3.
The other four (4) detainees herein, namely: Imelda de los Santos, Eufronio
Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (CARMIE)
No. L-61388 | April 20, 1983| Fernando,C.J. | Statutes, in general
PETITIONER: JOSEFINA GARCIA- PADILLA, et al.
RESPONDENTS: MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, et al.
SUMMARY: The case is an application for the issuance of the Presidential
Commitment Order on behalf of 14 detainees. Sabino Padilla and 8 others out of
the 14 detainees were then having a conference in the dining room at Dr.
Parong's residence. Prior thereto, all the 14 detainees were under surveillance as
they were then identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
engaging in subversive activities. They were arrested and later transferred to a
facility only the PCs know, hence, the present petition of Josefina, mother of
Sabina, for writ of habeas corpus.
DOCTRINE:
“the function of Court is merely to check—not to supplant—the Executive, or to
ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom
of his act.”
The President’s decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
“final and conclusive upon the courts, and all other persons.” This well-settled
ruling was diluted in the Lansang case which declared that the “function of the
Court is merely to check—not to supplant—the Executive, or ascertain merely
whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.”
FACTS:
1. The records show that nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein were
arrested on July 6, 1982 at about 1:45 p.m. when three (3) teams of the
PC/INP of Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya led by Lt. Col. Coronel, 1st Lt. de
Guzman and 1st Lt. Baria, after securing a Search Warrant No. S-82 issued
by Judge Sofronio Sayo of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya
conducted a raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong.
2. Apprehended during the said raid were Dra. Aurora Parong, Benjamin
Pineda, Sabino Padilla, Francisco Divinagracia, Zenaida Mallari, Letty
Ballogan, Norberto Portuguese, and Mariano Soriano who were then having
a conference in the dining room of Dra. Parong’s residence which had been
doing on since 10:00 a.m. of that same day.
Ortiz, Jr., Juanito Granada, and Bienvenida Garcia, were arrested on the
following day, July 7, 1982 by the same PC team.
4. On July 15, 1982, Tom Vasquez was arrested, and his Volkswagen car,
bearing Plate No. DAP 347, was seized by the PC authorities.
5. The (14) detainees were all detained at the PC/INP Command Headquarters,
Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya until their transfer to an Nueva Vizcaya from
July 6, 1982 until their transfer on the morning of August 10, 1982 to an
undisclosed place reportedly to Camp Crame.
6. Hence, this petition for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus filed by
Josefina Garcia-Padilla, mother of detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr.
on August 13, 1982
7. The mandamus aspect of the instant petition has, however, become moot
and academic, the whereabouts of petitioners having already become known
to petitioner Josefina Garcia-Padilla.
8. Petitioners’ allegations:
a. Nowhere in said warrant was authority given to make arrests,
much less detention
b. The search warrant which authorized respondents to seize
“subversive documents, firearms of assorted calibers, medicine and
other subversive paraphernalia” in the house and clinic of Dra.
Aurora Parong was a roving and general warrant and is, therefore,
illegal per se because it does not state specifically the things
that are to be seized (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383)
c. No criminal charges have as of yet been filed against any of the
detainees; that the fourteen (14) detainees were initially held at the
PC/INP Command in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya from July 6 up
to August 10, 1982, but were subsequently transferred by
helicopter in the morning of August 10, 1982 to a place or
safehouse known only to respondents
d. No judgment, decree, decision or order from a court of law
which would validate the continued detention of the petitioner
e. While it is true that a purported telegram stating the issuance of a
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was shown to the detainees
on or about July 11 and 12, 1982, but counsel and the detainees
have not yet been given a copy of such PCO, nor notified of its
contents, raising a doubt whether such commitment order has in
fact been issued
f. It is further alleged that respondents are denying the detainees
their constitutional right to counsel, averring that the detainees
were during their period of detention from July 6 to August 10,
1982 at the PC/INP Command in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya.

ISSUE/s:
1. WoN petitioners' detention is legal – YES
2. WoN the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) has provided
the legal basis of the detention of herein detainees following their arrest for
Proclamation No. 2045 covered offenses – NO ANSWER (This Court is not
possessed with the attribute of infallibility that when it reviews the acts of
the President in the exercise of his exclusive power, for possible fault of
arbitrariness, it would not itself go so far as to commit the self-same fault.)
RULING: The instant petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed. “We hold that
upon the issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order against herein petitioners,
their continued detention is rendered valid and legal, and their right to be released
even after the filing of charges against them in court, to depend on the President,
who may order the release of a detainee or his being placed under house arrest, as he
has done in meritorious cases.”
RATIO:
Whether or not petitioners' detention is legal.
1. Prior thereto to the arrest, the detainees were identified as members
of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) engaging in
subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra. Aurora
Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as their headquarters.
2. Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees mentioned
scampered towards different directions leaving on top of their
conference table numerous subversive documents, periodicals,
pamphlets, books, correspondence, stationaries, and other papers,
including a plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and student
sector (code-named YORK).
3. Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight (8) live
bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for M16 armalite,
eighteen thousand six hundred fifty pesos (P18,650.00) cash
believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine packed and
ready for distribution, and sizeable quantity of printing
paraphernalia, which were then seized.
4. There is no doubt that circumstances attendant in the arrest of the
herein detainees fall under a situation where arrest is lawful even
without a judicial warrant as specifically provided for under
Section 6(a), Rules 113 of the Rules of Court and allowed under
existing jurisprudence on the matter. As provided therein, a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when the person to be arrested has committed or actually
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence.
5. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its
fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in
furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in
the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for
the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before
the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail
if the offense is bailable.
Whether or not the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) has
provided the legal basis of the detention of herein detainees following their arrest
for Proclamation No. 2045 covered offenses
1. The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the
detention of a person for any of the offenses covered by Proclamation
No. 2045 which continues in force the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, if the arrest has been made initially without
any warrant. Its legal effect is to render the writ unavailing as a means
of judicially inquiring into the legality of the detention in view of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ. The grant of the power to
suspend the said privilege provides the basis for continuing with perfect
legality the detention as long as the invasion or rebellion has not been
repelled or quelled, and the need therefor in the interest of public safety
continues.
2. The significance of the conferment of this power, constitutionally upon
the President as Commander-in-Chief, is that the exercise thereof is not
subject to judicial inquiry, with a view to determining its legality in the
light of the bill of rights guarantee to individual freedom.
3. Reverting to the ruling of Montenegro vs. Castaneda that the
President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is "final and conclusive upon the courts, and all other persons."
4. Under LOI 1211, a Presidential Commitment Order, the issuance of
which is the exclusive prerogative of the President under the
Constitution, may not be declared void by the courts, under the
doctrine of "political question," as has been applied in the Baker and
Castaneda cases, on any ground, let alone its supposed violation of the
provision of LOI 1211, thus diluting, if not abandoning, the doctrine of
the Lansang case.
5. The supreme mandate received by the President from the people and
his oath to do justice to every man should be sufficient guarantee,
without need of judicial overseeing, against commission by him of an
 act of arbitrariness in the discharge particularly of those duties imposed
upon him for the protection of public safety which in itself includes the
protection of life, liberty and property. This Court is not possessed
with the attribute of infallibility that when it reviews the acts of the
President in the exercise of his exclusive power, for possible fault of
arbitrariness, it would not itself go so far as to commit the self-
same fault.

Invoking the Lansang Case

1. The Lansang case went no further than to pronounce the suspension of
the writ of the privilege of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, valid and
constitutional, on a finding that there was no arbitrariness attendant to
the suspension.

2. It never intended to suggest that for every individual case of arrest and
detention, the writ of habeas corpus is available, even after the
suspension of this privilege, to question the legality of the arrest and
detention on ground of arbitrariness. When a person is charged in court
for an ordinary offense, the law does not authorize the filing of a
petition for habeas corpus based on the ground that there is absolutely
no evidence to hold him for trial, which, in effect, constitutes an
allegation of arbitrariness in the filing of the case against him. The law
has afforded him adequate safeguards against arbitrariness, such as the
requirement of determining the existence of a probable cause by the
judge before the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

3. The finding of such probable cause may not be immediately brought for
review by this Court in a habeas corpus proceeding, on the claim of
arbitrariness.