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Cognitive Mobilization
and
Partisan Dealignment
in
Advanced Industrial
Democracies
Russell J. Dalton
Florida State University
Theories of mass politics have stressed the value of partisanship in providing citizens with
cues for political decision making. The expanding political skills and resources of contem-
porary electorates are, however, increasing the abilities of the public and lessening the need
for partisan cues. A process of cognitive mobilization in advanced industrial societies is
creating a substantial number of apartisans, sophisticated individuals who lack party ties.
Data from an eight-nation survey document the correlates of changing mobilization patterns,
and link these findings to a new style of dealigned politics.
* A previous version of this paper was presented at the 1982 ECPR Workshop on Problems
of Party Government, Aarhus, Denmark. I would like to thank the members of the
workshop, Scott Flanagan, Paul Beck, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful com-
ments on this article.
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COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION AND PARTISAN DEALIGNMENT 265
I Our focus on party and cognitive mobilization does not imply that social reference
groups and other sources of political cues are unimportant. Rather, the two mobilization
factors we examine normally are considered to be more proximate to political behavior than
are social characteristics. In addition, social groups apparently are declining as a source of
political cues (Ladd with Hadley, 1975, esp. ch. 5; Baker et al., 1981, ch. 7; Lipset, 1981, ap-
pendix; Petersson, 1978, pp. 116-19).
2 The findings in this research are drawn from two data sources: the Political Action Study
conducted by Samuel Barnes, Max Kaase, and associates, and the Eurobarometer surveys
conducted by the European Communities. Both data sources were made available by the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The combined results from
the Political Action Study are based on an equal weighting of the eight national samples; the
combined Eurobarometer results are weighted to obtain a representative sample of the Euro-
pean Community population.
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266 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 46, 1984
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COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION AND PARTISAN DEALIGNMENT 267
3 The partisanship question was worded as follows: "Which political party do you feel
closest to? (If close to a party) would you say you feel very close, fairly close, or not very close
to that party?" In West Germany and Austria the options were: very close, fairly close,
moderate, fairly distant, and distant. For details on these variables see Barnes, Kaase, et al.
(1979, pp. 579-80).
4 The cognitive mobilization index is based on a simple additive combination of education
and general interest in politics (see Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976, pp. 261-64). The
respondent's age and educational level was coded: (1) college; (2) completed secondary; (3)
some secondary; (4) primary or less. Political interest was coded: (1) very interested; (2)
somewhat interested; (3) not much interested; (4) not at all interested. These two questions
were added together to yield a seven point index (2-8). Values of 5 or less were treated as
high cognitive mobilization in figure 1.
5 The general correlation between partisanship and cognitive mobilization is also
replicated within each national sample: U.K. = .20; U.S. = .18; Finland = .26;
Austria = .18; Netherlands = .30; Switzerland = .34; Germany = .18; Italy = .22.
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268 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 46,1984
TABLE 1
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COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION AND PARTISAN DEALIGNMENT 269
TABLE 2
(BY NATION)
PARTISAN COGNITIVE
STRENGTH MOBILIZATION
6 The interpretation of this relationship is much debated in the research literature (Con-
verse, 1976, ch. 1). While we generally agree with Converse's life cycle interpretation, the
generational changes implied by the cognitive mobilization model also might produce a
generational decline in partisan attachments. We will return to this point below.
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270 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 46, 1984
A MOBILIZATION TYPOLOGY
FIGURE 1
STRENGTH OF PARTISANSHIP
COGNITIVE
MOBILIZATION
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COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION AND PARTISAN DEALIGNMENT 271
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272 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 46, 1984
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COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION AND PARTISAN DEALIGNMENT 273
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274 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 46, 1984
TABLE 4
MOBILIZATION TYPOLOGY BY AGE, SOCIAL CLASS, AND VALUE PRIORITIES
AGE
MOBILIZATION
TYPOLOGY 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 +
Apartisan 28.1% 22.7% 16.7% 16.1% 11.8%
Cognitive Partisan 26.5 28.2 23.7 24.1 22.2
Ritual Partisan 14.2 19.3 25.6 26.2 31.8
Apolitical 31.2 29.7 34.0 33.6 34.2
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
VALUES
MIXED MIXED POST-
MATERIAL MATERIAL POSTMAT MATERIALIST
Thus, the members of the new middle class are more likely than those of
other social strata to belong to the apartisan category.
The second panel of table 4 describes the distribution of mobilization
groups by social class. In order to tap the general social environment of
an individual, social class is measured by the occupation of the head of the
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COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION AND PARTISAN DEALIGNMENT 275
household. Individuals from new middle class families are more likely
than other class groups to belong to the apartisan category. Further-
more, even when members of the new middle class hold partisan ties, they
are substantially more likely to be cognitive partisans than ritual par-
tisans. At the other extreme, roughly two-fifths of the working class and
farmers remain removed from politics as apoliticals. Because of their
limited political skills, members of these two strata are mobilized into
politics primarily through partisan ties as ritual partisans.
A final element in the cognitive mobilization thesis is the relationship
between changing values and political sophistication (Inglehart, 1977,
pp. 1-18, 339-40). The socioeconomic trends of advanced industrialism
have led to the development of postmaterial values which stress political
participation and independence from elite-controlled hierarchical
organizations (such as political parties). In addition, postmaterialists are
only weakly integrated into most democratic party systems, because most
of the established parties have not been responsive to their new issue con-
cerns (Lijphart, 1981, pp. 40-41; Flanagan and Dalton, 1984). Thus,
postmaterialists should disproportionately belong to the apartisan
category.
The third panel of table 4 presents the relationship between value
priorities and the mobilization typology. Value priorities are strongly
related to cognitive mobilization. Consequently, the proportions of both
apartisans and cognitive partisans are largest among citizens with
postmaterial values. And conversely, the number of ritual partisans and
apoliticals are proportionately greatest among materialists.
In sum, education and political skills are mobilizing citizens into the
political process. However, this involvement often is occurring outside of
the party system. Some individuals orient themselves to politics through
a partisan framework out of necessity (ritual partisans) or choice
(cognitive partisans). However, a sizable number of young, new middle-
class, postmaterialist citizens are avoiding party attachments and are
more directly involved in the political process as apartisans.
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276 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 46, 1984
tion patterns among the four mobilization groups. Because of their social
background, the apartisans should be sophisticated and involved citizens,
especially for nonpartisan modes of participation. Conversely, the ritual
partisan may display a substantial level of political involvement, although
focusing primarily on partisan activities. This section tests several of
these expectations. We examine the impact of mobilization patterns on
opinions about the role of political parties, political sophistication, and
several forms of political participation.
Table 5 provides evidence from the Eurobarometer studies on group
differences in attitudes toward the role of parties in the political process.7
TABLE 5
Influence in National
Government
Favor 51.6 72.6 67.3 43.9
Neutral/No opinion 28.8 16.1 22.8 41.3
Against 19.6 11.3 9.9 14.8
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Influence in Local
Community
Favor 39.8 59.6 58.1 35.7
Neutral/No opinion 28.6 18.1 22.6 37.4
Against 31.6 22.3 19.3 26.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Influence in European
Community
Favor 43.8 62.7 58.8 36.4
Neutral/No opinion 29.6 20.8 28.0 43.8
Against 26.6 16.5 13.2 19.8
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
7Since the Eurobarometers lack a question on general political interest, a question tapping
active political discussion was substituted in measuring cognitive mobilization. The con-
struction of this cognitive mobilization index follows the guidelines in Inglehart and
Klingemann (1976, pp. 261-64). Extensive analyses verified that the Eurobarometer index
performs similarly to the index from the Political Action Study.
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COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION AND PARTISAN DEALIGNMENT 277
Respondents were asked whether they favored an important role for par-
ties in national government, their local communities, and the European
Community. Phrased in these terms, most Europeans favor party in-
fluence. Still, there are clear group differences in these opinions. In all
three areas the apartisans and apoliticals express limited support for party
influence, although the apoliticals often are undecided or neutral. The
cognitive and ritual partisans are strong supporters of party government.
This pattern is not a surprising finding; it is more a validation of our
mobilization typology.
Although Europeans support an influential role for political parties, the
extent of that support emerges more clearly when party influence is
weighed against other factors. For example, when Eurobarometer
respondents were asked whether members of the European parliament
should be guided by party or their own ideas about European integration,
only a minority of each group agreed with the primacy of party cues
(table 6). Furthermore, apartisans are most likely to propose that
EuroMPs vote based on their own ideas about Europe (68.3 percent); only
a slight majority of the three other groups favor this option.
A similar question focused on the role of members of the respective na-
TABLE 6
COGNITIVE RITUAL
APARTISAN PARTISAN PARTISAN APOLITICAL
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278 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 46, 1984
tional parliaments (table 6). Again, the party-support role received little
endorsement from any group, and least of all from the apartisans (13.9
percent). Constituency and policy orientations are preferred roles for
members of the national parliament. Ritual partisans and apoliticals are
oriented toward constituency service; cognitive partisans and apartisans
place relatively more stress on the policy aspects of the legislative role.
Another area of expected group differences is ideological sophistication.
Cognitive partisans should contain a large number of political ideologues
because they benefit from both mobilization sources; the political
sophistication of the apartisans and ritual partisans is tied to a single
mobilization dimension. The apartisans should be sophisticated about
politics because of their mobilization on the cognitive dimension. For the
ritual partisans, involvement in party politics and familiarity with the
parties and party leaders can substitute partially for their limited educa-
tion and cognitive skills (King, 1969, pp. 123-28). Despite wide dif-
ferences in social background, sophistication levels should be roughly
similar between apartisans and ritual partisans; only the apoliticals
should be noticeably less sophisticated.
Table 7 presents group differences on two measures of ideological
sophistication from the Political Action Study. The first measure taps the
active use of ideological thinking based on evaluations of political parties
(Barnes, Kaase, et al., 1979, pp. 559-60). This measure is based on
Philip Converse's well-known levels of conceptualization variable (Con-
verse, 1964, pp. 214-19). A significant percentage of all three mobilized
groups are classified as ideologues or near ideologues. The second
measure reflects a passive recognition and understanding of ideological
concepts in describing the terms "left" and "right" (Barnes, Kaase, et al.,
TABLE 7
COGNITIVE RITUAL
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COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION AND PARTISAN DEALIGNMENT 279
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280 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 46, 1984
TABLE 8
THE MOBILIZATION TYPOLOGY AND PARTICIPATION (%)
COGNITIVE RITUAL
APARTISAN PARTISAN PARTISAN APOLITICAL
Partisan
Voted in last
election a 82.0 90.0 88.5 73.0
Attend meeting
or rally 15.4 31.0 15.9 5.4
Convince other
how to vote 13.9 29.7 14.7 4.4
Work for party
or candidate 6.0 17.6 5.8 1.7
Non-Partisan
Discuss politics 63.9 78.7 36.6 23.5
Work with
people in
community 22.7 35.9 19.5 10.3
Contact officials 18.6 29.7 9.3 4.8
Anti-partisan
Protest potential 22.2 24.1 12.2 11.5
into a Guttman scale (Barnes, Kaase, et al., 1979, pp. 554-55). Cogni-
tive mobilization is relevant to participation in this domain, but party
mobilization is not. Thus, the apartisans now match the participation
orientations of the cognitive partisans. Ritual partisans and apoliticals
display a common pattern of lower support for protest.
In sum, the imbalance in participation patterns parallels our findings
for ideological sophistication. When partisan cues are relevant, the
political involvement of the ritual partisans rivals that of the better-
educated apartisans. However, as the value of partisan cues wanes, the
activity level of the ritual partisans falls toward the participation rates of
the apoliticals. Ritual partisans are mobilized into the political process,
but primarily in party-related terms.
CONCLUSION
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COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION AND PARTISAN DEALIGNMENT 281
emerged to challenge the established partisan order, and there are signs of
increasing intraparty tensions. The parties' control of citizen input has
been undercut by the rise in citizen action groups and protest movements.
In a few instances, these general trends have been accompanied by a
rapid decline in the proportion of party identifiers.
In part, these changes reflect the inability of the established parties to
deal with the new issues and problems of contemporary society. Con-
fronting the issues of environmental quality, resource shortages, and the
economic crises of the welfare state have placed severe strains on ad-
vanced industrial democracies. However, in addition to these immediate
issue tensions, we believe that a more fundamental and long-lasting proc-
ess of political change is altering the style and content of mass politics.
This research has focused on the differential effects of partisan and
cognitive mobilization as a partial explanation of the changes now occur-
ring in mass political behavior. The partisan mobilization thesis
presumes that many voters maintain affective partisan ties because par-
tisanship is a useful source of political cues. A core group of ritual par-
tisans serves as a stabilizing inertial force in democratic party systems.
Parties can mobilize these supporters at election time, but otherwise these
citizens are largely unconcerned about politics.
The characteristics of contemporary mass publics are, however,
undergoing substantial change. The expansion of education and the
growing sophistication of mass publics generally are decreasing the func-
tional value of partisan ties for some sectors of society. This cognitive
mobilization is focused on a group of citizens whose greater political skills
and resources enable them to be functionally independent of party cues:
the better educated and politically involved. Moreover, among social
groups that are identified with advanced industrial politics - younger
generations, the new middle-class, and postmaterialists - the apartisans
are represented disproportionately.
Both short-term partisan tensions and the long-term trend of partisan
decline are necessary to explain the present status of contemporary party
systems. If the short-term problems of party government are resolved,
the likely result would be at least a temporary revitalization of party
systems and a mobilization of apoliticals into the ranks of the ritual par-
tisans. Even if this occurs, we believe that a long-term process of par-
tisan dealignment will continue to function. Ongoing processes of
socioeconomic change gradually should increase the number of apartisan
citizens. 8 Thus, if our cross-sectional findings are projected as a
8 Ignoring short-term effects, such trends will require continued social change over a
relatively long time period. Data from the U.S. election studies can outline the past pattern
of change in at least one nation. The election studies use a different question on interest in
the election campaign, which also restricts the level of cognitive mobilization. Thus, these
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282 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 46, 1984
data must be viewed very tentatively. The number of apartisans has doubled over the past
thirty years, while the proportion of cognitive partisans has increased by only a fifth, and
ritual partisans actually have decreased by nearly half:
1952 1980
Apartisans 10.9% 22.3%
Cognitive partisans 31.9 38.0
Ritual partisans 42.5 25.2
Apoliticals 15.5 14.5
100.0 100.0
N= (1769) (1614)
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COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION AND PARTISAN DEALIGNMENT 283
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