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Daf Ditty Beitzah 23: Strollers on Yom Tov?

Stokke Xplory 6 Stroller - Red/Black/Black

"Pushing a carriage or stroller on bare soil (even soft earth) is similarly


permissible even if a distinct wheel-mark appears. This is because the rolling
motion of the wheels does not loosen the soil, but rather compresses it (similar
to a steam roller that compresses the earth beneath it, only a much smaller
scale). Compacting the soil does not improve it in any way for planting and is
therefore not Choraish. (However, one should take care to lift the wheels of the
carriage when turning on the soil so as to avoid scraping up dirt with the
sideways movements)."1
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Rabbi David Ribiat in The 39 Melachos, Volume 2, in Choraish

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MISHNA: There are three things that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya permits and the Rabbis
prohibit: His cow would go out on Shabbat with a decorative strap between its horns. Rabbi
Elazar holds that such a strap is considered an ornament for the cow rather than a burden, whereas
the Sages view it as a burden.

And one may comb [mekardin] an animal with a fine comb on a Festival in order to remove
ticks and dirt from its hair; the Rabbis prohibit this due to a concern that he might thereby come to
wound or bruise the animal. And one may grind pepper needed on the Festival even in its own
mill, although this appears similar to a weekday labor.

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Rabbi Yehuda says: One may not comb an animal to remove ticks and dirt from its hair on a
Festival because this certainly creates a wound, but one may brush it with a wooden comb, as
its blunt teeth do not wound the animal. But the Rabbis say: One may not comb, nor may one
even brush.

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GEMARA: With regard to the mishna’s statement that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya’s cow would go
out on Shabbat with a strap between its horns, the Gemara asks: Is that to say that Rabbi Elazar
ben Azarya had only one cow? But didn’t Rav say, and some say that Rav Yehuda said that
Rav said: Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya would tithe from his herds thirteen thousand calves each
and every year, which means that he had ten times that number of calves alone. Why, then, does
the mishna speak of his cow? The Gemara answers that it is taught in the Tosefta: This cow was
not his; rather, it was his neighbor’s. And because he did not protest her conduct and tell her
that it is prohibited to do so, the cow was called by his name to his discredit, as if it were his.

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§ It is taught in the mishna that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya holds that one may comb an animal on
a Festival. The Sages taught in a baraita: What is considered combing and what is brushing?
Combing is performed with a small-toothed comb and makes a wound; brushing is done with
a large-toothed comb and does not make a wound.

And there are three disputes with regard to this matter. Rabbi Yehuda holds that an
unintentional act, a permitted action from which an unintended prohibited labor ensues on
Shabbat, is prohibited, as in his opinion it is prohibited to perform an action that involves a
prohibited labor on Shabbat even if one has a permitted action in mind and does not intend to
perform the labor in question. Therefore, one may not comb an animal in a manner that will cause
a wound, even unintentionally. However, he differentiates between the cases: Although he
prohibits combing with a small-toothed comb that makes a wound, he permits brushing with a
large-toothed comb that does not make a wound, and we do not issue a decree and prohibit
brushing due to combing, as there is no concern that people will err and come to permit even
combing in the prohibited manner.

And the Rabbis also hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the
fundamental issue that an unintentional act is prohibited. However, they maintain that we issue
a decree and prohibit brushing due to combing. On the other hand, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya
holds in accordance with the dissenting opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that an
unintentional act is permitted. Therefore, both combing and brushing are permitted, as even
if the combing or brushing bruises the animal, there is no transgression of a prohibition, as there
was certainly no intention to cause the animal a wound.

Summary

Introduction Mishnah twelve contains three cases where Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah was more
lenient than the other Sages. We should note that not all of these sections deal with the laws of
Yom Tov.

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Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah allows three things and the Sages forbid them:
His cow used to go out with the strap which she had between her horns; It is forbidden to
carry things in the public domain on Shabbat. This is true even for a person’s animal, since it is
forbidden to make one’s animal perform work on the Sabbath. Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah
allowed his cow to go out with a strap between its horns, since this strap was only an adornment
and therefore he did not consider it “work”. In the same way a person can wear clothing in the
public domain and that is not considered carrying. However, the Sages forbid cows from
carrying anything, since most cows do not do so. Furthermore, if others were to see this they
would think that it is permitted for an animal to work on the Sabbath. (See also Shabbat 5:4).

may curry cattle on a festival; Currying is a type of combing done with a sharp metal comb.
Rabbi Eleazar permits a person to curry an animal on the festival, even though that might cause a
wound. Rabbi Eleazar permits this since even if he does cause a wound he did not intend to do so
and unintentionally performed work is permitted on Shabbat and Yom Tov.

And one may grind pepper in its own mill. Rabbi Elazar holds that grinding pepper is
permitted on Yom Tov because it is done in preparation of food, even if the grinding is done in a
large mill. The sages however allow the grinding of pepper only in a small mill, one which will
produce less ground pepper and that is easier.

Rabbi Judah says: one may not curry cattle on a festival, because it may cause a wound,
but one may comb them. Rabbi Judah states that currying is forbidden since it will cause a
wound but combing with a wooden comb is permitted since it will not cause a wound.

We learn that on Festivals, ketura was permitted in an Exilarch's home.2 But what is ketura? Does
it refer to the Aramaic root which would imply folding or creasing? Or does it refer to the Hebrew
root, which implies smoke, as would happen when burning incense? I cannot help but think of
Kibbutz Ketura in the south of Israel, where I spent some time 20 years ago. I wonder why the
founders chose that particular name - and if they were aware of this conversation.

The rabbis refer to Theodosius, who may have been a Torah scholar, when they reconsider Rabban
Gamaliel’s' leniency of preparing a whole kid goat. They are clear that the kid goat was not in fact
in violation of halacha, but that the community might see this action as similar to Temple sacrifice.

We are taught four new Mishnayot in the remainder of today's daf. The last of these begins Perek
III.

First, we learn a Mishna parallel to our last: Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya permits three things that the
Rabbis prohibit: a cow going out on Shabbat with a decorative strap between its horns which may
or may not be considered a burden, combing an animal for ticks which may or may not wound or
bruise the animal unintentionally, and grinding pepper in its own mill, which may or may not

2
https://dafyomibeginner.blogspot.com/2014/04/

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mimic weekday labor. Rabbi Yehuda agrees with combing an animal with only a wooden comb,
but the rabbis disallow this action.

The Gemara first notes that Rabban Elazar had many thousands of cows, and thus we are speaking
of permission given to his neighbor to decorate her one cow. The rabbis discuss the possible
differences between combing and brushing; between unintentional and intentional acts.

Our second Mishna teaches that the pepper mill is prohibited because each of its three parts is
susceptible to ritual impurity: the receptacle is a vessel, the middle section is a sieve that filters
pepper, and the upper part that does the grinding is a metal vessel.

The next Mishna tells us that a child's wagon is susceptible to ritual impurity imparted by treading
- it is sat upon. It may be handled on Shabbat for it is considered to be a vessel, and it can be
dragged on the grown d on Shabbat only upon cloth, a stone pavement, or other similar surface,
for it would otherwise create a furrow when dragged (and thus would be prohibited because
plowing is not allowed). Rabbi Yehuda teaches that the only vessel that can be dragged on the
ground on Shabbat are wagons, for their wheels do not make furrows in the ground; they press the
earth down. Plowing requires that earth is moved from its place.

In the Gemara, Rabbi Shimon notes that it is permitted to drag beds, chairs, or benches as long as
there is no intention to create a furrow. Further, Rabbi Yehuda was the person who put forward
the argument that wagons create furrows and that was accepted by the rabbis. He then goes against
his own opinion when he states that the wagon's wheels do not in fact create furrows. A note
reminds us of the resulting halacha. We cannot drag beds, etc., on Shabbat if they are so heavy
that they will certainly create furrows - even if that is not our intention.

A couple of points - what a different time; we live on solid wooden and concrete floors; we create
no furrows when we drag beds or chairs today in most of the developed world. Further, how could
the rabbis equate that type of furrow with plowing? We are not in the fields, for heaven's
sake. Why did they not take context/location into account? These 'fences' create restrictions that
push many Jews away from halacha - when they are rabbinical in origin as well as illogical or
unreasonable, it is difficult to accept their authority. This begs a much larger question regarding
ow we regard authority in Jewish thought and in Jewish life, but not for tonight.

Finally, our first Mishna of Perek III, which regards limitations on fishing and hunting. We are
not allowed to trap fish on Festivals, nor are we allowed to feed them. This is too close to the
prohibited action of hunting. We are allowed to trap animals or birds from within enclosures,
though, as they are considered to be trapped already and thus this is not hunting. We can place
food before them just as we do for other kept animals. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel goes on to
explain that enclosures are not identical regarding hunting. He teaches a principle: we are not

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allowed to trap an animal in an enclosure where that animal can evade us. But if we can simply
take the animal from the enclosure, this is not considered to be hunting and is allowed on Festivals.

Notes remind us that we are only permitted to feed the animals that are not muktze, or set aside,
lest we take them when we are not permitted. We can feed the non-kosher animals. We can feed
fish that were taken and placed in a fishbowl before the Festival, and we can catch fish from small,
clear ponds where the fish cannot escape us.

So much thought has gone into our treatment of animals. And yet the thought is geared toward
understanding how G-d intends those animals to be of use to us, with his halachot being the
ultimate rule. Today, in secular, ethically questioning segments of society, as much thought goes
in to how we treat animals. But the ultimate end is the welfare and experiences of the animals
rather that our interpretation of G-d's will. Thus to better our treatment of animals, Jewish,
ethically-minded, observant thinkers must find ways of interpreting the Torah (and the Talmud,
etc.) to creatively understand G-d's will when it comes to the treatment of animals.

EXTINGUISHING A FLAME ON YOM TOV

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:3

The Gemara earlier (22a) discusses whether one is permitted to extinguish a flame on Yom Tov in
a room where a man and his wife reside, or to extinguish a fire in order to save one's home from
damage. Both acts are considered necessary for Yom Tov (RASHI).

The principle of "Mitoch" teaches that any Melachah permitted for the sake of Ochel Nefesh is
also permitted for other purposes. The Melachah of Mechabeh (or Kibuy), extinguishing, is
permitted for the sake of Ochel Nefesh, as the Gemara here teaches when it says that one is
permitted to grill meat on top of burning coals on Yom Tov even though the fat that drips from the
meat extinguishes the coals.

Since "Mitoch" permits one to extinguish for any purpose, why does the Gemara here question
whether one is permitted to extinguish a fire on Yom Tov? Moreover, why does the Gemara
conclude that one is not permitted to extinguish a fire in these cases?

(Similarly, the Gemara teaches that the act of Mechabeh is permitted for other forms of Ochel
Nefesh: When a flame is smoking and is going to ruin the food, one is permitted to extinguish the
flame in order to save the food. Since Mechabeh is permitted in that case because of Ochel Nefesh,
why is it not permitted for other purposes because of "Mitoch"?

This case, however, of extinguishing a flame in order to save food, is not actually a case of
Mechabeh for the sake of Ochel Nefesh, but rather a case of Mechabeh for the sake of

3
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/beitzah/insites/bt-dt-023.htm

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"Machshirei Ochel Nefesh." "Mitoch" does not apply to Melachos that are permitted for the sake
of "Machshirei Ochel Nefesh," but only to Melachos that are permitted for the sake of actual Ochel
Nefesh. This seems to be the intention of the ROSH (2:19). See also PNEI
YEHOSHUA and KOVETZ SHI'URIM.

Nevertheless, "Mitoch" still should work to permit Mechabeh in all cases, since Mechabeh is
permitted in the case of placing meat on coals, which is an actual case of Ochel Nefesh.)

(a) The RE'AH here and in the SEFER HA'CHINUCH (#298) explains that there are two types
of Mechabeh: one form of Mechabeh effects a positive outcome (by accomplishing a desired
result), and the other form of Mechabeh effects a negative outcome (by removing an unwanted
entity). In the case of meat roasted over burning coals, one wants the juice of the meat to drip on
the coals. In that case, one extinguishes because he wants to achieve a desired consequence, and
not because he wants to remove something. The act of Mechabeh discussed in the Gemara here
refers to the second type, where one wants to remove the flame but not to obtain a positive
outcome. "Mitoch" permits only an act of Mechabeh which has a positive value, and therefore it
does not permit the act of Mechabeh discussed in the Gemara here.

(b) The CHIDUSHEI HA'ME'IRI explains that in truth the allowance to do an act of Mechabeh
on Yom Tov is not because of Ochel Nefesh. In this case, the act of placing meat over coals in
such a way that the juice of the meat will drip onto the coals is not considered Mechabeh for Ochel
Nefesh, because the dripping and extinguishing is not what one desires. It merely happens
incidentally while one cooks the meat. Deliberately extinguishing a flame is never permitted for
Ochel Nefesh, and thus "Mitoch" cannot permit it for other purposes.

The intention of the Me'iri is not clear. Perhaps he means that extinguishing the coals in such a
manner does not constitute the act of Mechabeh mid'Oraisa (according to the conclusion of the
Gemara), because it is done without intent -- it is a "Davar she'Eino Miskaven," and since there is
no certainty that the dripping juices will extinguish the coals, it is not a "Pesik Reishei."

(c) According to the RAMBAM's opinion, this question is not problematic at all. The Rambam
(Hilchos Yom Tov 1:4) maintains that there are only two Melachos to which "Mitoch" applies:
Hotza'ah and Hav'arah (carrying into Reshus ha'Rabim and kindling a flame). Only those two
Melachos may be performed for purposes other than food preparation. All other Melachos,
including Mechabeh, are permitted only for the sake of food preparation. Accordingly, "Mitoch"
does not apply to them.

(d) The ROSH (2:19) implies that extinguishing a flame for "Davar Acher" is not considered a
necessity for Yom Tov. Perhaps his reason is because it is not an act associated with a specific
need of Yom Tov. Similarly, extinguishing a flame in order to prevent a monetary loss is not an
act necessary for a specific Yom Tov need.

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Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:4

The Mishnah (22b) teaches that Rabban Gamliel rules leniently on three issues concerning Yom
Tov. He permitted the floors to be swept (he was not concerned that sweeping the floor would fill
in holes), he allowed incense to be burned and he encouraged people to eat a roasted goat on the
night of the Passover seder.

The Gemara on our daf discusses the case of the Passover seder, which was a point of
disagreement because the other Sages felt that it looked too much like the actual Pesach sacrifice.
The question at hand was: following the destruction of the Temple, what is the best course of
action? Should we eat meat at the seder roasted in commemoration of the Passover sacrifice that
had to be roasted (see Shmot 12:8-9) or would doing so present a problem because it would appear
that the sacrifice was being eaten outside the precincts of Jerusalem?

The Gemara relates a story about To-dos ish Romi who instructed the Jews of Rome to prepare a
goat for the seder meal exactly the way it was prepared for the sacrifice. The Sages’ response to
him was “were you not Todos, we would have excommunicated you for almost causing the Jewish
people to eat kodashim outside of their appropriate place.”

The Gemara in Pesachim (53a) asks whether the reluctance to place him under ban stemmed from
the fact that he was a talmid hakham, or, perhaps, because he was a powerful figure who could not
be punished. The Hatam Sofer points out that this is not merely a theoretical question, but a
practical one from which we can deduce that a talmid hakham should not be punished for making
an error but should simply be warned about it.

In response, the Gemara in Pesachim offers two stories about him.

The first story quotes Todos as teaching an aggadic homily, in which he explained the actions of
Hananiah, Misha’el and Azariah who allowed themselves to be thrown into a fiery furnace
(see Daniel chapter 3 ) by comparing their situation to that of the frogs of the second of the ten
plagues in Egypt who willingly jumped into burning ovens (see Shmot 7:28). According to this
story, since we have records of Todos teaching Torah publicly, apparently he was a scholar.

Rabbi Yossi bar Avin relates the second story, that Todos was someone who supported Torah
scholars by lending money or merchandise to them, thus allowing them to support themselves. It
should be noted that the Rambam lists eight levels of charity (see Rambam Hilkhot Matnot
Aniyim 10:7) ranging from giving a hand-out to a poor person to offering assistance in a secretive
way. The highest level enumerated is someone who enters into a partnership with a poor person,
allowing him to become self-sufficient, which, apparently, was Todos’ relationship with the Torah
scholars in his community.

4
https://www.ou.org/life/torah/masechet_beitzah_2127/

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Tosafos (Shabbos 110b) explains that the source for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon is the ‫ פסוק‬which
states that the ‫ מלאכה‬which is prohibited on Shabbos is ‫ —מחשבת מלאכת‬purposeful and intended
labor. This excludes actions which are done unintentionally.5 Nevertheless, we find that Rabbi
Shimon rules that unintentional acts are ‫ פטורים‬in other areas of halacha, as well.

For example, a nazir may wash his hair, and even rub his head, because his actions would be
unintentional, even though he might pull out hair. Here there is no ‫פסוק‬which might suggest that
this is exempt, as the one found in reference to Shabbos. Why is this allowed? Ritva explains that
once we find that the Torah teaches in reference to Shabbos that unintentional acts are ‫ פטורים‬,we
extend this rule further to other areas of halacha, as well, via a ‫ ב אב ין‬.

Pnei Yehoshua notes that the source for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon is found in the Gemara
(Yevamos 4b) where the Torah lists two ‫ פסוקים‬to prohibit wearing ‫ כלאים‬.One teaches that ‫כלאים‬
may not be worn. The second states that sha’atnez may not be placed upon a person (‫עליך יעלה לא‬
(Rashi explains that a merchant may carry fabrics of wool and those of linen on his back for
display, as his intent is not for wearing it himself. Hence, the exemption of ‫ אי מתכוין ו‬is universal.

When a stroller is pushed over sand or soft earth a groove may be left in the path of the wheels and
one can question whether such a practice is permitted on Shabbos because it is similar to plowing,
one of the thirty-nine prohibited melachos.

The Gemara (1) frames the issue of dragging a bench or couch on the dirt as a dispute between R’
Yehudah and R’ Shimon. R’ Yehudah maintains that an unintended outcome is prohibited whereas
R’ Shimon holds that it is permitted. Accordingly, one might assume that R’ Yehudah would
prohibit using a stroller on Shabbos and R’ Shimon would permit pushing the stroller.

Our Mishnah, however, teaches that even R’ Yehudah permits pushing a stroller. Yet this is not
because ‫ שאי דבר מתכוין ו‬is permitted, but rather because the wheels do not actually dig up the
ground. Rather, it presses the dirt down beneath it. Since the dirt is not being loosened and removed
it does not qualify as plowing and hence the activity is permitted (2).

5
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Beitza%20023.pdf

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One could argue (3) that the lenient ruling regarding pushing a stroller applies only when the
stroller is pushed in a straight line but when the stroller is turned it does dig up some of the dirt or
sand and should be prohibited.

Rav Ovadiah Yosef (4) disputes this approach and rules that it is permitted. The reason is that even
if it was accepted that the digging up of the dirt is inevitable when turning the stroller, nonetheless,
the Gemara declares that it is an unusual way of plowing and thus only registers as a Rabbinic
prohibition. Therefore, we are dealing with a question of an inevitable consequence (‫רישיה פסיק‬
(which is of no benefit ‫ ליה יחא( (דלא‬for a Rabbinic prohibition. Given those circumstances
Poskim write that the activity is permitted even ‫לכתחלה‬
(5).

On our daf we find that Rav Elazar Ben Azarya’s silence in the face of his neighbor’s failing
actually placed that one errant cow on Rav Elazar’s own account. Since he did not offer rebuke,
Rav Elazar ben Azarya’s neighbor assumed that the great rav’s silence signaled acquiescence.

In the synagogue of Radin, a sign hung on the wall: “Anyone who dares to raise his hand against
his friend will be placed in cherem!” Once, a notorious bully beat another Jew viciously and the
Chofetz Chaim, zt”l, instructed the shamash to punish the offender accordingly.

Fearing a reprisal, the shamash conveniently absented himself from shul for the following tefillah.
As soon as the Chofetz Chaim noticed the absence of the shamash, he took matters into his own
hands. The gadol ascended the bima himself and declared, “In order to fulfill the mitzvah of
‘fearing no man,’ (Devarim 1:17) I hereby pronounce so-and-so in cherem until he repents and
asks forgiveness!” A few hours later, the bully entered the shul in a contrite frame of mind,
admitted his sin before everyone, and publicly begged forgiveness of his victim!

The Chofetz Chaim often directed other Rabbonim to actively rebuke their congregations. He
would say, “Picture the heavenly judgment of an average ba’al habayis. The court will ask
him if he set aside time for Torah study, and he will also be asked all the other questions
normally put before the deceased. The defendant will offer various excuses, but none will be

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accepted because the heavenly court knows the absolute truth. Finally, the ba’al habayis will
try to exonerate himself by saying that the rav of his community never told him anything was
wrong! And this excuse will be accepted to a certain degree because you never rebuked your
flock. Why allow the sins of all those people to rest on your shoulders?”

Sue Parker Gerson writes:6

If you’ve been studying Daf Yomi for a while, you may have noticed something curious: Often,
the final passage of a chapter of Talmud has seemingly very little to do with the subject of the rest
of the chapter (or the tractate). This strange tendency puts me in mind of the Talking Heads’
line: “You may ask yourself, well, how did I get here?”

The mishnah that concludes chapter two of Tractate Beitzah is a case in point. At the bottom of
today’s daf, we read:

A child’s wagon is susceptible to ritual impurity by treading. And this wagon may be handled
on Shabbat. And it may be dragged (on the ground on Shabbat) only upon cloth.

Ah, it’s our old friend ritual impurity! Here, we learn that a child’s toy wagon is susceptible to
impurity. We also learn that such a toy may be handled on Shabbat, but only dragged on the ground
if there’s a cloth underneath it. We’ve actually seen this idea before, in Tractate Shabbat, where
the rabbis discuss whether a wheeled cart can be dragged because it might create a furrow, typically
a no-no on a day when farming is prohibited.

So, you may ask yourself, how did we get here? After all, the subject of both the chapter and the
wider tractate is the laws of Jewish festival days — not Shabbat or ritual impurity.

Following the thread backward, we return to the previous mishnah, which addresses the possibility
that a pepper mill can contract ritual impurity. From the discussion of one household item (the
mill) we moved seamlessly to another household item (the wagon). And we got on the subject of
the pepper mill because of the mishnah before that, which relates three rulings from Rabbi Elazar
ben Azarya about the permissibility of various actions on Shabbat and holidays — one of which
concerns a pepper mill.

Now that we know how we got to the matter of the child’s wagon, the more important (and
interesting) question is: Why are we here?

I think the reason the rabbis use the example of a child’s toy is because it is so ubiquitous. Two
millennia or so after this mishnah was written, most of us can probably picture a child’s toy wagon.
Maybe it’s painted red and made of natural wood (or, God forbid, plastic). Maybe it has a handle
that needs to be pulled. Or maybe it has a running board and a steering wheel that a child can
operate herself.

6
Myjewishlearning.com

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Because it’s so familiar, it’s the perfect entry point into a discussion about the permissibility of
playing with such toys on Shabbat and festivals. And indeed, a fascinating 2015 paper on the
question of sports and exercise on Shabbat cites this mishnah while discussing the permissibility
of riding a bicycle or a skateboard on Shabbat. In the paper’s summary, Rabbi Jonathan Lubliner
affirms that enjoyment of Shabbat is a mitzvah — and as we have seen throughout this tractate, it
is on festivals too.

These days, Shabbat and holiday prep in observant Jewish households the world over includes
spiriting electronic toys out of sight. Figuring out which toys are suitable for use on holy days was
a concern for the rabbis of the Talmud as well. And it’s no wonder: Shabbat and holidays are days
when school and work obligations are suspended, so there’s finally time to play! Family and
recreational time is just as important a feature of the holiday’s enjoyment as the food.

Wrapping up a chapter primarily about food preparation on holidays with a discussion about a
child’s toy wagon is thus a logical conclusion — even if we took a convoluted route to get there.
Same as it ever was.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:7


Early on in our daf (Beitzah 23a) we are taught that ‘inverting a fragrant cup on silk garments
on Yom Tov is prohibited because it creates a [new] fragrance [in the garment]’. This is codified
by the Rema in Orach Chaim 511:4, on which the Mishna Berura (note 26) adds that ‘[this applies]
even with a garment which is already fragrant, one may not place [fragrances] on it in order for
it to smell even more. Nevertheless, where an etrog was placed on the eve of a Festival on a
garment and was subsequently removed from it, it is permissible to return it, because [an
individual] does not [seek to generate] more of a scent by doing so’.

This question had a practical application in my home a few years ago when we bought one of my
daughters a cloth lavender stress ball which emitted a lavender scent especially when compressed.
The question on our mind was whether this was permitted to be used on Shabbat and Yom Tov -
and on the basis of the above mentioned Gemara, it seemed that it was not permitted.

However, I then explored this topic further and noted that the Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata (Ch.
15 note 337) cites Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach who suggests that the case mentioned by the
Mishna Berura, itself based on Beitzah 33b, concerning adding fragrance to an already fragrant
garment involves adding a different fragrance, but to add more of the same fragrance is permitted.
Moreover, Rav Auerbach supports this reading from the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch HaRav
(511:7) who states that ‘if a type of spice was placed on a garment to the point that the smell of
the spice has entered the garment, it is permitted to place more of this spice on [the garment] in
order to increase the scent of the spice in the garment. However, it is forbidden to place on [the
garment] a different type of spice for this then generates a new scent on the garment on the
festival’.

7
www.rabbijohnnysolomon

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As Rav Neuwirth observes, ‘it would appear in my humble opinion that [this distinction by Rav
Auerbach is evident from] the final comment.. of the Mishna Berura’. And it was on this basis
that we determined that it would be permitted to use the lavender stress ball on Shabbat - since
one may add fragrance to an already fragrant garment.

What’s Wrong With Texting on Shabbat? A Halachic Analysis

RABBI GIL STUDENT WRITES:8

Texting on Shabbat involves the violation of a number of rabbinic prohibitions and perhaps some
Biblical prohibitions as well. We will explore a few key technical issues, keeping in mind that
there are others which we cannot discuss due to space limitations.

Electricity

The treatment of electricity in halachah is complex. The accepted practice is to forbid adjusting
electric currents on Shabbat, although there is a range of opinions as to why. Early discussions in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries explored various approaches to defining electricity
within the categories of halachah.

The Gemara on our daf (Beitzah 23a) forbids, on a rabbinic level, spraying perfume on a garment
on Shabbat because it creates (molid) a fragrance within the garment. Rabbi Yitzchak Shmelkes,
in his responsa Beit Yitzchak (I:120:4) published in 1878, proposed that closing an electrical
circuit, thereby causing electricity to flow through the wires, is similar to perfume entering fabric
and also would fall under the rabbinic prohibition of molid.

Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, in his 1935 work Me’orei Eish, disagreed with Rabbi Shmelkes
based on an intimate understanding of the new technology and complex Talmudic arguments. A
decade later, in 1946, Rabbi Avraham Karelitz published his Chazon Ish on Orach Chaim (no. 50)
in which he forbade completing an electrical circuit because it constitutes the forbidden labor of
building (boneh).

The consensus today seems to follow Rabbi Yosef Eliyahu Henkin’s middle approach found in his
1945 work Eidut LeYisrael (nos. 20,56): unless there are extenuating circumstances, we follow the
strict views which completely forbid the closing of an electric circuit. When there are extenuating
circumstances, we consider the lenient views. Therefore, unless we are discussing a doctor or

8
https://jewishaction.com/religion/whats-wrong-with-texting-on-shabbat-a-halachic-analysis-2/

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soldier using a cell phone or e-reader on Shabbat for his vital work, or some similar mitigating
circumstance, we cannot permit the electronic use entailed.

Writing

Generating letters on a cell phone screen in almost all cases violates at least a rabbinic prohibition.
The Biblical prohibition against writing on Shabbat only applies to permanent ink on parchment
or ink and/or parchment equivalents. If one writes with fruit juice, which isn’t permanent, he
violates a rabbinic prohibition. Similarly, writing in sand is only rabbinically prohibited.

Absent life-threatening danger, even intelligence operatives in the army must avoid texting on
Shabbat.

Rabbi Shmuel Wosner (Shevet HaLevi 6:37), writing in 1983, ruled that creating letters on a
computer screen is Biblically prohibited. The screen will not dissolve or rot and is therefore the
equivalent of parchment. The letters also will remain on the screen permanently unless someone
actively erases them. However, Rabbi Nachum Rabinovich (Melumdei Milchamah [1993], nos.
57, 63) argues that writing on a computer screen is not a prohibited form of writing because neither
the letters nor the background is permanent. One will eventually turn off the electricity, causing
everything to disappear, and even if one does not, the batteries or generator will eventually lose
power and turn the computer off. Similarly, Dr. Avraham Sofer (Nishmat Avraham [2007, second
edition], vol. 1, p. 569ff.) records that Rabbi Auerbach told him that writing via an electron stream
is not considered writing with regard to the Biblical prohibition.

However, Rabbi Zalman Menachem Koren (Meorei Eish HaShalem [2010], pp. 943-946) notes
that a recently developed type of LCD, which includes the Kindle’s Eink technology, is
problematic even according to these lenient views. With this technology, the molecules remain in
place—the screen retains that which is written on it—even after being turned off. Writing on this
type of screen would be Biblically prohibited because both the “ink” and the “parchment” last.

Lighting

Cell phone screens present an additional issue. As previously mentioned, spraying perfume on a
garment is forbidden on Shabbat because it creates (molid) a fragrance within the garment. While
Rabbi Auerbach disagreed with the view that causing an electric current to flow is
considered molid, he did not entirely reject the Talmudic concept. He argued that unrecognizable
changes cannot be considered molid, but lighting a dark object, such as with a neon light, is
rabbinically prohibited.

Applying this to cell phone screens, both CRT and plasma screens involve lighting pixels one way
or another. Rabbi Auerbach would therefore consider their use on Shabbat rabbinically forbidden
because of molid. LCD screens are backlit. If the backlight is already on, then using such a screen
only blocks or modifies light and does not turn it on. Therefore, molid does not apply to LCD
screens unless one turns on the backlight. However, cell phones never maintain a constant
backlight because of the battery drain. Therefore, using even LCD screens is rabbinically
forbidden, according to Rabbi Auerbach, because of molid.

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Conclusion

There are other issues worthy of mention, such as texting indirectly (grama), texts being
automatically saved to a server which might be prohibited and the parameters of the somewhat
ambiguous prohibition of performing a “weekday activity” on Shabbat (uvda dechol), which we
cannot explore here. However, an important responsum by Rabbi Rabinovich (ibid.) places a
worthy emphasis on the entirety of halachic arguments on this subject.

Rabbi Rabinovich was asked by his students in the IDF whether when writing non-urgent security-
related information on Shabbat they should type on computers or write with special Shabbat pens
with slowly disappearing ink. After extensive consultation with IDF engineers, Rabbi Rabinovich
ruled that the otherwise rabbinically prohibited pens are halachically preferable to electronic
writing on a computer screen. Absent life-threatening danger, even intelligence operatives in the
army must avoid texting on Shabbat.

This normal life: Texting on Shabbat? Guidelines for the observant


Jew

Jewish law today would exclude Shabbat- observant Jews from all that. It’s time to start
addressing not only our past but where we’re going.

BRIAN BLUM writes:9

The growing phenomenon of Orthodox Jewish teenagers keeping what’s been called “Half
Shabbos” burst into the Jewish media several years ago. “Half Shabbos” describes someone who
observes all of the Sabbath regulations except one: using his or her smart phone to send text
messages.

Religious leaders reacted predictably to the revelation of what had been going on undetected right
under their noses.

“It is universally accepted in the Halacha- respecting community that electronics are off-limits
on the Sabbath,” said Agudath Israel spokesperson Rabbi Avi Shafran.

Texting on Shabbat is “very distasteful and not permissible on Shabbos,” warned the Orthodox
Union’s Rabbi Moshe Elefant.

The phenomenon “represents only the tip of the iceberg of a much deeper apathy with respect to
Hashem [God] and His Torah,” lamented Jonathan Rosenblum in Jewish Action magazine.
But what if instead of seeing Shabbat texting as a scourge to be fought, the rabbis considered “Half
Shabbos” as a kind of glass half full?

9
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/this-normal-life-texting-on-shabbat-guidelines-for-the-observant-jew-481752

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After all, kids using their phones on Shabbat aren’t leaving the fold. As one teen told The New
York Jewish Week in 2011, “I was not driving” on Shabbat. “I was not eating non-kosher.” Just
texting.

Moreover, there are fascinating, phonological reasons why texting on Shabbat has taken hold.
Texting is, in many ways, more akin to spoken language than writing.

“We speak in word packets of seven to 10 words,” Columbia University professor John
McWhorter explained in a popular TED Talk. Texting is similar.

“It’s much more loose, much more telegraphic” than the written word, McWhorter continued.
Indeed, the very lack of proper punctuation, capitalization and conventional grammar in a text
message reflects the speed and nature of real speech. ”It’s an expansion of [people’s] linguistic
repertoire.”

Shabbat, of course, is all about talking, of building human relationships because you’re not at work
or sitting in front of the television. Is it any wonder, then, that this new form of communication is
so compelling davka on Shabbat?

At the same time, there’s been pushback against texting – and all use of electronics on Shabbat –
from outside the religious world.

Filmmaker Tiffany Shlain is a member of Reboot, an organization which promotes the secular-
friendly “National Day of Unplugging.” She opened her AOL Web series “The Future Starts Here”
with an episode advocating shutting down one’s devices on the Sabbath.

Shlain’s point: Marking Shabbat as a “day of distinction” has immense value for Jews who want
to bring the most relatable traditions from Orthodoxy into a secular lifestyle.

But what if you can’t – or don’t want to – entirely turn off and stop texting? Perhaps it’s time to
create some guidelines for “observant texting” on Shabbat. Guidelines that can help Orthodox
teens feel like they don’t have to hide in the bathroom while “sinfully” texting their friends, and
that the rest of us can use to balance between WhatsApp and what’s for dinner.

First and foremost: no texting at the table during mealtime. It’s hard enough during the week to
get members of our family to not check their phones for a few minutes between bites of tofu and
rice. On Shabbat, it’s essential.

Second, no texting in public – even if all present are Shabbat texters. It creates a safe space where
everyone knows face-to-face conversation is paramount. That’s not religious coercion: Everyone
can do what they want in their own rooms. And because the rule is clear, there’s no sneaking
around.

Why not leave your phone at home while walking the dog or taking a Shabbat afternoon stroll? I
admit this is a tough one for me and I don’t always stick to it. But you’d be amazed what a little

21
mindfulness does when your attention is turned to your external surroundings, not the podcast
voices of Jad, Ira and Sarah in your headphones.

Set “quiet hours” for texting. Just as loud music and outdoor ball playing is supposed to cease
between 2 and 4 p.m. in Israel, try that with your phone. Tell your friends in advance: here’s when
I’m taking a texting break.

No selfies: one day a week you can skip documenting (and sharing) who you met or what you ate.
What happens on Shabbat stays on Shabbat.

If you leave your phone on at night at your bedside, put it on airplane mode once a week. Not only
will you be spared eight hours of potential radiation danger, you will probably sleep better knowing
you won’t be woken up in the middle of the night by an “urgent” text from a friend.

Extend these guidelines to your iPad and other devices where it might not be texting that’s the
draw but checking the latest news. Sometimes there’s really important stuff that breaks over
Shabbat. More often than not, it can wait (at least until quiet hours are over).

As reading increasingly moves away from print towards eBooks, it seems unfair to cut access to
your online library.

Try limiting your phone or iPad use to your Kindle or iBooks apps if you have the willpower. Keep
Chrome closed.

The future will see our phones and our brains become ever more enmeshed. Direct feeds, smart
contact lenses, bio implants, automatic real time translation à la Star Trek are not just the stuff of
far-off science fiction.

Jewish law today would exclude Shabbat- observant Jews from all that. It’s time to start addressing
not only our past but where we’re going.

It starts with a text on Shabbat.

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Medieval miniature depicting rabbi Eleazar ben Azaryah.

Shame on You!: The obligation to rebuke


Rabbi Jack Abramowitz writes:10

You shall rebuke your brother… (Leviticus 19:17)


If someone is not behaving properly, it is a mitzvah to correct his behavior. We must do so even
repeatedly, since the Torah says, “hochei’ach tochiach,” which is often translated as “you shall
surely rebuke,” but which also means, “you shall repeatedly rebuke.” (See Talmud Baba Metzia
31a.)

10
https://outorah.org/p/5884/

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Our verse continues, “and you shall not bear a sin because of him.” These words warn us to rebuke
others properly. As we will see in the next mitzvah, it is a sin to needlessly shame others, so we
are warned to correct others without public embarrassment. (More about this in the next mitzvah).
Failing to rebuke others at all can likewise cause us to “bear a sin.” Here are two ways:
(1) Our previous mitzvah tells us not to secretly loathe others. If we have a problem with others
because of their misdeeds, we should tell them in the hope of correcting their behavior, rather than
risk violating the prohibition against hating them in our hearts;
(2) If one has the ability to correct another’s behavior and fails to do so, he bears partial
responsibility for the misdeeds he could have prevented. We see this from the story of the “cow of
Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah.” The Talmud in Shabbos (54b) discusses how the cow belonging to
Rabbi Elazar’s neighbor used to go out on Shabbos wearing a forbidden type of strap. The cow
was called by Rabbi Elazar’s name because he never tried to correct his neighbor’s behavior.
We see from all this that if one properly rebukes others, he can avoid all sorts of trouble!
The underlying rationale for this mitzvah is to make peace. If one acts out in public but is gently
corrected in private, the two parties can reconcile. If one keeps the rebuke inside, it will just build
up into resentment and hatred.
It is only a mitzvah to try to correct someone when we think the other person might listen. If a
person knows that the rebuke will be ignored, he should keep it to himself. Proverbs 9:8 tells us,
“Don’t rebuke a scoffer; he’ll only hate you for it. But if you rebuke a wise person, he’ll love you
for it.” (See Talmud Yevamos 65b.) Of course, when our own behavior is corrected, we should
strive to act like wise people and appreciate the intervention!

This mitzvah applies in all times and places. It is discussed in the Talmud in tractate Brachos on
page 31a, in tractate Shabbos on 54b-55a, and elsewhere. It is codified in the Mishneh Torah in
the sixth chapter of Hilchos Deos. This mitzvah is #205 of the 248 positive mitzvos in the Rambam’s
Sefer HaMitzvos#72 of the 77 positive mitzvos that can be fulfilled today as listed in the Chofetz
Chaim’s Sefer HaMitzvos HaKatzar.

Eruv: An invisible boundary that's raised a firestorm of debate with


a long Rockland history

Steve Lieberman writes:11

11
https://www.lohud.com/story/news/local/rockland/2017/08/06/eruv-invisible-boundary-thats-raised-firestorm-
debate/533478001/

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Rivkie Feiner says growing up in Monsey during 1970s she took the eruv for granted, rarely
thinking about the symbolic boundary that expanded where she could play, carry toys and other
items beyond her home on the Jewish Sabbath.

Feiner, now 43 and married with grandchildren, says the eruv — an unobtrusive perimeter attached
to utility poles and fences that marks the public area in which Orthodox Jews may engage in
activities otherwise prohibited outside the home on the Sabbath — created a sense of community.

"I didn't realize any resistance," she said. "I took for granted my religious freedom in Monsey with
the eruv. What's going on today gives me pause and makes me thankful for what we have. I grew
up with the freedom to not having to think about it."

She doesn't recall the eruvs causing the type of divisiveness that has erupted in three nearby New
Jersey communities — Mahwah, Montvale, and Upper Saddle River, where residents are fighting
the expansion of the Rockland eruv.

Rockland's main eruv — thought to be the largest in North America — surrounds Monsey and
parts of Spring Valley, Pomona, Airmont and Chestnut Ridge, communities with large and
growing Orthodox Jewish populations. Eruv officials say the expansion into the Bergen County
communities is being done to cover areas of Airmont and Chestnut Ridge bordering New Jersey.

Jewish law has 39 prohibited activities for the Sabbath, from sundown Friday to sundown
Saturday. On this day of rest and prayer, prohibitions include carrying objects and pushing
strollers outside the home.

25
"A simple walk to the park pushing a stroller is not allowed," Rabbi Israel Kahan said.
"Carrying a child in your arms is prohibited. Tissues, keys. Just imagine you have to empty your
pockets every time you walk out of your house. Without the eruv, imagine you are locked down
with children in your house one day a week. You can't visit family and friends down the block."

The eruv allows a religious Jew to carry his prayer book and shawl to synagogue, Kahan said. Or
for a parent to push a stroller.

The eruv is encased in white PVC piping on utility poles owned by Orange and Rockland Utilities,
Kahan said. The piping is usually connected to the cable line, avoiding electrical lines, he said.

Eruvs are found around the world and date thousands of years. Kahan estimated eruvs date back
150 years in the United States.

Rockland's first eruv in Monsey and surrounding communities was erected around 1970, under
Rabbi Moshe David Tendler, the leader of the Community Synagogue of Monsey and a major
figure in Orthodox Judaism. His father-in-law was the late Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, a world-
renowned authority on Jewish law, who worked with Tendler on the eruv.

Moshe David Tendler, now 90, has been a professor of medical ethics and biology at Yeshiva
College.

26
His son, Rabbi Mordachai Tendler, said when his father set out to erect the eruv, Monsey's
Orthodox community had been its nascent stage, not the community of diverse Jewish faiths of
today. There were fewer than 200 Jewish families in Ramapo, including the Hasidic Village of
New Square, in the 1960s, when Community Synagogue formed, he said.

"The eruv means unity, with the concept being a unified domain like one big family, instead
of laissez-faire," said Mordachai Tendler, who worked with his father and grandfather.

He said the eruv became a necessity because his father's congregation back in the 1960s and 1970s
was comprised of young couples with children, and they were restricted on the Sabbath.

His father raised the money needed, worked with Orange and Rockland Utilities,
obtained permission from Ramapo and other government officials, and satisfied all legal
requirements.

The first eruv was "substantial," encompassing multiple square miles across most of Monsey and
parts of Spring Valley, he said.

Mordachai Tendler said his father received some opposition from another rabbi whose advise
wasn't sought, but otherwise the eruv went through without controversy. He said his father worked
in a cooperative way with the communities and governments.

27
Around 1986, the eruv was expanded as a 35-member board of rabbis was established to oversee
the eruv and issues within the growing religious community. Moshe Tendler served as co-president
with Rabbi Nachum Muschel, dean and principal of the Adolph Schreiber Hebrew Academy of
Rockland, known as ASHAR, and Rabbi Berel Wein.

"We found a route many times larger than the original eruv built by my father," Mordachai Tendler
said, adding he believes the Eruv remained the largest in North America.

He said that updated eruv utilized the fences of the Palisades Interstate Parkway and Thruway,
along with O&R poles, and filled in breaks in the fence.

Mordachai Tendler said when the Hasidic Jewish population began to grow and become more
influential, their leaders created another eruv, with different boundaries, about 18 years ago, which
exists today.

"An eruv is definitely a tremendous advantage for people with young children," Mordachai Tendler
said, "who want to go outside, play ball, or for people to push strollers. Your life is substantially
changed if you are stuck in your house. The Eruv makes the Sabbath much more enjoyable."

Feiner said she feels for the young mothers with children who don't live within an eruv.

She said that the eruv doesn't draw people into communities, the availability of houses does. She
noted young Jewish couples buying houses in Airmont, Chestnut Ridge and Pomona from families
who had moved in decades ago.

She said she's concerned about the collateral damage of people fearing the eruv.

"I wish there was no fear," she said. "People are buying homes because the houses are for sale, and
they are paying good money. We're not forcing people out of their homes. People have moved into
communities without an eruv."

Chaim Lazarus, 47, a lifelong resident who works in the building trades, said the eruv piping fits
in with the other equipment on the utility poles and provide what he called a loophole from the
Sabbath prohibitions, not unlike loopholes in tax law.

28
He said the eruv issue is being blown out of proportion, adding the ervu is placed on poles along
utility right-of-ways, not on private property.

Lazarus, who said his family has lived in Rockland for 80 years, said most people don't notice the
pipe on the poles. He said the controversy over the expanded eruv in neighboring northern Bergen
County "basically tells people we don't want you here."

"If people want to move, they will without an eruv," Lazarus said. "It's not obligatory for people
to live in communities with an eruv. It's a tremendous convenience. I guarantee you there was no
eruv in the 1940s when my grandfather moved here. It's like people can live without air-
conditioning but having air-conditioning is more convenient."

Judah Lerer, a Monsey businessman, said he grew up in Cliffside Park, New Jersey, without an
eruv. His family was one of the few Orthodox Jewish ones in what he called a very religious
Catholic township and his family never faced religious tension or hatred.

"Since there was no likelihood of there ever being an eruv around the township, I put up an eruv on
our own property, encircling our house, driveway and yard," he said, adding the eruv was ugly and
stood out. "This enabled us to move lawn chairs, to bring food out to our Sukkah, and even take
out the garbage."

He said without the eruv, "walking to synagogue meant we could carry nothing on our
persons," such as house keys or prayer books. Prayer books and shawls could be left at the
synagogue during the week.

Lerer said arguments on both sides of the eruv debate in Bergen County have become ugly, with
people stereotyping religious Jews and the religious Jews calling people anti-Semitic. He said such
characterizations have ruined Ramapo and threaten Rockland.

Orange and Rockland Utilities and its subsidiary Rockland Electric in New Jersey work with
religious communities concerning eruv. The utility says it provides access to its poles consistent
with various federal and state mandates and maintains that eruv installation is consistent with other
attachments, such as security cameras, Christmas lighting and private communication lines.

29
The courts have traditionally ruled that an eruv is not a sign, so municipal laws banning signs on
poles don't apply. The utility cites the federal court decision involving Tenafly, in New Jersey, and
the New York State Supreme Court decision involving Southampton, on Long Island.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found Tenafly's threat to remove an eruv
violated The U.S. Constitution's First Amendment protection of religious freedom. The appeals
court said the belief that the existence of the eruv encourages Orthodox Jewish migration into a
community — is not a reason to prohibit the eruv.

The New York court decision said the eruv and its components could not be considered signs
under Southampton's sign regulation.

"People are always scared of the unknown," Rabbi Kahan said. "There always are rabble rousers
who stir up trouble. Most people don't even notice the eruv on the utility poles unless you point
them out."

Halachic Analysis: Having a Goy Push Your Stroller on Shabbos

30
Rabbi Shlomo Segal writes:12

May one instruct a non-Jew on Shabbos to wheel a baby carriage in the street when the parents want to visit
friends or family and eat the seudas Shabbos there or they wish to participate in a Bris, Bar Mitzva or something
similar?

The prohibition of instructing a non-Jew to do work for a Jew is explained in great length in the
Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch in many different chapters including the comments in the footnotes.
Three reasons are given for this prohibition:
1) When a non-Jew does work for Jew because he was instructed by him, it is considered as he is
his shliach, emissary, and an emissary is considered as the person who has instructed him.
Although, we do not use this principle according to Torah, unless it is an instance of one Jew doing
a something for another Jew, still our sages have considered a non-Jew doing work for a Jew as a
shlichus, serving as an emissary for the Jew.
2) There is an allusion to this prohibition on Shabbos and Yom Tov in the Torah (Shmos 12:16),
“On Yom Tov work should not be done”, implying that even by someone else. If this prohibition
is relevant on Yom Tov, it is surely effective also on Shabbos.
3) In order that Shabbos should not be lenient in the eyes of people, and they might begin doing
work themselves.
As result of the above mentioned three reasons, our sages have been very stringent in instructing
a non-Jew to do work for a Jew on Shabbos and have instituted decrees. 1) Even when the non-
Jew is doing the work on his own for a Jew, although the Jew did not transgress any prohibition,
the Jew is not permitted to benefit from the work. This also applies to Motzoei Shabbos that one
cannot benefit from this work until after the time duration of the work. For example if the job was
done in one hour, the Jew cannot benefit from this job until an hour after Shabbos, because on
another occasion, he might directly instruct the non-Jew to do this job for him (see Alter Rebbe’s
Shulchan Aruch 243:2).
The Alter Rebbe also cited this concept in Hilchos Yom Tov (chapt. 515:1), “The same applies on
Yom Tov that our sages have been concerned, that if they will allow one to benefit from a non-
Jew’s job done on Yom Tov, immediately on Motzoei Yom Tov, he might instruct the non-Jew to
do something for him on Yom Tov, in order to have it ready for Motzoei Yom Tov. In addition to
the fact that instructing a non-Jew has become very casual and is considered lenient by people,
therefore our sages have decreed not to benefit from the jobs done until after the time duration of
the work, in order one would not benefit from a job done on Yom Tov.
We also find that our sages have been stricter in this matter, and even more than a prohibition of
Torah as stated in Shulchan Aruch (chap. 318:1), “Although when one cooks on Shabbos or does
other mlochos, the food is permitted to be eaten by other people on Motzoei Shabbos, without
waiting until after the time duration of the work, although it was cooked for these people, but
regarding the instructing a non-Jew to do work for a Jew, if we would allow him to use it
immediately on Motzoei Shabbos, there would be a suspicion that he might instruct the non-Jew
to do the work on Shabbos in order in order that he would have it ready for Motzoei Shabbos.

12
https://crownheights.info/something-jewish/492165/halachic-analysis-having-goy-push-stroller-on-shabbos/

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Therefore, our sages have decreed that even when the job is done for others, one should wait until
after the time duration of the work.
This also applies in an instance of a Mitzva. In Shulchan Aruch (chapt. 306:5) is cited, “One is not
allowed to do work through a non-Jew, even if it is for the sake of a Mitzva and he was instructed
before Shabbos.
The same is cited in Shulchan Aruch (chap. 331:8), “It is forbidden to take out a child from his
house to the Bris in a shul. If it is through a karmelis, a specific domain, there are those who permit
carrying the child, in order that a large crowd could attend.
Therefore, from all the above, it is obvious that instructing a non-Jew on Shabbos to wheel a child
in a carriage through the street is forbidden and especially according to the Alter Rebbe in chap.
325, where he wrote, “One should be stringent in our type of public domain. Although 600,000
people do not pass in it every day, it is considered a public domain from the Torah. And in a status
of public domain, one cannot permit it even if it was for the sake of a Mitzva.”
Therefore one should alert people who figure that it is permitted they should refrain from doing so
on Shabbos.

Eruv & Women

The construction of an eruv in most traditional communities may be a response to the needs of
women.

B L U G R E E N B E R G W R I T E S : 13

Jewish law forbids the carrying of objects into the public domain on Shabbat; it doesn’t matter if
the object is as light as a handkerchief or a house key or as heavy as a book of Talmud. Nor can
one push a baby carriage or stroller, or even carry a baby who cannot walk by himself or herself.

This law can definitely clip one’s wings! Particularly with babies, one can feel “locked in” on a
Shabbat. But Jews have found a way to resolve it; or, rather, several ways. One way is by having
objects that one needs outside of the home available at the other end of the line. For example:
having prayer books and Bibles at a synagogue for everyone who comes is a solution to a Jew’s
not being permitted to carry his/her own siddur (prayer book) through the streets.

13
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/eruv-women/

32
When I was a teenager, I would periodically apply my talents toward finding a good safe hiding
spot for my comb and lipstick in the small ladies’ room of my shul. I couldn’t carry these items,
and yet there was no way on earth I would walk into shul without recombing after the ten-minute
walk there. So I had to provide for these things properly. Best friends were those girls to whom
you would tell where your “Shabbos comb and lipstick” were hidden. When I married, and moved
away, I left my comb and lipstick in place. It was like leaving a small part of me behind in the shul
of my youth. I wonder if it’s still in place. I know no one is looking anymore, because an eruv has
since been put up in that neighborhood.

A second solution is to have craftsmen create things like Shabbos keys. A key, nicely gilded, is
affixed to a belt buckle or tie clip or pin back; thus, it becomes part of a person’s clothing or
jewelry on which there is no restriction of carrying. One would also tie a handkerchief around the
wrist rather than carry it in a pocket. Some of this seems ludicrous to an outsider, but it is all part
of the total commitment of an Orthodox Jew.

Privatizing the Public Domain

Still, neither of those solutions addresses the larger problem of taking babies out of doors on
Shabbat. But an eruv does. An eruv is a symbolic act by means of which the legal fiction of
community or continuity is established. An eruv symbolically transforms a public domain into a
large private one; this allows a Jew to carry outside the house items that would normally be
permissible to carry from place to place inside the house. In other words, when there’s
an eruv enclosure, one may carry on Shabbat, within reason, any item which is not muktzeh [at
item without potential use on Shabbat, which, according to rabbinic law, it forbidden to touch].

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An eruv encircles a town, and makes it all private property, even though we all know it isn’t private
property. An eruv is sometimes nothing more than a wire connected at appropriate points to
existing telephone wires, in order to completely close the perimeter. There are eruv checkers
and eruv hot lines—to see if the eruv is in order.

In recent years, many communities have constructed eruvin (plural), putting Shabbos key makers
and Shabbos babysitters out of business, but, in general, making life much less complicated and
more pleasant for traditional Jews.

A Wall that Liberates and Unites


For most of my early married and child raising years, I lived in a community that had no eruv; and
therefore, if I didn’t plan ahead for a babysitter to mind the babies at home or take them out in the
carriage, there was no way that I could go to shul or take an afternoon walk with [my husband]
and the bigger children. For the most part, I took it with great equanimity.

When I look back on those times, I can only wonder in amazement why it didn’t bother me more
and why I didn’t organize a huge rally of all Orthodox mothers of young children. Although
no eruv has come out of a women’s protest group, I think the increase in eruvin has something to
do with the new perception women have of themselves, their needs, and their place in community
life.

In Riverdale, New York, where we live, it took five years to get that eruv up. There were people
who resisted the idea, fearing it would lead to transgression of Shabbat—that is, the domino theory
of sinning. Also, the law is very complicated, and there are very few eruv experts around. And,
like all things, it costs money. But, finally, it was accomplished. I was very pleased to see it go up,
even though it came too late for me to benefit personally. However, in a way I, too, reap its benefits
every week. It’s very satisfying on Shabbat morning to see all those baby carriages and strollers
parked outside of shul, and to see all the beautiful new young life inside.

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