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In this research we examine poverty and other determinants of child labor in Bangladesh. We define
income quintiles as a means of measuring family poverty and add child and family characteristics to
our model. We estimate the likelihood that a child will work, using separate logistic regression models
for younger and older boys and girls in urban and rural areas. Our results support the notion that
a family’s poverty affects the probability that a child will work; keeping children away from work is
a luxury these families cannot afford. Moreover, it is important to examine separate demographic
groups in order to fully understand the determinants of child labor in Bangladesh since the effects of
child and family variables on the probability that a child will work differ among these groups.
1. Introduction
Americans have demonstrated strong disapproval of child labor through their own history and in
current movements to boycott imports from countries employing child labor.1 Wasserman (2000)
demonstrated the parallels between the historical pattern of the decline in child labor in the United
States and situations today in developing countries. She relied heavily on the notion that the greater
the extent of poverty in a country, the greater the amount of child labor. She noted that this
relationship holds within a country over time as well as across countries at a given point in time.
Though poverty may be a determinant of child labor, it cannot be examined in the absence of cultural
and social factors, such as education, culture, and urbanization.
Why should we care if poverty is a determinant of child labor in a developing country such as
Bangladesh? As researchers have noted, boycotting exports of goods produced by children may
actually worsen the welfare and well-being of those children and their families, first by lowering their
living standards and second by pushing children into dangerous work endeavors, such as begging and
prostitution (Bissell and Sobhan 1996; Wasserman 2000). Measures such as the Child Labor
Deterrence Act (the Harkin Bill), which would ban imports of products that children help produce,
* Department of Economics, University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, IA 50614-0129, USA; E-mail Shahina.Amin@
uni.edu; corresponding author.
Department of General Business, Southeastern Louisiana University, Hammond, LA 70402, USA; E-mail
Mquayes@selu.edu.
à Department of Economics, University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, IA 50614-0129, USA; E-mail Janet.
Rives@uni.edu.
We wish to thank Lisa Jepsen, Ken Brown, M. Imam Alam, Stan Lyle, Amanda Bieghler, and an anonymous referee for
their helpful comments.
Received July 2002; accepted June 2003.
1
Bachman (2000, p. 32) pointed out that the definition of child labor ‘‘is fraught with anomalies and contradictions, reflecting
a tangle of international standards, national laws, cultural practices and social expectations.’’ We define child labor later in the
paper.
876
Child Labor in Bangladesh 877
may be well meaning (Harkin 1999) but may not be in the best interests of those they are attempting to
help (Bissell and Sobhan 1996; Rahman, Khanam, and Absar 1999).2
In this research we examine poverty (as measured by income) and other child and family
characteristics as determinants of child labor in Bangladesh. If we can understand the dynamics of
poverty, education, and child labor, we may be in a position to create more effective ways of
eliminating child labor through education and economic development efforts. First, however, we must
understand the nature of child labor in Bangladesh and establish the connections that exist among
child labor, poverty, education, and other socioeconomic factors.
2
The proposed bill was a great enough threat to Bangladesh’s export industries that the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and
Exporters Association signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the ILO and UNICEF in July 1995. As a result,
employers in the Bangladeshi garment industry eliminated 50,000 jobs held by children (Rahman, Khanam, and Absar 1999).
For more discussion of the Harkin Bill, see McClintock (2001).
878 Amin, Quayes, and Rives
A third study looked directly at the influence of poverty on child labor for children in an African
country. Grootaert (1999) used a sequential choice model to find the determinants of child labor.
Using the Côte d’Ivoire Living Standards Survey 1985–1988, he separated the data into two groups,
urban and rural, and then conducted a multivariate analysis of the determinants of child labor force
participation. He controlled for child characteristics, parent characteristics, and household character-
istics. Grootaert included a dummy variable indicating whether household income fell in the lowest
quintile. He argued that inclusion of this variable captured the constraints faced by the poorest
households in terms of access to credit and insurance. Grootaert found some support for the idea that
financial constraints affecting the poorest households were among the most important variables in
determining child work and schooling outcomes for a sample of urban children. For rural children,
household poverty rarely influenced the decision to work.
When we examine empirical studies of child labor determinants for developing countries, we find
some support for the importance of poverty. Given mixed results from the literature, the purpose of
our research is to deepen the understanding of the connection between poverty and child labor by
developing a model that includes economic as well as social and cultural information for different
groups of children in Bangladesh. We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. We
improve on the income variables used by Grootaert (1999), Ray (2000a, b), and Delap (2001) by
dividing nonchild family income into quintiles. Unlike studies that focus on either urban or rural
children, we examine both. Finally, we develop separate models for younger and older children to see
if family poverty and other variables have stronger effects on younger children.3
The Data
We use logistic regression to estimate whether a child works, based on information about the
child and his or her family. Our dependent variable is binary; either the child works or the child does
not work. Data are drawn from the 1995–96 Household Expenditure Survey of Bangladesh, conducted
periodically by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). These data were released for public use in
1998. A two-stage stratified random sampling technique was followed, under the framework of the
Integrated Multipurpose Sample (IMPS) design which was developed on the basis of the Population
and Housing Census of 1991. The primary sampling unit used in the HES is the household. Although
there is an enormous amount of individual (household member) data available from the survey, the
focus of the survey was on the household and data on all household members were provided in the
household survey. A total of 371 communities were chosen for the survey to be nationally
representative with twenty households randomly selected from each of these communities. This
procedure produced data for a total of 7420 households.
The survey provides information on an individual’s location within Bangladesh, his or her
economic activity, occupation, industry, age, and educational background as well as household size,
household income,4 household expenditure, consumption, changes in wealth, and health and sani-
tation. Our sample consists of 11,373 children aged 5 through 14 who live in 5394 households. We
3
We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting separate models for younger and older children.
4
The survey requested information for all household members on their total income and the relevant sources of such income. A
separate section of the questionnaire collected detailed information about the household’s income from agricultural production.
The income measure is fairly reliable since the discrepancy is not substantial when matched with expenditure and savings data.
However, it should be noted that income is traditionally underreported in most surveys conducted in developing countries.
Child Labor in Bangladesh 881
Table 2. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample
Definition Mean (Standard Deviation)
Dependent Variable
Work 1 if child works; 0 otherwise 0.09 (0.29)
Independent variables
Poorest income 1 if income is in the lowest 0.20 (0.40)
,15,800 taka quintile; 0 otherwise
Poor income 15,800, 1 if income is in the second-lowest 0.20 (0.40)
,28,600 taka quintile; 0 otherwise
Middle income 28,600, 1 if the income is in the third quintile; 0.20 (0.40)
,43,745 taka 0 otherwise
Rich income 43,745, 1 if the income is in the fourth-lowest 0.20 (0.40)
,72,429 taka quintile; 0 otherwise
Richest income 1 if the income is in the top quintile; 0.20 (0.40)
72,429 taka 0 otherwise
Age Child’s age in years 9.45 (2.71)
Boy 1 if boy; 0 otherwise 0.51 (0.50)
Eduyr Child’s education in years 2.30 (2.54)
Urban 1 if urban; 0 otherwise 0.25 (0.43)
HHSize Household size 6.56 (2.45)
Headmale 1 if head of household is male; 0 otherwise 0.92 (0.27)
MHeadedu Male head’s years of education 4.79 (4.60)
FHeadedu Female head’s years of education 3.22 (1.57)
N ¼ 11,282
apply our empirical analyses to 11,282 of these children5 and then to sub-samples of boys and girls
from urban and rural areas.
5
We omitted 91 children from our empirical analysis because they were reported as household members in households in which
they were employed. Thus, the data on family characteristics, such as the household head’s education, applied to the head of the
household employing these children rather than to their own father or other relative. In these cases, the link between household
characteristics and the decision to have the child work is obscured. Fifty-three of the omitted children are girls, 13 from rural
areas and 40 from urban areas. Thirty-eight are boys, 23 from rural areas and 15 from urban areas.
882 Amin, Quayes, and Rives
did not work) are defined on an annual basis. Under our definition, a child is considered to work if
either he or she was employed the previous week (activities i and ii), whether income was earned
during the year or not, or if he or she earned income during the year regardless of his or her activity
status for the previous week. In other words, earning income over the past year becomes the criterion
for being classified as working for those who did not report that they were employed during the
previous week.6
A total of 1064 children are considered to be child laborers under this definition; this amounts to
9% of those in the sample. This figure is somewhat lower than reported in other studies (Rahman
1997; Ravallion and Wodon 2000) because our definition requires that a child who did not work
during the previous week would have had to earn income during the previous year to be counted as
child labor. Thus, our definition may underestimate the extent of child labor in Bangladesh. First, we
purposely omit children who were not paid for doing household chores; some may consider this child
labor, but we do not in this study. We exclude these children because the definition of ‘‘labor’’ in the
term ‘‘child labor’’ generally means that a child works on a regular basis for pay or is unpaid but
produces output that will be sold in the market (Bachman 2000). The only children claiming the
activity of household work who would be included in our study are those who earned income during
the year; there was only one such child. We cannot determine from our data source whether this
child’s income was from household work or from other jobs this child held earlier during the prior
year; thus, we retain this child in our sample.
Second, among those in our study who reported working the previous week, only 14% reported
receiving income during the year. This tells us that there might be other children who worked during
the year (but not during the previous week) who would not have earned cash income.7 The main point
is that these unpaid workers who did not report working during the previous week would not be
included as child labor in our study because we cannot distinguish them from those who did not work at
all during the previous year (see Ravallion and Wodon 2000 for an alternative measure of child labor).
6
We initially also defined child labor more narrowly as children who reported that they worked the previous week (category 1)
and who reported positive income for the past year. There were only 78 working children according to this definition, which
represents only 0.7 of 1% of those in the sample. This small number indicates the narrowness of this definition in light of the
cultural norms in Bangladesh.
7
This does not mean that children who do not report income are not paid; rather, their payment could come in the form of food,
lodging, or clothing. This would apply to servants and maids, for example. Agricultural workers who do not receive cash
payments may be paid with crops, fruit, or vegetables.
8
Results show that when the natural log of income is used instead of dummy income quintile variables, the coefficient of the log
of income is negative and statistically different from 0 at the 5% level or better for all models reported in Tables 3, 5, and 7.
Income is thus negatively related to the probability that a child will work, and the effect lessens as the income level increases.
Child Labor in Bangladesh 883
for a child in the second-lowest income quintile, Middle equals 1 for a child in the third-lowest income
quintile, Rich equals 1 for a child in the fourth-lowest income quintile, and Richest equals 1 for a child
in the highest income quintile. The omitted category is Richest; thus, a positive sign on a dummy
income category variable indicates that a child in this income category is more likely to work than
a child in the omitted category (Richest); that is, the probability of work (our dependent variable) is
higher for this income category than for the Richest category. We realize that poverty may exist at
a low level of income; thus, we expect that some higher-income-category variables may have
coefficients that are not statistically different from zero.
Table 2 shows additional determinants of child labor included in our model. Age indicates the
age of the child in years; the average age is 9.45 years. We expect families to be more likely to send
older children to work; thus, the coefficient on Age is expected to be positive. We also account for age
by dividing children into two groups. Younger children are ages 5 though 11, and older children are
ages 12 though 14. We make this distinction because the motivation for families to send children to
work may be quite different for younger as compared to older children.
The variable Boy takes on a value of 1 if the child is a boy and 0 if the child is a girl. Table 2
shows that 51% of the children in our study are boys. Families are more likely to send boys to work;
thus, we expect a positive sign on Boy. According to Delap (2001, p. 11), ‘‘household decision-
makers are reluctant to send girls out to work and will do so when all other household members . . .
are working and extra income is still required.’’ The variable Eduyr is the number of years of
education completed by the child.9 The average years of schooling for children in our study is 2.3
years. We would expect a negative sign on the coefficient of Eduyr since those children with more
education at any given age are more likely to still be in school and, thus, less likely to be working.
Urban takes on a value of 1 for a child living in an urban area and 0 if the child lives in a rural area.
Only 25% of children in our study are from urban areas. This is generally consistent with the overall
population distribution in Bangladesh, which is 85% rural (Rahman 1997). We expect a positive sign
on Urban because child work outside the home is more prevalent in the informal sector in urban areas
of Bangladesh (Rahman 1997).
The variable HHSize measures the household size as the number of people in the household;
the mean household size is 6.56 individuals. We expect a positive sign on the coefficient of HHSize
since the larger the family, the more mouths to feed and the greater the family’s need to have
children work for income. The variable Headmale takes on the value 1 if the head of the household
is a man. Ninety-two percent of children in our study come from male-headed households. For
88.1% of children in male-headed households, the head is the child’s father; in the remaining
cases, the head is a grandfather, uncle, brother, or other male relative. For 87.7% of children in
female-headed households, the head is the child’s mother; in the remaining cases, the head is
a grandmother, aunt, sister, or other female relative. We expect that male-headed households are
less likely to have children working because of social status and because of greater income stability
than in female-headed households. Thus, the expected sign on Headmale is negative. Finally, the
variable MHeadedu represents the household head’s education in years for a male household head,
and FHeadedu represents the household head’s education in years for a female household head.
Studies have shown that the more educated the parents, the more likely the children will attend
school rather than work (Grootaert 1999; Ray 2000b). Hossain (1996) suggested that poorly
educated parents may not see the eventual benefits of education as compared with the immediate
9
Reporting errors resulted in cases for which years of education exceeded age minus 4 (the earliest age at which formal
education could begin). For these cases, we defined Eduyr as Age 4.
884 Amin, Quayes, and Rives
advantages of income from child labor. Thus, we expect negative signs on the coefficients of
MHeadedu and FHeadedu.
The model that we estimate is shown here:
This model is estimated for the full sample of 11,282 children (first all children and then younger and
older children) and then for eight specific demographic groups described in the next section.
Logistic Regression
We apply logistic regression techniques to determine the way in which the previously discussed
factors influence the probability that a child will work. Because the dependent variable is binary,
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are not ideal. Instead, a logit model is used to estimate work
status equations.10
We report estimated coefficients and their standard errors as well as marginal effects (partial
derivatives) of independent variables in the logistic model. The marginal effect of the probability of
a particular independent variable is calculated as dP(y ¼ 1)/dx ¼ bP(1 P), where x is the independent
variable, b is the logit estimate, P is the probability that y equals 1, and (1 P) represents the
probability that y is 0 (Maddala 1988; Liao 1994; Allison 1999). Some children in our sample are in
the same households and therefore do not constitute independent observations. Because of this,
standard errors of the coefficients have been corrected for clustering.
10
Studenmund (2001, p. 436) outlined several reasons for not using an OLS model. First, the unrestricted OLS model can
predict a negative value or a value greater than 1 as the probability of labor force participation. Second, the OLS estimates are
less efficient than the logit estimates because of heteroscedasticity in the disturbances. Third, the standard errors of the OLS
parameters are not consistent, whereas asymptotic efficiency and consistency are well established properties of the maximum
likelihood estimates.
11
Marginal effects can be interpreted as follows using Table 3. The marginal effect of Age on the probability of working for the
full sample is 0.0174. This means that a one-year increase in age will add about .02 to the probability that a child will work.
For dummy variables, the interpretation of the marginal value is as follows using the dummy variable Boy from the same
equation in Table 3 (Allison 1999). The marginal effect is 0.0425, meaning that, on average, a boy’s probability of working is
0.04 of a percentage point higher than a girl’s. There are alternative approaches to interpreting the marginal effects of dummy
variables (Liao 1994).
Child Labor in Bangladesh 885
child, the greater the probability the child works; each additional year adds .02 to the probability of
working. Moreover, boys are more likely to work than girls; being a boy increases the likelihood
of working by almost .04. Similarly, being from an urban area adds .03 to the probability a child
will work.
It is apparent from Table 3 that some factors have different effects on the probability of working
for younger versus older children. Because of these differences and because of the influence of age
and gender on the probability that a child will work, we estimate separate equations for younger and
older boys and girls in urban and rural areas. Rather than providing additional discussion of income as
well as child and family characteristics for the full sample, we present detailed discussions for each of
the eight equations we have estimated for demographic subgroups.
Table 4. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for the Urban Modelsa
Boys Girls
Younger Older Younger Older
Dependent variable
Work 0.07 (0.24) 0.25 (0.43) 0.06 (0.23) 0.11 (0.31)
Independent variables
Poorestb (1 if income 0.23 (0.42) 0.19 (0.39) 0.23 (0.42) 0.13 (0.33)
,18,610 taka; 0 otherwise)
Poor (1 if income 18,610, 0.21 (0.41) 0.18 (0.38) 0.19 (0.39) 0.17 (0.38)
,36,000 taka; 0 otherwise)
Middle (1 if income 36,600, 0.21 (0.40) 0.18 (0.39) 0.20 (0.40) 0.23 (0.42)
,59,650 taka; 0 otherwise)
Rich (1 if income 59,650, 0.18 (0.39) 0.19 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.24 (0.43)
,105,600 taka; 0 otherwise)
Richest (1 if income 105,600 0.18 (0.38) 0.26 (0.44) 0.18 (0.38) 0.23 (0.42)
taka; 0 otherwise)
Age 8.10 (1.85) 12.89 (0.86) 8.08 (1.86) 12.90 (0.84)
Eduyr 1.94 (1.90) 4.75 (3.34) 1.84 (1.97) 4.80 (3.39)
HHSize 6.30 (2.38) 6.51 (2.47) 6.49 (2.50) 6.83 (2.48)
Headmale 0.92 (0.27) 0.90 (0.30) 0.92 (0.27) 0.91 (0.29)
MHeadedu 6.64 (5.04) 7.47 (5.10) 6.88 (4.96) 7.92 (5.00)
FHeadedu 2.65 (1.48) 2.76 (1.57) 3.78 (1.58) 3.96 (1.67)
N 939 457 940 450
a
Data are means (standard deviations in parentheses).
b
The income quintiles are on the basis of all urban households, so the means in each subgroups will not necessarily be 20%.
a one-person increase in family size. Having a male head of household decreases an older urban boy’s
likelihood of working by .23, a much larger effect than for any other urban subgroup of children.
When the male household head has a higher level of education, the probability that an older urban boy
will work decreases by .01. The education level of a female household head has a negative effect of
.06 on an older urban boy’s likelihood of working, confirming our expectation that more educated
parents choose not to send their children to work. Results for younger urban boys are similar except
that neither the child’s age, education, nor the male household head’s education is a statistically
significant determinant of child labor.
Of primary concern in this study is whether poverty (i.e., low nonchild family income) plays
a role in the decision to send a child to work. Our models support the link between family poverty and
child labor. For younger urban boys, the positive coefficient on Poorest is statistically significant;
thus, boys from the poorest income quintile are more likely to work than are those from the richest
income quintile. Boys in families from all other income quintiles are no more likely to be sent to work
than are boys in families from the richest quintile. For older urban boys, the coefficient is positive and
statistically significant on Poorest and on Middle, again showing the influence of low income on child
labor. For older urban boys, being in the poorest income quintile increases the probability of working
by almost .26 compared with older boys in the richest income quintile. This is the most important
predictor of work status for older boys followed closely by Headmale. For younger urban boys, the
marginal effect of Poorest is only about .08, whereas the marginal effect of Headmale decreases the
probability of work by .17. In summary, we cannot reject the hypothesis that family poverty
influences the child labor decision for both younger and older urban boys. In addition, being in a male-
headed household has a strong negative impact on the probability that urban boys will work.
Table 5. Logistic Regression Results for the Urban Models
Boys Girls
Younger Older Younger Older
Variables Logit Coefficienta MEb Logit Coefficient ME Logit Coefficient ME Logit Coefficient ME
Table 6. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for the Rural Modelsa
Boys Girls
Younger Older Younger Older
Dependent variable
Work 0.07 (0.26) 0.29 (0.45) 0.05 (0.21) 0.06 (0.23)
Independent variables
Poorestb (1 if income
,15,308 taka; 0 otherwise) 0.21 (0.41) 0.17 (0.38) 0.21 (0.41) 0.16 (0.36)
Poor (1 if income 15,308,
,27,200 taka; 0 otherwise) 0.20 (0.40) 0.19 (0.39) 0.21 (0.41) 0.18 (0.38)
Middle (1 if income 27,200,
,40,270 taka; 0 otherwise) 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40)
Rich (1 if income 40,270,
,64,800 taka; 0 otherwise) 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.41) 0.19 (0.40) 0.21 (0.41)
Richest (1 if income
64,800 taka; 0 otherwise) 0.19 (0.39) 0.23 (0.42) 0.18 (0.39) 0.25 (0.43)
Age 8.05 (1.81) 12.86 (0.86) 8.03 (1.81) 12.81 (0.83)
Eduyr 1.61 (1.72) 3.44 (3.18) 1.58 (1.76) 3.53 (3.24)
HHSize 6.54 (2.41) 6.59 (2.45) 6.55 (2.43) 6.81 (2.55)
Headmale 0.93 (0.26) 0.92 (0.27) 0.92 (0.27) 0.91 (0.29)
MHeadedu 3.92 (4.10) 4.37 (4.23) 3.83 (4.10) 4.50 (4.49)
FHeadedu 2.71 (1.40) 2.70 (1.40) 3.74 (1.48) 3.69 (1.52)
N 3072 1270 3035 1119
a
Data are means (standard deviations in parentheses).
b
The income quintiles are on the basis of all rural households, so the means in each subgroups will not necessarily be 20%.
Logistical regression results for younger urban girls, those ages 5 through 11, show statistical
significance and expected signs on Age but not on Eduyr. However, most family variables are
statistically significant with expected signs; only female household head’s educational level does not
influence the decision to send a young urban girl to work. The probability that young urban girls will
work decreases (by .03) for male-headed households, but the effect is smaller than for young urban
boys (.17). A young urban girl’s probability of working decreases by a negligible amount (.004) as the
male household head’s educational level increases. For these young urban girls, the effect of poverty
on child labor is evident from the positive signs and significance levels for Poorest and Poor. Being in
the poorest income quintile, for example, increases the probability that a young girl will work by
about .07 as compared to a young girl in the richest income quintile; this marginal effect is about the
same as for young urban boys.
By contrast, for older urban girls (ages 12–14), most child and family variables have no impact
on the girl’s employment status. Only Headmale and MHeadedu have a statistically significant and
negative influence on the probability that an older urban girl will work, and neither of these factors
decreases the probability of working by very much. Being older, more educated, from a larger
household, or from a household whose female head is more educated do not increase the likelihood
that an older urban girl will work. Family poverty, however, has a strong positive marginal effect (of
about .23 for those in the poorest income quintile) on older urban girls’ probability of working, an
effect that is similar to that for older urban boys and stronger than the effect for younger urban girls.
Poorest is the variable with the largest marginal effect on older urban girls’ work status. We conclude
that family poverty motivates older urban girls to work, but many of the child and family
Table 7. Logistic Regression Results for the Rural Models
Boys Girls
Younger Older Younger Older
Variables Logit Coefficienta MEb Logit Coefficient ME Logit Coefficient ME Logit Coefficient ME
characteristics that influence the probability of working for children in other urban demographic
groups do not affect older urban girls.
From our earlier observation of urban girls’ occupations (see Table 1), we see that a high
proportion of older girls worked as maids12 or as production workers, primarily in the garment industry.
Girls working in factories may be earning money for dowries that will be required when they marry.
Although paying dowries is illegal in Bangladesh, it is still widely practiced. Also, urban girls may be in
families who have moved from rural areas and continue to send money earned in the city back to their
extended families in rural areas. Finally, when urban mothers work outside the home, they often take
their daughters to work with them, or they find appropriate employment for their daughters so that the
daughters are not left home alone. All these are offered as explanations of the motivations of urban girls
to work that go beyond the child and family explanatory variables in our model.
12
Forty urban girls were among the 91 cases omitted because they were reported as members of households where they were
employed. These are cases where younger or older urban girls were employed as maids or servants. Thus, the maids and
servants remaining in our sample of urban girls are those reported as members of their own and not their employers’
households.
Child Labor in Bangladesh 891
In this study, we develop a logistic regression model and estimate it using data for Bangladesh.
We define income quintiles as a means of measuring family poverty and add child and family
characteristics to our model. We estimate the likelihood that a child will work, using separate models
for younger and older boys and girls in urban and rural areas. Our results support the notion that
a family’s poverty affects the probability that a child will work; keeping children away from work is
a luxury these families cannot afford. In most models, being in a male-headed household is the second
most important determinant of a child’s work status.
Older urban girls show the greatest divergence from our expectations. For these girls, aside from
poverty, only two variables, being from a male-headed household and a male household head’s
educational level, produced expected results. We conclude that these girls are motivated by factors not
captured in our model.
Based on the results of our study, we recommend that researchers with access to data from other
countries examine the role of poverty (in both its income and its wealth dimensions, if possible) and
other socioeconomic factors to determine whether the poverty–child labor link holds internationally.
If poverty is, indeed, a determinant of child labor in Bangladesh (and perhaps other countries) and
if child labor is an undesirable social and economic condition, then policymakers must turn their
attention to alleviating poverty. If other researchers find groups of children for whom poverty is not
a determinant of child labor, alternative solutions need to be examined.
Industrialized countries’ policies that ban imports of goods manufactured by children have come
under heavy criticism since these policies have pushed children into more dangerous work activities.
More promising than banning imports are efforts, already under way, to increase educational levels of
Bangladeshi children. Emphasis on education could decrease child labor directly by increasing the
time children devote to school and indirectly through investments in human capital that will improve
productivity and family income. Future generations would be endowed with the attributes that we
have found give families the luxury of keeping their young children out of the workplace, namely,
greater parental education and higher family income.
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Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. 1998. Household Expenditure Survey, 1995–96. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Bangladesh Bureau of
Statistics.
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