Daf Ditty Eruvin 62: SECHIRAT RESHUT

New Jersey town outraged over upcoming Gaddafi visit Aug 2009
Englewood, New Jersey officials attempting to block Muammar Gaddafi's
stay in their area

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Our shiur began with the beginning of the sixth Perek which deals with the Halachos of ‫חצירות‬
‫עירובי‬. When multiple houses share a ‫ חצר‬,the residents may only carry in the ‫ חצר‬if they join in
making ‫חצירות עירובי‬. However, if a non-Jew lives in the ‫ חצר‬,they may not carry even with an ‫עירוב‬
,unless they rent from the non-Jew his rights in the ‫חצר‬. Our ‫ משנה‬discusses the parameters of this
restriction.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Actually, the gentile does not render it prohibited for one to
carry, unless there are two Jews living in the same courtyard who themselves would prohibit
one another from carrying if there were no eiruv. In such a case, the presence of the gentile renders
the eiruv ineffective. However, if only one Jew lives there, the gentile does not render it prohibited
for him to carry in the courtyard.

MISHNA: One who resides with a gentile in the same courtyard, or one who lives in the same
courtyard with one who does not accept the principle of eiruv, even though he is not a gentile,
such as a Samaritan [Kuti], this person renders it prohibited for him to carry from his own house
into the courtyard or from the courtyard into his house, unless he rents this person’s rights in the
courtyard, as will be explained below.

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If a non-Jew - or a ‫ כותי‬- lives in the ‫ חצר‬,the ‫ קמא תנא‬, who the ‫ גמרא‬identifies as ‫ מאיר 'ר‬,holds that
the Jew may not carry in the ‫ חצר‬. - holds ‫רבי אליעזר בן יעקב – לעולם אינו אוסר עד שיהו שני ישראלים‬
‫ אוסרין זה על זה‬The non-Jew does not make it ‫ אסור‬for the Jew to carry in the ‫ חצר‬,unless there are
at least two Jews living in the ‫חצר‬. The ‫ משנה‬continues with an episode of a ‫ צדוקי‬who lived in the
‫ מבוי‬of ‫גמליאל רבן‬, which will be discussed later on ‫ח"ס דף‬.

Rabban Gamliel said: There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with us
in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, who renounced his rights to the alleyway before Shabbat.
And Father said to us: Hurry and take out your utensils to the alleyway to establish possession
of it, before he changes his mind and takes out his own utensils so as to reclaim his rights, in
which case he would render it prohibited for you to use the entire alleyway.

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GEMARA: Abaye bar Avin and Rav Ḥinana bar Avin were sitting, and Abaye was sitting
beside them, and they sat and said: Granted, the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the author of the
unattributed mishna, is clear, as he holds that the residence of a gentile is considered a significant
residence.

In other words, the gentile living in the courtyard is considered a resident who has a share in the
courtyard. Since he cannot join in an eiruv with the Jew, he renders it prohibited for the Jew to
carry from his house to the courtyard or from the courtyard to his house.

Consequently, the case of one Jew living in the courtyard is no different from the case of two
Jews living there. In both cases, the gentile renders it prohibited for carrying.

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A non-Jew, who lives in the ‫ חצר‬,is considered a full-fledged resident of the ‫ חצר‬,and therefore
his presence prohibits the Jew from carrying, regardless whether there is only one Jewish
resident - or many - in the ‫חצר‬. However, according to ‫ יעקב בן אליעזר 'ר‬- if he considers the ‫ם"עכו‬
a resident, the ‫ חצר‬should be prohibited if even a single Jew lives there? If he does not count as a
resident, why would it be ‫ אסור‬to carry when two Jews live there, considering that they make an
‫ עירוב‬among themselves?

Everyone agrees that the residence of gentile is not considered a significant residence, and
here they disagree about a decree that was issued lest the Jew learn from the gentile’s ways.
The disagreement is with regard to whether this decree is applicable only when there are two Jews
living in the courtyard, or even when there is only one Jew living there.

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The ‫ גמרא‬answers that actually they both agree that ‫ – דירה שמה לא כוכבים עובד דירת‬the
non-Jew is not considered a resident who can restrict the ‫חצר‬. However, the ‫ חכמים‬issued a
decree that one must rent the space from the non-Jew every week, because this inconvenience
would discourage Jews from sharing a ‫ חצר‬with non-Jews - ‫ – ממעשיו ילמד שמא גזירה‬so that
they do not learn from his ways.

The disagreement should be understood as follows: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov holds that since
a gentile is suspected of bloodshed, it is unusual for a single Jew to share a courtyard with a
gentile. However, it is not unusual for two or more Jews to do so, as they will protect each other.

Therefore, in the case of two Jews, who commonly live together with a gentile in the same
courtyard, the Sages issued a decree to the effect that the gentile renders it prohibited for them to
carry. This would cause great inconvenience to Jews living with gentiles and would thereby
motivate the Jews to distance themselves from gentiles. In this manner, the Sages sought to prevent
the Jews from learning from the gentiles’ ways.

However, in the case of one Jew, for whom it is not common to live together with a gentile in the
same courtyard, the Sages did not issue a decree that the gentile renders it prohibited for him to
carry, as the Sages do not issue decrees for uncommon situations.

‫ ב בן אליעזר רבי‬holds that in a case of a single Jew living in the ‫ חצר‬with the ‫ ם"עכו‬,there was
no need for such a decree - A Jew would rarely put himself in that situation, because – ‫עובד‬
‫ כוכבים חשוד אשפיכות דמים‬idolaters are suspected of wanting to murder a Jew. However, with
two Jewish residents the decree DOES apply - They WOULD share a ‫ חצר‬with an ‫ ם"עכו‬,because
they would feel protected by one another. However, ‫ מאיר 'ר‬holds that it is worthwhile to extend
the ‫ גזירה‬even for the occasional situation where one Jew lives in a ‫ חצר‬with a non-Jew.

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On the other hand, Rabbi Meir holds that sometimes it happens that a single Jew lives together
with a gentile in the same courtyard, and hence it is appropriate to issue the decree in such a case
as well.

Therefore, the Sages said: An eiruv is not effective in a place where a gentile is living, nor is
the renunciation of rights to a courtyard in favor of the other residents effective in a place where
a gentile is living.

Therefore, carrying is prohibited in a courtyard in which a gentile resides, unless the gentile rents
out his property to one of the Jews for the purpose of an eiruv regardless of the number of Jews
living there. And as a gentile would not be willing to rent out his property for this purpose, the
living conditions will become too strained, prompting the Jew to move.

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:

MISHNAH: If a man lives in a courtyard with an idolater or with one who does not accept the
principle of eiruv, either of them causes him to be restricted in the use of the courtyard.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: Neither can restrict him unless there are two Jews (living in the
courtyard) who impose restrictions upon each other. [Only in such circumstances does the right of
a third resident of the type mentioned, wherever that right has not been duly rented from him,
restrict their use of the common courtyard. He cannot, however, impose any restrictions upon a
Jew if the latter and he are the only tenants. The Gemora will explain the reason for this.]

Rabban Gamliel related: A Sadducee once lived with us in the same mavoi in Jerusalem and father
(Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel) told us(on a certain occasion when the Sadducee renounced his
right to his share in the mavoi): Hasten (before the Shabbos begins) and carry out all the necessary
utensils into the mavoi (in order to acquire by that act the Sadducee’s share) before he carries out
his (into the mavoi) and thereby imposes restrictions upon you (by reacquiring the right he at first
renounced).

[A Sadducee, according to this view, is not regarded as an idolater, whose right in a courtyard or
a mavoi must be rented, but as a heretic Jew, who may renounce his right by a mere declaration,
no renting of it being necessary. Since the Sadducee in question had received no rent, it was within

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his power to withdraw his concession at any moment, provided the other tenants had not acquired
possession of the mavoi by carrying their articles into it. That is the explanation in the instruction
to hasten the acquisition before the Sadducee had time to change his mind.]

Rabbi Yehudah related: The instruction was given in a different manner: Hasten and attend to your
needs in the mavoi before he carries out his (into the mavoi) and thereby imposes restrictions upon
you (by reacquiring the right he at first renounced). [According to R’ Yehudah, a Sadducee who
renounced his right to his share without receiving any payment for it may withdraw his concession
at any time even after the other tenants had, by the performance of some act, acquired possession
of his share. As he might change his mind at any moment, the other tenants had to carry out all
they needed prior to the commencement of the Shabbos.]

GEMARA: Abaye bar Avin and Rabbi Chinena bar Avin sat at their studies while Abaye was
sitting with them, and in the course of their session they dealt with the following question (on the
Mishna): It is quite possible to understand the view of Rabbi Meir (the first Tanna of the Mishna),
since he may hold the opinion that an idolater’s dwelling is legally a valid dwelling, and that no
difference is to be made between one Jewish tenant and two Jewish tenants. [That is why he rules
that an idolater invariably restricts the use of a common courtyard, irrespective of whether he has
many Jewish neighbors or only one.]

What, however, could be the view of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov? If he is of the opinion that an
idolater’s dwelling is legally a valid dwelling, restrictions should be imposed even in the case of
one Jewish tenant; and if he holds that it is legally no valid dwelling, no restrictions should be
imposed even in the case of two Jewish tenants? [This is because - in either case, as far as Shabbos
laws are concerned, he has no share in the courtyard; while the Jews’ shares are merged into one
common domain by means of their ‘eiruv!?]

Abaye said to them: But does Rabbi Meir hold that an idolater’s dwelling is legally a valid
dwelling? Was it not in fact taught in a braisa: An idolater’s courtyard has the same status as an
animal stable. [When he is away for the Shabbos, he does not restrict the movement of objects from
the houses into the courtyard; this is different by a Jew. Evidently, even R’ Meir holds that an
idolater’s residence is not a legal dwelling!?]

Rather, says Abaye: All agree that an idolater’s dwelling is legally not a valid dwelling, but the
point at issue between them here is the question whether a law had been instituted as a preventive
measure against the possibility of a Jew being influenced by his deeds.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds that, since an idolater is suspected of murder, a preventive
measure has been enacted by the Rabbis in the case of two Jews, who quite frequently live together
with an idolater, but not in that of one Jew, who as a rule, does not live together with an idolater,
while Rabbi Meir holds that, since it may sometimes happen that one Jew also should live with an
idolater, the Rabbis have laid down that no eiruv is effective where an idolater lives in the same
courtyard, nor is the renunciation of one’s right effective where an idolater is concerned, unless
that right has been rented out; but an idolater would not rent out his right.

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Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:1

The sixth chapter of Massekhet Eiruvin returns to the discussion of eiruvei hatzeirot – the laws

that regulate how to arrange to permit residents of a courtyard to carry within it. In particular,

this chapter focuses on the residents themselves. All of the residents need to participate in

the eiruv, but if one of them did not participate, even on Shabbat he can rectify the matter by

ceding his ownership to another resident who did participate.

One of the central questions dealt with is who is considered a resident of the courtyard for the

purpose of creating the eiruv, and what needs to be done if someone does not want to participate.

The Mishna (61b) brings a disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

Both agree that a non-Jew who lives in the courtyard will need to actually lease his part of the

courtyard to the others in order to allow them to establish an eiruv. Rabbi Meir feels that this is

necessary, even if there is only one Jew living in the courtyard; Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov deems

this necessary only if there are two or more Jewish residents. This disagreement does not really

stem from the rules of eiruv. They both agree, in principle, that the non-Jew’s presence in the

courtyard does not require his participation in the eiruv. Rather, this is a Rabbinic decree whose

purpose is to discourage Jews from taking up residence in a courtyard with non-Jews. Rabbi

Meir believes that this decree always applies, but Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov points to the fact

that it would be unusual for a Jew to live alone with non-Jews in their courtyard, due to his fear

of the non-Jews. Therefore, there was no need to establish a Rabbinic decree for such an unusual

situation.

The Gemara lists several amoraim who rule like Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, culminating

in Abayye’s statement to Rav Yosef that the tradition is that the teachings of Rabbi Eliezer ben

1
https://steinsaltz.org/daf/eiruvin62/

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Yaakov are kav v’naki – short, but clear and perfect – so we follow them in every area

of halakha.

The principle that the teachings of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov arekav v’naki appears several times

in the Gemara. There is some discussion about how broad a ruling it is. Does it apply only to his

teachings that appear in the Mishna, or in baraitot, as well? Is it only true against one adversary,

or even against a group? The conclusion seems to be that we will always follow the teachings of

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov. Tradition has it that his teachings appear 102 times in the Talmud –

matching the Gematria of the word “Kav,” and that his opinion is accepted in every one of those

cases.

R. Abby Sosland writes:2

While Jews have always lived among people of all faiths, the Talmud suggests some ambivalence
about Jews and non-Jews living in close proximity, ambivalence that we might find problematic
in our own day. We find an example of this in the mishnah on our daf (end of 61b)

One who resides with a gentile in the same courtyard, or one who lives in the same courtyard
with one who does not accept the principle of eruv, this person renders it prohibited for him to
carry from his own house into the courtyard or from the courtyard into his house.

According to the mishnah, it’s forbidden to construct an eruv that includes property owned by a
non-Jew, or even a Jew who doesn’t accept the laws of eruv. This ruling would clearly deter
observant Jews from living among non-Jews. After all, everyone likes to be able to carry a Shabbat
meal into a courtyard, and if living among non-Jews (or non-observant Jews) makes that
impossible, life may be much easier lived exclusively among observant Jews.

Despite this ruling, generations of observant Jews have lived peacefully and comfortably among
both non-Jewish and non-observant neighbors. Clearly, some sort of accommodation had to be
made. And we find one in the Gemara that follows.

According to the Gemara, one can construct an eruv in a mixed neighborhood by means of
something called a sechirat reshut, a property rental. If you have a neighbor who doesn't observe
the laws of eruv, you can lease their property from them and thus create a valid eruv that includes

2
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/FMfcgxwKhqdgCbplbCGNXvrcxqbHrkDv

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their property. In a large city, this requirement would render an eruv virtually impossible to
construct. But as the Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 391 explains:

in a large town you can lease the properties of all residents from a minister or public official. The
official can rent out private homes, the Shulchan Aruch reasons, because governments have the
right to quarter soldiers in private homes during wartime.

In a democracy, of course, this isn’t possible, which is why some authorities (including my late
father in law Rav Gettinger) did not accept the validity of a city wide eruv.

But most do. And for such an eruv to be kosher, a sechirat reshut is required. This process has
certainly made for some interesting moments in municipal politics!

Jews have a long history of navigating their way through the secular world. And while this mishnah
may have intended to discourage our living among other nations, the Gemara and later Jewish law
created practical pathways to co-existence. In the words of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi in the
Jerusalem Talmud, the very act of combining courtyards through the creation of an eruv hatzerot
creates community, and in so doing furthers peace among its participants.

Sharing property and building connections within larger cities can move us out of the insularity of
our own homes and create ties to the world around us. Jewish law creates livable observant
communities even among non-Jews, bringing the power of eruv into the non-Jewish, non-
observant world. The eruv then offers the potential for shared recognition of community and, at its
best, can be a true symbol of peace.

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Our Daf explains that, strictly speaking, the domain of a non-Shomer Shabbos resident should not
prevent a fellow resident from carrying on Shabbos within the enclosed area that they share.3 The
halachah remains that whenever a single Jewish individual or family shares the enclosed area with
any number of non-Jews, it is not necessary to rent their space from them for Shabbos.

For example, in the case of a triplex, there are several possible configurations:
a) Three Jewish families;
b) Two Jewish (Shomer Shabbos) families and one non-Jewish family;
c) One Jewish family and two non-Jewish families.

In the first configuration only eruvei chatzeiros among the three families is required. In the second
configuration we would require the two Jewish families to make an eruvei chatzeiros between
themselves and to contract a sechiras reshus from the non-Jewish family as well. In the third
configuration we would require no additional procedures at all.

The solitary Jewish family needs make neither eruvei chatzeiros nor sechiras reshus. We can easily
apply the principles that we have just outlined to apartment buildings and other situations where
more people reside together within an enclosed area.

A potential consequence of this halachah applies if one has the misfortune to land in an airport
(outside the State of Israel) after Shabbos has begun. If, as often happens, one can walk within an
uninterrupted enclosed area from the airplane, through the terminal, to an attached hotel, one may
carry one's luggage the entire way.

Different authorities might own these areas. Since, however, their status is one of exclusive non-
Jewish ownership, no rental of the domain is necessary to carry from one area to another.

Our Daf and - CONTEMPORARY SECHIRAT RESHUT

R. Haim Jachter writes:4

The procedure of eruv chatzeirot is effective solely for Jews who believe in the Oral Law and thus
believe in the efficacy of an eruv. However, one must rent the apartments, homes, and common

3
Daf Digest: https://dafdigest.org/masechtos/Eruvin/Eruvin%20062.pdf
4
https://www.ou.org/chag/files/2020/09/Eruvin-Daf-62-Sechirat-
Reshut.pdf?utm_source=MJL_Maropost&utm_campaign=MJL_Daf_Yomi&utm_medium=email

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areas (such as streets and parks) from every non-Jewish and non-believing Jewish resident of the
reshut hayachid. This procedure is known as sechirat reshut.

Renting every non-Jewish house within the tzurot hapetach is a virtually impossible task to
accomplish in a community eruv. Fortunately, Halachah provides an alternative method of
performing the sechirat reshut (see Shulchan Aruch, O.C. 391:1).

The Jewish community may rent the entire enclosed area from the head of the city (sar ha'ir) or
from one to whom this leader has delegated his authority. The Shulchan Aruch rules that the head
of the city has the halachic ability to rent out not just the public property within the tzurot hapetach,
but also the homes of its residents. His ability to rent out private homes stems from his right to
quarter soldiers and military equipment in those homes during a time of war without consulting
the residents.

Democratic countries forbid quartering soldiers under most circumstances. Nonetheless, the Tikvat
Zechariah (pp. 39-40, cited in The Contemporary Eruv pp. 115-117), discussing the possibility of
constructing an eruv in St. Louis in the 1890s, rules that a city government in America does have
the right to lease private homes for sechirat reshut. He reasons that local governments may search
and inspect private homes, in addition to maintaining the right to expropriate private land for public
use (eminent domain).

Others, including Rav Hershel Schachter (in a lecture at Yeshiva University), strongly question
this reasoning. They point out that the right of eminent domain is rarely used and is quite difficult
to apply. According to their opinion, it is forbidden to carry on Shabbat (even within an eruv) from
one's home to the private property of a non-Jew or non-observant Jew. Nonetheless, they
acknowledge that the mayor and police do possess the authority to close the public areas of the
city.

Rav Kenneth Auman of Brooklyn, New York informed this author that the Satmar Rebbe was
willing to create an eruv in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn for the Shabbat of Sukkot, were
it not for the problem of making a community wide sechirat reshut in a democracy.

Rav Yosef Shalom Elyiashiv is also quoted (The Laws of an Eruv, p. 156) as seriously questioning
the validity of a community wide sechirat reshut in a democracy. Nonetheless, Rav Zvi Pesach
Frank (Teshuvot Har Zvi O.C. 2:17) indicates that a sechirat reshut in a democracy is even more
valid than one conducted with a totalitarian regime.

A government that is (in the iconic words of Abraham Lincoln in the Gettysburg Address) “of the
people, by the people and for the people” is indeed the people’s government. Thus, a sechirat
reshut from a government leader is fundamentally a rental conducted by the official on behalf of
the people. It is for this reason, rules Rav Zvi Pesach, that in a democracy the sechirat reshut need
not be renewed when a new leader is installed in office. One should consult his rabbi regarding
which opinion to follow.

The Netivot Shabbat (ch. 37, note 93) notes that all would agree that the mayor and police cannot
rent out a foreign embassy located within a city, as international law recognizes it as sovereign

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territory of the nation it represents. Thus, it would be forbidden to carry into a foreign embassy
even in an area encompassed by an eruv, such as Jerusalem or Washington D.C., on Shabbat.

In fact, Muammar Gaddaffi’s September 2009 visit to New York raised a serious question in
regards to the validity of the Englewood, New Jersey eruv5. The Libyan Ambassador to the United
Nations resides in the heart of the Englewood Orthodox Jewish community. During the summer
of 2009, in anticipation of Gaddaffi’s possible visit to the Libyan property in Englewood in
September, extensive work was done on the property. The fences and gates that surrounded the
property were temporarily removed. These fences served to exclude the ambassador’s residence
from the eruv, thus ensuring that a sechirat reshut would not have to be performed with the Libyan
officials.

Rav Willig informed us that he had consulted with Professor Louis Henkin, son of the great posek,
Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, a world renowned expert on international law. Professor Henkin
explained that foreign embassies are not technically defined as foreign territory. Under normal
circumstances, local authorities grant the embassies a great deal of autonomy as a courtesy. Thus,
police would not usually enter a foreign embassy. However, in case of a serious emergency, such
as a fire, local officials do enter embassy property even if the foreign representatives protest such
entrance. Local authorities would not be able to do so if the embassy area was truly foreign
territory.

With Which Government Official Should the Sechirat reshut be Performed?

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ENGLEWOOD, N.J. At a run-down estate on Palisade Avenue here, construction workers and landscapers clamber around in
what appears to be a hurried top-to-bottom, inside-and-out makeover all in anticipation of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi and his
traveling tent.

Colonel Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, will be coming next month to address the United Nations, and the logistics of his stay are
complicated by the Bedouin-style, air-conditioned tent that he uses to greet visitors. In a visit to Russia, for example, the tent was
pitched in a garden at the Kremlin; in Rome, a public park.

Colonel Qaddafi had wanted to plunk his tent down in Central Park, but New York officials rejected the idea. Next on the list was
the Libyan-owned estate on Palisade Avenue, which would produce one of those only-in-America cultural collisions.

Many Americans are incensed at the Libyan leader for his past sponsorship of terrorists and would probably prefer that he not
come at all. But Englewood is a suburban city of 30,000 with a large Orthodox Jewish population, a community that has
particularly detested Colonel Qaddafi because Israel has been a favored target of terror.

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It is often unclear who is the appropriate authority to lease the area from (see Mishnah Berurah
391:18). In order to avoid this problem, rabbis often perform sechirat reshut from a number of
local authorities, such as the mayor and the police chief.

A particularly interesting situation occurred when Congregation Kesher Israel of Washington,

D.C. established an eruv for the community. Due to the ambiguous nature of Washington's
municipal authorities, the community performed sechirat reshut with United States President
George Bush and Washington Mayor Marion Berry, along with the heads of the police and city
council.

Rav Mordechai Willig told this author that he prefers to perform a sechirat reshut with the chief of
the fire department, as the fire department enjoys the right to enter a home without warning in case
of a fire emergency.

Rav Moshe Heinemann mentioned (in a talk delivered to a convention of the National Council of
Young Israel rabbis) that when he created the community eruv in Baltimore, at the insistence
request of a local Rav, he also conducted a sechirat reshut with the governor of the State of
Maryland.

Rav Zvi Lieberman also told this author that when he created the eruv for the Edgeware section of
London, he conducted the sechirat reshut with the representative of the Queen of England for his
area, in addition to other government officials. Rav Lieberman reports that the land in England is
formally under the control of the queen and thus conducting the sechirat reshut with the
representative of the queen to Edgeware further strengthens the validity of the eruv.

Expiration of a Sechirat reshut

In addition, a community sechirat reshut should not be allowed to expire. Unfortunately, this author
has encountered more than one community where the local rabbinate unwittingly let the
community’s sechirat reshut expire without renewal. This invalidates the whole eruv.

When conducting the sechirat reshut for the greater Teaneck eruv, this author rented the area for
twenty years (in conformity with Rav Schachter’s standards; other posekim permit a sechirat
reshut of a much longer duration). In addition, I stipulated that the sechirat reshut would
automatically renew in case we forgot to update the sechirat reshut.

Rav Willig told this author that this would be effective as a backup. Many authorities require the
renewal of the sechirat reshut when the non-Jewish official with whom it was performed leaves
office. The Netivot Shabbat (37:28 and notes 96-99) cites these authorities, but he argues that
sechirat reshut remains effective in democracies even when the government changes. He reasons
that a newly elected government is bound by agreements made by its predecessors. In practice,
Jewish communities today usually do not renew the sechirat reshut every time the town
government changes (also see Mishnah Berurah 382:26 and the aforementioned Teshuvot Har
Tzvi, O.C. 17), although Rav Mordechai Willig informed this author that he makes make an effort
to renew the sechirat reshut for the Riverdale, New York eruv when there is a change in the local
borough president.

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Renting Homes for an Eiruv
As we know, by taking common possession of an eiruv bread, the residents of an enclosed area
unite into one communal body, and thereby transform their courtyard into a reshus hayachid in
which it is permitted to carry. If even one Jewish resident of the courtyard abstains from this eiruv,
they are all forbidden to carry into the courtyard.

In the sixth chapter of Maseches Eiruvin, we find the halachos relevant to a courtyard that includes
among its residents a gentile or a Jewish apostate. Strictly speaking, one need not include a gentile
in the common possession of the eiruv-bread. The eiruv need only unite the Jewish residents.

Nevertheless, our Sages decreed that the very presence of a gentile neighbor in the courtyard
prevents the eiruv from functioning, and even including him in the eiruv would be insufficient.
They enacted this decree in order to discourage Jews from living among gentiles, a practice that
might lead us to learn from their ways.

Our Sages hoped that Jews would find it so inconvenient to live without an eiruv, that they would
decide to live elsewhere. Nevertheless, the Sages made a provision by which an eiruv would be
effective even among gentiles. If the Jews in the courtyard rent a right to the use of the gentile’s
home, the eiruv would then be effective.

The Sages assumed that the gentile would mistrust the intentions of his Jewish neighbors, and
refuse. One need not rent from the gentile homeowner himself. The gentile’s employees also have
a certain right to the use of his house; they may leave their possessions there while they work. It
is sufficient to rent even this minor privilege from the employees, in order for the eiruv to function
(64a).

Our Sages were lenient in this respect, since the complication of gentile neighbors is only a
Rabbinic stringency to begin with (Rashba, ibid).

Renting homes from the mayor:

The Rishonim (cited in Beis Yosef O.C. 391) apply this leniency to the power that was once
invested in the mayor of a city, to commandeer homes should need arise. He could force people to
lodge soldiers in their homes, or store supplies, in case of war. The mayor’s power represented a
certain degree of ownership of the homes of his subjects. It is therefore sufficient to rent the right
to make an eiruv from the mayor, rather than making individual contracts with each gentile
neighbor.

However, this leniency depends upon the absolute power of the mayor to enter houses, at least in
cases of war, without requiring the authorization of any other legislative body. Some hold that he
must have the authority to even declare war (see Biur Halacha, ibid). Today, most local authorities
do not have this power.

17
Even police generally require a warrant to break into people’s homes. Some governments have
provisions by which the government may forcibly purchase land from its subjects. However, this
is not viewed as a current right to use of the land, which may be rented for the purpose of eiruvin.
Rather, it is a right to purchase, which has no bearing as long as it is not utilized.

Therefore, we may not make one general agreement with the local authorities. Rather, we must
make an individual agreement with each gentile neighbor (Shulchan Aruch, ibid:1).

City governments have the right to reroute or close streets if need should be. Theoretically this
constitutes a sufficient degree of ownership to allow us to rent the rights to the street from the
government. We would then be allowed to make an eiruv on streets where only Jews live, and
include public land in the eiruv.

However, in practice, this is insufficient. As we have seen recently in our daf, if a courtyard
without an eiruv opens into a courtyard with an eiruv, it is forbidden to carry in either. Here too,
the gentile streets open directly onto Jewish streets.

Therefore, it is forbidden to carry on either. Even in areas where the government does maintain
the right to commandeer the homes of its subjects, foreign embassies and consulates are free from
the constraints of the local ruling body, according to international law.

Therefore, a separate agreement must be reached with the embassies to rent rights to their use.
These complications are another reason why many refrain from relying on the neighborhood eiruv
to carry. However, in neighborhoods where only observant Jews live, these problems do not apply.

Eruvin and Non-Participants

Gil Student writes:6

The theory of an eruv is that it is the joining of homes and property together into a communal area.
There is a problem, however, when the community includes non-observant Jews or those who do
not wish to be a part of the eruv.

I. Gentiles in an Eruv

The Mishnah and Gemara our daf states that gentiles cannot be part of an eruv but need not be.
Technically, their presence within an area does not require their participation in an eruv. However,
on a rabbinic level, two or more Jewish families who live in an area shared by gentiles must rent
permission from the gentiles to use their property. As it happens, my front walkway is shared with
my gentile neighbors but since we are only one Jewish family, we do not have to rent permission.

6
https://www.torahmusings.com/2010/05/eruvin-and-non-participants/

18
Because this rental is only a rabbinic requirement added onto the generally rabbinic laws of eruvin,
the requirements for rental are low. The Gemara allows a weak rental (sekhirus re’u’ah) and
permits rental of even just the right of a worker to place items on the gentile owner’s property.
You are also allowed to rent permission from a worker or government official who has some rights
to enter the land without the knowledge or consent from the owner.

II. Renting from a Jew

Rishonim debate whether rental can also work for a Jew. The Rosh (Eruvin 6:13) rules that it works
while the Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Eruvin 2:16) rules that it does not. The Shulchan
Arukh (Orach Chaim380:3) quotes both views and the Magen Avraham (ad loc. 6) and Mishnah
Berurah (ad loc. 13) are lenient. However, acharonim debate whether, even according to the
lenient view, a “weak” rental works for a Jew. Can we rent the rights from a worker or government
official, or do we have to go straight to the owner? R. Chaim Na’eh (Ketzos Ha-Shulchan 105:26)
is lenient but most are strict (e.g. Avnei Nezer 45:10). According to them, you must obtain the
consent of the owner, or at least cannot go against his explicit refusal. What, then, if he doesn’t
like the idea of the eruv and refuses to be a part of it?

R. Yehudah Leib Graubart (Chavalim Ba-Ne’imim vol. 1, Responsa no. 5) quotes R. Chaim Berlin
who in turn quotes a ruling of the Atzei Almogim (391:3) that nowadays renting from the
government is particularly effective. Tosafos (Bava Basra 55a sv. I’m) writes that in a place where
taxes are levied based on the property, the government has a lien on the house and is considered
its owner, to a degree. Therefore, the government has sufficient ownership over the town’s houses
to give permission for the eruv. This would solve all problems of Jews who choose not to
participate in the eruv. The government is sufficient to authorize participation.
R. Baruch Simon (Imrei Barukh on Eruvin U-Reshuyos, pp. 212-213) quotes R. Yoel Wosner who
holds that the government’s right of eminent domain, to seize anyone’s property, is sufficient to
consider the government an owner of the property. Therefore, as above, the government is
authorized to rent out property of both Jews and gentiles for eruvin purposes.

19
Shabbat and Gentile Lives7

The passing of Dr. Israel Shahak8 in 2001 marked the end of a very controversial career. Dr.
Shahak, a chemistry professor and human rights activist who spent a lifetime criticizing Israel's
treatment of Palestinians, will probably be best remembered for his theories about the basis of the
treatment he so denounced. He proposed that Israel's relations with Palestinians are based on a
history of religious racism. Jews, Shahak claims, have been so conditioned by their religion to hate
Gentiles that even the anti-religious Zionists have retained this aspect of their Jewish heritage.
Through scholarship with which an average Yeshiva student can find fault, Shahak culled source
after source from Talmud and halakhah that he claimed demonstrated that Judaism is a
fundamentally racist and hateful religion9.

7
https://www.aishdas.org/student/shabbat.htm
8
Israel Shahak (Hebrew: ‫ ;ישראל שחק‬born Israel Himmelstaub, 28 April 1933 – 2 July 2001) was an Israeli professor
of organic chemistry, at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a Holocaust survivor, a public intellectual of Liberal political bent, and
a civil-rights advocate and activist on behalf of Jew and gentile. For twenty years, he headed the Israeli League for Human and
Civil Rights (1970–90) and was a public critic of the policies of the governments of Israel. As a public intellectual, Shahak's
works about Judaism proved controversial, especially the book Jewish History, Jewish Religion: The Weight of Three Thousand
Years (1994
9
His treatments of this topic have become so popular that there are hundreds of websites containing summaries or quotations of
his work. At least one of his books, Jewish History, Jewish Religion - The Weight of Three Thousand Years, has been placed
entirely on the internet.

20
While his scholarship may have been less than rigorous, some of his points hit close to mark. It
behooves us, as sensitive Jews devoted to halakhah, to examine his work and attempt to wade
through the mistakes and evaluate whether, indeed, he may have raised issues of concern. This is
certainly not an attempt to redeem the legacy of a man who has caused so much anti-Jewish hatred
and violence. It is an effort to learn from one of our critics.

This author (Gil Student) is not arrogant enough (sic) to try to judge Judaism based on whatever
artificial values are currently popular. However, the attempt to understand Judaism based on the
ideals of our contemporary society serves a number of purposes. The first is to note contradictions
between these ideals and those of the Torah as we understand it. As Jews committed to Torah, we
need to know when our values are not the same as those of the society around us, if not for our
own understanding then to know what to reject from the outside world. Second, if one particular
aspect of Torah seems to contradict a value that emanates from another part of Torah then we need
to resolve this conflict. And third, this effort can help us arrive at a deeper understanding of Torah.
We hope that this essay will fulfill all three goals on its chosen topic.

More than anything, the episode that propelled Dr. Shahak into the international spotlight was
his claim to have witnessed in 1965 an injured Gentile left to die because an Orthodox Jew
would not allow his telephone to be used on Shabbat to call for help10.

While it is certainly difficult to understand exactly what prohibition is involved in allowing

someone else to use one's telephone on Shabbat11, Shahak claims that he contacted a rabbinic court
that confirmed that this Orthodox Jew's actions were appropriate and even pious. Subsequent to
this, Shahak alerted the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz which reported his story and thrust this episode
into the public view. Attempts to verify Shahak's story have failed and no deceased Gentile or
rabbinic court could be identified as having taken part in this tale.12 However, this did not deter
the story from spreading and creating controversy.

The details of the story, or whether it even happened, are not relevant right now. What is important
is the idea that Shahak so maliciously tried to demonstrate. Let us, therefore, examine this issue.
May we violate Shabbat in order to save someone's life and, if so, why and for whose life?

II

It has become ingrained within the Jewish psyche, and rightly so, that Shabbat must be violated to
save a life. The proverbial "man on the street" will not hesitate to report that pikuah nefesh
overrides Shabbat considerations. However, while the practical rule is well known, the halachic
reasoning behind it is probably not as famous. Many will likely explain that human life is more
important than Shabbat, and, as we shall see, there is basis for this explanation.13 Is this reason
10
Israel Shahak, Jewish History, Jewish Religion - The Weight of Three Thousand Years, ch. 1
11
Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayim 246:1; R. Yehezkel Landau, Dagul Mervavah, Yoreh Deah 151 on Shakh 6.
12
See my teacher R. Immanuel Jakobovits, “A Modern Blood Libel – L’Affaire Shahak,” Tradition, vol. 8 no. 2 (Summer 1996),
pp. 58-65.
13
Rashi, Sanhedrin 74a sv sevara; Mishnah Berurah 329:4 Biur Halakhah sv ela.

21
correct? Let us examine it. (To avoid confusion, let us state at the outset that we will conclude that
this reason is incorrect.)

This explanation requires immediate qualification when it is noted that, at least theoretically,
Shabbat may not be violated for a Gentile14. While the ruling that allows violating Shabbat to save
the life of a Gentile has been generally accepted15, it is for an ancillary reason and does not
contradict the theoretical premise that Shabbat should not be violated to save a Gentile. Therefore,
the reasoning behind pikuah nefesh must be amended to state that a Jewish life is more important
than Shabbat.

From this theoretical stance, Dr. Shahak inferred that Gentile lives are unimportant to Judaism.
But is this true? Does the evidence support this explanation?

Evidently not, when it is noted that, theoretically, Shabbat may not be violated to save the life of
a non-observant Jew16. While again, for an ancillary reason, Shabbat is violated, the common
explanation for pikuah nefesh must be modified to state that only the life of an observant Jew is
more important than Shabbat.17 This alone disproves Shahak’s inference. The permission to violate
Shabbat is not dependent on race or religion because non-observant Jews are included with
Gentiles.

To complicate matters even more, Ramban writes that we violate Shabbat to save a Ger Toshav, a
Gentile who has officially accepted on himself to live a righteous life. It now seems that some
Gentile lives and some Jewish lives are more important than Shabbat and some not. The logic that
pikuah nefesh is about the importance of lives is no longer as compelling as it once was. Indeed,
we would be remiss if we did not search for a more viable explanation.

As we shall see, a close reading of the sources shows that there is no evaluation that some lives
are more important than Shabbat while others are not. There is no implicit message that Gentile
lives are less significant than Jewish lives. No life is more important than Shabbat. What are more
important are the future commandments that a person will observe. In other words, the one
commandment of Shabbat may be violated to allow someone to fulfill many commandments in
the future. No life, whether Jewish, Gentile, observant, or non-observant, is more important than

14
Avodah Zarah 26a
15
R. Moshe Sofer, Responsa Hatam Sofer, Yoreh Deah 131, Hoshen Mishpat 194; R. Yisrael Lifschitz, Tiferet Yisrael, Avodah
Zarah 2:6; R. Hayim Halberstam, Responsa Divrei Hayim vol. 2 Orah Hayim 25; R. Shalom David Ungvar, Responsa Yad
Shalom 57; R. Mordekhai Ya'akov Breisch, Responsa Helkat Ya'akov vol. 2 54; R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe vol. 4, 49; R.
Yitzhak Ya'akov Weiss, Responsa Minhat Yitzhak, vol. 1 53, vol. 3 20, vol. 10 31:14; R. Eliezer Yehudah Waldenburg, Responsa
Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 8 15:6; R. Ovadia Yosef, Responsa Yabia Omer, vol. 8 Orah Hayim 38; R. Shlomo Zalman Braun, She'arim
Metzuyanim Bahalakhah, 92:1; R. Zvi Hirsch Shapira, Darkhei Teshuvah, 158:3; R. Yehoshua Yishayahu Neuwirth, Shemirat
Shabbat Kehilkhatah ch. 40 n. 42; R. Simhah Benzion Rabinowitz, Piskei Teshuvot, 390:2
16
R. Yosef Teomim, Pri Megadim, Orah Hayim 328 MZ 6
17
R. Mordekhai Ya'akov Breisch, Responsa Helkat Ya'akov vol. 1 45; R. Shmuel Wosner,Responsa Shevet HaLevi, vol. 3 36,
vol. 5 48; R. Yitzhak Ya'akov Weiss, Responsa Minhat Yitzhak, vol. 3 20, vol. 10 31:14; R. Eliezer Yehudah
Waldenburg, Responsa Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 8 15:5-6; R. Ovadia Yosef, Responsa Yabia Omer, vol. 8 Orah Hayim 38:8; R.
Yehoshua Yishayahu Neuwirth,Shemirat Shabbat Kehilkhatah ch. 32 n. 1; R. Simhah Benzion Rabinowitz, Piskei Teshuvot,
329:2

22
following the G-d-given laws of Shabbat. However, many commandments are more important
than one commandment and only they can override the Shabbat regulations.

The locus classicus for the source of why saving a life overrides Shabbat is a passage in Yoma
(85a-b) in which six Tannaitic and one Amoraic reasons are given. The last Tannaitic reason is as
follows:

R. Shimon ben Menasia said: "The Children of Israel shall observe the Shabbat [to make the
Shabbat an eternal covenant for generations]" (Exodus 31:16) The Torah said to violate one
Shabbat for him so that he may observe many future Shabbatot.

According to R. Shimon ben Menasia, part of observing any given Shabbat is the making of
Shabbat into an eternal covenant. In the case of saving someone's life, violating Shabbat to save
the endangered and allow him to observe future Shabbatot serves more to make Shabbat an eternal
covenant than observing Shabbat and allowing the person to die.18 However, the Talmud notes that
this only applies to someone who will definitely observe many future Shabbatot. The Scriptural
exegesis only permits violation of one Shabbat when there is a certainty that this will lead to the
observance of many future Shabbatot. When there is a doubt, for example a terminally ill patient
who may not live until the next Shabbat, the verse gives no permission to violate Shabbat
regulations. Therefore, the conclusion of the Talmudic passage is that only the Amoraic reason of
Shmuel satisfies all of the questions. Shmuel is quoted by R. Yehudah as saying:

"And live by them" (Leviticus 18:5) and not that one should die by them.

The implication is unclear but seems to be that one's observance of Torah commandments should
not lead to one's death. How this leads to the conclusion that one person can violate Shabbat to
save another person is not explained. However, the Talmud assumes that this applies even to a
case of doubt.

III

1) It appears from the passage that all of the Tannaitic reasons are rejected, including R. Shimon
ben Menasia's, because they do not apply to cases of doubt. Shmuel's reason is accepted as
authoritative and is the one most familiar to the average Jew. With this in mind, the following
passage from Shabbat (151b) is quite surprising.

It is taught: R. Shimon ben Gamliel said, "We violate Shabbat for a one day old baby. The Torah
said to violate one Shabbat for him so that he may observe many Shabbatot."

If this reason has been rejected, why is it brought again? Why does the Talmud not note that it is
rejected and bring Shmuel's reason? While it can be argued that this entire passage disagrees with
that in Yoma or was composed prior to it, the following post-Talmudic statements cannot be
dismissed in that way.

18
Rashi, Yoma 85b sv veshamru

23
2) The author of Halakhot Gedolot says that Shabbat may be violated even to save a fetus.
Ramban19 explains that even though a fetus is not a person and someone who kills it is not
executed20 we still say “Violate one Shabbat for him so that he may observe many
Shabbatot."Surely Ramban knew that this reason was rejected in Yoma.

3) While discussing the emergency powers of the high court, Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot
Mamrim 2:4) writes that the court can temporarily suspend a commandment or prohibition if this
action will serve to keep many in the fold or assist many to return to Judaism. Rambam
concludes with the following:

Just like a doctor will cut off someone's arm or leg so that his totality will live, so too the court can
rule at certain times to temporarily violate some commandments in order that they will all
[eventually] be fulfilled. It is like the early sages said, “Violate one Shabbat for him so that he may
observe many Shabbatot."

Again, we see this rejected opinion quoted. Here, it is cited not because of its exegetical merit but
because of its compelling logic. This will prove to be significant.

4) R. Menahem Meiri, in his commentary to the Mishnah in Yoma (83a), writes that we violate
Shabbat to extend a dying person’s life, even minimally, because in that short time he may repent
and confess his sins (to G-d). This seems to imply that the reason for violating Shabbat is not that
the temporary life is more important. Rather, the potential mitzvah21 Yet, that seems to be R.
Shimon ben Menasia’s reject view.

5) R. Yosef Karo in his Beit Yosef (OC 306) deals with the unfortunate case of a young girl who
is kidnapped by Christians, a not uncommon occurrence in Medieval Europe. May Shabbat be
violated to rescue this girl even though her life is not in danger? R. Karo concludes that one may
violate Shabbat to rescue this girl and rules that way. While his precise logic will be dealt with
shortly, it is noteworthy that R. Avraham Gombiner in his Magen Avraham (ibid.29) explains this
ruling by invoking the rule “Violate one Shabbat for him so that he may observe many Shabbatot."
Since only through violation of Shabbat will this girl remain an observant Jew, the potential of
many future observed Shabbatot overrides the prohibitions of this one Shabbat. Yet, how can this
rule be invoked if it is rejected in Yoma?

6) While we have already quoted the Talmudic passage that discusses life threatening situations
on Shabbat, there is another passage that discusses in general what to do when the observance of
a commandment poses a threat to one's life. In Sanhedrin (74a) there is a majority opinion that a
person can never violate adultery, forbidden sexual union, and murder even if he must be martyred
for this stance. However, any other commandment may be violated rather than sacrifice his life.

19
Torat Ha'Adam, Kitvei HaRamban, vol. 2 pp. 28-29; cited in R. Nissim ben Reuven's commentary to Rif, Yoma 3b sv vekatuv;
cf. Hiddushei HaRamban, Nidah 44b sv veha; Beit Yosef, Orah Hayim 390
20
This does not imply that abortion is permissible. See R. David M. Feldman, Birth Control in Jewish Law, part 5.

21
Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teshuvah 1:1

24
This is derived from the verse (Leviticus 18:5) "And live by them." There is also a differentiation
between public and private actions and times of peace versus times of oppression.22

What we have seen is that while the Talmud rejects the many different derivations of the
permission to violate Shabbat in order to save a life, it does not necessarily reject the underlying
logics. Indeed, many of the different derivations agree regarding the logic. We can say that R.
Shimon ben Menasia’s phrase “Violate one Shabbat for him so that he may observe many future
Shabbatot” is not unique to his derivation. It is a statement to which two other Tannaim and Shmuel
would agree. Thus, when the Talmud accepts Shmuel’s derivation, it is implicitly accepting R.
Shimon ben Menasia’s reason (but not his derivation) because, conceptually, he agrees with
Shmuel.

Given that, when the Talmud in Shabbat (151b) cites R. Shimon ben Menasia’s logic of “Violate
one Shabbat for him so that he may observe many future Shabbatot” it is not siding with R. Shimon
ben Menasia in the argument over the derivation of this rule. Rather, it is using his eloquent
phrasing to represent the majority and final opinion regarding the logic of the permission. Ramban,
too, utilizes this phrasing to explain why Shabbat may be violated to save a fetus. Similarly, Meiri
used this logic, which is accepted by the Talmud, to explain the underlying Mishnah.

This logic, to which Shmuel agrees, is, according to Tosafot, the underlying reason of saving one's
life by violating a commandment. This also explains why the Rambam, whose passion for noting
Biblical sources of laws is well documented, only cited the logic of “Violate one Shabbat…" and
not its Scriptural derivation. According to Shmuel, there is no Biblical source for this permission.

Let us return to R. Yosef Karo's discussion. He ruled that Shabbat may be violated to save a young
girl from apostasy and R. Avraham Gombiner cited “Violate one Shabbat…" as a basis for this
ruling. Not unbeknownst to R. Gombiner, R. Karo cited as his basis the language used in Shabbat
(4a) "Sin so that your friend will benefit." Evidently, that rule is logically equivalent to that of
“Violate one Shabbat…" However, the circumstances in which it appears is not appropriate to the
language of “Violate one Shabbat…"23 This equivalence should not be surprising because both
rules share the same underlying logic -- sometimes it is necessary to violate a commandment in
order to further greater observance.

Indeed, given this understanding, we can gain greater insight into a passage on Avodah Zarah
(26a). Regarding a midwife treating a Gentile pregnant woman, R. Yosef suggested that the
midwife should perform her services because of evah, which can perhaps be translated as “bad
feelings”. Gentiles would certainly resent this action so, rather than risk the consequences of
refraining, the midwife should violate Shabbat and treat the woman. Abaye says that the midwife

22
Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 157 where the detailed laws are discussed.
23
On the subject of "Sin so that your friend will benefit," see Tosafot, Shabbat 4a sv vekhi; R. Hershel Schachter, Be'ikvei
Hatzon pp. 14-18.

25
should refrain and say “For us, who observe Shabbat, I can violate Shabbat to treat. For you, who
do not observe Shabbat, I cannot violate it.”

Based on our understanding, Abaye is suggesting that Gentiles will accept a cogent and reasonable
explanation. If we are to clarify to them that we can only violate Shabbat for commandments,
including those observed by a non-Jewish Ger Toshav according to the ruling of Ramban, they
will not bear any “bad feelings” over this religious obligation. In Abaye’s time, Gentiles
understood and were respectful of religious obligations and would not have taken offense when
these restrictions were adhered to.

What we have seen is that the laws about for whom Shabbat may be violated are not a definition
of whose life is important and whose is unimportant. There is no implicit message that Jewish lives
are more important than Shabbat while Gentile lives are not. No life is more important than
following G-d's word. Rather, these rules are qualifications of how to follow the laws. The main
goal is to maximize observance and, with regard to Shabbat, that means only violating it if this
will lead to greater observance in the future. An observant Jew or a Ger Toshav will observe many
future commandments and, therefore, violating one law today will lead to the observance of many
future laws in the future.

VI

The question that still needs to be asked is how a religious system can give precedence to rules
over life. How can observance of Shabbat be more important than saving a person? It seems like
these rules are the product of a stale bureaucracy and not a system that has been called a “tree of
life” whose “ways are ways of pleasantness.” (Proverbs 3:13-14)

This impression, however, is based on a limited focus. One has to look beyond the apparent to
understand this issue. As we see life, it begins at birth and ends at death. However, Judaism teaches
that there is more to life than worldly existence and more to man than his physical self.

Conventional wisdom has it that Judaism is a this-worldly religion while, in contrast, Christianity
is next-worldly. Conveniently, this aphorism glosses over the ascetic and pietistic strains of
Judaism. More crucially, however, is that all segments of traditional Judaism affirm a certain
degree of next-worldliness. Even Maimonides, who is frequently cited as the paragon of this-
worldliness, agrees that man must be concerned regarding his place in eternity. Every person is
imbued with a soul that can remain forever (Hil Yesodei HaTorah 4:8-9). Man’s actions and
intellectual attainments in this world define how he will spend the eternity of the next world (Hil
Teshuva 8:3). A focus on the spiritual, on the one thing that will last forever, is critical in

In our case of violating Shabbat to save a life, we are dealing with Shabbat violation – an
occurrence that has eternal ramifications – and someone’s fleeting physical life. Regardless of
what happens, this person’s soul will remain forever. The only question is about his temporary,
physical life. Looking at this with our broad perspective, temporary life cannot take precedence
over a permanent change. This-worldly life cannot trump next-worldly life. Only commandments
themselves, many eternal changes, can override one eternal change. It is the greatest eternal effect
that must determine what takes precedence.

26
When Dr. Shahak criticized Judaism of being racist by denying medical treatment to Gentiles on
Shabbat, he was wrong on many counts. First, this is not practiced today, as can be evidenced by
the treatment of Gentiles by Jewish doctors in Sha’arei Tzedek Hospital in Jerusalem or by
Hatzoloh volunteers in New York. Second, the determination is not race-driven. In theory, it
applies to both non-religious Jews and Gentiles. It also does not apply to all Gentiles. As we have
seen from Ramban, we are allowed to violate Shabbat to save Gentiles who have officially
accepted on themselves to live righteous lives. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the
permission, or lack thereof, to violate Shabbat to save someone’s life is not in any way a valuation
of that person’s life because no life, whether Jewish or Gentile, is more important than Shabbat.

27