Daf Ditty Beitzah 38: Rabbi Abba

In Becoming the People of the Talmud, Talya Fishman examines ways in which
circumstances of transmission have shaped the cultural meaning of Jewish
traditions. Although the Talmud's preeminence in Jewish study and its
determining role in Jewish practice are generally taken for granted, Fishman
contends that these roles were not solidified until the late eleventh and early
twelfth centuries. The inscription of Talmud—which Sefardi Jews understand
to have occurred quite early, and Ashkenazi Jews only later—precipitated these
developments. The encounter with Oral Torah as a written corpus was
transformative for both subcultures, and it shaped the roles that Talmud came
to play in Jewish life.1

1
U of Penn Press 2013

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2
§ The mishna states: In the case of one who borrows a vessel from another on the eve of a
Festival, it is as the feet of the borrower. The Gemara asks: It is obvious that this is the case, as
the place of rest of the vessel has already been established in the possession of the borrower. The
Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where one did not deliver the
vessel to him until the Festival itself. Lest you say: Since the lender did not establish it in the
borrower’s possession before the Festival began, it should remain as the feet of the lender, the
mishna therefore teaches us that it is not so, but it is as the feet of the borrower.

The Gemara comments: Interpreted in this manner, the mishna supports a statement of Rabbi
Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who borrows a vessel from another on the eve of a
Festival, even if he did not give it to him until the Festival itself, it is as the feet of the
borrower.

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§ It is taught in the mishna: If one borrowed on the Festival itself, it is as the feet of the lender.
The Gemara again wonders: This is obvious. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state
this halakha in a case where this borrower is accustomed to borrowing such items from this
lender. Lest you say that since it is a regular occurrence for this loan to take place, the lender
establishes it in his possession ahead of time, and it should therefore be considered as though the
object’s place of rest is established as the feet of the borrower, the mishna therefore teaches us
that it is not so, as the lender certainly says to himself: Perhaps he will find someone else this
time, and he will go and borrow from him. Consequently, the lender does not transfer possession
of the object to the borrower until the latter takes it, and it may be carried only where the lender
may go.

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§ It is taught in the mishna: And similarly, a woman who borrowed spices from another to put
in a dish, or water and salt to put in her dough, these are as the feet of both of them. The Gemara
relates: When Rabbi Abba ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael, he said: May it be God’s
will that I say a statement of halakha that will be accepted by my listeners in Eretz Yisrael, so
that I will not be put to shame. When he ascended, he found Rabbi Yoḥanan, Rabbi Ḥanina
bar Pappi, and Rabbi Zeira, and some say he found Rabbi Abbahu, Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi,
and Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa, and they were sitting and saying in a discussion of the mishna:
Why is this the halakha with regard to dough? But let the water and salt be considered nullified

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in the dough, and the status of the dough should follow its flour rather than its minor ingredients,
such as water and salt. Rabbi Abba said to them:

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If one’s single kav of wheat became mingled with ten kav of another’s wheat, shall the latter
eat all eleven kav and rejoice? One does not allow his property to become nullified into someone
else’s property. The same applies to water and salt in dough. The Sages laughed at him. He said
to them: Did I take your cloaks from you that you are putting me to shame? They again laughed
at him.

Rabbi Oshaya said: They did well to laugh at him. They were correct that the two cases are
dissimilar, as they reasoned as follows: What is different about a case of wheat belonging to one
person that became mingled with barley of another, that Rabbi Abba did not say this case to them
as an example? He specifically chose an example of wheat mingling with other wheat and not that
case of barley because that is one type mingled with something that is not its same type. The
principle is: A type of food mixed with a large amount of food not of its own type becomes
nullified, and this principle applies even when the two foods belong to two different people. If so,
the same may be said when wheat of one individual is mixed with wheat of another as well.
Although, according to Rabbi Yehuda, an item mingled with another item of the same type is
not nullified, according to the Rabbis it is certainly nullified.

Summary

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In the case of one who borrows a vessel from another on the eve of a Festival, it is as the feet of
the borrower, even if he actually took it only on the Festival itself. If the lender stipulated that the
vessel must be returned to him on the Festival, it is as the feet of both of them (Arukh HaShulĥan).
If the vessel was borrowed on the Festival itself, it is as the feet of the lender, even if the borrower
habitually borrows the object from him (Shulĥan Arukh, Oraĥ Ĥayyim 397:11).

The rabbis continue their conversations about the halachot of Festivals.2 They wish to identify
how observance on Festivals can be distinguished from the halachot of weekdays and of
Shabbat. Some highlights from today's daf:

• Bereira: retroactive designation

o when facts were not established at a certain time but those facts were
determined later, we ask questions about whether or not the act was understood
retroactively
• Gilui Milta Lemafreya: retroactive discovery of a matter
o when facts are known at a certain time, but a person was not aware of those
facts. We can clarify the situation retroactively.
• As the feet of another: when another person has the power to determine either facts
or decisions
o an ox fattener is as the feet of all people
o an ox of a shepherd is as the feet of the people in that city only
o when one borrows a vessel before a Festival; it is as the feet of the borrower
§ when one borrows a vessel before a Festival but it is delivered on the
Festival; it is as the feet of both the borrower and the lender
o when one borrows a vessel during a Festival; it is as the feet of the lender

The rabbis discuss the concept of nullification when foods are combined.

• When a prohibited item is combined with permitted items of the same type, it is
nullified
• Salt and water may 'disappear' when they combine with wheat from dough
• Nullification and Monetary matters are compared with nullification of slaughtered
and unslaughtered meat, which is debated.
• The rabbis point out that spices added to a dish cannot be nullified as even small
amounts change the taste of the dish.

2
https://dafyomibeginner.blogspot.com/2014/05

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 "TUM'AS MES" OF DOORWAYS

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:3

The Gemara says that according to Rebbi Oshaya, Bereirah does not work for any matter which is
mid'Oraisa. Therefore, in the case of a corpse inside a house in which there is a doubt through which
doorway the corpse will be removed, all of the doorways become Tamei. The actual path of the corpse's
exit cannot be determined retroactively because this is a question of Tum'ah d'Oraisa, and Bereirah
does not work for a matter which is mid'Oraisa. RASHI writes that this Tum'ah is d'Oraisa because it
is a Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai.

Rashi earlier (10a, DH Kulan Teme'in) writes that the Tum'ah in this case is only a Gezeirah d'Rabanan.
How does Rashi there understand the Gemara here which says explicitly that the Tum'ah is mid'Oraisa?
(SHITAH MEKUBETZES 10a)

RAV SHLOMO KLUGER (in BIGDEI YOM TOV) answers that in the Gemara earlier (10a) Rashi
is explaining the opinion of Rava who says that the argument between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel in
the case of Tum'ah of entranceways involves Tum'ah l'Mafrei'a. Beis Hillel maintains that it is possible
to show, retroactively, which doorway was Tamei in the first place by opening it later, thereby being
Metaher all of the other doorways retroactively (the Gemara here understands the argument
differently). Rava certainly does not argue with the conclusion of the Gemara here that Bereirah does
not work for a Halachah d'Oraisa, so he must understand that this Tum'ah is only mid'Rabanan.

The Gemara here (Rebbi Oshaya), however, maintains that the Tum'ah is mid'Oraisa. (The SHA'AR
HA'MELECH gives a similar approach and explains that Rava maintains that the Tum'ah is
mid'Rabanan.)

THE "TECHUM" OF AN ANIMAL FOR SALE

Shmuel rules that the ox of a butcher ("Shor Shel Patam") has the Techum of "every person." This
means that the animal acquires the Techum of the one who buys it on Yom Tov. The ox of a shepherd
("Shor Shel Ro'eh"), on the other hand, acquires the Techum of "the residents of the town." Since a
shepherd raises his animals for himself and occasionally sells them to the residents of his town, the
animal acquires the Techum of the townspeople. If the resident of another town buys the animal from
the shepherd, he may not take it back to his city because it is limited to the Techum of its town.

Why do the animal of a butcher and the animal of a shepherd have different Techumin?

(a) RASHI and the RAMBAM explain that a butcher expects his animal to be sold on Yom Tov, and,
therefore, before Yom Tov he has in mind that the animal should acquire the Techum of the buyer.
(Apparently, his intention is effective because of Bereirah.) In contrast, a shepherd does not expect to
sell his animal to a buyer from a different town, but only to his neighbors. Therefore, he has in mind
that his animal should acquire the Techum of the people of his town and not his own Techum (if it
differs from the Techum of the town).

3
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/beitzah/insites/bt-dt-038.htm

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The RAMBAN and RAN ask why Shmuel says that Bereirah works in the case of a Shor Shel Patam
when Shmuel himself maintains that Bereirah does not work even for a Halachah d'Rabanan such as
Techumin (37b).

1. The BA'AL HA'ME'OR answers that the reason why Shmuel maintains that Bereirah does not
work in the case of a barrel of wine owned by partners (37b) is because it is not known for certain that
they will divide the barrel on Yom Tov. In the case of the butcher's ox, the butcher knows for certain
that he will sell the animal on Yom Tov; the only question is to whom he will sell it. In such a case,
since it is known that the animal will not have the owner's Techum on Yom Tov and the only question
is whose Techum it will have, even Shmuel agrees that Bereirah works.

2. The RA'AVAD (Hilchos Yom Tov 5:15) answers that Shmuel maintains that Bereirah does not
work only in a case of partners who own something together. Since they are particular about each
other's portion, each partner wants his own portion to go with him to where his Techum reaches.
Therefore, the partners cannot determine later which portion each one owned at the onset of Yom Tov.
In contrast, in the case of a butcher's ox the salesman does not want the ox to have his Techum. On the
contrary, he wants Bereirah to work so that the buyer can take the animal home.

(b) The RAMBAN and RAN explain that a butcher's ox is like an animal of Hefker; the butcher
removes his ownership from it as far as the Techum is concerned. In contrast, the shepherd gives his
ox to the townspeople so that they all have joint ownership of it. As such, it is limited to their common
Techum (and if two people in the town have Techumin in opposite directions, the ox may not be moved
at all on Yom Tov). (The RASHBA suggests that the rule that the butcher's ox is considered like
Hefker might be a Takanah d'Rabanan for the benefit of the wholesale butcher, so that he will have
buyers and will be able to sell his animals.)
Since the Halachah is that Bereirah works for matters which are mid'Rabanan, in both cases (Shor Shel
Patam and Shor Shel Ro'eh) the animal acquires the Techum of the buyer even if he is from a different
town.

(c) The BA'AL HA'ME'OR in the name of "Yesh Mefarshim" writes that when the Gemara says that
the ox of a butcher acquires the Techum of "every person" it does not mean that it acquires the Techum
of the person who buys it. Rather, it means that it is considered to have the Techum of every person
who could possibly buy it, and therefore the animal cannot be moved at all outside of the city.

Similarly, when the Gemara says that the ox of a shepherd has the Techum of "the residents of the
town," it means that since Bereirah does not work according to Shmuel, the animal has the Techum of
all of the people of the city. Everyone is a possible owner since it is not known who will buy the animal.
Since the animal has the Techum of every resident of the city, it may not be moved at all if some of
the residents have Techumin in opposite directions.

The question of whether the ox follows everyone's Techum if Bereirah does not work depends on a
basic understanding of what "Ein Bereirah" means. Does it mean that Bereirah does not work at all, or
does it mean that the true owner cannot be determined retroactively, but one of the possible purchasers
was indeed the owner.

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 The Limits of Traveling
Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:4

The Mishna (37a) teaches that just as a person cannot walk more than 2,000 cubits outside of the
city limits (called tehum Shabbat) on Shabbat and Yom Tov, his or her possessions are limited, as
well. In Massekhet Eiruvin we learned that by means of an eiruv techumim – by placing a meal at
the edge of the city limits – a person can establish his Shabbat in that place, thus shifting the area
that he is allowed to travel to 2,000 cubits around that space.

Thus, if a person were to lend something to his friend on Yom Tov, it can only be taken as far as
its owner is allowed to walk, even if the borrower has made an eiruv that permits him to travel
further than that. One example presented by the Mishna is a woman who lends water and salt to
her friend to bake bread on Yom Tov. The final product will be limited to the extent that it can only
be taken to places that both the borrower and the lender themselves could go. The Gemara on our
daf describes a discussion among the amora'im about this rule.

Three Israeli amora'im were discussing this matter (either Rabbi Yohanan, Rabbi Hanina bar Pappi
and Rabbi Zeira or else Rabbi Abbahu, Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi and Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaha) and
queried why this should be true; shouldn't the water and salt be considered batel – negligible – in
the context of the final baked product!?

Rabbi Abba said to them: If one's single kav of wheat became mingled with ten kav of another's
wheat, shall the latter eat all eleven kav and rejoice? One does not allow his property to become
nullified into someone else's property. The same applies to water and salt in dough. The Sages
laughed at him. He said to them: Did I take your cloaks from you that you are putting me to
shame? They again laughed at him.

This interaction is particularly interesting because the Gemara begins the story with a description
of the prayer recited by Rabbi Abba upon embarking on his trip from Babylonia to Israel, in which
he expressed his hope that his thoughts and ideas would be accepted by the scholars of Israel.

The Hatam Sofer explains that the Sages who lived in Israel recognized their own knowledge of
Torah, and often looked down on the Torah that was studied and taught in Babylon, which brought
a visiting scholar to be concerned lest his ideas would not be taken seriously.

Rabbi Jeremy Rosen writes:5

We’ve talked a lot in this series about how intent matters to the rabbis. Certain actions are
considered violations (or not) based purely on what was happening in the mind of the actor. On
today’s daf, the rabbis explore the concept of bereira (bray-RAH) which offers another twist — a
retroactive twist — on this idea of intention.

4
https://www.steinsaltz-center.org/home/doc.aspx?mCatID=68446
5
Myjewishlearning.com

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The word bereira simply means “choice” or “selection” but it has several meanings when it comes
to the laws of Shabbat and festivals. For one, it is used to describe the forbidden labor of sorting.
For example, one should not pick out edible food from the inedible, such as bones from fish
(though not every authority agrees with this example once the food is in a person’s mouth).

On our daf, however, bereira refers to the notion that a choice or selection can be applied
retroactively. One of the wildest examples of this occurs on Gittin 25a where the rabbis consider
the case of a husband who told a scribe to write a bill of divorce for him, but instead of writing the
name of the woman to be divorced (as normally required), he asked the scribe write it
to “whichever of my wives leaves the house first.” (One wonders that they weren’t all flocking to
the exit!) In any case, the rabbis disagreed over whether the divorce contracted this way was valid.
Must one designate the wife to be divorced explicitly in the bill, or can she be designated post
facto?

On Beitzah 37 (yesterday’s daf), the idea of bereira, again meaning retroactive designation,
continues to be a point of contention. We are told that Rabbi Hoshaya holds by bereira, whereas
Rabbi Yohanan does not. Or maybe it’s the other way around? Perhaps Rabbi Yohanan holds by
bereira, but not in matters of Torah law, only in matters of rabbinic law?

The Gemara brings an example drawn from the quintessential example of rabbinic law: the eruv.
Suppose a rabbi is coming to a place near one’s town to deliver a lesson on Shabbat. A person who
wants to travel more than 2,000 cubits outside the town to hear the rabbi must construct an eruv
techumim. Unfortunately, this person is unsure where the lecture will take place, so he cleverly
places two eruvs on Shabbat eve in two different directions, while stipulating that only one eruv
— the one on the side where the rabbi will teach (which he will not know until later) — will take
effect. Not only this, but if he hears that two rabbis will be coming to two different locations, he
might also place two eruvs and stipulate that he will decide on Shabbat which rabbi he prefers, and
consequently which of the two eruvs will take effect.

Does that sound a little crude? Rabbi Yohanan seems uncomfortable too, though not necessarily
for the same reason. He permits the first double eruv, but not the second. Here’s the Gemara again:

And Rabbi Yohanan said in explanation: This first case is referring to a situation in which the
rabbi had already arrived before the eruv was placed.

In the case of one rabbi and one lecture, the location had already been determined, it’s just that the
person did not know which location it was. This, according to Rabbi Yohanan, is completely
different from the case where there are two rabbis and the only thing not determined was which
lecture to attend — this truly was determined (inappropriately, according to him) on Shabbat. In
the end, he accepts the first behavior and not the second which proves that he does not accept
bereira, retroactive designation, after all.

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The Gemara concludes that it is therefore surely Rabbi Hoshaya, and not Rabbi Yohanan, who
accepts the concept of bereira, though Rabbi Hoshaya too applies it only to cases of rabbinic law,
not Torah law.

The fact that the Gemara struggles to determine who holds by this principle, and then states that
this rabbi in fact holds by a limited version of it, perhaps demonstrates rabbinic discomfort with
this particular legal fiction. And we can probably all agree that it is probably best to decide ahead
of time which wife you want to divorce.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:

Our daf (Beitzah 38a-b) contains one of the most confusing and cryptic exchanges in the entire
Gemara.

We are told that soon after Rabbi Abba moved from Bavel to Eretz Yisrael, at which time he
offered up a prayer that his Torah insights be accepted by the scholars in Eretz Yisrael, he became
involved in a debate about the law that was previously presented in the Mishna (Beitzah 5:4, 37a)
concerning the ‘techum’ limitations of dough which had been prepared on Yom Tov with other
ingredients (eg. water, salt) that had been borrowed on Yom Tov.

While his fellow Amoraim claimed that the water and salt should be nullified in the dough, Rabbi
Abba responded by explaining that ‘if a kav of one person’s wheat became mixed with ten kabim
of his friend’s wheat, the single kav remains the property of the first person’ (i.e. the principle
of nullification does not undermine the fact that what has been physically nullified remains the
borrowed property of someone other than the dough maker).

In response to Rabbi Abba’s argument, the other Amoraim laughed. Then, Rabbi Abba asked, ‘Did
I take your cloaks?’ to which they laughed once again - after which the Gemara then proceeds to
discuss the merits and flaws of Rabbi Abba’s reasoning.

On face value, Rabbi Abba’s halachic reasoning makes sense – or at least more sense than his
fellow Amoraim appear to acknowledge, and to see a clear and thorough treatment of the halachic
dimensions of this sugya, I recommend looking at Rabbi Yitzchak David Flakser’s (1917-1999)
‘Sha’arei Yitzchak’ commentary which can be accessed at https://bit.ly/2YseqkZ.

However, what particularly piqued my interest was the strange question posed by Rabbi Abba to
his fellow Amoraim. Having already presented his thesis to his colleagues, to which they
responded with laughter, he asks: ‘Did I take your cloaks?’, to which the Amoraim again respond
with laughter. What are we to make of this exchange?

To answer this question, I would like to share a fascinating explanation offered by Rabbi Aharon
Aryeh HaKohen Katz (1914-1988) as found in his sefer ‘Shivcho shel Aharon’ (see
https://bit.ly/3iHJbJz).

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There, Rabbi Katz explains that when Rabbi Abba’s initial reasoning was responded to with
laughter, he believed that his prayer - that his Torah insights be accepted by the scholars in Eretz
Yisrael - had been answered, and that the laughter was, in fact, an expression of appreciation and
agreement.

And why did Rabbi Abba think they specifically laughed? Because he thought that he had,
unknowingly, presented the very same reasoning that these Amoraim had been thinking of – which
had both amazed and amused them. Given this, Rabbi Abba then asked them, ‘Did I take your
cloaks?’.

This is because, as Rabbi Katz explains, ‘someone who quotes the original insights (chiddushim)
of another is referred to as someone who wearing the cloaks of another’. As such, by asking this
question Rabbi Abba was cryptically saying to them, ‘clearly I have unknowingly presented the
approach to this halachic question which you yourselves have been thinking of’. And by them
laughing, he believed that they confirmed that this was so.

Interestingly, there is a postscript to this insight of Rabbi Katz who relates that he came up with
this explanation in his youth while learning with his chavruta, Rav Yosef Greenwald (who was to
become the Rebbe of the Pupa Hasidic dynasty). Having shared his insight, Rav Greenwald then
showed him the yet to be published Talmud commentary of his ancestor (Rabbi Yosef Greenwald
of Tchechowitz, 1805-1870) who, around a century beforehand, had explained this Gemara in this
manner – to which Rav Greenwald then said to Rabbi Katz with a smile, “it looks like you took
his cloak!”.

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Amoraim (Aram. ‫ )ָאמוָֹרִאים‬refers to scholars in the Land of Israel and Babylonia who succeeded
the tannaim and preceded (in Babylonia) the savoraim and geonim. (See Table: Heads of
Academies.) The composition of the Mishnah by R. Judah ha-Nasi in the beginning of the third
century, and its subsequent dissemination and gradual acceptance in the academies of the Land of
Israel and Babylonia led to a break between scholarly activity of the earlier period and the halakhic
and aggadic activity of later scholars. These scholars are the “amoraim,” whose words constitute
most of the attributed material in the Talmudim and the amoraic midrash-compilations. The word
“amora” means “speaker” or “interpreter,” and the application of this term to these scholars likely
stems from their work in interpreting and deriving halakhah from the Mishnah and
contemporaneous beraitot. Already in both Talmudim, we find references to the amoraim as a
group distinct from tannaim: R. Levi and R. Simon are described as “two amorin” (TJ Berakhot

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1:1, 2c), and the Babylonian Talmud (Bavli) explicitly distinguishes tannaim from amoraim (TB
Eruvin 7a; TB Sanhedrin 6a and 33a). At times, the Babylonian Talmud also calls attention
to amoraim it describes as “amora’ei be-ma’arava” (“amoraim in the West,” meaning the Land
of Israel; e.g., TB Shabbat 21b, 96a; TB Ketubot 80a).

Many Palestinian amoraim (and the tannaim before them) conventionally bear the title “Rabbi”;
the equivalent title of recognition for Babylonian Amoriam is “Rav.” A number of amoraim in
both centers hold neither title. The traditional view is that the title “Rabbi” was only conferred on
a scholar after ordination by the patriarch and Sanhedrin in Palestine. Modern scholars have
suggested that the difference between these titles is actually a linguistic feature marking separate
dialects.

The Generations of the Amoraim

The amoraim were active between approximately 220 C.E. (the traditional date of the redaction
of the Mishnah) and 360 or 370 in the Land of Israel, and between 220 and approximately 500 in
Babylonia.

Heads of the Academies of Ereẓ Israel (Palestine) and Babylon

Rabbinic tradition credits Rav, a student of R. Judah ha-Nasi, with bringing the Mishnah to
Babylonia and thus inaugurating the amoraic period in Babylonia. It is customary to divide the
amoraic period into generations. In most cases such a division is artificial since many of the
scholars can be assigned to two successive generations. The first five generations consist of both
Palestinian and Babylonian amoraim. The last two to three generations, however, are limited to

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Babylonian amoraim. It is not easy to identify all the amoraim mentioned in the Talmud and
Midrash since the same amora often appears under different names, whereas two amoraim from
two different generations can bear the same name. Moreover, many names have been transmitted
incorrectly. Over 2,000 amoraim, however, can be identified with tolerable certainty. See the table
of the more prominent of the amoraim of the different generations.

THE PROBLEM OF AMORAIC ATTRIBUTIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

Up to and throughout much of the 20th century, scholars generally assumed that amoraic statements
preserved in the Talmudim and midrash-compilations accurately represented the positions held by
the sages to whom they were attributed, and that narratives purporting to relate information about
the lives of individual amoraim reflected reliable biographical traditions about the amoriam as
real, historical figures. Both of these views have undergone radical revision, and we must attend
to these issues before proceeding further with the portrayal of the amoriam as set out in rabbinic
literature.

Jacob Neusner and his students called the reliability of amoraic attributions into question, partly
on the ground that there is no source external to rabbinic literature that can be used to verify them,
and partly on the basis of a comparison of parallel traditions which testify to an internal literary
development within the rabbinic sources themselves. Skepticism about the reliability of
attributions is justified in part by the Babylonian Talmud itself, which sometimes notes that
an amora did not explicitly state a view attributed to him, but that the attributed view was inferred
from the amora's conduct in a particular instance ("lav be-ferush itamar ela me-kelala itamar";
e.g., Bava Batra 40b, 126a). In the Jerusalem Talmud as well, Shimon b. Ba was said to have
doubted R. Abbahu's attribution of a particular view to R. Yohanan (TJ Shabbat 6:1, 7d), again
demonstrating amoraic awareness that not all amoraic attributions may be accurate.

Few, if any, scholars still maintain the view that amoraic attributions are in all circumstances to be
presumed reliable. Recent studies by Richard Kalmin have demonstrated that one must also be
cautious about leaping to the opposite conclusion: that attributions are in all circumstances to be
presumed unreliable. Kalmin demonstrated the existence of patterns in statements attributed to
particular amoriam or to the amoriam of particular generations, and concluded that these patterns
are indicative of real historical differences in the amoraic scholarly enterprise. Thus, while the
accuracy of a discrete amoraic statement may be impossible to verify, the statements of
an amora or of a generation, when taken together, may indeed yield information that may be used
for historical reconstruction. Other research – such as Z.M. Dor's work on Rava's and Rav Papa's
engagement with Palestinian learning, and David Kraemer's finding that the later Babylonian
amoraic generations are more likely to preserve argumentation – buttresses that conclusion. But it
remains difficult to determine whether or not a given amoraic statement was actually uttered by
the sage to whom it is attributed, or whether the statement as transmitted preserves a form of the
tradition which remains relatively close to the original, without a detailed examination of all of the
parallel versions of the tradition, and all the relevant manuscript material. As a result, references
in this article to what a sage said or did should be understood as references to what he is
represented to have said or done.

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Rabbinic literature also contains narratives, many of which present details about the lives of
particular rabbis in the course of telling other stories. Other narratives purport to relate entire
episodes from rabbis' lives. Throughout the 19th and most of the 20th centuries, scholars viewed
these narratives as sources for rabbinic biography, and some scholarly work was done to draw
together the scattered details from disparate rabbinic sources in order to construct rabbinic
"biographies." To the extent that narratives contained accounts of supernatural events, scholars
resorted to the technique of the "historical kernel": ignoring the fantastic elements of narratives in
order to recover the kernel of historical information the story was thought to yield about the sage.
This project was problematic because for most, if not all amoraim, the Talmudim and midrash-
compilations leave large gaps in the chronology of their lives, which could only be supplemented
by guesswork and creative extrapolation – hardly the stuff of scholarly biography. The seminal
work of Jacob Neusner, William Scott Green, Shamma Friedman, Richard Kalmin, Jeffrey L.
Rubenstein and other scholars has led to a complete rethinking of the project of "rabbinic
biography." Scholars now recognize that rabbinic narratives are literary creations formulated to
serve the purposes of their narrators and/or of the redactors of the compilations in which they are
now found; they present edifying moral lessons, or teach about the rabbinic way of life, but are not
meant to be straightforward presentations of history or biography and must not be utilized as such.
Therefore, alleged discrete biographical details must not be lifted out of rabbinic narratives; the
narratives must be carefully studied as whole compositions in order to discern the overall message
the storytellers or redactors wished to convey. All of these methodological considerations
complicate the project of presenting the lives and activities of the amoraim, but the resulting
presentation benefits from the rigorous examination of the sources that these methodological
considerations require.

Relations Between the Land of Israel and Babylonia During the Amoraic Period

The presence of Palestinian amoraic traditions in the Babylonian Talmud and of Babylonian
amoraic traditions in the Jerusalem Talmud testifies to a significant degree of interaction between
these two centers of learning during the first four generations of the amoraim. While much of this
activity involved the transmission of traditions from Palestine to Babylonia, the Jerusalem Talmud
does call attention to the halakhic traditions of "the rabbis of there [Babylonia]," who are contrasted
with "the rabbis of here [Palestine]" (e.g., TJ Berakhot 1:9, 3d; 9:4, 14a). The Babylonian Talmud
also describes the activities of scholars known as the "naḥote" ("those who descended"), who
carried learning with them from the Land of Israel to Babylonia and back. Two of the best-
known naḥote were R. Dimi (= Avudimi, of the fourth Palestinian amoraic generation) and Rabin
(= Avin or Avun, of the third and fourth Babylonian amoraic generations), who eventually moved
to the Land of Israel. Naḥote typically brought discrete halakhic traditions (called "memrot"),
stories, halakhic sugyot, and aggadic traditions to Babylonia; their activity is often introduced by
the formulaic "When Rabbi X came [to Babylonia]" (e.g., Ket. 17a, AZ 11b). Rabin is also
described as writing letters to Babylonian amoraim (TB Ketubot 49b, TB Bava Meẓi'a 114a), as
are other Palestinian amoraim (TB Bava Meẓi'a 41b; TB Sanhedrin 29a; TB Ḥullin 95a).

The Babylonian Talmud also highlights halakhic information brought from Palestine by use of the
introductory phrase shalḥu mitam ("they [= the Palestinian scholars] sent from there [Palestine]").
Among these communications were some that cautioned the Babylonians to be careful to observe
the second day of the Festival (TB Beẓah 4b), to be careful to treat Rav Ahai with respect, who is

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described as "lighting up the eyes of the Exile" (TB Ḥullin 59b), and some that corrected and
expanded their halakhic knowledge in particular areas (e.g., TB Bava Batra 165b, TB Menaḥot
43a).

The two rabbinic centers are not portrayed as being of equal authority or as having equal prestige
during the amoraic period. Babylonia and its scholars are portrayed as subordinate to the authority
of the Land of Israel. Abbaye claims that since "we are subordinate to them, we do as they do"
(TB Pesaḥim 51a). The Babylonian Talmud also describes Babylonian judges as being the
"agents" of the scholars of the Land of Israel who are only empowered to adjudicate certain types
of cases that do not require expert, ordained judges only found in the Land (TB Bava Kamma 84b;
see also TB Sanhedrin 14a). Abbaye, speaking to Rav Yosef, thus referred to them both as
"laypeople" (hedyotot), presumably because they had not been ordained in Palestine (TB Gittin
88b).

The Palestinian amoraim are also portrayed as ridiculing Babylonian halakhic traditions
(TB Pesaḥim 34b, TB Yoma 57a, TB Zevaḥim 60b). R. Yohanan explained that Babylonia is
called "Bavel" because scripture, mishnah, and talmud are all mixed up ("balul") in it
(TB Sanhedrin 24a). This ridicule may simply reflect the natural tensions between competing
rabbinic centers rather than a real evaluation of Babylonian amoraic capabilities, since we can also
observe sharp intra-Palestinian polemics between sages in northern and southern Palestine
(TJ Sanhedrin 1:2, 18c; TJ Avodah Zarah 2:9, 41d). There is further support for this conclusion in
a tradition about Palestinian appreciation of the scholarly competence of the Babylonian rabbis.
Contrary to earlier Palestinian doubts about Babylonian competence with regard to bills of divorce,
the "Scholars" (ḥavrayya) said in the name of R. Yehoshua b. Levi: "Now that scholars are found
outside the Land, they are considered 'experts' [with regard to bills of divorce]" (TJ Git. 1:1, 43b).

The fourth generation Babylonian Amora Rava is the last Babylonian Amora mentioned in the
Jerusalem Talmud (TJ Beẓah 1:3, 60b). The absence of the rest of the fourth generation (not to
mention the fifth–seventh), from the Jerusalem Talmud is evidence that the final redaction of the
Jerusalem Talmud was being brought to a close during this time. Some post-Jerusalem Talmud
Palestinian scholars do appear in the Babylonian Talmud (e.g., TB Shabbat 107a; TB Ḥullin 59b).

Frankel, Mevo; Halevy, Dorot, 2; Weis, Dor, 3; Bacher, Bab Amor; Bacher, Pal Amor; Bacher, Trad; G.F. Moore, Judaism in the
First Century of the Christian Era, 2 (1927); H.L. Strack, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash (1931); M.
Mielziner, Introduction to the Talmud (1925); Hyman, Toledot; Margalioth, Ḥakhmei; J.N. Epstein, Mevo'ot le-Safrut ha-
Amora'im (1962); ADD. BIBLIOGRAPHY: M. Beer, The Babylonian Amoraim: Aspects of Economic Life (Heb., 1982); M.
Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles (1994); R. Kalmin, Sages, Stories, Authors, and Editors in Rabbinic
Babylonia (1994); idem, The Sage in Jewish Society of Late Antiquity (1998); idem, "Saints and Sages in Late Antiquity,"
in: Continuity and Change, ed. Lee I. Levine (Hebrew) (2004); Lee I. Levine, The Rabbinic Class of Roman Palestine in Late
Antiquity (1990); Jacob Neusner, A History of the Jews in Babylonia (1965–1970); Jacob Neusner, "The Present State of Rabbinic
Biography," in: G. Nahon & C. Touati (eds.), Hommageá Georges Vajda (1980), 85–91; Y. Breuer, in: Tarbiz, 61 (1997), 41–59;
D. Levine, Ta'aniyyot Ẓibbur u-Derashot ha-Ḥakhamim – Halakhah u-Ma'aseh bi-Tekufat ha-Talmud (2001); E. Diamond,
in: USQR, 48 (1994), 29–47.

[Alyssa M. Gray (2nd ed.)]

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 Rabbi Abba6

Rabbi Abba was among the great Amoraim. He was the student of Shemuel, and though he
learned from the great Babylonian Rabbanim, he often traveled to Eretz Israel to learn Torah from
its Rabbanim.

The Gemara recounts that Rabbi Abba traveled to Eretz Israel by sea, and when his boat arrived
by the shores of Akko, he embraced the earth. He had the merit of seeing Rabbi Yochanan, who
headed the great yeshiva of Tiberias and was extremely old at the time. He also saw Resh Lakish
(who died before Rabbi Yochanan). We also see just how much he loved Eretz Israel from a story
found in the Gemara. Rabbi Abba purchased a plot of land in Eretz Israel, then returned to Babylon.
However, what he didn’t know was that another Amora, by the name of Rav Gidel, had previously
begun negotiations to purchase that same plot of land. Rav Gidel went and complained about Rabbi
Abba to Rav Zeira, who in turn told Rabbi Yitzchak bar Napacha of the incident (the latter were
old friends of Rabbi Abba, and all three of them were among those who had come to Eretz Israel
from Babylon). Rabbi Yitzchak bar Napacha said, “Wait until he returns for the holidays,”
meaning that they should wait until he comes back from Babylon to verify the story with him.

When Rabbi Abba came back, his friends asked him what the law was concerning “a poor man
who awaits his portion, but then another comes and takes it.” In other words, what was the law

6
https://hevratpinto.org/tzadikim_eng/084_rabbi_abba.html

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concerning a person who acts maliciously with the poor, trying to seize what awaits him before he
has time to take possession of it? Rabbi Abba responded that such a person was a wicked man.
And when he was asked why he himself acted in this way concerning the land of Rav Gidel, he
replied that he was not aware that Rav Gidel had wanted to purchase it.

Rav Yitzchak bar Napacha therefore decided that he should give up the plot of land for Rav
Gidel’s benefit. Rabba Abba replied that he didn’t want to sell the plot of land, for it was his first
purchase in Eretz Israel, hence it didn’t bode well to sell it. Rather, he said that he was ready to
give it to Rav Gidel as a gift.

For his part, Rav Gidel didn’t want the land as a gift because of the principle that “one who hates
gifts will live” (Proverbs 15:27). The Gemara concludes the story by saying that neither of them
wanted to use the land in question, and so it was abandoned. This plot of land came to be known
as “the land of the Rabbis” (see Kiddushin 59a for details).

Rabbi Abba lived temperately and was accustomed to praying that his Torah views be accepted
by his colleagues. Among the Sages who had particularly great respect for Shabbat, Rabbi Abba
is mentioned favorably. He had the habit of purchasing 13 selaim of meat in honor of Shabbat, and
pressed his servant to prepare everything in the best possible way. Rabbi Abba apparently had
many guests on Shabbat, and he wanted to honor them with the finest tasting meals. He lived an
exceedingly long time, and in his later years he was considered as a leading Halachic authority in
Eretz Israel. He shared this distinction with Rav Ami, who was Rosh Yeshiva, while Rabbi Abba
himself was the Av Beit Din.

Rav Ami was named Rosh Yeshiva after the death of Rabbi Eliezer ben Pedat, who continued
the academy of Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Eliakim. When Rav Ami moved the
yeshiva to Cesarea, Rabbi Abba also joined him there. Rav Papa and Rav Ami called Rabbi Abba,
“Our father of Eretz Israel.”

The teachings of Rabbi Abba in Halachah and Aggadah are found throughout the Babylonian
and Jerusalem Talmuds, as well as in the Midrashim. One of his famous parables, by which he
explained what occurred between Ahasuerus and Haman, is cited in Megillah 14: “To what can
the story of Ahasuerus and Haman be compared? To two men, one who had a mound in his field,
and the other who had a pit in his. The latter thought, ‘Who could sell me a mound?’ while the
other thought, ‘Who could sell me a pit?’ After a certain time, they encountered each other. The
one who had a pit said to the one who had a mound, ‘Sell me your mound,’ to which the other
replied, ‘Take it for free! You’re doing me a favor.’ This is what happened when Ahasuerus said
to Haman, ‘The silver is given to you, the people also, to do with as you see fit’ [Esther 3:11].”

To show just how catastrophic honor-seeking is, Gemara Sanhedrin cites the explanation of
Rabbi Abba on the verse that states, “After this, Jeroboam did not repent from his evil way” (I
Kings 13:33). The Gemara asks about the meaning of “After this,” to which Rabbi Abba explains:
“After the Holy One, blessed be He, grabbed hold of Jeroboam by his cloak and said to him,
‘Repent, and I, you, and the son of Jesse will walk in Gan Eden,’ Jeroboam replied, ‘Who will be
in charge?’ to which the answer was ‘the son of Jesse will be.’ Jeroboam then responded by saying,
‘In that case, I want nothing of it!’ ”

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 Rabbi Abba died at a great old age, apparently in Eretz Israel.

Talmudic Arguments: The Use of Insults, Reprimands, Rebukes and

Curses as Part of the Disputation Process
Hershey H. Friedman writes:7

Abstract
In the Talmud, the colleague one argued with most in legal matters in the Talmud was known
as “bar plugta” who was typically one’s best friend. This was seen as the ideal study partnership
since it involved constructive arguing; one might see it as form of adversarial collaboration.
Unfortunately, arguing often results in insults being hurled and there is always the risk that an
insult can be seen as harsh rather than playful or part of the disputation process. One example
of an insult used fairly frequently is the term terada which either means scatterbrain or lunatic.
The following insult was said about Rabbah bar bar Chanah [bar means son]: “Every Abba is
as stupid as a donkey; and every bar bar Chanah is a fool.” This paper examines and discusses
many different insults, reprimand, rebukes and even curses used by the sages.

Disagreements, often over small matters, lead to discord and even war. If people can learn how to
disagree with each other and yet be respectful, the world would be a much better place. Sacks
(2006: 209) makes the point that: “Difference does not diminish; it enlarges the sphere of human
possibilities… We will learn to live with diversity once we understand the God-given, world-
enhancing dignity of difference.” One of the myths of history is that religion is the cause of most
wars. Actually, Phillips & Axelrod (2004) examined 1,763 wars recorded in history and found that
only 123 had a religious cause. Thus, religion accounted for about 7% of all wars and
approximately 2% of all fatalities during warfare (Lurie, 2012). Lurie asserts:

White (2012) comes up with a different statistic and concludes that religion was responsible for
the death of 47 million people, or 10% of deaths. Apparently, it is not that easy to answer the
question as to how many people died in the name of religion. One thing, however, is clear: Religion
should not be blamed as the major cause of violent death. It is indubitably true that disagreements,
even those with neighbors, can be destructive. Jacoby (2011) states that it is not strangers that we

7
file:///Users/julianungar-sargon/Desktop/Talmudic_Arguments_The_Use_of_Insults_Re.pdf

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should fear, it is our own neighbors. He says that “we live in an era of ethnic, national, and religious
fratricide.” Our own neighbor is the one likeliest to kill us. People kill each other over relatively
small differences. Indeed, Barash & 2 Webel (2009: 192) state that differences in ideology between
groups or countries, whether based on politics, economics, or religion, can often lead to war. These
wars are frequently quite vicious since ideologues tend to be certain that only their beliefs are
correct. They act like they are omniscient and do not tolerate dissent. Knowing how to disagree
without resorting to violence is important for everyone. According to Vozza (2016), companies
are hiring individuals who have effective conflict resolution skills, i.e., possess the art of
“nonviolent communication” and can disagree in a way that does not cause major conflicts.

Today’s U.S. Congress is a prime example of not knowing how to disagree in a productive manner.
One website compiled ten insulting terms used in the media to describe the outgoing 112th
Congress. These terms included: dysfunctional, do-nothing, most disliked, incompetent, worthless,
clowns, and unproductive (Maass, 2013). This is a major reason there is gridlock in government
and if it continues the United States will quickly find that it has become a second-rate power.

Friedman (2014) uses the Talmud as a tool for teaching the art of constructive arguing. He posits
that the Talmud consists of thousands of disagreements regarding Jewish law yet served as a
device to keep the Jewish people united. For example, there are hundreds of arguments between
Abaye (ca. 278 CE – 339 CE) and Rava (ca. 270 CE – 350 CE) in the Talmud; in fact, one can
find an argument between the two on almost every other page. Yet Abaye and Rava were friends
and are even buried together in the same cave. Talmudic arguments did not lead to ugly battles
(there are some exceptions) but were seen as the way to clarify the law as well as philosophical
questions. In almost every case, the person one argued with most was a close friend. Jacobs
(1994: 52) makes the point that:

With so many arguments in the Talmud, it is no surprise that there are quite a few cases where one
scholar insulted or rebuked another colleague or student. Despite this, they remained friends. This
paper will examine Talmudic insults and rebukes and see the lessons that can be learned from
them. Even when insulting another person it is important to remember that this must be done in a
manner that does not cause the other party to reject everything.

The Talmud uses the expression of “pushing away with the left hand while simultaneously drawing
closer with the right hand” as the proper way to rebuke (Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 47a). The
stronger hand, the right hand, draws close and makes it clear that the rebuke is not an act of total

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rejection. There is an art to properly admonishing a student or someone who is doing something
wrong.

What is the Talmud?

The scholars of the Mishna are called Tannaim (from c. 10 CE to 220 CE) and the scholars of the
Gemara are called Amoraim (from c. 200 CE to 500 CE). The Amoraim analyzed, explained, and
elaborated on the Mishna. By studying the Talmud, we are examining the wisdom of sages who
lived during a 500-year period. The Talmud, mainly concerned with halachah (Jewish law), also
provides a detailed record of the beliefs of the Jewish people, their philosophy, traditions, culture,
and folklore, i.e., the aggadah (homiletics) and is replete with legal, ethical, and moral questions.

The Midrash, a separate scripture, records the views of the Talmudic sages and is mainly devoted
to the exposition of Biblical verses. There are two versions of the Talmud: the Jerusalem Talmud,
a product of the academies in Israel, and the Babylonian Talmud, a product of the academies in
Babylon. The Babylonian Talmud, considerably larger than the Jerusalem Talmud, is more
authoritative. Both often use a case-method type of approach to illustrate a particular problem or
a proposed solution.

The Midrash is essentially devoted to the exposition of Biblical verses. There are two types of
Midrash: Halachic Midrash which is mainly concerned with Jewish law and Aggadic Midrash
which is homiletic and mainly concerned with morality. The sages quoted and discussed in the
Midrash are generally the same sages as in the Talmud. Debating Styles: Babylonian vs. Israeli
Not all the sages in the Talmud argued in a calm manner.

The Talmud notes that the scholars of Israel treated each other pleasantly and respectfully when
debating law; the Babylonian scholars sometimes hurt each other’s feelings when debating 5
(Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 24a). Rabbi Oshaia interprets a verse in Zecharia 11:7
homiletically to refer to the two debating styles. The Babylonian scholars were hoblim (literally,
injurers) who hurt other feelings when debating.

The Israeli scholars were noam (literally, pleasant), i.e., treated each other pleasantly when arguing
Jewish law. Rabbi Yitzchak interpreted a different verse in Zechariah (4:14) to refer to the different
debating styles. He compared the Israeli scholars to olive oil which is soothing and pleasant; the
Babylonian scholars were compared to the wood of the olive tree which is bitter. This may help
explain the following statement: “Three hate each other: Dogs, roosters, and sorcerers. Some
say, also prostitutes and some say, also the scholars in Babylon (Pesachim 113b).” As noted, the
scholars of Babylon were sometimes harsh when arguing the fine points of halacha. The Talmud
contrasts the eulogies of the scholars of Israel vs. the scholars of Babylon (Babylonian Talmud,
Megillah 28b). Resh Lakish, a great Israeli scholar, had no problem eulogizing an ordinary scholar
with lavish praise (“Woe! The land of Israel has lost a great man!”).

Rabbi Nachman, a Babylonian scholar was reluctant to be that effusive in an eulogy unless the
scholar was truly accomplished. It should be pointed out that scholars who compared the
Babylonian Talmud with the Jerusalem Talmud – 82 basic differences have been found – note that
ad hominem attacks are much more prevalent in the former. Even when comparing parallel stories

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that appear in both Talmuds, the negative criticisms generally do not appear in the Jerusalem
Talmud (Brand, 2013).

This discussion in the Talmud would convince one that the Jerusalem Talmud should be superior
to the Babylonian Talmud. Actually, it is the opposite and the codifiers of Jewish law rely almost
completely on the Babylonian Talmud which is much more authoritative than 6 the Jerusalem
Talmud. The Anaf Yosef says that the above statements critical of the Babylonian style of
scholarship was only true for one generation (that of Rabbah, Rabbi Yochanan, and Rabbi Zera).
After that, learning improved greatly in Babylonia and eventually scholarship there was well above
that in Israel. One might assume the criticism of the old style of debating resulted in a sea change
and the Babylonian scholars learned to work together. Indeed, as noted earlier, one’s best friend
was the scholar one argued with most. Rabbi Chiya b. Abba (Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 30b)
homiletically derives from a verse that “even a father and son and teacher and student who study
Torah at the same gate [appear to] become enemies of each other; yet they do not leave from there
until they come to love each other.” Rabbi Chiya is describing a style of debating that is harsh but
leads to love in the end. The following are some of the rebukes and insults one finds in the Talmud
and Midrash. One should keep in mind that the scholars of Babylon “had a mutual understanding
that insult was an accepted and expected part of the discourse, and that it was not to be taken
personally or with offense” (Dratch, 2014).

The Chavos Yair (Responsum 152) examines several of the insults in the Talmud and attempts to
explain them. He is puzzled by the fact that some of the sages appear to be so harsh to each other.
He believes that many of the insults involve teachers talking to students and this was a device used
by educators to motivate disciples.

“Babylonian Fools”

Some of the sages living in Israel were critical of Babylonian erudition. Interestingly, the
Babylonian scholars admitted that the “air of Israel makes one wise.” In particular, Rabbi Yirmiyah
was quite critical of the scholarship of the Babylonians. He sarcastically referred to Babylonia as
a “dark land” either because of its low altitude or because the Zoroastrians (fireworshippers) did
not allow the Jews to have any light during their festivals (Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 34b, see
Rashi and Soncino note 1b).

Rabbi Yirmiyah felt that the Babylonian scholars would provide dubious explanations for various
laws if they did not know the real reason. Rabbi Yirmiyah remarked: “The Babylonian fools,
because they dwell in a dark land, they express dark legal opinions” (Babylonian Talmud,
Pesachim 34b). Rabbi Yirmiyah also came up with a unique interpretation of the verse in
Lamenations (3:6) “He made me dwell in darkness like the eternally dead.” He said that this verse
refers to the learning of the Babylonians (Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 24a).

Rabbi Yirmiyah preferred the Israeli style of argumentation that was more relaxed than the
competiveness of the Babylonian scholars. 8 As noted above, he felt that the Babylonian style of
debating would result in opinions that were not well thought out and conclusive.

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“Those Babylonians are Fools, They Eat Bread Together with Bread”

Rabbi Yirmiyah’s teacher, Rabbi Zera, also referred to the Babylonians as fools when discussing
their diet: “Those Babylonians are fools, they eat bread together with bread (Babylonian Talmud,
Nedarim 49b; Beitza 16a). The Babylonians ate bread with daisa (a dish made of pounded grain,
similar to grits). This might be analogous to someone today who ate pizza with bread.

“Do not be Upset for One of Them is Equal to Two of Us”

Rabbi Ashi made this remark to Rabbi Sama stating that one scholar who is from Israel is equal to
two Babylonian scholars (Babylonian Talmud, Menachos 42a). Ravina, a scholar from Israel, had
refuted a statement that Rabbi Sama made about tzitzith and he was embarrassed. Abaye also
remarked to Rava that one Israeli scholar was equal to two Babylonian scholars. Rava replied:
When one of us goes to Israel he is better than two of the Israeli scholars. “After all, when Rabbi
Yirmiyah was here he did not know what the rabbis were talking about, but after he went up to
Israel he called us Babylonian fools” (Babylonian Talmud, Kethuboth 75a).

“They Laughed at this in the West [Israel]”

It should also be noted that if a Babylonian sage would come up with an unusual explanation, the
Talmud might state that “they laughed at this in the West” (i.e., in the academies of Israel which
is to the west of Babylon). This expression is used in many places in the Babylonian Talmud
(Beitzah 14a; Yevamot 88a; Nazir 42a; Bava Kama 102b; Sanhedrin 109b; Shevuot 26a, 34b;
Zevachim 15a, 62a).

The Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 17b) is very explicit as to who is meant by “West.”
It refers to Rabbi Yosi b. Chanina (his academy?). Apparently, some scholars in Israel had no
problem laughing at explanations which they felt were ridiculous (e.g., Babylonian Talmud, Nazir
42a; Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 109a). This is the Talmudic way of saying that the Israeli
sages thought the explanations of the Babylonian sages were absurd. In Sanhedrin 109a, the
discussion involves the sin of the Generation of the Dispersion that built the Tower of Babel (see
Genesis 11:1-4). The Torah does not actually disclose how they sinned. The Babylonian scholars
of Rabbi Shela’s academy said that they wanted to build a tower, ascend to the sky, and strike it
with axes to make its water flow. In other words, they wanted a constant source of rain and thus
never have to pray to God (ArtScroll). The reason for the laughter was because if this was the
reason, they should have built the tower on a mountain, not a valley. In Nazir 42a, the expression
is used to mock an objection raised by Rabbi Yosi b. Chanina to a statement dealing with the laws
of the nazirite. Here it must be referring to a different academy in Israel.

“They Laughed at It”

The Talmud was trying to understand what is meant by the statement: “Human dignity is so great
that it supersedes even a negative commandment of the Torah” (Babylonian Talmud, Berachos
19b). It is obvious that human dignity does not supersede every prohibition in the Torah. Rav b.
Shabba interpreted this to mean the verse that states (Deuteronomy 17:11): “You shall not deviate
from the word that they [the rabbis] will tell you, right or left.” They laughed at the statement

26
because they thought he meant the authority of the rabbis to interpret the Torah. Rabbi Kahana
said to them “If a great man like Rav b. Shabba says something, you should not laugh at it.” Rabbi
Kahana then explained what Rav b. Shabba meant (Babylonian Talmud, Berachos 19b).
Incidentally, human dignity generally supersedes rabbinical law.

“Stuff it down Shabba’s Throat”

Rav b. Shabba does better in this story. At least he is not forced to eat liver. Rav b. Shabba did not
eat it because he followed the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Yochanan b. Beroka, that
well-cooked liver is prohibited because it absorbed the blood that was emitted during the cooking
process (Babylonian Talmud, Chillin 111a). The fact that the name of Rav b. Shabba’s father was
used makes it apparent that Rabbi Nachman was angry and did not want to use the first name. The
commentaries discuss why Rabbi Nachman 11 wanted the liver stuffed down Rav b. Shabba’s
throat when people are permitted to take on stringencies. Student (2012) discusses the issue of
students disagreeing with their teachers. He notes that the Minchas Elazar (4:6) enumerates several
cases where Talmudic sages disagreed with their fathers and/or teachers. He mentions this story:

Individualistic behavior

The Gemara (Chullin111a) tells how one of R. Nachman’s students refused to eat the liver served
in the teacher’s home out of concern for the view that liver is forbidden even when broiled. When
R. Nachman realized what was happening, he used colorful language to instruct the other student
to force the reluctant student to eat the liver. He would not allow a student to follow a different
view, to disagree with him, at least in his home. I suspect that most Torah teachers are more tolerant
of individualistic behavior.

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“Vinegar son of Wine”

Rabbi Elazar the son of Rabbi Shimon (b. Yochai) became a police officer for the king. His job
was to apprehend robbers. He was very good at his job and arrested many robbers.

The Roman authorities executed them. He was criticized for doing this by Rabbi Yehoshua ben
Korcha who sent him the following message: “Vinegar son of wine! How long will you hand over
the people of our God to their execution!” His response was: “I am ridding the vineyard of its
thorns!” Rabbi Yeshoshua replied: “Let the Master of the vineyard come and get rid of His thorns
Himself” (Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 83b). “Vinegar son of Wine” was Rabbi Yehoshua’s
way of criticizing Rabbi Elazar b. the son of the great scholar Rabbi Shimon b. Yochai. He was
making it clear that what he was 12 doing was wicked. Both father and son hid from the Romans
in a cave for 13 years (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbos 33b-34a). All they had for sustenance were
carobs and water. The reason they had to go into hiding was because Rabbi Shimon b. Yochai was
critical of the Romans. This is what he said about the Romans: “All that they made they made for
themselves; they built marketplaces, to set harlots in them; bathhouses, to beautify themselves;
bridges, to levy tolls for them” (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbos 33b).

It is ironic that Elazar b. Shimon went to work for the Roman authorities. He is known in the
Talmud for his huge stomach (Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 84a). One can safely assume that
this huge belly did not come from carobs and water.

“The Children of Keturah”

Rabbi Yosef called the people in the “West” who laughed at what he said, “the children of
Keturah.” He had made a statement about the minimum dimensions of the altar. They were not
supposed to make the altar for the Temple smaller than that which was made by Moses in the
wilderness for the Tabernacle; the Tabernacle was portable. Rabbi Yosef stated that the minimum
was one cubit square. He was ridiculed by the “West” since the Torah clearly states that the altar
made by Moses was five cubits square (Exodus 27: 1). Abaye explained that Rabbi Yosef must
have been referring to the place of the pile. Rabbi Yosef then referred to those that ridiculed him
as “the children of Keturah.”

This expression was also used by Rabbi Tarfon. He was studying with his sister’s children who
did not say anything. To get them to speak, he purposely misquoted the verse in the Torah (Genesis
25:1): “Abraham proceeded and took a wife whose name was Yochani.” His nephews immediately
corrected him and said the name of the wife is Keturah 13 (not Yochani). He then referred to them
as “the children of Keturah” to indicate that they were ignoramuses who did not know halacha.
Abraham married Keturah after Sarah died. Sarah was his foremost wife and gave birth to
Yitzchak, father of Jacob. Abraham had six sons with Keturah (Genesis 25: 1-2): Zimran, Jokshan,
Medan, Midian, Ishbak, and Shuah.

These children had a much lower status and do not bury Abraham when he dies (Genesis 25:9).
Several of the nations that came from those six children became enemies of the Jewish people.
Rabbi Tarfon seems to have had a temper and been harsh with his nephews. He was unusual in
that he even swore by the life of his children.

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Thus, he used the expression “May I bury my children if this is not a stricken law which the listener
heard but erred” (Oholoth 16:1; see also Babylonian Talmud, Shabbos 116a). This expression is
vaguely reminiscent of an expression some use today: “I swear on my mother’s grave.” After
Rabbi Tarfon died, Rebbi went to his town and asked the residents: “Did that righteous man, who
was accustomed to ‘cutting down’ his children, whenever he took an oath, leave a son?”
(Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 85a).

Rebbi was afraid that the curse of a sage, even if made conditionally, is so powerful that it may
work even when the condition is fulfilled (Babylonian Talmud, Maakos 11a; Berachos 56a). It
turned out that Rabbi Tarfon’s children had died and all that was left was a grandson from a
daughter. He was so handsome that harlots that “were hired for two [zuz], hired him for eight” to
sleep with them. Rebbi got him to repent by offering his daughter in marriage (Babylonian Talmud,
Bava Metzia 85a).

“Demented Yarud [Ostrich]”

There is no question that Rabbi Abahu was playfully referring to his student, Rabbi Zera, as a
demented yarud. Rabbi Zera was a sage who was very strict about not laughing because he
concurred with the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan who stated in the name of Rabbi Shimon b. Yochai:
“It is forbidden for a person to fill his mouth with levity in this world” (Babylonian Talmud,
Berachos 31a). Rabbi Zera’s student, Rabbi Yirmiyah, on the other hand would ask his teacher
funny questions in order to get him to laugh (Babylonian Talmud, Niddah 23a). The Chavos Yair
(Responsum 152) discussed in the ArtScroll Talmud claims that Rabbi Abahu was critical of his
student because he was too much of an ascetic. Rabbi Abahu felt that Rabbi Zera’s excessive
asceticism and fasting affected his ability to think clearly. This is why he was so critical. Perhaps
this is why Rabbi Yirmiyah worked so hard to get Rabbi Zera to laugh. Most of the Talmudic sages
were opposed to living the ascetic life.

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Conclusion

Plester & Sayers (2007) describe how people working at three different IT companies use amusing
“banter” to strengthen workplace relationships. The term banter is a kind of spirited, playful
teasing whose purpose is to deflate another person’s ego in a humorous way. It is part of what
employees see as a “fun” organizational culture. Plester & Sayers also note that banter strengthens
the cohesion of the in-group. Many of the Talmudic insults can be seen this way. It is well known
that the ideal study partnership in the Talmud involves finding a “bar-plugta,” (a debating partner)
to disagree with (Friedman, 2014). Rosenberg & Rosenberg (2016) state: “law tends to be dry as
dust and just as forgettable. What better way to bring the law to life than to infuse it with the
excitement of drama and to use language that stirs the emotions and imagination?” Talmudic
arguing with its vibrant language has the same effect. Unfortunately, arguing often results in insults
being hurled. Rubenstein (2003: 58) posits that “the more intense the debate, the greater the
potential that it will break down into insults.” There is always the risk that an insult can be seen as
harsh rather than playful or part of the disagreeing process. Rubenstein (2003: 59) makes the point:

This could even happen between close friends and spouses. One party says something mean and
later regrets, but it is too late. This story in the Talmud illustrates what could result if a dispute got
too intense.

Despite all this, it seems that insults were used quite often among Talmudic sages, not only with
teachers and disciples. Dratch (2014) makes the following observation about Talmudic disputes:

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It is clear that some insults in the Talmud caused serious problems and did not end well: In
particular, the dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish where the former said: “A robber
understands the tools of his trade.” The story of Abdan and Yishmael b. Yosi also had a disastrous
conclusion. Given that there are thousands of disputes over Jewish law in the Talmud, one might
even be surprised at how few of them resulted in disparaging remarks or insults.

Perhaps the most important lesson derived from these examples is that even sages have to be
careful when using sarcasm, insults, and derision as a tool to enhance the disputation process. The
sages of the Talmud felt that the ideal way to learn from a mentor was by observing them and
seeing how they applied the law.

The Talmud relates that Rabbi Akiva followed his teacher into the latrine and learned three things
from his behavior there. Rabbi Kahana hid under his teacher, Rav’s bed. Some sages were
surprised at this brazen behavior. The answer given was: “This too is Torah and I need to learn”
(Babylonian Talmud, Berachos 62a). The proper way to admonish and insult is also Torah and we
all need to learn how to do it properly.

References

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