Daf Ditty Eruvin 63: Rebbe/Disciple Responsibilities

Sweet are the uses of adversity,

Which like the toad, ugly and venomous?
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head;
And this is our life, exempt from public haunt,
Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones, and good in everything

William Shakespeare (As You Like It, Act II, 1.14-1)

Elazar Kalman Tiefenbrun

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2
….what is the halakha concerning whether or not a disciple may rule about these matters in his
teacher’s place of jurisdiction? Abaye said to him: Rav Yosef said as follows: Even when Rav
Ḥisda was asked about the permissibility of cooking an egg in kutaḥ throughout the years of
Rav Huna’s life, he refused to issue a ruling.

Rav Hamnuna issued halakhic rulings in the town of Ḥarta De’argez during the years of Rav
Ḥisda’s life, even though Rav Ḥisda was his teacher.

The Gemara relates that Ravina once examined a slaughterer’s knife in Babylonia to check if it
was fit for slaughtering, during the lifetime of his teacher, Rav Ashi, who also lived in Babylonia.
Rav Ashi said to him: What is the reason that the Master acted in this manner? Isn’t it
prohibited for a disciple to issue rulings while his teacher is still alive?

Ravina said to him: Didn’t Rav Hamnuna issue halakhic rulings in Ḥarta De’argez during
the years of Rav Ḥisda’s life, as they were not in the same town, even though they were both
located in Babylonia? Since I do not live in the same town as you, it stands to reason that I would
be permitted to issue rulings as well. Rav Ashi said to Ravina: It was actually stated that Rav
Hamnuna did not issue halakhic rulings during Rav Ḥisda’s lifetime, and that is the correct
tradition.

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Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In fact, it was stated that Rav Hamnuna issued rulings, and it was also
stated that he did not issue rulings, and both traditions are correct. During the years of the life
of Rav Huna, Rav Hamnuna’s principal teacher, Rav Hamnuna did not issue rulings at all, but
he did issue rulings during the years of Rav Ḥisda’s life, for Rav Hamnuna was Rav Ḥisda’s
disciple-colleague. And since I, too, am the master’s disciple and colleague, I should also be
permitted to examine a slaughterer’s knife when I am not in the same town.

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Rava said: A Torah scholar may examine a knife for himself and use it for slaughtering, without
having to show it to the local Sage. The Gemara relates that Ravina happened to come to Mehoza,
the hometown of Rava. His host brought out a knife for slaughtering and showed it to him. He
said to him: Go, bring it to Rava, the town Sage, for examination.

Our daf begins by continuing the discussing of a ‫תלמיד‬Paskening in front of his Rebbe: one in
knives ‫ שחיטה‬checked Ravina – ‫רבינא סר סכינא בבבל‬city, while his Rebbe ‫ אשי רב‬was alive in another
city. When taken to task by his Rebbe ‫אשי רב‬, he justified doing so, based on the fact that he was a
‫ חבר תלמיד‬of ‫ אשי רב‬- he had become ‫‘ אשי רב‬s equal in scholarship. He cited ‫המנונא רב‬, who was
first a ‫ תלמיד‬of ‫הונא רב‬, and would not rule - even in another city - during the lifetime of his Rebbe.
After the passing of ‫ הונא רב‬he became a ‫ תלמיד‬of ‫חסדא רב‬, who was also a ‫ תלמיד‬of ‫הונא רב‬. However,
since ‫ המנונא רב‬was a ‫ חבר תלמיד‬of ‫ חסדא רב‬he DID Pasken in ‫ דארגז חרתא‬while his Rebbe ‫חסדא רב‬
was alive.
A ‫ תלמיד‬may inspect a knife for his personal use. However, if he is paying for the meat, he may not
inspect the knife. Even though a ‫ תלמיד‬may generally inspect a knife for his own use, '‫מהגרוניא אלעזר‬
‫ ר‬was punished for doing so in the city of ‫ יעקב בר אחא רב‬- either because they had already started
to discuss whether to show it to him, and it is therefore disrespectful not to show it to him - or
because ‫ רב יעקב בר אחא‬was a ‫ – מופלג‬significantly older and greater than everybody else, and
therefore deserving of extra ‫כבוד‬.

Rava:

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If the purpose of Paskening is to stop somebody from violating an ‫ איסור‬,it is ‫ מותר‬even in front of
a Rebbe. ‫ אשי רב‬explained to ‫ רבינא‬that in such cases we say; – ‫כל מקום שיש בו חילול ה' אין חולקין כבוד‬
‫לרב‬When there is a possibility of ‫ ה חילול‬,'we are not concerned with showing proper ‫ כבוד‬to a
Rebbe.

Issuing a psak in his teacher’s vicinity1

The Gemara continues its discussion of issuing a psak in the vicinity of one’s teacher, specifically
regarding the custom of bring a slaughter knife to the rov for inspection.

Rava ruled: A student may issue a ruling in his teacher’s vicinity to prevent another from sinning.

1
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Eruvin/Eruvin%20063.pdf

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Rava stated: If a student issues a ruling in his teacher’s presence, he is liable to death. If he issues
a ruling when not in his teacher’s presence, he has violated a prohibition but is not liable to death.
Rava’s statement is unsuccessfully challenged. The severity of this prohibition is expressed in a
number of different ways.

The Gemara also presents the consequences for ruling in one’s teacher’s presence. Two reasons
are presented to explain why Yehoshua died without children. The discussion concludes with the
topic of the restriction against inhibiting marital relations.

Our Daf begins a discussion of the prohibition against issuing a halachic ruling in front of one’s
Rebbi. ( )

Shulchan Aruch codifies this halachah but notes that there is a difference whether one is a full-
fledged student of one’s Rebbi or whether one is a student who is also a colleague (‫)חבר תלמיד‬.

He also draws a distinction whether one is in the actual vicinity of his Rebbi when he issued the
ruling or not.

Shvus Yaakov, in a responsa to a rov who had quickly declared

an animal to be terefah, criticized the rov for issuing his ruling without first researching the matter
in halachic works even though the matter seemed obvious to him.

Since the Torah expresses concern about people’s money, he should have been more hesitant to
issue a ruling that would cost people money. Additionally, Chazal warned against issuing a
halachic ruling in the presence of one’s Rebbi and in our times that applies to sefarim which stand
in the place of our rebbeim.

Sefer Yosef Ometz references these comments of Shvus Yaakov

and then adds the statement of R’ Yehonasan Eibishutz who wrote that whenever a question is not
absolutely clear he is careful to research the matter inside since “letters make one wise” – ‫אותיות‬
‫ מחכימות‬and it is essential nowadays since people have such a strong tendency to forget.

Yosef Ometz then adds that if R’ Eibishutz was careful to look at the halachah inside before issuing
a ruling and he was well known for his phenomenal memory, certainly the rest of us should take
note and be particular to research question before responding to halachic questions.

Aruch HaShulchan however, disagrees with the assertion that

one must consult sefarim before issuing a ruling in the same manner that one must consult his
Rebbi. Issuing a ruling in the presence of one’s Rebbi is a sign of disrespect but has nothing to do
with the concern that one may have forgotten the halachah. Therefore, since ruling without

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consulting one’s sefarim will not be a sign of disrespect there is no obligation to do so if one knows
the halachah.

Showing Respect for a Teacher in His Presence

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:2

On the previous daf the Gemara set down a rule that we always follow the teachings of Rabbi
Eliezer ben Yaakov. This rule leads to a discussion that focuses on whether a student is permitted
to make a decision that follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov without deferring to his teacher.
Generally speaking, a student was not permitted to issue rulings on issues of halakha in the
presence – or place – of his teacher, a tradition that stemmed from a concern for the teacher’s
honor. Some argue that ruling in the place of one’s teacher is tantamount to a rebellion again the
2
https://steinsaltz.org/daf/eiruvin63/

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king – mored be-malkhut – which would mean that even were the student to receive permission,
it would be forbidden for him to rule.

An example of a tradition that exemplifies this concern is that the shohet, the ritual slaughterer,
would give his knife to the Rabbi of the community to check, even if he himself was a learned
and knowledgeable person. The Gemara tells of a group of Rabbis in Yaakov’s city who, while
preparing a calf for slaughter, argued among themselves whether it was necessary to show the
knife to Rav Aha bar Yaakov.

Rav Abba bar Tahalifa said to them: Should we not be concerned with the respect of the Elder,
Rav Aha bar Ya’akov, and present the knife to him for inspection, as this is his town? Rabbi
Elazar from Hagronya said to them: That is unnecessary, since Rava said as follows:
A Torah scholar may examine a knife for himself. Rabbi Elazar from
Hagronya then inspected the knife, but he was later punished at the hand of Heaven for
disregarding the honor of the senior rabbi.

The Gemara expresses surprise: What was Rabbi Elazar from Hagronya’s mistake? Didn’t Rava
say: A Torah scholar may examine a slaughtering knife for himself? The Gemara answers: It
was different there, as they had already begun to discuss the issue of the honor of Rav Aha bar
Ya’akov. Had the name of Rav Aha bar Ya’akov never arisen, they would have been permitted
to examine the knife themselves. Once his name had been mentioned, however, they should have
approached him with the knife. Their failure to do so is considered a display of disrespect.

And if you wish, say instead: Rav Aha bar Ya’akov is different, as he was illustrious in age
and wisdom, and thus deserved more honor than a regular Sage.

Rav Aha bar Yaakov was a second generation Babylonian amora who lived long enough to
interact with Abaye and Rava, who were fourth century amoraim. He was well known for his
piety and for miracles that took place on his behalf. His students included Rav Papa and his
nephew Rav Aha the son of Rav Ika.

Rabbi Jay Gelman writes:3

The teacher/student relationship is a most special one. A teacher must treat his student as he would treat
his own child, and a child must relate to his teacher as a parent. The Talmud even rules that one must return
the lost object of one’s teacher before that of a parent, for “a parent brings you into this world, whereas a
teacher brings you to the World to Come”1 (Bava Metzia, 33a).

One of the ways in which a student must show respect to a teacher is not to issue rulings on matters of
Jewish law in that teacher’s presence (our daf). In fact, the primary purpose of semicha today is to allow a
student to issue rulings—provided he does not do so in the presence of his teacher (hence the term

3
https://www.torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/eiruvin-63a-may-we-debate

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for semicha, heter hora’ah, which translates literally as permission to issue rulings2. This prohibition is
taken extremely seriously by the Talmud, which ascribes the deaths of Nadav and Avihu to the fact that
they issued a ruling in the presence of their uncle, Moshe Rabbeinu.

Even when there is good reason for such rulings, one must exercise great caution. Our Sages note that, “one
who comes to anger will come to mistake”. This statement is made three times in reference to Moshe—and
is the reason given as to why the laws of kashering utensils were told to Elazar (the younger brother of
Nadav and Avihu) to relay to the Jewish people. Moshe, who had just expressed anger, could not be trusted
with such an important mission (see Bamidbar 31:13-25). Elazar, sensitive to his Rebbe, actually noted that
G-d told the laws to Moshe—and that he, Elazar, was just a messenger—yet, the Talmud says that he was
“lowered from his high position” for doing so. The Torah records that “before Elazar the kohen shall he
(Joshua) stand, who shall inquire of him of the judgment” (Bamidbar 27:21). Yet Joshua had no need ever
to inquire of him on matters of Jewish law. While Elazar was obligated to teach these laws, he should have
only done so when not in the presence of Moshe (see Torah Temimah, ibid).

Joshua, too, may have violated this principle, as the Talmud quotes a (contested) opinion that the reason
Joshua did not have any children was that he told Moshe to prevent Eldad and Meidad—about whom we
will read this week—from prophesying in the camp (Bamidbar 11:28). Even when looking out for the
honour of one’s teacher, one must be extremely careful.

Notwithstanding the respect because one’s teacher, the search for truth is even more important. Based on
the verse in Proverbs that “there is no wisdom, and no understanding, and no advice against G-d” (21:30),
our Sages teach that, “whenever there is a desecration of G-d’s name, we do not show honour to the
teacher”. Thus, if a student sees one doing something wrong and his teacher does not respond, the student
should do so.

The demand to refrain from expressing one’s opinion in the presence of one’s teacher is one that might
strike many as odd. However, such was never meant to stifle debate; students are encouraged to question
that which they hear. They may even present arguments and proofs against the position of their teachers. It
is offering rulings independently that concerned our Sages—and this prohibition applies even if the rulings
are in full agreement with those of one’s teacher.

More striking is the halacha that a child must not even assert that his parents are correct, because such a
statement implies that there is a possibility that they are not. We (at least I do) live in a culture that values
the exchange of ideas, that encourages children and students to think independently, even (I would say,
especially) if they disagree with their mentors. What constitutes respect can and does change from
generation to generation, so that while debating with a parent may have been considered disrespectful in
the past, that may no longer be the case. And even if one were to argue that such laws are fixed, Jewish law
notes that parents or teachers may renounce their claims to the honors due them.

What is most important is that we show the utmost respect to our mentors. The exact form that might take
is one that requires sensitivity to one’s time and place, and to the personality of those involved.

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R. Abby Sosland writes:4

When my father, Rabbi Henry Sosland, was alive, I would defer to him if anyone asked a question
about Jewish practice in our presence. If it was a difficult question, it would have been the height
of arrogance to start pontificating in front of my father. But what if someone asked a simple
question, like whether it’s permitted to eat a ham sandwich. Would it have been a show of
disrespect for me to answer?

That’s the question that gets addressed on our daf. One of the worst social crimes in rabbinic
culture was the appearance of arrogance in front of one’s teacher. For the rabbis, this principle
banned actions like issuing rulings on complex issues in Jewish law in the teacher’s presence. But
even on simple questions of Jewish law, the rabbis were cautious about answering if their teacher
was around.

Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Even when Rav Ḥisda was asked about the permissibility of cooking
an egg in kutaḥ, a dairy dish, throughout the years of Rav Huna’s life, he refused to issue a
ruling. Rav Ḥisda was a disciple of Rav Huna, and a disciple may not issue a ruling in his
teacher’s place of jurisdiction about even the simplest of matters.

According to the Gemara, even though Rav Hisda was asked a simple question, he declined to
answer while his teacher, Rav Huna, was alive. Ruling on an obvious point of Jewish law was
considered an insult. But even this practice has its limits.

Our Daf continues:

Rav Ḥisda nonetheless issued halakhic rulings in the town of Kafri during the years of Rav
Huna’s life, as he was not actually in his teacher’s place.

Being respectful in Rav Huna’s presence was essential. But it was apparently okay for Rav Hisda
to teach far from Rav Huna’s home even while he was alive.

In the midst of its discussion on Shabbat boundaries, the Talmud turns to focus on boundaries that
are essential in human interactions. It might be hard to imagine a person of great intellect staying
quiet on something he knows. We might picture the rabbis debating one another with bluster and
grand displays of knowledge. But perhaps they needed to be reminded that keeping one’s expertise
to oneself was actually a way to demonstrate an even more important trait: humility in the presence
of one’s teacher. And there was nothing quite as impressive as that.

4
Myjewishlearning.com

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A Matter of Life and Death (?)

Rabbi Jesse Paikin writes:5

“A teacher wields much more power than a doctor,” one of my teachers once told me. “A doctor
only holds one life in their hands at a time. A teacher can impact the lives of hundreds in a single
moment.”

I often think about the truth of this little aphorism. And yet, considering the occupations we reward
most in terms of salary and status, how true is it actually? Who gets to board airplanes first or walk
down red carpets? How should we understand the place teachers occupy in our society? And what
kind of respect and deference should they be afforded?

We’ve been examining these questions since yesterday as the Gemara focuses on the teacher-
student relationship. We’ve seen the Talmud’s insistence that a student cannot issue halakhic
rulings while in the presence of their teacher. And today's daf makes this rule, quite literally, a
matter of life and death.

Rava said: With regard to one who issues a halakhic ruling in his teacher’s actual presence, the
disciple is prohibited to issue such a ruling, and if he does so, he is liable to receive the death
penalty. However, when he is not in his actual presence, the disciple is still prohibited to issue
the ruling, but he is not liable to receive the death penalty.

According to Rava, a student who issues a halakhic ruling in the presence of his teacher is
deserving of death. And if that isn’t surprising enough, the Gemara goes on to relate a story that
further emphasizes this point.

Rabbi Eliezer had a certain disciple who issued a halakhic ruling in his presence. Rabbi Eliezer
said to his wife, Imma Shalom: “I will be surprised if this one completes his year,” i.e., if he
lives until the end of the year. And so it was, he did not complete his year.

His wife said to him: “Are you a prophet?” He said to her: “I am not a prophet, nor the son of
a prophet, but I have received the following tradition: Anyone who issues a halakhic ruling in
his teacher’s presence is liable to receive the death penalty.”

This is an understandably shocking story. No matter how much we wish to valorize teachers, we
would be hard-pressed to advocate enforcing respect out of fear of death. So, what can we take
from this story?

It’s worth recalling that while the Talmud discusses many cases where the death penalty is to be
applied, the rabbis were considerably wary of wielding such awesome power and essentially
legislated capital punishment out of existence.

5
Myjewishlearning.com

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We even catch a glimpse of this hesitation in the words of Imma Shalom, whose shock at her
husband’s declaration suggests an understanding that deciding matters of life and death should be
out of human hands. Imma Shalom (whose name means “Mother of Peace”) is one of the few
women quoted by name in the Talmud, so her rebuke stands out all the more. For the most part,
the death penalty here can be understood as carrying rhetorical, not legal weight.

So why the appeal to such an out-of-reach idea?

In rabbinic culture, learning was not just a matter of practical importance, but carried deep spiritual
significance as well. Consider how often the Torah is referred to as an etz chaim, a tree of life. The
power to issue halakhic rulings was not just a matter of practical legal authority, but an honor
bearing the weight of a life-giving tradition.

To overstep one’s bounds vis a vis one’s teacher, then, can be seen as a kind of spiritual murder,
the stealing of a teacher’s vitality -- and maybe even their livelihood. Rhetorically speaking, the
punishment fits the crime.

Our daf reminds us of the great responsibility carried by teachers and invites us to consider the
degree to which we should recognize that.

"MOREH HALACHAH BIFNEI RABO"6

Rava states that a student who pronounces a Halachic ruling (on an issue that is not
straightforward) in the presence of his Rebbi ("Moreh Halachah Bifnei Rabo") is Chayav Misah.
If his mentor is not present, it is forbidden, but the student is not Chayav Misah.

6
https://dafyomi.co.il/eruvin/insites/ev-dt-063.htm

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The Gemara implies that "Lo b'Fanav," not in front of his mentor, means that the Talmid is more
than three Parsa'os (twelve Mil) away from his mentor, and yet he is still forbidden to issue a
Halachic ruling.

How is Rava's ruling to be reconciled with the our daf that says that Rav Chisda ruled in Kafri in
the days of Rav Huna, his mentor, and Rav Hamnuna ruled in Charta d'Argaz in the days of Rav
Chisda, his mentor? If one is forbidden to be Moreh Halachah even when not in front of his mentor,
then why did they do so?

TOSFOS (DH Rav Chisda) answers that Rav Chisda was a Talmid Chaver of Rav Huna, and Rav
Hamnuna was a Talmid Chaver of Rav Chisda, and that is why they were permitted to be Moreh
Halachah when they were not in front of their mentors. In front of one's mentor, though, it is
forbidden even for a Talmid Chaver to be Moreh Halachah.

1. According to Tosfos (62b, DH Rav Chisda) and the Rosh, this means that the Talmid
is farther than three Parsa'os (which was the size of the encampment of the Jews in the
wilderness) away from his Rebbi. According to the Rashba and Ran, this refers only to a
Talmid who renders a decision within three Parsa'os of one's Rebbi (but if he is farther than
three Parsa'os from his Rebbi it is Mutar for a Talmid to render Halachic decisions even if
he is not a Talmid Chaver…

2. This is the opinion of Tosfos (DH Rav Chisda), based on the Gemara which says that Rav
Chisda was allowed to render Halachic decisions in Kafri, for he was not in the place of
his Rebbi, Rav Huna (who was in Pumpedisa) -- even though Rav Chisda was a Talmid
Chaver of Rav Huna. However, the Rambam (Hilchos Talmud Torah 5:9) seems to say that
a Talmid Chaver may render Halachic decisions even in the same town as his Rebbi.

3. This is clear from the Gemara which says that Rav Chisda and Rav Hamnuna rendered
Halachic decisions when they were not in the same town as their Rebbi; apparently each
was a Talmid Chaver of the other for otherwise it would have been Asur for them to pass
decisions even when not in the presence of their Rebbi (Tosfos, DH Rav Chisda; however

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 other Rishonim dispute Tosfos' conclusion and suggest a different explanation for why Rav
Chisda was permitted to render Halachic decisions in a place other than his Rebbi's;

TOSFOS in Sanhedrin (5b, DH Ela Im Ken) answers that a student is permitted to issue a Halachic
ruling while not in the presence of his mentor when he is more than three Parsa'os away, but only
on condition that he has permission from his mentor to do so.

When the Gemara here says that it is forbidden even not in the presence of his mentor, it refers to
when the student does not have permission from his mentor.

RAMBAM answers that one is forbidden to issue Halachic rulings even not in the presence of his
mentor only when he regularly does so. A student is permitted, though, to issue occasional rulings
when he is not in the presence of his mentor.

If the distance between one and his master be twelve miles, and a man asked him a question, he is
permitted to answer it. To separate one from committing a forbidden act, one may decide even in
the presence of his master. For instance?

Suppose he saw a man doing something which is really forbidden, because he did not know that it
is forbidden, or because of his wickedness, he has authority to prevent him from doing it, and say
to him: "This act is forbidden," even in the presence of his master, and even though his master did
not give him the authority to act, for wherever there is a likelihood that the Name would be
blasphemed, no honor is meted out to a master.

Whereat are these words said? Only in matters which come to pass incidentally, but for one to
establish himself for the purpose of rendering decisions, and to sit in a master's chair and render
decisions to everyone who may ask of him, even though he be in one end of the world and his
master be in the other end of the world, it is forbidden to do so prior to his master's demise, unless
he obtained authority from his master. But not everyone whose master died may occupy a master's
seat and teach the Torah, save if he be a disciple who attained judicial rank.

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 RAMBAM (Hilchos Talmud Torah 5:3

RASHBA and RAN explain that when the Gemara says that "she'Lo b'Fanav" is forbidden, it
means that the student is within three Parsa'os but not directly in front of his mentor. If he
is more than three Parsa'os away, then even a lowly student is permitted to issue Halachic rulings.

Halacha

Yoreh Deah 242

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RAMBAM Hil Talmud Torah 5:1

Even as a man is under command to honor his father and fear him, so is he obliged to honor his
master, but fear him yet more than his father; his father brought him to life upon this world but his
master who taught him wisdom, brings him to life in the world to come. If he chances upon a lost
article of his father and a lost article of his master, reclaiming that of his master precedes the one
of his father.

If his father and his master are burdened with a load, he should unburden the load of his master
first and then that of his father. If his father and his master be incarcerated in a prison, he should
free the master first and afterward free his father. If his father was a disciple of the wise, he should
free his father first. Likewise, if his father be a disciple of the wise, even though not weighty
alongside his master, he should reclaim the lost article of his father first and after that reclaim the
lost article of his master. There is no honor greater than the honor due a master, nor awe greater
than the awe due a master.

The sages said: "The awe of thy master is likened to the awe of Him Who is in heaven." (Pirke
Abot, 4.15). They have, therefore, said: "He who differs with his master is likened unto one who
differs with the Shekinah, even as it is said: 'When they strove against God'" (Num. 26.9;
Sanhedrin, 110a).

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Whosoever strives with his master is like unto one who strives against the Shekinah, even as it is
said: "Where the children of Israel strove with the Lord and He was sanctified in them" (Ibid.
20.13); and whosoever murmurs against his master is like unto one who murmurs against the Lord,
even as it is said: "Your murmurs are not against us, but against the Lord" (Ex. 16.8); and
whosoever has suspicious thoughts against his master is like unto one who has suspicious thoughts
against the Shekinah, as it is said: "And the people spoke against God and against Moses" (Num.
25).

Who is considered differing from his master? It is he who establishes by himself a school and
settles down to preach and instruct without having authority from his master to do so, and his
master is living, even though in another state. It is even forbidden to render a decision in the
presence of one's master, and whosoever renders a decision in the presence of his master is guilty
of an offense punishable by death.

Any talmid who establishes an independent 'house of study' or beit din in the vicinity of his Rebbi
is considered 'quarreling with and attacking' his Rebbi. This behavior is tantamount to rebelling
against the Shekhina (as Korach and his constituents did). Learning Torah demands that we
appreciate our study as part of the unfurling Masorah. It cannot be approached in a vacuum as
an independent course of study. The value we place in our Rabei'im stems from our recognition of
the vitality of our Masorah within our learning, and we honor a Rebbi as the transmitter of that
Masorah. One who subverts his Rebbi is indeed attacking the Shekhina, for he has lost sight of the
importance of Masorah and no longer can trace himself to Sinai.

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The Prohibition of Issuing a Verdict in the Vicinity of a Rebbi

Rav Moshe Taragin writes:7

The gemara in Sanhedrin (5a) discusses the various parameters governing the issuance of
halakhic pesak (rulings or verdicts). One such stipulation pertains to the proximity of a posek to
his Rebbi. According to the gemara it is Biblically prohibited for a talmid to issue pesak in the
vicinity of his Rebbi. This article will explore the scope and logic of this prohibition.

The simplest approach toward understanding this halakha would be to base it upon the
honor and kavod due to a Rebbi. The gemara in Pesachim (108a) declares that a student must fear
his Rebbi just as he fears Heaven and the Rambam (Talmud Torah chapter 5) draws the inevitable
conclusions: One may not sit in his seat, call him by his first name etc. Clearly, stripping him of
the service of issuing pesak would entail the greatest indignity.

Our Daf however, suggests a slightly different understanding of this halakha. The gemara refers
to the conduct of preempting one's Rebbi as 'Afkirusa' - which might be loosely translated as
'irreverence' or 'brazen contempt'. Rashi (ibid.) interprets the term as 'Chutzpah'.

This term might reflect a different understanding of this issur. A student who arrogates to himself
the duty of issuing pesak without utilizing the resources of his Rebbi (which are easily at hand) is
arrogant and overconfident.

Aside from the insult to his Rebbi, he is presumptuous about his own ability to tackle the halakhic
question at hand. Said slightly differently, he insults the Torah by assuming this heavy
responsibility without exploiting the wisdom and experience of others. To him Halakha is a 'light'
matter which can be decided upon effortlessly and quickly.

We have suggested two different perspectives on the prohibition of issuing a pesak in the
presence of a Rebbi. One version locates the issur in the insult or affront caused to the Rebbi whose
opinion was not sought. Alternatively, the issur might reflect an inner haughtiness or even a
carelessness with regard to halakha.

Several different halakhic consequences might stem from this fundamental difference of
perspective. In this respect the ruling of the Pitchei Teshuva (Yoreh De'ah 242:1) is revealing.
He cites in the name of the Shevut Ya'akov that in contemporary times, a posek who does not
sufficiently research his position using the necessary sefarim is guilty of this prohibition.
Obviously, the prohibition (thus extended) cannot possibly reflect an insult to the Rebbi's honor

7
https://www.etzion.org.il/en/prohibition-issuing-verdict-vicinity-rebbi

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(there is no particular Rebbi being insulted!). Evidently, according to the Shevut Ya'akov, the issur
entails a personal arrogance in reaching a pesak irresponsibly.

A second manifestation of this question might be the status of the prohibition if the Rebbi
licenses the talmid to issue pesak. Tosafot in Sanhedrin (5b) assume that such authorization would
eliminate any prohibition. The Chidushei ha-Ran agrees but cites the dissenting opinion of
Rabeinu Dovid (a talmid of the Ramban) who maintains that the prohibition applies even if the
Rebbi has waived his concern and been 'mochel' on his kavod. The Chidushei ha-Ran justifies his
own position by claiming "since the entire prohibition is meant to honor the Rebbi, he is able to
forgo this honor just as he is able to waive his honor in other areas (by allowing students not to
stand etc.)." Might the Rabeinu Dovid have disputed this basic assumption and claimed that the
concern of personal arrogance underlies this halakha and, hence, even if the Rebbi is disinterested
in his honor, the prohibition still applies?!

A third manifestation might pertain to the type of question the pesak is answering.

‫ת וס פ ות ד " ה ר ב ח ס ד א א ור י ב כ פ ר י ב ש ני ד ר ב ה ונא‬

(Tosfos permits only a Talmid Chaver, even not in front of his Rebbi.)

‫כדמפרש הקונטרס שלא היה שם מקומו של רב הונא ובפומבדיתא היתה מקומו‬

Explanation: This is like Rashi explained. [Kafri] was not Rav Huna's place, and Pumbedisa was
his place.

‫וצ''ל דתלמיד חבר דרב הונא הוה כמו רב המנונא דאורי בחרתא דארגז בשני דרב חסדא דמפרש בסמוך משום‬
‫דתלמיד חבר דיליה היה‬

We must say that he was a Talmid Chaver of Rav Huna, just like Rav Hamnuna, who ruled in
Charta of Argaz in the years of Rav Chisda. It explains below that this was [permitted] because
he was Talmid Chaver of him;

‫אבל תלמיד גמור אין יכול להורות אפילו שלא במקום רביה כדאמרינן בשני דרב הונא לא אורי רב המנונא‬
‫בחרתא דארגז אע''פ שהיה מקומו של רב הונא בפומבדיתא‬

However, a full Talmid may not rule even not in the place of his Rebbi, like we say that in the
years of Rav Huna, Rav Hamnuna did not rule in Charta of Argaz, even though Rav Huna's place
was Pumbedisa.

NOTE: The Gemara did not say so explicitly, but it says that Rav Hamnuna ruled in Charta in the
days of Rav Chisda. Had he done so even in the days of Rav Huna, it should have taught this bigger
Chidush! Rav Hamnuna was already an "Adam Gadol" in Rav Huna's lifetime (Kidushin 29b).
Tosfos infers that he did not rule at all in Rav Huna's lifetime, for he was a full Talmid.

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 ‫ואפילו רחוק ממנו שלש פרסאות או אפילו טפי אסור ואינו חייב מיתה‬

Pesak: Even if he is three Parsa'os away, or even more, it is forbidden, but he is not Chayav Misah;

‫דפריך עלה מאותו תלמיד שנתחייב מיתה על שהורה ברחוק שלש פרסאות מר''א אבל אם לא נתחייב מיתה לא‬
‫הוה קשיא מידי אפילו איכא איסורא במילתיה‬

We ask about the Talmid who was Chayav Misah for ruling three Parsa'os away from R. Eliezer.
However, had he not been Chayav Misah, it would not be difficult at all, even if there is an Isur in
the matter.

'‫ורבינא דסר סכינא בבבל משמע שהיה רחוק הרבה מרב אשי והיה אסור שם אם היה תלמידו גמור כו‬

Ravina checked [his own] knife in Bavel. It connotes that he was very far from Rav Ashi, and it
would have been forbidden if he were a full Talmid...

‫( תנחום בריה דר' אמי איקלע לאתרא דרש להו מותר ללתות חטין בפסח‬:‫והא דאמרינן בפ''ק דסנהדרין )דף ה‬

It says in Sanhedrin (5b) that Tanchum the son of R. Ami came to a place and expounded that
Lesisah of wheat (to wet it and immediately grind it) is permitted during Pesach;

‫אמרו ליה לאו ר' מני דמן צור איכא הכא ותנא תלמיד לא יורה הלכה במקום רבו אא''כ רחוק ממנו שלש‬
‫פרסאות כנגד מחנה ישראל‬.

They told him that [his Rebbi] R. Mani of Tzur is here, and a Beraisa teaches that a Talmid may
not teach Halachah in the place of his Rebbi unless he is three Parsa'os away, corresponding to the
length of the encampment of Yisrael [in the Midbar]!

‫צריך לומר דתלמיד חבר הוה ומש''ה חוץ לג' פרסאות שרי‬

Answer: We must say that he was a Talmid Chaver, and therefore it is permitted three Parsa'os
away.

‫והא דאמרינן בפניו אסור וחייב מיתה כל תוך שלש פרסאות חשיב בפניו‬

We say that in front of him is forbidden, and he is Chayav Misah. Anywhere within three Parsa'os
is considered in front of him;

‫כדמשמע באותו תלמיד שהורה לפני ר''א דאם היה תוך שלש פרסאות בדין היה חייב מיתה ומסתמא נמי לא‬
‫בפניו ממש היה‬

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 The episode with the Talmid who ruled in front of R. Eliezer connotes like this. If he was within
three Parsa'os, he was properly Chayav Misah. Presumably, he was not literally in front of him.
(He would not be so brazen to rule literally in front of him.)

‫וכן בני אהרן מסתמא לא הורו בפני משה ממש ועיקר שיעור דגמרינן שלש פרסאות כנגד מחנה ישראל מבני‬
‫אהרן גמרינן לה והתם חייבי מיתה הוו‬

Also, Aaron’s sons, presumably, they did not rule literally in front of Moshe. The primary Shiur
that we learn three Parsa'os corresponding to Machaneh Yisrael we learn from Bnei Aharon, and
there they were Chayav Misah.

‫ואומר ר''י דווקא בדבר שנראה חידוש לשואל ואפילו ביעתא בכותחא ומגלת תענית בכי האי גוונא איירי‬

Pesak (Ri): We discuss only a matter that appears to be a Chidush to the questioner, and even an
egg with Kutach, and Megilas Ta'anis;

‫ולא נקטינהו אלא לאשמועינן דאפילו בהני שהתלמיד בעצמו יודע שאינו טועה אסור להורות‬

They were mentioned only to teach that even regarding these, that the Talmid himself knows that
he does not err, it is forbidden to rule.

‫אבל דבר שהשואל יודע שידוע מנהגו של דבר זה כגון נותן טעם לפגם וכיוצא בו דכשמורה לו היתר אין דומה לו‬
‫דבר חידוש שרי‬

Tosafot in our daf Eiruvin (62b) claim that the prohibition only applies if the pesak contains some
new or novel element (a chidush). If, however, the pesak merely restates common knowledge it
may even be offered in the presence of a Rebbi. Possibly, Tosafot in Eiruvin view this prohibition
as stemming from the concern of personal arrogance. Answering a simple question (which we
sometimes refer to as a "no brainer") does not indicate arrogance. If, however, halakha forces a
talmid to exhibit discretion in deference to his Rebbi we might not differentiate between levels of
difficulty.

The Torat Chayim (Rav Avraham Chayim Schorr - a 19th century Talmudic commentator)
draws a similar distinction to Tosafot in Eiruvin. Commenting upon a Tosafot in Sanhedrin
(21a) he claims that the prohibition might not be relevant at all in monetary cases but be applicable
only with regard to pesak dealing with issurim.

This distinction as well might reflect the essence of the halakha. If the halakha arises out of concern
for the Rebbi such differences regarding the type of question posed might be difficult to defend.
The Rebbi's insult would be commensurate in monetary cases.

22
Yet, if the halakha evolves from the need to avoid 'intellectual arrogance' we might be more
tolerant in monetary cases in which the danger of an issur being committed as a result of the pesak
is almost non-existent and the money can always be returned. Such 'luxuries' might make us less
sensitive to the issuance of pesak.

The case of a Talmid Chaver

Another ramification might be the case of a 'talmid chaver'- an advanced student who has
studied many years and is almost at the level of his Rebbi.

Though our daf appears to grant such a student the license to issue pesak, it only addresses a case
where the talmid is not in the Rebbi's immediate vicinity (she-lo be-fanav). What would his rights
be if he were in the Rebbi's immediate vicinity?

Again, we might return to our point of departure: If the halakha is based upon the honor of the
Rebbi, the relative caliber of the student would not mitigate the possible insult- this student is still
a talmid and his 'usurping' is still an affront.

If, however, the halakha is based upon the arrogance of the 'hasty posek' who does not even bother
to consult his Rebbi, we might view the advanced talmid in a different light. After all, he has
acquired almost as much knowledge as his Rebbi and would seem to be just as equipped to handle
the question.

Interestingly enough, the issue of how to understand the prohibition MIGHT be glimpsed
in the sources cited by the gemara: Our Daf cites the death of Nadav and Avihu as the Biblical
source for this prohibition. The gemara attributes their untimely death to their having preempted
Moshe in 'deciding' the exact sequence by which the fire on the altar was to be kindled.

The gemara in Sanhedrin (5b) cites a different source - the desert encampment and the manner in
which halakhic queries were processed: The Torah:

‫לוֹ ִמחוּץ‬-‫ָהֹאֶהל ְוָנָטה‬-‫ז וֹּמֶשׁה ִיַקּח ֶאת‬ 7 Now Moses used to take the tent and to pitch it without the
,‫ ְוָקָרא לוֹ‬,‫ַהַמֲּחֶנה‬-‫ ַה ְרֵחק ִמן‬,‫ַלַמֲּחֶנה‬ camp, afar off from the camp; and he called it the tent of
‫ ֵיֵצא‬,‫ְמַבֵקּשׁ ְיהָוה‬-‫ ָכּל‬,‫ֹאֶהל מוֵֹﬠד; ְוָהָיה‬ meeting. And it came to pass, that every one that sought the
.‫ ֲאֶשׁר ִמחוּץ ַלַמֲּחֶנה‬,‫ֹאֶהל מוֵֹﬠד‬-‫ֶאל‬ LORD went out unto the tent of meeting, which was without
the camp.

Ex 33:7

that whoever had a question would pose it to Moshe (even if this procedure entailed considerable
traveling across the length of the encampment).

23
This setup, according to the gemara, reflects the Biblical prohibition. In a sense the two different
sources present vastly different scenarios. In the description of the machaneh we witness
QUESTIONS arising amidst the population and their being deferred to Moshe.

His students, though more proximate to the 'source' deferred to Moshe. Their handling the question
on their own would have constituted an affront to Moshe.

The case of Nadav and Avihu is different in as much as NO question arose or was actually posed.
They merely took their own initiative based upon their own judgment without consulting with
Moshe. They did not 'snatch' a pesak by intercepting a question.

We might wonder whether their initiative was an affront to Moshe, or (since no question was ever
posed) merely a sign of arrogance and recklessness.

In conclusion we might suggest that this issur is really two dimensional; sometimes it
entails an insult and other times it is prohibited because it suggests intellectual arrogance.

Our Daf cites the position of Rava that "in close vicinity to the Rebbi this prohibition carries a
punishment of death, while if performed at a distance (according to most Rishonim within a distinct
radius, yet not in the same house or town) the conduct is still prohibited but no death penalty
applies".

How are we to explain the split-leveled issur; though it applies even at a distance the penalty of
death applies only within the immediate vicinity?

Possibly, we might cross-section the issur as follows: Within a Rebbi's immediate vicinity (his
house or town) usurping his pesak would insult his honor.

This facet of the issur, is not only forbidden, but carries a death penalty. Outside of that immediate
vicinity (but possibly within a reasonable radius) no insult occurs and no death penalty applies.

Yet, a talmid who issues pesak arrogates to himself a function which is weightier than his hasty
response indicates. He displays the arrogance which is incompatible with being a true talmid
chokhom.

24
Judaica postcard Rabbi & Student, by Trinbetsch

25
Different Types of Relationships: Rebbe/Disciple

Rav Tzvi Sinensky writes:8

Just as Talmud Torah itself is multidimensional, so too there are a variety of rebbe-
talmid relationships, each of which is governed by a distinct set of rules. There is, firstly, a sharp
differentiation between the general obligation to revere a Torah scholar and the obligation to
respect one’s own rebbe.

Thus, Rambam treats these subjects in separate chapters (see above) in Hilkhot Talmud
Torah (Chapter 5 addresses respect for one’s own rebbe, Chapter 6 for any Torah scholar). While
the meaning of the term “rav muvhak” (primary teacher) is unclear and has been subject to wide
debate throughout the centuries (see Bava Metzia 33a), it is clear that this is the most intimate type
of rebbe-talmid relationship.

Authorities debate whether, on a biblical level, the range of obligations of respect mentioned above
apply only to a rav muvhak or to any teacher one has. Strikingly,

Avot 6:3 teaches that one must treat as one’s rebbe even a person who teaches one a
single halakha.

Does this mean that there is a biblical obligation to treat any every such individual with reverence?
This seems to be the subject of a dispute.

Rabbi Eliezer of Metz (Yere’im 231) clearly states that the full range of biblical obligations apply
even to the teacher of a single law.

Tosafot (Bava Kama 41b, s.v. Le-rabot), however, imply that the biblical requirement of respect
is limited to one’s primary teacher. (See also Responsa Binyan Tziyon 83, which follows Tosafot.)

8
https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-25-rebbe-talmid-relationship

26
 ‫ת וס' ד " ה לר ב ות ת " ח‬
(Summary: Tosfos explains why, in light of this D'rashah, the Torah needs to write "Mipnei
Seivah Takum".)
?‫ תיפוק ליה מהכא‬,‫ "מפני שיבה תקום" למה לי‬,‫וא"ת‬
(a)
Question: Why does the Torah see fit to write "Mipnei Sewivah Takum", since we can learn
it from here?
‫ או ברב‬,'‫ כדתנן )אבות פ"ד משנה י"ב( 'מורא רבך כמורא שמים‬,‫ דהכא ברבו מובהק‬,‫וי"ל‬
.‫מופלג דהוי כעין רבו‬
(b)
Answer: The current Pasuk is speaking about one's main Rebbi, as we learned in the
Mishnah in Pirkei Avos (4:12) 'The respect of your Rebbe should resemble the respect of
Hashem'; or else it speaks about a distinguished Talmid-Chacham, who has the same Din as
one's Rebbe.

Further muddying the waters, there are a whole range of in-between scenarios: a student who rises
to or supersedes the teacher’s level (talmid chaver); a first teacher of Jewish studies,
including aleph-bet; a teacher who brings one into the world of Torah and mitzvot, even as a
convert. In these and other situations, the authorities debate the precise parameters and malleability
of the rebbe-talmid relationship. Put differently, just as there are countless facets to Torah study,
so too there are numerous permutations of being a teacher of Torah.

Parent-Child Relationship

At its most profound level, the relationship between rebbe and talmid is the relationship between
parent and child. Taking this as a full-fledged halakhic principle, Rav Moshe of Trani (Kiryat
Sefer, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 5:1) notes that Rambam opens the chapter by writing that “Just as
one is obligated in the honor and reverence of his father, so too one is obligated in the honor and
reverence of his teacher, even more so than his father.” Rav Moshe deduces from here that the
biblical obligation to revere one’s teacher is an extension of the biblical obligation to respect one’s
parents.

Nowadays

Despite the great significance accorded to the obligations attending one’s respect for a teacher,
there is a striking suggestion, already among the Rishonim, that these laws may no longer be
applicable in the modern age. The 14th-century Tosafist Rav Aharon from Narbonne (Orchot
Chayim, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 21) cites a letter from Rav Shemuel of Évreux and his brother:

From the day on which our forefathers were exiled, our holy Temple was destroyed and our lands
were corrupted, the Torah and our hearts have been diminished, and we can no longer say that

27
“the reverence of your teacher should be like the reverence of heaven.” All the laws governing
how a student ought to interact with a teacher have been nullified; for the Gemarot, their
explanations, the novella and compositions are the teachers of people, and everything follows the
intelligence of the hearts. For this reason, in their town, they were accustomed for the student to
teach, and we do not apply the rule that one who issues halakhic rulings in the presence of one’s
teacher is liable to death. Likewise, a student may contradict his teacher’s words if he can, in
accordance with his analysis.

Analogously, Maharashdam (CM 1) argues that, nowadays, “it is not the scholar who rules, but
the book.” Thus, if the Évreux brothers hold that nowadays one may issue halakhic rulings in the
presence of one’s teacher, it is certainly justified for a student who has reached the level of
a posek to issue halakhic rulings in the same community as another posek, which would otherwise
be prohibited out of respect for the teacher.

Maharic (Responsa 171), however, forcefully rejects the position cited in Orchot Chayim. Noting
that Rambam and Tur cite the full range of halakhot regarding proper respect for one’s teacher in
their halakhic compendia, he infers that these authorities maintain that these rules remain in force
nowadays; there is no basis whatsoever, he contends, for relaxing these rules.

In reflecting on this seminal argument, we have seen three disputes concerning whether or not the
parameters of Talmud Torah have shifted in light of technological changes in the nature of
learning.

First, in regard to the question of Sinai and oker harim, Rav Shelomo Kluger and Peri
Chadash debate whether nowadays all would agree that analysis is prized over breadth of
knowledge due to the proliferation of books in print.

Second, the Vilna Gaon controversially maintains that the prohibition against forgetting one’s
learning is no longer in force nowadays.

Third, we have now seen the debate between Orchot Chayim and Maharic regarding the deference
owed to one’s rebbe nowadays.

While there is certainly room to distinguish among these three areas, taken together, they raise an
overarching question about the interplay between the timeless value of Talmud Torah and the
technological shifts that have impacted the nature of learning throughout the centuries.

In a different sense, Rav Kook’s treatment of Torat Eretz Yisrael suggests that there are other
ways in which the meaning or live experience of Torah study may shift not only with technological
advances, but also with new stages in Jewish history.

While the value of the rebbe-talmid relationship and Talmud Torah generally is a given, the
manifestations of these overarching values may shift significantly over the course of time.

28