruling that the convincing documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by respondent, was not controverted by petitioners.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision

is MODIFIED as follows: petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondent the billing
differential of ₱193,332.96; while respondent is ordered to pay petitioners ₱100,000 as
moral damages, ₱50,000 as exemplary damages, and ₱50,000 as attorney's fees. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 440 of 486

[8]
G.R. No. L-22677 February 28, 1967
PEDRO III FORTICH-CELDRAN, JESUS, MANUEL, MIGUEL and VICENTE, all

surnamed FORTICH-CELDRAN;
SANTIAGO CATANE and ABELARDO CECILIO, petitioners,
vs.
IGNACIO A. CELDRAN and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
San Juan, Africa & Benedicto and Eduardo B. Sinense for petitioners.
Casiano U. Laput for respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
A suit for annulment of an extrajudicial partition of properties and for accounting was filed
on February 3, 1954 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civil Case No. 3397-R).
Appearing therein as plaintiffs were: Jose, Francisco, Pedro, Jr., Ignacio, all surnamed
Abuton-Celdran (children of the deceased Pedro Celdran by the first nuptial) and, as the
administratrix of Francisco Celdran (another brother), Modesta Rodriguez. Defendants
were: Pablo Celdran (child of the deceased by the first marriage who refused to join as
plaintiff), Josefa Vda. de Celdran (spouse of the deceased by the second marriage),
Manuel, Antonio, Pedro III, Jesus, Vicente and Miguel, all surnamed Fortich Celdran
(children of the deceased by the second nuptial.
After the defendants answered on May 28, 1954, a motion to withdraw as co-plaintiff was
filed on May 24, 1957. It was signed "Ignacio Celdran. This motion has been marked as
Exhibit B-Josefa.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, with leave of court, the plaintiffs (excluding Ignacio) filed an amended
complaint impleading Ignacio Celdran as defendant. Ignacio Celdran filed an answer with
counterclaim and cross-claim.
After trial but before judgment, Ignacio Celdran had the document Exh. B-Josefa (the
motion to withdraw) examined by the Police Department of Cebu City. The police were of
the view that the same (signature therein) was falsified. Alleging newly discovered
evidence, Ignacio Celdran asked for new trial, which the court denied.
All the parties, except Ignacio Celdran, thereafter entered on May 6, 1959 into an amicable
settlement, recognizing as valid the aforementioned extrajudicial partition. Regarding
Ignacio Celdran, the court rendered judgment on July 19, 1961, declaring the same
extrajudicial partition as valid for having been ratified by him (Ignacio). Specifically, the
court found among other things that Ignacio signed the motion to withdraw (Exh. B-Josefa)
after he received P10,000 of the agreed P20,000 and two residential lots to be given to him
in return for his aforesaid ratification of the partition.
Page 441 of 486

Said decision was later amended to require Pedro III, Antonio, Jesus, Miguel and Vicente,
all surnamed Fortich-Celdran, to pay Ignacio the balance of P20,000 aforestated and to
deliver to him the promised two parcels of land.
Ignacio Celdran appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals. And said appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 30499-R, shown in the record before Us as still pending.
Now on March 22, 1963, at the instance of Ignacio Celdran, an information for falsification
of a public document — that is, Exh. B-Josefa or the abovementioned motion to withdraw
in the civil case — was filed by the City Fiscal of Ozamis in the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental. Accused therein were: Pedro III, Antonio, Manuel, Vicente, Miguel,
and Jesus, all surnamed Celdran (defendants in the civil case); Santiago Catane, as
subscribing officer; Abelardo Cecilio, as the person who filed the motion.
As private complainant, however, Ignacio Celdran on December 12, 1962, moved before
trial to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case on the ground of prejudicial question.
The reason given in support thereof was that the alleged falsification of the same
document is at issue in the civil case pending in the Court of Appeals.
Declaring that there was no pre-judicial question, the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental denied on January 28, 1963 the motion to suspend the prosecution. It ruled that
the alleged forgery was not an issue in the civil case.
Assailing the above ruling, Ignacio Celdran filed in the Court of Appeals on February 21,
1963, a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. No. 31909-R) to enjoin
the CFI of Misamis Occidental and the City Fiscal of Ozamis from proceeding with the
prosecution of the criminal case.
On February 18, 1964 the Court of Appeals decided said petition for certiorari, ordering the
suspension of the criminal case due to pre-judicial question.
Pedro III, Jesus, Manuel, Miguel and Vicente, all surnamed Fortich-Celdran; Santiago
Catane and Abelardo Cecilio — accused in the criminal suit and respondents in the petition
for certiorari — appealed to Us from the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February
18, 1964.
Appellants would contend that there is no pre-judicial question involved. The record shows
that, as aforestated, the Court of First Instance ruled that Ignacio Celdran ratified the
partition agreement; among the reasons cited by the trial court for said ruling is that Ignacio
Celdran received P10,000 and signed the motion to withdraw as plaintiff in the suit.
Disputing this, Celdran assigned as error in his appeal the finding that he signed the
aforementioned motion (Exh. B-Josefa) and maintains that the same is a forgery. Since
ratification is principal issue in the civil action pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, and
the falsification or genuineness of the motion to withdraw — presented and marked as
evidence in said civil case — is among the questions involved in said issue, it follows that
the civil action poses a pre-judicial question to the criminal prosecution for alleged
falsification of the same document, the motion to withdraw (Exh. B-Josefa).
Page 442 of 486

Presented as evidence of ratification in the civil action is the motion to withdraw; its
authenticity is assailed in the same civil action. The resolution of this point in the civil case
will in a sense be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal suit
pending in another tribunal. As such, it is a prejudicial question which should first be
decided before the prosecution can proceed in the criminal case.
A pre-judicial question is one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent to the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal; that is, it is determinative of the case before the court and jurisdiction to pass upon
the same is lodged in another tribunal.1
It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this Court against
Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by Us in abeyance, thus:
As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly forged by respondent

attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77 (Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago
Catane, etc., et al.) is necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu
Court of First Instance, action on the herein complaint is withheld until that litigation
has finally been decided. Complainant Celdran shall inform the Court about such
decision. (Supreme Court minute resolution of April 27, 1962 in Adm. Case No. 77,
Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc., et al.) .
Regarding the procedural question on Ignacio Celdran's right as private offended party to
file through counsel a motion to suspend the criminal case, the same exists where, as
herein, the Fiscal, who had direction and control of the prosecution, did not object to the
filing of said motion. And its filing in this case complied with Sec. 5 of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court which provides:
SEC. 5. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for the

suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a pre-judicial
question in a civil case, may only be presented by any party before or during the
trial of the criminal action.
Denial of the motion to suspend the prosecution was therefore attended with grave abuse
of discretion; and the issue having been squarely and definitely presented before the trial
court, a motion for reconsideration, which would but raise the same points, was not
necessary. Neither was appeal the remedy available, since the order denying suspension
is interlocutory and thus not yet appealable.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review — ordering suspension of
Criminal CASE No. 5719, People vs. Pedro Fortich-Celdran, et al., pending before the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, until after Civil Case, CA-G.R. No. 30499-
R, Pedro A. Celdran, et al. vs. Pedro Fortich-Celdran III, et al., shall have been decided —
is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
Page 443 of 486

[9]
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B.
ABAYAN, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.
Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.
City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the
resolution of the Court is whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the
Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of
marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the
latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We
sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal
of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy
against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of Manila,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said court. The
information was filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity
of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was
docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the ground that private
respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second
one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain
Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for
nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized
without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were
employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the
solemnization of the subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent
had lived together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of
wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by
them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was
Page 444 of 486
dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of
exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627
seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a
prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can
proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is
the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further directed that the
proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his
grounds for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De
la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that cited by respondent judge in
his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April
14, 1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of
which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 3 It is one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only
that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial
question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.5
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted
that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity
of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the
crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private
respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage
on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been
declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed
against him by private respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer the
civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case
of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied to the present case. Said case states that:
Page 445 of 486

The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by
the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are
automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the case.
In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the
petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by
means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second
marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for
the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different.
At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the
fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be
indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the
action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was
only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a
third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with
her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the
ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome
of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore,
has not abused much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to
suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second
marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito
is a later case and as such it should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot
agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly different. In the aforecited case it was
accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second
marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who
filed an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the
present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife,
who filed a complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent
was obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was still
subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case that
the second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such
judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply
the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered
as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the
Page 446 of 486
petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and
intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary
one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do
not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the
prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second
marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B.
Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage.
Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through
force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is
belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which
stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five
years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second
marriage and that it was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only
when Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of
one year from the solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with the
story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent
until November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato
was already previously married.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent
Judge did not err in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively
resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy
can be undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by
the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 447 of 486

[1]
G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY
OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-
SUPER), Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution 2 dated 9 May 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution 3 dated 20
November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño
(Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano
(Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation

(Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro
Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and
Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave
and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave

with pay to any employee in case of death of the employee’s legitimate dependent
(parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
Page 448 of 486

xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant death and
accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case

of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case
the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only
with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).4
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V.
Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy.5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female
fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.6
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his
claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and
accident insurance.7
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for
bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery
provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle
their dispute,8 prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).9 In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October
2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of
whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to
Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the
parties proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and
Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death
benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article
XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first
been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent
death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein
employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation
(Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were
able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
Page 449 of 486

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of
Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to
the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary
contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel. 15 Dugan’s child was only
24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillano’s child who was
already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the
same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer
Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees’ unions were the same as the
representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in
labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent
living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not
contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that
there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status
as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel,
relying on Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil
personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired
juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned
that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the
term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A
fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed
any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous.
Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted
definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the
Union to have unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA –
the death of whom would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and
other death benefits – bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister
companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and
incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies.
Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other
death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted "company
practice."
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator,

issued a Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and
death benefits.
Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
Page 450 of 486

This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by
the covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three (3)
indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be of
employee’s "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as
provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4)
indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of
employee’s "dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal
document to be presented.18
Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate
dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very
moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could
not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else,
specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she
died during the labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife
were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein

petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand
Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and
the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00) representing
death benefits, or a total amount of ₱16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for
bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an employee’s
dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was
excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the
death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical
personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that
the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status
of a child could only be determined upon said child’s birth, otherwise, no such appellation
can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to bereavement
leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.
Page 451 of 486

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño’s
Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as
follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which the term
"death" is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for
ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits
thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the
acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon
delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be
contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event
causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a
legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to
the term "death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and
death benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no
experience of "death" to speak of. The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead
fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than "loss of human life", especially for
the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to
assuage the employee and the latter’s immediate family, extend to them solace and
support, rather than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child.
[Continental Steel’s] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes
only sadly misses this crucial point.20
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator
Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21
In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration23 of Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear
and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only
one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical
personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2
of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child,
brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the
employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3)
of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent,
spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee;
Page 452 of 486

and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death
certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the
provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying
Hortillano’s claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly
proper interpretation of the terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the
provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to
the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted
that neither management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for
bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil
Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the
very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is
the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical
capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us
whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her
death that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement
leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the
unborn child upon the latter’s death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death.
Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. 24 Life is not synonymous with
civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of
the unborn from conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother.
If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental
Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to
exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general
Page 453 of 486

definition,26 even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not
have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother,
Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question
that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for
the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil
personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s
womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her

parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage.
Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between
parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter:
"Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis
ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated
in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those
who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself
gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it
was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was
conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her
conception.1avvphi1
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element
entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death
certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits
under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same should have been granted by Continental
Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an
employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his
family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and
sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents
whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Page 454 of 486

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other
death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and
again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of
any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.29 In the
same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor.
In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission,30 we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision
that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both
sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all
doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists
that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between
private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State,
enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we
are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we

categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social
justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and
compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)],
we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the
social justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and
Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming
the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
Montaño, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death
benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00)
and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00), respectively, grounded on
the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
Page 455 of 486

[2]
G.R. No. L-32181 March 5, 1986
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LEONOR VALENCIA, as Natural mother and guardian of her minor children,
BERNARDO GO and JESSICA GO; and THE HON. AGAPITO HONTANOSAS, Judge
of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Branch XI.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Judge Agapito Hontanosas of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI who ordered the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu to
make the necessary cancellation and/or correction in the entries of birth of Bernardo Go
and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu.
Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and
Jessica Go filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation
and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of
the City of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3043-R.
The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for
correction of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a summary
proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and innocuous changes
such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc., and
not changes or corrections involving civil status, nationality, or citizenship which are
substantial and controversial.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order
directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the Cebu
Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu, once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and notice thereof, duly served on the Solicitor
General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and Go Eng.
Respondent Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the opposition wherein she admitted that
the present petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil status and nationality or
citizenship of respondents, but alleged that substantial changes in the civil registry records
involving the civil status of parents, their nationality or citizenship may be allowed if- (1) the
proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations of the
petition or to disprove the same; that respondents have complied with these requirements
by filing the present special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court and that they have caused
Page 456 of 486
reasonable notice to be given to the persons named in the petition and have also caused
the order for the hearings of their petition to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that since the petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go and
Jessica Go from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status from "Legitimate" to Illegitimate",
and changing also the status of the mother from "married" to "single" the corrections
sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and
status of the petitioning minors and the status of their mother.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss.
After trial on the merits during which the parties were given all the opportunity to present
their evidence and refute the evidence and arguments of the other side, the lower court
rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered granting the instant petition

and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of the City of Cebu to make the
necessary cancellation and/or correction on the following entries:
A. In the Record of Birth of BERNARDO GO, to register said Bernardo Go

as 'FILIPINO' instead of 'CHINESE'; as 'ILLEGITIMATE instead of
LEGITIMATE', and his father's (GO ENG) and mother's (LEONOR
VALENCIA) civil status as 'SINGLE instead of MARRIED';
B. In the Record of Birth of JESSICA GO to register said Jessica Go as

'FILIPINO' instead of 'CHINESE'; as 'ILLEGITIMATE' instead of
'LEGITIMATE' and father's (GO ENG) and mother's (LEONOR VALENCIA)
civil status as 'SINGLE instead of MARRIED': and
C. In both Records of Birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go to change the

entry on Petitioner's Citizenship from 'CHINESE to FILIPINO'.
Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, the Clerk of Court is
hereby directed to furnish a copy of this decision to the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Cebu City, who shall forthwith enter the cancellation
and/'or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the
Civil Registry as adverted to above.
From the foregoing decision, oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines appealed to

us by way of this petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner Republic of the Philippines raises a lone error for the grant of this petition,
stating that:
Page 457 of 486

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE
PETITIONER'S CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL STATUS AND THE
CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL STATUS OF HER MINOR CHILDREN
BERNARDO GO AND JESSICA GO.
The petitioner premises its case on precedents from the 1954 case of Ty Kong Tin v.
Republic (94 Phil. 321) to the 1981 case of Republic v. Caparosso (107 SCRA 67), that
entries which can be corrected under Article 412 of the New Civil Code as implemented by
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court refer to those mistakes that are clerical in nature or
changes that are harmless and innocuous (Wong v. Republic, 115 SCRA 496). In Republic
v. Medina (119 SCRA 270) citing the case of Chua Wee, et al, v. Republic (38 SCRA 409),
there was this dicta:
From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the
promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there was
no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial
authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in
the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of
the Revise Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which should
be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on
the matter of correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108, lie all the other
provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court
pursuant to its rule- making authority under Sec. 13 of Art. VIII of the
Constitution, which directs that such rules of court 'shall not diminish or
increase or modify substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended
beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are
visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend
substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy
or paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would
thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying
substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of
the New Civil Code.
xxx xxx xxx
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of
clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or
citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief
cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right
in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy
is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the
opposition of the Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of
Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits
that "the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an appropriate
proceeding.
Page 458 of 486

What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black's Law Dictionary defines
"adversary proceeding as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte

application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to
the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes
an adoption proceeding." (Platt v. Magagnini, 187 p. 716, 718, 110 Was.
39).
The private respondent distinguishes between summary proceedings contemplated under

Article 412 of the Civil Code and fullblown adversary proceedings which are conducted
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
She states:
It will please be considered that the nature of the matters that may be
changed or corrected are of two kinds. It may either be mistakes that are
clerical in nature or substantial ones. Under the first category are those
'harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is
clearly misspelled, occupation of the parents, etc.,' (Ansaldo v. Republic,
No. L-10276, Feb. 14, 1958, 54 O.G. 5886) or 'one' that is visible to the eyes
or obvious to the understanding'. (Black v. Republic, No. L-10869, Nov. 28,
1958, 104 Phil. 848).
To the second category falls those which affect the civil status or citizenship
or nationality of a party (Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, No. L-5609, Feb. 5, 1954,
94 Phil. 321: Tan Su v. Republic, No. L-12140, April 29, 1959, 105 Phil. 578:
Black v. Republic, No. L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958, 104 Phil. 848; Bantoco Coo
v. Republic, No. L-14978, May 23,1961, 2 SCRA 42: Barillo v. Republic, No.
L-14823, Dec. 28, 1961, 3 SCRA 725).
Changes or corrections in the entries in the civil registry were governed, at

first, by Act No. 3753 (Civil Registry Law) which placed these matters
exclusively upon the sound judgment and discretion of the civil registrars.
With the effectivity of the New Civil Code on August 30, 1950, these matters
were governed by Article 412 thereof which prescribes judicial order before
an entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected. This requirement
was deemed necessary to forestall the commission of fraud or other
mischief in these matters.
But even then, it is not any correction that can be considered under Article
412 of he Civil Code. The nature of the corrections sought has to be
considered and if found to refer only to clerical errors the same may be
allowed under said article which was construed to contemplate only a
summary proceeding.
Page 459 of 486

And so in the Ty Kong Tin case, this Honorable Court took occasion to draw
a distinction between what entries in the civil register could be corrected
under Article 412 of the New Civil Code and what could not. In the process,
to our mind, this Honorable Court set down propositions which hold true not
only in that case but also in the subsequent cases for the latter merely
reiterated the Ty Kong Tin decision. These are:
First, that proceedings under Article 412 of the New Civil Code are
summary:
Second, that corrections in the entires in the civil register may refer to either
mere mistakes that are clerical in nature or substantial ones which affects
the civil status or -the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved; and
Third, that if the change or correction sought refers to mere correction of

mistakes that are clerical in nature the same may be done, under Article 412
of the Civil Code; otherwise, if it refers to a substantial change which affects
the civil status or citizenship of a party. the matter should be threshed out in
a proper action.
To our humble estimation, these propositions do not altogether bar or

preclude substantial changes or corrections involving such details as the
civil status or nationality of a party. As a matter of fact, just three years after
the Ty Kong Tin decision, this Honorable Court allowed a party to correct
mistakes involving such substantial matters as his birthplace and citizenship
in the birth certificates of his two sons. (Lim v. Republic, No. L-8932, May
31, 1957, 101 Phil. 1235)
Only that where the correction pertains to matters which are important and
controversial certain conditions sine que non have to be complied with. Thus
it was held:
If it refers to a substantial change which affects the status or citizenship of a

party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action ... .' (Ty Kong Tin
v. Republic, supra)
. . . . for changes involving the civil status of the parents, their nationality or

citizenship, those are grave and important matters which may have a
bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of said parents,
but of the offsprings, and to seek said changes, it is not only the State, but
also all parties concerned and affected should be made parties defendants
or respondents, and evidence should be submitted, either to support the
allegations of the petition or complaint, or also to disprove the same so that
any order or decision in the case may be made in the entry in a civil register
that will affect or even determine conclusively the citizenship or nationality
of a person therein involved. (Ansaldo v. Republic, 54 O.G. 5886; Emphasis
supplied; Reiterated in the cases of: Tan Su v. Republic, supra; Bantoto Coo
Page 460 of 486

v. Republic, supra; Barillo v. Republic, supra; San Luis de Castro v.
Republic, L-17431, April 30, 1963; Ilu Lin v. Republic, L- 18213, Dec. 24,
1963; Reyes v. Republic, No.
L-17642, Nov. 27, 1964; Calicdan Baybayan v. Republic, L-20707, March
18, 1966; Tan v. Republic, L-19847, April 29, 1966).
If at all what is forbidden is, in the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, 'only
the entering of material corrections or amendments in the record of birth by
virtue of a judgment in a summary action against the Civil Registrar. (Matias
v. Republic, No.
L-26982, May 8, 1969.
It will thus be gleaned from the foregoing that corrections involving such
matters as the civil status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship may
be allowed provided the proper suit is filed.
The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to
ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein. Under our system of administering
justice, truth is best ascertained or approximated by trial conducted under the adversary
system,
Excerpts from the Report on Professional Responsibility issued jointly by the Association of
American Law Schools and the American Bar Association explain why:
An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combatting

this natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that
which is not yet fully known. The arguments of counsel hold the case, as it
were, in suspension between two opposing interpretations of it. While the
proper classification of the case is thus kept unresolved, there is time to
explore all of its peculiarities and nuances.
These are the contributions made by partisan advocacy during the public
hearing of the cause. When we take into account the preparation that must
precede the hearing, the essential quality of the advocate's contribution
becomes even more apparent. Preceding the hearing inquiries must be
instituted to determine what facts can be proved or seem sufficiently
established to warrant a formal test of their truth during the hearing. There
must also be a preliminary analysis of the issues, so that the hearing may
have form and direction. These preparatory measures are indispensable
whether or not the parties involved in the controversy are represented by
advocates.
Where that representation is present there is an obvious advantage in the

fact that the area of dispute may be greatly reduced by an exchange of
written pleadings or by stipulations of counsel. Without the participation of
someone who can act responsibly for each of the parties, this essential
narrowing of the issues becomes impossible. But here again the true
Page 461 of 486

significance of partisan advocacy lies deeper, touching once more the
integrity of the adjudicative process itself. It is only through the advocate's
participation that the hearing may remain in fact what it purports to be in
theory; a public trial of the facts and issues. Each advocate comes to the
hearing prepared to present his proofs and arguments, knowing at the same
time that his arguments may fail to persuade and that his proofs may be
rejected as inadequate. It is a part of his role to absorb these possible
disappointments. The deciding tribunal, on the other hand, comes to the
hearing uncommitted. It has not represented to the public that any fact can
be proved, that any argument is sound, or that any particular way of stating
a litigant's case is the most effective expression of its merits.
xxx xxx xxx
These, then, are the reasons for believing that partisan advocacy plays a
vital and essential role in one of the most fundamental procedures of a
democratic society. But if we were to put all of these detailed considerations
to one side, we should still be confronted by the fact that, in whatever form
adjudication may appear, the experienced judge or arbitrator desires and
actively seeks to obtain an adversary presentation of the issues. Only when
he has had the benefit of intelligent and vigorous advocacy on both sides
can he feel fully confident of his decision.
Viewed in this light, the role of the lawyer as a partisan advocate appears,
not as a regrettable necessity, but as an indispensable part of a larger
ordering of affairs. The institution of advocacy is not a concession to the
frailties of human nature, but an expression of human insight in the design
of a social framework within which man's capacity for impartial judgment can
attain its fullest realization. (44 American Bar Association Journal (1160-
1161, 1958)
Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully
and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish
the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered, the suit or proceeding is appropriate.
The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil

register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.— Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an orde, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week
Page 462 of 486

for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
SEC, 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation
or correction of an entry in the civil register are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the
petition, it becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order fixing the time and place for
the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The
following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any
person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no
doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any
person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or
corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings.
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of
Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu was filed by
respondent Leonor Valencia on January 27, 1970, and pursuant to the order of the trial
court dated February 4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in the, Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of
Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on the Solicitor General. the Local Civil Registrar
and Go Eng. The order likewise set the case for hearing and directed the local civil
registrar and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest under the entries
whose corrections were sought, to file their opposition to the said petition. An opposition to
the petition was consequently filed by the Republic on February 26, 1970. Thereafter a full
blown trial followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying and presenting her
documentary evidence in support of her petition. The Republic on the other hand cross-
examined respondent Leonor Valencia.
We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a
special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the
requisite notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place
thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.
In Matias v. Republic (28 SCRA 31), we held that:
Page 463 of 486

xxx xxx xxx
. . . In the case of petitioner herein, however, the proceedings were not

summary, considering the publication of the petition made by order of the
court in order to give notice to any person that might be interested, including
direct service on the Solicitor General himself. Considering the peculiar
circumstances of this particular case, the fact that no doubt is cast on the
truth of petitioner's allegations, or upon her evidence in support thereof, the
absence of any showing that prejudice would be caused to any party
interested (since petitioner's own father testified in her favor), and the
publicity given to the petition, we are of the opinion that the Ty Kong Tin
doctrine is not controlling this case. "
Only last year, we had occasion to clarify the Ty Kong Tin doctrine, further. In Republic v.
Macli-ing (135 SCRA 367, 370-371), this Court ruled:
The principal ground relied upon in this appeal is that Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court upon which private respondents anchor their Petition is applicable
only to changes contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code, which are
clerical or innocuous errors, or to corrections that are not controversial and
are supported by indubitable evidence. (Tiong v. Republic, 15 SCRA 262
[1965]).
It is true that the change from Esteban Sy to Sy Piao would necessarily

affect the Identity of the father. (Barillo v. Republic, 3 SCRA 725 [1961]) In
that sense, it can be said to be substantial. However, we find indubitable
evidence to support the correction prayed for. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, 94 Phil. 321 (1954), as well as

subsequent cases predicated thereon, we forbade only the entering of
material corrections in the record of birth by virtue of a judgment in
a summary action. the proceedings below, although filed under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, were not summary. The Petition was published by order
of the lower Court once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in accordance with law. The Solicitor General was
served with copy of the Petition as well as with notices of hearings. He filed
his Opposition to the Petition. The Local Civil Registrar of the City of Baguio
was likewise duly served with copy of the Petition. A Fiscal was always in
attendance at the hearings in representation of the Solicitor General. He
participated actively in the proceedings, particularly, in the cross-
examination of witnesses. And, notwithstanding that all interested persons
were cited to appear to show cause why the petition should not be granted,
no one appeared to oppose except the State through the Solicitor General.
But neither did the State present evidence in support of its Opposition.
Page 464 of 486

To follow the petitioner's argument that Rule 108 is not an appropriate proceeding without
in any way intimating what is the correct proceeding or if such a proceeding exists at all,
would result in manifest injustice.
Apart from Bernardo Go and Jessica Go, there are four (4) other sisters and one (1) other
brother born of the same father and mother. Not only are all five registered as Filipino
citizens but they have pursued careers which require Philippine citizenship as a mandatory
pre-requisite. To emphasize the strict policy of the government regarding professional
examinations, it was the law until recently that to take the board exams for pharmacist, the
applicant should possess natural born citizenship. (See. 18, Republic Act 5921 and Sec. 1,
P.D. 1350)
The sisters and brother are:
1. Sally Go, born on April 29, 1934 was licensed as a Pharmacist after passing the
government board examinations in 1956.
2. Fanny Go, born on July 12, 1936 is a Registered Nurse who passed the government
board examinations in 1960.
3. Corazon Go, born on June 20, 1939, during the trial of this case in 1970 was a fourth
year medical student, qualified to take the government board examinations after
successfully completing the requirements for a career in medicine, and presumably is a
licensed physician now.
4. Antonio Go, born February 14, 1942 was an engineering student during the 1970 trial of
the case and qualified by citizenship to take government board examinations.
5. Remedios Go, born October 4, 1945 was a licensed Optometrist after passing the
government board examinations in 1967.
The above facts were developed and proved during trial. The petitioner failed to refute the
citizenship of the minors Bernardo and Jessica Go.
In this petition, it limits itself to a procedural reason to overcome substantive findings by

arguing that the proper procedure was not followed.
There are other facts on the record. Leonor Valencia is a registered voter and had always
exercised her right of suffrage from the time she reached voting age until the national
elections immediately preceding the filing of her petition. The five other sisters and brother
are also registered voters and likewise exercised the right of suffrage.
An uncle of the mother's side had held positions in the government having been elected
twice as councilor and twice as vice-mayor of Victorias, Negros Occidental. Respondent
Leonor Valencia has purchased and registered two (2) parcels of land as per Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-46104 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-37275. These
Page 465 of 486

allegations are well documented and were never contradicted by the Republic. As correctly
observed by the lower court.
The right of suffrage is one of the important rights of a citizen. This is also
true with respect to the acquisition of a real property. The evidence further
shows that her children had been allowed to take the Board Examinations
given by the Government for Filipino citizens only.
It would be a denial of substantive justice if two children proved by the facts to be

Philippine citizens, and whose five sisters and brother born of the same mother and father
enjoy all the rights of citizens, are denied the same rights on the simple argument that the
"correct procedure" not specified or even intimated has not been followed.
We are, therefore, constrained to deny the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 466 of 486

[3]
G.R. No. 157043 February 2, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
decision2 dated January 13, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128, which affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23 of San Juan, Southern Leyte dated September
14, 1999 granting a petition for change of name.
Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward
from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on September 9, 1998. In Special
Proceeding No. R-481,3 Capote as Giovanni’s guardian ad litem averred:
xxx xxx xxx
1. [Respondent] is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, married, while minor GIOVANNI

N. GALLAMASO, is also a Filipino citizen, sixteen (16) years old and both are
residents of San Juan, Southern Leyte where they can be served with summons
and other court processes;
2. [Respondent] was appointed guardian [ad litem] of minor Giovanni N. Gallamaso

by virtue of a court order in Special [Proc.] No. R-459, dated [August 18, 1998] xxx
xxx authorizing her to file in court a petition for change of name of said minor in
accordance with the desire of his mother [who is residing and working abroad];
3. Both [respondent] and minor have permanently resided in San Juan, Southern
Leyte, Philippines for more than fifteen (15) years prior to the filing of this instant
petition, the former since 1970 while the latter since his birth [in 1982];
4. The minor was left under the care of [respondent] since he was yet nine (9) years
old up to the present;
5. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P.

Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. [He] was born on July 9, 1982 [,] prior to the
effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his mother used the surname of the
natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; and [Giovanni] has
been known by that name since birth [as per his birth certificate registered at the
Local Civil Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte];
Page 467 of 486

6. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born and up to
the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial,
physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. [Giovanni’s pleas] for attention along
that line [fell] on deaf ears xxx xxx xxx;
7. [Giovanni] is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to
have his surname changed to that of his mother’s surname;
8. [Giovanni’s] mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in the United States
and [his] continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural
father, may complicate [his] status as natural child; and
9. The change of name [from] GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI

NADORES will be for the benefit of the minor.
xxx xxx xxx4
Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the change of
name on Giovanni’s birth certificate. Having found respondent’s petition sufficient in form
and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition.5 Publication of the petition in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Southern Leyte once a week for three
consecutive weeks was likewise ordered.6 The trial court also directed that the local civil
registrar be notified and that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) be sent a copy of the
petition and order.7
Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to
present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG, acting
through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the
motion.
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of
name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.8
From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal
with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary
proceeding.
Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name.9
In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s
decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of
indispensable parties.10 Petitioner cites Republic of the Philippines v. Labrador11 and claims
that the purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the
child’s change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding
adversarial.12
Page 468 of 486

We deny the petition.
"The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which serves to
distinguish him from all others; this symbol is his name."13 Understandably, therefore, no
person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. 14 This is a reasonable
requirement for those seeking such change because a person’s name necessarily affects
his identity, interests and interactions. The State must be involved in the process and
decision to change the name of any of its citizens.
The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of name. Here,
the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103,15 a separate and distinct proceeding from
Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction of entries in the civil registry (usually dealing
only with innocuous or clerical errors thereon).16
The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action before the court a
quo is intertwined with the nature of the proceedings there. The point is whether the
proceedings were sufficiently adversarial.
Summary proceedings do not extensively address the issues of a case since the reason for
their conduct is expediency. This, according to petitioner, is not sufficient to deal with
substantial or contentious issues allegedly resulting from a change of name, meaning,
legitimacy as well as successional rights.17 Such issues are ventilated only in adversarial
proceedings wherein all interested parties are impleaded and due process is observed.18
When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code
of the Philippines),19 the pertinent provision of the Civil Code then as regards his use of a
surname, read:
Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of
the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the
surname of the recognizing parent. (emphasis ours)
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mother’s surname from birth.
The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovanni’s putative father to
actually recognize him. Meanwhile, according to the Family Code which repealed, among
others, Article 366 of the Civil Code:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. xxx
xxx xxx (emphasis ours)
Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang20 is
enlightening:
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the
Page 469 of 486

right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use
the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they
may bear the father’s surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the
father bears only a given name and his mother’ surname, and does not have a
middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies
him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private
handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and
his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged child.1awphi1.net21
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s name to his
identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or
illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those
who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against
such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper
remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied
with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate
court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition
sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change
his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always
recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever
recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s
intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the
way of the reunification of mother and son.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by petitioner 22 in support of its position deal
with cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, a proceeding separate and
distinct from the special proceedings for change of name. Those cases deal with the
application and interpretation of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while this case was
correctly filed under Rule 103. Thus, the cases cited by petitioner are irrelevant and have
no bearing on respondent’s case. While the OSG is correct in its stance that the
proceedings for change of name should be adversarial, the OSG cannot void the
proceedings in the trial court on account of its own failure to participate therein. As the CA
correctly ruled:
The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an
adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors
in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of
name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There is no
doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the
civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes
beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition,
the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect
Page 470 of 486
the change in name. In this regard, [appellee] Capote complied with the requirement
for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation
notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy
thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including
the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in
nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the
petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded.
Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its
evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the
proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough.23 (emphasis supplied)
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.24 Respondent gave notice of
the petition through publication as required by the rules.25 With this, all interested parties
were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In
addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it.
Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all
interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the
opportunity to contest the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the January 13, 2003 decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128 AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 471 of 486

[4]
G.R. No. L-22607 July 30, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LEE WAI LAM, respondent.
Office of the Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo
for petitioner.
Manuel P. Calanog and Antonio E. Pesigan for respondent.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
An appeal by the Republic of the Philippines from the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila granting the petition of
respondent Lee Wai Lam to change his name to "William Lee Wong".
On October 6, 1954, respondent Lee Wai Lam filed a petition in the Court of First Instance
of Manila, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 24254, entitled "Petition For Change of
Name of Lee Wai Lam to 'William Lee Wong'" alleging, substantially, (1) that petitioner is of
age, single, a Chinese national, and a resident of 22 Elizondo St., Quiapo, Manila; (2) that
petitioner has been a bona fide resident of Manila since 1935; (3) that the reason why
petitioner asks for a change of name is "because his usual name before he entered the
Philippines was 'William Lee' but when his Landing Certificate of Residence was issued,
when he landed here, it was merely mispronounced and misspelled to 'Lee Wai Lam'. The
word 'Lee' stands for the adopted family of his grandfather, whereas 'Wai Lam' stands for
the given name which should have been placed as 'William', whereas his family and other
blood relationship have been known by the family name 'Wong'" 1 ; (4) that petitioner had
been known by the name "William Lee Wong" in the different schools that he attended,
namely: Philippine Sun Yat Sen where he studied the elementary course, in the Far
Eastern University where he studied the high school course, and in the Mapua Institute of
Technology where he studied civil engineering; and so the name "William Lee Wong"
appears in his school records.
The Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order setting the petition for hearing and
directing that a copy thereof be published as required by law. Said order reads in part:
A verified petition having been filed by petitioner, thru counsel, praying for the
reasons alleged therein that his name Lee Wai Lam be changed to William Lee
Wong;
It appearing that said petition is sufficient in form and substance, this Court hereby
sets the foregoing petition for hearing on March 16, 1955, at 8:30 a.m. and directs
that a copy of this order be published ... in the DAILY MIRROR ... once a week for
Page 472 of 486

three (3) consecutive weeks, so that all persons who are opposed to the petition
may file their opposition ....
The Republic of the Philippines, thru the Solicitor General, opposed the petition upon the
grounds, substantially, that the necessity for the change had not been established; and that
if the petitioner had been using the name "William Lee Wong" since his arrival in the
Philippines up to the present, as claimed by him, that fact constitutes violation of
Commonwealth Act No. 142 which prohibits the use of aliases without judicial authority.
After hearing, the lower court granted the petition, holding that the grounds for the
opposition of the Solicitor General are not obstacles to the grant of the petition. The
Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, on both questions of fact and of law. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
In the present appeal, the Solicitor General contends that the Court of Appeals committed
the following errors:1äwphï1.ñët
1. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the petition for change of name was
sufficient as to form and substance and that applicant although not yet of age at the
time of its filing had sufficient capacity to verify the same; and further erred in ruling
that the insufficiency of the petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.2
2. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the evidence on record was sufficient
proof of the truth of the allegations of the petition for the change of name sought.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the grounds for the opposition to the
change of name are no obstacle to the grant of the petition.
4. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court granting the
change of name sought.1äwphï1.ñët
1. We find no merit in the first assigned error. In Tse vs. Republic, 3 this Court held that "no
rule provides that a person desiring to change his name should be of age and that if he is a
minor the verification made by him is of no legal effect. ... (t)he jurisdiction of courts over
the subject matter depends upon the nature of the action or proceeding and not upon the
capacity or incapacity to sue of the parties. It is not an absolute prerequisite to jurisdiction
over an action by a minor that he should sue through a guardian ad litem." In the earlier
case of Oshita vs. Republic, 4 this Court said that the requirement regarding verification of a
pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requisite. Verification is simply intended to secure
an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not the product
of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.
The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is simply a condition affecting the form
of pleading, the non-compliance, of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order the correction of the pleading although it is not verified if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice or the law may thereby be served.
Page 473 of 486

2. The second, third and fourth assigned errors may be discussed jointly, all of them having
reference to the question of whether or not there is a "proper and reasonable cause" or any
compelling reason, which may justify the change of name.
In this connection, it may be well to first define what constitutes "proper and reasonable
cause" for a change of name. This Court, in Yu Chi Han vs. Republic, 5 had expressed what
is a "proper and reasonable cause" which would warrant a change of name, thus: "This
Court has already had the occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in
the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification and that a change
of name is a privilege and not a matter of right, so that before a person can be authorized
to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth civil registry he must show
proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change.
Otherwise, the request should be denied (Ong Peng Oan vs. Republic, L-8035, November
29, 1957). The following may be considered, among others, as proper and reasonable
causes that may warrant the grant of a petition for change of name: (1) when the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the
request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is
acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion
(Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660)."
In the case now before Us, the reasons of respondent Lee Wai Lam in asking for a change
of name, as found by the Court of Appeals, are: "(a) that he desires to adopt officially the
given name 'William' which was his real name in China, and not Wai Lam which was
placed by mistake in his landing certificate; (b) that 'William' stands for the Chinese name
'Wai Lam'; (c) that the family name 'Lee' which he now bears is the adopted family name of
his grandfather which is also carried by his father; (d) that the family name 'Wong' which he
wants to adopt is the family name of his ancestors in China; (e) that he was officially
registered in different schools and universities, such as Philippine Sun Yat Sen, Far
Eastern University, National University and Mapua Institute of Technology, as 'William L.
Wong' and was graduated and given certificates and diplomas from said educational
institutions under the name 'William. L. Wong'; (f) that he has been known to his friends
and in society in general as 'William L. Wong'; (g) that he has been officially registered in
the Bureau of Immigration under other names as 'William Lee Wong', 'William Lee', and
'William W. Lee'; and (h) that he wants to reconcile and harmonize his school records and
his immigration papers, especially because his application for post graduate studies in the
University of Michigan, U.S.A., has been accepted on the basis of his school records in the
Philippines wherein he was registered, as above stated under the name 'William L.
Wong'." 6
We note, from the reasons above stated, that respondent does not claim that his name
"Lee Wai Lam" is ridiculous, or tainted with dishonor, or is difficult to write or pronounce.
Neither is it claimed that the change of name is asked because of a change in his status.
Nor has it been shown that the use of the name, Lee Wai Lam, has produced confusion. It
simply appears that respondent wants to correct an alleged error because his actual name
in China was "William Lee" not "Lee Wai Lam"; that out of filial attachment he wants to
adopt his grandfather's (and his father's) surname "Lee" and his ancestral family name
"Wong"; that he has been known in school, among his friends and the society in general,
as "William Lee Wong"; and that his other names registered in the Bureau of Immigration
Page 474 of 486
are "William Lee Wong", "William Lee" and "William W. Lee", all of which he wants to
reconcile and harmonize by simply adopting one name, "William Lee Wong".
In Yap Ek Siu vs. Republic, 7 petitioner Yap Ek Siu's plea to change his name to "William
Tanchon" because "Tanchon" is the authorized surname of his father, a naturalized Filipino
citizen, out of a sense of filial respect, was not considered sufficient cause to change his
name; nor his claim that his Filipino playmates have called him from childhood by the name
"William". In Jesus Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, 8 the petitioner's claim that his various
names caused much confusion in the school records and unnecessary delay and
embarrassment to him in his dealing with the public was not considered a proper and
reasonable justification to legally authorize a change of name. In Grant vs. Republic, 9 it
was held that the fact that the petitioner has been using a different name and has become
known by it, does not constitute a proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a
change of name. In Chiu Hap Chiu vs. Republic, 10 although the petitioner had presented a
photostatic copy of a certification issued in his favor as Doctor of Medicine by the
University of Sto. Tomas wherein it appears that his name is Lo Hap Chiu, such proof was
not considered sufficient to justify a request for change of his name to Lo Hap Chiu. And
in Yu Chi Han vs. Republic, supra, where the petitioner had shown his desire to continue
using the name, Alejandro Go Yu, given after his birth or after his baptism, in his dealing in
the community or in the schools he attended, this Court declared that the petitioner has not
shown any proper and compelling reason that may justify the request for change of name.
Based on the rulings We have cited, We do not consider the reasons presented by the
respondent as proper and reasonable to authorize the change of his name as prayed for by
him.
The alleged error in placing the name of the respondent as Lee Wai Lam and not "William
Lee" in his Landing Certificate of Residence is not a convincing ground to warrant change
of his name. He has been using officially the name "Lee Wai Lam" all along, and he has
not been heard to complain that he has been prejudiced by the use of that name. The
name "Lee Wai Lam" appears not only in respondent's Landing Certificate of Residence
(LCR) but also in his Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). 11 He should retain, rather than
change that name. As We have stated, the State has an interest in the name borne by an
individual, and this is more so in the case of an alien whose identity, as a rule, is
established by the name appearing in his alien certificate of registration (ACR). 12 The
alien's name in the ACR should not be changed for trivial or capricious reasons.
Furthermore, since change of name is not a right but a privilege, this privilege should not
be granted to an applicant who asks to change his name because he finds himself in
difficulty due to his having used a name, or names, other than his official or real name.
In the case of Ty Bio Giao vs. Republic, 13 this Court said:1äwphï1.ñët
In cases of this nature, the possible consequences of a change of name must be

carefully taken into account, and the policy of the courts should be to deny the
application in the absence of clear proof that the change is really necessary and will
not in anyway serve any unlawful purpose. The State has an interest in the name
borne by each individual for purposes of identification, and the same should not be
changed for trivial reasons.
Page 475 of 486

3. Regarding the use of alias or aliases, in the instant case it is not denied that respondent
used names other than "Lee Wai Lam" without judicial authority. In Jesus Ng Yao Siong
vs. Republic, supra, this Court warns applicants for change of name against the
unauthorized use of alias or aliases, thus:
The admitted fact that petitioner had been using aliases ushers us to another
problem: Can a court of justice lawfully grant an application for a change of name
where he has violated a law regarding the use of aliases? This poser comes to the
fore, because petitioner was never authorized to use an alias by a competent court
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act 142 entitled 'An Act to regulate the
use of aliases.' With reference to the name Uy Keng Jesus or Jesus Uy Keng Lee
which he has used in school, or Keng Lee Uy by which he is known to his friends
and the general public, or Uy Keng Lee which he uses in his income tax returns, or
Jesus Ng Yao Siong which appears in his alien certificate of registration, none of
these names is a 'pseudonym for literary purposes,' or a name 'by which he had
been known since his childhood' or 'authorized by a competent court.' This use is
prohibited by that law. While we are loathe to attach a felonious label to the use of
these different names, we say that such use appears to be a violation of Section 1
of said Commonwealth Act 142, punishable with imprisonment ranging from 1
month to 6 months pursuant to Section 4 of said statute. Neither did he use those
other names as 'pen names' or 'stage names'; and another statute prohibits him
from using the same. To grant the petition here is to sanction an unlawful act which
might reach the proportions of a crime. Tan vs. Republic, supra, warns that this
cannot be done.
In the case of Ty Bio Giao vs. Republic, supra, the petition for change of name was denied
it having been found that the petitioner had used and had been known under several
names. Said this Court:
But the most important reason justifying denial of petitioner's application is the fact,
admitted by him, that during his residence in the Philippines he had used and had
been known under several names, without legal authority to do so. The possibility
therefore exists — should he be allowed now to change his name — that confusion
would arise in the minds of those who had previously known him under different
names.
4. Finally, and in connection also with the use of aliases, this Court has ruled that an
applicant for change of name should include in his petition — in the title and body thereof
— not only his real name and the name sought to be adopted, but also his aliases or other
names used. In other words, the title of the petition for change of name should include the
real name and all the aliases — not only in the body thereof. Again We quote from Jesus
Ng Ya Siong vs. Republic, supra:
1. Change of name is a judicial proceeding in rem, Jurisdiction to hear and

determine a petition therefor, by law, is acquired after publication of the 'order
reciting the purpose of the petition' and the 'date and place for the hearing thereof'
— for three (3) successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Publication
is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object, to bar indifferently
Page 476 of 486
all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to
be established.'
But, for that publication to be effective, it must give a correct information. To inform,
the publication should recite, amongst others, the following facts: (1) the name or
names of the applicant, (2) the cause for which the change of name is sought, and
(3) the new name asked for.
xxx xxx xxx
... Petitioner himself admits that he is known by all these names. This gives rise to
the necessity of including his aliases in the title of the petition — not only in the
body thereof. So that, the title of this petition should read 'In the matter of the
change of name of Jesus Ng, otherwise known as Jesus Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Uy
Keng Lee, Uy Keng Lee Jesus, Keng Lee Uy and Uy Keng Lee' (this last being the
name he uses in his income tax returns. The reason for this is obvious. Notices in
the newspapers, like the one under consideration, usually appear in the back
pages. The reader, as is to be expected, merely glances at the title of the petition. It
is only after he has satisfied himself that the title interests him, that he proceeds to
read down further. The probability is that the portions in the publication heretofore
quoted will escape the reader's notice. The purpose of which the publication is
made, that is, to inform, may thus be unserved.
We accordingly hold that for a publication of a petition for a change of name to be

valid, the title thereof should include, first, his real name, and second, his aliases, if
any.
In the case at bar, the record shows that the respondent has been using six (6)
names, viz.: (1) Lee Wai Lam, in his LCR and ACR; (2) William Lee Wong, in his school
records at Philippine Sun Yat Sen and Mapua Institute of Technology; and in his record at
the Bureau of Immigration; (3) William Wong, in his school record at the Far Eastern
University; 14 (4) William L. Wong, school record, National University; 15 (5) William Lee,
record, Bureau of Immigration; 16 and (6) William W. Lee, record, Bureau of
Immigration. 17 The names "William Wong", "William L. Wong", "William Lee" and "William
W. Lee" are not mentioned or included in his petition. Neither are they included in the order
of publication. Under the ruling in Jesus Ng Ya Siong vs. Republic, supra, therefore, such
omission is a fatal defect that warrants the dismissal of the petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals, appealed from, is
reversed, and the petition of Lee Wai Lam for a change of name is denied. Costs against
the respondent-appellee. It is so ordered.
Page 477 of 486

[5]
G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION

OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as
JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN
WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, Petitioners,
vs.
CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B.
MOLO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his
mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name
and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna
Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his
parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of
legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang….
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time
because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine
who was born in Singapore…. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of
the mother are not carried in a person’s name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a
middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister
since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin
language since they do not have the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is
for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed
to Julian Lin Wang.1
Page 478 of 486
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.2 The trial court found
that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petition—that is, that petitioner
Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle
name—did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the
change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in
the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers.
Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should now
be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added
that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he
will change his name by dropping his middle name.3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a
resolution dated 20 May 2004.4 The trial court maintained that the Singaporean practice of
not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate
Filipino child who intends to study there. The dropping of the middle name would be
tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of
Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of name would not prejudice public
interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the petition if the
reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable.5
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45)6 arguing that the
trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Court,
that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article
1747 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that "[W]ith globalization and mixed
marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family
name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency and harmony among
siblings, taking into consideration the "best interest of the child."8 It is argued that
convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not
prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out that the middle name "Carulasan" will
cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an
obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner
also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have denied the petition for change of name
until he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to
previous cases9 decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of name.10
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition.
The OSG filed its Comment11 positing that the trial court correctly denied the petition for
change of name. The OSG argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate
children have the right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right
cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same. According to the OSG,
there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name "Carulasan" is in the best
interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for
change of name and/or cancellation of entry.12 The OSG also adds that the petitioner has
not shown any compelling reason to justify the change of name or the dropping of the
middle name, for that matter. Petitioner’s allegation that the continued use of the middle
name may result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG
reiterates its argument raised before the trial court that the dropping of the child’s middle
Page 479 of 486
name could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner.
Hence, while petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no
confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is
customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use
of such middle name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law.13
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of
name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his
name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise,
the request should be denied.14
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and reasonable
cause’ for which the change is sought.15 To justify a request for change of name, petitioner
must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name
which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or
that the change of name would prejudice public interest.16
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable
cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be
satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a
mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts.17
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply
seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to
drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for
change of name usually deal with requests for change of surname. There are only a
handful of cases involving requests for change of the given name18 and none on requests
for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop the middle
name from his registered name? We have to answer in the negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a person’s name is relevant at this point. We

quote, thus:
Page 480 of 486

…For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the
word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals
and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at
large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one
method of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for
identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently been held that,
when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the
surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual
at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is
that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child.
The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to
which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect
the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for
nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the
start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside
the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or
mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.19
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that
middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the
maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who
may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father.20 The Family Code gives legitimate children the
right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, 21 while illegitimate children shall
use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case
they may bear the father’s surname.22
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father
bears only a given name and his mother’s surname, and does not have a middle name.
The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only
when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or
acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he
bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that
the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate,
legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a
middle name, and a surname.
Page 481 of 486

Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this
would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society. In
support, he cites Oshita v. Republic23 and Calderon v. Republic,24 which, however, are not
apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena

Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name from
Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the
following considerations: she had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; her other siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using
their mother’s surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there still
being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War; and there was no showing
that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice
public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an illegitimate
minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her behalf, to change her
name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather, Romeo C.
Calderon, her mother’s husband. The Court held that a petition for change of name of an
infant should be granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court
took into consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate the
stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the surname of her
illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates that every person be allowed
to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as doing so he does not
cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,25 in arguing that although Article 174 of the Family Code
gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the father and the mother, it is
not mandatory such that the child could use only one family name, even the family name of
the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and
Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
(her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had
been using since childhood, in her school records and in her voter’s registration). The trial
court denied her petition but this Court overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of
the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child, should principally use the surname of
her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of herm other to
which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample justification to grant
her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioner’s reason of convenience for the change of his name against the
standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his
justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his
petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all
analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the cases
of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were already of age when they filed their
petitions for change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their
Page 482 of 486
discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their
surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the
petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or
compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most
Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition
to the fact of therein petitioner’s election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the Court
granted the petition since the petitioner had been known since childhood by a name
different from her registered name and she had not used her registered name in her school
records and voter’s registration records; thus, denying the petition would only result to
confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a mother in
behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to buttress his argument that
he does not have to reach the age of majority to petition for change of name. However, it is
manifest in Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave
paramount consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name
is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued
use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his
petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left
to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. 26 As he is of tender
age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and
granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 483 of 486

[6]
G.R. No. L-32026 January 16, 1986
RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF ABSENCE OF ROBERTO L. REYES. ERLINDA

REYNOSO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON, JOSE P. ALEJANDRO, in his capacity as Judge, Court of First Instance of
Cavite, Branch II, Cavite City, respondents.
PATAJO, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite dismissing the
petition filed by petitioner-appellant Erlinda Reynoso Reyes to have her husband Roberto
Reyes declared an absentee.
In a petition filed on October 25, 1969 Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the declaration of the
absence of her husband Roberto L. Reyes alleging that her husband had been absent from
their conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and since then had not been heard from and his
whereabouts unknown. The petition further alleged that her husband left no will nor any
property in his name nor any debts.
The evidence presented by petitioner in support of her petition established that she and
Roberto L. Reyes were married on March 20, 1960; that sometime in April 1962 her
husband left the conjugal home due to some misunderstanding over personal matters; that
since then petitioner has not received any news about the whereabouts of her husband;
that they have not acquired any properties during their marriage and that they have no
outstanding obligation in favor of anyone; that her only purpose in filing the petition is to
establish the absence of her husband, invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of the New
Rules of Court and Article 384 of the Civil Code.
After hearing the Court a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that since Roberto L.
Reyes left no properties there was no necessity to declare him judicially an absentee. It
said:
A perusal of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court on absentees reveals that it is

based on the provisions of Title XIV of the New Civil Code on absence. And
the reason and purpose of the provisions of the New Civil Code on absence
(Arts. 381 to 396) are: (1) The interest of the person himself who has
disappeared; (2) The rights of third parties against the absentee, especially
those who have rights which would depend upon the death of the absentee;
and (3) The general interest of society which may require that property does
not remain abandoned without someone representing it and without an
owner (Civil Code by Francisco, Vol. 2, pp. 930- 931, 1953 Ed.).
Page 484 of 486
It will thus be noted that said provisions of the New Civil Code are
concerned with absence only with reference to its effects on property (2
Manresa, 101-102, Civil Code by Francisco, Vol. 2, p. 932. 1953 Ed.).
Article 384, New Civil Code, which is reproduced from Article 184 of the old
Code, and relied upon by herein petitioner, refers to the second period or
stage of absence, and specifically indicates the precise moment when the
same may begin. Thus, this article provides that after the lapse of two (2)
years without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of the last
news, and five (5) years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of
the administration of his property, his absence may be declared by the
Court. The primordial purpose of this declaration is to provide for an
administrator of the property of the absentee. It cannot be said that because
of the comma (,) between the words 'news' and 'and', the two-year period
mentioned in the first part of the law has no reference to or bearing on the
property of the absentee. Manresa states that the only reason for the
different periods is because in one case (2 years) the absentee has not left
a person in charge of the administration of his property, and in the other
case (5 years) the absentee has provided for his absence by appointing an
administrator of his property dispensing in a way the giving of news about
himself (2 Manresa, 127-128). It is worth to note, in this connection, that the
first period or stage of absence as covered by Article 381 of the New Civil
Code provides for provisional measures-the appointment by the Court of a
person to represent the absentee' in all that may be necessary'-when a
mere presumption of his absence arises. It should be noted that the
appointment of a 'representative' of the absentee is for the protection of the
interest of the latter. This is clear from the provisions of Article 382 which
enjoins the judge to 'take the necessary measures to safeguard the rights
and interests of the absentee. ... Moreover, it is not enough that a person is
declared an absentee. The law (see Articles 381, 382 and 383) requires the
judge to appoint a representative for the absentee precisely to safeguard the
property or interest of the latter. It is thus imperative that the declaration of
absence be for a specific purpose, and that purpose can be no other than
the protection of the interest or property of the absentee. Castan, in his
commentary, emphatically states that there must be an immediate necessity
for the representation of the absentee in some specific urgent matters (Vol.
1, pp. 182-183).
The same observation and commentary can be said of the corresponding

complimenting provisions of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, particularly
Sections 6 and 7 thereof which make it mandatory upon the Court to appoint
a representative, trustee or administrator who shall safeguard the rights and
interest of the absentee.
Considering that neither the petition alleges, nor the evidence shows, that
Roberto L. Reyes has any rights, interest or property in the Philippines,
there is no point in judicially declaring him an absentee.
Page 485 of 486

We affirm the order of the lower Court dismissing the petition. As this Court said in Jones
vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 197:
... For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the
former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence
made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole
purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been
absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that
the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to he living, that
such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present
so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III,
paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68). (On page 183).
The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has properties
which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the
Court (Article 384, Civil Code); the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of
property (Article 191, Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court that the administration of
an classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her (Article 196, Civil Code). The
petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the management of
the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife may be combined and adjudicated in the
same proceedings, Peyer vs. Martinez, 88 Phil. 72, 80).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the order of the
lower Court dismissing the petition to declare Roberto L. Reyes an absentee. With costs
against petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Page 486 of 486

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Assignment No.

G.R. No. 183965 September 18, 2009

JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Petitioner,

Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the parties on February 18,

4. [Respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all counterclaim or counter-

Petitioner filed on 15 April 2008 her Opposition8 to respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence in

RTC-Branch 24 summarized the arguments of respondent and petitioner in the Demurrer

3. Judicial Admissions or admission in petitioner’s pleadings to the effect that there

5. After receiving the benefits and concessions pursuant to their compromise

The summary of the Opposition is in this wise:

1. That the illegitimate filiation of petitioner to respondent is established by the

In the end, RTC-Branch 24 decreed:

RTC-Branch 24 denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration12 in a Resolution13 dated 29

It is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, previously before RTC-Branch 9,

The court rules in the negative.

A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a

ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;

(3) Any ground for legal separation;

(4) Future support;

(5) The jurisdiction of courts;

(6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)

The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February

Advincula v. Advincula21 has a factual background closely similar to the one at bar.

Although respondent’s pleading was captioned a Demurrer to Evidence, it was more

Demurrer to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which is

The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether petitioner has

G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005

Gerardo and Ma. Theresa’s relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On

WHEREFORE, the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby

Gerardo’s argument is without merit.

The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate is misplaced. It has no

In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained

In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family

Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951

MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas as guardian ad litem, and

Reyes and Dy-Liaco for appellants.

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad

Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:

Manresa on this point says:

G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997

CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners,

The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by

Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground

We find for petitioners.

The bone of contention in private respondent's demurrer to evidence is whether or not

I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken

The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually fixes a civil

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon

Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and

WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby

G.R. No. L-49542 September 12, 1980

2. The Honorable Trial Court erred in holding that plaintiff-appellant cannot

Hence, petitioner filed this petition on January 12, 1979.

The issues boil down to:

1. Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate

Q — What did you feel as a result of the incident where Antonio

A — I felt worried, mentally shocked and humiliated.

Q — If these feelings: worries, mental shock and humiliation, if