Daf Ditty Succah 20: Tabi (or Tabitha?

R. Gamaliel depicted in a medieval miniature.

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MISHNA: One who sleeps beneath the bed in the sukka did not fulfill his obligation, because
the bed constitutes a tent that serves as a barrier between him and the roofing of the sukka. Rabbi
Yehuda said: It was our custom that we would sleep beneath the bed before the Elders and
they did not say anything to us to the effect that we are not fulfilling our obligation. Apparently,
the halakhic status of the bed is not like that of a tent and it does not prevent fulfillment of the
mitzva.

2
§ Rabbi Shimon said, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda: There was an incident involving
Tavi, the Canaanite slave of Rabban Gamliel, who was sleeping beneath the bed, and Rabbi
Gamliel lightheartedly said to the Elders: Did you see my slave Tavi,1 who is a Torah scholar
and knows that slaves are exempt from the mitzva of sukka? Since it is a positive, time-bound
mitzva, Canaanite slaves, whose status with regard to this halakhic category is like that of women,
are exempt from the obligation to fulfill the mitzva of sukka. Therefore, he sleeps under the bed.
Rabbi Shimon continued: And by the way, as Rabban Gamliel was not issuing a halakhic ruling,
we learned that one who sleeps beneath the bed did not fulfill his obligation.

1
Normally, one does not accord to slaves the same mourning practices that one does for a free person. The community does not
come to offer condolences to the master nor does the master open his house to people coming to console him. However, Tabi was
a special slave, one who kept all of the mitzvoth to which he was subject (see Sukkah 2:1, where Tabi sleeps under a bed inside a
sukkah). Hence, Rabban Gamaliel again broke the normal halakhah and accepted formal condolences upon the loss of this special
slave.

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GEMARA: The mishna states that one who is sleeping beneath a bed did not fulfill his obligation
because a bed, like a tent, acts as a barrier between the person and the roofing. The Gemara asks:
But isn’t the height of the space beneath the bed lacking ten handbreadths, and a space less than
ten handbreadths high does not constitute a tent? Shmuel interpreted the mishna: It is referring
to the case of a bed ten handbreadths high.

The Gemara comments: We learned in a mishna there with regard to the impurity of a tent: Both
a hole that was perforated in a rock by water or by creeping animals, or a hole in a rock that
was perforated because it was eaten away by salt, and likewise a space in a course of stones,
and likewise a space in a pile of beams all have the legal status of a tent over impurity. A source
of impurity imparted by a corpse transmits impurity to other objects in those spaces, as they
constitute a tent over a corpse.

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Rabbi Yehuda says: The legal status of any tent that is not established by a person is not that
of a tent and does not transmit impurity. The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion
of Rabbi Yehuda? From where did he derive that halakha?

He derives by means of a verbal analogy that only a man-made tent transmits impurity, deriving
the tent written with regard to impurity imparted by a corpse from the tent written with regard to
the Tabernacle. It is written here with regard to impurity imparted by a corpse: “This is the
teaching when a man dies in a tent” (Numbers 19:14). And it is written there with regard to
the Tabernacle: “And he spread the tent over the Tabernacle” (Exodus 40:19). Just as there,
with regard to the Tabernacle, the tent was established by a person, so too here, with regard to
impurity of a corpse, it is a tent established by a person. And according to the Rabbis, because
the passage dealing with impurity imparted by a corpse, i.e., tent, is repeated several times, this
amplifies and includes any structure that provides shelter, even if it is not a standard tent.

Summary

Our daf ends and Perek II begins.2 We are introduced to a new Mishna that teaches about sleeping:
if we sleep beneath the bed in the sukka, we have not fulfilled our obligation. Rabbi Yehuda tells
us that an old custom of sleeping beneath the bed didn't bother the Elders. Rabbi Shimon adds a
story about Rabban Gamliel's Canaanite slave, Tavi, who slept beneath the bed. Rabban Gamliel
defended Tavi, saying that slaves are exempt from time-bound, positive mitzvot.

The Gemara begins its examination by looking at the 10-handbreadth height requirement. They
continue their examination by considering the legal status of a tent. Beds and tents could have
similar status regarding ritual impurity.

It is interesting to me that the rabbis spend so much time understanding and explaining what we
cannot do and why we cannot do it. Why not simply impose their understandings of what we must
do? Our tradition is founded upon this desire to debate, to understand, to argue, to explain. I
suppose that the study of daf yoni is simply one way of entering that tradition. It is impossible to
truly debate without understanding what it is that we are debating!

Daf Shevui writes:3

2
https://dafyomibeginner.blogspot.com/2014/02/
3
https://www.sefaria.org/Sukkah.20b.10?lang=bi&p2=Daf_Shevui_to_Sukkah.20b.12-21a.1&lang2=bi

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The problem with sleeping under a bed inside a sukkah is that there is a covering which creates a
barrier over the person so that the sekhakh is not what is covering him.

Rabbi Judah holds that the bed does not serve as a barrier between him and the sukkah and hence
one who sleeps under a bed has fulfilled his obligation. Interestingly, Rabbi Judah notes that this
was actually their custom. It might be that students visiting their rabbis on Sukkot, which seems
to have been a norm on festivals, found the sukkot quite crowded. Hence, some people would sleep
under the beds, causing the question to arise: is this legitimate behavior?

Rabbi Shimon agrees with the sages in section one, and he brings a story to illustrate his point.
Rabban Gamaliel owned a famous slave named Tabi. In tractate Berakhot 2:7 that Rabban
Gamaliel respected his slave, and that when Tabi died he even mourned for him. In this mishnah,
Tabi exemplifies his knowledge of halakhah by sleeping under the bed in the sukkah. He knew
that he was exempt from the sukkah, as are all slaves, so he did a demonstrative act to let others
know that one who sleeps under the bed has not fulfilled his sukkah obligation.

The mishnah seems to say that sleeping under any sized bed means that one has not fulfilled the
mitzvah of dwelling in the sukkah. But this is a problem—if the bed is less than ten handbreadths
high then it is not large enough to be a sukkah. How then could it form a barrier to the sekhakh of
the sukkah.

Shmuel answers that this bed is indeed ten handbreadths high. If it was any lower, one could sleep
under it in the sukkah without it forming a barrier.

Today’s section begins with a mishnah from Ohalot 3:7 that deals with the definition of a tent with
regard to the issue of “overshadowing.” Overshadowing means that if a dead body or piece thereof
is found in the same covered area as is an object susceptible to impurity, the object is defiled. There
are also other ramifications within the realm of purity laws to something being considered a “tent.”

Any structure, no matter how it is made, can act as an ohel, a tent. Earlier in this mishnah from
Ohalot it was taught that if there are spaces that are one handbreadth wide, long and tall between
the different parts, then the part on top is treated separately from the part below.
Rabbi Judah says that only human-made structures can serve as an ohel.

The Talmud says that Rabbi Judah derives his halakhah, that only human made tents count as
“tents,” from the fact that the same word is used in Numbers concerning purity as is used in Exodus
concerning the “tent” that was used in making the Tabernacle. Just as that was a real tent so too
the tent in Numbers 19 which conveys impurity must be a real “tent,” meaning it must at least have
been made by human hands.

A tent made by animals or water does not count as a tent.

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The Talmud then asks the typical question—how can the rabbis hold otherwise? How do they deal
with the fact that “tent” should imply that it is made by human hands. The answer is that the Torah
uses the word “tent” several times in Numbers 19:14. The repetitions of the word are interpreted
to mean that any structure that has the dimensions of a “tent” can act as a tent, even if it was not
made by human hands.

"HAREINI KAPARASO" -- "I AM AN ATONEMENT FOR HIM"

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:4

When Reish Lakish quoted a teaching in the name of Rebbi Chiya and his sons, he added, "I am
hereby an atonement for Rebbi Chiya and his sons." RASHI explains that since Rebbi Chiya was
the Gadol ha'Dor, Reish Lakish honored him and treated him like his Rebbi.

The Halachah is that when one quotes or refers to his Rebbi and father after their death, he should
say, "Hareini Kaparaso" (or "Hareini Kaparas Mishkavo") -- "May I be an atonement for him,"
out of respect. Rashi explains that this phrase means, "May Hash-m inflict upon me punishment
to atone for the sins of my Rebbi (or father) who passed away."

How can one person's afflictions serve as atonement for the sins of another person? The person
who sinned should be punished for his own sins.5

THE MAHARSHAM (3:151) explains that the principle, "Kol Yisrael Arevin Zeh la'Zeh" -- "all
of the Jewish people are responsible for one another," means that every Jew is in some way
responsible for the sins of every other Jew. This principle enables one Jew to make himself a
guarantor ("Arev") for another. When one person serves as guarantor for the repayment of a loan,
the lender has the option to collect from either the debtor himself or from the guarantor. Similarly,
one who says "Hareini Kaparaso" makes himself a guarantor for the sins of his father or Rebbi and
gives Hash-m the option to collect either from him or from the actual sinner.

However, the MACHANEH CHAIM (Choshen Mishpat #20) points out that it is evident from
numerous verses that one must bear personal liability for his own sins (see, for example, Yechezkel
18:20 and Tehilim 49:8). Rav Efraim Zalman Sternbuch also cites RAV HAI GA'ON (quoted
by MAHARAM ALSHAKER #101), who writes that one certainly is unable to trade or sell the
reward for a Mitzvah or the punishment for an Aveirah which he did.

The MACHANEH CHAIM suggests instead that the declaration of "Hareini Kaparaso" is merely
a way to give honor to the deceased or to pray for his soul. It is as though one says, "I wish that
my afflictions could be an atonement for him" (but not that they actually can be).
4
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/sukah/insites/su-dt-020.htm
5
RAV EFRAIM ZALMAN STERNBUCH shlit'a discusses this topic at length in SEFER YISSACHAR U'ZEVULUN, chapter
3. The sources cited here are culled from his discussion.

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Rav Efraim Zalman questions these two explanations from the Gemara in Kidushin (31b). The
Gemara there teaches that during the first twelve months after the death of one's father (or Rebbi),
the son is required to say "Hareini Kaparas Mishkavo" every time he mentions his father (or
Rebbi). However, the Halachah is that a person is not required to undergo physical torture or
hardship in order to honor his parents. For example, he is not required to beg from door to door in
order to raise money to honor them (see Shulchan Aruch YD 240:5).

Similarly, one is not required to suffer by giving up a prospective spouse because his father
disapproves (see VILNA GA'ON to YD 240:5). Accordingly, one should not be required to
undergo afflictions to attain atonement for his father. Why, then, does the Gemara obligate him to
say that he wants to have afflictions in order to atone for his father if he is not obligated to suffer
afflictions for his father's benefit? Even if he does not really receive the afflictions, as the
Machaneh Chaim suggests, he should not be required to say that he "wishes" he could if the
Halachah does not obligate him to honor his father in such a manner.

Rav Efraim Zalman rejects the proposition of Rav Binyamin Stern in B'TZEL
HA'CHOCHMAH (6:17-22) who writes that one's obligation to honor his parent is greater after
his parent's death than when his parent is alive. Moreover, it seems clear from a number of sources
that the afflictions that a son or disciple experiences indeed atone for the sins of his father or Rebbi
(see, for example, BEIS YOSEF OC 284). Rashi's words also imply that a person's own afflictions
are able to atone for the deceased.

Rav Efraim Zalman Sternbuch and his father, RAV MOSHE STERNBUCH shlit'a (Teshuvos
v'Hanhagos 2:47), write that according to TOSFOS RI HA'ZAKEN in Kidushin, one says
"Hareini Kaparas Mishkavo" only when he quotes a teaching of his father or Rebbi. Accordingly,
this declaration is not necessarily an expression of one's acceptance of afflictions to atone for the
sins of his father. Rather, with this declaration one expresses, "If I made a mistake when I repeated
my father's statement, then let me be punished for misquoting him, instead of him for not teaching
me properly, because it is my mistake and not his."

The Rishonim, however, do not seem to agree with this ruling. The DARCHEI MOSHE (YD
240) cites RABEINU YERUCHAM who says explicitly that whenever one mentions his father
and Rebbi during the first year after his death, he should say "Hareini Kaparas Mishkavo," even
when he does not quote a teaching in his name.

Rav Efraim Zalman Sternbuch (in Sefer Yisachar u'Zevulun, p. 55) writes that perhaps one may
attain atonement for his father only for the sin of not raising his son properly. The son says, "If I
sin, and as a result my father becomes deserving of punishment because of his failure to educate
me properly, I should be punished and not my father." He bases this approach on the words of the
Rishon, RABEINU SHNEUR, quoted by the BEIS YOSEF (OC 284).

The logic behind this is that one is able to atone for someone else's sin which caused his own sins
by forgiving the other person and suffering for his own sins. Alternatively, when he says that he
accepts upon himself afflictions for his sins (which were committed as a result of a deficiency in
his education), he does Teshuvah for what he did wrong and he thereby corrects his wrongdoing,

8
which consequently corrects his father's failure to educate him (since the son eventually became
educated properly as his Teshuvah demonstrates), and thus his father also benefits.

According to this, it is clear why the son is obligated to accept such afflictions for his father or
Rebbi, since it is his actions that cause the father or Rebbi to be punished. The same reasoning
may apply for a Gadol ha'Dor like Rebbi Chiya. Such a preeminent sage is responsible for the
deeds of everyone in his generation. As such, Reish Lakish was able to accept afflictions in order
to atone for any failure of Rebbi Chiya to educate his students that might have caused Reish Lakish
(his student's student) to sin.

Rav Efraim Zalman writes that he later found a responsum of the MAHARAM
CHALAVAH (#17) who discusses at length the principle that the punishment for one's sin cannot
be redirected to another person. However, he shows that the declaration of "Hareini Kaparaso"
indeed provides atonement for the deceased, and not merely by serving to forgive the father or
Rebbi for the sin of not providing a proper education for the son or disciple. He refers to the
Gemara in Sanhedrin (104a) which implies that a son may exonerate his father from punishment
("Bera Mezakeh Aba"). Similarly, the Gemara in Chagigah (15b) implies that Rebbi Meir and
Rebbi Yochanan were able to procure atonement for Acher (Elisha ben Avuyah).

The Maharam Chalavah explains how the atonement works. "It is appropriate for him to atone for
his father," he writes, and since the son "is the produce, the fruit, of a Tzadik," he is able to effect
atonement for that Tzadik. Likewise, a Talmid is able to effect atonement for his Rebbi, since he
learned Torah from him, and thus it is appropriate for the Talmid to save his Rebbi just as a son
saves his father. (A similar answer is given by the TESHUVOS HA'RASHBA 5:49.)

His intention might be as the Gemara in Yoma (87a) says, "One who causes merit for others, no
sin will come upon his hands." The Gemara explains that Hash-m saves such a person from sin,
because it is not proper for the Rebbi to suffer punishment in Gehinom while his Talmidim bask
in the reward of Gan Eden.

Similarly, when one teaches Torah to his son or disciple who then fulfills the Mitzvos as a result,
it is not appropriate that the father or Rebbi should suffer for his sins while the son or disciple is
rewarded for his merits, which themselves are to the credit of the one who taught him.
Consequently, the son or disciple has a moral obligation to save his father or Rebbi who caused
him to merit reward. This moral obligation is what obligates him to accept even physical suffering
to atone for his Rebbi, and it is what enables his acceptance of suffering to effect atonement for
his Rebbi.

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:6

The second perek of Masechet Sukkah focuses on defining the commandment that one must “sit”
in the sukkah for seven days (Vayikra 23:42). The perek deals with such questions as – Is one
obligated to sit in the sukkah during both day and night? Must one remain throughout the day, or

6
https://www.ou.org/life/torah/masechet_sukkah2026/

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only when performing specific activities? Are women and children obligated to sit in the sukkah,
too? Are there circumstances in which an individual may be freed of this obligation?

Another type of question dealt with in this perek involves clarifying whether a person – for reasons
of comfort, for example – can cover the sukkah or cover himself while sitting in the sukkah. The
first Mishnah deals with this question when it teaches that a person cannot sleep under a bed in
the sukkah, a ruling disputed by Rabbi Yehuda, who testifies that it was common practice to do
so. Furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda argues, the Sages never objected to such behavior.

The Mishnah closes with Rabbi Shimon’s testimony about Rabban Gamliel’s slave, Tavi, who
would sleep under the bed in the sukkah. According to Rabban Gamliel he did so specifically
because he knew that non-Jewish slaves were not commanded in the mitzvah of sukkah, from
which we can derive that someone obligated in the mitzvah would not be permitted to do so.

Tavi is a character who appears throughout the Gemara, identified as the slave belonging to Rabban
Gamliel d’Yavneh. In all of these stories he is presented as someone who was well-known for his
personal piety and learning. Not only Rabban Gamliel, but other sages sang his praises. Rabbi
Elazar ben Azaria, for example, was known to say that based on Tavi’s Torah knowledge it would
have been appropriate for Tavi to be reclining and for Rabbi Elazar to be serving him. Rabban
Gamliel tried on several occasions to find a way to set him free but was stymied in his efforts
because of the prohibition to set Canaanite slaves free. Nevertheless, when Tavi passed away,
Rabban Gamliel accepted consolation as if he was a family member, explaining that Tavi was
different than other slaves – he was a good and honest man.

Mark Kerzner writes:7

One who sleeps under the bed in a sukkah has not fulfilled his obligation of "dwelling in a sukkah."
This is also true of eating and drinking, but the teacher chose to talk about sleeping because even
a brief nap is not permitted outside the sukkah, while eating a snack is.

Rabbi Shimon tells a story to support this view. Tavi the slave of Rabban Gamliel was a Torah
scholar. He was once sleeping under the bed in a sukkah, and Rabban Gamliel remarked to the
Sages: "Do you see my slave Tavi? He knows that slaves are not obligated in the mitzvah of sukkah
(although they have to do many other mitzvot), and therefore sleeps under the bed!"

Why does Rabbi Shimon attract our attention to the word "remark?" - To tell us that Sages never
chit-chat, but that even their casual remarks require study. Why? - King David compares a scholar
to a tree planted near a stream, which yields fruit in season (students and teachings) and whose
leaves (lighthearted remarks) never wither (that is, contain sap of knowledge).

7
https://talmudilluminated.com/sukkah/sukkah20.html

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Tosafos and ‫ ר”ן‬note that the Yerushalmi understands that Tevi, the servant of Rabban Gamliel,
did not sit in the sukkah because he was intimidated by his master. Tevi was exempt from the
mitzvah, and he knew that Rabban Gamliel would not approve of his entering.8

When the Gemara notes that he wore tefillin, and he was technically exempt from that mitzvah as
well, the Yerushalmi concludes that, in fact, Rabban Gamliel did not interfere with Tevi’s doing
mitzvos.

The reason Tevi did not sit in the sukkah was simply to allow room for the Rabbis who wished to
enter. ‫ ר”ן‬asks that according to our initial understanding that Rabban Gamliel would have
protested his servant’s fulfilling a mitzvah for which he was exempt, even before noting that Tevi
wore tefillin, we should wonder why, in fact, would this be worthy of protest, and what is the
rationale in not allowing a servant to sit in a sukkah?

‫ ר”ן‬answers that we would have been concerned that he might pronounce a bracha unnecessarily.
Or else we might be wary lest Tevi then begin to do other mitzvos that are not benign, such as
wearing tefillin and performing the ritual of leaning upon an animal before its being brought as an
offering (‫)סמיכה‬.

These activities are not allowed unless they are obligatory due to their kedushah (according to
the opinion that one who is not obligated may not perform these mitzvos).

Daf al Hadaf cites an opinion that proper fulfillment of the mitzvah of sukkah requires that one
consciously note that we enter as a remembrance to ‫ מצרים יציאת‬.

A non-Jewish slave entering a sukkah would create a situation of disgrace, as he could not
comprehend this sublime concept. His perfunctory act of entering a sukkah without the proper
focus of ‫ מצרים ליציאת זכר‬is a disgrace of the mitzvah.

One who sleeps under the bed in a sukkah does not fulfill his obligation.

Teshuvas Kinyan Torah (1) was asked whether it is permitted to sleep on a bunkbed in the sukkah.
He ruled that it is prohibited based on a statement in Shulchan Aruch (2).

8
https://dafdigest.org/masechtos/Sukkah%20020.pdf

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Shulchan Aruch ruled that one is not permitted to spread a sheet over a bed that has posts by the
corners even if the sheet is less than ten tefachim from the bed. The reason is that the posts are
fixed and permanent and are therefore, treated stringently.

Similarly, since the legs of the bunk bed are permanent they must be treated stringently and the
upper bunk will prohibit the use of the lower bunk. Rav Simcha Bunim Waldenberg (3) disagrees
with this comparison. He maintains that since the top-bunk is not designed to form an ohel beneath
it but rather for sleeping on top of it, it does not form an ohel that would prohibit the use of space
beneath it.

Rav Shmuel HaLevi Wosner (4) examines the issue by questioning whether sleeping on a bunkbed
is the equivalent of sleeping under a bed, which is an issue only if the bed is ten tefachim from the
ground. If the reason one may not sleep under a bed is that he is no longer under the ‫סכך‬, (5), the
bunkbed will not pose an issue. Since this disqualification is only Rabbinic, it is logical to assume
that the decree was issued only if the bed is ten tefachim from the ground. Since the upper bunk is
not ten tefachim higher than the lower-bunk, it will be permitted to sleep on the lower-bunk.

On the other hand, if the reason one may not sleep under a bed is that it is included in the Biblical
prohibition against building one sukkah on top of another (6), height would not be a factor and the
restriction would apply regardless of the height of the upper bunk.

His conclusion is that the majority of Poskim maintain that the restriction is Rabbinic and thus
there is no issue as long as the upper-bunk is not ten tefachim higher than the lower-bunk.

The Akeidas Yitzchak, zt”l, explains that one who sleeps beneath a bed in the sukkah essentially
interposes his negiyos, personal ulterior motives, between himself and the protective shade of
Hashem without seeing how this invalidates his sleep in the sukkah. This denial ensures that he
remains far from Hashem because it prevents him from seeing what is wrong about his conduct.

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The Alter of Novardhak, zt”l, explains people often fail to find anything wrong with themselves
even when they are trying to make an accounting of their deeds. This is because their negiyos make
them unwittingly dishonest in their self-assessment.

This could be compared to someone who is secretly smuggling and selling contraband. Once, a
government official came to follow up on a tip provided by an informant. Could it be that
“Shmerel” is selling contraband? Shmerel greets the inspections officer with a big smile. He shows
him around what appears to be every inch of his warehouses and keeps up a pleasant demeanor
the entire time.

Because Shmerel is so helpful, he manages to quietly skip over the spots where the contraband is
actually concealed! The official foolishly says to himself, “This man is so well mannered and
helpful, he couldn’t be doing anything illegal. It must be that those who said that he smuggles
lied!”

Sleeping under a bed.

SARAH WOLF WRITES:

Today’s daf begins a new chapter of our tractate and a new series of questions about how to fulfill
the mitzvah of dwelling in the sukkah, and it starts with the following mishnah:

One who sleeps below the bed in a sukkah has not fulfilled their obligation to sleep in the
sukkah.

The Talmud never tells us why someone might want to sleep under their bed in a sukkah. But it
does explain why it could be a halakhic problem. On a technical level, the bed might constitute a
tent within the sukkah, which would be considered a barrier between the person and the sukkah
itself. And on a more intuitive level, if the goal of dwelling in a sukkah is to temporarily make
your residence in a building that is somewhat open to the elements, then maybe having a bed as an
extra layer of protection is kind of cheating.

Is it, though? The rabbis then debate whether this action is really so problematic.

Rabbi Yehuda says: We used to have a custom to sleep under the bed, which we did in front of
the elders, and they never said anything to us.

Rabbi Shimon says: There was an incident regarding Tavi, the slave of Rabban Gamaliel, who
was sleeping under the bed. Rabban Gamaliel said to the elders: Have you seen Tavi, my slave,
who is a student of the sages and knows that slaves are exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah?
That’s why he is sleeping under the bed!

Both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon bring proof from anecdotes. First Rabbi Yehuda notes that
he has a memory of sleeping under the bed in the sukkah when pre-rabbinic legal authorities were
there and did not disapprove, which suggests that this practice is actually legally fine. Taking the
other side of the argument, Rabbi Shimon tells the story of Rabban Gamaliel, who makes a light-

13
hearted — if also somewhat troubling — comment about his slave, Tavi. Rabban Gamaliel claims
that Tavi sleeps under the bed precisely because this action doesn’t count as sleeping in the sukkah.
Tavi apparently is so knowledgeable about rabbinic law that he knows, first of all, that he is
personally exempt from the mitzvah of dwelling in the Sukkah, and secondly, that someone
sleeping under a bed has not fulfilled their obligation.

How should we understand this story about Tavi? On one hand, there’s something very unsettling
about it. The anecdote seems to be premised on the highly problematic idea that it’s surprising or
funny that a human being with a lower social status should also be smart and knowledgeable. Even
though Rabban Gamaliel is technically complimenting Tavi here, it is a rather backhanded
compliment, along the lines of “You’re so smart for a …”

On the other hand, this anecdote can also be read as subtly undermining some seemingly stable
categories. Tavi’s actions poke a bit of a hole in the supposedly clear difference between who is
obligated in mitzvot and who is not: Despite being technically exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah,
Tavi apparently makes a point to sleep there anyway, and does so in a manner that only debatably
does not count.

And the role of the anecdote itself in the mishnah is likewise destabilizing: Whereas Rabbi Yehuda
tries to bolster his point by using the precedent of his own behavior and that of established legal
authorities, Rabbi Shimon’s anecdote relies on the precedent of a non-rabbinic figure whose
opinions are not usually considered. Just as the sukkah upends our usual understanding of a home,
so too the story of Tavi can encourage us to think in new ways about categories we normally take
for granted.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:9

A curious teaching of Resh Lakish is quoted in today’s daf (Sukkah 20a) where we are told that,
‘initially, when Torah was forgotten from [the people of] Israel, Ezra ascended from Babylon
and gave it a proper foundation. When it was again forgotten, Hillel the Babylonian ascended
[to Israel] and gave it a proper foundation. [And] when it was again forgotten, Rabbi Chiya and
his sons ascended and gave it a proper foundation.’

Significantly, some explain this ‘forgetting’ literally in terms of certain halachot ceasing to be
known. However, as Rabbi Ben-Zion Uziel explains (see ‘Michmanei Uziel’ Vol. 3 p. 284), ‘this
need not be understood literally. Instead, what was forgotten was the honour, authority and
study of Torah within [the people of] Israel…as expressed by the Sanhedrin, which was the
continuation of the chain of tradition from the time of Moshe.’

Given this explanation, what we are being taught in our daf is that while there were periods in
Jewish history when the honour, authority and study of Torah fell from the pedestal of national
Jewish consciousness, it was restored through the programs, teaching and rulings of Ezra, Hillel
and R’ Chiya and given a proper ‘foundation’ once again.

9
www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com

14
Significantly, we are taught in each of these cases that the individual ‘ascended’ from Babylon,
and though there are a variety of reasons why the Talmud Bavli might have wished to emphasise
this point, I believe that a further lesson can be learnt from here that sometimes it takes an outsider
to help us undergo a change of perspective about ideas and practices whose purpose and value we
have come to overlook or forget. At times this can be a physical outsider, while at other times it
can be people who are not or who have not been - until that point - considered to be part of the
‘institution’. But no matter who that person is, what is clear from R’ Uziel’s explanation is that
there is a deep association between the honour of Torah and the type of Torah rulings promulgated
within the Jewish people which help the people honour the Torah.

Today, I feel that we are currently in a period of significant ‘forgetfulness’ in terms of the honour,
authority and study of Torah. True, there are many who study Torah, and equally true is the fact
that Torah teachings and texts have never been more accessible than they are today. Still,
notwithstanding the fact that we no longer have a Sanhedrin, there is a paucity of Torah rulings
promulgated within the Jewish people which help the people honour to Torah.

Time to Go to Bed

Rabbi Jay Kelman writes:10

As important as classroom education may be, informal education is often more valuable. "The
service of Torah is greater than the study thereof" (Brachot 7b). In a classroom setting, we can
only see one facet of a person; but given a chance to spend some time with them over the course
10
https://torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/sukkah-21-time-to-go-to-bed

15
of a day, one can learn so much more [1]. As the Maharsha explains, so much that goes on in a
formal educational setting that is of little practical application; but when one spends time serving
scholars, one learns "halacha lema'aseh", which I believe in this context means lessons for life.
And if formal education is somewhat lacking, how much more so is book knowledge, in which
there is no interaction at all with a living being? Thus, although this method is no longer fully
feasible, our tradition is meant to be an oral one, passed down from one living being to another.
Great teachers surround themselves with others of similar caliber and are able to create an
atmosphere that has positive influence on all around them. "More pleasant is the table talk of the
servants of the patriarchs than the Torah of their children" (see Rashi Breisheet 24:42). While
Jewish law is important, the biblical narrative is even more so, teaching not only what to do in any
given circumstance [2] but providing guidance on how to lead our lives in all circumstances. Yet
outside of the patriarchal servants, we hear little from servants in general, and even less that is
worthy of study. That is, with the exception of Tebbi, the non-Jewish slave of Rabban Gamliel,
the Nassi of the Sanhedrin and the leader of the Jewish people in the aftermath of the destruction
of the Temple.
The second chapter of Masechet Sukkah details the mitzvah to dwell in a sukkah, a key component
of which requires that one sleep there [3]. The opening Mishnah (Sukkah 20b) records a debate as
to whether one may sleep underneath a bed and thus, not directly under the s'chach. Rav Shimon
brings proof that one may not do so from the fact that Tebbi would sleep under a bed in the sukkah.
"Rabban Gamliel said to them, 'Look at Tebbi, my servant, who is a Torah scholar and knows
that servants are exempt from [dwelling in a] sukkah; so therefore, he sleeps under a bed, and
according to our ways, we learn that one who sleeps under a bed does not fulfill his obligation'".
The above story illustrates not only Tebbi's knowledge of Jewish law but his great piety. The
Jerusalem Talmud (Eiruvin 10:1) notes that Tebbi wore tefillin, and the rabbis did not protest.
Tosafot (20a s.v.Hayashen) quotes the Jerusalem Talmud that there were many people in Rabban
Gamliel's sukkah--not surprising, as there is a mitzvah to visit one's teacher on Sukkot--so Tebbi
gave up his bed to those who were actually obligated to sleep in the sukkah. While he loved
volunteering to do mitzvoth, he understood that those obligated in such must come first.
And while he could have gone to sleep in another sukkah, he did not want to miss out on
conversation of the Sages -"even the idle talk of our sages requires study" (ibid 21b). This idea
is expressed in the halacha that one who is travelling to visit his teacher on Sukkot is exempt from
the mitzvah (ibid 27b).
The Talmud relates that when Tebbi died, Rabban Gamliel observed the rites of mourning. When
questioned by his students [4] asking, "'Did you not teach us that one does not receive
condolences for slaves?' he said to them, 'Tebbi, my slave, is not like other slaves; kosher is
he'" (Brachot 16b).
There is so much to learn, but there are so many ways and so many people who offer so many
valuable teaching moments.
[1] Rabbi Soloveitchik would often lament that while he was a most successful teacher intellectually, he felt he was unable to hand
over the deep religious yearning that he had acquired from his parents--something that is most difficult to give over in any classroom
setting. It is worth noting how those who knew the Rav from Boston, where he lived, had a very different perspective on this
towering giant than those who only knew him from the classroom in New York.

16
[2] While Jewish law reflects moral ideas and ideals, the richness of the Biblical narrative provides greater opportunities for moral
development and the foundation upon which the law is based. It is no coincidence that the Torah begins with stories
of sefer Breisheet.

[3] While one is allowed to eat snacks outside of a sukkah, one may not even take a nap outside of the sukkah (Sukkah 26a). The
reason many do not sleep in a sukkah today may be because many of our climates are unsuitable for sleeping in the sukkah--and
one need not endure discomfort to dwell in the sukkah. The Rama (Orach Chaim 639:2), however, gives a startling explanation;
since women are technically exempt from dwelling in a sukkah, and since husband and wife should sleep in the same room, the
husband is allowed to forego the sukkah in order to be with his wife.
[4] Contrary to what some may believe, Judaism thrives when students question their teachers.

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:11

A bed without shade The Mishna states that one who sleeps under a bed inside a Sukkah does not
fulfill his obligation. The Gemara explains that this is referring to a bed which is higher than ten
tefachim, which creates a barrier between the person and the Sukkah.

The Rishonim question this, as we find elsewhere that something which is even a tefach high is
considered an ohel. Why, then, is there a concern only regarding a bed that is ten tefachim high?
The Rif writes that the reason one does not fulfill his obligation of dwelling in a Sukkah is because
the bed is ten tefachim, and this would constitute a Sukkah within a Sukkah and for this reason
one does not fulfill his obligation.

There are various challenges to the explanation of the Rif. The Baal HaMaor disagrees with the
Rif. The Ramban in Milchamos offers a novel approach that explains why one who sleeps under a
bed inside the Sukkah does not fulfill his obligation. The Ramban writes that the s’chach on top
of the Sukkah is deemed to be invalid with regard to the space under the bed. The reason for this
is because the s’chach cannot provide shade under the bed as the bed is providing shade. One
would assume that the Sukkah should be valid, but one cannot fulfill his obligation.

Thus, according to the Ramban, the Sukkah is invalid with regard to the one sleeping under the
bed, because the Sukkah is not providing the person with shade.

Rav David Brofsky writes:12

Introduction – The Centrality of the Sekhakh

11
http://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Sukkah-Daf-Notes-21.pdf
12
www.etzion.org.il/en/halakha/orach-chaim/holidays/sekhakh-1-sekhakh-pasul-and-gaps-sekhakh

17
 Two parts come together to form a sukka: the walls and the sekhakh. A careful study of
the gemara and its commentaries points to the centrality of the sekhakh. As we shall see,
the gemara and Rishonim at times debate the extent to which the walls are also considered to be
part of the sukka - but the centrality of the sekhakh remains clear.

For example, the gemara (2a) offers different explanations for the mishna’s assertion that
“a sukka which is more than twenty amot high is not valid.”

From where do we know this? Rabba answered: Scripture says, “That your generations
may know that I made the children of Israel to dwell in sukkot” - [with a sukka] up to
twenty amot [high], a man “knows” that he is dwelling in a sukka, but with one higher
than twenty amot, he does not “know” that he is dwelling in a sukka, since his eye does
not see it. R. Zeira replied: From the following verse, “And there shall be a booth for a
shadow in the daytime from the heat” - [with a sukka] up to twenty amot [high] a man
sits in the shade of the sukka; but with one higher than twenty amot he sits not in the
shade of the sukka, but in the shade of its walls… Rava replied: [It is derived] from the
following verse, “You shall dwell in booths seven days” – the Torah declared: For the
whole seven days, leave your permanent abode and dwell in a temporary abode. [With
a sukka] up to twenty amot [high], a man makes his abode a temporary one; [in one]
higher than twenty amot, a man does not make his abode temporary, but permanent.

According to both R. Zeira and Rabba, a sukka higher than twenty amot is invalid because one
cannot properly appreciate or benefit from its sekhakh. Indeed, Rashi explains that according to
Rabba, “He doesn’t see the sekhakh, and the sukka is the sekhakh, after its name.” Even according
to Rava, defining a sukka as a temporary or permanent abode depends upon the quality and location
of the sekhakh and not the walls.

Similarly, the gemara (9a) teaches that one may not derive benefit from the “wood of
the sukka” for the duration of the festival.

18
 From where do we know that the wood of the sukka is forbidden all the seven [days of
the Festival]? From Scripture, which states, “The festival of Sukkot, seven days to the
Lord;” and it was taught, R. Yehuda b. Beteira says: Just as the Name of Heaven rests
upon the Festival offering, so does it rest upon the sukka, since it is said, “The festival
of Sukkot, seven days to the Lord:” just as the festival [offering] is “to the Lord,” so is
the sukka also “to the Lord.”

While all agree that this prohibition refers to the sekhakh, the Rishonim disagree as to whether this
prohibition applies only to the sekhakh (Rosh 1:13) or to the walls as well
(Rambam, Hilkhot Sukka 6:15). R. Soloveitchik suggests that the Rosh and Rambam disagree
regarding this point: the Rosh believes that the walls are not inherently part of the sukka, but merely
support the sekhakh, while the Rambam views both the walls and the sekhakh as part of
the sukka (R. Zvi Reichman, Reshimot Shiurim [New York: 4749], p. 5). R. Soloveitchik’s
grandfather, R. Chaim Soloveitchik, reportedly understood that even the Rambam agrees that the
walls are not to be considered part of the sukka at all, and we can attribute the prohibition of
deriving benefit from the walls of the sukka to the mitzva of yeshiva ba-sukka, which one fulfills
inside the entire sukka.

Some relate this question to another intriguing debate. The first mishna of
the masekhet teaches that a sukka “which has more sun than shade (chamata meruba mi-tzilata),
is not valid.” The gemara (7b) records a debate regarding how we measure the ratio of sun to
shade.

Our Rabbis taught: [This applies only where] the sunshine is due to the scanty covering,
but not where it is due to [gaps in] the walls, while R. Yoshiya says, Even where it is due
to [gaps in] the walls. R. Yemar b. Shelemiah said in the name of Abayye: What is the
reason of R. Yoshiya? Because it is written: “And you shall cover the ark with the
veil” (Shemot 40:3). Now, since the “veil” was a partition and the Divine Law
nevertheless called it a “covering,” it is evident that a wall must be akin to a covering.

While the first opinion clearly limits the halakha of chamata meruba mi-tzilata to the sekhakh, R.
Yoshiya applies it to the walls of the sukka as well!

19
 Similarly, the Or Zaru’a (Hilkhot Sukka 289:2; see also Hagahot Asheri 1:24) cites a
Yerushalmi that derives from the same verse that one may not construct a sukka from materials
that are mekabel tum’a (objects that potentially may become tamei), that is, materials which may
not be used for sekhakh. Again, this source implies a similarity between the sekhakh and the walls.
(Our text of the Yerushalmi [1:6], however, teaches the opposite.)

Once again, we see a dispute regarding the definition of the sukka and the roles of
the sekhakh and the walls.

Finally, the halakhot of lishma for sukka, or at least the requirement that the sukka not be
“old,” refers to the sekhakh (9a). Likewise, the requisite of “ta’aseh – ve-lo min ha-asuy”- derived
from the verse, “The holiday of Sukkot you shall make (ta'aseh)” (Devarim 16:13) - teaches that
the sekhakh should be actively placed on the sukka and one should not construct the sukka in a
manner in which the sekhakh, already placed upon the sukka, only later becomes valid. For
example, one may not hollow out space within a large haystack, hoping to use the hay on top of
the space as sekhakh, as the hay became sekhakh only after the walls were created by hollowing
out the inside of the sukka. The Rema (635:1), based upon this principle, rules that one should only
place the sekhakh upon the walls once they are erect. This may be especially relevant to
canvas sukkot, where one may erect the frame before suspending the walls. The Arukh Ha-
Shulchan (5) argues that be-diavad, the sukka is valid. In any case, these halakhot and others
further highlight the primacy of the sekhakh in the building of the sukka: When the Torah says,
“you shall make,” it refers to the sekhakh.

Regardless of whether one focuses upon the transient nature of the sukka from a physical
or spiritual perspective, as we have discussed previously, one’s experience within the sukka relates
primarily to its sekhakh, and therefore, as Rashi (2a) writes, “the sukka was named for
the sekhakh.”

The Definition of Valid and Invalid Sekhakh (Sekhakh Kasher and Sekhakh Pasul)

The Talmud teaches that only materials that fulfill three conditions may be used for sekhakh:
they must grow from the ground (gidulo min ha-aretz), they must not be able to
contract tum’a (eino mekabel tum’a), and they must not be connected to the ground (eino mechubar
le-karka). The Talmud (Sukka 11a) cites this principle:

20
 This is the general rule: Whatever is susceptible to tum’a and does not grow from the
soil may not be used for sukka-covering, but whatever is not susceptible to tum’a and
grows from the soil may be used for sukka-covering.

The gemara (12a) continues:

When Rabin came, he said in the name of R. Yochanan: Scripture says, “[You shall keep
the Feast of Tabernacles seven days] after you have gathered in from your threshing-
floor and from your winepress” (Devarim 16:13). The verse thus speaks of the leavings
of the threshing-floor and the wine-press.

The gemara interprets the verse as referring to making sukkot, “from that which you have gathered
in from your threshing floor and from your winepress.”

Regarding gidulo min ha-aretz, some Rishonim point out that animals, which receive their
sustenance from the land, are sometimes considered gidulei karka. The Me’iri (11a) discusses
whether leather hides may be used for sekhakh. Most Rishonim, as well as the Shulchan Arukh
(629:1), rule that one may only use that which grows from the ground, such as branches,
for sekhakh.

Items that are mekabel tum’a include vessels made from metal, or even from materials that
would ordinarily be valid for sekhakh, such as wood, but were shaped into a beit kibul (a
receptacle) and were made into vessels; these may not be used as sekhakh. Therefore, one may not
use cartons or boxes for sekhakh.

What about boxes that were broken and are no longer considered vessels?
The gemara (15b) teaches that “If he covered the sukka with discarded vessels, it is invalid.” In
other words, even though the broken vessel is no longer mekabel tum’a, one may not use it
for sekhakh. The Rishonim dispute the reason for this prohibition. Rashi (s.v. bivlai) explains that

21
since these broken vessels were once vessels, the Rabbis prohibited using them for sekhakh. The
Rambam (Hilkhot Sukka 5:37) explains that the Rabbis prohibited using broken vessels
as sekhakh lest one come to use a vessel which is still mekabel tum’a.

The Arukh Ha-Shulchan (629:5) writes that according to the Rambam, if one intentionally
breaks a vessel, with the intention of “purifying” it, one may use the pieces for sekhakh. The Shevet
Ha-Levi (3:95) writes that the halakha is not in accordance with the Arukh Ha-Shulchan.

What if one cannot discern whether the broken pieces were once a vessel? R. Eliezer
Yehuda Waldenberg (Responsa Tzitz Eliezer 13:66) relates the following story:

It once happened that a rabbi from chutz la-aretz moved to Israel right before Sukkot.
He took apart the wooden crate within which his belongings were packed and made them
into thin wooden strips… and used them as sekhakh for his sukka. His neighbors mocked
him, claiming that his sukka is invalid since he used sekhakh which came from a vessel,
as the crates were considered a davar ha-mekabel tum’a. He came to me during chol ha-
mo’ed to ask if indeed they were correct. I answered him that they were… I saw he was
greatly distressed at the embarrassing prospect of having to disassemble his sukka and
erect a new one on chol ha-mo’ed.

Rav Waldenberg describes how he showed the man the opinion of the Arukh Ha-Shulchan cited
above in an attempt to comfort him. That evening, between Mincha and Ma’ariv, he discussed the
issue with another person, who related that although R. Chaim Berlin also prohibited using these
wooden strips for sekhakh, R. Shmuel Salant (1816-1909), the former chief rabbi of Jerusalem,
permitted using these strips if they no longer appeared as if they came from the original wooden
vessel.

In addition, some suggest that a “lift” - a wooden moving container which is broken open
after use - is not mekabel tum’a (Keilim 16:5), and therefore one may use its pieces
for sekhakh (Sukka Ke-Hilkhata p. 59; Sefer Ha-Sukka Ha-Shalem, p. 270).

22
 Finally, the Rishonim search for the source of the requirement that sekhakh be detached
from the ground (talush min ha-karka). Rashi (11a) explains that the verse says, “That you have
gathered,” implying that it is after being cut from the ground. The Ritva (11) suggests that this
requirement comes from the principle of ta’aseh ve-lo min ha-asuy (discussed above); sekhakh is
intended to be placed on the sukka.

In addition to the above, the Rabbis also prohibited certain types of sekhakh that would
ordinarily have been valid. For example, one may not use sekhakh that emits a foul smell,
or sekhakh from which pieces fall into the sukka, as this may cause one to leave the sukka (12b).

The Talmud also records Rabbinic enactments that disqualify certain types of sekhakh,
even if they fulfill the requirements delineated above. We will discuss one of them, which may
have particular relevance.

The Impact of Gaps and Sekhakh Pasul on the Sukka

Previously, we encountered halakhot pertaining to both sekhakh pasul and gaps in

the sekhakh. The Talmud discusses the extent to which sekhakh pasul or air affects the sukka, and
whether or not one may eat and sleep under them.

We have already learned that if sekhakh pasul at the side of one’s sukka is less than
four amot wide, we invoke the principle of dofen akuma, and the sukka is valid. However, when
the sekhakh pasul is more than four amot from the side, the sukka is disqualified. What
about sekhakh in the middle of the sukka? The Talmud (17a) cites a dispute between Rav and
Shmuel.

In Sura they taught this decision in the above words; in Nehardea, they taught [as
follows]: R. Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Invalid sekhakh in the middle [of
the sukka] invalidates if it is four [tefachim wide]; at the side, only if it is four amot wide;
while Rav says: Whether in the middle or at the sides, [it invalidates] only if it is
four amot wide.

23
Most Rishonim, including the Rif (8b), Rambam (Hilkhot Sukka 5:14), Rosh (1:32), and Ran (8b),
rule is accordance with Shmuel and disqualify a sukka even if the portion of sekhakh pasul is
four tefachim wide.

Only sekhakh pasul that runs the entire length of the sukka disqualifies the sukka.
Furthermore, this would only apply to a sukka constructed of three walls, when
the sekhakh pasul begins from the middle wall and extends across the sukka to the side without a
wall, because in that case neither remaining side has enough walls for a valid sukka. However, if
a strip of sekhakh pasul runs across a sukka constructed from four walls, it may simply divide
the sukka into two separate sukkot if each has three complete walls of at least seven tefachim by
seven tefachim.

The gemara (19a) teaches that although one may not sleep under a gap in the sekhakh, even
one which is under three tefachim wide, one may sleep under sekhakh pasul less than
four tefachim wide. Most Rishonim, including the Ba’al Ha-Ma’or (7a), permit one to sleep under
a section of sekhakh pasul less than four tefachim wide. The Ra’avad (hasagot on the Rif 7a) and
Ritva (19a), however, insist that while one may sleep under a portion of sekhakh pasul less than
three tefachim wide, one may not sleep under a portion of sekhakh pasul over three tefachim wide.
Although the Shulchan Arukh (632) does not cite this distinction, the Mishna Berura (3) cites
some Acharonim who rule that preferably one should be stringent.

Regarding air, the mishna (17a) teaches:

“If one distances the sekhakh three tefachim from the walls, it is invalid.”
The gemara (18a) discusses whether this principle, which overlooks a gap of less than
three tefachim, applies in all cases.

This applies only to the side, but as regards the middle, R. Acha and Ravina differ. One
says that the rule of lavud applies in the middle, while the other says that the rule
of lavud does not apply in the middle.

The Rambam (Hilkhot Sukka 5:20), the Rosh (1:33), and the Shulchan Arukh (631) rule
that lavud applies to a gap both from the side of and in the middle of the sekhakh.

24
 A gap in the sekhakh (avir) differs from sekhakh pasul in that sekhakh pasul only poses a
problem if it is wider than four tefachim. Furthermore, the gemara (19a) teaches that one may not
sleep under a gap in the sekhakh, even one which is under three tefachim wide.

Since the gemara clearly did not intend that the sekhakh of one’s sukka should be similar
to the roof of a house, without any holes, as discussed above, the Rishonim differ as to when one
may sleep under the gaps in the sekhakh. Some Rishonim (Ritva 18a, s.v. amar Abbaye; Ran 9a)
explain that one may not sleep under a gap of less than three tefachim, within which one may fit
one’s head or the majority of one’s body. Others (Rosh 1:36; Rabbeinu Yerucham, Toldot Adam
Ve-Chava 8:1) however, disagree, and rules that one may not sleep under a gap which runs the
entire length of the sukka. The Rama (632:2) cites both opinions; therefore, one should not sleep
under a gap that either runs the length of the sukka or within which one may fit one’s head or the
majority of one’s body.

Interestingly, R. Shlomo b. Yehoshua Adeni (early 17th century), in his commentary on the
Mishna, Melekhet Shlomo (Sukka 2:1), suggests that although one may not sleep under a gap of
less than three tefachim, one may eat there. The Bi’ur Halakha (632:2), however, rules that one
should not distinguish between sleeping and eating.

Although the gemara concludes that in a large sukka, over seven tefachim by
seven tefachim, sekhakh pasul does not combine with air in order to disqualify the sukka,
the Rishonim (Tosafot 17a s.v. ilu; Rosh 1:33; Shulchan Arukh 632:4) ask whether a total of
four tefachim of sekhakh pasul, divided by less than three tefachim of air, disqualifies the sukka.
Although air cannot combine with sekhakh pasul in order disqualify the sukka, does it function, in
this case, like sekhakh kasher, interrupting between the two segments of sekhakh pasul? The
question remains unresolved (Bikkurei Yaakov 9; Mishna Berura 19).

25
 R. Gamaliel depicted in a medieval miniature.

TABI

Wilhelm Bache and M. Seligsohn write:13

Slave of Gamaliel II., known for his acquaintance with the Talmudic laws and for his piety;
mentioned in several instances in the Mishnah.

During the Feast of Tabernacles, Ṭabi used to sleep under the bed in the booth. In allusion to this
habit Gamaliel observed, "Ṭabi, my slave, is a scholar; he knows that the law of booths does not
apply to slaves, and therefore he sleeps under the bed" (Suk. ii. 1 [20b]).

Yet Ṭabi used to wear phylacteries, a duty and privilege of free men; but, his piety being known,
he was not interfered with (Yer. 'Er. x. 26a).

Wishing to free him, but unable to do so since it would be contrary to the Law, Gamaliel, ostensibly
by accident, put out one of his slave's eyes; then, meeting R. Joshua, he expressed his great joy at
having found occasion to free his slave (comp. Ex. xxi. 26-27).

Joshua, however, told him that he was mistaken, since no witnesses had been present and since he
had confessed to the act himself (B. Ḳ. 74b; comp. Yer. Ket. iii. 28a).

13
https://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/14186-tabi#ixzz1DJkBibqb

26
When Ṭabi died his master received condolences from his friends, a rare occurrence in the case of
slaves (Ber. 16b).

It is said in Azariah da Fano's "Gilgule Neshamot" (s.v. "Gamaliel") that Gamaliel's soul emanated
from that of Shem, while Ṭabi's soul emanated from that of Ham, who was destined to be a slave
to his brother (comp. Gen. ix. 25).

Besides, according to the lesser numerical values ("mispar ḳaṭon") of the letters of the alphabet,
the names of Ham and Ṭabi both have the same numerical value, namely, twelve.14

Slavery in Early Roman Palestine

Tractate Semachot 1:12

14
Bibliography: Heilprin, Seder ha-Dorot, ii.; Levy, Neuhebr. Wörterb.

27
Scott G. Chase writes:15
The evidence of slavery in early Roman Palestine is remarkable in its diversity, however limited
it may be in quantity. Enslaved labor was found in elite Jewish households, the courts of local
ethnarchs, and among foreign soldiers stationed in the region.

Slaves worked on farms, in the banquet halls and ritual baths of priestly families, in public
bathhouses and aboard ships, and undoubtedly in a wide variety of other contexts. They served
kings, priests and prominent rabbis. They could be physicians, hairdressers, palace guards, estate
managers and even body doubles or assassins. At least some married their owners; others were
almost certainly buried in their tombs.

Given the range of evidence presented, and the strong degree of correspondence with broader first
century practice, it may be tempting to view slavery in early Roman Palestine as undifferentiated
from slave systems in other parts of the empire. This is not the case. Almost everywhere where we
locate authentic evidence of enslaved labor in first century Palestine, it is connected to the
religious, military and political elite.

Our epigraphic evidence speaks largely of imperial and foreign military connections, and the
places where the literary and material evidence most closely correspond among the dwellings of
the high priestly families, at the various estates and fortresses of the Herodian tetrarchs, and at
Capernaum, it is a specific sociopolitical class that exercises slavery. Among all the categories of
enslaved activity identified, only domestic service and light commercial activity are found in the
broader social context.

The Mishnah also describes slavery in the context of specific rabbinic households as well as the
activities of particular enslaved persons.

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file:///Users/julian/iCloud%20Drive%20(Archive)/Desktop/Slavery_in_Early_Roman_Palestine.pdf

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Catherine Hezser (below) believes that at least some of these traditions go back to a historical
reality in the first century. She suggests that, unlike the scholarly groupings of Hillel and Shammai,
certain rabbinic ‘households’ functioned like a Roman domus, and that “the priestly houses
mentioned in the Mishnah and Tosefta appear in connection with particular Temple-related tasks
assigned to them and are likely to have included slaves.”227

She includes among them the “houses of R. Gamliel, R. Shimon b. Gamliel, and R. Chaninah,” all
of whom are “mentioned in connection with more mundane practices…: the baking of bread, the
washing of clothes, the soaking of lentils, and the setting up of candlesticks.”228 In her view, they
should not be counted as ‘schools’ as such, but instead as prominent rabbis possessed of “a slave
familia which fulfilled certain menial tasks for them.”229

The house of Gamliel is of particular interest not only because of its connection to the apostle Paul
(who was “brought up,” ἀνατεθραµµένος, “at the feet of Gamliel,” παρὰ),

but because of the Mishnaic references to Gamliel’s slave Tabi. Tabi is found in three episodes
that show his importance in assisting Gamliel in the observance of Jewish law. In M. Pes. 7.2, he
is called upon to “roast the Pesach sacrifice for [Gamliel’s household] on a gridiron,” an act that
would have required specific ritual knowledge as well as culinary skill. During the holiday of
Sukkot, Tabi goes missing, only to be found, “sleeping under a bed [in the sukkah]” (M. Suk. 2.1),
a ritual practice that is not obligated of slaves.

When Tabi finally dies, R. Gamliel receives condolences on his behalf, a practice that is not
customary for slaveholders who have lost slaves. (M. Ber. 2.7) Gamliel’s students

The Mishnah passages about Tabi raise fascinating questions about the religious and moral
expectations first century Jews had for their slaves. Hezser argues that the stories about Tabi
function as exemplars of idealized master-slave relations, a genre that has parallels in
contemporary Roman literature.

These stories portray a slave “as loyal and obedient to his master, as a model of fides and
obsequium.” Keith Bradley believes that there existed a “a repository of such anecdotes about
slaves … generally available to writers,”231 which found their way into sources as diverse as
Valarius Maximus, Seneca and Macrobius.232 This characterization stands in contrast to the
more frequent portrayal of slaves as “dangerous, greedy, dishonest and lazy” found in the works
of Roman agricultural writers and the above-mentioned quote from Hillel.233

In the example of Macrobius, Hezser writes that the slaves of philosophers are “even presented as
philosophers themselves.”234 Insofar as rabbinic Judaism represented a “philosophy” in ancient
categories, Tabi would be an ideal example of the genre, and one who stands out as distinctive

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precisely because he defies typical rabbinic expectations that suggested both a general indifference
of slaves to halakha and an indifference of masters to the plight of their slaves.

The very necessity of Gamliel’s “explanation” is, for Hezser, evidence that “such behavior was
not customary for masters.”235 If this is the case, the picture painted here is somewhat dark: not
only do the early rabbinic commentators raise no objections about the ownership of slaves, but are
surprised at their dignified treatment.

226 Keith Bradley, Slavery and Society, 68.

227 Hezser, Jewish Slavery in Antiquity, 126.
228 Ibid.
229 Ibid. 81 τοὺς πόδας Γαµαλιὴλ; Acts 22:3
230 Keith Bradley believes that there existed a “a repository of such anecdotes about slaves … generally available to writers,”
231 which found their way into sources as diverse as Valarius Maximus, Seneca and Macrobius.
232 This characterization stands in contrast to the more frequent portrayal of slaves as “dangerous, greedy, dishonest and lazy”
found in the works of Roman agricultural 230 Catherine Hezser, “Household Slaves,” 395. 231 Bradley, 33. Cf. Hezser, 395.
232 Ibid. 82 writers and the above-mentioned quote from Hillel.

225 Ilan, Tal Ilan, Integrating Women into Second Temple History (Texte Und Studien Zum Antiken Judentum, 76) (Tübingen:
Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 188.
Bradley, Keith. "Animalizing the Slave: The Truth of Fiction." The Journal of Roman Studies 90 (2000): 110-125.

Bradley, Keith. "On the Roman Slave Supply and Slavebreeding." in Finley, M. I. Classical Slavery. London: F. Cass, 1987.

THE IMPACT OF HOUSEHOLD SLAVES ON THE JEWISH

FAMILY IN ROMAN PALESTINE
CATHERINE HEZSER writes:16

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 Lev Rabba 19:4 TABITHA

Gerhard Langer writes:

The Parashah has six Pisqaot. Pisqaot I–III deal with the topics of proper learning, based on Song
5:11: “His head is like gold, pure gold; His locks are like clusters of dates and black as a raven.”
– The simple and the wise will discern, the learning and the lazy, the meaning of the letters, the
lines and the rows become important.

The fourth Pisqa is based on Eccl 10:18; it interprets this verse according to Israel’s biblical
history, the negligence and laziness that led to the destruction of the Temple. The rabbis derive a
chance for the better through God from Isa 35:4.

The parable of the maidservant of R. Gamliel shows the connection between Halakha and life. She
notices, while inspecting the wine barrels in the house that she is menstruating but manages not
to render wine impure. This way she ensures Gamliel’s livelihood, the wine.

An important topic in Pisqa V is the interpretation of “many days,” derived from 2 Chr 15:3 as
referring to the “many days” of a woman’s blood flow. It actually means three days only, but they
are perceived as longer, since these are sad days, similar to the days of waiting for salvation
through God.

Pisqa VI uses King Yekhoniah/Yehoiahin in Babylonian exile as an example, showing the tight
connection between exile, punishment, and the Halakha on blood flow. When Yekhoniah’s wife,
as a result of the intervention of Nebuchadnezzar’s wife, is given permission to visit him in prison
to have sexual intercourse, she refuses when she realizes that she was beginning to menstruate. In
return, God lauds her and gives her a child as a gift. In this way, the bloodline is vouchsafed.

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An analysis of A, B and C as listed above follows:

A: Its beginning is already an associative masterpiece. The Song of Songs tends to be interpreted
in Rabbinic tradition allegorically/typologically. Israel as lady-love and God as the beloved are
in the focus.

In Song 5:11, the head of the beloved is described as follows: rosho (his head) is ketem paz (fine
gold). The Hebrew word for gold (ketem) also means “crimson stain” and serves as a symbol of
menstruation (e.g. in mNid 8.1) and therefore as a link to the verse of Leviticus. Rosho (his head)
can be compared to reshit (beginning) in the biblical Book of Proverbs 8. Hence the linguistic link
connects the stain of the menstruating woman with the beginning of the creation of the world,
identified with the Torah. The Torah is pure and precious.

The sign of impurity, the stain, turns through observance of the purity laws into a token of
appreciation of the purity of the Torah. Though the Temple ceases to exist, no letter of the Torah
can fade. Whoever dares to confuse two letters or to ignore a letter jeopardizes the existence of the
world (Pisqa II). Tabitha (Pisqa IV), R. Gamliel’s maidservant is saving lives in a double sense.
First by not contaminating the wine in the barrels through her menstruation and therefore not
jeopardizing the Rabbi’s livelihood, and secondly, in a figurative sense, by strictly obeying the
laws and thus preserving Israel’s livelihood. The story of Yehoiakim and Yekhoniah/Yehoiahin
and his wife in Pisqa VI corresponds with element A as it demonstrates the right behaviour not in
the context of school but in the well-known history of Israel in the light of the catastrophe of the
destruction of the Temple.

Yehoiahin’s wife – corresponding to Tabitha in Pisqa IV – does not hide her menstruation from
her husband and in doing so brings about a miracle: she gets pregnant without having had sexual
intercourse. Her descendant will eventually push the messianic bloodline of David. The exposure
of the source of the blood, i.e. sexual intercourse during the time of impurity, correlates with the
provoked destruction of the sanctuary.

Like the Temple, the woman also requires special treatment in accordance with the halakhic laws
of the Torah. The stain (and with it the niddah) can be understood as sign of being aware of the

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laws, of being different from the nations by owning the fine gold, the Torah, and at the same time
can be a sign of a self-inflicted impurity and the exile. What seems dark is actually bright and
shiny like a student of the Torah. The daily worries about the Halakhah as an example of the
observance of purity laws correlate with the worries about studying the Torah and correspond to
the theology of history about the destruction of the Temple and future salvation. The Song of Songs
frames the whole narrative: In the beginning, the beloved as the symbol of God and his Torah is
in focus while the narrative gradually shifts towards an immaculate Israel in the end: “You are all-
beautiful, my beloved, and there is no blemish in you” (Song 4:7).

B: Here the important keyword is rav (many) (Pisqa V).

It occurs in reference to the many days during which women have their discharge and finds its
counterpart in the many women and horses of Solomon and the many days Israel is waiting for
salvation after the destruction of the Temple.

C: In Pisqa V one finds the center of the Parashah. The Israelites said: “My tears have been my
food day and night” (Ps 42:4). God answers from heaven: “Say to those with anxious heart, Take
courage, fear not. Behold, your God will come with vengeance; [The recompense of God will
come, but He will save you]” (Isa 35:4).

Leviticus Rabbah 19 exhibits a carefully constructed tactical approach on the part of its editors
who, with great skill, combine different traditions to make a pointed statement. Two major
principles are intertwined here, the purpose of studying the Torah and correct behaviour in day-to-
day life (derekh erets), which is covered by obeying the laws concerning sexual abstinence and
observing menstruation.

Halakhic (legal) and haggadic (narrative) elements engage and complement one another
organically. The example shows that the midrash Leviticus Rabbah is a collection that serves as a
textbook, based on the biblical text, and as a guide to rabbinic studies while practicing theology of
history and influences the organization of day to-day life and its rules. The importance of biblical
text and its focus on purity laws is not being narrowed in their very meaning or even abolished but
lifted to a higher and broader level. The highest level is the connection to the study of the Torah,
which should be practiced day and night. The distinction between an attentive and a simple person
is crucial at this point. Just as a woman is bound to observe her menstruation, one is bound to
observe the Torah. Neglect is the opposite of attention (e.g. in Pisqa IV).

To the rabbis, moral and ethical behaviour (like the camping on Mt. Sinai without friction), being
true to the Torah (in the Halakhah, e.g. menstruation), correct study and acquisition of knowledge
(step-by-step) all go hand-in-hand in the light of true Judaism. The tightknit connection between
sanctification and purity in day-to-day life, in studies and in the observation of history corresponds
to the fundamental position of the book of Leviticus. There, ritual and personal sanctification are
closely connected, body and Temple are parallels. The Temple might have ceased to exist and its
reconstruction is very unlikely, thus the Torah gains even more importance as a foothold,
becoming both an expression of hope and a means to encounter the Holy.

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