Jao v. CA, G.R. No.
128314, May 29, 2002 (382 death, as required by the Rules of Court, but
SCRA 407)
The main issue before us is: where should the
settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where
the decedents had their permanent residence, or in
Quezon City, where they actually stayed before their
demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. –
If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in
the province in which he resides at the time of
his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring
ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines
shall be settled or letters of administration granted in the
proper court located in the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case
of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,14 where we held that
the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place
where the decedent had his permanent residence or
domicile at the time of death. In determining residence
at the time of death, the following factors must be
considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to
choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at
the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein
permanently.15 While it appears that the decedents in
this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City
for medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never
adopted Quezon City as their permanent residence.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are
admissible in evidence, were thus properly considered
and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We
agree with the appellate court’s observation that since
the death certificates were accomplished even before
petitioner and respondent quarreled over their
inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true
situation at the time of their parents’ death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the
decedents’ residence at the time of death,  over the
numerous documentary evidence presented by
petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by
petitioner pertained not to  residence at the time of
to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v.
Court of Appeals,16 we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi
termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides", like the terms "residing" and
"residence", is elastic and should be interpreted
in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section
1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
such nature – residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor. Even where the statute
uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a
person’s properties are kept in the place where he
permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a
person’s properties can be found mostly in the place
where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he has
his domicile in a place different from that where he
keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive
personal and business interests. No generalizations can
thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of
where to keep records or retain properties is entirely
dependent upon an individual’s choice and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when
he differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions
and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court
of Appeals and Bejer v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that
venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus
defined, "residence", in the context of venue provisions,
means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or
place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. All told, the lower court and
the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the
settlement of the decedents’ intestate estate was
properly laid in the Quezon City court.
Conde v. Abaya
G.R. No. L-4275, 23 March 1909
FACTS:
Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya
and Sabina Labadia died on the 1899. Paula Conde, as
the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista
Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya
moved the settlement of the intestate succession.
An administrator has been appointed for the said estate.
However, Roman Abaya brother of Casiano came
forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it
for himself as being the nearest relative of the
deceased. The court declares Roman Abaya to be the
sole heir of Casiano Abaya and to be therefore entitled
to take possession of all the property of said estate.
Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she
acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya
but that she considered her right was superior to his and
moved for a hearing on the matter. She prayed that she
be declared to have preferential rights to the property
left by Casiano Abaya.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action in
the acknowledgment of the natural child from Casiano
Abaya.
RULING:
The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the
child is of a personal character and generally pertains
exclusively to him. Only the child may exercise it at any
time during his lifetime. As exception, and in three cases
only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to
wit: (a) if he or she died during his or her minority, (b)
while insane, or (c) after action had already been
instituted.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought
by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute the action.
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to
claim his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole
lifetime, he or she may exercise it either against the
presumed parents or his or her heirs. The right of action
which the law concedes to the natural child is not
transmitted to his ascendants or descendants.
DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-
ANDRES,MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR.,EVELYN
SUAREZ-DELEON AND REGINIO I. SUAREZ,
PETITIONERS, VS.THECOURT OF APPEALS,
VALENTE RAYMUNDO,VIOLETA RAYMUNDO,
MA.CONCEPCION VITO ANDVIRGINIA BANTA
RESPONDENTS.G.R. No. 94918, September 02, 1992
Facts:
Petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father,
MarceloSuarez died in 1955, leaving five parcels of land
located in Pasig and Metro Manila. Unfortunately, the
estate of Marcelo Suarez has not been liquidated or
partitioned. In 1977, petitioners’ widowed mother and
Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases
for rescission of contract, and were ordered by the Court
of First Instance of Rizal to pay, jointly and severally,
herein respondents the aggregate principal amount of
about P70,000 as damages. Thus, the five the parcels of
land in Pasig and Metro Manila, were levied and sold, in
favor of the private respondents as the highest bidder. In
1984, before the expiration of the redemption period,
petitioners filed a an action against private respondents
for the annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of
the ownership of the levied pieces of property.
Petitioners allege that their rights were prejudiced when
the parcels of land are levied and sold. Because being
strangers to the case decided against their mother, they
cannot be held liable and that the five parcels of land, of
which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold
on execution. On the contrary, Private respondents
claim that the sale was valid and that petitioners do not
have the legal capacity to annul the sale because they
don’t exercise any right over the property. The Court of
first instance ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering
petitioners to vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale;
todesist from removing or alienating improvements
thereon;and to surrender to private respondents the
owner's duplicate copy of the torrens title and other
pertinent documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision ofthe lower court.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners acquire rights over the
property?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners are co-owners
of the parcels of land, and they have rights over the
property. Thus, the auction sale is invalid. Article 777 of
the Civil Code provides that “The rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent.” Hence, Petitioners became co-
owners of the property not because of their mother but
through their own right as children of their deceased
father. Furthermore, Article 888 of the civil code
provides that “The legitime of the legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate
of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely
dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of
legitimate children and of the surviving spouse as
hereinafter provided.” Article 892 par. 2 likewise
provides: “If there are two or more legitimate children or
descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a
portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate
children or descendants.” Therefore, from the foregoing,
the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the
legitime of each child. The proprietary interest of
petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is
different from and adverse to that of their mother.
Petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the
action to annul the auction sale to protect their own
interest.
PAMPLONA vs. MORETO
SUMMARY:
Flaviano and Monica Moreto had 6 children. The
spouses owned 3 lots in Laguna. Six years after Monica
died, Flaviano sold Lot 1495 to the Pamplona spouses.
Flaviano pointed to the eastern part of Lot 1496 as the
lot 1495 subject of the sale. The Pamplona spouses built
houses thereon and introduced improvements including
a pig corral. It turns out the lot is part of Lot 1496. The
trial court and CA held that the sale made by Flaviano is
valid only as to the ½ because the other half pertains to
the heirs of Monica (i.e., their 6 children). The SC held
that the sale is valid in its entirety.
DOCTRINES:
At the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership
was already dissolved six years before, therefore, the
estate became a co-ownership between Flaviano
Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs of his
deceased wife, Monica Maniega. Since this is a co-
ownership, Art. 493 of the Civil Code is applicable.
There was a partial partition of the co-ownership when
at the time of the sale, Flaviano Moreto pointed out the
area and location of the 781 sq. meters sold by him to
the Pamplona spouses on which the latter built their
house.
FACTS:
On July 30, 1952, or more than 6 years after the death
of his wife Monica, Flaviano, without the consent of their
heirs, and before any liquidation of their conjugal
partnership could be effected, executed in favor of
Geminiano Pamplona (petitioner), the deed of absolute
sale covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The sold lot
consists of 781 square meters.
The spouses Pamplona constructed a house on the
eastern part of Lot 1946 because Flaviano pointed to it
as lot the sold them. Rafael, their son, also built a house
thereon. Improvements were introduced including a
cemented piggery corral.
It was found out that the lot was actually a part of Lot
1496.
On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In
1961, the respondents demanded on the petitioners to
vacate the premises on the ground that Flaviano had no
right to sell the lot as the same belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the
latter was already dead when the sale was executed
without the consent of the respondents who are the
heirs of Monica.
The spouses Pamplona refused to vacate the premises
occupied by them, hence, this suit was instituted by the
heirs of Monica seeking for the declaration of the nullity
of the deed of sale as regards one-half of the property
subject matter of said deed. (The other ½ rightfully
belongs to Flaviano)
CFI – Laguna ruled in favor of the respondents. The
deed of sale was nullified as to the ½ belonging to the
heirs). Spouses Pamplona appealed to CA but the CA
affirmed the CFI.
ISSUE:
WON the sale made by Flaviano to the Pamplona
spouses is valid in its entirety or as to his ½ share only.
(ENTIRETY)
RATIO:
When the Pamplona’s bought the lot, Monica was
already dead hence, the conjugal partnership of the
Moreto spouses was already dissolved. The conjugal
estate was not inventoried, liquidated, settled, and
divided by the heirs. Neither was there a judicial or
extra-judicial partition between Monica’s heirs.
Accordingly, the estate became a property of community
between Flaviano and their children in the concept of co-
ownership.
Marigsa v Macabundoc:
The community property of the marriage, at the
dissolution of this bond by the death of one of the
spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership and
becomes the property of a community, by operation of
law, between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the
deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the
widower or the widow, if he or she be the heir of the
deceased spouse. Every co-owner shall have full
ownership of his part and in the fruits and benefits
derived therefrom, and he therefore may alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in
question.
Since it is a co-ownership, Article 493 of the New Civil
Code is applicable:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved.
The effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
The conjugal partnership consisted the following:

(1) Lot 1495 – 781 square meters

(2) Lot 1496 – 1021 square meters
(3) Lot 4545 – 544 square meters

The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters.

These three parcels of lots are contiguous with one
another as each is bounded on one side by the other.

Since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-

indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as
his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to
dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona
spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some
392 sq. meters belonging to him at the time of the sale.

The CA is wrong in ruling that the sale was valid as to

one-half and invalid as to the other half.

The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment

the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location and even
indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to
be erected without objection, protest or complaint by the
other co- owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and
tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, a
factual partition or termination of the co-ownership,
although partial was created, and barred not only the
vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private
respondents herein from asserting as against the
vendees-petitioners.

DISPOSITIVE:
The judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification, the sale is valid in its entirety.

OTHER NOTES:
The Court also considered the Moreto heirs guilty of
laches. There is no dispute that the houses of the
spouses Pamplona as well as that of their son Rafael
Pamplona, including the concrete piggery coral adjacent
thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of
the complaint by the private respondents on July 25,
1961, or a period of over nine (9) years.

And during said period, the private respondents who are

the heirs of Monica Maniega as well as of Flaviano
Moreto who also died intestate on August 12, 1956,
lived as neighbors to the petitioners-vendees, yet lifted
no finger to question the occupation, possession and
ownership of the land purchased by the Pamplonas, so
that We are persuaded and convinced to rule that
private respondents are in estoppel by laches to claim
half of the property in dispute as null and void. Estoppel
by laches is a rule of equity which bars a claimant from
presenting his claim when, by reason of abandonment
and negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse without
presenting the same. (International Banking Corporation
vs. Yared)