Daf Ditty Shabbes 114

Rembrandt - Portrait of a rabbi in a beret holding a cane.

It is not so much we who read Kafka’s words; it is they who read us.
And find us blank. –

George Steiner, “A Note on Kafka’s ‘Trial’

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 ‫ ״ׇכּל‬:‫ ֶשֶׁנֱּאַמר‬,‫ ׇכּל ַתְּלִמיד ָחָכם ֶשׁ ִנְּמָצא ְרָבב ַﬠל ִבְּגדּוֹ — ַחָיּיב ִמיָתה‬:‫ְוָאַמר ַרִבּי ִחָיּיא ַבּר ַאָבּא ָאַמר ַרִבּי יוָֹחָנן‬
,‫ ָהא ִבְּגִליָמא‬:‫ ְוָלא ְפִּליִגי‬.‫ ְרָבד ִאיְתַּמר‬:‫ ָרִביָנא ָאַמר‬.‫ ֶאָלּא ״ַמְשׂ ִניַאי״‬,‫שׂ ְנַאי״‬
ַ ‫שׂ ְנַאי ָאֲהבוּ ָמֶות״ — ַאל ִתְּק ֵרי ״ְמ‬
ַ ‫ְמ‬
‫ָהא ִבְּלבוָּשׁא‬.

And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A Torah scholar on whose clothes a fat
stain is found is liable to receive the death penalty, as it is stated:

‫ מצאי )ָמָצא( ַח ִיּים; ַוָיֶּפק‬,‫ לה ִכּי ֹמְצִאי‬35 For whoso findeth me findeth life, and obtaineth favour
.‫ ֵמ ְיהָוה‬,‫ָרצוֹן‬ of the LORD.

,‫ְמַשׂ ְנַאי‬-‫ָכּל‬ ;‫ ֹחֵמס ַנְפשׁוֹ‬,‫ לו ְוֹחְטִאי‬36 But he that misseth me wrongeth his own soul; all they
.‫ָאֲהבוּ ָמֶות‬ that hate me love death.'

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 “All those who hate me love death” (Proverbs 8:36), and the Sages said: Do not read: Those who
hate me [mesanai]. Rather, read: Those who cause me to be hated [masniai]. Those who cause
people to hate the Torah by creating the impression that those who study Torah are unclean deserve
the death penalty.

Ravina said: A fat stain [revav] was not stated, but rather a bloodstain [revad] was stated
(Rabbeinu Ḥananel), which is a greater disgrace. The Gemara adds: They did not disagree over the
halakha. Rather, the dispute is whether that which we learned concerning stains on a Torah
scholar’s clothes refers to an overgarment that people wear over the rest of their clothes, while that
which we learned with regard to a bloodstain refers to an undergarment, where a bloodstain is
disgraceful but other types of spots are not.

RASHI

They make themselves loathsome to others, so that they say “woe to those Torah scholars who
are despicable and decrepit” which results in the defamation of Torah.

This verse from Proverbs is cited in two other places in shas:

Eruvin 99a

‫אמר ריש לקיש כיח בפני רבו חייב מיתה שנאמר כל משנאי אהבו מות אל תקרי למשנאי אלא למשניאי‬

Having mentioned phlegm, the Gemara cites a related teaching: Reish Lakish said: One who
expelled phlegm in front of his master has acted in a disrespectful manner and is liable for the
punishment of death at the hand of Heaven, as it is stated:

‫ מצאי )ָמָצא( ַח ִיּים; ַוָיֶּפק‬,‫ לה ִכּי ֹמְצִאי‬35 For whoso findeth me findeth life, and obtaineth favour
.‫ ֵמ ְיהָוה‬,‫ָרצוֹן‬ of the LORD.

,‫ְמַשׂ ְנַאי‬-‫ָכּל‬ ;‫ ֹחֵמס ַנְפשׁוֹ‬,‫ לו ְוֹחְטִאי‬36 But he that misseth me wrongeth his own soul; all they
.‫ָאֲהבוּ ָמֶות‬ that hate me love death.'

“All they who hate Me love death” (Proverbs 8:36). Do not read it as: “They who hate [mesanai]
Me”; rather, read it as: “Those who make themselves hateful [masniai] to Me,” i.e., those who
make themselves hateful by such a discharge.

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Megilla 28a

‫למימרא דמעליותא היא והא א"ר יוחנן כל תלמיד חכם שמברך לפניו אפילו כ"ג עם הארץ אותו ת"ח חייב‬
‫ לו( מיתה שנאמר‬,‫כל משנאי אהבו מות אל תקרי משנאי אלא משניאי )משלי ח‬

Is this to say that doing so is especially virtuous? But hasn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Any Torah
scholar who allows someone else to bless Grace after Meals in his presence, i.e., to lead for him,
even if that person is a High Priest who is an ignoramus, then that Torah scholar is liable to receive
the death penalty for belittling his own honor? This is as it is stated:

‫ מצאי )ָמָצא( ַח ִיּים; ַוָיֶּפק‬,‫ לה ִכּי ֹמְצִאי‬35 For whoso findeth me findeth life, and obtaineth favour
.‫ ֵמ ְיהָוה‬,‫ָרצוֹן‬ of the LORD.

,‫ְמַשׂ ְנַאי‬-‫ָכּל‬ ;‫ ֹחֵמס ַנְפשׁוֹ‬,‫ לו ְוֹחְטִאי‬36 But he that misseth me wrongeth his own soul; all they
.‫ָאֲהבוּ ָמֶות‬ that hate me love death.'

“All those who hate me, love death” (Proverbs 8:36). Do not read it as “those who hate Me
[mesan’ai],” rather read it as though it said: Those who make Me hated [masni’ai]. The honor due
to a Torah scholar is representative of the honor of God in the world. Therefore, by belittling his
own honor, he causes others to fail to respect God, which can ultimately develop into hate. If so,
why did Rabbi Perida consider his behavior to be so deserving of praise?
‫כי קאמר איהו בשוין‬

The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Perida says this, he was speaking of people of equal stature.
He was particular to honor the priesthood only when the priest was also a Torah scholar.

Daf Shevui to Megillah 28a:3

Peridah said that he lived a long life partly because whenever he ate, he allowed the Kohen to
recite birkat hamazon (the zimmun). But R. Yohanan said that a “Talmid hakham,” a Torah scholar
that allows anyone else who is an “ignoramus” to bless birkat hamazon in front of him is deserving
of death. This is true even if the ignoramus is the high priest himself. This idea is derived from a
midrash on Proverbs 8:36. Instead of reading simply that anyone who hates Torah loves death, the
midrash vocalizes the verse to read “anyone who causes Torah to be hated.” Someone who sees
an ignoramus reciting birkat hamazon in front of a Talmid hakham will cause the Torah to be
hated, because he will think that being an ignoramus is more honorable than being a Talmid
hakham.

The resolution is that R. Peridah referred to a Kohen who was also well versed in Torah learning.
Such a Kohen would bless birkat hamazon in front of R. Peridah. But if the Kohen was an
ignoramus, R. Peridah would not let him recite birkat hamazon.

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This section is an excellent example of the tension between two values in the rabbinic world—
Torah learning and genealogy. The Kohen Gadol has the quintessential pedigree, but if he is
an ignoramus, it is not worth anything, at least not to the rabbis.

Rebbi Yochanan states that a Talmid Chacham who walks in public with a "Revav" (stain) on
his clothing is Chayav Misah. Ravina states that he may not go out with a "Revad." The Gemara
explains that they do not argue; one refers to the Talmid Chacham's overgarment, and the other
refers to the shirt underneath his overgarment.

What is the difference between a "Revav" and "Revad," and what is the difference between a
stain found on the overgarment and a stain found on the shirt beneath the overgarment?

RASHI says that a "Revav" is a stain of oil or fat. Oil or fat is forbidden only on one's
overgarment, where it can be seen by all. "Revad" is a stain of (semen) Shichvas Zera. A stain of
"Revad" is forbidden even on one's undergarment, because it gives the impression of Shichvas
Zera and is exceedingly disgraceful.

RABEINU CHANANEL says that "Revav" refers to a stain of tar. The reason a Talmid
Chacham may not walk out with a tar-stain on his garment is because it causes people to stay
away from him in fear that the tar on his clothing might touch and stain their clothes. Tar is
forbidden even on one's shirt beneath the overgarment for this reason.

"Revad" refers to blood. A Talmid Chacham may not go out with a bloodstain because it looks
like a "Kesem" (a bloodstain from a woman who was a Nidah). People might think that it is from
a woman and they will stay away from him, because they are disgusted by the blood.

However, a bloodstain is forbidden only when it is on the overgarment, because when it is on the
undergarment, everyone will assume that it came from a bug that he killed (or from a scratch on
his body), and they will not think it is a "Kesem" and stay away from him.
him in fear that the tar on his clothing might touch and stain their clothes. Tar is forbidden even
on one's shirt beneath the overgarment for this reason.1

TOSAFOS

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains that these are inner and outer garments.)

‫( גבי שחור כחרת ור' יוחנן אמר אלו כלים האוליירין‬.‫הא דר' ינאי בגלימא כדמשמע בפ' כל היד )נדה דף כ‬
‫הבאין ממדינת הים‬

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Rav Mordechai Kornfeld Daf Advancement Forum

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Explanation: R. Yanai discusses an outer garment, like it connotes in Nidah (20a) regarding
"black like Cheres (vitriol, used to make ink)", and R. Yochanan said that these are Kelim of
Ulyarin that come from overseas;

‫למימרא דאוכמי נינהו והאמר ר' ינאי כו' לא קשיא הא בגלימא הא בפתורי‬

The Gemara asks that this implies that [Ulyarin Kelim] are black - but R. Yanai told his children...
This is not difficult. This refers to a garment, and this to Pesorei (linens);

‫דר' ינאי בגלימא דהיא סומקי דשחורים לא הוו כדמסיק הכא אבל פתורי הוו אוכמי ולבושא חיורי‬

R. Yanai discusses a red garment, for they are not black, like we conclude here. Linens were black,
and undergarments were white.

JASTROW

The origin of this word as well as its meaning are unclear. Some commentaries state that it is from
the Greek word ὀλερόν, oleron, meaning unclean or faded.

The garments of bath attendants were imported from overseas and were not familiar to all.
Consequently, there were disputes with regard to their color2.

RAMBAM

‫ ְול ֹא ִיְלַבּשׁ ל ֹא‬.‫ ְוָאסוּר לוֹ ֶשׁ ִיָּמֵּצא ְבִּבְגדוֹ ֶכֶּתם אוֹ ַשְׁמנוּ ִנית ְוַכיּוֵֹצא ָבֶּהן‬.‫ַמְלבּוּשׁ ַתְּלִמיד ָחָכם ַמְלבּוּשׁ ָנֶאה ְוָנִקי‬
‫ ְול ֹא ַמְלבּוּשׁ ֲﬠ ִנ ִיּים ֶשׁהוּא ְמַבֶזּה ֶאת לוְֹבָשׁיו ֶאָלּא‬.‫ַמְלבּוּשׁ ְמָלִכים ְכּגוֹן ִבְּגֵדי ָזָהב ְוַא ְרָגָּמן ֶשַׁהכּל ִמְסַתְּכִּלין ָבֶּהן‬
‫ ְול ֹא‬.‫שׂרוֹ ִנ ְרֶאה ִמַתַּחת ַמָדּיו ְכּמוֹ ִבְּגֵדי ַהִפְּשָׁתּן ַהַקִּלּים ְבּיוֵֹתר ֶשׁעוִֹשׂים ְבִּמְצ ַר ִים‬ ָ ‫ ְול ֹא ְיֵהא ְבּ‬.‫ְבָּגִדים ֵבּינוֹ ִנים ָנִאים‬
‫ ְול ֹא ְיַשְׁלֵשׁל‬.‫ִיְהיוּ ְבָּגָדיו ְסחוִּבין ַﬠל ָהָא ֶרץ ְכּמוֹ ִבְּגֵדי ַגֵּסּי ָהרוַּח ֶאָלּא ַﬠד ֲﬠֵקבוֹ וֵּבית ָיד ֶשׁלּוֹ ַﬠד ָראֵשׁי ֶאְצְבּעוָֹתיו‬
‫ ְול ֹא ִי ְנַﬠל ִמ ְנָﬠִלים ְמֻטָלִּאים ְטַלאי ַﬠל ַגֵּבּי‬.‫ַטִלּיתוֹ ִמְפֵּני ֶשׁ ִנּ ְרֶאה ְכַּגסּוּת ָהרוַּח ֶאָלּא ְבַּשָׁבּת ִבְּלַבד ִאם ֵאין לוֹ ְלַהֲחִליף‬
‫שִּׂמים ְול ֹא ָיִשׂים‬ ָ ‫שּׂם ַלשּׁוּק ְול ֹא ִבְּבָגִדים ְמֻב‬ ָ ‫ ל ֹא ֵיֵצא ְמֻב‬.‫שִׁמים ֻמָתּר ִאם ָהָיה ָﬠ ִני‬ ָ ‫ ֲאָבל ִבּימוֹת ַהְגּ‬.‫ְטַלאי ִבּימוֹת ַהַחָמּה‬
‫ ֶאָלּא ִאם ֵכּן ָהָיה‬.‫ ְוֵכן ל ֹא ֵיֵצא ְיִחיִדי ַבַּלּ ְיָלה‬.‫שׁם ְכֵּדי ְלַהֲﬠִביר ֶאת ַהזֲֻּהָמא ֻמָתּר‬ ֹ ֶ ‫ ֲאָבל ִאם ָמַשׁח ְבָּשׂרוֹ ְבּב‬.‫שׁם ִבְּשָׂﬠרוֹ‬ ֶֹ ‫בּ‬
‫ ָכּל ֵאלּוּ ִמְפֵּני ַהֲחָשׁד‬.‫לוֹ ְזַמן ָקבוַּﬠ ָלֵצאת בּוֹ ְלַתְלמוּדוֹ‬:

The disciple of the wise should wear becoming and clean clothes, and it is forbidden to have a spot
or grease or anything of a like unclean nature, found upon his garment. He should not wear clothes
fit for a king such as trimmed with gold or purple which attract everybody's gaze, nor the clothes
of a pauper which put the wearer to shame, but average garments of becoming style. He should

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Steinzaltz

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not wear transparent garments as, for example, garments made of very fine linen which are made
in Egypt; nor should they be too long, trailing upon the ground, like the garments of the arrogant,
but it may reach to the heel, and the sleeves to his finger-tips. He should not permit to trail his
fringed garment, as it appears arrogant, save only on the Sabbath, if he has no other to change. He
should not wear patched-up shoes, patch upon a patch, in summertime; but in wintertime it is
permitted if he be poor. He should not go out on the street perfumed, nor with perfumed garments,
nor put perfume in his hair; but if he puts perfume upon his skin to remove perspiration there is no
rule forbidding it. Likewise, should he not go out alone at night, unless he had set a specified time
to go out to his studies. All these ethical rules are so as not to cast any suspicion upon the disciples
of the wise. (Hullin, 91b; Pesahim 112a; Berakot 45b C. G.)

If a Torah scholar is not careful and appears publicly in a stained jacket, he desecrates the name
of God in public (Rambam Sefer HaMadda, Hilkhot Deot 5:9).

Our Daf continues:

‫ ֵאיֶזהוּ‬:‫ ְוָאַמר ַרִבּי יוָֹחָנן‬.‫ ֵאלּוּ ַתְּלִמיֵדי ֲחָכִמים ֶשׁעוְֹסִקין ְבִּב ְנָינוֹ ֶשׁל עוָֹלם ׇכּל ְיֵמיֶהן‬:‫ַמאי ״ַבָּנִּאין״? ָאַמר ַרִבּי יוָֹחָנן‬
‫ ֵאיֶזהוּ ַתְּלִמיד‬:‫ ְוָאַמר ַרִבּי יוָֹחָנן‬.‫ַתְּלִמיד ָחָכם ֶשַׁמְּחִזי ִרין לוֹ ֲאֵביָדה ִבְּטִביעוּת ָהַﬠ ִין — ֶזה ַהַמְּקִפּיד ַﬠל ֲחלוּקוֹ ְלהוְֹפכוֹ‬
‫ ַוֲאִפילּוּ ְבַּמֶסֶּכת ַכָּלּה‬,‫שׁשּׁוֲֹאִלין אוֹתוֹ ָדָּבר ֲהָלָכה ְבׇּכל ָמקוֹם ְואוֵֹמר‬ ֶ ‫ָחָכם ֶשְׁמַּמ ִנּין אוֹתוֹ ַפּ ְרָנס ַﬠל ַהִצּיבּוּר — ֶזה‬.
The Gemara asks: Who are the builders mentioned here? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: These are Torah
scholars, who are engaged in building the world all of their days.

And with regard to this, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Who is a Torah scholar of whom the Sages said that
one must return a lost object to him based on visual identification, even if he does not provide an
identifying sign for it?

That is one who makes sure his upper undergarment is turned inward so that the uneven stitching
is not visible. This means that he conducts himself like a Torah scholar in all his ways, even in
matters of cleanliness and order (Maharsha).

On a related note, the Gemara adds that which Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Who is a Torah scholar who
may be appointed as a leader of the community?

This is one who is asked about matters of halakha on any topic and he is able to answer, and even
if he were asked about tractate Kalla, a tractate that few have mastered.

RASHI

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He can respond anywhere: meaning all of shas, even Masechet Kalla which most people are
unaccustomed to learn…

TOSAFOS
‫י' בקונט' דלא רגילי בה אינשי והוא נתן בלבו לגורסה‬
Explanation #1 (Rashi): People are not used to it, and he put his heart to it to learn the text [by
heart].

NOTE: This is a minor tractate. It is found after Masechet Avodah Zarah.

[‫ ב"ח‬- ‫( גבי ע''מ שאני תלמיד ]צ"ל חכם‬:‫ובקדושין פי' לגריעותא בפרק האיש מקדש )דף מט‬

Explanation #2: In Kiddushin (49b, Rashi) explained that this diminishes (the level of Chachmah
required), regarding "[you are Mekudeshes to me] on condition that I am a Talmid Chacham";

'‫אין אומרים כשמעון בן עזאי וכשמעון בן זומא אלא כל ששואלין אותו דבר הלכה ואפי' במסכת כלה ופי‬
‫בקונטרס אפי' במס' כלה שהיא קלה‬
We do not say that he must be [as great as] Shimon ben Azai or Shimon ben Zoma. Rather, anyone
whom we ask him a matter of Halacha [and he can answer], and even in Masechet Kallah. Rashi
explained even [if it is only] in Masechet Kalah, which is simple.

‫ונראה דהכא משמע )ואומר( דנקט ליה משום חשיבות שיודע אפי' במסכת כלה דלא רגילי בה אינשי ראוי‬
‫למנותו פרנס‬
Assertion: It seems that here it connotes that it mentioned [Masechet Kallah] for importance - he
knows even Masechet Kalah, which people are not used to it, it is proper to appoint him for a
leader;

‫אבל התם קתני דבר אחד מתלמודו משמע אפי' לא למד אלא מסכת כלה ואמר הימנה דבר אחד הרי זה חכם‬

However, there it taught "one matter from his learning." It connotes even if he learned only
Masechet Kalah, and he says from it one matter, he is a Chacham.

‫ומיהו בפירוש רש''י דקידושין וכן בפי' רבינו חננאל אין כתוב בהן דבר אחד מתלמודו‬

Remark: However, in Rashi's Perush in Kiddushin, and likewise in R. Chananel's Perush, it does
not say "one matter from his learning."

‫( רב‬.‫ורבינו יצחק מפרש דהאי מסכת כלה היינו דרשות הסדורות מהלכות החג כדאמרינן בלא יחפור )ב''ב כב‬
‫נחמן בר יצחק ריש כלה הוה‬

Explanation #3 (R. Yitzchak): This "Masechet Kallah" is Drashos arranged from the laws of the
festival, like we say in Bava Basra (22a) "Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak was the head of Kalah";

‫וקאמר איזהו ת''ח שראוי למנותו על הציבור באתריה כדאמר בסמוך במסכתי' באתריה‬

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It says [here] "who is a Talmid Chacham that it is proper to appoint him over the Tzibur for a
leader in his place?" [In his place means] like it says below, in the Masechet [that they are learning]
in his place;

‫כגון שיודע להשיב בכל מקום שישאלוהו באותה מסכת אפי' במס' כלה שרגילין בה ראוי למנותו בעירו אבל‬
‫בציר מהכי אין ראוי למנותו‬
[It answers] e.g. he knows to answer anywhere that they ask him in that Masechet, even in
Masechet Kalah that they are used to it, it is proper to appoint him in his city. However, less than
this it is not proper to appoint him.

‫והא דהוצרך לחזור ולהשמיענו בסמוך אי במסכתיה באתריה אע''ג דכבר השמיענו כאן‬

Some ge’onim write that tractate Kalla was the tractate studied in the yeshiva during the periods
when multitudes would gather in the study hall. However, they interpret the criterion of being able
to answer a question on Kalla as a stringent one.
A scholar who is asked about the tractate being studied in the yeshiva will have to respond in the
presence of all the Torah scholars gathered in the yeshiva.

Therefore, his answer must satisfy the greatest Sages of his generation.

MAHARSHA

Maharsha explains that the Torah scholar mentioned in this context is not necessarily a brilliant
Sage. Rather, the Gemara is referring to a person who is God-fearing and conducts himself in the
ways of the Sages.

If an individual is able to answer questions correctly in a particular area of halakha, he can be

entrusted with communal responsibilities. For example, one who is knowledgeable with regard to
the halakhot of charity may be appointed a manager of charity distribution.

Rashi explains that a person who is familiar with Massechta Kallah must be an exceptional scholar,
because most people do not study it.

Accordingly, such a person is certainly qualified to serve as a leader of the community.

Tosafos notes that Rashi himself interprets this in a different manner. When a person proposes
kiddushin to a woman on the condition that he is a Talmid Chacham, the kiddushin is valid even
if he has only studied Massechta Kallah.

Rashi explains that it is an easy Massechta, but, nevertheless, this is adequate for him to be
qualified as a Talmid Chacham.

R” i clarifies that Massechta Kallah is a collection of insights about the festivals. If a person is
proficient in this area, he can serve as a leader in his community. In this context, when our Gemara

9
says “he must be able to answer questions in whatever area we ask”, it means that he can answer
questions in any topic within this Massechta.

The Chazon Ish qualifies the guideline of the Gemara about what defines a person as a Talmid
Chacham. When the Gemara says that he must be able to answer questions in any area in which
he is asked, it does not mean that he has to have the answer at the tip of his tongue.

Rather, it simply means that he has to be capable of finding the answer and coming to proper
conclusions with his research by analyzing the Gemara and the Shulchan Aruch with its
commentaries.

The Chazon Ish justified the curriculum which is followed in the yeshivos with this explanation.
The young men are trained to analyze and understand the issues involved in the various topics.
The method of study thus prepares them to sharpen their intellect, and to develop their listening
and communication skills. Finally, they become expert in comparing related issues and making
correct correlations and arriving at accurate conclusions. These are the hallmarks of the true Talmid
Chacham3.

Rav Feinstein notes that scholars must be particular that their garments be respectable and clean,
as indeed is clear from our passage and others.4 Yet, one must distinguish between pronounced
particularity in the attractiveness of one’s appearance, which is a woman-like act, and a respectable
presentation, which is essential human dignity, which does not require the use of a mirror, because
the use of a mirror would denote a woman-like emphasis an appearance.

Rav Feinstein finds the forbiddance for a man to use a mirror to be completely compatible with
his previously presented premise. A man cannot dress and/or perform a woman-like act because
of the result that he is dressed or adorned as a woman; similarly, a man is proscribed from using a
mirror because the outcome is that one conveys a woman-like particularity with one’s appearance.

Masechet Kalla

The minor tractates (Hebrew: ‫מסכתות קטנות‬, masechtot qetanot) are essays from
the Talmudic period or later dealing with topics about which no formal tractate exists in
the Mishnah. They may thus be contrasted to the Tosefta, whose tractates parallel those of
the Mishnah.

Each minor tractate contains all the important material bearing on a single subject. While they
are mishnaic in form and are called "tractates," the topics discussed in them are arranged more
systematically than in the Mishnah; for they are eminently practical in purpose, being, in a certain
sense, the first manuals in which the data scattered through prolix sources have been collected in
a brief and comprehensive form.

3
Daf Digest Shabbes 114
4
‫)שו"ת אגרות משה )ח"ב מחיו"ד סי' סא‬

10
There about 15 minor tractates. The first eight or so contain much original material; the last seven
or so are collections of material scattered throughout the Talmud. Ancient authorities mention
especially seven such tractates, which are doubtless the earliest ones. Their name and form
suggests that they originated in the period of oral tradition which was dominated by
the Talmud and the Midrash, so that these treatises are doubtless of great antiquity, some of them
having been compiled in their main outlines before even the final redaction of the Talmud in the
6th century.

There is also a lost tractate called "Eretz Yisrael" (about laws pertaining to the Land of Israel).
Similarly, a Masechet Hanukkah is mentioned in connection with the Vilna Gaon, but is not
extant.

The time when these works were compiled remains uncertain. Some scholars assign them to the
end of the geonic period, but recent scholarship favors a much earlier date. M. Higger, in the
introduction to his critical edition of these seven minor tractates, judges them to be the "first
post-mishnaic compendia regulating specific Jewish practices and usages." His opinion is that
"most of the Minor Tractates are Palestinian in origin but were later modified or elaborated in
Babylonia."

Thus, it may be that the original composition of these codes was already completed by 400 c.e.
Since they were of Palestinian origin, they were not included in the final redaction of the
Babylonian Talmud.

The first medieval scholar to clearly cite one of these brief codes is RAMBAN. In his Torat ha-
Adam Inyan ha-Hoẓa'ah and in his Milḥemet ha-Shem to Alfasi (Alfasi; mk 16a), he cites the
passage in Ẓiẓit which discusses whether the fringes in the tallit in which the deceased is buried
should be untied.

11
Menahem b. Solomon Meiri likewise makes reference to this same passage in Ẓiẓit 5. A similar
passage, to be found in Semaḥot (ch. 12), is twice cited by Tosafot (Pes. 40b and Av. Zar. 65b).

Although a substantial portion of these tractates consists of material already in the Talmud, they
occasionally contain items which are not found elsewhere, such as the above-cited text from Ẓiẓit.
Another example of such new material is the concept that the main shortcoming of the Samaritans
was that they denied the centrality of Jerusalem.6

Kutim concludes with the statement that when the Samaritans renounce Mount Gerizim and
acknowledge Jerusalem and the resurrection of the dead, they will be accepted as Jews.7

5
Beit ha-Beḥirah al Masechet Berakhot, ed. by S. Dikman (19652), 61b
6
From Dubnow History of the Jews from Roman Empire to the early Medieval Period Vol 2

7
https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/minor-tractates

12
 Franz Kafka age 34

Before the Law: (“Vor dem Gesetz”)

Before the law sits a gatekeeper. To this gatekeeper comes a man from the
country who asks to gain entry into the law. But the gatekeeper says that he
cannot grant him entry at the moment. The man thinks about it and then asks
if he will be allowed to come in later on. “It is possible,” says the gatekeeper,
“but not now.” At the moment the gate to the law stands open, as always,
and the gatekeeper walks to the side, so the man bends over in order to see
through the gate into the inside. When the gatekeeper notices that, he laughs
and says: “If it tempts you so much, try it in spite of my prohibition. But take
note: I am powerful. And I am only the most lowly gatekeeper. But from room
to room stand gatekeepers, each more powerful than the other. I can’t endure
even one glimpse of the third.” The man from the country has not expected
such difficulties: the law should always be accessible for everyone, he thinks,
but as he now looks more closely at the gatekeeper in his fur coat, at his large
pointed nose and his long, thin, black Tartar’s beard, he decides that it would
be better to wait until he gets permission to go inside. The gatekeeper gives
him a stool and allows him to sit down at the side in front of the gate. There

13
he sits for days and years. He makes many attempts to be let in, and he wears
the gatekeeper out with his requests. The gatekeeper often interrogates him
briefly, questioning him about his homeland and many other things, but they
are indifferent questions, the kind great men put, and at the end he always
tells him once more that he cannot let him inside yet. The man, who has
equipped himself with many things for his journey, spends everything, no
matter how valuable, to win over the gatekeeper. The latter takes it all but,
as he does so, says, “I am taking this only so that you do not think you have
failed to do anything.” During the many years the man observes the
gatekeeper almost continuously. He forgets the other gatekeepers, and this
one seems to him the only obstacle for entry into the law. He curses the
unlucky circumstance, in the first years thoughtlessly and out loud, later, as
he grows old, he still mumbles to himself. He becomes childish and, since in
the long years studying the gatekeeper he has come to know the fleas in his
fur collar, he even asks the fleas to help him persuade the gatekeeper. Finally
his eyesight grows weak, and he does not know whether things are really
darker around him or whether his eyes are merely deceiving him. But he
recognizes now in the darkness an illumination which breaks inextinguishably
out of the gateway to the law. Now he no longer has much time to live. Before
his death he gathers in his head all his experiences of the entire time up into
one question which he has not yet put to the gatekeeper. He waves to him,
since he can no longer lift up his stiffening body.8

The Gemoro is acutely aware of the status and the station of a Talmid Chacham and fearful
of disdain by the public or of being misinterpreted as the behavior of an am haa’retz.

Kafka’s parable “Before the Law” (“Vor dem Gesetz”), a text which, according to George
Steiner, contains “the nucleus of the novel [The Trial] and of Kafka’s vision.”

This is one of the most if not the single most commented upon of Kafka’s texts. We approach it
with fear and trembling, intimidated and vulnerable: “Helplessness seizes one face to face with
this page and a half,” notes George Steiner.9

Like Gemoro, has everything not already been said, been written, been thought, about this text?
Like a detective, the commentator seeks a new clue; he searches for the key that will once and
for all resolve the enigma, unveil the mystery that hides so secretively within its depths. A
mystery which we know everything depends upon.

8
Translation by Ian Johnston

9
George Steiner, “A Note on Kafka’s ‘Trial,’” in No Passion Spent: Essays 1978–1995, Yale University Press, New Haven and
London 1996, 239–252, 251.

14
A reader might skeptically wonder at the discovery of yet another interpretation of “Before the
Law”: “What more can be added?” he asks himself. And he may be right. Perhaps nothing new
can be said here; perhaps nothing original is to be added. Perhaps the gates of interpretation are
henceforth sealed. We may have arrived too late.

But before this text, do we not always already come too late? Are we not, by definition,
latecomers? Has not the doorkeeper always already shut the door? The moment one realizes
there is nothing to add to this text might be the very moment one realizes that, from the start, this
text, though soliciting interpretation, in fact defies interpretation. We are indeed seized by
helplessness. Equally impotent before this text, the first reading equals the last reading, because
strictly speaking there is no first and no last here. No one comes better equipped, better prepared.
Before this text, as before the law, we find ourselves equally exposed, equally empty, without
resources. Before this text, we find ourselves, exactly like the story’s protagonist, the
countryman, the Mann vom Lande: ignorant. And from this position the text inspires us
infinitely. Something is revealed. Yet we do not know exactly what, or why. We are ignorant,
from the beginning to the end. Ignorance will therefore be my gateway into this story.10

This Daf brought up for me painful memories of my Jewish education in postwar London, and
the reverberating voice of the Rebbes, who with disdain, dismissed me as an Am Haa’retz. This
was further drummed into me in my in-law’s home where the Lithuanian giants of Torah bore
down upon all who dared enter this sanctuary of learning.

The protagonist of the Kafka story has no proper name: he is simply a Mann vom Lande, a
countryman, or, more literally, a man from the land, from the soil. For an ear versed in Jewish
texts, the term evokes a well-known figure: the Talmudic figure of the am-haa’retz11

In fact, some opinions suggest that the am-haa’retz is not necessarily one who is ignorant. In
tractate Berakoth, for instance, we learn:

“Our Rabbis taught: Who is an am haa’retz? Anyone who does not recite the Shema’ evening
and morning. This is the view of R. Eliezer. R. Joshua says: Anyone who does not put on tefillin.
Ben Azzai says: Anyone who has not a fringe on his garment. R. Nathan says: Anyone who has
not a mezuzah on his door. R. Nathan b. Joseph says: Anyone who has sons and does not bring
them up to the study of the Torah. Others say: Even if one has learnt Scripture and Mishnah, if
he has not ministered to the disciples of the wise, he is an am haa’retz. R. Huna said: The
halacha is as laid down by ‘Others’”

Berakoth 47b

10
Eli Schonfeld Am-ha’aretz: The Law of the Singular. Kafka’s Hidden Knowledge
11
The first to have drawn attention to the affinities between Kafka’s Mann vom Lande and the Hebrew am-ha’aretz was Heinz
Polizer in 1966: “Yet in spite of the fact that the description ‘the man from the country’ hardly seems appropriate at first, it
begins to fit K. as soon as it is translated into its Hebrew equivalent am-ha’aretz. Kafka was familiar at least with the Yiddish
version of the word, amhoretz; since 1911 he had occupied himself intensively with Jewish and Yiddish folklore, and the
expression actually occurs in the diaries late in November this year.” See Heinz Politzer, Franz Kafka: Parable and Paradox,
Cornell University Press, Ithaca and New York 1966, 174. This reference has since been quoted routinely in the literature on
Kafka’s “Before the Law.”

15
that the definition of the am-haa’retz is thus not ignorance; rather, it refers to disrespect of
certain commandments or customs. Nevertheless, there are Talmudic sources that clearly define
the am-haa’retz as the non-scholarly individual, as the one who does not study Torah.

In Tractate Pesahim, for instance, we learn:

“It was taught, Rabbi said: An am haa’retz may not eat the flesh of cattle, for it is said: ‘This is
the law [Torah] of the beast, and the fowl.’ (Lev. XI, 46) Whoever engages in [the study of] the
Torah may eat the flesh of beast and fowl, but he who does not engage in [the study of] the
Torah may not eat the flesh of beast and fowl”

Pesahim 12b

The very passage where Kafka evokes the Talmudic am-haa’retz is one that testifies to his own
am aratzut, to his own ignorance.

Kafka is an am-haa’retz. But his ignorance is not an ordinary one: it is an ignorance conscious of
itself.

It is, in a way, a Socratic ignorance. An ignorance that hides knowledge: like Socrates, who
knows he does not know, Kafka, through his ignorance, possesses a deep, hidden knowledge.

This hidden knowledge is the knowledge of this ignorance without which it is impossible to
depict the Mann vom Lande in front of the door of the Law as Kafka does in his parable.

16