Daf Ditty Shabbes 106: Freedom or Wildness?

What is liberty without wisdom and without virtue?

It is the greatest of all possible evils; for it is folly, vice, and madness.

Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France

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 ‫ ְונוְֹת ִנין ִלְפֵניֶהם‬,‫ ֲאָבל ָצִדין ַחָיּה ָועוֹף‬.‫ ְוֵאין נוְֹת ִנין ִלְפֵניֶהם ְמזוֹנוֹת‬,‫ ֵאין ָצִדין ָדִּגים ִמן ַהֵבּיָב ִרין ְבּיוֹם טוֹב‬:‫ְגָּמ׳ ְתַּנן ָהָתם‬
‫ ַקְשָׁיא‬.‫ ְוֵאין נוְֹת ִנין ִלְפֵניֶהם ְמזוֹנוֹת‬,‫ ֵבּיָב ִרין ֶשׁל ַחיּוֹת ְוֶשׁל עוֹפוֹת ְוֶשׁל ָדִּגים — ֵאין ָצִדין ֵמֶהם ְבּיוֹם טוֹב‬:‫ וּ ְרִמי ְנהוּ‬.‫ְמזוֹנוֹת‬
‫ ַקְשָׁיא עוֹפוֹת ַאעוֹפוֹת‬,‫ַחָיּה ַאַחָיּה‬.
GEMARA: We learned in the mishna there in tractate Beitza: One may not trap fish from the
enclosures on a Festival, nor may one place food before them, because it is prohibited to feed an
animal that may not be eaten on the Festival. However, one may trap an animal or a bird from its
enclosures and slaughter them, and one may also place food before them. The Gemara raises a
contradiction from that which was taught in the Tosefta: From enclosures of animals, of birds,
and of fish, one may not trap on a Festival, nor may one place food before them. This is difficult
due to a contradiction between the ruling with regard to an animal in the mishna and the ruling
with regard to an animal in the Tosefta. This is similarly difficult due to the contradiction between
the ruling with regard to birds in the mishna and the ruling with regard to birds in the Tosefta.

‫ ָהא ַרָבַּנן‬,‫ ָהא ַרִבּי ְיהוָּדה‬:‫ִבְּשָׁלָמא ַחָיּה ַאַחָיּה ָלא ַקְשָׁיא‬.

The Gemara says: Granted, with regard to the contradiction between the ruling concerning an
animal in the mishna and the ruling concerning an animal in the Tosefta, it is not difficult, because
this, the Tosefta that prohibits trapping and feeding the animals in the enclosures, is in accordance
with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda cited in the mishna that an animal trapped into an enclosure
whose trapping is inadequate, i.e., it is still necessary to pursue and apprehend the animal, is not
considered trapped. That, i.e., the mishna in Beitza, which permits trapping and feeding the
animals in the enclosures, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who said that animals
in an enclosure are considered trapped.

‫ ָהא ֵבּיָבר ֶשֵׁאינוֹ ְמקוֶֹרה — ְוָהא‬,‫ ָהא ֵבּיָבר ְמקוֶֹרה‬:‫ עוֹפוֹת ַאעוֹפוֹת ָנֵמי ָלא ַקְשָׁיא‬,‫ֶאָלּא עוֹפוֹת ַאעוֹפוֹת ַקְשָׁיא! ְוִכי ֵתּיָמא‬
‫ ַלַבּ ִית — ָלא‬,‫ וֵּבין ְלַרִבּי ְיהוָּדה וֵּבין ְלַרָבַּנן ִצפּוֹר ַלִמְּגָדּל — ִאין‬,‫!ַבּ ִית ִדְּמקוֶֹרה הוּא‬

However, concerning the contradiction between the ruling with regard to birds in the mishna and
the ruling with regard to birds in the Tosefta, it is difficult. And if you say that the contradiction
between the ruling with regard to birds in the mishna and the ruling with regard to birds in the
Tosefta is also not difficult because this, the mishna, which permits trapping, is referring to a
roofed enclosure, in which a bird is considered trapped, and therefore there is no prohibition
against apprehending it on Shabbat; and that the Tosefta, which prohibits trapping, is referring
to an unroofed enclosure in which a bird is not considered trapped and apprehending it is
prohibited, that does not resolve the contradiction. As with regard to a house, which is roofed,
there is no dispute, and according to both Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, trapping a bird into a
closet, yes, it is considered trapped, while trapping it into a house, no, it is not considered trapped.

‫ ָלָמּה ִנְקָרא ְשָׁמהּ‬:‫ ְדָּתָנא ְדֵּבי ַרִבּי ִיְשָׁמֵﬠאל‬.‫ ְלִפי ֶשֵׁאיָנהּ ְמַקֶבֶּלת ָמרוּת‬,‫ ָהָכא ְבִּצפּוֹר ְדּרוֹר ָﬠְסִקיַנן‬:‫ָאַמר ַרָבּה ַבּר ַרב הוָּנא‬
‫ ָהא‬,‫ ָהא ְבֵּביָבר ָגּדוֹל‬,‫ ַהְשָׁתּא ְדָּאֵתית ְלָהִכי — ַחָיּה ַאַחָיּה ָנֵמי ָלא ַקְשָׁיא‬.‫״ִצפּוֹר ְדּרוֹר״ — ִמְפֵּני ֶשָׁדָּרה ַבַּבּ ִית ְכַּבָשֶּׂדה‬
‫ְבֵּביָבר ָקָטן‬.
Rabba bar Rav Huna said: Here, in the mishna, according to which a bird in a house is not
considered trapped, we are dealing with a free bird, a sparrow, because it does not accept
authority. That bird is not intimidated and evades capture even in a house, as the school of Rabbi
Yishmael taught: Why is it called a free bird [tzippor dror]? Because it dwells [dara] in a house
as it does in a field.

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Therefore, the distinction between a roofed and unroofed enclosure resolves the apparent
contradiction between the mishna and the Tosefta.

The Gemara says: Now that you have arrived at this understanding, that the difference between
the rulings in the two sources is predicated on different circumstances and not on a tannaitic
dispute, the apparent contradiction between the ruling with regard to an animal in the mishna and
the ruling with regard to an animal in the Tosefta is also not difficult.

This, the ruling in the Tosefta which prohibits apprehending the animal, is referring to a large
enclosure from which the animal cannot escape, but it can still avoid being apprehended.
Therefore, the trapping is considered inadequate, and apprehending the animal constitutes
trapping. That, the ruling in the mishna that permits apprehending the animal, is referring to a
small enclosure in which the animal cannot evade its pursuers and requires no further trapping.

Rabah bar bar Chanah says that the Mishnah (106a) discusses a "Tzipor Dror," a wild bird which
does not accept authority.

Such a bird is not considered captured even when it is enclosed in a house.

RASHI (DH b'Tzipor Dror) explains that the reason the bird is not considered captured while it is
in the house is because it flies from one corner of the house to the other and one cannot catch it.

In the Mishnah, however, Rashi (DH ha'Tzad Tzipor) explains that the bird is not considered
captured because it escapes through the windows.

Why does Rashi change his explanation? (Rashi in Beitzah (24a) also changes his explanation
from the Havah Amina, in which he explains that the bird escapes through the windows, to the
conclusion, in which he explains that the bird escapes by fleeing from one corner of the house to
another.)

Either way RASHI has to explain this unique quality of such a common bird who recognizes no
authority, a true free bird, and a metaphor for so many anthropomorphic referents in the western
canon.

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True to style, Rav Kornfeld1 suggests that the Gemara initially suggests that the difference between
a bird that is considered captured and one that is not considered captured depends on the type of
enclosure surrounding the bird.

If it is roofed, the bird is considered captured. If it is not roofed, the bird is not considered captured.

If the Gemara at this stage means that the bird can evade capture by fleeing from one corner to the
other, then it should not matter whether the enclosure is roofed or not; the bird can always escape.

It must be that the Gemara at this stage refers to an ordinary bird that can escape only through open
parts of the house (and not by fleeing from corner to corner).

The Gemara concludes that a bird is not considered captured even in a roofed area when that bird
is a Tzipor Dror. Accordingly, it must be that the bird escapes by flying from corner to corner, and
not by flying away through the windows.

This is why a Tzipor Dror is the only bird that is not considered captured in such a situation.

IBN EZRA

‫ אמר רבי משה כי העוף‬.‫ שם עוף מנגן אולי נקרא כן בעבור שאין מנהגו לנגן כל זמן שאיננו חפשי‬- ‫דרור‬
,‫ והם עושים כן‬,‫שתולדתו לברוח מיישוב בני אדם יחוג למקום הכבוד מקום הקרבנות הקרובים לפניו דרך משל‬
‫ רק‬,‫ ורבי יהודה בן בלעם לעג לר' משה כי מה דעת יש בעופות‬...‫אולי היו קרבים אל מזבחך שידעו מקום המזבח‬
‫ והנה הצפור מצאה‬.‫ ואני מתנודד ולא אמצא מה שאחפוץ‬,‫הפירוש כי נכספה נפשי לחצרות ה' ואל מזבחותיך‬
(‫ )תהלים פד ד‬.‫בית וקן ואני אינני מוצא‬
:‫רד"ק‬

RADAK

‫ לפיכך נקרא דרור שהוא‬,‫ וזכר דרור ידוע שמנהגו לקנן בבתים לעולם‬...‫וזכר צפור ודרור שדרכם לקנן בישוב‬
(‫ )שם‬...‫חפשי בין בני אדם שמקנן בבתיהם‬

RALBAG

Free bird, known to all as one who seeks freedom, like the sparrow who evades any type of human
captivity…
‫ רק ר' יהודה הוסיף והוציאו‬,‫ כמו צפור דרור שאינו תחת רשות אדם‬,‫ לכולי עלמא מורה על החירות‬- ‫דרור‬
‫ )ויקרא‬...‫ ומענין דר המורה על הסיבוב שיוכל לסחור ולסבב בכל מקום‬,‫ שיכול לדור בכל מקום‬,‫מענין דר ודירה‬
(‫כה י‬
,‫ ֵאת ְשַׁנת ַהֲחִמִשּׁים ָשָׁנה‬,‫י ְוִקַדְּשֶׁתּם‬ 10 And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty
‫ ֹיְשֶׁביָה; יוֵֹבל‬-‫ ְלָכל‬,‫וְּקָראֶתם ְדּרוֹר ָבָּאֶרץ‬ throughout the land unto all the inhabitants thereof; it shall
-‫ ְוַשְׁבֶתּם ִאישׁ ֶאל‬,‫ ִתְּהֶיה ָלֶכם‬,‫ִהוא‬ be a jubilee unto you; and ye shall return every man unto his
.‫ִמְשַׁפְּחתּוֹ ָתֻּשׁבוּ‬-‫ ְוִאישׁ ֶאל‬,‫ֲאֻחָזּתוֹ‬ possession, and ye shall return every man unto his family.

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Daf Yomi Advancement Forum

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RAV Hirsh:

Rav Shamshon Rafael Hirsch, great philologist that he was, understood this tzipor dror as a bird
“which only follows its natural trend, without altering it or being affected by human proximity.”

On the verse: Lev 14:4 regarding the birds offered for a leper:

-‫ ְוָלַקח ַלִמַּטֵּהר ְשֵׁתּי‬,‫ ַהֹכֵּהן‬,‫ ד ְוִצָוּה‬4 then shall the priest command to take for him that is to be
‫ וְּשׁ ִני‬,‫ ְטֹהרוֹת; ְוֵﬠץ ֶאֶרז‬,‫ ִצֳפּ ִרים ַחיּוֹת‬cleansed two living clean birds, and cedar-wood, and
.‫ תוַֹלַﬠת ְוֵא ֹזב‬scarlet, and hyssop.
Citing Chullin 62a

‫דבר אחר למינהו להביא סנונית לבנה דברי ר"א אמרו לו והלא אנשי גליל העליון אוכלים אותו מפני שקרקבנו‬
‫נקלף אמר להם אף הן עתידין ליתן את הדין אלא עורב וכל מין עורב‬

Alternatively, the phrase “after its kinds” is written to include the white senunit and teach that it is
non-kosher; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rav Hirsh comments:

‫ שהיא הסנונית‬,‫ ומקובל לומר‬,‫בחולין ס"ב אמרו שהצפור הכשרה לטהרת מצורע קרויה סנונית‬... - ‫שתי צפרים‬
‫ )ויקרא יד ד‬.‫)הקרויה כן היום‬

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The Swallow is saying, “So that my soul shall praise you, and shall not be silent, YHVH my elo’ah,
I shall give thanks to you forever.”

The Snunis, says Rav Chaim Kanievsky in his Peirush on Perek Shira, is the Tzipor Dror that a
Metzora brings for a Korban.

Why does a Metzora bring two of these birds? The gemara says in Chulin (62a) that Tzora'as is a
punishment for Lashon Hara generally committed by people who talk too much. So as a Kapara
he must slaughter birds who also chirp non-stop all day to remind him that he is not a bird and
should watch his mouth.

So what Shira does this bird says? "L'Maan Yizamercha V'lo Yidom"; for the sake that I will praise
you and not remain silent.

Talking is great. That is why Hashem gave us the ability to do so.

That is what makes us better than animals. They are simply classified as "Chai"; alive. We are
"Midaber"; we can speak. That puts us in a whole new league. But only if we speak what we were
intended to speak; praise of Hashem for all he does for us every day.

RASHI

‫סנונית‬- ‫ארונדייל"א נכנסת תחת כנפי הנשר ומעכבו מפרישת כנפיו‬:

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‫)‪The Five Dreads (Shabbat 77b‬‬

‫‪With regard to these creatures, the Gemara cites that which our Sages taught: There are five‬‬
‫‪dreads, i.e., dread that the weak cast over the mighty: The dread of the mafgia, a small creature,‬‬
‫;‪over the lion; the dread of the mosquito over the elephant; the dread of the gecko over the scorpion‬‬
‫‪the dread of the swallow over the eagle; the dread of the kilbit, a small fish, over a whale.‬‬

‫דרור ‪ -‬סנונית‬
‫‪Rav Korman2 identifies the issues in taxonomy:‬‬

‫כאמור‪ ,‬לא מתירים עוד עוף או ציפור על פי סימני טהרה‪ ,‬אלא לפי מסורת‪ .‬לכן מרגיש אני צורך להעיר‪ ,‬שציפור‬
‫דרור‪ ,‬הכוונה לציפור שאנו מכנים אותה "דרור"‬

‫‪As mentioned, no more chicken or bird is allowed by purity, but by tradition. That is why I feel the‬‬
‫‪need to comment that a sparrow bird, the reference to a bird we call a "sparrow" (in Polish -‬‬
‫‪Wrubel, German Spatz or Sperling) is pure.‬‬

‫‪I heard from my grandfather, Rabbi Ya'akov Moshe, Rabbi Gershon Korman (who perished in the‬‬
‫‪Holocaust), who remembers that when he was in a difficult situation they were allowed to eat a‬‬
‫‪sparrow bird. I mentioned it, since many have discussed it, it bans and it permits.‬‬

‫היא טהורה‪ .‬שמעתי מפי סבי ר' יעקב משה ב"ר גרשון )‪ Sperling‬או ‪ Spatz‬בגרמנית ‪) - Wrubel,‬בפולנית‬
‫קורמן הי"ד )נספה בשואה(‪ ,‬שזכור לו‪ ,‬שכשהיה מצב קשה התירו לאכול ציפור דרור‪ .‬הזכרתי זאת‪ ,‬מאחר ורבים דנו‬
‫בזה‪ ,‬זה אוסר וזה מתיר‬

‫כל חילוקי הדעות נובעים מאי הגדרה נכונה באיזו ציפור מדובר‪ .‬אלה האוסרים מתכוונים לציפור שאנו מכנים סנונית‬
‫והיא אכן צפור טמאה )ראה בהערות ‪ .(20-19‬הדרור מתואר ע"י רבי יהושע‪" ,‬שאוכלת מפתו ושותה ממימיו" )ויקרא‬
‫רבה ט"ז‪,‬ז(‪ .‬הדרור בטבעו אכן מחפש קרבת אדם‪ .‬הוא לא מאפשר לאדם להתקרב אליו קרוב מדי‪ ,‬מכאן שמו "דרור"‪.‬‬
‫אולם בכל מקום מגורי אדם‪ ,‬שם מתקרבים הדרורים‪ .‬לא כן הסנוניות‪ .‬יש הקוראים‪ ,‬כאמור‪ ,‬לדרור סנונית ויש כאלה‬
‫המכנים את הסנונית "דרור"‪ .‬הסנונית אינה אוכלת מפתו של האדם וגם לא מפת כלשהו‪ .‬היא נזונה אך ורק מזבובונים‬
‫שונים‪ ,‬שהוא תופסת במעופה‪.‬‬
‫‪All differences of opinion stem from a mis-definition of which bird it is. These bans refer to a bird‬‬
‫‪we call a swallow and it is indeed an unclean bird . The sparrow is described by Rabbi Yehoshua,‬‬
‫"‪who "eats his mouth and drinks from his water‬‬

‫ָאַמר ַרִבּי ְיהוָּדה ַבּר ִסימוֹן ִאֵלּין ִצָפַּרָיּא קוָֹל ִנין‪ָ ,‬אַמר ַהָקּדוֹשׁ ָבּרוּ‪ ¤‬הוּא ָיבוֹא ‪),‬ויקרא יד‪ ,‬ד( ' ְוִצָוּה ַהֹכֵּהן ְוָלַקח ַלִמַּטֵּהר וגו‬
‫ַהקּוֹל ִויַכֵפּר ַﬠל ַהקּוֹל‪ַ .‬רִבּי ִשְׁמעוֹן ֶבּן ֵל ִוי ָאַמר ִצפּוֹר ְדּרוֹר ֶשׁאוֶֹכֶלת ִמִפּתּוֹ ְושׁוָֹתה ֵמיָמיו‪ַ ,‬וֲהלוֹא ְדָּב ִרים ַקל ָוֹחֶמר וָּמה ִאם‬
‫ִצֳפּ ִרים ֶשׁאוְֹכלוֹת ִמִפּתּוֹ ְושׁוִֹתין ֵמיָמיו ְמַכְפּ ִרין ָﬠָליו‪ֹ ,‬כֵּהן ֶשֶׁנֱּהָנה ִמ ִיְּשָׂרֵאל ְבֶּﬠְשׂ ִרים ְוַא ְרַבּע ַמְתּנוֹת ְכֻּהָנּה ַﬠל ַאַחת ַכָּמּה‬
‫‪ְ .‬וַכָמּה‪ְ ,‬בַּמְתָלא ָאְמֵרי ְדָּאֵכיל ַבֲּהֵדי קוָֹרא ִיְלֶקה ַבֲּהֵדי ִקיָלא‬

‫‪2‬‬
‫קורמן‬ ‫הרב‬ ‫מאת‪:‬‬
‫אל‪ :‬הטהור והמותר ‪ -‬פרק א‬

‫‪8‬‬
 Leviticus Rabbi 16: 7

Sparrow in its nature is indeed seeking human proximity. He does not allow a person to get too
close to him, hence his name "Dror". But everywhere human habitation, where sparrows are
approaching. Not so the swallows. Some, as mentioned, call for a swallow and some call the
swallow a "swallow". The swallow does not eat a person's mouth nor any map. It is fed exclusively
by various flies, which it catches in flight.

The Bird offerings of the Metzora3

Notice the negative connotation of dror as freedom used here.

The typical bird-offering is a turtledove or a young dove. Just as the dove, says the midrash, is
loyal to its mate, recognizing no other, so does Klal Yisrael recognize nothing but its Father in
heaven.
When a person sins, he distances himself (and his community) somewhat from their Source. He
seeks atonement through his korban of a dove, which symbolizes attachment to Him. He tries
through it to close the distance that he opened, and return the connection to its healthier condition.

The bird that is used in the purification of the metzora, however, is anything but typical. Rather
than the dove, it must be a tzipor dror/ “freedom bird,” one that refuses to be mastered.

When trapped indoors, it will fly from corner to corner, evading man’s grasp. (our Daf and Rashi) In the
wild, it goes from place to place, seemingly not having a place it call its own.

It is a symbol of rootlessness and aimlessness – just like the person who speaks lashon hora. While
other sins create a bit of distance to Hashem, the person is still connected and bound to Him.
Lashon hora severs the connection altogether.

Rebbe Nachman makes the distinction between pure and impure birds connecting it to the two
birds brought by the leper and the rabbinic reason associating leprosy (tzaraas) with Lashon
Hara.

Rebbe claims that the midrashic trope of using the bird as a sacrifice (unusual) because of its
chattering, to atone for the chatterer (lashon Hara) reflects a deeper mystical notion. Listening to
the song of pure vs impure birds or music has a deleterious effect on the soul.

Likutei Mehoran 3:1

3
https://torah.org/torah-portion/mei-marom-5779-metzorah/

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 ‫ ִכְּדִאיָתא ַבִּמְּד ָרשׁ‬,‫)ויקרא פ' טז( ִכּי ִהֵנּה קוֹל ַה ְנִּגיָנה ִנְמֶשֶכת ִמן ַהִצֳּפּ ִרים‬: ‫ִמְפֵּני ָמה ְמֹצ ָרע ָטֳה ָרתוֹ ְתּלוָּיה ִבְּשֵׁתּי‬
‫ ֶשִׁדֵּבּר ָלשׁוֹן ָה ָרע‬,‫ ִכּי ִנְלָקה ֵמֲחַמת קוֹלוֹ‬.‫ ָיבוֹא ַקַלּ ְנָיא ִויַכֵפּר ַﬠל ַקַלּ ְנָיא‬,‫ִצֳפּ ִרים ַחיּוֹת ְטהוֹרוֹת‬.

The reason for this is that the voice of song is drawn from the birds. As we find in the Midrash:
Why is the purification of a leper dependent upon two live pure birds? Let the chatterer come and
atone for the chatterer (cf. Vayikra Rabbah 16:7). For he was stricken on account of his voice,
which spoke lashon hara (slander).

‫ ֶשַׁהְשֵּׁתּי‬,(:‫ ְוָכתוּב ַבֹּזַּהר )ויקרא נג‬.‫ ִנְמֶשֶׁכת ַה ְנִּגיָנה ֶשׁלּוֹ ִמן ַהְשֵּׁתּי ִצֳפּ ִרים ַחיּוֹת ְטהוֹרוֹת‬,‫ ִמי ֶשׁהוּא ָכֵּשׁר‬,‫ִנְמָצא‬
‫ ִכּי לוֵֹקַח ַה ְנִּגיָנה‬,‫ ַה ְינוּ ְלשׁוֹן ְנבוָּאה‬,‫ ִמְלּשׁוֹן ָחזוֹן‬,‫ ִנְק ָרא ַהְמַּנֵגּן ַחָזּן‬Œ‫ ְלָכ‬.‫ִצֳפּ ִרים ַהַנּ"ל יוֹ ְנִקים ֵמֲאַתר ִדּ ְנִביִאים ָי ְנִקין‬
‫ֵמֲאַתר ִדּ ְנִביִאים ָי ְנִקין‬.

We see, then, that the virtuous person draws his song from the two live pure birds. Thus it is written
in the Zohar (III, 53b) that these two birds nurse from the same place that the prophets nurse. This
is why a singer is called a ChaZaN, from the word ChaZoN, which connotes prophecy. [The
chazan] takes his song from the same place that the prophets nurse.

Rebbe was very insistent that music emerging from a Church was damaging to the soul.

Based on the Zohar I:217b

‫ ָכּל ַחד ְוַחד‬.‫ ְיָמָמא‬¤‫ ְוַחד ַכּד ִאְתֲחַשׁ‬,‫ ְוַחד ִצפּוָֹרא ַכּד ָנִהיר ְיָמָמא‬,‫ָנְפָקא ַחד ִצפּוָֹרא ִלְסַטר ָדּרוָֹמא ְוַחד ִצפּוָֹרא ִלְסַטר ָצפוָֹנא‬
‫ ַמה ְדָּשְׁמִﬠין ֵמַההוּא ָכּרוָֹזא‬,‫ָקֵרי וַּמְכ ְרָזא‬.

Music seems to have an important function, and for Rebbe a central role in his mysticism.

The source of music in general is from birds and the music of evil comes from “the birds of the
Other Side” (Zohar I:217b). These birds of evil receive their nourishment from the ‘breasts’ of the
Sefirah of Malchut 4

Modern notions of “freedom” Political vs Religious

There are two concepts of freedom and each reflects the milieu most appropriate for it. According
to Rabbi Pruzansky it’s all very simple, Torah vs Paganism:

The American concept reflects the ideal for a secular society; the heavy hand of the ruling class
has historically been unkind to individual freedoms and the pursuit of happiness, and thus liberty
remains the prevailing ethos and with good reason.

Conversely, the Torah view is the archetype for a religious nation. It promotes discipline and self-
control, and mandates both behavior and values that bring a godly and sacred dimension to life.
Such is only possible in a divinely-ordained system.5

4
Likkutei Moharan 3, based on Eytz Haim, Shaar HaKlippot 2
5
Rabbi Pruzansky https://rabbipruzansky.com/2020/05/15/on-liberty-with-apologies-to-john-stuart-mill/

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However any depth understanding of the basis for American Freedom cannot be allowed such easy
definitions. Alexander Rosenthal-Pubúl is an online lecturer in political thought at Johns
Hopkins University’s Center for Advanced Governmental Studies from his home in Spain. He is
also cofounder and director of the Petrarch Institute, which is dedicated to keeping alive the
classical humanist tradition. I like his article comparing the western notions of deomcary and
freedom and its split between the Judaeo-Christain vs Greek roots. In light of the protest movement
and the questioning of American democracy in light of its racist origins let’s read:

Western civilization is unique among world cultures in the special significance and value it
accords to the idea of freedom. Already a central value in Greco-Roman and Christian thought,
modern liberalism has exalted freedom as the central human and political value. The effort to
secure individual liberty in the religious, political, cultural, and economic spheres lies at the
heart of the whole modern project. The liberal doctrine of individual liberties with its intellectual
roots in the European Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is enshrined in
the founding documents of the American and French revolutions. America in particular—a
nation “conceived in liberty” as Lincoln put it in the Gettysburg Address—has deeply identified
itself with the cause of freedom. One of President George W. Bush’s first seemingly spontaneous
responses to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was to say that “freedom itself was attacked this morning
by a faceless coward.”

It is left to those gadflies of the world—the philosophers—to raise the awkward question, What
does “freedom” mean? The answer is surprisingly elusive. An acquaintance with Western
intellectual history reveals that while “freedom” is almost universally lauded as a value, there is
no real consensus on its definition. Nevertheless, at least two broadly influential conceptions of
freedom have emerged in the Western tradition: one is the modern liberal understanding, and
the other took shape in classical Greece. Both ancient Greek and modern liberal thought are
complex and involve many variations. Essentially we are speaking of the main emphasis of the
modern liberal tradition on the one hand and the tradition of Greek thought that arises from
Socrates on the other. With that caveat and at risk of a certain oversimplification we may call
these distinctive conceptions “modern freedom” and “ancient freedom.”

What distinguishes the two? Perhaps the most influential account of liberalism’s distinctive
concept of freedom came from one of its key twentieth century champions, Isaiah Berlin, who
emphasizes the notion of negative freedom as the defining element of the liberal political
tradition. This is basically the idea of freedom from external constraint. This seems to be indeed
what is ordinarily meant by the civic freedoms of contemporary liberal democracies. One has
“freedom of speech” or “freedom of religion” to the degree one can speak as one desires or
practice one’s faith without external constraint, especially from the state and its law. Such are
the familiar freedoms guaranteed, for instance, by the American Bill of Rights.6

This definition is inadequate. The ancients fully understood the notion of negative freedom but
believed that freedom considered as merely “unrestrained action” tends to undermine itself,
giving birth to tyranny within the soul and within the city. The real distinction then is that the

6
https://isi.org/modern-age/reflections-on-ancient-and-modern-freedom/

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Greek philosophers did not see negative freedom as an end in itself. They warned not only of the
tyranny of external constraints but also of the tyranny of the passions. The classical Greek
conception is therefore more inclusive and capacious in connecting freedom directly with the
question of virtue. The contrasting failure of modern liberalism to relate its idea of freedom
intelligibly to any more universal conception of the Good is at the very heart of its present crisis.
Excavating the classical conception of freedom will therefore be helpful in raising critical
questions about the direction of the modern political order. It is first necessary, however, to
provide an adequate account of modern freedom.

Despite the fact that the Leviathan is an apologia for a form of authoritarianism, many key
elements of Hobbes’s theory were taken up in liberal thought. Hobbes rejects the Aristotelian
starting point of man as a political animal, instead building up his political theory from the
individual in a state of nature prior to society. In Leviathan, Hobbes provides a pithy definition
of freedom:

LIBERTY OR FREEDOME signifieth (properly) the absence of opposition (by Opposition, I

mean externall Impediments of motion;) . . . A FREE-MAN, is he, that, in those things, which
by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to do.7

The idea of freedom in classical Greek philosophy by contrast is centered on an ideal of self-
mastery.8 The freedom discussed in classical philosophy is not the ability to actualize one’s
desires whatever they might happen to be.

Freedom is rational self-government—the ability to act according to one’s rational judgment

without bondage either to external coercion to the compulsive force exerted by irrational desires
and passions.

To illustrate the contrast between classical Greek and modern understandings of freedom it
might be helpful to think of an alcoholic possessed by a constant, burning desire to drink
intemperately. Under what circumstances is this alcoholic free? According to the negative
conception of freedom, the alcoholic is free if he is able to drink alcohol as frequently as he
wishes without external obstruction. But according to the Greek philosophical tradition, the
alcoholic is not a free man but a slave to his cravings. True freedom would mean mastery of his
desire.

It would seem therefore that the relationship of freedom to virtue and the good is one of the
principal ways in which classical and modern freedom can be distinguished. If freedom is
defined negatively as merely unobstructed action, it is evident that negative freedom can be
used either for good or for evil. In short, negative freedom would seem to be morally neutral.
This can be clearly seen in the freedoms of liberal societies. Take for example “freedom of
speech”—it can be used to promote acts of benevolence and justice; equally it can used to mass-

7
Thomas Hobbes, “Of the Liberty of Subjects,” chap. 2 in Leviathan,
8
Werner Jaeger, Paidea: The Ideals of Greek Culture, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 53ff, and also the
footnotes on p. 379.

12
produce pornography, immerse crucifixes in urine, or insult the grieving families of dead
soldiers.

By contrast, it is through the moral disciplines that one acquires freedom in the Greek
philosophical conception. The acquisition of courage frees one from slavery to fear, liberality
frees from slavery to the lust for money and wealth, temperance from slavery to alcohol and
sexual lust, and the same with the other vices. In the Greek view one is free only to the precise
degree one has acquired the virtues. Freedom and virtue therefore exist in a necessary
relationship. Indeed freedom as self-mastery is the very foundation of the virtuous life. Turning
to Xenophon’s Socrates:

Should not every man hold self-control to be the foundation of all virtue, and first lay this
foundation firmly in his soul? For who without this can learn any good or practice it
worthily? Or what man that is the slave of his pleasures is not in an evil plight body and soul
alike? (Memorabilia 1.5.4–5)

For Aristotle the end of politics is therefore conditioned by a teleological conception of the end
of man in general—namely the realization of the good or virtuous life. Man attains this end in
the context of the political community. In the classical view expressed by Aristotle, it is not the
protection of a merely negative freedom of each individual to live as he wishes that constitutes
the end and justification of politics but freedom in the sense of rational and virtuous self-
mastery.

Socrates himself recognizes the value of free debate and free inquiry not only in the life of the
polis but also in the dialectical process of philosophical inquiry. In these words to Polus in
the Gorgias he states:

It would indeed be a hard fate for you, my excellent friend, if having come to Athens, where
there is more freedom of speech than anywhere else in Greece, you should be the one person
who could not enjoy it.9
Gorgias 461e

Thus democracy for Plato is essentially indifferent on the question of virtue and vice—all modes
of life enter into the polis in a position of equality. The liberation of all desires and appetites,
moreover, overturns social order and leads to a condition of lawless anarchy that eventually
culminates in tyranny—the least free and least virtuous of all political forms:

Now Prof Rosenthal-Prubul expounds:

What is the relationship of this classical concept of freedom to Christianity—the world religion
that displaced the ancient Greco-Roman gods and presented itself as the saving truth that sets men
free (John 8:32)? Since Christianity arises initially from Hebrew rather than Hellenic roots, the
relation between Christian and classical views of freedom raises for us the vexed problem of

9
Plato, Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

13
“Athens and Jerusalem,” which permeates almost all aspects of the Western civilizational
tradition. Some philosophers have argued for a basic incompatibility between the claims of Greek
philosophy and those of the Bible. As Leo Strauss, for example, argued:

So philosophy in its original and full sense is then certainly incompatible with the Biblical way
of life. Philosophy and the Bible are the alternatives or the antagonists in the drama of the
human soul. Each of the two antagonists claims to know or to hold the truth, the decisive truth.
The truth regarding the right way of life. But there can only be one truth: hence conflict between
these claims and necessary conflict among thinking beings; and that inevitably means
argument.10

Man’s fundamental condition in the fallen state is here considered as one of slavery to sin. Thus
we see that both the Socratic and the Judaeo- Christian understandings conceive the absence of
freedom as enslavement to those self-centered passions and desires that obstruct the only worthy
freedom of man—the freedom that leads to moral rectitude.

While on close analysis there are certain differences between the Judaeo-Christian religious
understanding of sin and the Greek philosophical notion of vice, there is an even broader harmony.
The major difference resides not in the definition of freedom but rather in the question of how
freedom can be achieved. For the former it is thought Torah and Mitzvot for Jews and for
Christians like St. Paul man is unable to free himself from sinful passions by his own power, but
depends for his liberation on a supernatural intervention—the grace of God manifested in Jesus
Christ. For the Greeks, by contrast, the acquisition of virtue remains fully in the natural and human
sphere—a matter of the right philosophical understanding of the Good and the moral discipline of
the virtues.

The main lesson then, which we derive from the ancients, is that freedom when set against reason
and virtue is self-negating. The individual or society given to an unrestrained license yields
immediately to the despotism of the passions and eventually to the despotism of state-imposed
constraints.

The disorders of the soul beget disorders in the commonwealth, which eventually require greater
measures of coercive power to keep them within bounds.11 True freedom is won and sustained by
virtue. This insight of the classics occurs as well in the modern conservative tradition. As
articulated by Edmund Burke:

Men are qualified for civil liberty in exact proportion to their disposition to put moral chains
upon their appetites. . . . Society cannot exist unless a controlling power upon will and appetite
be placed somewhere; and the less of it there is within, the more there must be without. It is

10
Leo Strauss “Relativism,” in Thomas Pangle, The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press), 13–26. And Leo Strauss, “The Mutual Influence of Theology and Philosophy,” Independent Journal of Philosophy 3
(1979; rpt. of 1954 article):

11
Russell Kirk, “The Moral Imagination,” in Literature and Belief, vol. 1 (1981), 37–49,
http://www.kirkcenter.org/index.php/detail/the-moral-imagination/.

14
 ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free.
Their passions forge their fetters12

“To The Bird” Bialik, 1892

12
Edmund Burke, “Letter to a Member of the National Assembly,” http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15700/15700-h/15700-
h.htm#MEMBER_OF_THE_NATIONAL_ASSEMBLY

15
 Sing to me, tell me, dear bird from the faraway wonderful land,
is there in the land of sun and beauty,
much evil and hardship too?
Have you greetings from my brothers in Zion,
my distant brothers yet near?
Oh Happy ones, have they known,
that I suffer, great pains I suffer?
Do they know how numerous my foes stand,
so many, oh countless,
who rose against me?

Sing me, my bird,

wonders from the Land,
where spring will endure for eternity

In celebration of Juneteenth it is appropriate to cite the poetry of

Dunbar 1872-1906

16
 A little bird, with plumage brown,
Beside my window flutters down,
A moment chirps its little strain,
Ten taps upon my window–pane,
And chirps again, and hops along,
To call my notice to its song;
But I work on, nor heed its lay,
Till, in neglect, it flies away.

So birds of peace and hope and love

Come fluttering earthward from above,
To settle on life’s window–sills,
And ease our load of earthly ills;
But we, in traffic’s rush and din
Too deep engaged to let them in,
With deadened heart and sense plod on,
Nor know our loss till they are gone.

The Sparrow

17
Paul Laurence Dunbar

18