Agricultural Land Section 3[c]

Natalia Realty, Inc. and Estate Developers and Investors Corp. v. Department of Agrarian
Reform, et al., 225 SCRA 278 (1993); (reiterated in ARBA v. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc.,
G.R. No. 163598, August 12, 2015)

Facts:

Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. is the owner of a 127.0078 hectares of land. On April 18, 1979,
PD No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land as townsite areas to absorb the population
overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite.

The Natalia properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation. Estate
Developer and Investors Corp. (EDIC), as developer of Natalia properties, applied for and was
granted preliminary approval and locational clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission for the establishment of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, therein. Thus, Natalia
properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.

On June 15, 1988, RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, went into
effect. Conformably therewith, respondent, issued on November 22, 1990 a Notice of Coverage
on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly
90.3307 hectares.

Natalia properties registered its objection to the Notice of Coverage. On the other hand, EDIC
protested to respondent and twice wrote a request for the cancellation of the Notice of
Coverage.

Issue: Whether or not lands classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved
by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its precursor agencies, prior to June 15,
1988, are covered by RA 6657.

Ruling: No, lands that were classified prior to the effectivity of RA 6657 are not covered under
this law. Sec 3. Definitions – For the purpose of this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise:
(c) Agricultural Land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and
not classified as mineral, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. “Agricultural lands” are only those lands
which are “arable and suitable agricultural lands” and “do not include commercial, industrial
and residential areas. Base of the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as “agricultural lands”. These
lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of
their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan. Therefore, the Natalia properties are not covered by
RA 6657.
DAR Adm. Order No. 04, Series of 2003 (2003 Rules on Exemption of Lands from CARP
Coverage under Section 3[c] of Republic Act No. 6657 and Department of Justice [DOJ]
Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990); See Ros v. DAR, G.R. No. 132477, August 31, 2005

Facts: Petitioners are the owner/developers of several parcels of land located in Arpili,
Balamban, Cebu. By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Municipal Council
of Balamban, Cebu, these lands were reclassified as industrial lands. As part of their
preparation, for the development of the subject lands as an industrial park, petitioners secured
all the necessary permits and appropriate government certifications. Despite these permits and
certifications, petitioners received a letter from respondent, informing him that DAR was
disallowing the conversions of the subject lands for industrial use and directed him to cease and
desist from further developments on the land.

Issue: Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use by the
Municipality of Balamban, Cebu has the effect of taking such lands out of the coverage of the
CARL and beyond the jurisdiction of DAR.

Ruling: Yes, the lands are still covered by CARL despite that it was already reclassified by the
Municipality of Balamban. Sec 3. Definitions – For the purpose of this Act, unless the context
indicates otherwise: (c) Agricultural Land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, residential, commercial or industrial land.
After the passage of RA 6657, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the
process of conversion jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands
reclassified before the effectivity of RA 6657 are exempted from conversion. Department of
Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990 has ruled that, with respect to the conversion of
agricultural lands covered by RA 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to
approve such conversion may be exercised from date of its effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus,
all lands that are classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before June 15, 1988 no
longer need any conversion clearance.
 CONVERSION V. RECLASSIFICATION
(ALARCON V. CA, 453 PHIL. 373 CITED IN CREBA V. SEC., G.R. NO. 183409, JUNE
18, 2010)

Facts:

Petitioner (CREBA) seeks to nullify and prohibit the enforcement of the following Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Orders :

(AO) No. 01-02 , issued on February 28,2002 entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land
Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 issued, on 29 October
1997entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-
agricultural Uses," and DAR AO No. 01-99 which covers all applications for conversion from
agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use, .as amended by DAR AO
No. 05-07 particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities and
DAR Memorandum No. 88 issued on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the
processing and approval of all land use conversion applications to address the unabated
conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development.

Petitioner avows that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdiction as he has
no authority to expand or enlarge the legal signification of the term agricultural lands through
DAR AO No. 01-02, that it was made in violation of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657
because it covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to
other agricultural uses, such as the conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been
reclassified by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations, to residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988.that said Section 2.19 of DAR
AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes the constitutional mandate on local autonomy
under Section 25,[13] Article II and Section 2,[14] Article X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is not a valid exercise of police power for it is the
prerogative of the legislature and that it is unconstitutional because it suspended the land use
conversion without any basis and petitioner claims that there is an actual slowdown of housing
projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting
problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of
the whole nation.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION AND REGULATE

LANDS THAT HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL,
INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON-AGRICULTURAL USES.

RULING:

Yes, the DAR Secretary has jurisdiction and regulate lands that have been reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial, or for other non-agricultural uses.

Executive Order No. 129-A vested upon the DAR the responsibility of implementing the
CARP. Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure the successful implementation of the CARP,
Section 5 of the said executive order authorized the DAR to establish and promulgate
operational policies, rules and regulations and priorities for agrarian reform implementation.
Section 4 thereof authorized the DAR to approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses. Similarly, Section 5 of the same
executive order has given the DAR the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion
of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be
provided for by law. Section 7 of the aforesaid executive order clearly provides that "the
authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the DAR and the discharge of its
powers and functions shall be vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.

Agricultural lands, which are already reclassified before the effectivity of Republic Act No.
6657 which is 15 June 1988, are exempted from conversion. It bears stressing that the said date
of effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 served as the cut-off period for automatic
reclassifications or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion
clearance or authority. It necessarily follows that any reclassification made thereafter can be the
subject of DAR's conversion authority. Having recognized the DAR's conversion authority
over lands reclassified after 15 June 1988, it can no longer be argued that the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform was wrongfully given the authority and power to include "lands not
reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June
1988" in the definition of agricultural lands.

under Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 is limited to cases in which agricultural lands
already awarded have, after five years, ceased to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater
economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. To suggest, however, that
these are the only instances that the DAR can require conversion clearances would open a
loophole in Republic Act No. 6657 which every landowner may use to evade compliance with
the agrarian reform program

It should logically follow, therefore, from the said department's express duty and function to
execute and enforce the said statute that any reclassification of a private land as a residential,
commercial or industrial property, on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15
June 1988 should first be cleared by the DAR.

CONVERSION V. RECLASSIFICATION

This Court held in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals that reclassification of lands does not suffice.
Conversion and reclassification differ from each other. Conversion is the act of changing the
current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR while
reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-
agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and commercial, as embodied in the land use
plan, subject to the requirements and procedures for land use conversion. In view thereof, a
mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change
its use. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the
agricultural land for other purposes.

It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and conversion that
agricultural lands though reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural uses must still undergo the process of conversion before they can be used for the
purpose to which they are intended.
 ROXAS & CO. INC. VS CA, G.R. NO. 127876 DECEMBER 17, 1999

FACTS:

 This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the
validity of the acquisition of these haciendas by the government under Republic Act No.
6657, and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
 Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three
haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the
Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas..
 On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over
legislative power from the President. 2 This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the
President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.
 Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a
voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229.
Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by
respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.
 On September 29, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice entitled "Invitation to
Parties" to petitioner. The Invitation was addressed to "Jaime Pimentel, Hda.
Administrator, Hda. Palico." Therein, the MARO invited petitioner to a conference on
October 6, 1989 at the DAR office in Nasugbu to discuss the results of the DAR
investigation of Hacienda Palico, which was "scheduled for compulsory acquisition this
year under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program."
 On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR through then Department Secretary Miriam D.
Santiago sent a "Notice of Acquisition" to petitioner.
 On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted Case No. N-0017-96-46 (BA) with respondent
DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the CLOA’s issued
by respondent DAR in the name of several persons. Petitioner alleged that the
Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist
zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang
Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-agricultural
 respondent DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of whether the
property was subject to agrarian reform, hence, this question should be submitted to the
Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination
 On October 29, 1993, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 32484.
It questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the denial of due
process in the acquisition of its landholdings.
 The petition for conversion of the three hectares was denied by the MARO on November
8, 1993.
 Hence, this recourse

Issue: Whether the three haciendas are not subject to agrarian reform because they have been
declared for tourism, not agricultural purposes and this Court has to take cognizance of the
conversion proceedings and rule accordingly.
Ruling :
 Respondent DAR’s failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioner’s landholdings does
not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over petitioner’s application for conversion of its
haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The agency charged with the mandate of approving or
disapproving applications for conversion is the DAR.
 At the time petitioner filed its application for conversion, the Rules of Procedure governing the
processing and approval of applications for land use conversion was the DAR A.O. No. 2, Series of
1990.
 The DAR’s mandate over applications for conversion was first laid down in Section 4 (j) and Sections 5
(l) of Executive Order No, 129-A, Series of 1987 and reiterated in the CARL and Memorandum Circular
No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the President.
 Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
likewise empowers the DAR to authorize under certain conditions, the conversion of agricultural lands.
 Section 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the President provides that
"action on applications for land use ‘conversion on individual landholdings shall remain as the
responsibility of the DAR, which shall utilize as its primary reference, documents on the comprehensive
land use plans and accompanying ordinances passed upon and approved by the local government units
concerned, together with the National Land Use Policy, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 129-
A."
 Applications for conversion were initially governed by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1990 and DAR A.O.
No. 2, Series of these A.O.’s and other implementing guidelines, including Presidential issuances and
national policies related to land use conversion have been consolidated in DAR A.O. No. 07, Series of
1997. Under this recent issuance, the guiding principle in land use conversion. “to preserve prime
agricultural lands for food production while, at the same time, recognizing the need of the other sectors
of society (housing, industry and commerce) for land, when coinciding with the objectives of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law to promote social justice, industrialization and the optimum use
of land as a national resource for public welfare."
 "Land Use" refers to the manner of utilization of land, including its allocation, development and
management. "Land Use Conversion" refers to the act or process of changing the current use of a piece
of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR.
 The court ruled that Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner’s application for
conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power to
determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from
the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court.
 petition is granted in part and the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas are
nullified for respondent DAR’s failure to observe due process therein. In accordance with
the guidelines set forth in this decision and the applicable administrative procedure, the
case is hereby remanded to respondent DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and
determination of petitioner’s application for conversion.
 Roxas & Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals involves three haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, namely, Palico,
Banilad and Caylaway, owned by herein respondent Roxas & Company, Inc.  At issue there was the validity of
the haciendas' coverage under the CARP as well as Roxas' application for their conversion from agricultural to
non-agricultural use. For failure to observe due process, the acquisition proceedings over the haciendas were
nullified.  With respect, however, to the application for conversion, the Court held that DAR is in a better position
to resolve the same, it being the primary agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.  In its Decision
dated December 17, 1999, this Court ordered the remand of the case to the DAR for proper acquisition
proceedings and determination of Roxas's application for conversion.
 NHA v. Allarde, G.R. No. 106593, November 16, 1999

FACTS:

Lots 836 and 839 (subject property) are registered in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 34624 and No. 34627.

They form part of the Tala Estate in Bagong Silang, Kalookan City, which, on April 26, 1971,
was reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for, among others, the housing programs of the National
Housing Authority According to private respondent Rufino Mateo, he had lived in the disputed
lots since his birth in 1928.

In 1959, he started farming and working on a six-hectare portion of said lots, after the death of
his father who had cultivated a thirteen-hectare portion of the same lots.

On September 1, 1983, the National Housing Authority (petitioner) notified the respondent
spouses of the scheduled development of the Tala Estate including the lots in question, warning
them that it would not be responsible for any damage which may be caused to the crops planted
on the said lots.

In 1989, private respondent Rufino Mateo filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform a
petition for the award to them of subject disputed lots under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) In January 1992, in pursuance of the implementation of Proclamation
No. 843, petitioner caused the bulldozing of the ricefields of private respondents, damaging the
dikes and irrigations thereon, in the process.

On March 18, 1992, the respondent spouses brought before the respondent Regional Trial
Court a complaint for damages and to enjoin the petitioner from bulldozing further and making
constructions on the lots under controversy.

Petitioner traversed such complaint, contending that the said lots which were previously
reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for housing and resettlement purposes, are not covered by the
CARP as they are not agricultural lands within the definition and contemplation of Section 3 (c)
of R.A. No. 6657.

ISSUE; WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT LOTS ARE AGRICULTURAL LANDS AND
THEREFORE, COVERED BY THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM
(CARP).

RULING:

NO, THE SUBJECT LOTS ARE NOT AGRICULTURAL LANDS. In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs.
Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court succinctly held that lands reserved for, or converted
to, non-agricultural uses by government agencies other than the Department of Agrarian
Reform, prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), are not considered and treated as agricultural
lands and therefore, outside the ambit of said law, 17 on the basis of the following disquisition: .
..

Sec. 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement
and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes
"agricultural land," it is referred to as "lands devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this
Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are
only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands".

Thus, since as early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (including the disputed lots) was
reserved, inter alia, under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program of the National
Housing Authority, the same has been categorized as not being devoted to the agricultural activity contemplated
by Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, 19 and is, therefore, outside the coverage of the CARL.
 Advincula-Velasquez v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 111387, June 8, 2004

FACTS:

The spouses Jose Velasquez and Justina Velasquez were the agricultural lessees of a riceland
with an area of 51,538 square meters, located in Sitio Malaking Kahoy, Bo. Ibayo, Parañaque,
Metro Manila.

The subject property was originally possessed and claimed by Martin Nery but in 1972, in an
action for annulment and reconveyance, the court decided that the spouses Martin and Leoncia
de Leon Nery, Salud Rodriguez, Gertrudes de Leon, and the Lorenzo siblings, co-owned the
property.

In 1978, the Lorenzo siblings filed an action for partition against their co-owners, Martin and
Leoncia Nery, but later submitted a compromise agreement where they agreed to sell the said
land to the Delta Motors Corporation.

On August 24, 1979, Jose S. Velasquez, in his capacity as agricultural leasehold tenant, filed an
action before the then Court of Agrarian Relations, for the redemption of the subject property
under Presidential Decree No. 27. He claimed that he had information that the property had
been offered for sale.

On January 25, 1980, Delta Motors Corporation purchased the subject property for
P2,319,210.00, evidenced by a Deed of Sale. The Register of Deeds of Metro Manila issued
TCT No. 20486.

Meanwhile, Jose S. Velasquez impleaded the Delta Motors Corporation as party respondent in
his complaint with the CAR, praying that he be allowed to redeem the property for the amount
of only P8,800.00 from the said corporation. He anchored his right under Presidential Decree
No. 27. The CAR ruled that the property was not covered by the Operation Land Transfer.

As it was, the property had been reclassified as low-density residential zone as early as 1981
under Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01. The ordinance was prepared by the Metro
Manila Commission and the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), and approved
in March 1981 by the then Metropolitan Manila Authority.

In the meantime, the subject property was mortgaged by Delta Motors Corporation to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for its obligation with the latter. The corporation
failed to pay its account, which impelled the bank to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage.

On July 30, 1986, the PNB executed a deed of sale with mortgage for P11,868,000.00 in favor
of Remman Enterprises, Inc. It decided to develop the property into a residential subdivision as
part of its socialized housing project.

However, the Velasquez Spouses vehemently opposed the development of the property and
refused to vacate the same, stating that they are agricultural tenants over an agricultural land.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT LAND IS STILL AGRICULTURAL IN

NATURE AND IF NOT, WAS THE RECLASSIFICATION OF THE LANDHOLDING
FROM AGRICULTURAL TO RESIDENTIAL VALID?

RULING: The court ruled that subject land is no longer agricultural in nature.
 The records show that as early as 1981, the landholding was reclassified as a low density zone
under Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, Series of 1981 before Rep. Act No. 6657
took effect on June 15, 1998.

In Natalia Realty, Inc. and Estate Developers and Investors Corp. v. Department of Agrarian
Reform, et al., we held, thus:

We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657
provides that CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced,
all public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural lands," it is
referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands
which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial
and residential lands."

Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These
include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by
government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations
Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself
defined "agricultural land" thus

"xxx Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657
and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as
approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding
competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use."

The court also ruled that the conversation of the said landholding was valid.

Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990 has ruled that, with respect to the
conversion of agricultural lands covered by RA No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority
of DAR to approve such conversion may be exercised from the date of its effectivity, on June
15, 1988. Thus, all lands that are already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential
before 15 June 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance.

Following the DOJ opinion, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994, stating
that lands already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6657 no
longer needed any conversion clearance: Its Legal Basis would be Sec. 3(c) of RA 6657 which
states that agricultural lands refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this
act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
 Jose Junio et. el., petitioner v. Garilao, respondents Citation:

G.R. No. 147146 July 29, 2005

Facts:

Jose Junio et al, the petitioners, claim that Sta. Lucia Realty Corporation and the Estate of
Guillermo Villasor, represented by Irving Villasor, are bulldozing and leveling certain parcel of
agricultural lands in Bacolod. These are for the purposes of converting it into a residential
subdivision; that as prospective CARP beneficiaries of the land in question, ‘being former
laborers, actual occupants and permanent residents of Barangay Pahanocoy,’ their rights will be
prejudiced by the illegal conversion of the land into a residential subdivision.

The DARAB OIC Executive Director forwarded the complaint to PARAD for appropriate
action on 1994. Before any hearing could be conducted thereon, the Secretary of the DAR
issued an Order exempting from CARP coverage such lands since the same was classified as
residential prior to the effectivity of CARL on June 15, 1988.

The Court of Appeals sustained the Exemption Order issued by public respondent.

Issue: W.O.N. the subject lands are covered by the CARP.

Ruling:

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Section 4 of RA 6657 specifically provides lands covered by the CARP and it includes “All
private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised
or that can be raised thereon.”

Section 3(c) of the CARL defines agricultural land as that which is "devoted to agricultural
activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."

The DAR in its Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990 explained the meaning of
agricultural lands covered by the CARL further, entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations
Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Land to Non-Agricultural Uses," issued pursuant
to Section 49 of CARL, which we quote:

"Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and
not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as
approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding
competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use."

According to DAR AO 6-94, an application for exemption from the coverage of the CARP
must be accompanied by a certification from the HLURB that the Board has approved the
pertinent zoning ordinance prior to June 15, 1988. In the instant case, the landowner did file an
accompanying Certification from the HLURB.

The Certifications carried the presumption of regularity in their issuance.

 Petitioners did not present any evidence to overcome that presumption. The letter of the
deputized zoning administrator of Bacolod City -- cited by petitioners to contradict the
Certifications -- did not touch on, much less corroborate, their claim that the subject
landholding remained classified as agricultural. It merely restated what was already provided in
the law -- that only the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Bacolod City could reclassify lands.

Petitioners next assert that, for tax purposes, the subject property was declared by its owners as
agricultural land since time immemorial until at least 1994. It is settled, however, that a tax
declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. Under the Real
Property Tax Code, a tax declaration serves only to enable the assessor to identify a property for
assessment levels, not to bind a provincial/city assessor.

Consequently, even if the subject landholding has been declared as agricultural for taxation
purposes, once a local government has reclassified it as residential, that determination must
prevail for zoning purposes.
 Department of Agrarian Reform, petitioner v. Berenguer et. al., respondents Citation:
G.R. No. 154094 March 9, 2010

Facts:

Pablo Berenguer et al, the respondents, received from the DAR notices of coverage of their
said landholdings by the Governments Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 (CARL) in April 1998. They protested the notices of
coverage, filing on October 5, 1998, in the office of DAR Regional Director Dalugdug in
Legaspi City, their application for exclusion of their landholdings from CARP coverage, and
praying for the lifting of the notices of coverage.

The DAR Secretary, in October and November 1998, without acting on the respondents
application for exclusion, cancelled their titles and issued certificates of land ownership awards
(CLOAs), covering their landholdings, to the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (Baribag). More so, it is not given to the respondent’s
workers on the landholdings, although Baribag was not impleaded in the respondent’s
application for exclusion. Regional Director Dalugdug denied the respondents application for
exclusion. Thus, they appealed the denial to the DAR Secretary.

Pending resolution of the respondents appeal to the DAR Secretary on March 9, 1999, Baribag
filed in the office of DAR Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for Legaspi City
RARAD Florin a petition seeking to implement the order of Regional Director Dalugdug
denying the respondents application for exclusion.

RARAD Florin issued an implementing writ placing Baribag in possession of the respondent’s
landholdings on March 15, 1999. She denied the respondents motion for reconsideration.

The respondents appealed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board by
filing a notice of appeal with the office of RARAD Florin on March 24, 1999.

On April 6, 1999, then Acting DAR Secretary Conrado Navarro denied the respondents appeal
of the order of Regional Director Dalugdug denying their application for exclusion and petition
to lift the notice of coverage. RARAD Florin noted the respondent’s notice of appeal, and
issued the writ of possession sought by Baribag.

The respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which treated the petition as a
petition for review. The CA granted the petition, and reversed the DAR Secretary’s April 6,
1999 order. The CA set aside the writ of execution and writ of possession issued by RARAD
Florin; ordered the cancellation of Baribags CLOAs; and directed the DAR Secretary to restore
the respondents in the possession of their landholdings.

Issue: 1. W.O.N. the lanholdings of the respondents are subject to the coverage of CARL.

2. W.O.N. Baribag was justified to be a beneficiary.

Ruling:

1. Resolution No. 5, passed on March 12, 1981 by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, showed that the limits of the poblacion area of the municipality included Barangay
Bibincahan, where the respondent’s landholdings were situated. The significance of this fact
cannot be overstated, for, thereby, the respondent’s landholdings were presumed to be industrial
and residential lands. Jurisprudence has been clear about the presumption.
 There is no dispute that as early as 1981, the respondent’s landholdings have been part of the
poblacion of Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Thus, respondent’s landholding were nonagricultural, and,
consequently, outside the coverage of the CARL, was fully warranted. In fact, the excerpt from
the Comprehensive Development Plan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon showed that Barangay
Bibincahan was within the Central Business District of the municipality.

2. The CARL has set forth in mandatory terms in its Section 22 of the CARL who should be the
qualified beneficiaries, but the DAR did not strictly comply with the law. Instead, the DAR
excluded such workers based on its speculation and conjecture on why the actual workers on
the landholdings had not shown interest and had not responded to the call of the DAR field
officers during the screening process. As such, the DAR did not really determine who the
lawful beneficiaries were, failing even to present any documentary proof that showed that the
respondent’s workers genuinely lacked interest to be considered beneficiaries of the
landholdings, or refused to subject themselves to the screening process.

There was also no evidence presented to justify that Baribag was a qualified beneficiary within
the context of Section 22 of the CARL, and be entitled to be awarded the landholdings.

The highly irregular actuations of the DAR did not end with the unwarranted awarding of the
landholdings to Baribag in violation of Section 22 of the CARL. The DAR also violated the
respondent’s right of retention under Section 6 of the CARL, which accorded to the respondents
as the landowners the right to retain five hectares of their landholdings, and the right to choose
the areas to be retained, which should be compact or contiguous. Thus, assuming that the CARL
covered the respondent’s landholdings, and that the DAR was correct in awarding the
landholdings to Baribag, the DARs cancellation of all of the respondents TCTs effectively
nullified the respondent’s right of retention, thereby depriving them of their property without
due process of law.

Lastly, RARAD Florins issuance of the writ of execution in favor of Baribag was highly
irregular. It must be noted, first, that because Baribag was not even a party in relation to the
respondents application for exclusion before Regional Director Dalugdug, RARAD Florin did
not acquire jurisdiction over Baribag. As such, the legal authority of RARAD Florin to
implement the award to Baribag by execution did not exist. Secondly, the denial of the
respondent’s application for exclusion was still pending review by the DAR Secretary when
RARAD Florin issued the writ of execution to implement Regional Director Dalugdug’s order
to place Baribag in possession of the respondent’s landholdings. Hence, the issuance of the writ
of execution was premature and bereft of legal basis.
 Alangilan Realty & Dev’t Corp. v. Office of the
President, represented by Alberto Romulo, as Executive
Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 180471, March 26, 2010

FACTS:

 Petitioner is the owner/developer of a 17.4892-hectare land in Barangays Alangilan and

Patay in Batangas City (Alangilan landholding). On August 7, 1996, petitioner filed an
Application and/or Petition for Exclusion/Exemption from Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) Coverage
 It averred that, in 1982, the Sangguniang Bayan of Batangas City classified the subject
landholding as reserved for residential under a zoning ordinance (1982 Ordinance), which
was approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. It further alleged that,
on May 17, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Batangas City approved the City
Zoning Map and Batangas Comprehensive Zoning and Land Use Ordinance (1994
Ordinance), reclassifying the landholding as residential-1. Petitioner thus claimed
exemption of its landholding from the coverage of the CARP
 On May 6, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao issued an Order denying
petitioner's application for exemption. The DAR Secretary noted that, as of February 15,
1993, the Alangilan landholding remained agricultural, reserved for residential
 It was classified as residential-1 only on December 12, 1994 under Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Resolution No. 709, series of 1994. Clearly, the subject landholding was
still agricultural at the time of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657, or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), on June 15, 1988
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order, arguing that the Alangilan landholding
was already reserved for residential use as early as October 6, 1982
 However, the DAR Secretary was not at all persuaded, and denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration on December 21, 1998
 The phrase "Reserved for Residential" is not a zoning classification contemplated in the
aforestated A.O. as to exempt a particular land from the coverage of R.A. 6657. Moreso
in this case, because the phrase was attached to the word "Agricultural"; in fact, we can
say that it merely qualified the term "Agricultural." We believe that the correct
interpretation of the zoning should be that the land is agricultural, but it may be classified
and used for residential purposes in some future time, precisely, because it has been
reserved for residential use.
 On appeal, the Office of the President (OP) affirmed the decision of the DAR Secretary
 motion for reconsideration was filed, but the motion also suffered the same fate, as the
OP denied it on March 20, 2003
 Petitioner went up to the CA via a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the OP
decision. On August 28, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether the court of appeals seriously erred in holding that petitioner's alangilan
landholding is subject to the coverage of the comprehensive agrarian reform law,
 notwithstanding that the property has been converted to non-agricultural uses by the zoning
ordinance of the city of Batangas prior to the law.

Ruling:

 Indeed, lands devoted to non-agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL.
These include lands previously converted into non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to convince us
that the Alangilan landholding ceased to be agricultural at the time of the effectivity of
the CARL.
 It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as agricultural, reserved
for residential in 1982, and was reclassified as residential-1 in 1994. However, contrary
to petitioner's assertion, the term reserved for residential does not change the nature of the
land from agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by the DAR Secretary
 the term reserved for residential simply reflects the intended land use. It does not denote
that the property has already been reclassified as residential, because the phrase reserved
for residential is not a land classification category.
 Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject landholding
was still agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
had to pass an Ordinance in 1994, reclassifying the landholding as residential-1. If,
indeed, the landholding had already been earmarked for residential use in 1982, as
petitioner claims, then there would have been no necessity for the passage of the 1994
Ordinance.
 In this case, however, petitioner failed to establish that the subject landholding had
already been converted into residential use prior to June 15, 1988. We also note that the
subject landholding was still being utilized for agricultural activities at the time of the
filing of the application for exemption.
 Not having been converted into, or classified as, residential before June 15, 1988, the
Alangilan landholding is, therefore, covered by the CARP. The subsequent
reclassification of the landholding as residential-1 in 1994 cannot place the property
outside the ambit of the CARP, because there is no showing that the DAR Secretary
approved the reclassification.
 Heirs of Deleste v. LBP, et al., G.R. No. 169913, June 8, 2011
(reiterated in Ong, et al. v. Imperial, et al., G.R. No. 197127,
July 15, 2015)
Facts:

 The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the
owners of a parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City, consisting of 34.7
hectares (subject property). Said spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a son named
Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another woman. Virgilio had been raised by the couple
since he was two years old. Gregorio also had two daughters, Esperanza and Caridad, by
still another woman
 Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property.[4] On
February 16, 1954, Hilaria and Virgilio sold the subject property to Dr. Jose Deleste
(Deleste) for PhP 16,000.
 On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died.[7] Gregorio's brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as
special administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses
 On April 30, 1963, Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased
spouses, filed before the Court of First Instance, Branch II, Lanao del Norte an action
against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject property
 October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that
tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries
 only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
as the landowners
 In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the "Zoning
Regulation of Iligan City," reclassifying the subject property as commercial/residential.
 On February 28, 2002, the heirs of Deleste, petitioners herein, filed with the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify private
respondents' EPs
 On July 21, 2003, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a
Decision[22] declaring that the EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues of
ownership, the subsequent reclassification of the subject property into a
residential/commercial land, and the violation of petitioners' constitutional right to due
process of law.
 Dissatisfied, private respondents immediately filed their Notice of Appeal on July 22,
2003
 the DARAB, in DARAB Case No. 12486, reversed the ruling of the PARAD in its
Decision[25] dated March 15, 2004. It held, among others, that the EPs were valid as it
was the heirs of Deleste who should have informed the DAR of the pendency of Civil
Case No. 698 at the time the subject property was placed under the coverage of the OLT
Program considering that DAR was not a party to the said case.
 , petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85471,
challenging the Decision and Resolution in DARAB Case No. 12486. This was denied by
the CA
 On March 19, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideratio
Issue: WHETHER PETITIONERS' LAND IS COVERED BY AGRARIAN REFORM GIVEN
THAT THE CITY OF ILIGAN PASSED [CITY] ORDINANCE NO. 1313 RECLASSIFYING
THE AREA INTO A STRICTLY RESIDENTIAL AREA IN 1975.

Ruling:

 , After an assiduous study of the records of the case, We agree with petitioners that the
subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform
program in view of the enactment by the City of Iligan of its local zoning ordinance, City
Ordinance No. 1313
 It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify agricultural into
non-agricultural lands. In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. CA,[45] this
Court held that pursuant to Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 2264, amending the Local
Government Code, municipal and/or city councils are empowered to "adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning
Commission." It was also emphasized therein that "[t]he power of the local government
to convert or reclassify lands [from agricultural to non-agricultural lands prior to the
passage of RA 6657] is not subject to the approval of the [DAR].
 it is not controverted that City Ordinance No. 1313, which was enacted by the City of
Iligan in 1975, reclassified the subject property into a commercial/residential area.
DARAB, however, believes that the approval of HLURB is necessary in order for the
reclassification to be valid.
 We differ. As previously mentioned, City Ordinance No. 1313 was enacted by the City of
Iligan in 1975. Significantly, there was still no HLURB to speak of during that time.
 Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial land with the
enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be considered as an
"agricultural land" within the ambit of RA 6657. As this Court held in Buklod nang
Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc.,[50] "To be exempt
from CARP, all that is needed is one valid reclassification of the land from agricultural to
non-agricultural by a duly authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when the
CARL took effect."
 In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984. Therefore, for all intents and purposes,
it was only in 1984 that private respondents, as farmer-beneficiaries, were recognized to
have an inchoate right over the subject property prior to compliance with the prescribed
requirements. Considering that the local zoning ordinance was enacted in 1975, and
subsequently approved by the HSRC in 1978, private respondents still had no vested
rights to speak of during this period, as it was only in 1984 that private respondents were
issued the CLTs and were "deemed owners.
 Rom v. Roxas & Co., Inc., G.R. No. 169331, September 5,2011
Facts:
 On September 30, 1997, respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land located in
Barangay Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas, having an aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares
 Respondent asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers only
agricultural land[5] which is defined under Section 3(c) thereof as "land devoted to
agricultural activity x x x and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land." Respondent claimed that prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June
15, 1988, the lands subject of its application were already re-classified as part of the
Residential Cluster Area specified in Zone A VII of the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning
Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982.
 . Respondent cited DOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990) which provides that lands already
classified by a valid zoning ordinance for commercial, industrial or residential use, which
ordinance was approved prior to the effectivity of the CARL, no longer need conversion
clearance from the DAR.
 Considering that the application for exemption was not accompanied by proof of
disturbance compensation,[8] the DAR, through its Center for Land Use Policy, Planning
and Implementation (CLUPPI-II), directed respondent to submit proof of payment of
disturbance compensation and/or waiver of rights of bona fide occupants.
 petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[14] Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration[15] and Second Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
 they claimed that these certifications have already been superseded by Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution No. 30, Series of 1993,[19] which classified the area of Barangay Aga
as an agricultural zone except for the 50-meter strip from both sides of the National Road
with existing roads, which was classified as residential zone
 Said motions, however, were dismissed by the DAR in an Order
 the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari it being an improper remedy. The CA held
that petitioners should have filed a petition for review under Section 1, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court

Issue: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OR

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE GRANT OF RESPONDENT
ROXAS' APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE OF THE CARL
WITHOUT THE REQUIRED PAYMENT OF DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION,
WITHOUT ANY UNDERTAKING TO PAY THE SAID COMPENSATION AND
WITHOUT ANY BOND BEING POSTED BY THE LANDOWNER TO SECURE
PAYMENT OF SAID COMPENSATION

Ruling:

 There is no merit in the petition.

 We note at the outset that this case is intimately related to Roxas & Company, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals [36] and Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW,[37] earlier
resolved by this Court on December 17, 1999 and December 4, 2009, respectively. In
fact, the present case is similar to one[38] of the seven consolidated petitions in Roxas &
Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW, except that the parcels of land involved therein are
located in Hacienda Palico, while here, they are situated in Hacienda Caylaway.
 Remarkably, in its application for exemption in DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98
subject of this case, respondent submitted documents in support of its application for
exemption similar to those submitted by it in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-
98 subject of G.R. No. 167505. And, having established through said documents that the
27 parcels of land are within the coverage of the said (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning
Ordinance No. 4, the DAR declared as well that respondent substantially complied with
the requirements of DAR AO No. 6, series of 1994 in DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-
98. The DAR thus granted the application in an Order of the same date and of exactly the
same tenor as that issued in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98.

 Given this backdrop, we are inclined to uphold the DAR's November 6, 2002 Order
which granted respondent's application for exemption in DAR Administrative Case No.
A-9999-014-98 subject of this case. Aside from the fact that this Court in Roxas &
Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW has already upheld the grant of a similar application
which, notably, was supported by the same documents submitted in support of the
application herein, our own review of the records of this case reveals that there was
indeed no error on the part of the DAR in issuing said Order. The documents submitted
by respondent to support its application for exemption as well as the Investigation Report
of CLUPPI-II[48] clearly show that the 27 parcels of land, specifically identified, were
already re-classified as residential prior to the effectivity of the CARL. "Well-settled is
the rule that findings of fact of x x x quasi-judicial bodies (like the DAR) which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this Court
unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that
they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record."[49]

 On this ground alone we can already deny the petition
 LBP v. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. No. 161796, February 8,
2012

Facts:

 At the heart of the controversy is a large tract of land, denominated as Lot No. 23 of the
Montalban Cadastre (Lot 23), located in Brgy. Mascap, Montalban, Rizal with an area of
1,645 hectares, more or less originally registered in the name of Alfonso Doronilla
(Doronilla
 On June 21, 1974, then President Marcos issued Proclamation 1283, carving out a wide
expanse from the Watershed Reservation in Antipolo, Rizal and reserving the segregated
area for townsite purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be
 Then came the amendatory issuance, Proclamation 1637 dated April 18, 1977, thereby
increasing the size of the reservation, designated as "Lungsod Silangan Townsite" (LS
Townsite), by 20.312 hectares and revising its technical description so as to include,
within its coverage, other lands in the municipalities of San Mateo and Montalban, Rizal
to absorb "the population overspill in Greater Manila Area," but again "subject to private
rights, if any there be,
 1) On October 21, 1972, PD 27 (Tenant's Emancipation Decree) was issued. In
accordance with PD 27 in relation to LOI 474 and related issuances, the DAR undertook
to place under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program of the government all
tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who
own other agricultural lands of more than seven (7) hectares. In line with this program,
the tenants of Doronilla tilling portions of his property, who claimed their primary crops
to be rice and/or corn, organized themselves into farmers' cooperatives or Samahang
Nayons and applied for certificates of land transfer (CLTs
 Earlier, or on March 15, 1983, J. Amado Araneta, now deceased, acquired ownership of
the subject Doronilla property by virtue of court litigation. A little over a week later, he
had OCT No. 7924 canceled and secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. N-70860 in his name.
 his estate, wrote the DAR Secretary requesting approval, for reasons stated in the
covering letter, of the conversion of Lot 23 from agricultural to commercial, industrial
and other non-agricultural uses.
 On December 12, 1989, DAR issued a "Notice of Acquisition" addressed to Doronilla,
covering 7.53 hectares of the land now covered by TCT No. 216746 and offering
compensation at a valuation stated in the notice
 , formally protesting the series of land surveys being conducted by the Bureau of Lands
on what is now its property. It claimed that the CARL does not cover the said property,
being part of the LS Townsite reservation, apart from being mountainous, with a slope of
more than 70 degrees and containing commercial quantities of marble deposit.
 By September 25, 1990, some 1,200 emancipation patents (EPs) had been generated in
favor of 912 farmer-beneficiaries and TCTs derived from the EPs issued.[19]
 It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that Araneta, sometime in April 1992, filed
with the DARAB an action against the DAR and Land Bank for Cancellation of
Compulsory Coverage under PD 27 and Exemption from CARL Coverage of the
erstwhile Doronilla property,
  By Decision dated October 17, 1994,[22] Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD) Fe Arche-Manalang ruled against Araneta, denying its bid to have its property
excluded from OLT coverage and/or the compulsory scheme under CARL.
 Araneta appealed to the DARAB proper Board hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision
 By Decision of September 19, 2003, the CA, as earlier stated, set aside the Decision of
the DARAB, in effect nullifying all the individual farm lots awards thus made by the
DARAB ostensibly in favor of the named intervenor-appellees and necessarily all other
unnamed awardees

Issue: whether such lands are covered by the CARL

Ruling:

Several basic premises should be made clear at the outset. Immediately prior to the
promulgation of PD 27 in October 1972, the 1,645-hectare Doronilla property, or a large
portion of it, was indisputably agricultural, some parts devoted to rice and/or corn production
tilled by Doronilla's tenant

CLTs were eventually generated covering 73 hectares, with about 75 CLTs actually distributed
to the tenant-beneficiaries. However, upon the issuance of Proclamation 1637, "all activities
related to the OLT were stopped."[31]

The discontinuance of the OLT processing was obviously DAR's way of acknowledging the
implication of the townsite proclamation on the agricultural classification of the Doronilla
property. It ought to be emphasized, as a general proposition, however, that the former
agricultural lands of Doronilla--situated as they were within areas duly set aside for townsite
purposes, by virtue particularly of Proclamation 1637--were converted for residential use. By
the terms of Natalia Realty, Inc., they would be exempt from land reform and, by necessarily
corollary, beyond DAR's or DARAB's jurisdictional reach. Excerpts from Natalia Realty, Inc

. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to what
constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land." The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
"Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and
"do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.

the key date to reckon, as a preliminary matter, is the precise time when Doronilla's Lot 23, now
Araneta's property, ceased to be agricultural. This is the same crucial cut-off date for
considering the existence of "private rights" of farmers, if any, to the property in question.
This, in turn, means the date when Proclamation 1637 establishing LS Townsite was issued:
April 18, 1977. From then on, the entire Lot 23 was, for all intents and purposes, considered
residential, exempted ordinarily from land reform, albeit parts of the lot may still be actually
suitable for agricultural purposes. Both the Natalia lands, as determined in Natalia Realty, Inc.,
and the Doronilla property are situated within the same area covered by Proclamation 1637;
thus, the principles regarding the classification of the land within the Townsite stated in Natalia
Realty, Inc. apply mutatis mutandis to the instant case.
The above [Natalia Realty, Inc.] ruling was reiterated in National Housing Authority vs. Allarde
where the Supreme Court held that lands reserved for, converted to, non-agricultural uses by
government agencies other than the [DAR], prior to the effectivity of [RA] 6657 x x x are not
considered and treated as agricultural lands and therefore, outside the ambit of said law
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby partly DENIED. The CA Decision dated September 19, 2003, as effectively
reiterated in its Resolution of January 22, 2004 and April 2, 2004, is AFFIRMED with the modification that the 75 CLTs
issued prior to the effectivity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974 are declared legal and valid.  The
other CLTs, EPs, CLOAs issued by DAR involving the subject property are hereby CANCELED and NULLIFIED
Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. v. Alcaide, G.R. No. 167952, October 19,
2016 (MR and Supplement to MR)
Facts:
 On April 14, 1998, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) issued a
Notice of Coverage over the subject landholding informing petitioner that the
subject properties were being considered for distribution under the government's
agrarian reform program
 Petitioner then filed a Petition before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
wherein it argues that the properties were bought from their previous owners in
good faith; that the same remains (sic) uncultivated, unoccupied, and untenanted
up to the present; and, that the subject landholdings were classified as industrial,
thus, exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP).
 Respondents on their part countered, among other things, that the classification of
the land as industrial did not exempt it from the coverage of the CARP considering
that it was made only in 1997; the BLURB certification that the Municipality of
Bifian, Laguna does not have any approved plan/zoning ordinance to date
 On June 8, 2001, then DAR Secretary Hernani A. Braganza, issued an Order in
favor of the respondent declaring that the subject properties are agricultural land;
thus, falling within the coverage of the CARP.
 July 24, 2001: Respondents filed their Motion for the Issuance of an Order of
Finality of Judgment10 of even date praying that an order of finality be issued for
petitioner's failure to interpose an appeal or motion for reconsideration from the
June 8, 2001 Order of the DAR Secretary.
 August 3, 2001 DAR issued its Order11 granting the motion for the issuance of an
order of finality of judgment and directing that an order of finality be issued.
 August 6, 2001 DAR, through Director Delfin B, Samson (Dir. Samson), issued
the Order of Finality.12
 August 17, 2001 Petitioner received a copy of the Orders dated August 3 and 6,
2001.
 August 20, 2001 Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Finality13 of even date.
 August 28, 2001 Petitioner's counsel filed a Manifestation with Urgent Ex Parte
Motion for Early Resolution14 of even date manifesting that said counsel changed
his office address and praying that its motion to lift order of finality be resolved at
the earliest opportunity as the delay in its resolution will likely delay petitioner's
plan to develop the subject area for low cost social housing.
 September 4, 2001: DAR, through a letter15 issued by Dir. Samson, informed
petitioner's counsel that the case has been decided and that an order of finality has
already been issued.
 September 14, 2001: Petitioner filed its motion tor reconsideration16
questioning the June 8, 2001 and August 6, 2001 Orders of the DAR and praying
that said orders be set aside.
 September 21, 2001: DAR issued its Order directing the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
 November 5, 2001: DAR issued its order denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
  November 21, 2001: Petitioner filed its Notice of Appeal17 dated November
19, 2001 before the OP.

Issue: whether or not subject landholdings are subject to CARP coverage.

Ruling:

 We find no merit in the instant petition. Subject landholdings are still agricultural land
and, accordingly, fall within the CARP coverage. Department of Justice Opinion No. 44,
series of 1990, is not applicable. As certified to by Ms. Carolina Casaje of HLURB on
October
16, 1997, there is no HLURB-approved Town Plan/Zoning Ordinance of the municipality
of Biñan, Laguna, reclassifying subject landholdings as industrial. The tax declaration
presented by petitioner indicating that subject landholdings is a proposed industrial area
is not sufficient in law to effect the reclassification insisted upon by petitioner. As
exhaustively discussed in the above-mentioned DOJ Opinion, there should be a zoning
ordinance and that the same must be approved before the effectivity of RA 6657, i.e.,
July 15, 1988. Neither requirement obtains herein.
 Neither was there any showing that said reclassification has been authorized by the DAR
as required under Section 6534 of Republic Act No. 6657 of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law.35chanrobleslaw

Aside from the reclassification by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Biñan,
petitioner also relies on the tax declaration purportedly reclassifying the subject
landholding as industrial. However, as petitioner itself admitted, what was indicated in
said tax declaration was merely "proposed industrial."36 Evidently a "proposal" is quite
different from "reclassification." Thus, petitioner cannot also rely on said tax declaration
to bolster its contention that the subject landholding has already been reclassified from
"agricultural" to "industrial."
DAVAO NEW TOWN DEVT CORP V. SPS SALIGA GR. NO. 174588 12-11-2013

FACTS:

 the root of the present controversy are two parcels of land –4.9964 hectares 6 and 2.5574
hectares7 (subject property) - situated in Catalunan Pequeño, Davao City and originally
registered in the name of Atty. Eugenio Mendiola
 the respondents - spouses Gloria Espino Saliga and Cesar Saliga (spouses Saliga) and
spouses Demetrio Ehara and Roberta Sugue Ehara (spouses Ehara), (collectively referred
to as respondents) - filed before the Office of the PARAD in Davao City a complaint for
injunction, cancellation of titles and damages against DNTDC
 the respondents claimed that they and their parents, from whom they took over the
cultivation of the landholding, had been tenants of the property as early as 1965. On
August 12, 1981, the respondents and Eugenio executed a five-year lease contract
 While they made stipulations regarding their respective rights and obligations over the
landholding, the respondents claimed that the instrument was actually a device Eugenio
used to evade the land reform law.
 The respondents also argued that pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 27, they, as tenants, were deemed owners of the property beginning
October 21, 1972 (the Act’s effectivity date); thus, the subsequent transfer of the property
to DNTDC was not valid
 DNTDC alleged in defense that it purchased the property in good faith from the previous
owners (Paz M. Flores and Elizabeth M. Nepumuceno) 10 in 1995. At that time, the alleged
tenancy relationship between the respondents and Eugenio had already expired following
the expiration of their lease contracts in 1986

 DNTDC also claimed that prior to the sale, the Davao City Office of the Zoning
Administrator confirmed that the property was not classified as agricultural; it pointed out
that the affidavit of non-tenancy executed by the vendors affirmed the absence of any
recognized agricultural lessees on the property. DNTDC added that the property had
already been classified to be within an "urban/urbanizing zone" in the "1979-2000
Comprehensive Land Use Plan for Davao City" that was duly adopted by the City Council
of Davao City and approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission (HSRC) (now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB]).

 PARAD conceded that the respondents were tenants of the property, it nevertheless ruled
that the property had already been reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural uses
prior to June 15, 1988, the date when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) took effect. Thus, since R.A. No. 6657 covers only
agricultural lands, the property fell outside its coverage.

 the DARAB reversed and set aside the PARAD’s ruling. The DARAB ordered DNTDC
and all persons acting in its behalf to respect and maintain the respondents in the peaceful
possession and cultivation of the property, and the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) to enjoin the DNTDC from disturbing and/or molesting the respondents
in their peaceful possession and cultivation of it.

 the CA affirmed in toto the January 12, 2001 decision of the DARAB. The CA similarly
declared that the tenancy relationship established between the respondents and Eugenio
was not extinguished by the expiration of the five-year term of their lease contracts or by
the subsequent transfer of the property to DNTDC.
  The CA was also convinced that the property was still agricultural and was, therefore,
covered by R.A. No. 6657. While the CA conceded that the conversion of the use of lands
that had been reclassified as residential, commercial or industrial, prior to the effectivity of
R.A. No. 6657, no longer requires the DAR’s approval, the CA pointed out that the
landowner must first comply with certain pre-conditions for exemption and/or conversion.

ISSUE; whether the property had been reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural uses
prior to June 15, 1988 so as to remove it from the coverage of R.A. No. 6657

RULING:

 The subject property had been reclassified as non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988;
hence, they are no longer covered by R.A. No. 6657

 the property had been reclassified to non-agricultural uses and was, therefore, already
outside the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) after it took
effect on July 15, 1988.

 Power of the local government units to reclassify lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural uses; the DAR approval is not Required

 Under Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264 30 (the then governing Local Government
Code), municipal and/or city officials are specifically empowered to "adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning
Commission

 Citing the cases of Pasong Bayabas Farmers Asso., Inc. and Junio, this Court arrived at
significantly similar ruling in the case of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association
(ARBA) v. Nicolas.36

 Based on these considerations, we hold that the property had been validly reclassified as
non-agricultural land prior to June 15, 1988.