Daf Ditty Succah 21: Healing Leaves

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZEMCeymW1Ow

I return to you, and you are dying again

Golden leaves gloriously reflecting the brilliant sun
Anxiety-ridden
For a week or two you will be dead-on-the-ground
A darkening browny rust trodden leaf
Ve-emunascha baleilot
I hereby promise to wait for you
Once again Another year
Or at least the winter
I believe in your eternal return
That you will grow anew.
It is the same you
1
 A genetic promise
This tree same shape same color.

So I will wait out the winter ahead

Watch this tree
Naked in the snow
Brown and bereft
And remember these few days
Of golden sunlit rustling
When we were together
And I blessed you

I promise to witness your dying

And your birth in the spring
A greenhorn
You will not recognize me
We will need to get re-acquainted
No matter
I look forward to it
And then next year as you take your leave once more
You too will realize
It was all about waiting and faith
And hope and promise.

Julian Ungar-Sargon

2
The mishna relates that Rabbi Shimon said, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda: There was
an incident involving Tavi, the Canaanite slave of Rabban Gamliel who was sleeping beneath
the bed, and Rabban Gamliel claimed that Tavi did so because he was a Torah scholar and knew
that slaves are exempt from the mitzva of sukka. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon said:
From the conversation of Rabban Gamliel we learned two matters. We learned that
Canaanite slaves are exempt from the mitzva of sukka, and we learned that one who sleeps
beneath the bed did not fulfill his obligation.

The Gemara questions the formulation of the baraita. And let Rabbi Shimon say: From the
statement of Rabban Gamliel. Why did he use the atypical expression: From the conversation of
Rabban Gamliel?

The Gemara answers: Through this expression he teaches us another matter in passing, like that
which Rabbi Aḥa bar Adda said, and some say that Rabbi Aḥa bar Adda said that Rabbi
Hamnuna said that Rav said: From where is it derived that even the conversation of Torah
scholars require analysis, even when the intention of the speaker was apparently not to issue a
halakhic ruling? It is as it is stated with regard to the righteous:

-‫ַפְּלֵגי‬-‫ ָשׁתוּל ַﬠל‬,‫ְכֵּﬠץ‬ --‫ג ְוָהָיה‬ 3 And he shall be like a tree planted by streams of water, {N}
:‫ָמ ִים‬ that bringeth forth its fruit in its season, and whose leaf doth
-‫ ְוָﬠֵלהוּ ל ֹא‬--‫ ִיֵתּן ְבִּﬠתּוֹ‬,‫ֲאֶשׁר ִפּ ְריוֹ‬ not wither; and in whatsoever he doeth he shall prosper.
.‫ַיֲﬠֶשׂה ַיְצִליַח‬-‫ִיבּוֹל; ְוֹכל ֲאֶשׁר‬
Psalm 1:3

“Which brings forth its fruit in its season and whose leaf does not wither” This teaches that
with regard to a Torah scholar, not only is his primary product, his fruit, significant but even
ancillary matters that stem from his conversation, his leaves, are significant.

3
MISHNA: One who supports his sukka on the legs of the bed, i.e., he leans the sukka roofing
on a bed, the sukka is fit. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the sukka cannot stand in and of itself without
support of the bed, it is unfit.

4
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the statement of Rabbi Yehuda deeming
this sukka unfit? Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Abba bar Memel disagree with regard to the rationale.
One said: It is unfit because it lacks permanence.

The sukka is not stable enough, as if the bed is moved the sukka will collapse. And one said: It is
unfit because he is supporting the roofing with an object that is susceptible to ritual impurity,
as the bedframe is a vessel.

Not only the roofing, but that which supports the roofing as well may not be susceptible to ritual
impurity.

5
The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between them? The Gemara explains: The
difference is in a case where one wedged iron skewers into the ground and roofed the sukka
upon them. According to the one who said that the reason the sukka is unfit is because it lacks
permanence, this sukka has permanence, and it is fit. However, the one who said the reason the
sukka is unfit is because he is supporting the roofing with an object that is susceptible to ritual
impurity, he is supporting it with an object that is susceptible to ritual impurity, so it is unfit.

6
Abaye said: The Sages taught this dispute only in a case where one leaned the roofing on the
bed. However, if one placed the roofing atop the bed, i.e., he affixed poles to the bed and the
roofing is supported by those poles, everyone agrees that the sukka is fit.

What is the reason that it is fit? According to the one who said that the sukka is unfit because
it lacks permanence, this sukka has permanence as even if the bed is moved, the roofing will
move with it and will not collapse.

And according to the one who said the sukka is unfit because he supports it with an object that
is susceptible to ritual impurity, in this case he is not supporting it with an object that is
susceptible to ritual impurity, as the roofing is not supported by the bed.

Summary

7
A fantastical story illustrates the rabbis' concern regarding similarities between tents and sukkot
regarding ritual impurity.1 The story involves the rituals surrounding the red heifer, which
required the utmost strictness regarding ritual purity. Apparently, some women and children - we
are not told whom these people are - resided in courtyards atop of rocks. We learn that children
had no opportunities to come into contact with ritual impurity (however, we know that women
menstruated and even gave birth in this place; beneath the rocks there could be "graves in the
depths").

Children aged seven and eight are said to have been responsible for collecting and delivering cups
of water critical to the red heifer rituals. The courtyards were made by people, and the rabbis agree
that the legal status of a naturally existing tent is the same as that of a human-made tent. I am not
clear on how they reach this conclusion based on their story.

After wondering whether these children sat on doors or oxen, the rabbis wonder about creative
understandings of 'tents'. Do animals act as tents? They protect shoes and other items place
beneath them, right? Oxen also protect shepherds from the sun, "and the rain from the rain". A
quote from Job (10:11) reminds us that the backs/skin of oxen and other animals, including
humans, are created to protect our innards. Thus oxen are not like tents.

The rabbis continue to argue. Are sukkot temporary or permanent residences? Are tents
temporary or permanent residences? They digress and discuss a verse from Psalms 1:3: "...Which
brings forth fruit in its season and whose leaves do not wither." The rabbis take this to mean that
the conversations of the rabbis are of great importance - the fruit, the leaves, and the stems. This
justifies their conversations today regarding oxen. All parts of their discussions are of value.

1 https://dafyomibeginner.blogspot.com/2014/02/
8
We end the daf with a new Mishna: the Rabbis say that a sukka is fit if supported by two legs of a
bed. Rabbi Yeduda teaches that the sukka is fit only if it can stand on its own. The rabbis argue
about this possibility, wishing to avoid situations where the sukka is truly supported by the bed,
where the bed frame could impart ritual impurity, and where the bed might render the sukka a
temporary or permanent residence.

Today it struck me that the rabbis are spending much time and effort on beds in sukkot. Were they
used there for structural purposes? It seems more likely that people were moving their beds into
their sukkot so that they could truly dwell there over the Festival. But how big were these sukkot
to house beds, eating areas, living spaces, etc.? We know that there is no limitation on the size of
a sukka. Perhaps they were huge! But what about the poor, who could not afford such space? And
what about those who were making the pilgrimage to Jerusalem - did they also move their beds
into the sukka? Much easier today, with cushions and sleeping bags.

The person uses his bedposts to support the sukkah. The sages and R. Judah dispute whether this
sukkah is valid if it cannot stand without the support from the bedposts.
The Talmud tries to explain why R. Judah disqualifies such a sukkah. There are two amoraic
opinions, but as sometimes happens, the Talmud doesn’t know which statement goes with which
amora. In any case, one amora holds that R. Judah disqualifies the sukkah because it is not
permanent enough. As we have seen a few times, the amoraim say that R. Judah requires that the
sukkah have a relatively high degree of permanence. The other opinion holds that the problem is
that the sukkah is propped up on something that is susceptible to impurity, namely the bed.
The Talmud will now explore the ramifications of the differences between these two opinions.
These two opinions would differ if someone made a sukkah by sticking four iron stakes in the
ground and using them to hold up the sekhakh. The sukkah would be directly supported by
something that receives impurity, and therefore the amora who explains that R. Judah disqualifies
a sukkah propped up by something susceptible to impurity would also hold that R. Judah would
disqualify this sukkah. However, this sukkah is permanent, or at least more permanent than one
supported by a bed. So the other amora would say that R. Judah allows this sukkah.
Abaye limits R. Judah’s disqualification to a case where he supported the sekhakh with the
bedposts. If he, props up the sekhakh in another way (such as putting iron posts into the ground),
but the beds serve as walls of the sukkah the sukkah is valid. This sukkah is permanent because it
is not attached to the bed nor is it propped up by the bed.

Daf Shevui writes:2

The person uses his bedposts to support the sukkah. The sages and R. Judah dispute whether this
sukkah is valid if it cannot stand without the support from the bedposts.

The Talmud tries to explain why R. Judah disqualifies such a sukkah. There are two amoraic
opinions, but as sometimes happens, the Talmud doesn’t know which statement goes with which
amora. In any case, one amora holds that R. Judah disqualifies the sukkah because it is not
permanent enough. As we have seen a few times, the amoraim say that R. Judah requires that the
sukkah have a relatively high degree of permanence. The other opinion holds that the problem is

2 https://www.sefaria.org/Sukkah.21b.10?lang=bi&p2=Daf_Shevui_to_Sukkah.21b.15-18&lang2=bi
9
that the sukkah is propped up on something that is susceptible to impurity, namely the bed.
The Talmud will now explore the ramifications of the differences between these two opinions.

These two opinions would differ if someone made a sukkah by sticking four iron stakes in the
ground and using them to hold up the sekhakh. The sukkah would be directly supported by
something that receives impurity, and therefore the amora who explains that R. Judah disqualifies
a sukkah propped up by something susceptible to impurity would also hold that R. Judah would
disqualify this sukkah. However, this sukkah is permanent, or at least more permanent than one
supported by a bed. So the other amora would say that R. Judah allows this sukkah.

Abaye limits R. Judah’s disqualification to a case where he supported the sekhakh with the
bedposts. If he, props up the sekhakh in another way (such as putting iron posts into the ground),
but the beds serve as walls of the sukkah the sukkah is valid. This sukkah is permanent because it
is not attached to the bed nor is it propped up by the bed.

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:3

A bed without shade

The Mishna states that one who sleeps under a bed inside a Sukkah does not fulfill his obligation.
The Gemara explains that this is referring to a bed which is higher than ten tefachim, which creates
a barrier between the person and the Sukkah.

The Rishonim question this, as we find elsewhere that something which is even a tefach high is
considered an ohel. Why, then, is there a concern only regarding a bed that is ten tefachim high?
The Rif writes that the reason one does not fulfill his obligation of dwelling in a Sukkah is because
the bed is ten tefachim, and this would constitute a Sukkah within a Sukkah and for this reason
one does not fulfill his obligation.

There are various challenges to the explanation of the Rif. The Baal HaMaor disagrees with the
Rif. The Ramban in Milchamos offers a novel approach that explains why one who sleeps under a
bed inside the Sukkah does not fulfill his obligation. The Ramban writes that the s’chach on top
of the Sukkah is deemed to be invalid with regard to the space under the bed. The reason for this
is because the s’chach cannot provide shade under the bed as the bed is providing shade. One
would assume that the Sukkah should be valid, but one cannot fulfill his obligation. Thus,
according to the Ramban, the Sukkah is invalid with regard to the one sleeping under the bed,
because the Sukkah is not providing the person with shade.

Supports for the s’chach

The Gemara states that one should not support the s’chach with something that is susceptible to
tumah. Since many people are currently engaged in constructing their Sukkah, it would be

3 http://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Sukkah-Daf-Notes-21.pdf
10
appropriate to mention some of the halachos pertaining to the support for the s’chach. These
halachos are quoted with sources in the Sefer Nitei Gavriel from Rav Gavriel Zinner.

Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 629 rules that it is preferable not to place the s’chach on something
which is susceptible to tumah. It is also preferable that one should not place something which is
susceptible to tumah on top of the s’chach in order that the s’chach should not scatter or fall. This
issue was discussed previously on Daf 13 regarding kernels of grain.

This Halacha is true even if it is only rabbinically susceptible to tumah. There are authorities who
maintain that the supporting beams for the s’chach should not be more than four tefachim wide
whereas other opinions maintain that this is not a necessary requirement. One is allowed to place
the s’chach directly on a stone wall, but some opinions rule stringently and maintain that one
should place reeds on top of the wall under the s’chach. Most halachic authorities rule that one
does not have to be particular regarding the supports for the supporting beams of the s’chach.

The Pri Megadim, however, rules that one should not attach his supports to the Sukkah with nails
and pegs in a manner that without those supports the boards would fall. The Chazon Ish rules
similarly. If one would use screws in order that the beams should not move from their positions,
this would not be a concern. Even if one supports the s’chach with something that is susceptible
to tumah, and certainly if he has no other option, it does not invalidate the Sukkah.

Shabbos and the Torah scholar

The Gemara states that even the casual conversation of Torah scholars requires study. The Zohar
states that a Torah scholar is in the category of Shabbos. One should be careful to minimize his
speech on Shabbos. This idea is alluded to in this Gemara because a Torah scholar, who is in the
category of Shabbos, is careful with his speech.

NOT "KEVA": SECHACH PLACED ON THE LEGS OF A BED

In the Mishnah, the Tana Kama and Rebbi Yehudah disagree about a Sukah constructed by placing
Sechach atop the legs of a bed. The Tana Kama says that such a Sukah is valid. Rebbi Yehudah
says that it is not valid.

The Gemara gives two reasons for Rebbi Yehudah's opinion. According to one Amora, he
invalidates the Sukah because it is not "Keva." Another Amora says that he invalidates the Sukah
because it is supported by an object that can become Tamei (see following Insight).
What does the Gemara mean when it says that Rebbi Yehudah invalidates the Sukah because it is
not "Keva"?

RASHI explains that since the bed-poles support the Sukah, when one moves the bed the Sukah
also moves, and a movable Sukah is not a "Diras Keva," a permanent dwelling place. Rebbi
Yehudah invalidates this Sukah because he requires that a Sukah be a "Diras Keva" (7b).
11
However, the Mishnah later (22b, and cited on 7b) says that a Sukah may be built on top of a
wagon or camel, which implies that a movable Sukah is valid. Rashi apparently maintains that
Rebbi Yehudah disagrees with the Halachah expressed in that Mishnah, just as Raban Gamliel
disagrees with it (TOSFOS DH she'Ein Lah). It is possible that Rebbi Yehudah agrees with the
other ruling in the Mishnah there, that a Sukah built on a boat is valid, because in that case the
Sukah is considered stationary and "Keva." A boat on water is never fully stationary, and thus any
position of the boat is considered a stationary position (see Tosfos).

According to this explanation, the Halachah should not follow the view of Rebbi Yehudah in this
case. A Sukah made by placing Sechach on the legs of a bed should be valid, because this is the
Halachah with regard to the case of a Sukah atop a wagon.

The RAN gives a different answer to reconcile the ruling of the Mishnah later with Rebbi
Yehudah's ruling. In the case of a Sukah on the legs of a bed, the floor of the Sukah is the ground
beneath the bed; the Sechach is merely supported by the bed-poles. In that case, when the bed is
moved, the Sechach is moved to cover an entirely different area of floor. In contrast, a Sukah built
on a wagon has the floor of the wagon as its floor, and thus as the wagon moves the Sukah's floor
moves with it and does not change. Therefore, even though the Halachah is that a Sukah on a
wagon is valid, the Halachah can also follow the view of Rebbi Yehudah in the case of a Sukah
on a bed (and the Sukah is invalid).

According to the Ran's explanation, when the Gemara concludes that the Sukah is valid when the
Sechach is placed over the bed (and is not supported by the legs of the bed), it means that the
Sechach is placed on the bed in such a way that the bed is the floor of the Sukah. When the bed
moves, the floor of the Sukah also moves.

TOSFOS and the RAMBAN quote the Yerushalmi and explain that "Keva" here means that this
Sukah is not a residence in which one easily lives, because there are less than ten Tefachim from
the top of the bed until the roof of the Sukah. Since it is not a residence that can be used in a normal
way, it is not a valid Sukah.
The RA'AVAD on the Rif explains that the Sukah is not on the bed itself, but rather the bed
supports the Sukah on one side. When one moves the bed to sleep in it, the whole Sukah will
tumble down. Therefore, it is like a Sukah which cannot endure a Ru'ach Metzuyah (a wind of
ordinary strength; that is, normal usage will cause it to fall down). Such a Sukah is invalid (even
according to those who permit a Sukah which is a "Diras Arai," on 22a).

NOT "MA'AMID": SECHACH PLACED ON THE LEGS OF A BED

In the Mishnah, the Tana Kama and Rebbi Yehudah disagree about a Sukah constructed by placing
Sechach atop the legs of a bed. The Tana Kama says that such a Sukah is valid. Rebbi Yehudah
says that it is not valid.

The Gemara gives two reasons for Rebbi Yehudah's opinion. According to one Amora, he
invalidates the Sukah because it is not "Keva" (see previous Insight). Another Amora says that he
invalidates the Sukah because it is supported by an object that can become Tamei.
12
RASHI explains that the object ("Ma'amid") which serves to support the Sechach is considered
like the Sechach itself, and thus if it can become Tamei it is invalid, just like Sechach itself which
can become Tamei. However, there are several sources that seem to contradict this law of Ma'amid:

(a) Rava (15b) discusses Sechach placed on metal rods atop a Sukah. He rules that when the
Sechach is placed across the rods the Sukah is valid even though the Sechach is supported by the
rods. Why is the Sukah valid? It should be invalid because the Sechach is supported by a Ma'amid
which is Mekabel Tum'ah.

(b) The Mishnah (22b) says that a Sukah built atop a tree is valid. Why is it valid? The Sukah is
supported by the tree, which is attached to the ground. Since any object attached to the ground is
invalid for use as Sechach, a Ma'amid that is attached to the ground should invalidate the Sukah
as well.

(c) Common practice is to allow the Sechach of a Sukah to be supported by a solid wall made of
bricks or cement (manufactured from rock, sand, or clay). Those materials are not valid for use as
Sechach (as the RITVA states on 4a, 11b, and at the end of 21b). Why, then, may such a wall be
used as a Ma'amid?

Apparently, Rava rules that Sechach may be supported by metal rods because he maintains that
the reasoning for Rebbi Yehudah's ruling in the Mishnah here is that a Sukah built on top of the
legs of a bed is not "Keva." Rava does not agree with the Amora who says that Rebbi Yehudah
invalidates a Sukah built on the legs of a bed because the Ma'amid is Mekabel Tum'ah. Therefore,
Rava permits Sechach to be supported on an object which is Mekabel Tum'ah. (KORBAN
NESANEL)

With regard to a Sukah built in a tree, the RA'AVAD explains that Sechach supported by a
Ma'amid that is Mekabel Tum'ah is invalid only mid'Rabanan. The Rabanan enacted a Gezeirah to
prevent people from thinking that just as an object which is Mekabel Tum'ah may be used as a
Ma'amid, so, too, it may be used as the Sechach itself. Since it is an uncommon practice to build a
Sukah in a tree, the Rabanan did not apply their Gezeirah in such a case.
The RAMBAN and RITVA answer that even if Sechach supported by a Ma'amid that is Mekabel
Tum'ah is invalid mid'Oraisa, as Rashi says ("Ma'amid is considered like Sechach"), perhaps the
Mishnah's case of a Sukah in a tree refers to Sechach that is supported by wooden boards, and
those boards are supported by the tree. The tree itself does not directly support the Sechach; it
merely supports the boards which in turn support the Sechach. Accordingly, the tree is "a Ma'amid
of a Ma'amid" (Ritva; see following Insight), and therefore it is no different from every other Sukah
which ultimately is supported by the ground (which may not be used for Sechach).

The RAN suggests logical grounds for the common practice to use a solid wall (made of bricks or
cement) to support the Sechach of a Sukah. First, it is highly uncommon that one uses earth or
stone for the Sechach of a Sukah. Therefore the Ra'avad's reasoning (see (b) above) applies in this
case as well.

13
Second, the Ran and Ritva explain that everyone knows that earth or stone cannot be used for
Sechach, because such a roof is that of a permanent house and not that of a temporary Sukah. Since
everyone knows that such material cannot be used for Sechach, there is no basis to prohibit it from
being used as the Ma'amid for Sechach, because no one will confuse the Ma'amid with the Sechach.
(This approach justifies the practice to support Sechach on a stone wall only according to the view
of the Ra'avad, who says that the Isur of Ma'amid is mid'Rabanan. It does not justify the practice
according to the view of Rashi, who maintains that the Isur of Ma'amid is mid'Oraisa.)

"MA'AMID" AND "MA'AMID D'MA'AMID"

In the Mishnah, Rebbi Yehudah says that a Sukah constructed by placing Sechach atop the legs of
a bed is not valid. The Gemara gives two reasons for Rebbi Yehudah's opinion. According to one
Amora, he invalidates the Sukah because it is not "Keva." Another Amora says that he invalidates
the Sukah because it is supported by an object that can become Tamei. Since such an object may
not be used as Sechach, it also may not be used to support the Sechach.

This issue is very relevant in practice. Is one permitted to use metal rods to support the Sechach of
his Sukah? May one secure the Sechach by tying it with processed strings of cotton or linen?
Similarly, may one use metal nails to hold down the boards which support the Sechach?

(a) In the Mishnah, the Rabanan argue with Rebbi Yehudah. The BA'AL HA'ME'OR rules that
the Halachah follows the view of the Rabanan. He rules this way apparently because that opinion
is the opinion of the majority, or, as the RA'AVAD explains the Ba'al ha'Me'or's intention, because
the Mishnah later (22b) permits one to place Sechach on a portable object or on an object which
may not be used as Sechach itself.

(b) Other Rishonim assert that since the Amora'im discuss the reason for Rebbi Yehudah's ruling,
the Halachah follows his opinion. Accordingly, a Sukah built by placing Sechach on the legs of a
bed is invalid. (According to the ROSH, the Rabanan and Rebbi Yehudah do not even argue;
Rebbi Yehudah merely explains the opinion of the Rabanan.)

The Amora'im give two reasons for Rebbi Yehudah's opinion. The ROSH says that the primary
reason is because such a Sukah is not "Keva." He accepts the definition of "Keva" as explained by
Tosfos and the Ramban in the name of the Yerushalmi (see Insights to 21:1:b): Rebbi Yehudah
disqualifies the Sukah because its Sechach is too low (it is less than ten Tefachim from the top of
the bed) and thus it is not "Keva." This is how the SHULCHAN ARUCH (OC 630:3) rules.

However, the RAMBAN, RITVA, and RAN rule stringently and maintain that the Halachah also
follows the second reason -- that one may not support Sechach with an item that is Mekabel
Tum'ah. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 629:7) indeed writes that it is questionable whether one may
use a Ma'amid that is Mekabel Tum'ah.4

4 Some, however, explain the words of the Shulchan Aruch differently. They explain that the Shulchan Aruch rules elsewhere
(OC 628) that rods, which are Mekabel Tum'ah, may be used as a Ma'amid.
14
HALACHAH: The SHA'AR HA'TZIYUN (OC 630:60) lists many Rishonim who place no
limits on the type of Ma'amid that may be used to support the Sechach. Therefore, he concludes
that although it is best to be stringent l'Chatchilah and use only a Ma'amid that is fit to serve as
Sechach, b'Di'eved the Sukah is valid even with a Ma'amid that is Mekabel Tum'ah.

What is the Halachah with regard to a "Ma'amid d'Ma'amid" -- a Ma'amid of a Ma'amid? This
refers to an object that supports the Ma'amid that in turn supports the Sechach. Is the Sukah valid
when the object that supports the Ma'amid that supports the Sechach is itself not valid for Sechach?
The MAGEN AVRAHAM and the VILNA GA'ON (in his comments to the Shulchan Aruch OC
629:8) rule that a Ma'amid of a Ma'amid is permissible even though it can be Mekabel Tum'ah.
The proof is that the Ramban, Ritva, and Ran -- who say that one should be stringent when it comes
to a Ma'amid -- explain that if one supports the Sechach on wooden poles (a valid Ma'amid) that
are supported by a bed, the Sukah is valid even though the bed is Mekabel Tum'ah and supports
the Ma'amid (that is, the bed is a Ma'amid of a Ma'amid).

The CHAZON ISH (143:2), however, rules stringently, based on the Ramban. The Ramban
permits the use of a Ma'amid of a Ma'amid that is Mekabel Tum'ah only because the Ma'amid
(which is invalid as Sechach) is a horizontal surface that serves the same purpose as the ground
("Ma'aseh Karka b'Alma"). This reasoning applies, however, only when the invalid object serves
as the floor of the Sukah. If the object stands upright and supports the Ma'amid of the Sechach,
such as metal nails that hold down the beam that supports the Sechach, then that logic does not
permit one to use a Ma'amid of a Ma'amid that is invalid for Sechach. (The RITVA presents the
arguments of the Ramban slightly differently. According to the Ritva, the allowance to use a
Ma'amid of a Ma'amid that is invalid for Sechach applies when the secondary Ma'amid is farther
away from the Sechach than the primary Ma'amid, and not because it merely serves as the ground
of the Sukah. Accordingly, the proof of the Chazon Ish may actually be the subject of a Machlokes
Rishonim between the Ramban and Ritva.)

The Chazon Ish presents a second argument. He says that if the Ma'amid (even one which is valid
for use as Sechach) of the Sechach rests on an object that is Mekabel Tum'ah, then that Ma'amid
may no longer be used as Sechach. Consequently, the Sechach that rests on that Ma'amid is
considered to rest on an object which cannot be used as Sechach (a domino effect), and thus the
Sukah should be invalid.

However, it could be that this logic does not apply here to prohibit the use of a Ma'amid of a
Ma'amid. These Rishonim (Ramban, Ritva, Ran) maintain that a Ma'amid that is Mekabel Tum'ah
invalidates the Sukah only mid'Rabanan -- the Rabanan enacted a Gezeirah lest one err and think
that he is permitted to use such material for the actual Sechach of the Sukah. Since the Pesul of a
Ma'amid that is unfit for Sechach is only a Gezeirah d'Rabanan, the Rabanan limited their Gezeirah
to an actual Ma'amid. They did not apply it to a secondary Ma'amid.

The Chazon Ish concludes that, in practice, one should be careful not to use even a Ma'amid of a
Ma'amid that is Mekabel Tu'mah (except for the cases mentioned in the previous Insight, in which
one is permitted to use material that is invalid for Sechach as a Ma'amid according to all opinions).
As mentioned earlier, the Sha'ar ha'Tziyun writes that b'Di'eved the Sukah is valid.

15
Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:5

The second Mishnah in the perek discusses a case of someone who built his sukkah by resting it
on bedposts – al karei ha-mitah. The Tanna Kamma rules that the sukkah is fit for use; Rabbi
Yehudah rules that if the sukkah cannot stand on its own it is disqualified.

Several explanations are given that attempt to clarify the case of building a sukkah al karei ha-
mitah. Most commentaries appear to accept the definition offered by the Talmud Yerushalmi that
the bed is part of the sukkah – in effect, the floor of the sukkah. According to the Tosafot Rid, we
are talking about a case where the bed is so large that it is the size of a kosher sukkah, and
the s’chach is being placed on the four poles that extend up from the head and foot of the bed. A
similar explanation has the bed acting as support for the sukkah on one side.

The Ra’avad disagrees and offers an alternative understanding of the case in the Mishnah. He
argues that the bed is not part of the structure of the sukkah at all; it is merely near the supports for
the sechach which are leaning against it. The concern is that if the bed falls down or is removed,
without the support offered by the bed the entire sukkah may collapse. The Ramban offers another
approach, suggesting that we are talking about a case where the legs of the bed are
ten tefachim (handbreadths) high (i.e. the minimum height of a kosher sukkah), and that the bed is
turned over so that its legs are used to hold the sechach. The concern in this case is that the bed
might be removed by someone who wants to use it for its actual purpose.

As far as Rabbi Yehuda’s position is concerned – that if the sukkah cannot stand on its own it is
disqualified – the Rosh sees this comment as a clarification, rather than a disagreement with the
position of the Tanna Kamma. Other commentaries disagree, and according to them it is not clear
whether halakha follows the opinion of the Tanna Kamma or that of Rabbi Yehuda.

Mark Kerzner writes:6

Earlier we said that being under the bed in a sukkah is not considered fulfilling the mitzvah of
sukkah, and quoted a precedent for this. But why not? Usually a bed is lower than ten handbreadths,
it is not considered as a roof to shield us from the roof of the sukkah and should be nullified! - You
are right, this is correct: in the case of a low bed there is no argument, one can sleep under it.
However, the teacher was talking about a tall bed.

And yet, Rabbi Yehudah quotes a precedent that goes in the opposite direction. He says, "We were
sleeping under the bed in a sukkah in the presence of the Sages, and they did not say anything."
Now we need to explain Rabbi Yehudah's point of view. Rabbi Yehudah will say that even though

5 https://www.ou.org/life/torah/masechet_sukkah2026/
6 https://talmudilluminated.com/sukkah/sukkah21.html
16
the bed looks like a tent, it is made to lie upon it, not to hide underneath it, and thus it does not
qualify as a regular tent with a roof, regardless of geometry. Alternatively, the explanation may be
that according to Rabbi Yehudah own's opinion , sukkah has to be a permanent steady dwelling.
A bed, which is movable, is only a temporary shelter, so the steady roof of a sukkah is considered
proper roof, while the bed is not, and we can ignore it.

Sara Ronis writes:7

Let’s be honest — parenting is hard. Parents need to ensure that their children are fed, clothed,
educated and physically and emotionally healthy. On top of all of these things, a few select parents
in the time of the Temple had an additional high-wire parenting challenge: ensuring that their
children were ritually pure from birth!

There’s a whole complicated reason a parent might do this. The problem that these parents were
trying to solve was the fact that there might be dead bodies deep in the ground that no one knows
about — and they might be anywhere. Anyone who passes over this ground will become ritually
impure with death impurity, the most severe kind of impurity. The only way to really guard against
contracting death impurity is to create a platform above the ground, with a space between the
ground and the platform, to interrupt the upward flow of death impurity. (Some impurities travel
through airspace, but this one does not.)

Today’s daf explains:

Courtyards were built in Jerusalem atop the rock, and beneath was a space due to the concern
lest there is a grave in the depths. And they would bring pregnant women, and they would give
birth there in those courtyards. And they would raise their children there.

It all sounds very strange and confining. Keeping a kid on a platform for years? Why go to all this
effort?

The Gemara explains that all of this effort was “for the red heifer.” The Torah lays out the ritual
of the red heifer in Numbers 19. In order to purify someone of death impurity, the ashes of a
completely red heifer must be mixed with pure water and sprinkled on the ritually impure person
after a series of days of purification.

Here’s the problem: Since most people are ritually impure with death impurity (after all, an
unmarked grave could be anywhere!) anyone who draws the water to mix with the ashes is going
to immediately transmit the impurity to the water. So in order to complete the ritual of the red
heifer, which is designed to remove death impurity, you need to have someone who is already free
from death impurity to draw the water. Enter the children born and raised on these platforms:

And the priests would bring oxen there. And they would place doors on the backs of these oxen,
and the children would sit upon the doors and they would hold cups of stone (which are not
susceptible to ritual impurity) in their hands. When they reached the Siloam pool, they

7
Myjewishlearning.com
17
descended into the water and filled the cups with water, and ascended and sat themselves on the
doors. Rabbi Yosei says: Each child from his place on the door would lower the cup with a rope
and fill it with water due to the concern lest there is a grave in the depths.

The Gemara goes on to discuss the logistics of sitting squirmy children on doors balanced on oxen.
(Parents will relate to this challenge.)

I started this piece talking about parents making choices about how to raise their kids, but in truth
it doesn’t seem to have been the parents — or at least not the mothers — making this choice. The
Gemara says “they would bring pregnant women.” Who is they? Probably the priests. What did
the pregnant women think about spending their pregnancies and years of their lives living on
platforms? The Gemara doesn’t say.

The Gemara’s brief discussion of the extraordinary efforts that went into the ritual of the red heifer
is fascinating. It sheds light on how the rabbis think about the challenges of the red heifer ritual,
and their creative solution. But for careful readers, it also hints at the high cost of ritual purity:
Both the financial cost of building and maintaining these platforms and, far more significantly, the
profound human cost for parents and children.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:8

Towards the end of today’s daf (Sukkah 21b) we are taught a lesson from Rav that ‫שיחת תלמידי‬
‫‘ – חכמים צריכה לימוד‬the casual conversations between Torah scholars are deserving of study’, and
as the Ben Ish Chai explains (see Ben Yehoyada on Sukkah 21b), it is particularly noteworthy that
Rav is the author of this teaching since we have an example elsewhere in the Gemara where a
casual remark of Rav led to the clarification of a significant halachic ruling.

In terms of the debate, the Gemara (Chullin 111b) teaches that: ‘In a situation where fish was
placed on a [hot] meaty plate, Rav said, “it is forbidden to eat [the fish] with kutach (a dairy dip)”
while Shmuel said, “it is permitted to eat [the fish] with kutach”.’ This is because, as the Gemara
then proceeds to explain, Rav was of the opinion that the fish absorbs meat flavour from the hot
plate, whereas Shmuel was of the opinion that the flavour absorbed by the fish is secondary meat
flavour.

As the Ben Ish Chai explains, though the Gemara presents Rav’s remark as if it was taught in a
formal capacity, this was not actually the case. Instead, as Gemara Chullin proceeds to explain,
this statement was derived from something said by Rav when he went to visit his grandson Rav
Shimi bar Chiya.

While at the house of his grandson, we are told that Rav had an eye-ache, and so in order to ease
his discomfort, his family prepared an eye ointment for him on a plate. Then, sometime later, they
served him hot food on the same plate (which had been rinsed in-between). Yet, notwithstanding
this, Rav remarked that he could taste the flavour of the ointment in the food that he was eating –

8
www.rabbijohhnysolomon.com
18
from which it was inferred that Rav was of the opinion that flavour can be imparted from hot
plates.

As the Ben Ish Chai explains, ‘what we see from here is that from a casual conversation of Rav,
a significant halacha was derived, and consequently, it is meaningful that Rav is the one who
taught this idea [that the casual conversations between Torah scholars are deserving of study]
because he himself had seen how this is so.’

Ultimately, many of the most important lessons which we learn from our teachers are not based
on what they say or do in a classroom, and this means that to be a committed learner, we need to
deliberately look, listen and learn from our teachers - because even when they think they are not
teaching, they often are.

Rabbi Mendel Weinbach writes:9

"Even the casual remarks of Torah scholars should be studied." This counsel of the Sage Rav is
based on King David's comparison of the Torah scholar to a "tree planted by a stream, which
produces fruit in its season and whose leaves do not wither." (Tehillim 1:3) Even the least
substantial part of this tree - the leaves, which symbolize the casual remarks of the Torah scholar
- will not go to waste.

Two different dimensions of what can be learned from the conversation of the Torah scholar appear
in Rashi's explanations here and elsewhere. In our gemara, the above counsel is cited in reference
to a statement made by Rabbi Shimon regarding his experience in the succah of Rabbi Gamliel.
Tevi, the non-Jewish slave of Rabbi Gamliel, slept under a bed in that succah. Rabbi Gamliel called
this to the attention of his colleagues by exclaiming: "Did you see what sort of Torah scholar my
slave Tevi is? He is aware that slaves are exempt from the mitzvah of succah and he therefore
sleeps under the bed."

Rabbi Shimon's report on this incident concludes that "from the casual remark of Rabbi Gamliel
we learned two things: 1) Slaves are not obligated in the mitzvah of succah; 2) One who sleeps
under a bed has not fulfilled the mitzvah of sleeping in the succah (because the covered area created
by the bed serves as a barrier between him and the succah)."

Rabbi Shimon intentionally used the term "casual conversation" rather than "words" in order to
show that even though Rabbi Gamliel was not consciously teaching words of Torah to his audience
but was only priding himself on the wisdom of his slave, there was still so much to learn in halachic
matters from this casual remark.

9 https://ohr.edu/explore_judaism/daf_yomi/the_weekly_daf/315
19
In Mesechta Avodah Zarah (19b) Rashi offers a different perspective of Rav's counsel. Even the
casual remarks of Torah scholars should be studied in order to learn from them how to express
oneself in their style of speech which is pure, rich and healing.

The two explanations are complementary rather than contradictory. When one listens carefully to
even the casual remarks of a Torah scholar he is bound to learn something he did not know before,
and how to express himself in better fashion.

Self-Evident Lessons

Rabbi Yehudah Prero writes:

If one were to examine the text of the prayers we recite, one would notice that we oft request from
G-d that He assist us in instilling in ourselves the proper level of fear of heaven and the ability to
serve Him with love. However, in one place in the prayers, this request is somewhat qualified. In
the prayer “Ahava Rabba” that precedes our recitation of She’ma, we ask that G-d “dedicate our
hearts to love and to fear” His name. We do not merely ask that G-d assist us fear and love properly;
we ask that our hearts be dedicated to such.

The reason for this special prayer of dedication, Rav Yitzchak Hutner zt”l said, can be better
understood by examining a law in the Talmud. In the beginning of the tractate Zevachim, we learn
that a divorce document written lacking intent for a specific woman is invalid, but an animal that
is sanctified without intent for a specific offering is nonetheless sanctified and may be offered. An
animal that is sanctified is merely awaiting to be used for the holy purpose to which it was
dedicated, and therefore specific intent is not needed.

It is self-evident what will occur. However, a woman, so to speak, is not “waiting to be divorced.”
If a husband desires to divorce his wife, the divorce document must be drafted with her in mind.
The lack of specific intent invalidates the document. The only way a man can evidence his desire
to divorce is with the document itself, and therefore the evidence must be clear and convincing.
There is only one way to accomplish this, and that is with manifest intent.

Very often, in our service of G-d, we may go through motions without thinking what we are doing.
We act out of habit and custom. It does not outwardly appear that our actions are motivated by
love or fear of G-d. Do we deserve credit or acknowledgment that we are devoted servants of G-d
for such actions? The answer should be no. That is why we ask G-d specifically to dedicate our
hearts to his service. If our hearts are dedicated to Him, then we are akin to that animal that is
sanctified without specific intent.

20
That specific intent is not necessary as the very nature of our beings, a heart dedicated to G-d,
makes it evident that all we do is motivated by our love and fear of G-d. Even when no specific
motive or intent is clear from our actions and deeds, if we have a heart dedicated to G-d, our love
and fear of G-d is self-evident.

The concept of self-evident motivation is true as well in a certain service of G-d that is in focus as
the holiday of Shavu’os approaches. Our daf states (Sukkah 21b)

“The conversation of Torah scholars is worthy of study, as it states (Tehillim 1:3) “and whose
leaves never wither (meaning that even the conversation of a scholar, which is compared to a
leaf, does not wither, and has Torah content itself).'”

The Talmud is telling us that the Torah scholar, whose life is dedicated to acquiring more Torah
knowledge with a thirst and passion, has conversations of a sort that differ from the layman. The
scholar is dedicated to Torah, and therefore some Torah lesson can be extracted from that which
he says. Even if the scholar has no clear intent to impart such a lesson, the very nature of his being
makes it self-evident that there is something to learn from his utterances.

On Shavu’os, we celebrate the anniversary of the nation of Israel being given the Torah at Sinai.
During the weeks leading up to Shavu’os, we have been preparing ourselves for our personal re-
acceptance of the Torah come Shavu’os. By seriously dedicating ourselves to Torah, we are
imbued with a new spirit: all we say has some Torah lesson contained within. We are sanctified to
G-d and His Torah, and our devotion becomes self-evident.

21
 Can I Use Zip-Ties To Hold Down My Sekhakh?

Dan Margulies writes:10

Last year, I received a frantic call the day before Sukkot. The query came from neighbors who
while busily erecting their sukkah. They needed to know: “Can we use zip ties to hold down
our sekhakh? We read in the OU guide at shul that it’s not allowed!” The halakhic
recommendations prepared by Rabbi Eli Gersten and reviewed by Rabbi Yaakov Luban in 2013
include the following questions and answers that would seem to prohibit the use of plastic zip-ties:

Q: How should the schach be supported?

A: One should not rest schach directly on metal or plastic, but rather on wooden beams placed on
top of the metal poles (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 629:7). If one’s mats are woven with plastic
wire, they must make sure that the schach is placed perpendicular to the wooden beams; otherwise
the stalks are being supported exclusively by the plastic wire.

Q: Can one tie their schach mats to the sukkah with string?

A: Schach mats are notorious for blowing off of the sukkah. Therefore, the mats should be tied
down. However, one should not tie the schach with wire or synthetic strings, but rather they should
use cotton or hemp string or place heavy 2x4s on top of the schach to weigh it down.”

To my mind, there’s more to this matter. A thorough analysis of the parallel sugyot in both talmuds
(m. Sukkah 2:2, y. Sukkah 52d (2:2), b. Sukkah 21b), as well as the attendant commentaries,
offers an alternate take on the halakhic sources in defense of the more lenient practice, that it is
allowed (even ab initio) to use zip-ties, and even metal wire to support the sekhakh of the sukkah.

In yeshiva shorthand, this issue is known as “maamid be-davar ha-mekabbel tumah,” that is, the
question of the permissibility of supporting the sekhakh of the sukkah with a material (like metal)
that is susceptible to tumah (impurity). Or more broadly, a material (like plastic) that is unsuitable
to be used as sekhakh. Besides the recommendations published by the OU, this Halakhah (among
the numerous laws of the walls and roof of the sukkah) has become well-known and is taken
seriously (perhaps disproportionately seriously) by many Halakhah-abiding Jews.

Sekhakh for the sukkah is limited by several criteria (Rambam Hil. Sukkah 5:1, Shulhan
Arukh, Orah Hayyim 629:1): the material must have grown from the ground (‫)גדולו מן הארץ‬, must

10 https://www.thelehrhaus.com/scholarship/can-i-use-zip-ties-to-hold-down-my-sekhakh/
22
be detached from the ground (‫)נעקר מן הארץ‬, and it must be not be susceptible to impurity ( ‫אינו‬
‫ )מקבל טומאה‬e.g. it cannot be food or any utensil (like a bowl or bed).

The Sugya

The Mishnah (m. Sukkah 2:2) presents a debate relevant to this issue between the anonymous first
opinion in the Mishnah, that of the Sages, and Rabbi Yehudah:

.‫ אם אינה יכולה לעמוד בפני עצמה פסולה‬:‫ רבי יהודה אומר‬.‫הסומך סוכתו בכרעי המטה כשרה‬

One who leans his sukkah on bed-poles—it is suitable. Rabbi Yehudah rules: If it cannot stand on
its own [i.e., without the bed-poles]—it is disqualified.

The Talmud Bavli (b. Sukkah 21b) expands and clarifies this debate between the Sages and Rabbi
Yehudah, specifically explaining how it articulates legal principles applicable beyond the case of
a sukkah built into bed-poles:

‫ מפני שמעמידה‬:‫ וחד אמר‬,‫ מפני שאין לה קבע‬:‫ חד אמר‬.‫מאי טעמא דרבי יהודה? פליגי בה רבי זירא ורבי אבא בר ממל‬
‫ הרי יש‬,‫ למאן דאמר לפי שאין לה קבע‬.‫ מאי בינייהו? כגון שנעץ שפודין של ברזל וסיכך עליהם‬.‫בדבר המקבל טומאה‬
‫ לא שנו אלא‬:‫ אמר אביי‬.‫ הרי מעמידה בדבר המקבל טומאה‬,‫לה קבע; ומאן דאמר מפני שמעמידה בדבר המקבל טומאה‬
‫ הרי יש לה קבע; למאן דאמר מפני‬,‫ מאי טעמא? למאן דאמר לפי שאין לה קבע‬.‫ אבל סיכך על גב המטה כשרה‬,‫סמך‬
.‫הרי אין מעמידה בדבר המקבל טומאה‬ ,‫שמעמידה בדבר המקבל טומאה‬

What is the reason for Rabbi Yehudah’s position? It is a debate of Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Abba
bar Mamal. One [Rabbi Zeira] says it is because it is not “fixed,” and one [Rabbi Abba] says it is
because he supports [the sekhakh] with a material which is susceptible to impurity. What [case]
distinguishes between the[ir opinions]? Consider for example if he drove metal rods [into the
ground] and covered them over [with sekhakh].

According to the one who says [Rabbi Yehudah disqualifies it] because it is not “fixed,” behold
this one is “fixed.” And according to the one who says [Rabbi Yehudah disqualifies it] because he
supports [the sekhakh] with a material which is susceptible to impurity, behold [here too] he
supports [the sekhakh] with a material which is susceptible to impurity [i.e., metal]. Abaye said:
They only stated [their opinion] in a case where he leaned [the sukkah against the bed-poles] but
if he had covered over a bed [with sekhakh] it would be suitable [even according to Rabbi
Yehudah].

What is the reason? According to the one who says [Rabbi Yehudah disqualifies it] because it is
not “fixed,” behold this one is “fixed.” And according to the one who says [Rabbi Yehudah
disqualifies it] because he supports [the sekhakh] with a material which is susceptible to impurity,
behold [here] he does not support [the sekhakh] with a material which is susceptible to impurity.

23
The sugya as presented here in the Bavli avoids any discussion of the position of the Sages. It also
avoids any attempt to prove that the Halakhah follows one opinion or another. The Rishonim,
picking up on this lacuna, discuss this question in great detail.

The claim that the sukkah must be “fixed” is talmudic shorthand for a collection of tannaitic
debates (collated and discussed on b. Sukkah 7b) about the permanence, sturdiness, and size of
the sukkah. Rabbi Yehudah is one of the proponents of this approach (m. Sukkah 1:1 where he
allows a sukkah taller than 20 amot), so Rabbi Zeira is justified in seeing that same criterion at
play here. Importantly, the opinions who require that the sukkah be fixed are mostly rejected in
favor of the opinions allowing or even requiring the sukkah to be ‫“—עראי‬casual/impermanent.”

Alfasi’s codification (Sukkah 10a, §1010) mirrors the Talmud’s cryptic formulation:

.‫ אם אינה יכולה לעמוד בפני עצמה פסולה‬:‫ רבי יהודה אומר‬.‫הסומך סוכתו בכרעי המטה כשרה‬

.‫ אבל סכך על גבי המטה – כשרה‬,‫אמר אביי לא שנו אלא סמך‬

One who leans his sukkah on bed-poles—it is suitable. Rabbi Yehudah rules: if it cannot stand on
its own—it is disqualified. Abaye said: They only stated [their opinion] in a case where
he leaned [the sukkah against the bed-poles] but if he had covered over a bed [with sekhakh] it
would be suitable [even according to Rabbi Yehudah].

Alfasi’s goal in writing his code as an abridgement of the talmud text was to make the halakhic
conclusions of the sugyot clear; it is surprising to see him quote the Mishnah in full (including the
debate) and the statement of Abaye. The reader is left wondering whether Alfasi understood
Abaye’s statement to include a conclusive determination according to Rabbi Yehudah, or if Alfasi
included it for some other reason.

Three Possible Approaches

There are basically three different approaches on how to rule in this sugya, taking into account
both the Talmud and Alfasi’s code—aligned logically along the three different opinions we have
seen.

1) We rule like the Sages against Rabbi Yehudah

2) We rule like Rabbi Yehudah, and the reasoning for his ruling is that the sukkah must be fixed,
like Rabbi Zeira

3) We rule like Rabbi Yehudah, and the reasoning for his ruling is that the sekhakh must not be
supported by a material susceptible to impurity, like Rabbi Abba

24
The Halakhah follows the Sages: The first approach is taken by Rambam and Rabbi Zerahiah ha-
Levi (“Baal ha-Maor”). Rambam expresses his opinion succinctly and clearly in his Commentary
to Mishnah (2:2):

‫ ולפיכך מצריך שתהא יכולה לעמוד בפני עצמה … ואין‬,‫ וכבר נתבארה לך שטתו‬,‫ר’ יהודה סובר סוכה דירת קבע בעינן‬
.‫הלכה כר’ יהודה‬

Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion is that the sukkah must be fixed and his opinion has already been
explained (see Rambam to m. Sukkah 1:1) therefore he requires that it be able to stand on its own
… and the Halakhah does not follow Rabbi Yehudah.

This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that Rambam does not address the case discussed in
our Mishnah at all in his Mishneh Torah.

Usually, it is reasonable to assume that Rambam and Alfasi agree in their halakhic rulings without
strong evidence to the contrary. After all, Rambam praises Alfasi’s code in his introduction to
his Commentary to Mishnah as “contain[ing] all the rulings and laws that are needed in our time.”
Rambam’s father, Maimon, was a student of Ibn Megas himself a student of Alfasi. However,
because Alfasi’s ruling is so cryptic we are still left wondering. For Rambam, our Mishnah itself
is enough proof that we rule against Rabbi Yehudah, according to the general rule of mishnaic
debates “one against many, the Halakhah follows the many.”

Why then did Alfasi quote the opinion of Abaye—itself a compromise solution that addresses both
the interpretations of Rabbi Zeira and the Rabbi Abba bar Mamal—if the Halakhah does not follow
the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah at all?

This question is strong enough that Rabbi Zerahiah ha-Levi, a fierce opponent of many of Alfasi’s
halakhic rulings, understands Alfasi to have ruled according to Rabbi Yehudah (otherwise why
cite Abaye’s conclusion). He sides with Rambam against his understanding of Alfasi, although
Rambam likely understood Alfasi to be aligned with his own ruling (see Sefat
Emet Sukkah 21b s.v. sham).

The core of this approach lies in two principles 1) that we rule like the majority against Rabbi
Yehudah and 2) the reasoning behind Rabbi Yehudah’s ruling may very well be a principle rejected
elsewhere in Sukkah. Thus, to reject Rabbi Yehudah’s stringency here is to reject his approach
globally, and we never even enter a discussion of supporting the sekhakh with a material
susceptible to impurity.

The Halakhah follows Rabbi Zeira within Rabbi Yehudah: The second approach to how to
understand the sugya and Alfasi’s ruling is developed by Tosafot (s.v. she-ein) and Rosh (2:1)
based on the parallel sugya in the Talmud Yerushalmi. The debate around Rabbi Yehudah’s
position as presented in the Yerushalmi takes a much more conclusive turn:

25
‫ והא‬.‫ אמר רבי ]א[בא משם שאין מעמידין על גבי דבר טמא‬.‫אמר רבי אימי משם שאין ממעי המיטה לסכך עשרה טפחים‬
‫’ אין תימר משם שאין‬.‫תני ‘מעשה באנשי ירושלם שהיו משלשלין מיטותיהן לפני חלונותיהן והיו מסככין על גביהן‬
‫ אלא משם שאין ממעי המיטה לסכך עשרה‬,‫מעמידין על גבי דבר טמא הרי מעמידין על גבי דבר טמא הוי לית טעמא‬
.‫טפחים‬

Rabbi Immi said [the reason behind Rabbi Yehudah’s ruling is] that there are not ten tefahim of
space from the surface of the bed to the sekhakh. Rabbi [A]bba said [the reason behind Rabbi
Yehudah’s ruling is] that one should not support [the sukkah] on top of something [that can
become] tamei. And it was taught [in t. Sukkah 2:3]: ‘A case of people in Jerusalem who used to
hang their beds out their windows and cover them with sekhakh.’

If you would say that the reason [for Rabbi Yehudah’s ruling] is that one should not support
[the sukkah] on top of something [that can become] tamei, behold they used to support [their
sukkot] on top of [beds] which can become tamei, thus that must not be the reason. Rather, it must
be that [Rabbi Yehudah disqualifies it] because there are not ten tefahim of space from the surface
of the bed to thesekhakh.

This parallel version of sugya presents another version of the debate about the rationale for Rabbi
Yehudah’s position that sheds light on our reading of the Bavli. The first explanation of the
problem R. Yehudah has with the sukkah, formulated in the Bavli (attributed to Rabbi Zeira) as “it
is not fixed,” is explicated in the Yerushalmi (attributed to Rabbi Immi) as about the amount of
airspace between the surface of the bed and the sekhakh.

Normally, the ten tefahim of vertical airspace are measured from the floor of the sukkah,
disregarding any of the furniture brought into the sukkah; here because the sukkah is built into the
bed-poles Rabbi Yehudah’s requirement of fixed-ness (i.e., sturdiness and size) requires that the
ten tefahim begin from the top surface of the bed rather than from the floor. Abaye’s solution in
the Bavli—building the sukkah around the bed rather than into it—makes perfect sense as to why
it would address this concern because once the bed is no longer a part of the sukkah but only a
piece of furniture in it, the idea to measure the ten tefahim from the surface of the bed no longer
makes sense.

In addition, after recording the debate between Rabbi Immi and Rabbi Abba, the Yerushalmi
quotes a proof against Rabbi Abba from the Tosefta; the case of the scrupulous Jerusalemites
demonstrates that supporting these sekhakh on top of a bed is not problematic at all. Thus, for the
Yerushalmi, within the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, the correct interpretation must be that of Rabbi
Immi and Rabbi Zeira— the problem is that the sukkah is not sufficiently fixed, as it needs
ten tefahim from the surface of the bed to the sekhakh.

Rabbi Immi’s interpretation of the case quoted in the Tosefta (that it would be problematic to build
a bed-sukkah with air space less than ten tefahim measured from the surface of the bed to
the sekhakh) even appears in our text of the Tosefta in situ (though not in the version quoted by
the Yerushalmi).

26
Tosafot and Rosh conclude that the flow of the sugya in both the Yerushalmi and the Bavli (when
read as a direct parallel to the Yerushalmi) indicates that the Halakhah follows the opinion of
Rabbi Zeira within Rabbi Yehudah. However, if the whole basis of Rabbi Yehudah’s approach is
his internally consistent requirement that the sukkah be fixed—an opinion rejected in the Talmud
elsewhere—how can the Halakhah accord with him here? Rosh suggests that there are two
different standards of fixed-ness.

Although Rabbi Yehudah’s global insistence on a high level of fixedness was rejected by others,
in this case, a more minimal standard (that there be ten tefachim from the surface of the bed to
the sekhakh) was adopted even by his opponents. Just because the requirement that there be
ten tefachim from the surface of the bed to the sekhakh is an example of Rabbi Yehudah’s position
on fixed-ness does not mean that it should be rejected here.

The approach of Tosafot and Rosh, corroborated by responsa of Rashba 1:213 (also cited as n.216
of those originally attributed to Ramban) and of Terumat ha-Deshen n.91, is that which was
presented by Rabbi Yosef Karo in his Beit Yosef (629 and 630, and see Darkhei Moshe ha-
Arokh 629:7) and Shulhan Arukh (Orah Hayyim 630:13) as the conclusive Halakhah:

.‫ פסולה‬,‫ כשרה; ואם לאו‬,‫הסומך סוכתו על כרעי המטה והכרעים הם מחיצות אם יש בה גובה י’ טפחים מן המטה לסכך‬

One who leans his sukkah on bed-poles, and the bed-poles are walls, if there are ten tefahim from
the surface of the bed to the sekhakh, it is suitable. And if not, it is disqualified.

Because the approach of Rosh, based on the case from the Tosefta quoted in the Yerushalmi
fundamentally rejects the interpretation of Rabbi Abba (that Rabbi Yehudah’s disqualification is
based on a concern of susceptibility to impurity) it follows that Rosh, and seemingly Shulhan
Arukh are unconcerned with this criterion. However, from Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 629:7 it
seems like Rabbi Yosef Karo is hedging his ruling to accommodate the stringency of the third
approach:

,‫ לכן אין לסכך עליו; ואפילו להניחו על הסכך להחזיקו‬:‫ הגה‬.‫יש להסתפק אם מותר להניח סולם על הגג כדי לסכך על גביו‬
.‫ כגון ספסל וכסא שמקבלין טומאת מדרס‬,‫אסור; וה”ה בכל כלי המקבל טומאה‬

It is doubtful if it is permissible to rest a ladder on the roof in order to cover it over

with sekhakh. Rema’s Gloss: Therefore one should not cover it over with sekhakh, and it is even
forbidden to place it on top of the sekhakh to secure it, and so too regarding any object that is
susceptible to impurity, like a bench or a chair which are susceptible to midras-impurity.

The doubt expressed by Rabbi Yosef Karo, and more fully explicated by Rabbi Moshe Isserles in
his gloss, is that the ladder is disqualified because it is susceptible to impurity—a concern that only
makes sense within the third approach to our sugya, following the interpretation of Rabbi Abba.

27
The Halakhah follows Rabbi Abba within Rabbi Yehudah: The third approach to the sugya is
developed by Raavad and supported by Ramban and Ran in their commentaries to Alfasi’s code,
as they characteristically rebut Rabbi Zerahiah Halevi’s critique. Rabbi Zerahiah ruled in
accordance with the Sages, understanding Alfasi to have ruled like Rabbi Yehudah. In response,
Raavad and Ramban defend the position of Rabbi Yehudah as interpreted by Rabbi Abba—that it
is unsuitable to support the sekhakh on a material that itself can become impure (and perhaps even
more broadly, the material supporting the sekhakh must itself be suitable to be used as sekhakh,
see Rosh 2:1).

This argument rests on two claims. The first is that the flow of the sugya (involved entirely in a
discussion of Rabbi Yehudah’s position) is evidence that the Halakhah follows Rabbi Yehudah,
even against the rules followed by Rambam (that is even against the majority opinion of the Sages).

The second claim is that the Halakhah should consider the opinion of Rabbi Abba, not Rabbi Zeira,
as authoritative. This is against the conclusion of the sugya as presented in the Yerushalmi, and
disregards the proof brought from the Tosefta. Nonetheless, the argument is based on the fact that
Rabbi Yehudah’s requirement that the sukkah be “fixed” is rejected elsewhere (cf. b. Sukkah 2a,
3b, 7b).

If Rabbi Yehudah’s position is adopted as authoritative here, it must be for a different reason,
namely Rabbi Abba’s rather than Rabbi Zeira’s explanation.11

It is this position—that of Raavad, Ramban, and Ran—that would disqualify a sukkah built where
the material supporting the sekhakh is itself susceptible to impurity, like a metal pole or wire.
(Synthetic materials are excluded from laws of impurity but could still be a problem if using any
non-valid sekhakh item is prohibited, a possibility Rosh 2:1 refutes.) Because of their
characteristic opposition to Rabbi Zerahiah ha-Levi’s interpretations of Alfasi and his halakhic
rulings, their defense of the position that he attributed to Alfasi may all be a back-and-forth about
a straw-man. Alfasi (and Rambam as explained above) could respond to Rabbi Zerahiah’s critique
by saying, “I actually agree with you that the Halakhah follows the Sages against Rabbi
Yehudah.”

This would leave Raavad and Ramban’s defense of this position divorced from the actual position
of Alfasi. Further frustrating their interpretation is that it does not accord with the material from
the Tosefta and Yerushalmi cited by Rosh in support of his interpretation. Nonetheless, because of
the prominence of Ramban and Ran in particular (as well as the fact that Rabbi Joel Sirkis in
his Bayit Hadash 629 s.v. ‘od strongly endorsed this approach), it entered the halakhic
conversation, and is proposed as a stringency for which to strive.

Modern Halakhic Codes

11 This ignores the clever distinction suggested by Tosafot and Rosh that there is an agreed upon lower standard of fixedness that
even Rabbi Yehudah’s opponents concede to him, but again that is based on the Yerushalmi which is not being considered here.
28
Rabbi Yosef Karo in Shulhan Arukh 629:7 claims, based on a responsum of Rashba (n.215 of
those originally attributed to Ramban) that it is “doubtful” whether one can use a ladder (which is
arguably susceptible to impurity) to secure and support the sekhakh. This indicates his willingness
to adopt the approach of Raavad, Ramban, and Ran against the approach of Rosh that he seemingly
endorses later in 630:13.

Rabbi Avraham Gombiner in Magen Avraham 629:9, citing Bayit Hadash, notes this apparent
inconsistency between the rulings recorded in Shulhan Arukh in 629:7 and 630:13, resolving it by
explaining that Rabbi Yosef Karo adopts the more stringent approach as a stringency to be
maintained ab initio when building the sukkah, but that post facto he adopts the more lenient
approach, as above.

The reconciliation suggested by Magen Avraham is dismissed by Rabbi Eliyahu of Vilna (Beur
ha-Gra 629:7) who strongly endorses the approach of Rosh that there is no problem of using a
material susceptible to impurity to support the sekhakh.

Rabbi David Segal in Taz 629:10 understands the problem with the ladder as having nothing to do
with it being a material which is susceptible to impurity supporting the sekhakh; rather the ladder
is disqualified because it is 4tefahim wide, and thus understands the Shulhan Arukh as universally
adopting the ruling of Rosh against Raavad, Ramban, and Ran.

The rulings of Rabbi Israel Meir Kagan in Mishnah Berurah and Rabbi Yehiel Mikhel Epstein
in Arukh ha-Shulhan reflect these authors’ general approaches to dealing with these sorts of
unresolved debates among medieval and early-modern commentators.

Mishnah Berurah (630:59) first notes the accepted opinion of Rosh and then the stringency of
Ramban:

‫ ומ”מ‬.‫דאף דמעמיד ע”ג מטה שהיא מקבלת טומאה לא איכפת לן בזה דקבלת טומאה על הסכך נאמר ולא על הדפנות‬
.‫ מ”א בסי’ תרכ”ט ס”ח‬,‫לכתחלה נכון להזהר בזה כי יש מן הפוסקים שמחמירין בזה‬

Even though he supports [the sekhakh] on top of a bed which can become impure, we don’t care,
because [the criterion that it not be susceptible to impurity] was stated regarding the sekhakh and
not the walls; nonetheless, ab initio it is proper to be careful regarding this because some of
the poskim are strict, seeMagen Avraham 629:8.

Mishnah Berurah adopts the more stringent approach either because he usually relies heavily
on Magen Avraham (in this case traced back through Bayit Hadash to Ramban and Ran) or
because he has a penchant suggesting legal interpretations that fulfill as many medieval approaches
as possible. However, in his Shaar ha-Tziyyun n.60, he notes that although Alfasi, Rosh, and Rabbi
Israel Isserlein (author of Terumat ha-Deshen) rejected the concern about the supporting material
being susceptible to impurity, he nonetheless was concerned that Ran and Ritva’s interpretation of
Alfasi was correct.

29
The Mishnah Berurah offers that after he explored the issue further, he discovered that many
(perhaps even the majority of medieval commentators) reject this concern including Rabbi Yitzhak
ibn Ghiyyat (Hil. Sukkah §241), Rambam, Rabbi Zerahiah ha-Levi, Rid (b. Sukkah 21b), and
Rabbi Zedekiah ben Abraham (Shibolei ha-Leket§344 quoting Rid; however he also quotes Sefer
Ha-Ittur who rules like Rabbi Yehudah). He concludes his footnote with a hedging
recommendation echoing Magen Avraham to be stringent even if the law truly accords with the
more lenient approach that would permit supporting the sekhakh with a material susceptible to
impurity:

.‫ אכן לכתחילה נכון להזהר בזה לצאת ידי כל הדעות‬,‫ובודאי יש לסמוך על דעת המקלין בזה‬

Certainly one can rely on the opinion of the lenient authorities in this matter; however, it is
proper ab initio to be careful in this matter to fulfill the requirements of all authorities.

Arukh ha-Shulhan adopts a similarly characteristic approach to this question, cutting through the
back-and-forth to a clear bottom-line recommendation based on the Yerushalmi, Rosh, and Beit
Yosef. He discusses the position of Ran, as adopted by Rabbi Yoel Sirkis in his Bayit Hadash, and
rejects it saying (Orah Hayyim 629:19):

‫למה לנו להחמיר ומה גם שכמה קושיות יש על שיטה זו … וכיון שכן הוא גם הכרעת רבותינו בעלי הש”ע והאחרונים‬
.‫אין להחמיר בזה‬

Why should we be stringent, and further there are several challenging questions against this
approach … and since this is the decision of our teachers the authors of the Shulhan Arukh and the
later authorities one should not be stringent in this matter.

Although he sides more strongly with the permissive approach, using the powerful formulation
“why should we be stringent,” he also engages with a bit of hedging (like Magen
Avraham and Mishnah Berurah v.s.) in 630:35-36:

‫ויש מי שחושש לבלי להעמיד בדבר המקבל טומאה ולכן נמנעים מלקבוע מסמורות בסכך הסוכה ונכון הוא ומ”מ בדיעבד‬
.‫אין זה פסול מפני דרוב רבותינו לא חשו לטעם מעמיד בדבר המקבל טומאה וכן הוא בירושלמי‬

And there are those who are concerned not to support [the sekhakh] with a material that can
become impure, and therefore they avoid nailing down the sekhakh of the sukkah [with metal
nails], and it is commendable; nonetheless, post facto this does not disqualify [the sukkah] because
the majority of our rabbis were not concerned with the opinion that disqualifies [a sukkah] because
[the sekhakh] is supported with a material that can become impure, and it is thus in the Yerushalmi.

Although he mentions that many (including Bayit Hadash, Magen Avraham, and Mishnah
Berurah) see the ab initio stringency as a necessity, and commends their stringency, he concludes
that the majority opinion and that which was codified in Shulhan Arukh is to be lenient, and that
this is sufficient.

30
Conclusion

In conclusion, this sugya presents a range of practical conclusions stemming from a debate that
illustrates many of the key details of talmud study: juggling different rules of adjudication—do we
follow the majority or the opinion most discussed?—balancing the weight of Bavli and
Yerushalmi, balancing the interpretations of different commentators, weighing how each of them
is quoted and used by later authorities throughout the process of codification and super-
commentary, and understanding the interplay between ab initio and post facto considerations.

Core pillars of halakhic jurisprudence—Rambam and Rosh—agree that there is no problem of

using a material susceptible to impurity as a support for the sekhakh. This is also a plausible read
of Alfasi and the Shulhan Arukh, leading me to agree with Arukh ha-Shulhan and the Vilna
Gaon that regarding the practical Halakhah, one need not be overly concerned about this
stringency.

Knowing that Raavad’s comments may have been written largely as a reaction to Rabbi Zerahiah
ha-Levi’s comments, rather than to assert his own position and reading of the sugya and of Alfasi’s
ruling, I am less inclined to adopt the interpretation of Raavad and Ramban. That said, the
suggestion to be stringent as much as possible ab initio could very well be what the Mishnah and
Alfasi really meant, and that position is certainly understandable.

In the final analysis, I am not compelled to be so overly concerned with this question to extend
this already arguable stringency beyond its explicit scope—materials susceptible to impurity—to
any material disqualified for use as sekhakh, e.g. plastic zip-ties. It is a difficult claim to make
from within the text, and it is an unnecessary stringency that makes sukkah construction more
difficult and dangerous for hard-working Jews during an already busy time of year.

31
Rav Shlomo Levy writes:12

The Mishna in Sukka (21b) records a dispute about one who supports his sukka with the

legs of a bed. The anonymous first Tanna of the Mishna says that such a sukka is fit, whereas Rabbi

Yehuda says that if the sukka cannot stand on its own, it is unfit. In the Gemara, the Amoraim

disagree as to Rabbi Yehuda's rationale:

Rabbi Zera and Rabbi Abba bar Memel disagree. One says: Because it has no

permanence. And the other says: Because he supports [the sukka] with something that

contracts ritual impurity.

This second understanding of Rabbi Yehuda's position is the source for the prohibition to

support sekhakh with something that contracts ritual impurity. Before we consider questions of

practical Halakha, let us try to understand the reason for this prohibition.

The Ra'avad, the Ramban, the Ritva and the Ran all explain that we are dealing here with

a rabbinic decree, lest someone come to use unfit sekhakh. (Sekakh cannot be made out of

something that can contract impurity.) According to them, there is no problem here according to

Torah law, for the laws of sekhakh apply exclusively to the sekhakh itself, and not to the walls of

a sukka, everything being fit to serve as walls of a sukka. The Sages, however, decreed that a

12
https://www.etzion.org.il/en/halakha/orach-chaim/holidays/what-materials-may-be-used-support-sekhakh
32
person should not support his sekhakh with something that contracts ritual impurity, lest he come

to use that same material for the sekhakh itself.

Rashi, ad loc., seems to disagree. For Rashi explains:

Even though we only learned this disqualification regarding sekhakh, since [the ma'amid]

supports the sekhakh, it is as if he used that which contracts ritual impurity for sekhakh.

Rashi seems to imply that we are not dealing here with a decree lest he come to use the

disqualified material for sekhakh, but rather "it is as if he used that which contracts ritual impurity

for sekhakh." An obvious objection may be raised: Surely, in the end, the support is not part of

the sekhakh, so why should we view the situation as if he used the disqualified material

for sekhakh?

The Bach (sec. 629), in explanation of Rashi, writes: "[This follows from that which] we

maintain in general, namely, that all follows the ma'amid (that which gives food its form and

substance)."

This argument, however, requires explanation. Do we maintain in general that all follows

the ma'amid? The law of ma'amid usually relates to mixtures of forbidden food, where one food

becomes commingled with another and gives it form or essence. For example, if rennet from the

stomach lining of a non-kosher animal is mixed with milk, it causes it to stand, i.e., to curdle and

turn into cheese. In other examples as well, e.g., non-kosher yeast, we are talking about a forbidden

food that becomes mixed up with a permitted food. The law that states that a ma'amid is not

nullified does not create any new prohibition, but rather prevents bittul – annulment of the non-

kosher food. In general, a forbidden food becomes annulled when mixed with a majority or sixty

parts of permitted food. Something that is a ma'amid, however, does not become annulled. The

33
cheese is forbidden, because it contains the non-kosher rennet that was not annulled, and since it

cannot be separated out, the entire cheese is forbidden.

In light of all this, it is very difficult to compare this to the ma'amid (support) of sekhakh.

Surely the support is not intermingled with the sekhakh; it is underneath the sekhakh. In order to

permit the sukka, there is no need to annul the support, because it is not at all used

as sekhakh. How, then, can one say that it is as if he used the ma'amid as sekhakh? Surely in the

ordinary case of ma'amid, we are talking about a ma'amid that is found inside the food that

becomes forbidden.

We are forced, then, to the conclusion that the Bach understood the law

of ma'amid differently. We are not talking about mere non-annulment. Rather, the law is that food

that is given form by some non-kosher ingredient becomes entirely forbidden, because that which

gives it form is forbidden.

This may be compared to the idea of davar ha-gorem, mentioned in Pesachim. The Gemara

there talks about bread that was baked in an oven fired with the wood of an ashera (a tree

worshipped as part of idolatrous rites). Entirely burned and consumed, the wood no longer exists,

but it caused the dough to turn into bread. The novelty of the prohibition applying to this bread is

that even though the original object of prohibition no longer exists – for the forbidden wood is

now ashes – since the dough changed form on account of the prohibited object, this change is

regarded as sort of a perpetuation of the prohibited object in the bread itself. The baking of the

bread relates to the forbidden wood, even though that baking is not a separate object, but a state in

which that object exists. Apparently, however, a prohibition can apply even to a state. In other

words, an object that has been affected by that which is forbidden becomes prohibited even when

34
the original object of prohibition no longer exists, and that which does exist is the new state created

by the forbidden object.

The Bach apparently understood the principle of ma'amid in this manner. The cheese is not

forbidden because of the rennet that was not nullified, but because it curdled on account of that

which is prohibited. The prohibition of the rennet applies to the change from milk to cheese, even

without relating to the rennet itself as a forbidden food within the cheese.

Support for the Bach may be adduced from the words of Rabbenu David to Pesachim 26b.

Rabbenu David emphasizes there regarding ashera wood:

Even though… the wood leaves in the bread neither taste nor substance… nevertheless

the improvement and new state of the bread is what is forbidden.

In the continuation of his words, Rabbenu David himself compares this law to the law

governing yeast that leavens bread. He writes:

Even though something itself that is forbidden fell into it, it is nullified in it… and it is

forbidden only because of the leavening, and the leavening is neither taste nor substance,

but rather a state that was added to the dough.

The Bach seems to maintain that the same law applies to a sukka. There is no external

change in the wood used as sekhakh, as there is in the cheese or in the bread, but its status changes.

Previously it had merely been wood, but now it is sekhakh that turns the hut into a sukka. A change

similar to the baking of bread exists also in the wood that serves as sekhakh. Therefore, if this

change is effected by that which is disqualified, then in this wood there now lies also the qualities

of the ma'amid. It is as if there is in the sekhakh something that contracts ritual impurity and

disqualifies all the sekhakh.

35
 Thus far, we have attempted to clarify the position of Rashi according to the Bach. As was

stated above, however, the Rashba and the Ran understood that we are dealing here with a rabbinic

decree. They apparently maintain that it cannot be argued here that the wood undergoes a change,

as do the cheese and the bread, and therefore in the sekhakh itself there is nothing there now to

disqualify it by Torah law.

As for normative law, the Rishonim disagree on two points:

1) Does the law follow Rabbi Yehuda or the Sages?

2) If the law is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, what is the concern?

The Rif cites the words of Abaye in the Gemara, ad loc.: "This only applies where he

supported [the sukka with the legs of a bed], but if he spread the sekhakh on the bed – it is fit."

Abaye's statement is only necessary according to Rabbi Yehuda, for according to the Sages, even

if he supported the sukka with the legs of the bed, the sukka is fit. Thus, several Rishonim infer

from this that the Rif ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda. He ruled in this manner, explains

the Rashba, because the talmudic discussion revolves around the position of Rabbi Yehuda,

implying that the Halakha follows his view.

In contrast, the Rambam states explicitly in his commentary to the Mishna that the law is

not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, and therefore he does not bring the law in his code. This is

also the position of the Ba'al ha-Ma'or (ad loc.), the Ravya (II, no. 631) and other Rishonim.

Rashi does not relate directly to the question of final Halakha, but his position on the matter

may be inferred from a careful reading of his words. He explains that according to the position that

Rabbi Yehuda disqualifies a sukka that is supported by the legs of a bed because it is not considered

a permanent structure, Rabbi Yehuda follows his own position stated elsewhere that

a sukka requires permanence (as opposed to the Sages, who maintain that a sukka must be a

36
temporary structure). Inasmuch as it is clear that the law must be the same in both places, perforce

it follows that if we do not rule in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda regarding the need for a

permanent structure, we should also not rule in accordance with him regarding a sukka supported

by the legs of a bed.

There is, however, no proof according to the position that Rabbi Yehuda disqualifies

the sukka because of ma'amid. According to this, however, the argument put forward by the

Ramban and other Rishonim that the law must be in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda because the

Amoraim discuss his position, falls to the wayside. For there is at least one Amora who discussed

Rabbi Yehuda's position, even though the law is not in accordance with it. Had the Gemara thought

that according to the second position in the Gemara the law is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

perhaps it should have mentioned this as a practical ramification between the two understandings.

Thus, it seems clear that Rashi maintains that the law here is not in accordance with Rabbi

Yehuda. The other Rishonim do indeed disagree with Rashi in their understanding of Rabbi

Yehuda, arguing that all agree that there is no connection between what Rabbi Yehuda says here

and what he says at the beginning of the tractate regarding the need for a permanent structure.

The Ramban and others who ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda also took into

consideration the position that Rabbi Yehuda disqualifies the sukka because of the problem

of ma'amid. Thus, they ruled that it is forbidden to support a sukka with that which is unfit to be

used as sekhakh. The Rosh records another position. The Rosh concludes that indeed one must be

concerned about the view of Rabbi Yehuda, but not because of the problem of ma'amid, but

because of the need for permanence. According to him – following the Yerushalmi - permanence

here means that there be ten tefachim of usable space in the sukka. Therefore the Rosh adds: How

37
can the Sages possibly disagree with this? He concludes that perhaps in fact the first Tanna of the

Mishna agrees with Rabbi Yehuda on this point.

The Bet Yosef cites the various opinions, and in the Shulchan Arukh (end of sec. 630), he

rules in accordance with the Rosh, who maintains that there is no problem whatsoever

of ma'amid. He, therefore, permits a person to spread out sekhakh over the legs of a bed, provided

that there are ten tefachim between the bed and the sekhakh. The Rema voices no disagreement

with the Shulchan Arukh. Elsewhere, however, the Shulchan Arukh writes (629:3): "A doubt arises

as to whether it is permissible to lay a ladder across the roof for sekhakh." The Taz in nos. 9 and

10 understands that the doubt relates to the use of a ladder as sekhakh¸ and is unconnected to the

problem of ma'amid, about which the Shulchan Arukh and the Rema issued a lenient ruling in

sec. 630. In contrast, the Magen Avraham understands that the problem here is that of ma'amid.

Even though the Shulchan Arukh issued a lenient ruling in sec. 630, here we are dealing with the

"lekhatchila" law. In other words, according to the Magen Avraham, since we are dealing here

with a doubt relating to a dispute regarding a rabbinic law, there is room to be lenient bedi'eved,

but nevertheless the Shulchan Arukh maintains that lekhatchila it is preferable to take into

consideration those who are stringent.

The words of the Bet Yosef seem to support the Taz, for he brings the responsum of the

Ramban which he also cites in the Shulchan Arukh, according to which the words, "A doubt

arises," do not relate to a case of ma'amid. For he says this in relation to the words of the Terumat

ha-Deshen – who is lenient on the matter of a ladder – who explicitly deals with the law regarding

a ladder itself, and not with ma'amid, regarding which he accepts the position of the Rosh cited

above.

38
 As for the Halakha, many Acharonim agree with the Magen Avraham that at

least lekhatchila one should be stringent and refrain from supporting the sekhakh with something

that contracts ritual impurity, and this indeed is the customary practice. However, in a situation of

great need, and in the absence of viable alternatives, one can rely on the simple reading of

the Shulchan Arukh and the Rema, according to which there are no restrictions whatsoever on that

which supports the sekhakh.

Regarding materials that are disqualified for use as sekhakh only by rabbinic decree, like

broken pieces of utensils, many Acharonim are inclined to say that one may be lenient about them

even lekhatchila. This is because even according to the Ran – whose position has been accepted

as Halakha – the prohibition regarding ma'amid is only by rabbinic decree, and therefore there is

no second decree regarding something that is prohibited only by rabbinic decree. This position is

stated explicitly by the Ritva.

One issue that remains in dispute is the question of ma'amid dema'amid, a second-

degree ma'amid - that is, something that supports the support of the sekhakh. The Shulchan

Arukh in sec. 629 writes that the poles that support the sekhakh may be reinforced with nails.

The Magen Avraham explains that while the nails are unfit to be used as sekhakh, here they serve

merely as a second-degree ma'amid, reinforcing the poles that support the sekhakh, and therefor

they are permitted even lekhatchila. The Chazon Ish in sec. 143 disagrees with the Magen

Avraham, arguing that material that is unfit to serve as sekhakh may not be used even as a second-

degree ma'amid. The Chazon Ish puts forward two arguments: 1) The wording of the Ramban and

the Ran indicates that they only permit the support of sekhakh on poles that are standing on the

ground, and that they do not issue a general allowance regarding a second-degree ma'amid. 2) The

material that is fit to be used as sekhakh which is now supporting the sekhakh is itself disqualified

39
because it is supported by something that is disqualified for use as sekhakh. In other words, in

every case of an unfit second-degree ma'amid, the ma'amid itself is regarded as disqualified, and

so the sekhakh is supported by an unfit ma'amid.

The Chazon Ish's argument must be examined both according to the reasoning of the Ran

and according to the reasoning of the Bach.

According to the Ran, who believes that we are dealing with a rabbinic decree lest a person

come to use the unfit material for the sekhakh itself, it is certainly possible to argue that the Sages

only issued their decree about a first-degree ma'amid, because of its proximity to the sekhakh, but

not about a second-degree ma'amid. For the first-degree ma'amid does not turn into unfit material,

just because it is supported by unfit material. According to the Bach as well, there is room for

leniency, for even if we say that it is as if the ma'amid exists in that which it supports, it is possible

to distinguish and say that this applies only when the ma'amid causes the sekhakh to be

fit sekhakh and remain standing in its place. When, however, the nails cause the poles to become

supports, that type of impact is not regarded as a significant change in status so that the support

should become forbidden as a result.

SUMMARY:

1. It is customary not to support the sekhakh itself with anything that is unfit to be used

as sekhakh, unless there is great need and no other alternative presents itself.

2. If the support is unfit to be used as sekhakh only because of a rabbinic decree (e.g., flat

wooden utensils, broken pieces of utensils), some Acharonim permit its use even lekhatchila.

3. All agree that one is permitted to support the sekhakh with walls that are attached to the

ground, because there is no concern that a person will come to use them for sekhakh.

40
4. Regarding a second-degree ma'amid, the Magen Avraham and many Acharonim rule

leniently, whereas the Chazon Ish is stringent.

Mystical Autumn Leaves

Rabbi Boruch Leff writes:13

Why did God create a world where I need to do all this raking?

With Labor Day announcing the unofficial end to summer, I noticed something on my neighbor's
lawn that filled me with dread: fallen leaves! (Thank God it was not my lawn. Yet.)

13
https://www.aish.com/h/hh/e/inspiration/48948666.html
41
Autumn always makes me think about the laborious task of raking leaves off my lawn -- day after
day, week after week. What kind of meaning and growth can I derive from raking thousands of
leaves off my lawn? Why did God create a world where I need to do all this raking?

In Kabbalistic thought, the seasonal calendar is a reflection of the spiritual calendar. The
environmental conditions of the world are landmarks for the spiritual growth we should be
experiencing during that season. Specific times of the year are predisposed to hardship, and other
times are predisposed to renewal and joy. We might call this "spiritual weather."

Environmental conditions are landmarks for the spiritual growth we should experience during
that season.

This is why the Hebrew word for time is zman, which means "prepared." Each moment in time is
already prepared and predestined for a specific type of growth. In addition, the Hebrew word for
year is shana, which means to repeat -- because every year contains the same basic elements of
the previous year, but with new opportunities for growth.

The spiritual power of renewal that exists in springtime is physically manifest in the budding of
new fruits and flowers. Summer's spiritual hardships are manifest through the oppressive summer
heat.

ANTIDOTE TO DEPRESSION

What is the spiritual message of the fallen leaves in autumn? And why does God make leaves
transform into beautiful, magnificent colors just before they loosen from the tree, float to the
ground, and die?

Rosh Hashana, the Jewish New Year, always occurs in autumn. This is the time of year when Jews
are to introspect and evaluate the state of their souls. You might call Rosh Hashana services the
"Annual State of the Soul Address."

God does not want us to become spiritually dejected, so He sends beautiful autumn
leaves.

Too often, we may delve deeply into our souls and find much lacking. These thoughts can depress
us and make it difficult to plan and achieve growth for the coming year. God does not want us to
become spiritually downtrodden and dejected, so He sends us the beautiful autumn leaves.

Driving on American highways in the fall is often a remarkable sight.

As Grace Aguilar writes in her poem, "Autumn Leaves":

42
 Autumn Leaves!
How beautiful your fading glories are,
O'er hill and dell, o'er wood and fell,
ye shed rich light afar,
Of every gorgeous hue and shade-brown,
ruddy, green, and gold,
Each glance more brilliantly arrayed, new glowing rays unfold.

God truly makes a rainbow of colors in the leaves. Why?

Rav Tzaddok (in "Likutei Ma'amarim") describes leaves as a symbol for righteous actions. These
include simple actions which are not always accentuated or perceived.

Similarly, Our daf (Sukkah 21b) explains the verse in Psalms 1:3, "[A righteous person] shall be
like a tree planted by streams of water, that brings forth fruit in its season, and whose leaves do
not whither."

The Talmud says that "leaves" refers to the simple, idle conversations of righteous individuals that
are conducted without forethought and go unnoticed.

God shows us beautiful leaves during the introspective season of autumn because He is reminding
us of positive and pure actions that we have overlooked. We have accomplished greatly during the
past year, yet we do not usually give ourselves credit for meaningful and righteous deeds. We need
to know that we have much to build on for the coming year, and we should take pride in who we
are and what we have done.

Yes, we need to improve and eliminate some misguided deeds and character traits -- but we can
only do that by building on the positive accomplishments of the past year.

ONE BY ONE

We must also realize that even though we have many good deeds under our belts, we can never
rest on our laurels. The beautiful leaves fall and the tree remains bare to show that we must start
to build new and better deeds in the coming year.

The tree remains bare to show that we must start to build new and better deeds in
the coming year.

Yes, we rake in all of our leaves, all of our hundreds and hundreds of magnificent holy actions,
but we must renew and start again to grow new leaves. We must make all our actions, all our
leaves, "for healing" -- for helping others and ourselves achieve great heights -- as the prophet
proclaims: "So its waters will grow from the Sanctuary, so its fruit will be for food and its leaves
for healing." (Ezekiel 47:12)
43
In a week or two, I'll be heading outside with my rake in hand. But instead of feeling frustrated by
the mounds of leaves, I will try to contemplate my actions, one by one, leaf by leaf. I will gather
all of my deeds from the previous year and look to create more of those healing leaves that cure,
one by one, the spiritual darkness and disease in our lives.

Rebbe Nachman of Breslov (1772-1810) was one of the great Hasidic teachers of all time. As the
grandson of the Baal Shem Tov, he possessed a rich and deep spiritual wisdom. Reb Noson of
Breslov (1780 — 1844) was Rebbe Nachman's foremost disciple. He compiled an eight-volume
commentary on his teachings.

In this collection of letters to family, friends, and followers, Reb Noson demonstrates the insights
he gleaned over the years from the Hasidic tradition where closeness to God and an ability to sense
His Presence in the midst of everyday life are two major motifs. He admonishes those around him
to speak to the Holy One about everything. Expressing gratitude is very important: "This is the

44
purpose for which we were created to constantly thank and praise His Great Name every day."
Other advice given by Reb Noson is to banish despair, to look for a positive side in everything,
and to renew faith through regular spiritual practice.

In one letter, the Hasidic teacher writes: "Relax your mind with things that cheer you and bring
yourself to joy, even, if need be, with silliness. You have no idea what is really going on in the
world." Profound words, especially the last sentence that alludes to the mystery that lies above and
beyond our reason.

Healing Leaves

Likutei Moharan 60:7:5

This is the explanation of “their leaves litruphah (for healing)” (Ezekiel 47:12). “Their leaves” is
the aspect of the conversation of Torah scholars, as our Sages, of blessed memory, said <regarding
the verse>

“Their leaves will not wither” (Psalms 1:3)—even the conversation of Torah scholars [requires
study] (Sukkah, ibid.). And this is “LiTRuPhaH”: L’haTiR PeH (to unbind the mouth)—i.e., the
aspect of “from what is muTaR to your PeH (permitted to your mouth).”

When his conversation is in the aspect of “the conversation of Torah scholars requires study”—
i.e., “to study, teach, safeguard and practice,” as explained above—then he is protected from
unworthy students.

45
This is the aspect of “from what is permitted to your mouth”;

Whose Leaves Do Not Wither

In Jewish sources, the leaf is a metaphor for the fragility and durability of life.

J E F F R E Y S P I T Z E R W R I T E S : 14

Leaves fade, leaves wither and fall. Unlike flowers whose blossoms are always so short-lived,
leaves teach us of the cycle of nature and the cycle of life. We see ourselves in the growth from
the tender bud, to the small but rapidly growing leaflet, to the mature and robust leaf, and
inevitably, to the fading, drying, and falling leaf.

The poetic souls who composed Judaism’s sacred texts used the leaf as a powerful metaphor for
both the fragility and the durability of the force of life. The first mention of a leaf in the Bible is
the "olive leaf freshly plucked" ( Genesis 8:11 ) in the beak of the dove returning to the ark after
the flood. The image of the durable olive, whose leaves "do not fall off, either in the heat of the
summer or the rains of the winter" ( Numbers Rabbah 8:9 ) is, perhaps, even more striking than
that of the dove who bore its leaf back to Noah. The flood destroyed all life, but somehow, the
olive tree remained alive. For the rabbis, the olive leaves represent the enduring generations of
Jews, and in particular, the descendants of righteous Jews-by-choice whose seed "shall endure
forever" (ibid.).

The psalmist compares one who meditates on Torah and lives righteously to a tree planted by the
water "whose leaves do not wither" ( Psalms 1:3 ). The prophet Jeremiah repeats the image and
applies it to one who trusts in God; his leaves will be a luxuriant green, free of anxiety over a
coming dry season ( Jeremiah 17:8 ). The prophet Ezekiel extends this image in his vision of a

14
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/quotwhose-leaves-do-not-witherquot/
46
messianic future; then, trees will bear fruit every month and the leaves will not whither, "their fruit
shall be for food, and their leaves for healing" ( Ezekiel 47:12 ).

The leaf that does not fade and does not fall is an image of the ideal and the enduring in Jewish
consciousness, but most leaves do wither and die. The leaf represents not just the inevitability of
frailty and death, but also, as the leaf drifts on the wind, to the pitiful state of being subject to the
whims of the more powerful. Job puts it most poignantly in his harsh, accusing rhetoric; "Will you
break a leaf driven to and fro? And will you pursue the dry stubble?" ( Job 13:25 ). The Torah
preserves a curse that should Israel abandon the covenant, they will become faint of heart so that
the mere sound of rustling leaves will induce a state of terror ( Leviticus 26:36 ). In an apocalyptic
vision, sin will cause all to fade as a leaf and be carried away on the wind ( Isaiah 64:5 ).

Perhaps because of these associations, the leaves of the forest and the meadow are seen
in Hasidic sources as endowed with a spirituality of their own. Rabbi Nachman of Bratzlav
encouraged people to follow the model of the patriarch Isaac who "went out into the field to pray
toward evening" ( Genesis 24:43 ). Nachman asserts that when one prays in the field, "the entire
plant world comes to your aid and lends strength to your prayers" (Likutei Moharan, Tanina 11).
The psalmist describes the comfort provided by leaves through their shade as Divine protection.
"The Lord is your keeper; the Lord is your shade upon your right hand" ( Psalms 121:5 ).

W H I L E I S R A E L B U R N S 15

ARRIVING ON THANKSGIVING (SIC)

ISRAEL BURNS

I DO NOT FEEL THE HEAT

NOR THE SMELL OF BURNING TREES
LIKE I ONCE DID WHEN THE RAMOT FOREST BEHIND MY
HOUSE BURNED
NO, THIS IS DIFFERENT,
SEEN ONLY THE TV SCREEN,
FROM THE VANTAGE OF THE ELYSIUM FIELDS AND THE
BRILLIANT SKIES OF JERUSALEM
ONLY VISUAL IMAGES OF CLOUDY SKIES OVER HAIFA,
IT IS MERELY A CHIMERA,
(ARUTZ SHEVA OR CNN,)
AND PAPERS WITH OP-ED RECRIMINATIONS AS TO THE

15
Jyungar… https://jyungar.tumblr.com/page/5
47
 PRIME MINISTER’S INEPTITUDE OR WORSE
HIS BLATANT FUNNELING OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS
APPROPRIATED FOR FIRE TANKERS AND A “SUPER” 747
TO SETTLEMENTS, INSTEAD OF LEARNING
FROM THE LAST CATASTROPHE…

ISRAEL BURNS
ON THANKSGIVING,
SHE BURNS LIKE THOSE FORESTS IN CALIFORNIA AND
OREGON
BUT HERE IT IS BLAMED ON TERRORISTS,
ARSONIST WITH POLITICAL MOTIVE
IF YOU CAN’T BEAT THE ARMY, OR TERRORIZE THE
CIVILIAN POPULATION
BURN THE LAND YOU LOVE!
EVERYTHING HERE IS IMPUTED TO MOTIVE.

ISRAEL BURNS
ON THANKSGIVING,
THE FLAMES ARE FAMILIAR
FROM THE SECOND TEMPLE AND TITUS
TO THE BURNINGS IN MAINZ SPEYER AND WORMS
AND THE VILLAGES OF GALITZIA
CHMIELNIKI,
THE WITCHES OF SALEM
JESSE WASHINGTON (WACO 1916)
FROM THE FLAMETHROWERS OF WWI THAT TERRORIZED
TEENAGE SOLDIERS IN THE TRENCHES
AND THE CYCLONE-B CORPSES
THE TOWNS OF DRESDEN AND TOKYO
(BOTH SIDES USE FLAMES)
ISIS BURNINGS IN A CAGE
THOSE GIRLS WHO REFUSED THEM SEX
WE ARE SO OUTRAGED BY THE SOCIAL MEDIA COVERAGE
BROUGHT TO OUR SMART PHONES
BUT NOTHING HAS CHANGED.
FLAMES NO LONGER CONTAINED IN HEPHAESTUS’ HEARTH,
NO LONGER A SMITH FOR WEAPONS OF WAR
NOW LOOSENED BY HIS IMPOTENCE
(HE TOO WAS REJECTED BY HIS MOTHER)

ISRAEL BURNS ON THANKSGIVING

BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE WIND PATTERN AND HUMIDITY
A FREAK OF NATURE
THE SCIENTISTS TELL US
BUT THEN NATURE IS CHANGING
48
 AND THE WORLD IS WARMING
AND THE PRESIDENT ELECT REFUSES TO BELIEVE SCIENCE
THIS FIRE OF RAGE
TRUMP SUPPORTERS BEATING UP FREE SPEECH ADVOCATES
HE WINKS AND NODS AND LOOKS AWAY
THE FIRE OF THE STORM TROOPERS
THE BURNING OF KRISTALLNACHT BOOKS
IS ONLY A GENERATION AWAY
THE CIVILITY OF ADENAUER’S EUROPE IS OVER.

ISRAEL BURNS ON THANKSGIVING

AND A PIECE OF US BURNS INSIDE
IN IMPOTENCE
IN RAGE
THE FIRE IN CHERNOBYL NEVER DIED
THE COOLING TOWERS OF FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI
CANNOT COPE
THE COOLNESS OF CRITICAL THOUGHT IS INSUFFICIENT
TO PUT THESE FIRES OUT
THEY MUST BURN UNTIL THERE IS NO FUEL LEFT.

OUR PROPHET LEFT US LAST WEEK

HIS WORDS SEEM EERILY MANIFEST.

IN MEMORIAM, LEONARD COHEN.

AND WHO BY FIRE, WHO BY WATER,

WHO IN THE SUNSHINE, WHO IN THE NIGHT TIME,
WHO BY HIGH ORDEAL, WHO BY COMMON TRIAL,
WHO IN YOUR MERRY MERRY MONTH OF MAY,
WHO BY VERY SLOW DECAY,
AND WHO SHALL I SAY IS CALLING?

AND WHO IN HER LONELY SLIP, WHO BY BARBITURATE,

WHO IN THESE REALMS OF LOVE, WHO BY SOMETHING BLUNT,
AND WHO BY AVALANCHE, WHO BY POWDER,
WHO FOR HIS GREED, WHO FOR HIS HUNGER,
AND WHO SHALL I SAY IS CALLING?

AND WHO BY BRAVE ASSENT, WHO BY ACCIDENT,

WHO IN SOLITUDE, WHO IN THIS MIRROR,
WHO BY HIS LADY’S COMMAND, WHO BY HIS OWN HAND,
WHO IN MORTAL CHAINS, WHO IN POWER,
AND WHO SHALL I SAY IS CALLING?

49
50