Urban Operations MOD PDF

Army Code 71657
(2009)
ARMY FIELD MANUAL

VOLUME 2 OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS
PART 5
URBAN
OPERATIONS
This publication supersedes AC 71657

AFM Vol 2 Pt 5 Urban Operations (2002)
2009
Issue 4.0: October 2009

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PREFACE
BACKGROUND
1. The increasing complexity of the contemporary and future operating environments,

of which the urban environment is but one aspect, will pose a challenge to armed forces
which operate in them, demanding new tactics, specialized equipment and heightened
levels of discrimination. This emphasises the need for an agile and flexible force that can
succeed when faced with situations across the spectrum of conflict. Such agility and
flexibility will, in part, be determined by the composition of the deployed force; but it is
critically dependent on that force being well practiced in Tactics Techniques and
Procedures (TTP).
2. This manual describes the different TTPs required to operate in the urban
environment and deliberately focuses on combat operations as these are the most
demanding circumstances under which soldiers will have to operate. However, many of the
TTPs are relevant to operations across the Spectrum of Conflict and there is a new chapter
on Stability Ops. Soldiers deployed on operations, where they will have to undertake tasks
in towns and villages, will employ these TTPs to varying degrees depending on the intensity
of combat operations. Training for combat operations is the foundation for all operations in
an urban environment.
“The Army will need to be cautious about drawing general conclusions from urban
operations in Basra and Baghdad. Unless all or most of the favourable factors apply
in a future operation, the result could be very different. There is considerable reason
to continue to teach tactics for urban operations in the anticipation that it will not be
so easy, whilst stressing the need to be pragmatic and to exploit local
circumstances”1.
3. Whatever challenges are inherent in warfare are magnified significantly in the urban
environment. From Stalingrad to Inchon to Panama to Basra, operations in urban areas
have been characterized by “poor communications, difficult command and control, difficult
target acquisition, short engagement ranges, reduced effectiveness for fire support assets,
and difficulties in providing logistical support”. Tall buildings, sewers, and tunnels give the
battlefield dimensions of height and depth that are absent on open terrain.
4 In essence, fighting in urban areas is primordial and brutal. The enemy is at close
range; snipers and explosive devices may be present; stress is extremely high; and the
opposing force is frequently indistinguishable from the civilian population. Demographic
and urbanization trends in the developing world are likely to lead to such environments that
are even more stressful and more difficult for operations. Increasingly better informed
through the growth of media sources, urban human populations will be the “vital ground” in
the resolution of any armed conflict. Nevertheless, brutal, close combat demands that a
war fighting ethos be maintained throughout all levels of training and education.
5. Historical data suggest that it is extremely difficult for modern forces to make best
use of their technological advantages against a determined adversary in an urban
environment. The different characteristics of the various urban environments, including
1
Operations In Iraq - An Analysis From The Land Perspective. Page 3-16 (Army Code 71816).
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 i

population and structure density, low, medium and high buildings, subterranean structures
et al, tend to negate the technological advantages (e.g. close air support, mobility,
communications, etc) enjoyed by modern military forces. The advantage of military
technology, typically associated with long-range, high technology weapons platforms that
use mass and mobility, is significantly reduced in urban environments.
6. It is precisely for this reason that less sophisticated forces are drawn to urban areas.
Such battles in the recent past, like at Grozny, Mogadishu, Jenin and Gaza 09 have been
characterized by conflict between modern combined arms forces and informally organized
irregulars. Aware of the increasing unwillingness to take casualties or cause collateral
damage, and understanding the lack of comparative advantage in the urban environment,
adversaries are increasingly likely to engage military forces in cities.
7. The degeneration of urban operations into a series of small group or even of

individual battles was evident in operations as different as Stalingrad, Hue, and Beirut. The
nature of built up areas is responsible for this fragmentation process. As battles proceed,
the streets and building-blocks of the urban physical morphology fragment urban operations
into conflict, between force elements usually of section or platoon size, with generally
insufficient space for the deployment and manoeuvring of larger units. Combat
disintegrates into a series of more or less separate and isolated conflicts around such
fortress areas.
8. Given that much of an urban battle is likely to take place inside buildings or
underground, it is likely to be invisible to all except those actually fighting it on the ground.
As a result, it will difficult for higher-level commanders to maintain an accurate picture of the
battlefield at any given time. Given this inevitable fragmentation, operational effectiveness
will depend greatly on the quality of leadership at lower levels.
AIM
9. The purpose of this publication is to explain the effect that combat in urban areas will
have on the conduct of military operations and to describe the tactics and procedures
involved in their prosecution.
10. The doctrine underpinning the overall principles for military operations does not
change simply because of the altered physical conditions of the urban environment and
thus this publication complements AFM Volume 1 Part 2 ‘Battlegroup Tactics’. It also
records those tactical factors that need greater emphasis where urban conditions affect
operations.
SCOPE
11. The publication is split into three parts. Relevant historical examples and
appropriate quotations are included throughout to provide an insight into how soldiers have
operated in these conditions during previous campaigns.
a. Part A. Part A describes Urban Warfare, the environment, issues relating to

coalition operations and the military interaction with the civilian population.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 ii

b. Part B. Part B deals with fighting the Urban Battle, the purpose of which is to
provide a guide for use by commanders, staff officers and regimental planners in
units and at formation level when operating in urban and built-up conditions. It
describes the effects that this environment will have on combat operations, the
functions in combat, the employment of particular weapon systems and the tactics
used by the combat arms.
c. Part C. Part C deals with aspects that concern the individual, how he
survives, lives, trains for and operates in these conditions and is designed for the
young officer and NCO as a basis for further instruction. It provides some tactical
features about the movement of troops and urban operations at Section and Platoon
level. It also covers subterranean operations, night operations and the use of
obstacles.
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
12. The content of this publication is not an authority to operate outside the Law of
Armed Conflict (LOAC), and must not be used or interpreted in a manner inconsistent with
the principles below (IAW JSP 383, LOAC Manual 2003). In the event of any doubt,
guidance must be sought through the chain of command.
APPLICATION THROUGH LEADERSHIP
13. Although doctrine and TTPs provide practical guidance on the conduct of operations,
their publication, alone, will not significantly add to operational success. Unless soldiers
understand doctrine, are well trained in the TTPs and are sufficiently motivated to carry out
their tasks to the best of their ability their effectiveness on the battlefield, as individuals or
part of a team, will be limited. It is leadership which ensures that training is effective and
drills are learned and followed correctly. It is leadership which drives effective action and
motivates soldiers to give their utmost to achieve the common purpose. It is leadership
which turns the bald statements of facts in these publications into battle winning or life-
saving action. And moreover, it is strong leaders who recognise that doctrine writers do not
have a monopoly on wisdom and adapt and develop this guidance to win in the prevailing
circumstances.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 iii

ARMY FIELD MANUAL
VOLUME 2 OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS
PART 5 URBAN OPERATIONS
PREFACE i
CONTENTS v
PART A – URBAN WARFARE
CHAPTER 1 THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
Section 1 The Military Significance of Urban Warfare A-1-1

Section 2 The Nature of Urban Operations A-1-2
Section 3 The Nature of Urban Terrain A-1-4
Section 4 Other Factors in Built Up Areas A-1-8
CHAPTER 2 URBAN COALITION OPERATIONS
Section 1 Urban Coalition Operations A-2-1

Section 2 Operating Under US Command A-2-2
CHAPTER 3 MILITARY INTERACTION WITH THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
Section 1 The Status of Civilians A-3-1

Section 2 Military Responsibilities and Authority A-3-2
Section 3 Civilian Factors A-3-5
ANNEX A TO PART A TYPES OF BUILDING CONSTRUCTION A-A-1
PART B – FIGHTING THE URBAN BATTLE
CHAPTER 4 PREPARING FOR THE URBAN BATTLE
Section 1 Operational Planning B-4-1

Section 2 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace B-4-7
Section 3 ISTAR B-4-12
Section 4 Command, Control and Communications B-4-15
CHAPTER 5 ALL ARMS COMBAT
Section 1 Close Combat B-5-1

Section 2 Combat Support B-5-23
Section 3 Combat Service Support B-5-42
Section 4 Recent Lessons Identified B-5-50
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 v

CHAPTER 6 CONVENTIONAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Section 1 Introduction B-6-1

Section 2 Planning an Attack B-6-4
Section 3 The Stages of Offensive Action B-6-7
Section 4 Urban Strike Operations B-6-15
CHAPTER 7 CONVENTIONAL DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Section 2 The Elements of a Defensive Operation B-7-1
Section 3 The Use of Delay in Defensive Operations B-7-10
Section 4 Enhanced Blast Weapons B-7-14
CHAPTER 8 STABILITY OPERATIONS

Section 2 Factors for Consideration during Stability Operations B-8-2
Section 3 Security and Control B-8-4
Section 4 Initial Restoration of Essential Services and Facilities B-8-6
Section 5 Interim Governance Tasks B-8-7
Section 6 Military Support to Security Sector Reform B-8-7
PART C – URBAN COMBAT SKILLS
CHAPTER 9 COMBAT SKILLS
Section 1 Camouflage and Concealment C-9-1

Section 2 Fighting Positions C-9-3
Section 3 Movement C-9-11
Section 4 Entry Techniques C-9-16
Section 5 Clearing Buildings C-9-27
Section 6 Defended Localities C-9-32
Section 7 Navigation in Built-Up Areas C-9-34
Section 8 Casualty Evacuation C-9-35
Section 9 Ammunition Resupply C-9-37
Section 10 Isolated Personnel in the Urban Environment C-9-39
CHAPTER 10 WEAPON EFFECTS
Section 1 Introduction C-10-1

Section 2 Small Arms C-10-2
Section 3 Grenades C-10-4
Section 4 Heavier Infantry Direct Fire Weapons C-10-5
Section 5 Tank Weapons C-10-6
Section 6 Indirect Fire Weapons C-10-7
Section 7 CBRN C-10-7
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 vi

CHAPTER 11 SUBTERRANEAN OPERATIONS C-11-1
CHAPTER 12 NIGHT OPERATIONS C-12-1
CHAPTER 13 THE USE OF OBSTACLES IN URBAN OPERATIONS
Section 1 Introduction C-13-1

Section 2 Lethal and Non-Lethal Obstacles C-13-1
Section 3 Mines C-13-2
Section 4 Demolitions C-13-3
Section 5 Booby Traps C-13-4
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 vii

URBAN OPERATIONS
PART A
URBAN WARFARE
Issue 4.0: Oct 09

CHAPTER 1
SECTION 1 – THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF URBAN WARFARE
‘The future of war is not the son of Desert Storm, but the stepchild of Chechnya.’
General Charles C Krulak, USMC
1. Whereas 2% of humanity lived in urban areas in 1800, 47% of the world’s population
do now and by 2030 this figure is estimated to grow to above 60%. In developing nations,
the current trend towards conurbations with 10 million or more inhabitants is expected to
continue. Land Forces should expect to operate routinely in urban areas, where the
adversary operates amongst the population and where cultural understanding and
sensitivity will be crucial to military success. Land Forces need to be appropriately
structured, equipped and trained to understand the constraints and exploit the opportunities
presented by such complex battlespace.
2. Potential enemies recognise the inherent danger and complexity of the urban
environment to the outsider and may view it as their best chance to negate the
technological and firepower advantage of modern armed forces, possibly as a component
of hybrid warfare1.
3. An intelligent enemy will exploit this benefit in a number of ways. The urban
environment gives him the opportunity to cause a significant number of casualties that will
damage both the morale of his opponents and the support of their domestic electorate. He
may incite mistakes and over-reaction against the civilian population. Above all, he will
strive to seize and retain the initiative or at least delay his opponents’ attempts to do the
same. He fully understands that his conflict is fought ‘amongst the people’ and, especially
in large conurbations, he will attempt to capitalize on his endeavours both internally through
direct influence of the local population and externally through indirect influence of the world
community facilitated by the ever present media.
4. The same skills required to defeat an enemy in a complex, modern urban

environment will also be required in other situations where the enemy makes use of mud
built houses or subterranean tunnels. Such skills demand a high level of training, all arms
co-operation and judicious and comprehensive use of all the resources available.
5. Non-combatants present a particular difficulty in urban warfare as operations are

likely to be fought amongst the civilian population. Their presence demands a variety of
additional skills and resources in order to gain their support and to prevent them from both
interfering with our own operations and providing willing or unwilling succour to the enemy.
6. Irregular opponents and complex terrain mean that engagements are often fought at
low levels with outcomes determined by initiative, resolution, firmness, skill, courage and,
above all, sound leadership.
1
The Land Warfare Centre working definition of hybrid warfare is, ‘Asymmetric strategies waged by
operationally integrated hybrid adversaries, adopting a broad range of modes of conflict1, methods in warfare1,
and types of technology/capabilities, whose tactically fused actions will usually be synchronised for strategic
effect, and which usually take place in a populated battlespace1 within complex terrain’.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-1-1
7. The high density of communication and information systems in the urban
environment favours the rapid and widespread dissemination of information. Information
and news will spread like wildfire, whether intended or not. This carries the risk that the
situation is misjudged by rumour or deliberately propagated misinformation and that,
consequently, wrong decisions are made.
8. The worldwide use of the English language and developed communications systems
of all sorts will enable even the most backward insurgent or enemy to interfere with
insecure communications systems and take advantage of poor voice procedure and
security. The insurgent is able, with currently available technology, instantaneously and
effectively to coordinate his operations, fires and activities against a conventional opponent
over a wide time and space continuum.
SECTION 2 – THE NATURE OF URBAN OPERATIONS
BACKGROUND
9. The UK should expect urban operations to be an integral and principal part of any
military campaign. In the final instance, military campaigns may well be won or lost in the
urban environment. Military operations require UK, coalition and allied forces to conduct a
range of activities right across the spectrum of operations, from Military Assistance to Civil
Effect (MACE), through Counter Insurgency (COIN) to Fighting in Built-Up Areas (FIBUA).
All these operations may take place predominantly in urban areas.
10. Contemporary operations have been characterized as being ‘...confronted by the

entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of
three adjacent city blocks’ – the ‘Three Block War’2. The concept of a ‘Three Block War’
relates to military operations of varying intensity taking place in close proximity to each
other. It demands the highest levels of professional collective and individual competence at
the same time as discipline, war-fighting skill, courage and leadership.
THE SPECTRUM OF OPERATIONS
11. General. The three principal land tactical activities are offensive, defensive and
stability operations3. Any and all of these activities could take place in built-up areas, and
the operational conduct of each will be affected by the urban environment. FIBUA is
attritional in nature, costly in casualties and involves large amounts of resources, time and
effort. Historically, the strategic advantage of the early and rapid seizure of ground led to
the operational military imperative to bypass built up areas. Sophisticated, long-range anti-
armour defence tended to be based in the forward edges of villages and the leading edges
of woods, designed to canalise armour into killing zones between towns and villages.
Consequently, there was little need to prepare for fighting in built up areas. Experience
over the last decades has shown that the advantage of conventional armed forces is largely
negated in the urban environment. The future operational environment will demand the
highest levels of skill on the part of all military forces to defeat his enemy who will often be
2
The ‘Three Block War’ was a concept devised by Gen Charles Krulak in the late 1990s to describe the
complex spectrum of challenges likely to be faced by soldiers on the modern battlefield. In three contiguous
city blocks soldiers may be required to conduct full scale military action, peacekeeping operations and
humanitarian relief.
3
Army Doctrine Publication, Land Operations, DGD&D, AC 71819.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-1-2
operating on his home territory while, if necessary, gaining and retaining the support of the
indigenous population.
12. Offensive Operations. Conventional operations in an urban environment heavily

favour the defence. Historical evidence4 suggests that to capture and hold a city the
attacker may require an advantage of 5:1 or 6:1. Three tactical concepts, Penetration,
Thrust and Saturation, should be considered for use in offensive operations.
a. Penetration. Urban penetration is designed for operations against clearly

defined objectives, either enemy or terrain, that can be secured, defended and
subsequently used as forward operating bases.
b. Thrust. Urban thrust is focused on attacking an enemy on a narrow axis

of advance. The thrust maximizes combat power at the point of the attack with a
view to upsetting the enemy balance, capturing ground and forcing the enemy to
withdraw.
c. Saturation. Urban saturation is a similar tactic to that used by police forces

responding to an emergency and requiring backup. The saturation concept
considers numerous fire teams or section-sized units operating in a dispersed, non-
contiguous fashion in the urban environment. As these units patrol their assigned
area, they have to be prepared to respond rapidly to calls for assistance by
neighbouring teams.
13. Defensive Operations. In large built-up areas, the concept of defensive operations
should be mobile and should exploit depth, with the defender concentrating on moving
forces from key terrain features or buildings to other similar features, to counter the main
enemy thrust and to maximise his weapons’ capabilities. Although the principles employed
are the same as for other defensive operations, the differences lie in the techniques
employed and the prioritisation and emphasis on essential features. These are:
a. To give early warning of the intention to defend a built-up area. This is

essential to enable the necessary pre-positioning of Combat Supplies and other
defence materiel.
b. When time permits, to ensure that planning for the defence is detailed and
centralised. Since most actions are conducted by small units, control is
decentralised. Detailed Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) will be
essential and has to include types of building construction, routes through and
around the battlefield, including underground systems, and civilian communications
facilities and utilities. The defence should seek to exploit the three dimensional
nature of urban operations.
14. Stability Operations. Stability operations are planned continuously and conducted
concurrently with offensive and defensive operations. They are defined as military
operations which contribute to order, security and control in order to set the conditions to
allow the primacy of non-military and indigenous organisations to develop accountable
institutions and mechanisms of government. These operations will include Peace Keeping,
Peace Enforcement, Conflict Prevention, Humanitarian Assistance, Irregular Warfare, Post-
Conflict Reconstruction and Non-Combatant Evacuation. The training requirements
4
Russian wars in Chechnya (Grozny) 1994, 2000.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-1-3
involved in the preparation for involvement in stability operations can be found in Army Field
Manual Volume 1, Part 9, ‘Tactics for Stability Operations’.
SECTION 3 – THE NATURE OF URBAN TERRAIN
15. Civilisation is in the middle of a surge of urbanisation with more than a dozen new
‘mega cities’ and slums having been established in the last two decades. One of Africa’s
largest slums is in Nairobi and is home to some 750,000 people. The population there is
growing by 5% each year and it is widely believed to be close to crisis. Municipal waste-
collection rates dropped from 90% in 1978 to 33% in 1998. When it rains, storm water
washes the accumulated waste into the water sources used by the poor. Yet Nairobi is not
exceptional by international standards. Conditions such as these are the main reason why,
every day, there occur about 6,000 deaths around the world from water-borne diseases.
Despite all this, people are moving to cities in droves. In 1950, two-thirds of the world’s
population lived in rural areas. New York City was then the only settlement with more than
ten million people. Today there are twenty such mega-cities and more are on the way.
Most of these mega-cities are in developing countries that are struggling to cope with both
the speed and the scale of human migration. Estimates of the future spread of urbanisation
are based on the observation that in Europe, and in the Americas, the urban share of the
total population has stabilised at 75-85%. If the rest of the world follows this path, it is
expected that in the course of the next decade an extra 100 million people will join the cities
of Africa and 340 million the cities of Asia – the equivalent of a new Bangkok every two
months. By 2030 it is estimated that nearly two-thirds of the world’s population will be living
in urban areas.
Fig A-1-1 The Surge of Urbanisation

Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-1-4
16. History also shows that the transition can be uncomfortable. The slums of
Manchester were, in their time, just as awful as those of Nairobi today. But people move
there for exactly the same reason; however nasty conditions seem, the opportunities of
urban life outstrip those of the countryside.
17. Some experts indicate that governments, international donors and aid agencies
spend too much on rural development and neglect the cities. Most states have a rural
development policy, but only a few have urban ones. Moreover, these experts point out
that, although rural areas often have worse sanitation, greater illiteracy and homelessness
than cities, such figures are deceptive. Being illiterate, homeless or without access to
unpolluted water are far more serious problems in a crowded city than in the countryside.
In many rapidly developing cities, the slums and shanty towns are growing twice as fast as
the whole city. Worldwide, more than one billion urban dwellers live in inadequate housing.
These neighbourhoods are characterised by newly arriving rural immigrants building
haphazard shanties on squatter plots. Such slums become epicentres of unrest, disease
and hunger and are focal points for aid relief and efforts to improve or demand change.
However, operations in these areas can be more difficult than in a high rise city centre due
to transient populations and temporary structures. The conditions in urban areas will give
rise to grievances and long standing rivalries and could well be the cause of future political
instability. It is reasonable to anticipate that future military operations, conventional or
otherwise, will have to focus more on undeveloped slums in and around major cities. Sadr
City in Baghdad is one example.
URBAN CHARACTERISTICS
18. Built-up areas are characterized by density of construction and population, street
patterns, compartmentalization, affluent and poor sections, modernization and the presence
of utility systems. The differences are in size, level of development and style. A typical
urban area consists of the following elements:
Fig A-1-2 Example of a Town Centre, Newry, Northern Ireland, 2006

Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-1-5
a. City Core. In most cities, the core has undergone more recent development
than the core periphery. As a result, the two regions are often quite different.
Typical city cores of today are made up of high-rise buildings which vary greatly in
height. Modern planning for built-up areas allows for more open spaces between
buildings than in old city cores or in core peripheries. Outlying high-rise areas are
dominated by this open construction style more than city cores.
b. Commercial Ribbon. Commercial ribbon development includes rows of

stores, shops and restaurants that are built along both sides of major streets through
built-up areas. Usually such streets are wide and open. The buildings are uniformly
two to three storeys tall – about one storey taller than the dwellings on the streets
behind them.
c. Core Periphery. The core periphery consists of streets with continuous

solidly constructed buildings.
d. Outlying Areas. Residential sprawl and outlying industrial areas consist of

low buildings that are normally detached and arranged in irregular patterns along the
streets with many open areas
Fig A-1-3 Residential Sprawl
e. Subterranean. It is not so easy to categorise the underground systems that

abound in cities and towns, and which provide an additional dimension to urban
operations. Most European houses have cellars, usually self-contained, which differ
with the type of building. Many towns have sewage systems or, less commonly,
conduits for electric or telephone cables which are large enough to permit passage of
troops. Some cities have underground railways or rivers. It is important to be aware
of the tactical implications of any underground systems.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-1-6

f. Historical City Centre. For towns, particularly the centre of towns or the
older parts of the town, the houses are normally closely packed with smaller streets
and open areas laid out in an irregular manner. Outside the town a more modern
and methodical layout can be assumed.
g. Villages. Most villages are small and compact, usually comprising a few
streets with one central street where any shops and offices may be situated.
Although there may be much open land around a village, within the village itself the
density of housing and construction could well be the same as for a town.
Fig A-1-4 Village of Mud Dwellings, Afghanistan
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-1-7

SECTION 4 - OTHER FACTORS IN BUILT UP AREAS
TERRAIN
19. Urban terrain is complicated. The

primary impact of urban terrain is that it limits
individual fields of view. A soldier in an
urban environment could find himself fighting
almost alone or with perhaps only one or two
other men from his section within sight. The
enemy could be 20 cm away behind a wall,
cognisant of his presence, or not. A family of
non-combatants could be similarly situated.
Movement is canalised by doors, stairways,
alleyways, streets, roads, walls and fences;
some provide protection, some do not. The
enemy could be in front of him, behind him,
above him or below him, and he will not
know. His sense of direction will be distorted
by the way the streets are laid out, and his
hearing will be affected by the noise of battle
echoed and distorted by buildings. The
sound of rifle shots will ricochet like the
rounds themselves and he will not know from where they were fired. He will not always be
able to see his commander or necessarily know where he is. Using his radio will frequently
be impossible and voice contact difficult, dangerous or pointless. The advantage will
always start with the defender who will know the ground better than his opponent, will have
prepared his fields of fire and obstacles and is at home in his warren.
20. Classic urban operations training has focused on the difficulties of fighting in first
world villages, towns and cities. The problems posed by the potential western urban
battlefield have been exacerbated by the growth of multi-story urban cores, residential,
commercial and industrial areas and subterranean levels. The contemporary urban
environment could also include the complete spectrum of habitation from large, un-
modernised towns crowded by small streets and alleyways, through underdeveloped slums
in and around rapidly developing cities, to mud huts and jungle villages.
21. Operating in built up areas is exacerbated by difficulties beyond war-fighting.

Inadequate housing in slums and shanty towns, neighbourhoods characterised by rural
immigration and by haphazard shanties on squatter plots will become epicentres of unrest,
disease and hunger. Even relatively low levels of damage to urban infrastructure can
cause serious problems to water supply, sewage disposal and to communication links. The
efficiency, health and survivability of the soldier as well as the non-combatant will all be
affected and threatened.
22. All arms fighting in built up areas is very likely to cause collateral damage. The
damage to buildings of all types will create difficulties for the movement of vehicles and
troops and can cause fundamental changes to the topography of the urban terrain. Rather
than enable the destruction of the enemy, our use of heavy and support weapons can
provide him with improved obstacles to conventional offensive military operations, with
cleared fields of fire and improved defensive protection. The nature of operations can
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-1-8

radically alter the terrain in a built-up area in a short period. Incidental or intentional
demolition of structures can change the topography of an area and destroy reference
points, create obstacles to mobility and provide additional defensive positions for defenders.
Fig A-1-5 High Rise Residential Area, Grozny, Chechnya
THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
23. Operations, especially those of an urban nature, are conducted amongst the people
and in the presence of the media. As well as providing the enemy with the chance to
reduce the technological advantage of his opponent and cause him significant casualties,
the urban environment allows the enemy to provoke mistakes by conventional forces
against the civilian population, such as over-reaction, collateral damage against their
homes, disruption of vital facilities, large-scale arrests and the break-up of families and
communities. Fighting in population centres gives give the enemy a chance to win the
battle for the “hearts and minds” of the non-combatant civilians. Moreover, objective and
subjective media reporting provides opportunities for the enemy to gain the initiative and
prevent his opponents from doing so.
24. The populations of large cities and towns throughout the world are dense and
complicated. Unlike rural inhabitants, discrete urban dwellers are permitted an anonymity
wherein they can foster a distorted view of the general good. Soldiers involved in urban
operations must understand the historical background and aspirations of the different
networks of the urban society in which they operate, be prepared to anticipate people’s
reaction to events and expect to be able exploit their knowledge by the way they operate.
25. Anonymity. In an urban environment the insurgent or terrorist can remain

anonymous. The urban environment can provide the home and background for the friends
and relations who can provide his cover. By using disguise or subterfuge, the enemy
combatant or foreign fighter can immerse himself into the indigenous population. Being
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-1-9

anonymous, the enemy can plan and conduct operations more easily and without risk of
compromise. He or she can undertake offensive actions for longer and more precisely than
in conventional warfare, often under direct view, but without the knowledge of the external
force.
26. Density of Population. The density of urban population increases the difficulty of
the identification of the foe, facilitates the initiation of terrorist actions, enables the use of
willing or unwilling human shields and makes atrocities more effective. The presence of
numerous civilians results in many becoming casualties, as a result of both the primary
effects of munitions and the secondary effects such as collapsing structures and flying
glass.
27. Information and Influence. The presence of the media in built up areas can be
exploited by the enemy. The enemy needs the oxygen of publicity to survive and win. The
effects of his actions can be disseminated rapidly around the globe in the presence of the
media. A clever enemy will also exploit the media to place his opponent in a bad light.
CIVILIANS
28. The term ‘civilian population’ refers to all civilians living in the area of operations who
are not members of the armed conflicting parties. It includes formal, informal, national and
international organisations and groups, as well as government and non-government
organisations. Neither the civilian population nor individuals uninvolved in combat can be
made the target of attack.
29. History has shown that people invariably will not or cannot leave the urban
environment even when it becomes the scene of intense military combat. The presence of
possibly large numbers of uninvolved people may thus be a characteristic feature of urban
operations, and tactics and operations must take account of this fact.
Fig A-1-8 Civilians
30. The attitude of the civilian population will have a decisive impact on the planning and
conduct of military operations.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-1-10

MAPPING AND DIGITAL MAPPING DATA
31. Conventional urban cartography will not necessarily provide sufficient detail,
currency or accuracy for an adequate terrain analysis of built-up areas. Consideration
should therefore be given to the use of intelligence gathering systems to get the best
information. Image maps are regularly produced along with some overlay information, such
as roads and key buildings in order to provide the most up to date mapping for urban
operations. However users should be aware of the disadvantages of imagery over
conventional mapping namely; loss of detail due to glare, shadow, vegetation and snow and
the potential displacement of buildings due to height.
32. Other than by the study of open source internet information, which may be out of
date or inaccurate, electronic intelligence-gathering systems will not always be able to
quickly capture information about the sewer, subway and underground water systems that
an enemy can use for individual and group infiltration and movement. The capacity and
capability of elevated railways and major transit routes to carry troops and vehicles will be
critical to operational planning. Knowledge about fuel and gas supply and storage facilities,
electric power stations and emergency systems, and mass communications facilities is
critical to the urban battle and there are country-wide infrastructure booklets available from
the Defence Intelligence Services (DIS) or other military sources.
33. Certain public buildings need to be identified during the Battlefield Area Evaluation
(BAE) phase of an IPB. Hospitals, clinics, surgical facilities, buildings that may pose a
RADIAC hazard and religious buildings will need to be treated according to the laws of war
and the rules of engagement. Public utilities, such as power stations and water processing
plants, must be identified and careful consideration given to whether or not they should be
targeted. Lack of water, for example, could well force population movement to seek
adequate supplies resulting in both hindrance to military operations and the distracting
requirement to avert humanitarian problems. The locations of civil defence facilities, such
as air raid shelters, and food supplies will similarly affect operations.
34. Public stadia, parks, sports fields, school playgrounds and other open areas will offer
all troops, in particular snipers, relatively good visibility of their targets and must be noted.
Such areas can also provide civilian holding areas, interrogation centres, insurgent
segregation areas and prisoner of war holding facilities. These open areas can provide the
opportunity for re-supply by air and consideration must be given to their protection from fire
and view.
35. Construction sites and commercial operations such as warehouses, building supply
depots and railway maintenance yards, can serve as primary sources of construction
materials when rubble is not present or insufficient.
36. Roads, rivers, streams and bridges can provide suitable avenues of movement.
Public baths, swimming facilities and cisterns are useful in providing bathing facilities. They
also provide an alternative water source in the event of the breakdown of public utilities.
WEATHER
37. Some consequences of weather effects are peculiar to an urban environment and
will affect tactical considerations.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-1-11

38. Precipitation.
a. Heavy precipitation can destroy roads, railways, bridges and other structures,
particularly those in close proximity to waterways.
b. Rain or melting snow can flood basements and subway systems. If automatic
pumping facilities that normally handle rising water levels are deprived of power,
storm drains and other sewer systems will become hazardous or impassable.
c. Chemical agents may be washed into underground systems by precipitation.

Systems may contain agent concentrations much higher than surface areas and
become contaminated ‘hot spots’. These effects become more pronounced as
agents are absorbed by permeable sewer walls.
39. Visibility.
a. Air inversion layers are common over low lying cities located in depressions or
in river valleys. Inversion layers trap dust, chemical agents and other pollutants,
reducing visibility, and also creating a rise in ground and air temperature.
b. Many large urban areas are located on rivers and river junctions. Rivers,
canals and waterways often create a potential for fog in the low lying areas.
40. Wind. The channelling of strong winds through city streets and their effect on high
rise buildings may present difficulties and have an adverse effect on the conduct of
operations.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-1-12

CHAPTER 2
SECTION 1 - URBAN COALITION OPERATIONS
“The requirement for successful military operations will remain based on skill, courage,
character and resources: but there is a new element, multinationality, which has more
potential, particularly in terms of human resource, than anything that preceded it.”
RUSI Journal, Apr 1996, “Partnership for Peace”,

Lt Col PJF Schofield RGJ.
COALITION OPERATIONS
1. UK urban operations may be conducted as part of an international response to a

crisis, under a UN mandate for example, as part of a formal military alliance such as NATO
or as a coalition of international partners. The UK could be in a leading role with other
nations’ forces OPCOM, OPCON or TACOM, or it might be subordinated to another nation
or multinational headquarters. A formation or battlegroup involved in such operations
should expect close military interaction at all levels with headquarters, commanders, staff,
units and sub-units from other nations. The danger and difficulty of fighting in the urban
environment may be exacerbated by the unfamiliar experience of such intercultural
reliance, and it is therefore vital that friction is minimised if all elements are to add value in
an optimal manner. This is best achieved by developing an understanding of the other
nations’ culture, doctrine and capabilities, preferably prior to deployment.
2. The following are general considerations for UK Forces operating with other nations:
a. Planning Practices. Superior HQs from other nations may expect planning
practices that UK commanders may find prescriptive or perhaps only partially useful.
Joint drills and planning procedures should be confirmed and rehearsed, and
acronyms explained and understood. Commanders should make personal
confirmation of the mission and execution of urban operations. There may be a
requirement for additional Reports and Returns and shared SOIs and SOPs.
b. The Chain of Command. Units attached to other nations during urban

operations may lack the support of an appropriate intermediate command and may
require higher HQ functions1. There may be no dedicated UK Legal Advisor.
National Political Caveats in urban operations may oblige units to adjust operational
plans at short notice. Headquarters’ establishments may have to be increased.
Consideration should be given to the use of liaison officers at appropriate levels of
command to improve operational situation awareness.
c. Rules of Engagement (ROE). ROE may vary between allies, affecting

tactics and operational procedures. Pre-operational agreements must include a
commonly understood ROE matrix.
d. Equipment Interoperability. Complete equipment interoperability is an

unrealistic aspiration. However, capabilities utilizing the electromagnetic spectrum
must at the very least avoid mutual interference, and should where possible offer a
1
For example in Joint Fires, expanded J2, J5, HUMINT, ISTAR, Battlespace Management, Targeting,
Logistics and Planning,
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-2-1
workable degree of interoperability. Where this is not possible, consideration must
be given to modifying or replacing existing equipment, or indeed procuring new
capabilities. The first priority for any headquarters acting within a coalition is to
ensure that there is IT and communications interoperability. Other areas that must
be considered include intelligence databases, ECM and force tracking systems.
e. ABCA2. Although not a formal alliance, the armies of ABCA nations have
served together on numerous occasions. The ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
(COH) provides general advice on coalition operations and specific guidance on
urban operations.
SECTION 2 - OPERATING UNDER US COMMAND
Fig A-2-1
US Task Force 2-2 Tactical Operation Centre, Fallujah 2004
3. In the case of major combat operations, strategic guidance3 states that the UK is to
be prepared to provide a combat division to work within a US corps. Similar but lower
levels of subordination might occur. The US Army has identified the generic military
capabilities needed to support the types of possible operational relationships between the
US and allied/coalition forces in urban operations. The list is not exhaustive4, but includes:
a. Integrated multinational command and control.
b. Interoperable communications and information systems.

2
An organization promoting interoperability between the armies of America, Britain, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand.
3
Defence Strategic Guidance, 2008.
4
Further detail can be sought from the US Army Multination Force Compatibility Concept and the US Army
International Activities Plan (AIAP).
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-2-2
c. Common situational awareness.
d. Collaborative planning.
e. Integrated coalition combat identification system.
f. Integrated battlespace management.
g. Exchange of intelligence and classified information.
4. When operating under US command in the urban environment UK elements should

request the appropriate levels of resources to achieve full interoperability. Units should
ensure:
a. Close and adequate integration in the superior headquarters.
b. Sufficient US representation in UK headquarters.
c. Passage of information and data exchange.
d. Understanding of the specialised use of information technology.
e. Exploitation of intelligence and ISTAR assets.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-2-3

CHAPTER 3
MILITARY INTERACTION WITH THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
SECTION 1 - THE STATUS OF CIVILIANS
THE PRESENCE OF CIVILIANS
1. The presence of civilians complicates the conduct of operations, and civilians

abound in urban areas. In many cases, people will not or cannot leave the urban
environment even when it becomes the scene of intense military conflict. Their presence
has a significant and not necessarily negative impact on the planning and conduct of
operations. For example, a commander should attempt to capitalize on their presence by
shaping their attitudes, but he may be constrained in his freedom of action by both his
mandatory obligations and any discretionary commitments in respect of their welfare and
benefits.
Fig A-3-1 Bloody Sunday, Londonderry, 30 January 1972
2. The term ‘civilian population’ refers primarily, but not exclusively, to the indigenous
inhabitants, but not only them. It also refers to all civilians present in the area of operations
who are not members of the armed conflicting parties. It includes formal, informal, national
and international organisations and groups as well as government and Non-Government
Organisations (NGOs). According to the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), neither the civilian
population nor individuals uninvolved in combat can be made the target of attack.
Fig A-3-2 Civilians in Grozny, 1999, 2000

Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-3-1
NON-COMBATANTS, PERSONS ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED FORCES AND
CIVILIANS ON THE BATTLEFIELD
3. Under the LOAC, some members of armed forces, such as medical personnel and
chaplains, are classified as non-combatants and do not have the right to take a direct part
in hostilities1.
4. Persons accompanying the armed forces with an identity card authorizing them to do
so are treated as PWs when captured. Examples are civilian members of military aircraft
crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units and personnel
manning service organisations responsible for the welfare of the armed forces2.
5. Civilian combatants who take up arms against an invading enemy force without time
to form regular armed forces (levée en masse) are entitled to PW status if they wear a
fixed, distinctive insignia that can be seen at a distance; carry their weapons openly; and
operate according to the rules and customs of warfare. Other civilians who provide
assistance to such groups may or may not be entitled to status as combatants, depending
on whether or not they are actually members of the resistance group. When dealing with
such individuals they should be treated as PW until a higher authority determines their
status.
6. Armed civilian groups that do not meet the criteria of a legal resistance as described
above, or individuals caught in the act of sabotage, terrorism, or espionage are not legal
combatants. If captured, they may be considered criminals under the provisions of the
LOAC. They are to be treated humanely and with respect, but should be interned in a
facility separate from that in which PWs are held. When possible, they should be
transferred to the local police as quickly as possible. Reprisals, mass punishments, taking
of hostages, corporal punishment, pillage and destruction are prohibited.
SECTION 2 - MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY
CIVIL OBLIGATIONS
7. General. The Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) staff and the Legal Advisor
(LEGAD) have the responsibility to advise the commander about his legal and moral
obligations to the civilian population. This requirement can be fulfilled by CIMIC staff
conducting coordination for the health and well being of civilians. It can include the re-
establishment of water systems, the distribution of available food stocks, clothing and
medical supplies and the establishment of displaced persons, refugee and evacuee camps.
If the civil government is not functioning, it is the commander’s responsibility to conduct
evacuation planning and to provide for the well being of the civilian population. He should
do this only with those internal assets already available.
8. Liaison. Liaison between CIMIC staff and, where sanctioned, Host Nation (HN)
government departments, promotes the conduct and success of urban operations.
9. Responsibilities. The primary responsibility of the CIMIC staff is the co-ordination

of activities necessary for the evacuation of civilians from the battle area. This is
accomplished in two separate but supporting actions:
1
JSP 383, Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, paragraph 4.2.2.
2
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoner of War (GC III), Art 4.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-3-2
a. CIMIC staff co-ordinate with the military police and, where present and
friendly, local police, in planning civilian evacuations. Such evacuations are, where
possible, geographically de-conflicted with military operations.
b. CIMIC staff co-ordinate with Psychological Operations (Psyops) staff, local

government officials, radio and television stations, newspapers and others, to
publicise the evacuation plan.
10. Relations with the Media. While free access by the media to units in the field is
desirable, operational security, existing guidelines and rules of engagement considerations
take first priority. All members of the media visiting the operational theatre must have an
escort officer. Ensuring that the media follows the established guidelines and understand
the rules of engagement will help prevent negative publicity that could jeopardize the
operation. Consideration should be given to units appointing a representative to serve as a
point of contact with the local population, in order to deal with their concerns.
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT CONSIDERATIONS
11. General. One of the main purposes of the LOAC is to protect civilians from the
effects of hostilities. Civilians may be reluctant or unable to leave their homes, and their
presence must be considered in the planning and conduct of urban operations. The impact
of civilians in the urban battlespace will affect:
a. Mobility. Refugees fleeing the urban area in numbers will cause blockages
on routes used or targeted by the military. Plans should be made to provide
alternative routes that will have to be broadcast, marked and controlled, although
there is no guarantee that the population will do what it is told. Help from any local
authorities should be sought.
b. Firepower. The principle of proportionality must guide the commander in his

planning decisions. The LOAC draws distinctions between military personnel and
their resources and civilians and their possessions, including their homes, religious
buildings and communities. Commanders must do everything possible to minimise
civilian casualties and minimise collateral damage caused to civilian property and
possessions. The presence of civilians will influence the choice of weapon systems
or munitions to achieve the necessary military effect as well as the designation of
no-fire and restricted-fire areas.
c. Protection. The types of defensive obstacles in the urban environment will

be limited by the presence of civilians. Minefields must be marked and guarded to
prevent unwitting entry by anyone3.
LEGAL ADVICE
12. Legal advice is offered to the formation commander through the Legal Advisor
(LEGAD) on his staff. The LEGAD provides support on operational law issues including
ROE, LOAC, use of force, and captured personnel. Additionally, the LEGAD will have an
understanding of host nation law and other policy guidelines that may apply.
3
The UK is a party to the Ottawa Convention 1997 and possession or use of anti-personnel landmines is prohibited.
The use of anti-tank mines is permitted in some cases. Minefields cannot be used to designate refugee routes.
(JSP 383 6.13 – 6.14).
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-3-3
LEGAL AUTHORITY
13. The limits of the authority of a commander must be understood. Where UK forces
are present in a state by virtue of an invitation from the government of that state,
the actions of the commander must fall within the mission mandate and not infringe the
sovereign powers of the government. When there is no ruling government, the authority of
the commander may reach further and will encompass the civil tasks that would otherwise
be met by the Host Nation government. A commander will need that degree of authority
necessary to accomplish his mission. A host government, where possible, remains
responsible for the safety and well-being of the civilian population.
14. Commanders at all levels are responsible for protecting civilians and their property to
the maximum extent possible. Looting, vandalism, excessive collateral damage and brutal
treatment of civilians are all strictly prohibited and individuals who commit such acts may be
in breach of the LOAC and military law. The religions and customs of the civilian
population must be treated with respect. Women, particularly, should be protected against
any form of abuse. Operations in built-up areas may result in complex situations that may
require further legal advice. Certain control measures such as road blocks, curfews,
escorts, buffer zones and no-go areas should be considered to ensure the safety and well
being of civilian communities.
15. Civilian property and possessions must be respected and not attacked. Private
property must be respected. The requirement to respect private property is subject to the
conditions of the conflict. For example, military operations inevitably cause damage to
private property. In some cases, forces are entitled to requisition property for necessary
military purposes. Still, the principle of respect is important. Moreover, specific guidance
should be issued for the procedures armed forces must follow if and when requisitioning is
considered necessary. A note detailing the use of or damage to civilian property should be
kept or given to the owner so that he has evidence of a claim if compensation for use or
damage becomes available. In some cases, use of homes or property requires that
payment be made. In some circumstances, an occupying force may requisition
commodities.
16. The presence of deployed troops should be under the authority of a politically
brokered mandate that will provide the force with legitimacy and define how it may conduct
operations.
17. The legal authority of the commander over civilian government officials and the
civilian populace must be determined rapidly. The host nation’s responsibility for its own
population can affect the commander’s authority in civil-military matters. In areas where
the local government’s authority is limited, the commander may be required to assume
greater responsibility for the safety and well being of the civilian population.
CONTROL MEASURES
18. A commander may enforce control measures to conduct operations, maintain

security, or to ensure the safety and well-being of the civilians, as follows:
a. Curfew. A commander defending a town could establish a curfew to maintain

security or to aid the control of military traffic. The curfew may not be imposed as a
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-3-4

punishment; it would not be legal. A curfew should be imposed through the offices
of the civilian authority, if present and effective.
b. Evacuation. If the purpose is to use buildings or quarters for operational

reasons, to enhance security or to safeguard civilians, the commander can require
the evacuation of civilians. If he does so, he must specify and safeguard the
evacuation route. Food, clothing and sanitary facilities should be provided at their
destination until the evacuees can provide for themselves.
c. Forced Labour. The LOAC prohibits the use of civilians in combat.

However, civilians can be used if the operational requirement demands it as long as
it is out of contact. Guidelines for the use of civilian labour should be published by
the appropriate formation commander after seeking higher authority. The
commander may oblige civilians over the age of 18 years to work, and permitted
jobs could include the maintenance of public utilities, so long as those utilities are
not used in the general conduct of operations. Jobs can also include services to the
local population such as care of the wounded and burial of the dead. Civilians can
be obliged to help evacuate and care for military wounded, so long as it does not
involve any physical danger. Prohibited jobs include digging entrenchments,
constructing fortifications, transporting supplies or acting as guards. Civilian
volunteers can, nevertheless, be employed in such work.
SECTION 3 - CIVILIAN FACTORS
“In June 2006, US Army and US Marine Corps units and elements of the Iraqi Army
commenced Operation Together Forward, the attack to regain coalition control over
Ramadi. Instead of a classical approach to urban warfare involving overwhelming use of
forces and firepower, Coalition Forces opted for an operational design built around the
concept: Clear-Hold-Build. Coalition forces attacked Ramadi from three sides (the fourth
being protected by a river). Along each axis of attack, the objective was fairly shallow – just
deep enough to establish a new Combat Outpost (COP). As soon as the COP was
established and security in place, efforts shifted to training and introducing Iraqi Police and
Army units. Additionally, Civil Military Operations Centers were introduced and local works
projects were begun. Once all of this had been initiated, Coalition Forces and Iraqi forces
would leave enough force behind to ensure continued security and would commence
another shallow attack where the process was repeated. Without a doubt this process
lasted longer than alternative approaches; however, the advantages were clear. The Iraqi
Police and Army were given as much responsibility as they could handle. This Iraqi face on
operations built confidence in Government of Iraq’s ability to provide security. Cleared
areas were held, instead of simply captured and then abandoned. This provided continuous
security throughout cleared parts of the city, and established the security backdrop that was
vital to enabling the reconstruction process to begin. Finally, a slower and more deliberate
approach, minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage, built civil support not only
for the operation, but for Coalition Forces”
US LTC Matthew J. Van Wagenen

1-37 AR Task Force, Ar Ramadi
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-3-5

LOCAL GOVERNMENT
19. The military may be required to undertake a range of civil administration tasks in
support of a weak host nation government, or in the absence of a working indigenous or
international administration. This is particularly likely to be the case in the immediate
aftermath of major combat operations, when the military may be the only organisation
capable of delivering governance.
20. Such tasks may range from CIMIC liaison to the establishment of an interim military
government and are likely to include some responsibility for the provision of essential
services.
21. The military should seek to hand responsibility for governance tasks to an
appropriate indigenous or international civil organisation at the earliest appropriate
opportunity. Its primary role will be to establish the environment in which civil agencies can
operate.
22. A close liaison and working relationship should be developed with local government
police and military forces. In addition to information on items of special interest, they may
provide information on the following:
a. The population
b. The density of the built-up area
c. Fire fighting capabilities
d. The location of hazardous materials
e. Security capabilities
f. Civil evacuation plans
g. Key public buildings.
They may also provide English interpreters.
23. Further advice about the provision of governance can be found in Army Field
Manual, Volume 1, Part 9, Tactics for Stability Operations.
FOOD
24. Rapid urbanisation in developing countries, including the wide-scale abandonment

of rural life and family farms combined with undeveloped and inefficient industrial urban
programmes and social infrastructure have frequently led to food shortages. The military
implications are significant. As well as being the cause of mass migration and instability,
food shortage leads to revolts and increased support for armed opposition groups.
25. Neutral, non-governmental organisations that supply food can be the target of armed
factions and deployed troops may be required to provide and maintain humanitarian and
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-3-6

food distribution networks. It could be the responsibility of deployed troops to provide life
support to populations who could be providing succour to their opponents.
DISEASE
26. Operating in the urban environment requires an efficient and comprehensive service
infrastructure to remain healthy and sound. It needs clean water, food supplies, sewage
and rubbish disposal, hospitals and the associated social infrastructure to counter disease
and function properly. In some areas the rapid growth in urbanisation has overtaken the
development of basic infrastructure such as the development and expansion of sewage
and water supply systems.
27. In many parts of the world, in overpopulated shanty towns, many even without toilet
facilities, thousands of people live cheek by jowl, thereby providing ideal conditions for the
transmission of airborne, waterborne and contact-transmission diseases. The problems
are exacerbated by rapidly increasing population size and the lack of social support
infrastructure. Troops deployed into urban areas are required not only to provide for their
own health needs, but may require the resources to provide basic and improved medical
support to the indigenous population. They need to do so as part of the operational
requirement, and as part of the tactical battle and strategic campaign to win over the
support (hearts, minds and bodies) of the people.
28. Maintaining the health and welfare of troops in an urban environment requires
planning, preparedness and good organisation and the maintenance of essential services.
Arrangements will have to be made for constant supplies of fresh water, effective sewage
and rubbish disposal and full time medical support. The same hygiene arrangements must
be made available to the indigenous population to achieve operational and strategic
campaign goals.
POLLUTION
29. Pollution can cause health and environmental problems. For example, cities in
China have recorded up to nine times the levels of sulphur dioxide in comparable
developed cities. Sub-surface land and water levels contaminated by toxic waste have
caused high levels of birth defects in babies. One of the responsibilities of a force deployed
into the urban environment will be to ensure its own protection and possibly that of the
civilian population, against the consequences of widespread pollution and associated
disease.
TOXIC WASTE4
30. Within an urban environment there is a particular threat from chemical, radiological
and biological toxic hazards. All those operating in such an environment must be mindful of
the implications of 'not knowing what is behind the wall'. Exposure to toxic chemicals may
come from natural sources or more likely from general industrial toxic waste. A military
force must be aware of the medical implications.
31. Environmental and Industrial Hazards (EIH) may have immediate or long term health
effects on personnel, as well as impacting on a commander's operational capability. Toxic
materials may be released through battle damage, accidents or terrorism.
4
See also Chapter 10, ‘All Arms Combat’, Paras 26-30.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-3-7
REFUGEES
32. The danger of operations in urban areas together with infrastructure damage is likely
to result in significant proportions of the civilian population fleeing to seek refuge
elsewhere. Such migrations may both interfere with the conduct of military operations and
create humanitarian problems en route and at any final destination.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-3-8

ANNEX A TO
PART A
TYPES OF BUILDING CONSTRUCTION
INTRODUCTION
1. Chapter One, Section 3, gives a broad description of the nature of urban terrain and
conurbations. This annex provides some structural information and factors that should be
considered when selecting buildings to be used in the prosecution of military operations. It
is intended to provide an overview for the all arms commander. More detailed technical
information can be found in Military Engineering, Pamphlet Number 2, Field Fortifications1.
2. The following descriptions and diagrams of buildings are intended to help

commanders identify the type of construction and their key characteristics. The table at the
end of this Annex2 provides generic information about building characteristics and advice
on their suitability for defence.
MASS CONSTRUCTION BUILDINGS
3. Mass construction buildings are those in which the outside walls support the weight of
the building and its contents. Additional support, especially in wide buildings, comes from
using load-bearing interior walls, strong points (called pilasters) on the exterior walls, cast-
iron interior columns, and arches or braces over the windows and doors. Modern types of
mass construction buildings are wall and slab structures such as many modern apartments
and hotels, and tilt-up structures commonly used for industry or storage. Mass construction
buildings are built in many ways:
a. The walls can be built in place using brick, block, or poured-in-place concrete.
b. The walls can be prefabricated and "tilt-up", or as panels.
c. The walls and roofs can be prefabricated and assembled like boxes.
Fig A-A-1 Mass Construction Buildings
1
Further advice about structures and fortifications is available from the Brigade Close Support Engineer
Regiment or Works Group RE
2
Building Types and Characteristics, taken from Military Engineering Vol 2, Pam 2
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 A-A-1
BUILDINGS BUILT WITH BRICK
4. Brick buildings are the most common and the most important of the mass construction
buildings. In Europe, brick buildings are commonly covered with a rendered finish so that
bricks do not show.
a. Small Shop. One of the most common uses of brick buildings is the small shop.
These buildings are found in all built-up areas but are most common at the edge of
any business and industrial area.
Fig A-A-2 Brick Buildings
b. Warehouse. A warehouse is another common mass construction building

usually situated in industrial areas and along commercial ribbons. It is normally built
of poured-in-place reinforced concrete or of prefabricated walls that are "tilt-up". The
walls of warehouses provide good cover, although the roof is vulnerable. These
buildings are built on slabs, which can normally support the weight of vehicles. The
wide doors and entrances can provide excellent cover and concealment for tanks.
Fig A-A-3 Warehouse
c. Public Gathering Places. Public gathering places (churches, stadiums) are

mass-construction buildings with large, open interiors. The walls provide good cover,

but the roof does not. The interior walls are not load-bearing and are normally easy to
breach or remove. Public gathering places are most common in the centre and edge
of cities, residential, and outlying high-rise areas.
Fig A-A-4 Public Places
FRAMED BUILDINGS
5. Framed buildings are supported by a skeleton of columns and beams and are usually
taller than frameless buildings and the exterior walls are not load-bearing. These are often
referred to as clad buildings. There are three main types:
Fig A-A-5 Light Structured Framed Buildings
a. Heavy Clad Framed Buildings. The walls of heavy clad buildings are made of
brick and block that are sometimes almost as thick as frameless brick walls, although
not as protective. Heavy clad framed buildings are found in the centre and edge of
large cities and towns. They can be recognized by a classic style or architecture in
which each building is designed with three sections the pediment, shaft, and capital.
Unlike the brick building, the walls are the same thickness on all floors, and the
windows are set at the same depth throughout. Often the frame members (the
columns) can be seen, especially at the ground floor. The cladding, consisting of

layers of terra cotta blocks, brick, and stone veneer, does not provide as good a cover
as the walls of brick buildings. It provides some protection against small-arms fire and
light shrapnel fragments but does not withstand fire from heavy weapons.
(1) The floor plans of these buildings depend upon their functions. Office
buildings normally have small offices surrounding an interior hall.
(2) Department stores normally have large, open interiors. Often there is a
mezzanine level within the store. Steel fire doors often exist between sections of
the store. The steel fire doors are normally activated by heat. Once closed, they
are difficult to breach or force open, but they effectively divide the store into
sections.
(3) Another type of heavy clad framed building is used as a high-rise factory.
Such buildings are normally easily recognized because the concrete beams and
columns are visible from the outside. They are usually located in older industrial
areas. Because the floors are often made to support heavy machinery this
building provides good overhead cover.
Fig A-A-6 Heavy Clad Framed Building

Fig A-A-7 Heavy Clad Framed Department Store
b. Light Clad Buildings. Light clad buildings are modern buildings constructed
mostly of glass. Most framed buildings built in recent years are light clad buildings.
They are found in both core and outlying high-rise regions. Their walls consist of a
thin layer of brick, lightweight concrete, or glass. Such materials provide minimal
protection against any weapon. However, the floors of the buildings are much heavier
and provide moderate overhead cover. The rooms in light clad framed buildings are
much bigger than those in heavy clad; buildings also usually stand detached from
other buildings. The interior partitions are thin, light, and easy to breach.
Fig A-A-8 Light Clad Framed Building
c. Multi Storey Car Park. A building in the urban area where all floors can support
vehicles. Multi storey car parks are normally high enough to provide a 360-degree
field of fire for Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) weapons.

Fig A-A-9 Multi Storey Car Park
FLOOR PLANS
6. Floor plans in buildings follow predictable patterns. One of the factors that will
determine a floor plan is the building shape. The basic principle governing building shape
is that rooms normally have access to outside light. This principle helps to determine the
floor plans of large buildings.
Fig A-A-10 Building Shapes and Sizes
RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS
7. In cities with European influence houses are normally mass construction brick
buildings interspersed with tall concrete apartment buildings.
8. Rural buildings in North and South America, and south-east Asia are commonly made
of wood. In continental Europe, southwest Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, where wood is

extremely scarce, rural buildings are normally constructed of concrete blocks.
9. In the Middle East and tropical regions, the most common housing is the enclosed
courtyard. Houses are added one to another with little regard to the street pattern. The
result is a crooked, narrow maze, which is harder to move through or to operate vehicles
and weapons.
Fig A-A-11 Enclosed Courtyard
BUILDING TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS
10. Certain characteristics of both mass construction and framed buildings can be
helpful in analysing a built-up area. Details are shown below3:
Ser Construction Examples Characteristics Recommendation

(a) (b) © (d) (e)
1 Post and Old farm houses, Weak walls and timber rafters Avoid where
Frame cottages offering no frontal protection. Stone possible.
or brick outer infill. Studded partition
interior walls. High fire risk. Sway
reinforcement probably necessary.
2 Masonry Town halls, banks, Probably solid walls. Usually two to Usually a good
chateaux and large four storeys high with wooden floor choice if not
manor houses. joists, but banks may have solid isolated.
floors. Thickness of walls diminishes
with height. Possible fire hazard.
Floors may require props. Movement
within buildings invariably easy.
Resistance to sway governed by
location of interior walls.
3 Good quality Detached or semi- Buildings probably have cavity walls Good choice.
brick or detached houses. and may have reinforced concrete
concrete block. floors. Small fire risk. Sandbags
needed to provide full protection.
Party walls provide some resistance
to sway. Props needed if floors have
timber joists.
4 Low quality Terraced houses, Buildings easily demolished by direct Avoid unless cellars
brick shops. fire weapons. Medium fire hazard. can be used.
Walls offer little protection, but shops
may have cellars.
3
Taken from Military Engineering Volume II Pamphlet No 2 Field Fortifications, Chapter 8
5 Large Type A – Modern Solid concrete or steel frame A possible choice if
commercial department stores, buildings with strong floors but walls protection can be
factories or may be weak, frequently with large achieved.
commercial offices windows. Difficult to collapse building
and frame resistant to sway. Likely to
have cellars. Movement within
building easy. Low fire risk.
Type B – Older Strong walls and floors. Fire hazard Good choice.
department stores low to medium dependent on type of
and commercial floor. Walls give good protection but
premises additional sandbags desirable.
Internal movement relatively easy.
6 Medium/high Type A – Offices Large windows, frame construction, Possible choice if
rise concrete reinforced concrete floors, weak protection can be
block walls. Probably low fire risk. Difficult achieved.
construction to collapse building but walls and
windows offer no protection.
Movement between floors usually
difficult. Tall buildings conspicuous.
Probably have cellars.
Type B – Small windows, reinforced concrete Possible choice.
Apartments. load-bearing outside walls. Probably
good protection, but movement
between floors probably difficult.
Usually low fire risk. Tall buildings
usually surrounded by open space
with lack of covered routes for
removal of casualties etc.
Note: Some apartment blocks have Poor choice.

prefabricated walls and are prone to
vertical collapse. Difficult to identify.
7 Single floor Warehouses and Usually steel or reinforced concrete Of little value
industrial single floor frame construction with brick or lightly without substantial
factories. clad walls. Little overhead or frontal protective work, but
protection unless there are they provide cover
substantial dwarf walls, but floors are from view.
usually strong.
11. The table above describes the construction and materials used in industrialised and
developed areas. It should be noted that construction standards are variable in less well
developed or regulated areas and, even if a structure appears to fit into one of the
categories described in the table, caution should be exercised where there is any doubt
about the quality of construction or materials used. There is always potential for
unexpected and catastrophic collapse.

URBAN OPERATIONS
PART B
FIGHTING THE URBAN BATTLE
Issue 4.0: Oct 09

CHAPTER 4
PREPARING FOR THE URBAN BATTLE
SECTION 1 - OPERATIONAL PLANNING
“In one moment of time, our serving members will be feeding and clothing displaced
refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two
warring tribes apart – conducting peacekeeping operations – and, finally, they will fighting a
highly lethal mid-intensity battle – all on the same day…all within three blocks.”
General Charles C Krulak, USMC
Fig B-4-1 The Three Block War, UNPROFOR, Former Yugoslavia 1993
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
1. Operations in the urban environment are an integral part of any military deployment
or posture and cannot be viewed in isolation. The need to fight in built-up areas will be
dictated by the strategic and operational requirements, the commander's intentions, and the
apparent intentions of the enemy. The urban environment has certain implications for
operational planning.
a. Offensive Operations. Planning for offensive operations must assume that

fighting will take place in the parts of built-up areas where people live. These urban
areas, from small rural hamlets to large, modern cities may be of tactical, operational
or strategic importance. They may encompass the infrastructure of government,
communications centres, transit routes or industrial or logistic facilities. They may
include centres of population that need to be defended and protected against an
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-1

insurgency that aims to use them for malevolent purpose. During any offensive
operation, plans will need to be made to capture, clear or neutralise built up areas.
b. Defensive Operations. The defence of an urban area can be made either to

deflect an enemy advance into killing areas between urban areas or to draw the
enemy into the urban environment in order to wear him down by attrition and delay.
The concealment and protection afforded by towns and villages confer considerable
advantages to the defender. Built-up areas may canalise enemy armour into open
country where it becomes vulnerable to flank fire from the edges of the built-up areas.
This may disrupt an enemy force requiring it to carry out repeated fixing or clearance
operations. In close country the judicious use of built-up areas by the defender, in
conjunction with other obstacles, can block and delay the enemy advance by forcing
him to undertake lengthy and costly clearance operations. The nature of built-up
areas makes them suitable for delaying operations although the potential for becoming
fixed, isolated or decisively engaged should not be underestimated. Small forces can
hinder the tactical movement of much larger forces and ultimately may be able to
trade less space for time than in open country.
c. Large Town and City Fighting. Large built-up areas pose difficult problems
for attacker and defender alike. Their size, density, and complexity will require large
numbers of troops and significant time for preparation neither of which may be
available. Large towns and cities cannot be disregarded, however, since they may
offer good transit routes or protection which is denied in open country, or they may be
strategically significant.
d. Stability Operations. In addition to delivering the kinetic effect traditionally

associated with military activity, there will be a requirement to influence the
perceptions and attitudes through influence activity. Military operations may be multi-
tasked and troops may be conducting stability operations alongside colleagues
involved in conventional military operations. Stability operations will take place
amongst the people and be conducted within the urban environment.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNING
2. The urban environment has implications for command nodes at every level. The
more limited capacity for surveillance and target acquisition, the presence of non-
combatants, the requirement for increased intelligence capture and force protection,
difficulties with communications, the fleeting nature of targets and limited engagement
opportunities will provide additional challenges to headquarters.
3. Consideration should be given to enhancing the resources for headquarters nodes at

battlegroup level and below to include assets responsible for:
a. ISTAR. ISTAR devices can provide useful information if it can be gathered,

collated and appropriately disseminated rapidly and laterally. The information
provided by UAV, air, aviation and technical and close observation sources should
be organised, prioritised and rapidly disseminated. The volume of data can be
increased during coalition operations.
b. Human Terrain Mapping. Intelligence gathering in the urban environment

and particularly in the context of hybrid war is critical to operational success.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-2

People-centric intelligence based on human terrain mapping, including information
about tribal dynamics, indigenous social and caste behaviour, work and social
routines and politics should be gathered, recorded and passed quickly to the levels
that need it.
c. Influence Activities. Close quarter fighting is a psychologically charged

activity that affects all sides, and can be exploited for advantage.
(1) The successful tactics of the Chechen insurgents in Chechnya in 19991

had a major effect on the self-confidence of the conventional Russian forces,
and consequently on the tactics of the Russian commanders. When Hamas
in 2008 manipulated images of the Israeli invasion of Gaza for international
media consumption, their propaganda successfully affected the operational
battle by limiting the types of operation the IDF2 could undertake. At the
strategic level, potential casualty lists may have consequences for each level
of urban fighting.
(2) The co-ordination of Media, CIMIC and Information3 operations

(“Influence Activities”) supports the execution of conventional military
operations through the following:
(a) Shaping the presentation of the conflict.
(b) Isolating the opposition from positive or supportive local and

international opinion.
(c) Offensive operations (PSYOPS, Media, EW, CNO).
(d) Defensive activity.
(e) Exploiting psychological and media opportunities.
d. Fires. Owing to the presence of non-combatants, the need to provide

protection to civilians and the possibility of fratricide, the integration and
management of the three-dimensional battle-space in the urban environment
requires enhanced control.
e. Soldiers-First. The all-round threat in urban environment requires the

preparation of soldiers from all arms to be prepared to fight to achieve their primary
task, be it repair, equipment maintenance, resupply or other duties. Consideration
should be given to the preparation and training for urban combat of all troops
involved in urban operations.
1
Russian armoured columns attempting to penetrate Grozny were ambushed, sealed and destroyed, with
substantial loss of life.
2
Israeli Defence Forces.
3
Including PSYOPS, EW, Deception, Key Leader Engagement (KLE), Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP)
and Computer Network (CNO) operations.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-3
THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH TO OPERATIONS IN URBAN AREAS
4. The nature of built-up areas restricts tactical movement and operations may
necessarily develop into a series of low-level tactical engagements. Offensive momentum
can easily be lost and an operation may develop into a battle of attrition. Attritional
operations prove costly in time, casualties and resources. While this may be necessary or
unavoidable at some stages of an operation, planning should be guided by a manoeuvrist
approach to such operations.
INFORMATION
5. The collection of detailed and accurate information, and the intelligence produced as
a result, is more complex in urban operations than for operations in any other environment.
There has to be a detailed collection plan and co-ordinated collection effort both before and
during the operation. The information gathered should then be incorporated into a
comprehensive IPB, and continually monitored and amended as the operational situation
dictates.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6. The attacking force should have a superiority of at the very least 3:1 in order to
overcome the advantages of the defence. The defender will have greater local knowledge
of the terrain. He will have made his defensive plans around the nature of the urban
infrastructure in which he chooses to fight. He will try to limit by every means at his
disposal the information gathering capability of his opponent. He will site his killing areas
around structures that limit the flexibility of the attacker. To gain the initiative over the
defence, the attacking force should always use its combat power to seize objectives that
reduce or negate the capacity of the defence to continue to fight. This should be done by
coordination of direct and indirect fire and the strict synchronization of the movement of
every element involved in the attack. The attacker must gain and retain the initiative as
early as he can. He must dictate the tempo of operations. As well as being systematic in
his approach to the capture and retention of key ground and to his destruction of the enemy
and his ability to fight, the attacker must be prepared to exploit any and every weaknesses
in the defensive plan. He must risk bypassing enemy locations in order to secure key
objectives and all troops involved in the operation should expect to have to fight in all
directions as the operation progresses. The use of deception will give the attacker
advantage at every stage of the operation. The infantry should provide the majority of the
troops involved in any urban operation, but plans must make use of every soldier from
every arm and every available weapon system to achieve the commander’s aim.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
7. As in every other defensive operation, urban defence must be aggressive.

Wherever possible, the battle should be taken to the attacker. The attacker’s options
should always be limited by the actions and the initiative of the defence. The defender
should seek to destroy the cohesion of each attack force. The attacker will be unsure of his
ground. He will be uncertain of what and whom he is facing, and he will be afraid. This
weakness, like every other, should be exploited by the defence. The defence must not
allow the attacker to retain the initiative. Defence should be conducted using a combined
arms force and every weapon and soldier available. The defence should seek to exploit
the advantage of his intimate knowledge of the built-up area to delay and disrupt the attack
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-4

with highly mobile forces able to move rapidly from one part of the battlefield to another.
The defender should aim to surprise his enemy, to ambush him where he does not expect
it. He should channel enemy forces into killing areas dominated by strong points where the
defence maintains the initiative, freedom of movement and local superiority in firepower.
Maximum use should be made of reserves, particularly during the later stages of the
operation. Small and comparatively lightly armed and equipped forces in defensive
operations can be singularly effective, can impose delay and can causing significant
numbers of casualties on significantly larger forces. The employment of local counter
attacks, ambushes and determined attempts to re-occupy previous defensive locations will
be effective ways to discomfort, confuse and disorientate the enemy.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
8. Urban operations of any type will create increased demands for resources,
ammunition, engineer stores and large numbers of specialist stores. There will be a
likelihood of high casualty rates and high ammunition expenditure that will require
additional planning, production and issue. Additional resources may be required to
reinforce and expedite existing casualty evacuation and improve ammunition re-supply
chains. Re-supply points for all natures may need to be much closer to the forward
elements than would otherwise be the case.
ORGANISATION
9. Combat in urban terrain can have implications for the command organisation at unit
and sub-unit level. Consideration should be given to the increment of intelligence staff at
sub-unit level as a result of the increased intelligence requirements for all urban operations.
It can also be considered at platoon level in the case of detached platoons. The increased
collation and planning requirements for stability, and particularly COIN, operations may also
need to be reflected in incremental change.
10. The need to organise urban combat along ‘all arms groupings’ requires the
reorganisation of platoons and companies to be able to fight independently and with the
capacity to use every arm and tool at its disposal. There is a need to include engineer,
support weapons, air and indirect fire control and interpreter facilities at platoon level and
below to enable mission-orientated groupings
COMMAND AND CONTROL
11. Urban combat is a particularly confusing form of combat where the commander’s will
is not always straightforward to execute. The commander will need to take advantage of
every opportunity to unbalance the enemy and it is imperative that the intention of the
overall commander is clearly understood by every soldier at every level, and that, if
possible, the outcome of each small, low-level tactical engagements conform to his plan.
12. Retention of the initiative will be a defining factor in the success, or not, of all urban
combat. Once the commander’s parameters are decided, defined and promulgated,
subordinates can be give as much freedom of action and, if possible, time, to achieve their
tasks.
13. In order to provide and encourage the maximum amount of freedom of action to his
subordinates (and thereby extend his influence over the battlefield), the commander should
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-5

provide the best possible system of immediate communication and situational awareness to
all. Urban operations can create increased difficulty to communications and may require
significantly more communications assets to overcome limitations on range than would
normally be required.
OTHER OPERATIONAL FACTORS
14. Built-up areas are often hubs of road and rail networks. Roads and rail are needed
as axes for movement and lines of communication. There are thus likely to be
circumstances when it will be necessary to retain or regain control of built-up areas in order
to dominate the transport infrastructure. Furthermore these areas often contain valuable
economic installations and large numbers of workers. They may therefore be regarded as
areas of strategic importance.
15. Whether attacking or defending, a large number of dismounted infantry are required.
If a built-up area is defended, it may be preferable to an attacker to bypass or encircle it
rather than become engaged in the task of capturing the area. Operational imperatives will
determine whether this is either necessary or possible
16. A built-up area which can easily be avoided has little defensive value though it may
have a channelling effect. A built-up area is usually only worth defending if it will oblige the
enemy to make a time-consuming manoeuvre to bypass it. The decision to defend an
urban area will involve the use of a significant number of troops for a considerable amount
of time and will place the indigenous civilian population at threat.
GUIDELINES
17. All operational and tactical planning for urban combat, at every level, should include
reference to the points below:
a. Simple Plan. Fighting in urban areas is particularly difficult to control, and

communication is likely to be difficult. A simple and flexible but thorough plan that
exploits the benefits of mission command is therefore essential.
b. Thoroughness. Fighting in the urban environment is multi-dimensional: the

enemy will be in sewers, in rooms, along streets and on rooftops. Absolute care
must be taken to clear and secure all areas as they are captured in order to prevent
re-infiltration and counter-attack.
c. Momentum. Urban operations are characterised by brutal, high intensity

combat. In every type of urban operation commanders must ensure that the
relentless pressure is maintained on an enemy who is never allowed to retain or
regain the initiative.
d. Fires. Within the imposed operational constraints of collateral damage and

ammunition resupply and availability, maximum use should be made of all available
firepower, munitions and weapon systems.
e. Deception. In urban areas, deception is a particularly useful means of

confusing the enemy and its use should be encouraged at all levels.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-6

SECTION 2 - INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE
WITHIN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
‘Failures in intelligence preparation meant that the 6,000 Russian force attempting to
penetrate the city was fighting an enemy far better prepared for a defensive battle, and
much larger than expected. Within the first few hours of battle, Russian units were trapped
in the streets, their armoured vehicles destroyed by enemy troops shooting from upper and
lower stories of buildings that main tank guns could not engage. As happened 50 years
before in Berlin, entire tank columns were effectively paralyzed by the immobilisation of the
lead and tail vehicles. Russian troops unwittingly collaborated in the destruction by
remaining in the APCs, mistakenly believing that they were safer in their armoured vehicles
that out.’
Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994-2000

Lessons from Urban Combat, Rand
Fig B-4-2 Russian BMP1P, Grozny
INTRODUCTION
18. The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)4 process within an urban
environment broadly follows that for any operational planning, although several factors
require further consideration. This section is not an explanation of the IPB process, but
rather it outlines some of the considerations for conducting IPB in support of urban
operations.
GENERAL
19. The continuing growth of built-up areas around the world increases the likelihood of
conducting the full spectrum of operations within complex urban environments. As with any
IPB, the initial stage of the process graphically records the results of the Intelligence
Estimate, including; analysis of the ground, the adversary, most likely and most dangerous
courses of action and indicate where friendly forces may best target adversary weakness.
4
Details of the IPB process are outlined in AFM Vol 1 Part 8 Command and Staff Procedures Chapter 3
Annex A.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-7
IPB WITHIN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
20. The urban environment is viewed by many hostile factions as a means to negate the
technological and firepower advantage of a sophisticated army. Any future conflict is likely
to have a significant urban dynamic. It will increasingly be important to maintain the social,
economic and political institutions almost simultaneously in order to maintain a degree of
stability. Intelligence support to the IPB process is not doctrinally different to any other
environment, there are simply different considerations and potentially larger volumes of
data to be managed operating within a complex environment5. The three distinguishing
characteristics of the urban environment are: terrain, society and infrastructure.
Fig B-4-3 Russian Soldiers Patrolling through Grozny, 1999
BATTLESPACE AREA EVALUATION6
21. Mobility Corridors. Urban areas are often considered restricted or severely
restricted for any manoeuvring unit, especially armoured and some mechanised formations.
However some urban operations will require certain mechanised and armoured elements to
operate within the confines of an urban environment. Outside of conventional high intensity
operations the ability of an adversary to move around within an urban area using a
predetermined Mobility Corridor (MC) must be considered in terms outlined below in the
terrain analysis section.
22. Avenues of Approach. While units may be unable to deploy in a conventional

tactical formation, an urban Avenue of Approach (AA) should not be discounted in the first
instance. The option of a conventional adversary conducting manoeuvre operations within
an urban environment should always be considered in terms of capability (both fire power
5
The 4 stages of the IPB process are Battlespace Area Evaluation (BAE), Threat Evaluation (TE), Threat
Integration(TI) and Decision Support is the from of the Decision Support Overlay (DSO).
6
BAE outputs are Mobility Corridors/Avenues of Approach, Terrain Analysis and Weather Analysis.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-8
and mobility) and nature of the urban terrain. When friendly forces are conducting a
Counter-Insurgency (COIN) or Peace Support Operation (PSO) an adversary is likely to be
operating as an irregular force and as such the considerations for MC and AA will be
potentially different. The aggregation of adjacent and adjoining MCs may determine
primary routes and direction of threat that may be deemed an AA.
23. Terrain Analysis. The specific type of urban area must be considered. Density,
layout, pattern and construction type can have significant effects on survivability, Command
and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) efforts. For
example, buildings may collapse or whole city blocks may be destroyed or burned down,
leaving only rubble. These effects can be tactically significant, as some terrain features will
significantly change and fields of fire will open and close. The output outlines the effect of
the urban environment on both friendly and enemy operations. This analysis should inform
the commander how the adversary may use the ground to best advantage. When
considering urban terrain it is necessary to adopt a more lateral approach to the
determination of MC and AA. A three-dimensional approach should be adopted. The
following list is by no means definitive or exhaustive:
a. Surface.
(1) Road.
(2) Railways.
(3) Tram.
b. Sub-Surface.
(1) Impassable.
(2) Negotiable – walking.
(3) Negotiable – crawling.
c. Above-Surface.
(1) Interior – rooms, stairwells, lifts, and internal utilities ducting.
(2) Exterior – walkways, fire escapes, tiered structures.
A major consideration is the obstruction to movement within the urban environment. Any
obstruction, whether man made or as a result of destruction of the infrastructure, will
canalise movement. An understanding of the land use will outline some mobility
considerations for both adversary and friendly forces.
24. Analysis of the Society. Operations within an urban environment are likely to
involve a large number of non-combatants. The increased likelihood of any future operation
having a significant urban dynamic requires all soldiers to have a level of cultural
awareness. Intelligence Staffs with a higher level of knowledge and sound cultural
understanding will deliver better results from IPB. A greater understanding will assist the
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-9

IPB process, reduce cultural bias and provide a degree of decision support to the
commander. Such considerations are:
a. History, Culture and Social Structure. An understanding of the local

population and the origin and development of the dominant culture in the region can
give an insight into likely adversary activity. Fundamental to this is attempting to
identify key leaders (tribal, political, religious and economic) for subsequent
engagement. An understanding of the local culture, customs, politics and religion
combined with a level of understanding of the social structure will assist in
assessments of likely civilian population reaction to military activity.
b. Population Density, Ethnic Mix, Economic Situation and Education. An

understanding of such factors can highlight possible targets for Ops Support and
provide an indication of the likelihood of certain Ops Support functions being
successful. Knowledge of the urban population dynamic is likely to give an indication
of the possible Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPRE) that may immediately
impact friendly forces.
25. Analysis of the Urban Infrastructure. Within the urban environment the
infrastructure is likely to be a key consideration. Such infrastructure has significant
implications for the mobility of ground, aviation and air assets as well as sustaining the
indigenous population. Analysis of the infrastructure will also indicate possible Toxic
Industrial Hazard (TIH). Areas for consideration include:
a. Transport networks including road, rail, bridges, ports and harbours.
b. Communications networks including radio, TV and telephone networks such

as landline and mobile options.
c. Urban fuel supplies including coal, oil and gas.
d. Water supply.
e. Waste disposal.
f. Medical facilities, including the maintenance of the indigenous capabilities.
g. A nuclear power plant or commercial chemical installation.
26. Weather Analysis. Within any environment analysis of the weather provides
implications for both air and ground operations. Weather can impose considerable
restrictions on sensors and certain manoeuvre elements. The output is the production of
the weather overlay. An example within the urban environment could be the impact of
rainfall and subsequent runoff rendering tunnels as severely restricted terrain.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-10

THREAT EVALUATION
27. Threat Evaluation (TE)7 is the definition of the enemy capability, unconstrained by
the effect of the environment. The threat within an urban environment can be more difficult
to define. Due to the large civilian population the threat spectrum can range from
conventional to hostile irregular forces, criminal elements and political movements and
demonstrations. Conventional forces are likely to conform to an urban doctrine template
utilising known weapon systems. However, irregular forces operating within an urban
environment are unlikely to follow a template and the Threat Evaluation will depend on the
specific adversary and urban area. Such threats could include sabotage, subversion and
even theft. As with any IPB, the threat will require continual review for each assessed
adversary in order to develop a recognised modus operandi (MO).
THREAT INTEGRATION8
28. Similar to the terrain considerations, the threat within the urban environment is 3-
dimensional and due to the possible nature of the adversary, multi-faceted, from high
intensity conventional urban operations to lower intensity COIN or PSOs. The constraints
of the battlespace on the adversary tactics and likely deployments will outline a Most Likely
(ML) and Most Dangerous (MD) COA.
DECISION SUPPORT OVERLAY
29. The end product of IPB, the Decision Support Overlay (DSO) remains a graphical
display of the commander’s plan based on the assessed threat COA. Production of the
DSO within the urban battlespace provides the same outputs; where the enemy should be
targeted by direct fire, indirect fire, air, aviation and engineer assets in order to achieve a
desired affect in time and space. It is based on both friendly and assessed enemy
timelines. It is important to also consider the impact of non-kinetic effects within the three-
dimensional urban battlespace.
INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
30. Urban areas impose considerable constraints on certain collection assets. The full
spectrum of collection capability from National to Tactical assets can be deployed to good
effect in order to answer intelligence questions within the urban battlespace. The individual
representatives from each of the following disciplines will be able to best advise on the
capabilities including; human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence including
geospatial intelligence (IMINT/GEOINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and
signature intelligence (MASINT), counter-intelligence (CI) and open-source intelligence
(OSINT).
7
Threat Evaluation is an understanding of the enemy capability, tactics and vulnerabilities. Outputs are:
Doctrine Template, High Value Target List (HVTL), Operational Situation Data, Organisational Charts, and
Threat Evaluation.
8
Threat Integration develops likely enemy Coarse of Action (COA) and attempts to identify activities that when
observed will confirm or deny a particular COA the enemy commander may have chosen. Outputs are:
COAs, Event Overlay, Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), and recommendations for the ISTAR plan
and Situational Overlay.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-11
SECTION 3 - INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLEANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION AND
RECONNAISSANCE
ISTAR IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
31. The Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)

capability provides timely and actionable information to support the commander and the
decision making process. UK doctrine states that operations should be intelligence-led; the
ISTAR process builds on the Intelligence Cycle9 with practices and procedures designed to
harness the capability of the collection assets. The information gathered, assembled and
collated at HQ level will provide the intelligence critical to the planning and conduct of
successful military operations. At the basic, but frequently the most productive, level ISTAR
is provided to the commander through the eyes and ears of his soldiers. In conventional
operations, battalion resources will include the reconnaissance platoon with its specialised
vehicles, training and equipment. In certain environments, information can be gathered
through covert operations and close observation techniques.
32. It is critical that commanders at all levels understand the type, quantity and
capabilities of the ISTAR assets available to them, and should understand:
a. How ISTAR works within formations.
b. Who is responsible for conducting ISTAR.
c. What products are available and how to bid for them.
d. ISTAR collection effects.
33. The nature of the urban environment can render reconnaissance, surveillance and
intelligence and target acquisition problematic. The urban environment limits the
individual’s field of view. The enemy could be behind a wall, and so could a family of non-
combatants. Urban furniture, buildings, doors, stairways, alleyways, streets, roads, walls
and fences impede movement, limit observation and deny intelligence gathering. The
practical limitations of manoeuvre in and amongst buildings and the advantages provided to
the defender of ease of concealed movement make the physical gathering of accurate and
timely information difficult. The advantage will invariably remain with the protagonist who
will know the ground better than his opponent.
9
Direction, Collection, Processing and Dissemination.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-12
Fig B-4-4 Conducting Real-Time Urban Surveillance
34. In the urban environment, ISTAR is a support to planning. ISTAR improves

situational awareness and targeting, enables real-time monitoring and surveillance, assists
decision making and improves force protection. A battlegroup deploying on operations can
have access to a wide range of ISTAR assets and should expect to receive comprehensive
briefings on their capabilities. The battlegroup should include these assets in planning and
training prior to deployment.
35. During urban operations the battlegroup G2 cell may be supplemented by ISTAR,
PSYOPS, HUMINT, CIMIC and other specialists. The intelligence that the G2 cell provides
about enemy intentions and capabilities will derive from the intelligence and information
gathered from formation HQ, the analysis of information from casual contacts gained
through patrolling, patrol reports, and the information gathered by all the available ISTAR
assets. This intelligence may be further supplemented by other sources and agencies.
ISTAR ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES
36. Technological advances continue to improve ISTAR capabilities and effect. With
increased stand-off, ISTAR assets are delivering better effect, viewing and listening to a
wider portion of the electro-magnetic spectrum and communicating this data back to
deployed HQs in greater detail over longer distances at greater speeds. ISTAR gathering
sensors are contained in satellites, fixed10 and rotary wing11 aircraft with cameras and a
‘sparkle’ function12, manned and unmanned air vehicles (UAVs13), balloons, overt and
covert ground vehicles, masts, unattended covert systems and ground sensors and covert
military activity. The bearer systems deliver various options for communicating information.
Further systems aid the interpretation, translation and analytical function to provide
corroborated intelligence to meet the original Request for Information (RFI). Fusion of
multiple assets is the key to maximising the potential of ISTAR.
37. Real-time ISTAR input provides an essential aid to battlespace management,

allowing the ground commander to fight the battle with the most accurate and recent
10
For instance NIMROD at 28,000 feet.
11
For instance BROADSWORD, an Electro Optical Infrared MX5 Camera fixed to a SEAKING helicopter at
8,000 feet.
12
LO with UHF comms to ground units and an IR beam to designate targets visible through II sights.
13
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Characteristics will be found in the ISTAR Handbook and the SOHB.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-13
information available. A Ground Control Station (GCS) monitors the real-time and other
ISTAR input. The downlink can be viewed in the battlegroup operations room14 and on a
mobile version in battlegroup tactical HQ.
THE ISTAR PLANNING FOCUS
38. The planning focus is influenced by detailed planning needed to conduct operations
in a built-up area, the impact of the presence of non-combatants on kinetic operations, the
need to gain and retain the support of the local population and the human dimension on
media operations.
a. For certain operations, JARIC15 can provide detailed aerial photography and
imagery analysis.
b. Current intelligence and historical information should be available from within

battlegroup and brigade resources.
c. ISTAR assets, including guard (point of origin) reports, CCTV footage and
information analysis can provide intelligence to supplement force protection.
d. UAVs provide high-resolution imagery of any target and area of interest and a
real-time downlink to the GCS. Low altitude, oblique photos of targets (IMINT16) in the
urban environment can be obtained, enabling accurate estimates to be made of
building dimensions17, occupation details, use and target status.
e. Surveillance of the electro-magnetic spectrum enables radio and telephone

signal capture and additional information.
f. ISTAR can provide route cover for vehicles by looking ahead and in depth for
the enemy18.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
39. ISTAR assets with Target Acquisition and Precision Strike19 capabilities enables
engagements in line with the normal targeting process. Theatre SOIs should describe the
decision-making requirements for Positive Identification (PID).
ISTAR ASSET USE
40. The availability of technical means of information gathering does not negate the
need for the analysis of historical and current threats, the synchronisation of intended
targets and the allocation of co-ordinated nicknames to geographic points and areas in
order that the land, air and maritime components of all participating nations have a common
understanding.
14
Consideration can be given to including the Royal Engineer representative, the BC, the FOOs and the FAC
in the GCS.
15
Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre, UK based.
16
Imagery Intelligence.
17
Wall height, gate width and approximate strength, window elevation from the ground, window size, roof
height.
18
Including, in Stability Operations, RPG gunmen, IED teams and SA firers.
19
For instance Fast Air with targeting pod and armed UAV, such as HERMES and PREDATOR.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-14
41. The standard of IMINT from many of the ISTAR sources can be of high quality, but
consideration should be given to the use of several source types, not necessarily airborne,
focussed on a specific location to capitalize on the strengths and overcome the
weaknesses of each.
42. The strengths and weaknesses of ISTAR assets, and associated capabilities, must
be understood. The best imagery in the world might be of little use if the operating crew
and downlink are of dubious quality. The use of secure internet chat rooms with UAVs can
involve delay and a time lag following commands. Pre-training for ISTAR operations using
non-UK equipment should be considered in a coalition environment.
43. The G2 elements of the battlegroup must remain inquisitive, and use the assets to
their full potential during the limited time that they are assigned.
SECTION 4 – COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS
‘With ill-defined front lines, and a defence in depth of no more than a few hundred yards in
places, command posts were almost as vulnerable as forward positions. Colonel
Vishnevsky, the commander of the 62nd Army’s artillery division wrote to a friend from
hospital. “When I left the bunker, I could hear sub-machine gun fire all around us.” A
German tank came right up to the entrance of his bunker and “its hull blocked the only way
out.” Vishnevsky and his officers had to dig for their lives to escape into the gully on the far
side.’
Anthony Beevor,
Stalingrad, Penguin Books
COMMAND
44. Commanders must be able to engage and interact with the enemy, to keep pace with
the complex urban environment, to predict how the operation is going to change and to
minimise the impact of combat on the civilian population.
45. In order to be able to maintain mobility and to minimise the stress levels of their
troops in a complicated and dangerous environment, plans should be flexible enough to be
able to do the following:
a. react quickly to the changing situation.
b. ensure effective all arms co-ordination and
c. gain the maximum benefit from dynamic training and liberal interpretation of
doctrine, so that soldiers will either instinctively know what to do or use their initiative
to overcome an unforeseen problem.
46. The factors that underpin successful urban operations are as follows:
a. Tactical and mental agility in the three block war context.
b. Identification and location of friend, foe and non-combatant.
c. Sharing and acting upon pertinent information.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-15

d. Location, observation and tracking of the enemy.
e. Provision of precision effects with graduated firepower.
f. Provision of physical mobility able to cope with the constraints of urban

terrain.
g. Provision of timely Combat Service Support.
h. Interpretation of the local culture, customs and behaviour.
CONTROL
‘In urban areas, ground operations tend to become decentralized. It is therefore highly
important that C2 be flexible, adaptive and decentralized as well. Essential to C2 is the
thorough knowledge and understanding of the commander’s intent at every level of
command. To further enhance decentralized C2, commanders at all levels should issue
mission-type orders and use implicit communications wherever possible.’
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2002
47. Operations in urban areas are invariably difficult to control. In every campaign
theme and tactical activity commanders and headquarters at battlegroup level and below
need to be far forward, in immediate contact behind and close to the troops in combat.
Troops fighting in built up areas may know little about how the battle is progressing or
where their commanders are. Situational Awareness (SA) information passing through
headquarters must be made available to the lowest level. Shared situational awareness
(SSA) is key to understanding the progress of the battle and to avoiding friendly casualties.
All soldiers must be aware of the location of friendly troops across or within their own
boundaries.
48. The presence of NGOs (such as the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières,
Charities, Private Military Companies), OGDs (such as DfID20 and the FCO21), and local
agencies and authorities, must be accounted for. Troops must have a clear understanding
of where they are, what they are doing, how they are controlled and how they affect the
tactical plan. The Civil-Military Cooperation plan should be briefed to the lowest level.
49. The screening of radios and GPS and the complex three dimensional urban
environment restrict the ability to know where troops are and what they are doing.
Personal, visual and electronic communication is difficult in areas subject to significant
screening, both within buildings and in streets between buildings. Consistently manned
secure voice radio is the key to all-informed real time command and control.
50. All round observation using eyes and ears is necessary in the contact battle, but this
should be balanced against the security offered by ISTAR and surveillance devices
operated remotely or from behind armour. Troops in combat should be fighting ‘heads up’
for best effect, or if they cannot, due to incoming fire or the threat of snipers, through optics
and sights. Peering at a computer screen could prove fatal, both to AFV crewmen and to
those they are supporting with fires and kinetic effect.
20
DfID – Department for International Development.
21
FCO – Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-16
51. The complexity of urban operations and vulnerability of all ranks, including
commanders, demands simple drills, clearly understood by everybody. Complicated plans,
drills and procedures may lead to confusion, exacerbated if commanders become
casualties and communications fail.
52. The information provided by fighting vehicles with access to battlefield management,
including automated position location technology, must be made available to the
dismounted troops. HQ locations should be selected for both security and access to
protected reliable communications.
53. Combat ID is useful but not infallible means of avoiding fratricide. Its effectiveness
can be enhanced by the use of boundaries as restrictive fire lines. Boundaries are a fault
line, but SSA and better multi-spectral ISTAR offers the chance to move with assurance, to
engage targets more precisely and to permit closer direct and indirect fires. Precision and
tailoring of effects and yields allows strike to be modified and the minimisation of collateral
damage.
54. In the urban environment, the importance of sectors, report lines, boundaries and
collection points is increased and can be significant. Attention must be paid to all three
physical dimensions – above, on and below ground.
a. Sectors. Clearly defined and recognisable sectors should be numbered or

lettered. Sectors will normally be allotted as company group tasks and then divided
into sub-sectors for platoon tasks.
b. Report Lines. Report lines should reflect clearly identifiable landmarks, for
example, for streets, rivers, railway lines, at right angles to the line of advance.
c. Boundaries. Boundaries between units and sub-units should be clearly

identifiable. Main thoroughfares provide the obvious approach for enemy movement,
the likely focus for operations, and equally identifiable alternatives should be sought.
Direct fire weapons provide the ability to interlock and overlap arcs, but in the urban
environment, in order to reduce the chances of fratricide, consideration can be given
to using boundaries as restrictive fire lines.
d. Collection Points. Protected and accessible collection points should be

established by each company group. It is here that combat supplies are delivered by
the battlegroup and collected by platoons, and casualties and PWs collected and
escorted to the rear.
COMMUNICATIONS
‘Under fire, the battalion commander was still trying to get communications with his
subordinate units. The radio operators in the [command vehicle] were still having difficulties
receiving and sending radio messages. The two-storey houses they were bumped up
against were masking the VHF signals. Even in his Humvee, he couldn’t get a consistent
signal among the labyrinth of houses.’
Nasiriyah, Iraq, 2003, from “Ambush Alley”

Tim Pritchard
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-17

55. Military operations in urban areas have demonstrated how easily VHF radios are
screened and how their range can be reduced. Commanders should be prepared to
encounter difficulty in establishing and maintaining communications; they should therefore
plan for the frequent re-siting of rebroadcast stations in order to ensure communications,
and consider the consequent force protection issues. All radio users should be trained in
and employ basic skills which are just as important in the era of digital communications –
movement to establish communications, elevation where possible and avoidance of
obscuration from walls or buildings. Although movement between defensive locations may
be difficult and dangerous, command must be close and personal. Once battle is joined,
communication difficulties may demand a greater level of mission command and delegation
of authority, and will place greater importance on planning and mission rehearsal.
Inadequate communications and VHF screening necessitates a greater emphasis on simple
plans, defined sectors and clear boundaries. Commanders must consider the need to use
runners, dispatch riders and, as a last resort, local communication systems, landline and
mobile phones. The use of low level codes like BATCO can help negate the security issue.
The assumption must be made that everything said will be heard and compromised.
56. Although Personal Role Radio (PRR) equipment is robust, light and user-friendly it
operates on VHF and therefore suffers from screening. It may be both necessary and
possible during protracted COIN and Peace Support operations to establish a radio network
based on commercial secure bulk CIS developed either on satellite telephones, where there
could again be security issues, or a pocket-phone network based on high VHF or UHF
bands via permanent, protected rebroadcast stations. Radios should be carefully sited and
maximum use made of rebroadcast stations and the remoting of antennae to high spots.
The use of the upper end of the VHF band and high power options on radios, where these
exist, might improve communications. Security is critical, even relatively unsophisticated
enemies will exploit the radio spectrum. For example, local civil systems22 within an urban
environment are able to monitor and interfere with military communications. If all electronic
communications fail, information might have to be passed by foot or motor transport.
SECTION 5 - ELECTRONIC WARFARE
‘Communications will be difficult and the security of communications vital. During the
battles for Grozny, the Chechens, many of whom had served in the Russian Army and
spoke Russian, were able to use the Russian radio net to their advantage. The young,
inexperienced and not fully trained Russian troops initially often spoke in clear, in large part
because the forces operating the equipment were not familiar with the requirement for
secure communications. Their conversations were not only monitored, but the Chechens
were able to transmit disinformation which led to Russian forces being drawn into harm’s
way.’
Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994-2000, Lessons from Urban Combat, Rand
57. The problems of Electronic Warfare (EW) in the urban environment are exacerbated
by the density of radio and particularly mobile telephone use and by screening from urban
infrastructure. EW systems have to function with the clutter and multi-path effects inherent
in built up areas, and frequently suffer reduced range and low-power transmission.
22
For instance those from local taxi firms, local radio stations etc.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-18
58. In the urban environment EW detachments are deployed either in static HQ over-
watch or embedded with units. EW detachments can be deployed on foot, by vehicle or at
short-halt capable of 24-hour operation. Where possible EW sensors should operate from
a secure location, but can be deployed in the light role if required.
59. The purpose of EW is to provide the commander with electronically gathered

information of the enemy’s intentions and capability. EW operators are able to provide the
bearing, location, intentions and movement of the threat and can be networked with other
detachments and ISTAR assets to provide a position fixing capability. EW detachments are
capable of electronic attack, although its use should be co-ordinated in order to minimise
the impact on other spectrum users.
60. Increasingly sophisticated enemies operating in a built up area will have similar
electronic surveillance and electronic attack resources capable of significant intercept and
intrusion. Units must ensure rigorous emission control policies, good voice procedure and
communications security.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-4-19

CHAPTER 5
ALL ARMS COMBAT
SECTION 1 - URBAN CLOSE COMBAT
‘They knew the houses they were hiding in and where the most complex hiding spots were
located. They knew the spots that gave them the best geometry to fire on us without us
seeing them. These guys were smart, well trained and, worst of all, willing to fight to the
death…..they knew how to fight us in an urban environment. They didn’t challenge the
tanks or armour but blended in…without obvious signs to target. They would move from
house to house and fall back as we approached. They had weapons and ammunition
staged in every house. It was really complex.’
Al Fallujah, Iraq, 2004

‘A Tale of Three Cities’, Russell Glenn
INTRODUCTION
1. Urban Close Combat is a brutal, manpower intensive infantry-led business. Combat

is often at very short range and the soldier is faced with an enemy who can be above him,
below him and behind him1. Fratricide is an ever present danger2.
2. The nature of military operations since the end of the Cold War and global
urbanisation since 1945 reinforce the fact that operations in urban areas are not only
increasingly likely in any future conflict, but may well be a future enemy’s preferred ground
for his military operations.
THE FUNCTION AND ROLE OF TROOPS IN CLOSE COMBAT
3. Unit and formation structures should be optimized for urban fighting into task-
organized combined arms groups.
4. The combination of forces at the lowest levels, such as armour, infantry and aviation
with engineer support to each, are likely to be critical to achieving success in urban terrain.
The groupings must always have the necessary elements of manoeuvre, firepower,
protection, command structure, and logistic support to achieve and capitalise on tactical
success. The grouping should be dependent upon the mission and the enemy threat. The
types of forces employed will be dictated by the operating environment.
5. The urban environment favours close combat by dismounted troops. Weapon

platforms with long range weapon systems are limited by cover and range from getting the
maximum advantage from their systems. They are also vulnerable to attack at close range
by small arms and short range anti-tank weapons.
1
Nearly every unit involved in the attack on Fallujah by US forces in 2004 suffered more casualties from rifle
and machine gun fire from behind them than from in front. The enemy had either been bypassed or, more
often, had moved into empty buildings captured, cleared and then vacated by the advancing US formations
and units.
2
The majority of Russian fatalities during the first battle for Grozny in 1994 were caused by their own side.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-1
6. In the urban environment, whether in offence or defence, dismounted forces will
normally be based on infantry formations. Support to the infantry will be provided by other
arms and services which must be able to operate in the dismounted role. The primary aim
of the infantry and the other dismounted troops will be to close with and defeat the enemy
by firepower and close combat.
7. The means by which dismounted troops close with the enemy can be various.
Tactical and operational movement into the dismounted environment can be by armoured
fighting vehicle, on foot or by helicopter. Each of these methods offers different levels of
mobility, protection and firepower, but will not change the fundamental role of the
dismounted soldier once he has closed with the enemy. The tactical mobility of the
dismounted troops will dictate the level of integral fire support and logistic backup available.
The Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) will provide the higher level of fire support and
logistic backup required, play an important part in the commander’s tactical plan, provide a
communications base and, if necessary, improve the speed for casualty evacuation.
However, in spite of ever increasing levels of physical protection, such as additional armour
packs, they will remain vulnerable to Emplaced Explosive Ordnance (EEO).
8. Despite significant advances in weapon, equipment and vehicle development the

way to conduct close combat and fight at close quarters has not changed for many years
and is unlikely to change significantly in the future. Developments in technology for urban
operations will provide alternative ways of gaining intelligence but close combat will be won
by individual initiative, courage, leadership, determination and collective team work.
9. Every soldier in the urban environment, of any rank and from any arm, is vulnerable
to attack at close quarters. He or she can expect to be required to engage in close combat
with the enemy. The scope of urban operations will range from infantry units fighting with
or without armour support, through every level and type of stability operation, to encounters
by support personnel with the enemy at close range. Distinction cannot be drawn between
those whose raison d’être is to close with and engage the enemy and those for whom such
an encounter would be unlikely in a rural environment.
10. Urban close combat has been defined as 'operations which take place on foot, in
direct fire contact with the enemy and involving the deliberate application of concentrated
violence to achieve the mission'. Following this definition, the following lessons can be
drawn:
a. Weapons, ammunition and equipment used in close combat should be small

and light enough to be carried and used effectively in close combat. Consideration
should be given to the issue of a pistol to all ranks as a secondary weapon.
b. For the dismounted soldier, close combat will generally take place at ranges
from 200m down to the length he need thrust his bayonet. The shorter the range
over which he is fighting the more stark, dangerous and personal the environment
becomes. The soldier should seek to use all his available weapons to give him the
greatest possible stand-off distance and all round utility.
c. The constant 360 degree vulnerability of the close combat soldier increases
the need for all round defence and protection.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-2

d. Fighting can be at very close range for protracted periods of time. At
Stalingrad in 1942 and 1943 the defending Russians used every different type of
weapon and soldier to fight the battle. They hugged the enemy as close as possible
to prevent him effectively using his supporting arms, exhausted him through
constant attrition and by fear and proximity, thereby causing him to open fire at every
opportunity, day and night, to give away his position.
11. Dismounted close combat involves both individual and collective activity. The
individual fighting soldier is constrained by time, space, and the range of the weapons and
equipment he can carry. Collective activity will be based on the ability of individual groups
of soldiers to move, close with and encircle his enemy, supported by direct-fire and longer
range weapons.
12. Summary. Regardless of his arm or service, the core function of the urban soldier
is to close with the enemy and defeat him. Whatever he does, in order to survive and win,
he must have the right weapons, and the ammunition and support that he needs to
complete his task.
THE USE OF GRENADES IN CLOSE COMBAT3
13. Grenades. HE Hand grenades are an essential weapon for assaulting and clearing
buildings. Grenade ammunition expenditure is likely to be heavy. During WW2, it was
common for a battalion fighting in urban areas to use in excesses of 500 hand grenades in
a day. The HE grenade is the most commonly used grenade during combat in built-up
areas and is used while clearing rooms. The overuse of HE grenades in lightly constructed
buildings may cause total, or partial, collapse of walls. There is a risk that fragments may
penetrate internal walls, risking injury to friendly forces in adjacent rooms.
14. Grenade Machine Gun. The Grenade Machine Gun (GMG)4 can provide high
explosive fire support to a range of 2000m. With a cyclic rate of 350 rounds per minute, it
provides the battlegroup commander with an accurate high rate of fire. It can also be fired
in single shot. It is particularly useful against dismounted personnel, soft skinned vehicles
and light armoured vehicles.
15. Underslung Grenade Launcher. In comparison to the use of hand thrown

grenades, the use of an Underslung Grenade Launcher (UGL) significantly reduces the
vulnerability of the firer. UGL should be used to assist initial entry into buildings and launch
grenades into openings above ground floor level. Their use inside buildings for room
clearance is likely to be limited. The 40mm UGL fitted to the SA80 L85A2 rifle fires the
High Explosive Dual Purpose (HEDP) Grenade. It can:
a. Penetrate 45 mm of steel.
b. Penetrate 300mm of concrete.
c. Produce casualties within a 5m radius of grenade.
3
See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Para 10.
4
Man-portable or vehicle mounted, normally fired by a two or three man team but can be
operated by an individual if required.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-3
Fig B-5-2 UGL Being Fired in Afghanistan, 2007
SNIPERS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT5
16. General. Snipers can be highly effective in a

number of roles in the urban environment. The value of the
sniper to a unit depends on the type of operation, the level
of conflict and the Rules of Engagement. To provide timely
and effective support, the sniper needs a clear picture of
the commander’s concept of operations and intent in order
to operate independently when necessary. Clear control
measures must be employed to prevent fratricide and to
maintain control. An effective sniper group can disrupt the
enemy a great deal and cause delay out of all proportion to
its numbers. The effectiveness of a sniper will largely
depend on the terrain, and the complex nature of the
different types of urban dwellings will directly affect how the
sniper can be employed.
17. Capability. A sniper can provide a 24 hour

capability and his role is not limited to simply engaging
enemy targets. Likely tasks for snipers in the urban
Fig B-5-3 - UK Sniper,
environment are as follows:
Afghanistan, 2007
a. Urban to Rural/Rural to Urban Engagements. Snipers are in a good
position to utilise their weapon ranges to the maximum without becoming decisively
engaged. Their stealth is a huge advantage in mixed environments.
b. Denial of Key Terrain. Snipers can efficiently and effectively deny key
terrain such as routes and specific buildings to the enemy in a built up area.
5
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-4
c. Covering Obstacles. Snipers can be utilised to cover obstacles and assist in
choking enemy movement. Enemy commanders are likely to move forward to
observe and should be priority targets.
d. Supporting the Close Battle. Snipers are able to support troops during
urban penetration and urban thrust operations in a variety of different ways. They
are able to support local counterattacks with precision fire and provide a screen
either as part of an ISTAR plan or part of a guard force providing both precision fire
and observation.
e. Isolated Employment. Sniper teams can be employed in isolation,

maximising their stealth, although this may carry significant risk.
f. Control of Offensive Support. A sniper should be able to call in and adjust

Offensive Support (OS) and should be employed within the OS bubble. He may
wish to utilise OS rather than compromise his position using his rifle. Snipers should
be able to call in and control mortar and artillery fire. The use of black light to
enhance night capability offers a distinct advantage.
g. Counter Sniping. The enemy will almost certainly have his own
snipers/sharp shooters operating in the urban environment. Snipers will be looking
for signs and patterns of enemy snipers. Our own snipers can reduce and restrict
the enemy sniper’s observation, movement and their ability to shoot.
Fig B-5-4 Bosnian Sniper, Former Yugoslavia 1993
h. TASKORG/Groupings. Snipers may well be employed by the commander in

a mixed grouping eg ISTAR. Flexibility should be used when employing snipers for a
specific task particularly when screening or guarding an area - using a cocktail of
weapon systems in a screen or guard matrix may produce the best effect.
i. Flank and Rear Observation. Snipers can be used to protect troops by the
provision of early warning of follow up action and counter attacks, and by engaging
such activity with precision fire and OS.
j. Attacking Targets of Opportunity. Targets of opportunity may be given

priorities by the commander. Types of targets might include enemy snipers,
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-5

commanders, vehicle commanders, radio operators, engineers, and machine gun
crews.
k. Observation Posts. Snipers will inevitably use OPs as a means to observe

and carry out much of their task. Both urban and rural OPs can be used depending
on the ground. Urban tasks could include gaining information on the enemy,
establishing enemy habits and patterns, triggering reserves and QRFs, monitoring
local reactions to operations, calling for OAS and destroying key personnel.
l. Heli-Sniping6. Firing from helicopters is a task for which snipers are not
normally trained, but heli-sniping is a possibility for short duration urban operations,
particularly when elevation and clear shoots are difficult. Heli-sniping may be used
by a commander on specific urban penetration operations.
18. Positioning. A sniper does not have to move or be positioned with lead or fighting
elements. He may have to occupy a higher position to the rear or flank, potentially some
distance away from the element he is supporting. By operating far from the other elements,
a sniper avoids decisive engagement but remains close enough to engage distant targets.
A sniper is likely to get the best observation and arcs of fire from elevated positions,
although he should not be placed in obvious positions, such as church steeples and roof
tops, since the enemy can often observe and target such locations. Indirect fire can
generally penetrate rooftops and cause casualties in top floors of buildings. Furthermore,
snipers should not be positioned where there is heavy traffic; these areas invite enemy
observation as well. A sniper must consider a variety of factors when selecting a fire
position or observation post including the following:
a. Communications. A sniper needs good communications in order to both

coordinate with the force elements that he supports and apply offensive support.
This may be difficult to achieve in urban terrain.
Fig B-5-5 1BW Snipers, Iraq, 2004

6
Firing unrestrained weapons from helicopters requires specialised training, and may only be carried out by
suitably qualified aircrew and snipers operating (and practised) as an integrated team, specifically authorised
for the task.'
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-6
b. Observation. Good observation with cleared fields of view over likely enemy
locations and routes is essential. Ideally, a fire position should offer long-range fields
of fire and all round observation.
c. Concealment and Survival. The sniper must be covert and understand the
three dimensional aspect to concealment in the visible light and thermal spectra.
The use of solid, robust structures for protection from both direct and indirect fire
should be sought. As well as selecting a suitable position with cover from fire, he
also needs protection from the elements.
d. Sustainability. Depending on the duration of the operation, snipers will need

to be re-supplied. Thought must be given to the method of re-supply including the
use of covered approaches and caches.
e. Alternative Positions. After engaging a target, snipers should withdraw to a

pre-planned alternative position in order to avoid compromise.
19. Building Construction. The material and structure of buildings in the area of
operations should be considered, in respect of both protected positions and planning
weapon effect. The type of building and the materials used in its construction has an
impact on ammunition penetration thus ammunition selection.
20. Sniper Target Building Breakdown. The following is a diagram of how a sniper
might define a point on a target building. This method is easy to use and brings troops onto
the target quickly and efficiently.
Fig B-5-6 Sniper Colour Clock Code
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-7

21. Offensive Operations. Sniper tasks during an offensive operation in an urban
environment can include the following:
a. Investment. Snipers can be employed during the investment, dominating

ground around the objective.
b. Break-in. The attacker will be at his most vulnerable during the break-in
battle. Precision fire support is critical in order for assaulting troops to secure a
foothold.
c. Securing the Objective. The assaulting troops should conduct a systematic

approach to the securing of the objective and will require support throughout. The
enemy is likely to have established strong defensive positions with a comprehensive
obstacle plan. Overwatch through the provision of precision fire support and the
coordination of OS by snipers enables commanders to manoeuvre more freely.
d. Clearance. In clearing the remaining enemy from the area, snipers can be
used as cut-offs and in overwatch positions, guiding clearance troops on the ground
and engaging enemy when necessary.
e. Re-organisation. The threat of enemy counter attack and sniper fire is high
during the re-organisation. Snipers can be employed to counter this and provide
commanders with early warning of any enemy attack.
22. Defensive Operations. Sniper tasks during a defensive operation in an urban

environment can include the following:
a. Perimeter Force. Snipers can be an integral part of the perimeter force

providing observation for early warning, coordination of OS and precision fire.
b. Disruption Force. Snipers can be used in conjunction with the disruption

force, either organic to it or in support.
c. Main Defensive Area. In the main defensive area snipers can be tasked to
engage in selected killing areas, cover obstacles and assist in preventing the enemy
from grouping for coordinated attacks.
d. Reserve. On deployment of a reserve, snipers can be used to provide

precision fire support, assist in guiding their manoeuvre on the battlefield and adjust
OS.
23. Effects Of Sniper Weapon Systems. When employed effectively, snipers not only
have a physical impact on the enemy but also a significant psychological effect, particularly
in an urban environment. Commanders need to have an understanding of the effects of the
weapons and optics a sniper carries in order for him to be employed for best effect. Part C,
Chapter 11 contains detail of sniper weapon effects.
24. Sniper Priorities. Engagement priorities for snipers are determined by the relative
importance of the targets to the enemy. Sniper targets usually include commanders,
enemy snipers and the personnel of crew served weapons.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-8

25. Limitations on Employing Snipers in the Urban Environment. Limitations on the
use of snipers in the urban environment may include the following:
a. Degraded communications.
b. Disrupted command and control, leading to degraded situational awareness

and the possibility of fratricide.
c. Difficulties in sustaining the sniper(s). This is a particular issue when snipers

are deployed in relative isolation. The duration of sniper operations will generally be
short as re-supply will heighten the risk of compromise. The pre-positioning of
combat supplies can extend duration.
d. Restricted fields of view and arcs of fire due to the complex terrain.
e. Ammunition penetration of buildings. Armour piercing rounds may be

necessary.
f. Employing snipers in isolation carries risk. This can be mitigated by

dedicating a QRF.
g. All buildings that need to be occupied by a sniper should be cleared first. A

sniper may need assistance to clear a suitable fire position or OP before occupation.
h. There is a risk of compromise after an engagement with a sniper rifle. The

use of suppressors and alternative positions will mitigate this.
i. The weather has an impact on visibility and sustainability.
FIGHTING VEHICLES7
GENERAL
26. Fighting vehicles consist of tanks, tracked and wheeled Infantry Fighting Vehicles
(IFVs), recce vehicles and other armed vehicles8. They can be used very effectively in
intimate support of dismounted forces in urban operations. In urban terrain, their mobility,
firepower, communications and surveillance and target-acquisition attributes are invaluable
to dismounted troops. Up-to-date descriptions of the capabilities of AFVs in current use
may be found in the All Arms Tactical Aide Memoire.
27. In built-up areas, AFVs are vulnerable as their mobility and firepower can be
restricted. In urban terrain streets and alleys constitute ready-made fields of fire and killing
areas. AFVs are restricted by obstacles, can be canalised by urban infrastructure and can
be subject to possible ambush and short-range attack. Gun elevation, depression and
traverse are restricted. Infantry intimate support reduces the risk to AFVs, however, and
should be considered the norm.
7
See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Paras 16-20.
8
including protected mobility platforms.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-9
28. Conventional FIBUA defensive operations are centred on prepared and fortified
positions. All approaches to these positions are normally covered by fire and may be
protected by landmines, IEDs9 and obstacles. Tanks and other AFVs can be used
effectively with dismounted infantry in the pursuit and in armoured raids into urban terrain.
Consideration should be given to avoiding weight-supporting constructions (eg bridges,
flyovers) until they have been cleared by dismounted forces and confirmed, if necessary, by
specialist reconnaissance.
THE EMPLOYMENT OF AFVs OTHER THAN TANKS
29. AFVs other than tanks that can contribute to the urban battle consist of CVR(T)
Scimitar, Warrior IFV and other armed protected mobility vehicles that may be issued for
specific operations. They may all, to varying degrees, offer protection, firepower and
mobility as well as providing the means for the movement of personnel, freight and
casualties.
AFVs IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
30. The likely tasks for AFVs in urban offensive operations are to:
a. Provide protected transport for infantry as close as possible to the objective.
b. Provide intimate support to assault troops on the objective.
c. Destroy enemy positions with direct fire.
d. Breach walls en route to, and in, the objective area.
e. Isolate the objective by movement and with direct fire to prevent enemy
withdrawal, reinforcement, or counterattack.
f. Counter enemy armour.
g. Provide II and TI illumination of targets.
h. Establish roadblocks and barricades.
i. Provide re-supply of ammunition and explosives for the assault force.
j. Provide a mobile reserve.
k. Evacuate casualties.
31. To maximise offensive momentum dismounted infantry and AFVs must work
together. Good communications between the dismounted infantry and AFV is critical.
External telephones fitted to AFVs provide the primary and best means of communication to
dismounted infantry. AFVs can provide direct fire support to dismounted infantry who
themselves can provide close protection to the vehicle. Combined Arms training should be
conducted at all levels down to single AFV/section level.
9
Improvised Explosive Devices.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-10
32. Smoke from AFVs can be used to screen the movement of the vehicle10 and
dismounted troops or blind the enemy. Consideration should also be given to the
incendiary effect of smoke munitions.
AFVs IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
33. Typical tasks for AFVs in urban defence include:
a. Providing a mobile reserve.
b. Providing fire support including DFs and FPF for the defending forces and
mutual support to other AFVs from protected fire positions.
c. Providing rapid, protected transport for the infantry.
d. Providing mutual support for anti-tank weapons.
e. Covering obstacles by fire.
f. Providing re-supply of ammunition and other supplies.
g. Evacuating casualties from areas under fire.
h. Defending flanks
i. In co-operation with the dismounted infantry defending buildings and routes.
34. AFVs should be integrated into the defensive plan to make use of their protection,
firepower and mobility to cover likely approaches and selected killing areas. Routes and
fire positions should be carefully prepared to provide protection against enemy anti-armour
weapons. Plans for the defence should include the use of alternative fire positions for AFVs
and the preparation of withdrawal routes.
10
Either from Multi Barrelled Smoke Grenade Discharger’s (MBSGD) or, in the case of CR2, its on board
smoke generators.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-11
Lessons from an extended defensive fire fight using IFVs at Red 10, Basra City, 21
May 2007:
• Importance of good vehicle maintenance and battle procedure by all section

members.
• Importance of good driver training. Drivers must be confident and able to use
their initiative.
• Live firing from vehicles should be practised every day, including the use of
alternative fire positions.
• Target Indication is difficult. Good target indication and clear fire control orders
are essential. Use tracer and, if necessary, button compasses on wrist watches
for target indication.
• Smoke will obscure the enemy and blind your fire.
• Carry as much vehicle and personal ammunition as you can in your vehicles.
• Be proactive in defence.
• The driver is alone. He can hear gunfire and commands on his headset. Get
down to him.
• Use more protection on armoured vehicles – eg sandbags.
• The vehicle crew must multi-task – use BOWMAN, drive, command the vehicle.
Cpl J P Smith, R Coy, 4 RIFLES, 2007
AFV CANNON
35. General. The 30mm Rarden cannon11, mounted on CVR (T) Scimitar and Warrior
510/511, can provide significant firepower to the infantry and can be used either in intimate
support or from a stand-off position. In addition, the co-axially mounted machine guns can
enhance the level of suppressive fire. Two types of ammunition are available:
a. Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot. Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot

(APDS) is the main anti-armour round available for use with the 30mm cannon. It is
suitable for engaging light armoured and soft-skinned vehicles out to 1500m.
b. High Explosive. High Explosive (HE) rounds are suitable for engaging soft-
skinned vehicles, bunkers and dismounted infantry out to 1500m. HE has the most
utility in an urban environment, providing assistance to assault troops without the
more extensive collateral damage of a High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) round.
36. Limitations. There are several limitations when using 30mm cannon in the urban
environment:
a. Like the tank main armament in the urban environment, 30mm cannon is
restricted in elevation and traverse.
b. HE rounds may have limited effect against hard structures, eg concrete or

reinforced buildings.
11
See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Paras 14-15. The Rarden Cannon is soon to be replaced by a
40mm CTA (Cased Telescope Ammunition) system.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-12
c. The weapon platforms may have difficulty in manoeuvring in an urban
environment due to their size and weight.
d. Although not as hazardous to dismounted troops as the 120mm tank gun,

30mm cannon does produce a minimal danger from ejected rounds, as well as the
associated dangers of the phosphorous from the smoke grenade dischargers.
TANKS12
‘When the lead UK tank came into sight, they made a direct hit with the first [anti-tank]
round, disabling the tank and blocking the route of advance with the whole line stalled
behind it. Similarly, when a tank came to a halt beside a tall building on a second road, a
demolition team collapsed the façade of the building on top of the tank, thereby stopping
the second tank.’
Jaffa, Palestine, 1948

“City Fights”, Benjamin Runkle
Fig B-5-7 UK Sherman Tank in Palestine, 1948
37. The powerful, high-velocity gun that is mounted on tanks provides the infantryman
with major contribution to success in built-up areas: heavy, direct, fire support. Although
the infantry assumes the lead role during combat in built-up areas, tanks and infantry must
work as a close team. The tank, using HESH, can provide effective direct fire against
buildings as the round will breach most walls and fortifications. The co-axial machine gun
can provide effective neutralising covering fire.
EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS
38. As part of the all arms battle, tanks are best suited to tasks within the Investment
Force, or direct Fire Support Group in offensive operations and in the Perimeter Force in
defensive operations. In these roles they can make maximum use of their firepower and
12
See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Para 16-20.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-13
mobility without exposure to the threat of hand held anti armour weapons. Other points to
note are:
a. Tanks need infantry on the ground to provide security in built-up areas and to
designate targets. Against targets protected by structures, tanks should be escorted
forward to the most covered location that provides a clear shot. On the spot
instructions by the local infantry commander are essential to ensure that the tank's
fire is accurate and its exposure is limited. The tank commander may have to halt in
a covered position, dismount, and reconnoitre a route forward into a suitable firing
position.
b. Tanks are equipped with very effective thermal sights that can be used to
detect enemy personnel and weapons that are hidden in shadows and behind
openings. Dust, fires, thick smoke and atmospheric conditions significantly degrade
these sights.
c. Burning particles from white phosphorous turret-mounted grenade launchers

can easily start uncontrolled fires and are hazardous to dismounted infantry near the
tank. The tank commander and the local infantry commander should coordinate
when and under what conditions these launchers can be used.
d. The tank's size and armour can provide dismounted infantry with cover from
direct fire weapons and fragments. With co-ordination, tanks can provide moving
cover for infantrymen as they advance across small open areas. However, enemy
fire striking a tank but not penetrating is a major threat to nearby infantry.
Fragmentation generated by anti-tank rounds and ricochets off tank armour have
historically been a prime cause of infantry casualties while working with tanks in
built-up areas.
e. Some tanks (normally the squadron 2IC's tank) are equipped with dozer
blades that can be used to remove rubble barriers under fire, breach obstacles, or
seal exits.
39. Limitations. Tanks can be particularly vulnerable to hand held anti-tank weapons
which can find ample cover in the urban environment. However, this limitation is only valid
where the enemy has such a capability that can defeat our tanks. Intelligence staff advice
on the current and any likely future enemy anti-tank capability should thus be sought before
planning operations, in order to assess the risk. Particular limitations of elevation,
depression and traverse are shown in Figures B-6-7 and B-6-8. Where possible, tanks
should take advantage of open areas which offer the best fields of fire. The weight of tanks
may cause collapse of cellars, drains and underground systems and therefore routes and
firing positions have to be reconnoitred with care.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-14

Fig B-5-8 – Challenger Two Elevation Restrictions
Fig B-5-9 – Challenger Two Depression Restrictions
40. Firing Angles. Tank guns produce their best urban target effects when fired
perpendicular to the hard surface.
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT13
PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT
41. The likely tasks for anti-tank weapons14 in the urban environment are as follows:
a. Surveillance Operations. Javelin has an effective thermal sight and should
be incorporated into the STAP. When the armoured threat is low and observation
difficult, Javelin should be fully utilised for observation.
b. Force Protection. The primary weapon used for force protection will be
NLAW15. Concurrent with all operations is the requirement to use anti-armour
weapons for force protection. This type of operation will be carried out by all troops
throughout the urban battlefield.
13
14
This section should be read with Chapter 10, section 6, Anti Tank Weapons Effects.
15
See below.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-15
c. Flank Protection. The long range (2500m), thermal sight and anti-armour
capability of Javelin means that it can be ideally used for flank protection on the edges
of the built up area.
SPECIFIC FACTORS FOR THE USE OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS IN URBAN

OPERATIONS
42. Consideration should be given to the following factors when using anti-armour
weapons in the urban environment:
a. Soft Launch. Both Javelin16 and NLAW can be fired from a confined space.
This potential should be exploited where possible.
b. Firing from Elevated Positions. The use of NLAW from upper storeys will
protect the firer from an enemy’s tank main gun and coaxial machine guns fire due to
the limits of weapon elevation. Furthermore, the top armour on a tank is thinner and
will improve the chance of an effective immobilizing strike. Using these techniques,
NLAW may be used in offensive and defensive operations. It is particularly effective
in ambushes.
c. Safe Launch. Safe Launch will be critical in the urban environment. Any
obstruction can cause premature detonation or ricochet. Commanders should
ensure they are aware of, and if necessary remove, potential obstructions from the
likely flight path of the missile
d. Use of Other Systems. Effective use can be made of other weapon systems
in an anti-armour capacity, particularly in the urban ambush. The use of snipers will
be highly effective against exposed AFV commanders and drivers. Blast and direct-
fire damage to antennae, optics and other external equipment can significantly
reduce AFV fighting ability.
NLAW
Fig B-5-10 NLAW
43. General. NLAW17 is one man, disposable, fire-and-forget weapon with a range of
between 20-400m for moving targets and up to 600m for static targets. NLAW can be fired
16
Javelin has a minimum range of 65m, NLAW a minimum range of 20m.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-16
from an enclosed or exposed position in the Over-fly Target Attack (OTA) or the Direct
Attack (DA) mode
44. Scaling. NLAW is an all arms weapon, available to all troops operating in the
battle-group and should be deployed with all groups operating in the urban battlefield. All
units receive high-scaling of NLAW for anti-armour tasks in urban operations. NLAW
should be deployed with rifle platoons and the anti-tank platoon for offensive and defensive
action in the urban environment, and to other elements of the battle-group, including
attached CSS elements, for self-defence.
45. Employment. NLAW is primarily used to defeat light armoured vehicles and
neutralize fortified firing positions. Due to the design of the warhead and the narrow blast
effect, it is not as effective in this role as heavier weapons such as a tank main armament.
a. NLAW is most effective when firing from upper storeys, or from the flanks and
rear. When firing at main battle tanks, these weapons should always be employed
against weaker areas in volley or paired firing as they normally require a number of
hits to achieve a kill on a tank. Firing from upper stories protects the firer from tank
main guns and coaxial machine gun fire since tanks cannot sharply elevate these
armaments. In addition the top armour on a tank is normally much thinner than
elsewhere, thus greatly improving the chance of an effective immobilising strike.
Using these techniques, NLAW may be used in offensive and defensive operations.
It is particularly effective in ambushes.
b. The effect of NLAW against buildings or defensive positions is likely to be

limited. The shaped charge is unlikely to create a significant breach in a wall or
cause casualties to those inside the building. However, the blast and shock may be
sufficient to neutralize a defensive position in a room for a short period. Against
structures, shaped-charge weapons should be aimed about 6 inches below or to the
side of a firing aperture in order to increase the probability of killing the enemy
behind the wall.
46. Back-blast. During fighting in built up areas, the back-blast area in the open is more
hazardous due to loose rubble and the channelling effect of the narrow streets and alleys.
It is not advisable to fire NLAW from inside a building although firing from an enclosed
space is possible. The most serious hazard that can be expected is hearing loss.
Structural damage to the building can also occur. These risks should be assessed against
the advantages gained by firing from cover.
JAVELIN
47. General. Javelin18 provides a highly flexible stand-off precision weapon ideally
suited to ISTAR and fire support tasks. Its use in urban environment will depend on the
possibility of using its range, its lethality and flexibility of employment. It is man-portable
and has a low logistic burden. Primarily an anti-armour weapon, it can be used against
secondary targets. A number of specific tactical considerations must be considered in
order to employ the weapon effectively:
17
Due into service 2009. This section should be read in conjunction with section 6, Chapter 10; NLAW Fire
Effects.
18
This section should be read in conjunction with section 6, Chapter 10; Javelin Fire Effects.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-17
a. Range. As engagement ranges are likely to be close, the minimum range of
only 65m in direct attack mode provides a particularly useful capability. Longer
engagements are possible in less dense areas and where the Command Launch
Unit (CLU) has line-of-sight to the target position.
b. Visibility. Urban developments are often located along canals and rivers
which create potential for fog in low lying areas. Air inversion layers are common
especially where cities or towns are in low lying bowls or valleys. These trap dust,
chemical agents and pollutants, increasing obscuration and reducing visibility. Like
all thermal surveillance devices, the CLU will be affected by these obscurants.
c. Time. Engagement times are likely to be short as the urban environment will
only present fleeting targets. Timely ISTAR feeds, careful targeting, efficient in-
action drills and fire control will all be of paramount importance. Engagement
difficulties will also demand a greater scale of battery coolant units (BCUs) than is
usually allocated. To increase in-action time, operators should adopt the tactical
carry when contact is imminent.
d. Field of Fire. To improve the opportunities for target acquisition and reduce
vulnerability in the urban environment, use should be made of separate observers to
locate the target and call forward the Javelin and any other direct fire system, by
providing a quick and accurate target indication. Care must be taken to note and
avoid the urban furniture (street lights, power lines, walls, fences, bridges, trees and
large shrubs, vehicles, television antennae, and rubble) that will affect the ability to
engage moving targets. The requirement for improved fields of fire may necessitate
the occupation of an exposed building.
e. Firing Positions. Firing positions can be constructed on or inside buildings,

although positions outside of buildings may offer considerable tactical advantages.
Positions should be selected that provide protection from direct and indirect fire.
Safe Launch is absolutely critical in any environment. An obstruction could cause a
premature detonation or ricochet. Concealment, including the use of thermal
protection, will be essential for urban OPs.
f. Secondary Targets. Secondary targets such as buildings, bunkers, sniper

positions, fire bases, mortar base plates, hovering rotary aircraft and non-armoured
vehicles will present themselves in the urban environment.
Fig B-5-11 Point of Aim against a Masonry Structure
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-18

(1) Engagements. The attack mode will needs to be carefully selected for
the target type and the track gates adjusted to the visible centre of mass. It
may be difficult to achieve ‘lock-on’ with small targets at longer ranges.
(2) Weapon Effect. The Javelin warhead will penetrate approx

1500mm of concrete or sandbag structure and create an over-pressure effect
inside. If fired against soft surfaces (ie glass, wood, etc.) the larger secondary
charge may not detonate until a subsequent impact is made. Against a robust
structure the penetration will only create a fist size hole and is therefore
unsuitable for creating access points. If the structure is weak, there is a far
greater chance it may create larger damage and possibly even collapse.
g. Trigger OPs. The use of an OP matrix in the urban environment maximises

the ability of Javelin teams to identify armoured targets. The ISTAR feed mitigates
the fleeting nature of urban engagement, allow the early initiation of Battery Coolant
Units (BCUs) by anti-tank detachments and the immediate engagement of targets on
acquisition.
h. Time of Flight. Commanders must be aware of the time of flight of their

weapon system to any likely targets in their chosen engagement area. If an AFV is
capable of transiting through the engagement area more quickly than any missile will
reach its intended target, either a new position must be found, or obstacles must be
placed to slow down vehicles.
i. Attack Profile. Due to the attack profile of the Javelin missile in top attack
mode, it is likely that some ‘street furniture’ may have to be removed to ensure safe
launch of the weapon system. If this is unfeasible, direct attack should be used,
although frontal engagements will be less successful.
ANTI-STRUCTURE MUNITIONS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT19
Fig B-5-12 Anti-Structure Munition
19
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-19
48. The UK Army will use the Anti-Structure Munition (ASM) from 2009. Lighter but the
same length as the NLAW, the ASM is also a one-man disposable, fire-and-forget weapon
for use against (primary targets) urban structures and bunkers and (secondary targets) light
AFVs and soft skinned vehicles. With a combat effective range of between 15m-400m, the
ASM has a tandem warhead break-in charge (BIC) and a follow-through bomb (FTB) that
penetrates concrete structures and enables subsequent physical access. The purpose of
the BIC is to create a hole sufficiently big to enable access to fighting troops.
MORTARS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT20
49. The 60mm21 and 81mm mortars can be used effectively in the urban environment.22
In comparison with their use in open terrain, mortars in the urban environment have
reduced killing zones, an impaired ability of the observer to record and adjust the fall of shot
and poor communications between the commander, the MFC and the mortar base-plate
positions. Nevertheless, the array of mortar ammunition and fuse type will provide an
effective and useful contribution to both offensive and defensive operations in urban areas.
50. The urban environment greatly restricts low angle indirect fire. The trajectory of
mortars operating in the high angle will be less affected but ‘dead space’23 will be about half
the height of the building behind which lies the target.
MORTAR EMPLOYMENT
51. In urban operations, the following points about the use of mortars should be noted:
a. In offensive operations mortars can fire into buildings and the deep spaces
between them. In defensive operations mortars positioned behind buildings are
difficult for the enemy to accurately locate and even harder for him to hit.
b. Mortars can be fired through the roof of a ruined building if the ground-level
flooring is solid enough to withstand the recoil. If there is only concrete in the mortar
base plate area, mortars can be fired using sandbags or Raschen Bags24 as buffers
under the base plates and curbs as anchors and braces.
c. The 60mm and 81mm have limited effect on stronger structural targets. Even
with delay fuses they seldom penetrate more than the upper stories of light buildings.
However, their wide area coverage and multi option fuses make them useful against
an enemy force advancing through streets, other open areas, or over rubble.
d. Mortar platoons often operate more than one mortar detachment during
fighting in built-up areas. Mortars can be dispersed and converge on the same
target to achieve a similar beaten zone as a mortar line.
e. All of the standard mortar projectiles are useful during fighting in built-up
areas. HE is likely to be the most commonly used round. WP is effective in starting
20
21
The 60mm Mortar is due into service in 2009.
22
This section should be read with Chapter 10, section 7, Indirect Fire Effects.
23
The area that will not receive the fall of shot.
24
A Raschen Bag is a bag of ballast that is placed underneath the baseplate to improve the accuracy of the
mortar when used in snow or other soft ground conditions. It is named after Colonel Dan Raschen, Royal
Engineers, the inventor.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-20
fires in buildings which may force the enemy out of cellars and light frame buildings.
It is also the most effective mortar round against dug-in enemy tanks. Even near-
misses blind and suppress tank crews, forcing them to close hatches.
f. Mortar smoke tends to persist longer and give greater coverage in built-up
areas than in open terrain. However this tendency to linger means that its
indiscriminate use can create adverse affects for friendly forces.
g. Urban areas degrade the effects of illuminants. They are often of limited use
because of the deep canyons and building shadows. Rapidly shifting wind currents
in built-up areas also affect mortar illumination, making it less effective.
EMPLOYMENT OF MORTARS IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
52. During the ‘break-in’ phase of an assault of a defended urban area, mortar sections
should normally be deployed outside the built up area. MFCs should be located with an
Infantry Company or battlegroup, either with the commander, the lead platoon or in an
Anchor or Air OP. The use of an Air OP has to be judged against resources and the current
air threat. The concept will be to provide a heavy enough weight of fire, coordinated with
other indirect and direct assets, to allow the infantry to enter the town or city and gain a
foothold. Other roles will be harassing fire to the depths and flanks of the urban area to
stop enemy reinforcement of the defended localities or to neutralise enemy forces
attempting to leave the town.
53. Indirect Role. The key to indirect fire is good observation. The MFC must be high
enough to be able observe the target areas, and maintain good communications to the
tactical commander. The mortar line can remain centralised, grouped as in sections or
deployed as dispersed barrels. It is important that the MFC understands the tactical plan in
order to react quickly when the plan changes. Accurate and rapid mortar fire can be used
in urban areas to destroy enemy positions, block enemy approach routes, forming up
positions and disrupt possible counter attack. In the assault, fire must be lifted at the last
safe moment (LSM). LSM must be judged carefully, but can be reduced by the tactical
commander. Tactical commanders may choose to reduce the safety distances.
54. Direct Role. Mortars can be used in the direct fire role, if necessary. The target is
adjusted by sight by the section commander until the rounds are accurate.
EMPLOYMENT OF MORTARS IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
55. The range and concentrated fire capability of the mortar should be exploited in the
early stages of an enemy assault by being deployed to the forward edge of the built up
area. The mortar OPs should be sited as far forward as possible in order to maximise their
range. Reserve mortar lines should be reconnoitred and prepared amongst the streets and
buildings as the OPs withdraw into the urban area. Base-plate positions should be pre-
prepared to allow for a swift re-occupation.
56. Mortars can be deployed to the rear of, or outside, the town or city in order to provide
unrestricted fire. Communications will be critical to the coordination of accurate and timely
indirect fire; the use of line can also be used as a back up to VHF communications. The
MFC needs to be high enough to maintain good visibility of the target area. He may deploy
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-21

to a tall building, a building on a street junction or an air OP if the aircraft are available and
the air threat is low.
57. Concentration of Fire. The concentration of fire must be carefully coordinated to

achieve the greatest destructive damage to the enemy. Mortar fire is unlikely to penetrate
armour but will force the crew to close down, restricting their view and capability. Splinters
will damage surveillance and communication equipment, and thereby degrade the
operational effectiveness of armoured vehicles. Converging fire on a specific target in order
to maximise concentration must be judged against the resources available and the type of
target that is being engaged. The use of mortar rounds onto a street in a linear fashion can
be used to break up an attack in depth. The re-supply of mortar lines must be carefully
coordinated and can be achieved through the use of pre-dumped ammunition.
AMMUNITION
58. Mortar ammunition includes:
a. High Explosive.
(1) Lethality. The lethality radius of HE rounds is reduced by the walls of

buildings around the point of impact. However a round detonating in an
enclosed area has a greater level of lethality which may be enhanced due to
the ricochet effect off road surfaces and buildings.
(2) Delay. Use of the delay fuse on the HE round will enable the round to
penetrate a tiled roof before exploding. The delay will be about 0.05 of a
second between first penetration and explosion. Use of the delay fuse
against thick, sun dried mud roofs will be less effective.
(3) Proximity. Use of the proximity fuse will enable rounds to be exploded
at seven feet or 14 feet above ground. Tall buildings can cause proximity
fused mortar rounds to detonate prematurely if they pass too closely.
b. Illumination.
(1) The 81mm mortar burn time for white illumination is 33 seconds over a
200m radius. The 60mm burn time is 25-35 seconds over a 200m radius.
The radius could be limited by shadow caused by buildings and walls in the
immediate vicinity.
(2) The use of IR illumination by the 81mm mortar enables troops

equipped with Night Vision Systems to see without the enemy being aware
they are being illuminated (IR Illumination has a small noise and light
signature when used). The radius is the same, 200m, but the burn time is
increased to 90 seconds.
(3) Urban areas degrade the effects of illuminants. They are often of
limited use because of the deep canyons and building shadows. Rapidly
shifting wind currents in built-up areas also degrade mortar illumination.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-22

c. White Phosphorous.
(1) White Phosphorus (WP)25 is effective in starting fires in buildings which

may force the enemy out of cellars and light frame buildings. It is also the
most effective mortar round against dug-in enemy tanks. Even near-misses
blind and suppress tank crews, forcing them to close hatches.
(2) Mortar smoke tends to persist longer and give greater coverage in
built-up areas than in open terrain. However this tendency to linger means
that its use can create adverse affects for friendly forces.
SECTION 2 – COMBAT SUPPORT
ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE IN SUPPORT OF URBAN OPERATIONS26
59. General. Firepower is the fundamental capability of field artillery27. It shatters the
enemy’s cohesion and undermines his will to fight. It enables the combat arms to
manoeuvre through either the application of firepower or the demonstrable capability to
apply firepower. The roles and tasks of close support artillery and Naval Gunfire Support
(NGS) do not change in the urban environment, although the manner in which they are
applied must be tailored to that environment. The wider proliferation and increased
availability of precision guided munitions, in particular GMLRS, has increased the utility of
artillery in urban operations. Provided that the target information is sufficiently accurate,
then the significant reduction in probable error means that the impact of collateral damage
is vastly reduced.
60. Deployment. The close proximity of buildings and other obstacles affects
manoeuvrability, and can create a significant cresting problem. The deployment of guns
can also be complicated by the proximity of the local population. Furthermore, the effects
of guns firing in built up areas may reduce the stability of buildings and structures and
create the added danger of falling masonry on own troops and civilians. However, mindful
of certain considerations and constraints, guns can deploy into and fire from urban areas.
Examples are firing from within a roofless building with walls capable of withstanding the
blast and overpressure created by firing, or hiding in buildings and moving outside to
engage from a firing point.
61. Employment. Artillery can have significant utility in urban operations, although due
consideration must be given to collateral damage and ROE issues. In the indirect role, UK
artillery systems can be fired in the high angle, thereby reducing the constraining impact of
‘dead space’ behind buildings at the target end. The advent of precision-guided artillery
has vastly increased the utility of artillery in urban areas with a limited collateral damage
footprint. The following factors should be considered when directing effect from artillery
systems into urban areas:
a. Fuze Settings. The fuzes on artillery HE rounds can be set to suit certain
conditions as follows:
25
The use of WP can be deemed unlawful if it is employed contrary to the LOAC, in particular against civilians
and their property, and against combatants were it to cause unnecessary suffering.
26
27
This section should be read with Chapter 10, section 7, Indirect Fire Effects.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-23
(1) Proximity. Artillery fuzes can be set to proximity (airburst), which is
effective against personnel and soft-skinned vehicles in the open, although it
has little effect against robust structures; this might be taken into
consideration as a way to reduce collateral damage. The safety distances for
proximity are greater than for other fuze settings.
(2) Point Detonating (PD). HE PD is effective against structures, but the

round explodes on impact with the ground or a structure, so if a round were to
hit a structure, then much of the explosive effect would be outside of that
structure.
(3) Delay. If a round with a delay fuze were to strike a structure, then it is
likely that the round would penetrate and detonate inside the structure, with
the structure itself perhaps containing some of the fragmentation and blast
effects from the round. Furthermore, if the round were to strike the ground,
then – depending on the nature of that ground – the round might detonate in
the ground, which would absorb some of the blast and fragmentation effect.
This might be taken into consideration as a way to reduce collateral damage.
b. Ammunition.
(1) High Explosive. High Explosive (HE) is best used in the high angle
(as described above) when firing into or from an urban environment. High
angle allows the engagement of targets on the ground between buildings that
may otherwise be in the shadow of said structures. High angle also allows
the blast and fragmentation to be directed straight down onto the target rather
than losing kinetic effect on walls and other obstacles behind which the
enemy may take cover. When engaging targets with HE, consideration
should be given to the penetration qualities of the rounds. Setting a delay on
the fuze will allow the round to penetrate some roofs before detonating within
the structure. The blast effect of an HE shell detonating within a closed
structure should be considered as the main effect of the round as opposed to
fragments of splinters. The blast will be contained within a structure and
follow the path of least resistance (through open doorways, along corridors)
and will have a greater effect than shell splinters, the effects of which may be
constrained by thick walls and floors. The blast of an HE shell is likely to
cause secondary fragmentation from windows and doors which will add to the
splinter effects and may cause injury outside of the safe distance of a round.
This is especially true in areas with large, glass fronted structures. Proximity
can be used to neutralise threats in the open and on top of buildings.
However, as with mortar proximity fuzes, shells passing close to tall structures
may function prematurely due to the sensitivity of the Doppler radar based
fuze system.
(2) Smoke. Smoke can be used in the urban environment but

consideration must be given to what effect it will have on friendly forces as
well as the enemy. Unlike mortar smoke, artillery smoke is not WP but Base
Ejecting (BE). BE red phosphorous (RP) can still be used to blind enemy
forces including armoured crews but is less likely to have an incendiary effect.
RP will hug the ground more than WP which has a tendency to pillar, and due
to this ground hugging characteristic it may leave the tops of taller buildings
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-24

exposed and the enemy on them unsuppressed. The movement of air
through an urban environment means that smoke fired into it will linger on the
downwind side of any structure and may swirl in directions other than straight
downwind. This may cause problems for any friendly troops who may
subsequently move into that location. Smoke can be used to mark targets for
air assets but it will be more difficult to locate a point of origin within an urban
environment especially if there is any wind present due to the swirling effect of
the smoke.
(3) Illumination. Artillery illumination suffers from the same problem as

mortar illumination (see above). Illumination can also be fired to burn on the
ground which can be an effective marker, both day and night, for air assets.
Illumination burning on the ground or on buildings may also start fires which
may force the enemy out of cellars and light frame buildings. Users must be
aware of the secondary effects of burning buildings, such as smoke, and the
consequences for friendly troops who may need to fight through the area later
on. There may be a risk to own troops from illumination carrier shells. Also,
in counter insurgency campaigns the enemy have been known to use
expended carrier shells to construct IEDs.
(4) Inert. Inert ammunition can be used in both the direct and indirect fire
roles. In the direct fire role it can be used to knock holes in structures and
destroy the fabric of buildings. This requires the guns to be relatively close to
the target and this is not desirable. In the indirect role, inert rounds can be
used to as a statement of intent alongside a deliberate info ops campaign in
order to have an effect on the enemy whilst reducing collateral damage. Due
to the lack of any blast effect, an effect on the enemy from an inert round
requires an obvious direct hit on the intended target, or at least an indication
in the mind of an adversary that a round has landed.
62. Precision Munitions.
a. Guided Munitions. GPS guided munitions such as GMLRS have significant

utility in urban operations due to their accuracy and the ability to use a delay fuze,
thereby achieving penetration into a structure and potentially containing much of the
effect of the strike within the structure. GPS guided munitions rely on a mensurated
grid for target engagement, and are therefore not suitable for use against mobile
targets. The following table illustrates some of the characteristics of GMLRS:
Ser Characteristic Remarks

1. Purpose • Destruction and Neutralisation – effective
(Effect) • Attrition – possible (resources permitting)
• Suppression and harassing fire – ineffective
2. Warhead 200lb class warhead, blast optimised, containing 54lbs of HE. One
rocket has a lethal splinter (fragmentation) distance of 40m. The
warhead (incl. rocket) has poor fragmentation qualities.
3. Target Set • Compounds – Point Detonating (PD) is effective
• Buildings & trenches – Delay Shallow (DS) is effective
• Bunkers – Delay Deep (DD) is effective (dependent upon
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-25

protection)
28
• Personnel – PD is effective (static only)
• Soft skin vehicles – PD is effective (static only)
• Armoured vehicles – Ineffective
4. Accuracy GMLRS accuracy depends principally upon the ‘quality’ of the
target location GR. On operations in Afghanistan FSTs routinely
observe GMLRS impact within 10m of the point of aim when used
in conjunction with a mensurated target GR.
5. Surprise The rocket glides silently for the last 2/3 of its trajectory. The
rocket impacts without warning.
6. Trajectory Default is ‘vertical - 89º’ (nominal - 65º is available). Weapons that
impact vertically spread fragment less than weapons coming in
from the side. Vertical trajectory negates any error in the fire
mission altitude.
7. Range Maximum 70km, minimum 15km
8. Responsiveness Planning time from the call for fire until the platform is ready to fire
can be significant due to the requirement to clear airspace. (On Op
HERRICK 9 in 2008/9 the average has been around 8 mins.) Time
of flight varies from 20 seconds to 2.5 minutes, depending on
range.
b. Loitering Munitions. Loitering munitions (LM) are due into service in 201029.
LMs will provide a precise method of engaging a static or moving target.
63. Point of Aim. In an attempt to reduce the collateral damage effects of massed or
non-precision artillery, the point of aim can be adjusted by the observer. For example,
artillery fire can be employed on the fringes of urban areas as a cut-off, or to fix an
adversary, whilst reducing the destructive effect of artillery inside the urban area. In a
similar vein, artillery can be used to demonstrate close to or in urban areas, most notably
with non-lethal natures such as smoke or illumination. However, steps must be taken to
ensure that the empty carrier shells do not cause undesired effects30.
64. Factors Affecting Employment. In the Contemporary Operating Environment it is

very unlikely that forces will be able to operate without restrictions, even in high intensity
operations. The following should be considered:
a. Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE). The CDE process may limit the ability
of an observer to attack targets. While the use of artillery should be proportionate
and collateral damage minimised, this must not so restrict freedom of action that the
required effects cannot be achieved. Specific and clear instruction on CDE must be
given to maximise freedom of action, including procedures for authorising fire when
required.
b. ROE. ROE authorising the use of crew served and indirect fire weapon
systems often have a number of conditions. Built up areas are likely to include
Restricted or Prohibited Targets within their bounds and civilians could still be, or be
28
A proximity fuze for GMLRS is due into service in 2009. This will increase the efficacy of GMLRS against
personnel in the open and soft-skinned vehicles (static only).
29
As at Apr 09: EOC is Dec 10.
30
During 2008 while firing in support of troops in contact and aware of the risks, a carrier shell fired from UK
artillery killed an Iraqi woman in Basra province.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-26
presumed to be, in the area, all of which must be considered when planning for the
use of artillery in the urban environment. Any procedures for the clearance or
authorisation of fires must be clear and responsive to the needs of the troops in
contact.
c. Ammunition. The need to select the ammunition which will achieve the
required effect is not specific to the urban environment. CDE and ROE may limit the
ammunition available for selection. The environment itself can limit the effectiveness
of some ammunition or change the manner in which it can be used. Illuminating
ammunition can be used to mark targets for aircraft by allowing the flares to burn on
the ground; in the urban environment this may start fires that could create obstacles,
obscuration or even force troops out of key locations.
d. Location of Observers and Fire Support Teams. The coordinated use of

indirect fire in any environment relies on the effective deployment of observers in
order to conduct dynamic procedural control of fires and joint fires. Observers and
Fire Support Teams (FSTs) find maintaining coverage of the ground challenging,
particularly when mobile, as fields of view are usually very limited. Observers need
the ability to move quickly (protection should be a key consideration) to control
engagements and to communicate effectively if they are to influence the battle. A
combination of anchor Ops and observers with the manoeuvre troops is one way of
achieving this. The anchor will have a good general command of the ground, with
the other observers more limited in their coverage, but well placed to conduct
individual attacks. The plan for the deployment of observers must be specifically
addressed during the Plan Review Execute Evaluate (PREE) cycle and use of Air
Observation Posts (AOPs) should be considered. When in range, naval gunfire can
provide effective fire support. If naval gunfire is used, a liaison team should be
attached to the appropriate units. Any liaison unit would operate at the unit’s main
CP. Two firepower control teams normally operate at the company level, providing
ship-to-shore communications and coordination for naval gunfire support. It should
be noted that due to the nature of naval gunfire support (NGS) and technology,
certain constraints apply to the type of fire that can be made available. Current NGS
offers highly accurate flat trajectory fire rather than effective suppressive fire.
e. Ammunition Selection. As indicated, the nature of the environment may

change the selection criteria for some ammunition natures. The risk of fire has been
highlighted and must be considered when planning missions, particularly with
illuminating and WP rounds. PD and Delay fuzes will function in the upper levels of
a building, with little or no effect on the lower ones. Against concrete reinforced
structures considerable amounts of ammunition may be required to cause damage
and casualties, which may be prohibitive wither in terms of CSS or damage caused.
HE fuzed with proximity will have little effect on the structures themselves, but is
effective for clearing streets or rooftops. The availability of precision munitions will
directly affect the way that artillery is fought in this environment. GMLRS (Guided
Multiple Launch Rocket Systems) is extremely effective as it has good penetrative
capability and (providing the target information is sufficiently accurate) it can be used
to attack specific parts of the building thus containing the effects, reducing collateral
damage and the risk to friendly forces.
f. Engagement Ranges. Experience has shown that in the urban environment

engagements happen at very short range. This affects the way that artillery can be
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-27

used as targets may be too close to friendly forces to be engaged with ‘dumb’
munitions. However the buildings themselves may provide sufficient protection for
fire to be brought into very close range, although the weight of fire (eg the number of
guns) and ammunition nature (area coverage) have to be considered. GMLRS will
allow the execution of attacks within close proximity to friendly forces.
g. High/Low Angle Fire. In relation to the line of fire, there will be areas
‘behind’ buildings which artillery cannot engage. High angle fire reduces the size of
these areas because the angle of descent is much steeper. However, there will
always be areas which cannot be engaged, although the size will vary considerably
depending on the complexity and high rise development of an urban area. Other
weapon systems will be required to achieve effects in these areas.
h. Direct Fire. In the direct fire role artillery has historically played an important
part in urban operations. Whilst use of artillery in the direct fire role would normally
be associated with defence of the gun position, it could feasibly be utilised as a direct
fire weapon in certain situations, for example to achieve elevations that some other
direct fire weapon systems are unable to reach. However, the minimum ‘time to
fuze’ function must be considered. Furthermore, artillery can be used in the direct
role to destroy structures when ‘top attack’ might not be feasible; the advantage with
using artillery in this way, as opposed to weapons systems such as tanks which fire
a high velocity round using a fixed charge, is that the artillery round can be fired
using a low charge. This ensures target effect with a reduced danger template
beyond the target, and consequent reduction of ROE and collateral damage
concerns. Self-propelled artillery has particular utility in this role, since the
detachment is afforded a degree of protection by the gun.
.
i. STA. Artillery STA systems are effective in the urban environment, but their
use must be carefully planned in order to reduce any limitations produced by the
physical conditions. The ASP sound ranging system will detect acoustic events, but
accuracy may be reduced as buildings can affect acoustic wave propagation.
Radars have significant dead ground in their coverage as a result of buildings
blocking the radar beam; this is equally true of moving target and weapon locating
radars. UAVs remain a potent capability in built-up areas, although the more dense
and high rise an urban area is, the more complex the mission planning will become.
AIR DEFENCE IN SUPPORT OF URBAN OPERATIONS
65. Air Defence (AD). AD systems can be effective in urban operations. The major
constraint is the requirement to acquire and track targets in an uninterrupted manner over a
significant missile time of flight. This is hindered by the presence of tall buildings, but may
be mitigated by deploying launchers on high points. HVM can be dismounted and fired
from the shoulder or from the LML31, which gives it greater flexibility to deploy in urban
areas including, if necessary, deployment by SH or stairs to high rise roof tops. Rapier FSC
is more constrained by its radar requirements, but could, for example, be driven to the top
of a multi-storey car park. The denser, more complex and high rise an urban area, the
more difficult AD operations will become and consideration should be given to deployment
outside or on the fringes of the urban area.
31
Lightweight Multiple Launcher.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-28
ENGINEER SUPPORT TO URBAN OPERATIONS
66. General. The overall co-ordination of engineer effort for all operations lies with the
Joint Force Engineer. However, decentralised execution is never more critical than in the
urban environment, where reaction times must be fast and effort targeted at the local level.
Although it is normal to resist ‘penny-packeting’ of engineer resources, the best use of
combat engineer assets is often gained by using small teams to support the fighting in an
urban environment. Nevertheless, there will be times when sub-unit or even a unit is
focussed entirely on formation level objectives, with peacetime troop, section and crew
structures being broken up to create teams that can work on specialist capabilities (eg
electrical supply, water provision etc). Sufficient flexibility of mind and quick re-organisation
is essential to be able to meet the rapidly changing nature of tasks.
67. Roles. The recognised roles of employment of engineers for operations apply
equally to operations in the urban environment as they do anywhere else:
a. Mobility Support. A variety of man-made objects such as steps, ditches,

craters, barriers, man-made obstacles, rubble and/or mines could be used to deny
freedom of movement or canalise a force. The Trojan breaching vehicle offers an
enhanced capability in leading a penetration or thrust in the form of a grab arm and
increased power and protection. It can also operate closed-down with the use of
cameras. Explosive breaching methods may have to be used, though the risk of
causing collateral damage is likely to be significant. Booby trap clearance requires
dismounted combat engineers and route maintenance tasks require additional plant
assets. Titan bridge-layers can be used to cross gaps during the investment and
break-in phases on the edge of the urban environment in order to assist in the
breakthrough of protective obstacle belts that cannot be crossed by Trojan and its
fascines. Titan can also be fitted with the Bulk Earth Moving Attachment (BEMA)
and full/track width mine plough if necessary, allowing it to clear mines and some
ditch/earth obstacles. Likewise in defensive operations Titan fitted with a BEMA can
create ‘A’ vehicle pits.
b. Counter-mobility Support. Employment of obstacles and mines can be

used to deny, delay, disrupt or canalise the enemy, as part of an investment as much
as in defence. The principle of emplacing mines within obstacles and covering them
with fire remains extant.
c. Survivability Support. Survivability is an all arms responsibility. Close

support engineers have only a limited knowledge of structures and weapon effects,
but can seek specialist advice from Wks Gp RE. Static defensive positions may
require fortification32 and formations or units employing a mobile defence can be
advised on existing structures that offer enhanced survivability33. In the
Contemporary Operating Environment and Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations,
field fortifications are required to increase the survivability of potential targets such
as camps, patrol bases, observation posts (OP), vehicle check points (VCP).
Clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW), weapon collection and disposal also
32
ME Vol 2 Field Engineering - Pam 2 Field Fortifications, Chapter 8 Urban Fortification.
33
ME Vol 2 Field Engineering - Pam 2 Field Fortifications, Part B Chapter 1 Building Construction Types and
Table 8-1.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-29
increase the survivability of a force. The likely scale of battlefield munitions
clearance and the associated manpower requirement should not be underestimated.
d. General Engineer Support. In the build up to combat operations there will

be a requirement for general engineering support such as camp infrastructure, range
construction and PW cages. Although Close Support (CS) engineers will be
focussed on preparing for combat, the Joint Force Engineer will be required to
balance the competing needs of different elements of the Force. Close support
engineer units can undertake most general support engineering tasks, including
limited restoration of essential services, route maintenance, camp infrastructure and
PW cages.
68. Guidelines for Employment. The following factors should be considered when
employing Engineers in the urban environment:
a. Combined Arms Teams. At the tactical level, operations in an urban

environment normally require the deployment of integrated all arms teams. In an
urban operation close support engineers may need to be represented as low as
platoon or section level. During the battle for Basra in 2003 some of the lead
platoons had two-man engineer teams in each Warrior fighting vehicle. On dismount
the two-man engineer team would often be the first to exit the vehicle to identify and
clear mines and booby traps or gain entry to buildings. It is essential therefore that
close support engineers are able to fight effectively and are afforded the same
degree of protection and mobility as the combat arms that they are supporting.
Similarly, larger engineer tasks in the urban environment will normally require the
provision of combat arm escorts and protection, unless being undertaken in a benign
environment.
b. Early Warning and Reconnaissance. Terrain and infrastructure information

is vital to the planning process for all operations. Such information includes
mapping, types of urban areas, layouts, building construction, key installations, likely
weapon effects on buildings, etc. Much of this is available from open sources and a
variety of manned and unmanned collection assets from across the force can
contribute to the picture; specialist engineers may be required to collect/provide
some information (eg building construction, weapon effects). The urban environment
can swallow manpower, equipment and materiel very quickly. Early warning of likely
tasks and information on availability of local materiel is essential. Unit diving teams
can also provide key information on bridges, waterways and sub-surface systems.
c. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. Allied to the need for an

effective means of accessing or collecting terrain and infrastructure information is the
need to develop a broad approach to the IPB process. Engineers can advise on the
availability and vulnerability of essential and non-essential services to local
communities, so that a balance can be struck between targeting during war fighting
and the need for such services during the subsequent reconstruction and
development.
d. Battle Procedure. Slick battle procedure is always necessary for the

effective delivery of close engineer support, but even more so in the urban
environment where the demands placed by the three block war can change the
nature and type of engineer support (principally between combat and construction
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-30

engineering) very quickly and over very short distances. A high tempo of response
and reaction is therefore required. Effective communications across the engineer
command is essential to deliver this. Information will have to go up, down and
across to ensure engineer commanders remain constantly updated. It is vital that all
incidents are reported in an accurate and timely manner in order that ongoing and
subsequent operations can benefit from experience already gained. The introduction
of Bowman and the Makefast Battlefield Information System Application 34 will
enhance the communication function.
69. Engineers in Offensive Urban Operations.

a. The Investment. Past tactical doctrine for the employment of engineer
reconnaissance at both formation and battlegroup level has focused on rural war-
fighting with very little direction for urban operations. During the transition from the
rural battle to the investment of an urban area a key requirement for all arms
reconnaissance assisted by engineers, will be to identify routes, vulnerable points,
obstacles etc. Their ability to quickly pass likely tasks to the squadron within a
battlegroup will enable concurrent activity within the troops and ultimately maintain
momentum. Slick battle procedure is necessary for the effective delivery of engineer
support in the urban environment where the nature and type of engineer support can
change very quickly and over very short distances. A high tempo of response and
reaction is therefore required.
(1) Terrain and infrastructure information is vital to the planning process in

all operations.
(a) Formation and battlegroup reconnaissance assets, usually

supported by engineers, will be required to select a number of
approach routes based on the identification and assessment of natural
and man-made obstacles surrounding and leading some way into the
urban environment. The provision of detailed 3-dimensional terrain
analysis including the subterranean attack corridors is likely to be key
to success.
(b) Early identification of the types of urban terrain35 including key

structures, likely enemy strong points, HQs or communication centres,
will be critical to shaping the operation.
(c) The identification of essential services (water, gas, electricity)

will be critical. The assaulting force must understand how each utility
system works in order to be able to disable key elements as necessary
and reinstate them post conflict.
(2) As the battle progresses reconnaissance assets should be

focusing on the identification of enemy in-depth positions, likely counter-attack
routes and counter-mobility tasks. When faced with a large urban sprawl,
reconnaissance assets will have to travel greater distances to circumnavigate
an urban area to avoid a tactical engagement. Alternatively, the
34
Engineer planning tool on Bowman
35
Financial/Business district, Historical/Old town, High, Medium and Low Residential and Slums/Shanty
towns, Heavy Industrial and Light Industrial. See Part A, Chapter 1, paragraph 20.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-31
reconnaissance assets will be forced to move into depth using a secure urban
avenue of approach some distance from the objective.
(3) As part of FR and operational intelligence gathering, conduct route

reconnaissance; early identification of obstacles, structures (including sewers
and tunnels) and strong points; terrain analysis; and potential counter-mobility
options on possible counter-attack routes.
b. The Break-In. The use of engineer assets to contribute to the collection of

terrain and infrastructure information has been covered in the paragraphs above, but it
is worth reiterating that their tasks are continuous and as varied as each new avenue
of approach that presents itself. The engineer assets embedded in Formation Recce
will remain with squadrons gathering high-level, coarse-grained information.
Engineers working with the battlegroup close recce will refine the knowledge of terrain,
infrastructure and routes. Integral recce, ie those assets within engineer squadrons,
will complete detailed recces to enable engineer tasks to be undertaken.
(1) Close Reconnaissance. Working with battlegroup close recce,

engineer close recce assets should be focussing on the detailed
reconnaissance of obstacles along the avenue of approach. Other tasks will
include the preparation of initial reports and the preliminary identification of
harbour areas/hides etc.
(2) Integral Reconnaissance. Integral reconnaissance, ie those assets

within engineer squadrons, will complete the detailed recce of engineer tasks
to enable materiel and troops to be brought forward and the task completed in
a timely manner.
(3) CS Engineering. A variety of man-made objects such as ditches,

craters, barriers, rubble and emplaced explosive ordnance can deny freedom
of movement or canalise a force. Mechanical (Trojan or plant) or explosive
(PE4) breaching methods should be used. Whether light, armoured, field or a
mixture, commanders should expect to be tasked to provide the following
support:
(a) Armoured Engineering. Trojan is a suitable lead vehicle if

obstacles and mines are anticipated, otherwise it should be positioned
well forward. Careful control is required to ensure that it does not
become isolated from the armour/infantry it is supporting by becoming
too focussed on the task ahead. Situation dependant, the vulnerability
of Trojan and the increased chance of flanking or elevated RPG
attacks in the urban environment make it essential that mutual support
and close armoured protection is maintained whilst engineers are on
task. The rapid deployment of fascines to combat anti-tank ditches and
well practised mechanical breaching drills will enable the remainder of
the battlegroup to exploit success.
(b) Combat Engineering. The engineers are key to sustainable

mobility measures and influencing the momentum of a battlegroup
through mobility tasks during the break in battle.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-32

(i) Mobility. Battlegroup and follow-on forces require defile
lanes, the clearance of fields of fire and route clearance along
alley ways, through structures (houses /gardens /garages) all of
which may contain mines or booby traps. The clearance of UXO
and the associated manpower requirement should not be
underestimated and rarely will there be sufficient specialist EOD
troops to clear everything: it will be essential to prioritise the
work and it may be necessary to use combat engineers on
occasion with the authority from the JF engineer. At the same
time, infantry soldiers do not receive training on the
identification, assessment and disposal of booby traps and
mines. Therefore, in order to maintain momentum and to
ensure routes are opened in a timely manner it is essential that
engineer assets are placed well forward and grouped with the
assaulting sub-units.
(ii) Counter-Mobility. The employment of obstacles and

mines can be used to deny, delay, disrupt or canalise the
enemy. The principle of employing mines within obstacles and
covering them with fire remains extant in any type of operation.
(iii) Survivability Support. A close support engineer unit

can offer some advice on building structures and defensive
measures though specialist engineers will be required to advise
on weapon effects, particularly defensive measures against
Enhanced Blast Weapons (EBW). Temporary static defensive
positions or patrol bases may require some degree of
fortification against counter attacks, reiterating the need to have
engineers placed well forward within the lead companies during
the break-in battle.
b. Urban Penetration. The close engineer support to the tactic of Urban

Penetration required is likely to be:
(1) Mobility. Trojan is a suitable lead vehicle if obstacles and mines are
anticipated, otherwise it should be positioned well forward. Titan is vulnerable
deployed in the urban environment and should be held further back and cued
by engineer recce. Mine clearance and removal of demolition charges may
have to be conducted by hand36. Engineer (Search, EOD and Combat
Engineer trained) or Assault Pioneer representation may be required down to
section level. If sub-surface routes are being used, dismounted combat
engineers, divers or specialist working in Confined Spaces (WICS) trained
troops may be required to clear and prove routes.
(2) Counter-Mobility. Once seized, the target area may be threatened by

counter-attack. Hasty obstacles may be required to defend the objective.
Ditching, improvised obstacles and hand emplaced mines all offer timely
solutions.
36
During the battle for Basra in 2003, mines were cleared from routes by hand whilst under enemy fire.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-33
(3) Survivability. EOD/booby trap clearance may be required and the
survivability of the defending force can be enhanced by digging fire support
positions using all available mechanical assets (eg Trojan and plant) or
fortifying the position (bunds, sandbags or Hesco37 walls).
c. Urban Thrust. The provision of close engineer support to the tactic of urban
thrust could include:
(1) Mobility. Trojan is a suitable lead vehicle if obstacles and mines are
anticipated, otherwise it should be positioned well forward. Titan is vulnerable
deployed in the urban environment and should be held further back and cued
by engineer recce. Mine clearance and removal of demolition charges may
have to be conducted by hand. Engineer (Search, EOD and Combat
Engineer trained) or assault pioneer representation may be required down to
section level. If sub-surface routes are being used, dismounted combat
engineers, divers or specialist working in Confined Spaces (WICS) trained
troops may be required to clear and prove routes.
(2) Counter-Mobility. During an urban thrust, the force is vulnerable to

attack from the flanks. Hasty obstacle emplacement may be required to
protect the flanks of thrusts. Hasty obstacles may also be used to facilitate
the withdrawal of friendly forces from the thrust.
d. Urban Saturation. The key to the tactic of urban saturation is speed and
flexibility; effective mobility support is essential. Teams responding to a call for
assistance must be able to reach the intended target area rapidly. Engineer
representation with each of the deployed teams is preferable, but may not be
practical. Accurate terrain intelligence and mapping must be made available prior to
the operation; engineer reconnaissance and analysis must remain responsive
throughout an operation.
e. Securing of Objectives. Situation and ROE dependant, commanders should

expect to find themselves carrying out a protracted break-in battle which may or may
not culminate in an objective. At the same time, engineer troops previously
employed with the lead platoons who have gone into a defensive stance may be
asked to reorganise in order to provide engineer assistance to secure an objective -
which by its very nature is likely to be fortified in some way.
f. Clearance and Reorganisation. Once the key objectives have been

secured it remains an all arms responsibility to conduct a thorough clearance of the
area whilst the reconnaissance assets continue to carry out their primary task of
identifying enemy counter attack routes or in depth positions.
(1) CS Troops. In order to upgrade hastily built defences and to upgrade

routes, CS troops will find themselves retracing their steps to carry out such
tasks as mine and ‘bypassed house’ clearance, route upgrades and the
marking or clearing of patrol lanes between buildings.
(2) EOD and Search. All Arms search teams should be used whenever
possible. Although not held in close support regiments some RE search and
37
Hesco-Bastion; manufacturer of mesh/geofabric gabions to construct protective walls.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-34
EOD assets may be allocated to a formation committed to the clearance of
the urban environment to ensure, as a minimum, access and clearance of the
real estate to be used by own troops. Further capability will be required if
concerted search operations, or clearance of EO hazards to the civilian
population is to be undertaken.
(3) Engineer Logistics. A robust engineer logistic chain is required to

support the varied demands of both combat and force support engineering.
The latter demands the wherewithal to conduct local procurement of
resources to meet the high tempo of urban operations. This must include the
delegation of purchasing authority to regimental or even squadron level.
g. Engineer Tasks. Engineers will be required to undertake a variety of tasks

during offensive operations, including:
(1) Conducting a close technical reconnaissance to determine the exact

location and type of enemy obstacles and minefields, and to make breaching
recommendations.
(2) Clearing obstacles38, including mines and booby traps where

necessary.
(3) Using of hand-emplaced demolitions to destroy fortifications and strong

points that cannot be reduced with the unit's organic assets.
(4) Laying mines and other obstacles to protect flanks and rear areas.
(5) Conducting rapid mobility operations (and non-explosive methods of

entry, gap crossing, support to CSS).
(6) Constructing rapid reinforcement and force protection of temporary

own force locations, together with the provision of counter-mobility effects.
(7) Restoring utilities/services during subsequent consolidation.
70. Engineers in Defensive Urban Operations.
a. Defence against Armour. In defensive situations, when opposed by an

armour-heavy enemy, priority should be given to the construction of anti tank
obstacles throughout the built-up area. Use of local materials, where possible,
makes obstacle construction easier and reduces logistical requirements. Streets
should be barricaded in front of defensive positions at the effective range of anti tank
weapons. These obstacles are used to increase the destruction by anti tank fire, to
separate dismounted enemy infantry from their supporting tanks, and to assist in the
delay and destruction of an attacker. Anti tank mines in and around obstacles and
covered by fire, help to stop an enemy attack.
b. Survivability. Engineer armoured vehicles and plant, in particular Trojan, but

also MWT and LWT, have wide utility in defensive urban operations, whether by
38
Eg rubble, wire, vehicles, as well as urban structures such as walls, ramps, steps, etc.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-35
moving rubble, demolishing buildings for fields of fire or digging in troops and
vehicles.
c. Engineer Tasks. Engineers may perform the following tasks during the
defence of a built-up area:
(1) Construct complex obstacle systems.
(2) Provide technical advice to commanders, to include use of existing

facilities.
(3) Convert buildings to rubble.
(4) Lay mines.
(5) Assist in the preparation of defensive strong points and fields of fire.
(6) Maintain counter-attack, communications, and re-supply routes.
(7) Enhance movement between buildings, catwalks, bridges, and so on.
(8) Construction of operating bases, including force protection and

essential services
(9) Fight as infantry, when needed.
71. Engineer Capability Requirements.
a. Command and Control. Sufficient command and control nodes are required
to cope with concurrently employing assets in close support of Battlegroups whilst
also delivering more general engineering support across the formation’s area of
responsibility. In particular, the engineer staff in a brigade headquarters must have
the ability to cope concurrently with war-fighting, peace support and humanitarian
assistance tasks, including EOD. BGEs will always need to remain with
Battlegroups, but squadron headquarters must be able to switch away.
Responsibility for the CIMIC and reconstruction effort at formation and battlegroup
level could rest with close support engineer COs and OCs, who must interface with
the relevant specialist staff at divisional level and above.
b. Reconnaissance. A robust engineer recce capability is required at all levels

to work with formation and battlegroup recce as well as being tasked separately to
meet critical engineer information requirements. These include identifying sources of
materiel, the detailed analysis of damaged structures and the technical assessment
of essential services.
c. Combat Engineering. Basic combat engineering will remain the foundation

for the delivery of engineer effort in the urban environment. It has applicability
across the spectrum of operations.
d. Armoured Engineering. Armoured engineers are key to assisting with

mobility support to war-fighting missions. Consequently, they must also have the
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-36

capability to dismount and reinforce combat or construction tasks in the urban
environment.
e. Search and EOD. Although not held in close support regiments it should be
expected to deploy search and EOD assets with a formation committed to the urban
environment so as to ensure, as a minimum, access and clearance of real estate for
use by own troops. This will often have to be deployed alongside combat engineers
with the formation’s fighting echelons. Further capability will be required if concerted
search operations, clearance of EO hazards to civilian populations or the training of
a local clearance capability is to be undertaken.
HELICOPTERS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
72. Typically, the use of helicopters in urban operations focuses on support to ground
troops, who will be predominantly dismounted infantry. Missions may involve any of the
fundamental aviation roles39, but their viability will depend on the level of threat, and the
degree of risk that the commander is prepared to take.
a. Where there is a significant threat from enemy AD systems or air interdiction,

the preferred tactics for minimising risk are 'nap of the earth' (NOE) flying; agile
manoeuvre and long sensor/weapon stand off ranges. As a rule, urban terrain will
limit or preclude these preferred tactics by reducing fields of view and engagement
ranges and constraining the helicopter’s agility because of the compressed
manoeuvre space. However, the degree of impact will vary across terrain profiles
ranging from small population centres to urban sprawl and high-density high-rise city
centres. NOE flight has the advantage of masking the aircraft’s approach, which
increases surprise. It also exposes the helicopter to the threat of small arms fire
(SAF) and other 'low tech' short range weaponry, as urban terrain provides the
enemy with an abundance of well concealed and protected fire positions.
b. Flight at medium altitudes (1500' - 3000' above ground) substantially reduces

the effectiveness of SAF and low-tech projectiles, but increases vulnerability to air to
air and surface to air systems, including MANPADs40. Technical countermeasures41
can reduce vulnerability to Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), but the threat from Air
Interdiction and sophisticated AD systems will remain. Consequently, when faced
with a predominately low-tech threat, such as in PSO and COIN operations, medium
level flight is the preferred tactic for reducing risk, and has the added bonus of
improving acquisition ranges for sensors and weapons. Medium level flight can also
be used in a high intensity, hi-tech threat environment, but is only viable when risk
can be mitigated by suppressing the enemy AD and air interdiction capability by
utilising either ground based systems/activity42, or air component support43.
73. Helicopter crews are able to build detailed situation awareness and a useful rapport
with ground units, which will increase with the ability to operate from medium level for
39
Offensive Action, ISTAR, Control and Direction of Firepower, Command Support, Movement of Personnel
and Materiel.
40
Man-pack (shoulder launched) air defence missile systems.
41
Defensive Aids Suites (DAS) fitted to helicopters can include a variety of countermeasures, including
jammers, flares and chaff, which are designed to defeat specific threats.
42
For example: GBAD, Arty Suppression and EW.
43
For example: Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) packages to
establish local Air Superiority.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-37
protracted periods. Attack Helicopters (AH) are capable of quickly providing accurate fire,
particularly from the 30mm gun housed in the chin-mounted turret, and effective against
personnel and lightly armoured vehicles. AH free-flight rockets may be used against area
targets, but must be delivered from a more deliberate flight profile than the off-axis capable
chin-gun. Hellfire missiles, although primarily intended for use against heavy armour, may
also be used successfully to penetrate buildings. Missiles are available with either Radar
Frequency (RF) guidance (which can only recognise vehicle targets), or Semi-Active Laser
(SAL). Targets for SAL missiles may be designated by the AH onboard laser or remotely.
Operators of Laser Target Designators (LTD) need to be aware that flat, reflective surfaces,
typically found built-up areas, increase the risk of false lock-on.
74. ISTAR. AH are equipped with an excellent range of Electro Optical (EO), Thermal
Imaging (TI) and radar sensors, which although optimised for target acquisition, can also be
used for observation and surveillance tasks. Other helicopters can be fitted with EO and TI
surveillance systems, many of which can provide real time imagery down-linked to ground
stations. Such systems used over urban areas at medium height, beyond enemy weapons
range, by day or night, can overcome many the difficulties faced by ground based
observation, and provide the ground commander with vital information that is responsive to
the situation as it develops.
75. Helicopter Assault Operations. Helicopter assault operations are normally split
into two categories:
a. Large-Scale Assaults. Spaces big enough for large scale helicopter

operations can be found within built up areas, for instance car parks and sports
arenas, but they need to be found and consideration must be given to factors such
as ingress and egress routes.
b. Small-Scale Assaults. Small teams or individuals may have to be landed

onto the rooftop of a specific building. Success depends on minimum exposure, thus
urban direct assault operations are normally conducted at night. However night
operations have a high degree of risk due to the degradation of Night Vision Devices
(NVD) in brightly lit areas and the difficulty in identifying urban obstacles (eg
electrical wires, telephone poles, antennas, mines and wire). Such operations are
normally conducted by aircraft which routinely support SF Ops. Before making such
an assault there should be confirmation that no obstacles exist (eg electrical wires,
telephone poles, antennas, mines and wire) that could damage either the helicopter
or the deplaning troops. In many urban areas there may be buildings with purpose-
built helipads but other buildings, for example multi-storey car parks, are usually
strong enough to support the weight of a light helicopter. The delivery of troops onto
a building can also be accomplished by abseil, fast-roping or hover-jumping from the
helicopter.
76. Air Movement of Troops and Supplies. The tempo of urban operations can result
in a greater turn-over of troops engaged in combat, and there may also be more casualties
than with units fighting in open terrain. At the same time, roads are likely to be crowded
with re-supply units and evacuation vehicles, and may also be blocked by craters or rubble.
Helicopters provide a means of bypassing such obstructions, and delivering troops to the
last covered position short of the fighting. Similar techniques can be used for air movement
of supplies and for casualty evacuation.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-38

77. Support for Convoys and Vehicle Patrols. Helicopters, in particular AH, can
provide excellent observation and fire support (top cover) to convoys and vehicle patrols.
Overall effectiveness in this role increases with the ability to operate from medium level for
protracted periods.
78. Close44 Combat Attack. Close Combat Attack (CCA) is a mission flown in close
support of ground forces to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, delay, deter or otherwise affect
enemy forces and requires detailed integration with the fire and movement of friendly
forces. AH is the best platform for providing CCA in the Urban Operations. Other armed
aviation can conduct CCA, but limited firepower and protection reduces effectiveness and
survivability. The fires capabilities of armed aviation will be maximised when integrated
with other force elements including Close Air Support (CAS), Indirect Fire Support and GM.
Armed aviation can be task organised to Ground Manoeuvre brigades and Battlegroups for
CCA operations and therefore all commanders and their staffs, down to the lowest level,
must understand how CCA can be utilised in support of GM units45.
79. CCA Control. CCA will normally be conducted through a trained controller46 using a
standardised (NATO) call for fire. This ensures that the observer understands and
considers the issues relating to ROE, collateral damage, fratricide, and battlespace
management. However, in an emergency situation, it is possible for an untrained observer
to call for Emergency-CCA (E-CCA) using a simplified format, which alerts the aircrew to
emergency nature of the mission, and that they must take full responsibility for the target
effects. Detailed call for fire procedures are contained in Annex A to AFM Volume 1 Part 12
– Air Manoeuvre Operations.
80. Communications Planning. Aviation units providing support to ground manoeuvre

forces must be included in the communications plan. At present Battlefield Helicopter (BH)
radios are not fully interoperable with BOWMAN, and the deployment of Secure Voice
Rebroadcast (SVR) may require special consideration47. Helicopters can also assist C3
(airborne relays and command posts).
AIR (FIXED WING) SUPPORT IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
81. General. The compressed battle space in the urban environment increases the
difficulties experienced under the planning and conduct of ‘traditional’ Close Air Support
(CAS48) aircraft operations. Targets are hard to locate and identify, non-combatants and
both enemy and friendly forces could be intermingled, there is a significant risk of fratricide,
and enemy short-range air defence weapons are hard to suppress.
82. Threats. Urban terrain provides excellent cover and concealment for a variety of
weapon systems. The terrain and infrastructure may limit suppression options and the
cluttered environment with light, fire and smoke will make threat and target acquisition
difficult.
44
The term “close” refers to the battle situation and does not imply a specific distance.
45
AFM Volume 1 Part 2 – Battlegroup Tactics.
46
A trained controller refers to an individual who has completed a recognised course in CCA and carried out
live controls. This is normally restricted to FOO, OP Ack levels 3&4, MFC (A&B), NGA levels 3&4, FAC, and
AAC Aircraft Commanders. The opportunity for live controls currently only occurs during Mission Specific
Training (MST).'
47
Appendix 2 to Chapter 2 to AFM Volume 1 Part 12 - AH Interoperability with BOWMAN gives more detail on
the capabilities and deployment of SVR.
48
ATP-3.3.2.1 Tactics, Techniques and procedures for close air support operations.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-39
83. Employment. When employing CAS aircraft in support of forces operating in the
urban environment the following should be considered:
a. Surveillance. CAS platforms normally have the ability to remain in a holding

pattern above the threat whilst being able to transmit real-time intelligence to the
Ground Commander. UAVs will offer longer persistence in this surveillance role.
b. Presence. The overt presence of CAS platforms can dissuade the enemy
from engaging.
c. Shock and Concussion. Heavy air bombardment provides tactical

advantages to an attacker. The shock and concussion of the bombardment reduce
the efficiency of defending troops and can destroy defensive positions.
d. Rubble and Debris. The rubble and debris resulting from air attacks may
increase the defender's cover while creating major obstacles to the movement of
both defending and attacking forces.
e. Proximity. The proximity of opposing forces to friendly troops may require

the use of precision-guided munitions and may require the temporary
disengagement of friendly forces in contact. In addition, the use of precision guided
munitions may be limited by the proximity of structures which may affect acquisition
or the terminal phase of flight of an air weapon.
f. Indigenous Facilities. The use of air weapons may be restricted by the

presence of civilians or the requirement to preserve key facilities within a city.
g. Limited Ground Observation. Limited ground observation may require the

use of an airborne FAC.
84. Offensive Operations. CAS may be employed during offensive operations to:
a. To support the Investment Force by interdicting entry and exit routes to the
built up area.
b. To support attacking units by reducing enemy strong points with precision

guided munitions.
c. To conduct tactical air reconnaissance and to provide detailed intelligence of

enemy dispositions, equipment, and strengths.
85. Defensive Operations. CAS may be employed during defensive operations:
a. To strike enemy attack formations and concentrations outside the built-up

area.
b. To provide precision-guided munitions to support counter attacks.
86. Command and Control. Urban terrain presents severe problems in maintaining
communications due to manmade structures that inhibit Line of Sight (LOS) and absorb or
reflect transmitted signals, similar to weapon employment problems. While these problems
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-40

will force a higher degree of decentralization, the combat force should make every attempt
to minimize them.
87. Forward Air Controllers (FAC). In CAS positive air to ground communications are
essential to coordinate and authenticate markings. Considerable training in an urban
environment is required for both FAC and aircrew. A high FAC proficiency in normal CAS
procedures is critical if the FAC is to step into an urban environment with no previous urban
training. For successful urban CAS there are a number of specific considerations:
a. If an FAC on the ground cannot see the target, the engagement should be
handed over to an airborne FAC, if available.
b. The commanders should be aware that an FAC may not be in position to

observe all areas and buildings containing friendly forces due to surrounding
structures and battlefield confusion.
c. During urban CAS it is likely that the FAC will be marking and engaging
targets within 100 meters of his own position, ie within Danger Close parameters,
which will in turn be affected by surrounding infrastructure. The FAC must therefore
select the appropriate ordnance to limit the potential of fratricide.
d. The tactical situation will be changing rapidly from building to building and the
CAS aircraft may need to be used to confirm and report targets in an ISR role.
e. The FAC must plan for redundant communications and marking tools as a
single tool will not work in all urban environments. A FAC will have to apply greater
consideration in utilizing a laser designator as the cluttered environment will affect
acquisition and attack directions. An elevated position will greatly increase attack
success: a ROVER FMV49 link provides a pseudo-elevated position50 to the FAC. At
night, the FAC can employ the FMV link and use CAS IR pointers to mark for other
CAS platforms or ground forces.
f. Normal FAC equipment for urban CAS operations will include:
(1) IR strobe light.
(2) Chemlights/cyalumes.
(3) Pyrotechnics (smoke/illumination).
(4) Access to a grenade launcher with illumination and smoke rounds.
88. Ground to Air Co-ordination. Navigation in the urban environment is difficult. It is

essential for Air that reference systems are produced centrally. Ground forces, FACs and
aircrew should perform detailed mission planning to maximise the effectiveness of all
assets. An urban grid system should be prepared. The FAC should avoid “over-
targeting”51 and select grid sectors based on what the aircrew/aircraft sensors can more
49
Full Motion Video.
50
Although the FAC is on the ground, through ROVER he is getting an elevated ‘Bird’s Eye’ (pseudo) view of
the battlespace.
51
ie By numbering every building in the built up area.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-41
easily see52. Maps fail to show the vertical development of urban terrain and rapid
movement from position can often create confusion between ground and aerial observers
as to friendly and enemy locations. Ground forces, FACs and aircrew should perform
detailed mission planning to maximise the effectiveness of all assets. An urban grid system
labelling structures and prominent features should be prepared. The FAC should select
grid sectors based on what the aircrew/aircraft sensors can most easily see such as rivers,
road junctions, buildings, bridges etc. The FAC should avoid over targeting (ie numbering
every building in the city) and simply number buildings in the expected and adjacent
objective area. CAS planners need to ensure that all involved are using the most current
and accurate maps, imagery, etc that are being used for reference.
89. Basic Urban Grid. The basic urban grid demonstrates lettered and numbered
buildings. Reference to block, letter and number will provide a quick cueing process.
SECTION 3 - COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
“All units in the division were on the “front lines”. There was no sanctuary on the battlefield.
Virtually every element of the division was engaged at some point in the fight. All
movements in the division zone were combat operations….Small paramilitary teams
attacked U.S. forces around the built-up areas in an attempt to draw the division into a city
fight. Unit check points, assembly areas, command post areas, as well as forward elements
faced the constant threat of car bombs, dismounted suicide bombers and limited rocket-
propelled grenade (RPG) and small-arms attacks by two to four-man teams….All elements
in the division had to provide for their own security because the division did not have
sufficient maneuver assets to dedicate to force protection.”
US 1st Sergeant Fullard,

nd
B Battery, 1/10 Field Artillery, 2 Marine Infantry Brigade,
Nasiriyah, Iraq, 2003
CSS GUIDELINES
90. During operations in built-up areas, the terrain and the nature of warfare creates
unique demands on units and formations. The delivery of timely CSS is affected by
increased ammunition consumption, high casualty rates, transport difficulties consequent of
the decentralized nature of the threat and the 24 hour and all round vulnerability of all arms.
Enduring operations require intimate close support, characterised by discrete task
organised logistic groupings that provide first-line support to deployed force elements.
Innovative techniques and in-depth planning are required.
91. Troops involved in defensive operations may be fighting for protracted periods in
small, often isolated, groups. Resupply, reinforcement and maintenance will need
imagination, anticipation, robust communications and constant updated situation
awareness. Every means of transport asset should be considered to achieve the aim.
92. An attacking force is also likely to encounter difficulties. CSS planning and preparation
has to be thorough for both attack and defence. Although logistic resupply will be more
difficult in urban terrain, some circumstances and for limited periods there could be extra
52
eg Rivers, roads, road junctions, major buildings and bridges.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-42
resources available locally, particularly defence stores and food. Proper requisitioning
procedures should be observed.
93. The nature of the urban environment means that CSS personnel are likely to be
caught up in close quarter fighting. Training must prepare CSS personnel to be equipped
and ready to fight in the urban environment. Every soldier will need to be prepared to drive,
maintain and repair vehicles, navigate, communicate, provide medical assistance and fight
to get support forward. The number and complexity of points of delivery will increase the
tempo of operations and the skill required of detachments.
94. In urban COIN operations, similarly there is no

distinction between forward and rear, especially when
logistic bases form a hub and spoke system. In an era of
360° resupply operations, logistic troops must be more
highly trained to enable them to ‘fight logistics through’ and
the logistic plan must be in synergy with the overall
campaign plan. Logistic resupply of Security Force (SF)
and logistic bases may require the creation of Combat
Logistic Patrols (CLP), deliberate operations involving all
arms and may be joint.
Fig B-5-13 Russian Ration Resupply, Stalingrad, 1942
95. Urban operations are manpower intensive. Economy of force may demand the use
of logistic troops for operational tasks such as base protection, but these must be of a
defined duration, within the capability of the troops deployed and not to the detriment of
sustaining the force.
96. Forces providing support for combat in an urban environment will require a high and
constant degree of self-sufficiency. Guidelines to providing effective CSS to units fighting in
built-up areas are as follows:
a. Provide supplies to units in the required quantities as close as possible to the

location where those supplies are needed.
b. Protect supplies and CSS groups from the effects of enemy fire by using
surprise and avoiding detection.
c. Disperse and decentralize CSS detachments.
d. Provide them with the appropriate communication facilities.
e. Plan for the use of carrying parties and stretcher bearers, down to the lowest
level.
f. Position support units as far forward as the tactical situation permits.
g. Plan for the provision of specialist equipment such as grappling hooks,

ladders and explosives.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-43

h. Plan and use host nation support and civil resources when authorized and
practical.
COMBAT SUPPLIES
“Besides ammunition, the most pressing need was water. The Germans cut the main water
supply to Oosterbeck on the first day of the battle, so as the UK drained their canteens, the
search for water became paramount. Storage tanks, central heating systems, even fish
bowls were drained.”
Arnhem, Holland, 1944

“City Fights” by NL Lt Col G.A. Lofaro
Fig B-5-14 Street Fighting in Arnhem, 1944
97. Commanders must plan for the provision of combat supplies in detail. In attack,
plans should be made to enable quick replenishment and to provide suitable assets to bring
supplies forward. In defence, defended locations must be self-sufficient and supplies pre-
dumped in accordance with the tactical plan. There will be a requirement for large
quantities of engineer defence stores to be transported and dumped in accordance with the
tactical plan.
98. Ammunition53. Combat in the urban environment is characterized by constant high

ammunition expenditure rates with a corresponding requirement for replenishment.
Average ammunition consumption rates will exceed the standard rate by a factor of two or
more. Plans must include how ammunition is to be moved right forward to the troops
fighting the battle. AFVs will be required to defend assets and provide casualty evacuation
as well as for the provision of ammunition if the terrain prevents logistic vehicle traffic. The
use of carrying parties should be considered if streets are blocked by rubble. In defensive
operations ammunition should be stockpiled if possible. Early consideration should be
given to breaking ammunition packs down into multi-nature packs to facilitate distribution to
dispersed groups.
99. Water. The climate and season affect the operational requirement for water. The
planning rate for normal conditions is 10 litres/man/day, and the worst case is 25
53
This paragraph should be read with the section on Ammunition Resupply on p C-9-40.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-44
litres/man/day54. Plans for the distribution of water should be made as a priority during both
defensive operations and prolonged offensive operations, and should take as high a priority
as for ammunition and fuel.
100. Fuel. Fuel consumption will vary from that of rural war fighting. Combat vehicles
will perform less cross-country movement and normally use less fuel in built-up areas.
Engineer equipment and power generation equipment will require fuel, although overall
requirements will be relatively small. There may be a greater requirement for packed fuel.
101. Rations. Obstacles, obstructions and other restrictions to movement in the urban
environment may limit the amount of equipment individual troops can carry. Troops may be
obliged to carry only ammunition and water, and rations will need to be brought forward at
least daily when the tactical situation allows. During defensive urban operations
consideration can be given to centralised cooking.
EQUIPMENT SUPPORT
102. General. Maintaining operational availability, and with it combat effectiveness, is

particularly demanding during urban operations and requires engineering commanders with
both tactical situational awareness and technical knowledge. The complex urban
battlespace is demanding and has the potential to present pervasive threats; the ES
challenge is compounded by rapidly-evolving tactical situations and consideration must be
given to the implications of the time taken to conduct repairs. Nevertheless, in order to
maintain combat effectiveness, mission critical equipment should be repaired as close to
the point of failure or damage as is technically and tactically feasible. Consequently,
expedient repair is likely to form the foundation of repairs and should be complemented by
robust and agile recovery plans that enable the move of equipment casualties to
appropriate repair locations.
103. ES Principles. The over-arching ES principles are applicable to all types of

operations in all environments. Details of these principles and other aspects of ES doctrine
are contained in AC 71877 Battlefield ES Doctrine, which must be consulted for urban and
all other operations. The close and complex terrain, potential for rapid situational changes
as well as complexity of command and control (C2) within urban operations all compound
the challenge of delivering ES. Specific considerations for ES in urban operations have
therefore been articulated below, using the ES principles as a framework.
104. Repair Forward. Mission critical equipment should be repaired as close to the point
of failure or damage as is technically and tactically feasible, in order to maximise combat
effectiveness. The urban battlespace is unlikely to be rigidly structured into linear forward
and rear areas, however repair forward remains highly applicable in the context that
‘forward’ is in relation to the equipment casualty and its point of failure. Recognising the
complex threat that exists within this environment, ES elements will be relatively soft targets
whilst manoeuvring and operating forward. They must therefore be highly capable of
fighting in urban operations, in addition to conducting their specialist role. To reduce
exposure to risk, ES commanders should develop robust and agile recovery plans that
enable repairs to be conducted in the most tactically and technically suitable locations,
whilst remaining in the forward environment. Where these recovery assets are exposed to
elevated risk, additional force protection should be considered.
54
JWP 4-01.1 dated Mar 05. The planning rate is 10 litres/man/day, and the (NATO approved) worst case is
25 litres/man/day.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-45
105. Stability. In a complex urban environment there will be tactical and technical
situations that do not provide the stability required to conduct repair. Consequently, the
majority of lengthy and complex repair tasks will take place between missions, to deliver
inter-mission and subsequent mission ES effect. To generate these effects, there is a
requirement for ES capabilities with the stability and time available to generate the long-
term sustainment of the force. This is of particular concern during urban operations, when
the close environment can impede situational awareness, tactical changes can quickly
undermine stability for ES, and equipment failures can be high and require increased
sustainment effort. However, the urban environment can also provide substantial benefit to
the conduct of ES, through the use of hard-standing to improve the efficiency of repairs,
and buildings to enhance force protection, provide cover from view and enable the use of
non-tactical light in aid of ES. Buildings offer the additional advantage of suppressing the
noise resulting from ES activity. The use of specialist infrastructure such as utility supplies
and overhead cranes can also provide clear benefit to the efficient completion of complex
ES tasks.
106. Echelons of ES. ES capability is organized into echelons in order to concentrate

effort, optimise effectiveness, minimise the CSS footprint and meet protection requirements.
Such organization also enables the principle of repair forward by structuring tactically and
technically capable assets. The ES structure is layered with mobile and well protected
assets integral to battlegroups, and progressively less mobile and protected, but technically
more capable, assets in a more tactically benign environment. Urban operations may vary
considerably in nature, duration and complexity, therefore the supporting ES echelons may
require further task organisation into larger or smaller elements to provide the most suitable
balance of concentrated effort, effectiveness, CSS footprint and protection.
107. C2 at Every ES Echelon. For the output of the ES organisation to be responsive to

the changing requirements placed upon it, effective C2 at every ES echelon is essential.
Directed Logistics aims to improve support to units by meeting ES and CSS demands more
precisely through accurate forecasting of forthcoming mission requirements. REME
commanders at every ES echelon are required to direct the required resources effectively,
efficiently and intelligently to provide the required equipment availability to enable the
commander’s plan to be executed. The close nature of the urban terrain, difficulty in
maintaining situational awareness and the potential for a rapidly changing situation all
further complicate ES activity and increase the demand for robust planning and highly
effective ES C2. Recovery assets, FRTs and ISTs require particular emphasis, since these
ES assets will frequently be employed forward, across boundaries and into high threat
situations.
CONVOY OPERATIONS
108. Convoy operations in the urban environment should be considered as operations in

their own right, properly planned and resourced like any other operation in war. The
proximity of buildings to the road, restricted numbers of alternative and escape routes,
vulnerability to direct conventional and Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive (VBIED) attack
and the presence of large numbers of civilians makes reaction to attack extremely difficult.
109. Protection and Security. A tactical convoy is a group of at least four vehicles
moving under a single commander over the same route. The convoy must be able to
deploy tactically at short notice. Stocks of similar natures and commodities should be
equally distributed throughout the vehicle packet to ensure the delivery of at least some of
all the natures demanded. Convoys must be afforded protection appropriate to the threat.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-46

Consideration can be given to the use of an escort force to provide the convoy with
additional firepower if required. Consideration should always be given to the planning of
Close Air Support and indirect DF fire support on targets such as choke points, suspected
ambush sites, known danger areas and easily identified terrain features along the route.
This requires co-ordination, good communications, training and rehearsal.
110. Ambush Locations. Where possible, convoys should not halt in the urban
environment. Possible ambush locations include junctions, bridges, high buildings, crowds,
roundabouts, traffic lights and over and underpasses.
PROVOST
111. Provost Marshal. The Provost Marshall (PM) serves as the commander's
proponent for policy, plans, procedures and doctrine of all provost activities. During urban
operations, the PM is focussed on the provision, advice and support for the handling of
PWs, the regulation of all movement and manoeuvre, and the investigation of all criminal
activities. Where viable integral civil and military police forces exist, the PM may interact
between these agencies, on behalf of the commander, to ensure information sharing, close
cooperation and liaison. Where such forces do not exist, the PM will be required to ensure
the maintenance of law and order within the local population, with priority given to the
restoration of the local police force, the constitutional and legal system, and judicial and
penal services.
112. Tasks. The RMP can perform the following tasks during urban operations:
a. The regulation of movement and manoeuvre, such as route reconnaissance,

route selection, signing and manning of routes and circuits into and around the urban
area, and the provision of MP stations and posts.
b. Control of displaced persons and refugees in close cooperation with

indigenous military and civilian police forces and Non-Government Organisations
(NGOs).
c. The specialist military police element of a routine UK Forces patrol55,

providing special to arm advice on the ground directly to the commander on arrest
and detention, searches of people, property or vehicles, incident control, and crime
scene management. They will also provide surety to correct handling of evidence
and detainees in support of pre-planned operations.
d. Provision of advice to the chain of command on PW/Internee/Detainee issues

in accordance with Joint Doctrine (JDP 1.10).
e. The implementation of crime reduction initiatives to prevent the wilful and

wanton destruction of buildings and materiel. Such initiatives should also prevent
Service Personnel and civilians from looting, pillaging and other criminal activities in
the aftermath of a conflict.
f. Liaison with Other Governmental Departments (OGDs) and Non-Government

Organisations (NGOs).
55
Including the provision of Close Protection where required.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-47
g. Policing the force protection measures imposed by the chain of command.
h. The provision of close protection to ‘at-risk’ military personnel and in support

of OGD.
i. The investigation of all incidents involving absentees and deserters from the
UK Forces.
113. Post Conflict. Conflict in an urban area may lead to a complete collapse of law and
order and a rapid deterioration of any social fabric. Where this is the case, there will be a
requirement for a protracted military force presence and a defined plan to prevent further
deterioration and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR). The RMP can contribute towards
this plan by:
a. Providing a credible police force. The priority will be to fill the vacuum created
by conflict; in most cases, the RMP will be the only viable police force able to
effectively restore law and order. The focus for the RMP will be maintaining law and
order within the local population and service personnel, clarification of the
constitutional and legal system56, restoration of the local police force, civilian courts
and judiciary, and the continued supervision of these establishments.
b. The use of the RMP SIB to deal with complex and protracted investigations
such as war crimes.
c. Specialist oversight and surety to the correct handling and processing of

prisoners of war, internees, and detainees in accordance with Joint Doctrine (JDP
1.10).
d. Through policing activities gather, process and assimilate information and

intelligence.
e. The regulation of movement and manoeuvre, such as route reconnaissance,

route selection, signing and manning of routes into and around the urban area, and
the provision of MP stations and posts.
f. Assistance to OGDs and humanitarian agencies.
g. The training and mentoring of indigenous civil and military police forces.
MEDICAL
114. General. Major combat operations within an urban environment may cause
significant casualties due to fragmentation; burning, collapsing buildings and environmental
health hazards. From the point of wounding the subsequent extraction, treatment and
evacuation of casualties will be combat power intensive within this challenging environment.
Confidence in the delivery of the medical plan will ensure the sustainment of the force and
the maintenance of moral. Clinical effect will be best achieved through the early grouping
and forward positioning of assets whilst maintaining balance.
56
In consultation with Army Legal Services.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-48
115. Time Related Constraints of Medical Care. Time is a fundamental factor in patient
survival and recovery, and the siting of medical facilities based on the 1-2-4 hour principle is
a clinically critical factor. Ideally, a medical treatment facility offering Primary Surgery (PS)
will be located within one hour of own troops; where this is not achievable, the 1-2-4 Hour
principle offers a number of alternatives involving multiple treatment nodes providing
damage control surgery linked by evacuation capabilities. Critically injured patients who
cannot receive PS within one hour should undergo damage control surgery within two hours
and PS within four hours57.
116. Medical Planning. In addition to ‘time’ the critical components of medical planning
are the Population at Risk (PAR) and the estimated casualty figures. These coupled with
the dispersion of the force will determine the lay-down and force packaging of medical
support.
117. Allocation of Medical Assets. The generic allocation of a medical regiment and a
close support hospital in support of a ground manoeuvre brigade provides the framework
for the delivery of the Seven Capabilities of Care58 and the flexibility to support the 1-2-4
Hour principle.
118. Command and Control (C2). The timely passage of accurate casualty information
facilitates efficient medical decision-making. At battlegroup level the medical troop
commander provides this function and at brigade level the medical regiment commanding
officer provides advice and direction, with SO2 Medical coordinating the staff branch.
119. Sub-Unit Level. Initial treatment will be delivered via ‘buddy-buddy’, team medics
and Combat Medical Technicians (CMT). The casualty will be ‘extracted’ from the
immediate danger; ‘treatment’ will then be given and subsequent ‘evacuation’ to the most
appropriate medical treatment facility will occur. The triage59 category will drive the clinical
imperative for evacuation. Situational Awareness and cross boundary liaison will be
required to ensure that the most effective and timely method of evacuation is supported.
Sub-units should be able to identify and enable the use of Emergency Helicopter Landing
Sites (EHLS) to receive the Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT)60.
120. Battle Group Level. The battlegroup should be enhanced with a medical troop.
This will supplement the Unit Aid Post. Capabilities will include C2; a treatment section; an
ambulance section and a dental section. This will allow the commander flexibility to
enhance the unit aid post or to provide an alternative Role 1 facility.
121. Brigade Level. The planning and conduct of these operations is complex. In
addition to the support provided to the battlegroups the medical regiment and close support
hospital will be able to enhance the baseline ground evacuation capability with the
following:
57
JDP 4-03 Medical Support to Joint Operations 2nd Edition dated January 2007.
58
The 7 Capabilities of Care are: Force Health Protection (including Medical Intelligence); Pre Hospital
Emergency Care (PHEC); Primary Health Care (PHC); Deployed Health Care (DHC); Medical Evacuation
(MEDEVAC); Medical Command, Control, Communication, Computerisation, Information, Recording and
Management (C4IRM) and Medical Logistics.
59
Triage is the allocation of priorities to casualties.
60
MERT delivers the Forward Aero medical Evacuation (Fwd AE) clinical capability which might be from the
point of wounding.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-49
a. MERT. MERTs are trained to deliver Pre-Hospital Emergency Care (PHEC)
including resuscitation. The vulnerability of helicopters to small arms fire within the
urban environment may limit their freedom of action.
b. Role 2 Light Manoeuvre. A Role 2 Light Manoeuvre (LM) can be deployed

to ensure the delivery of damage control surgery within two hours of wounding. This
enhances the opportunity to manoeuvre whilst ensuring clinical timelines are
supported. Role 2 LM has a planning constraint of 72 hours.
c. Close Support Hospital. A close support hospital delivers primary surgery

and can deploy in support of a manoeuvre brigade to ensure that primary surgery can
be delivered within four hours of wounding. The holding policy of the facility will affect
it’s agility and ability to manoeuvre. Tactical MEDEVAC to subsequent deployed
hospital care may be undertaken by ground or air.
122. Force Support. The Force Support Hospital underpins the provision of deployed
hospital care; this can either be a Role 2 Enhanced or a Role 3 facility. Strategic
MEDEVAC out of the theatre of operations will take place; this is likely to be to Role 4
(National Health Service) capability in the UK.
123. Inter-Hospital Evacuation. The evacuation assets allocated to the force will
provide inter-hospital evacuation. The span of responsibility for this ground evacuation for
the deployed hospital care ranges from the Role 2 LM to the Force Support Hospital.
124. Psychological Impact. The management of the psychological impact on soldiers is

a commander’s responsibility. At unit level Trauma Risk Management (TriM) can be
undertaken following a traumatic incident which has the potential to cause physical,
emotional and psychological harm. Trained medical personnel within the Field Mental
Health Team are able to provide both hospital based care and outreach services within
battlegroup areas.
SECTION 4 - RECENT LESSONS IDENTIFIED
125. Background. Recent experiences of fighting in an urban environment are the

Second Battle of Fallujah and the earlier battles for Baghdad and Basra during the war-
fighting phase of operations in Iraq.
126. Basra and Baghdad. There are a variety of reasons why recent operations in Basra
and Baghdad were unlike those of other earlier urban operations. These include the
following:
a. The aggressive use of armour in urban operations was only possible to the
extent seen because of the protection enjoyed by our AFVs. One Challenger
received 14 hits from RPGs, and none penetrated the armour. However, the anti-
tank systems used by the Iraqis were of old patterns such as the Russian RPG-7.
b. Coalition air forces could operate over built up areas with considerable
freedom, which provided two benefits. The first was effective aerial surveillance,
largely from UAVs. The second was the ability to attack precisely using Precision
Guided Munitions (PGM).
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-50

c. Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and other PGMs were employed in
urban operations for the first time. This meant that, once pinpointed, Iraqi strong
points could be attacked accurately with considerable effect and little risk of collateral
damage.
d. Iraqi forces were insufficiently numerous to form continuous fronts. They

could only occupy very small areas of any built up area, leaving gaps and areas of
weakness.
e. For a number of reasons, including a lack of support from most of the local
population, Iraqi forces deployed into enclaves in which they could be accurately
located. Consequently they had little freedom of movement.
f. HUMINT was available both from the local population and from other sources.
This allowed Iraqi positions to be accurately located, then attacked using either
PGMs or ground assault.
g. Most buildings were only one or two storeys high, minimising the threat to
armour from upper stories and rooftops.
h. Coalition forces adapted rapidly to the circumstances in which they found

themselves. For example, when they found that their armour was largely
invulnerable to the anti-tank threat, they adapted their tactics accordingly. This is
partly a reflection of their professional quality and partly due to the way they are
trained to 'think on their feet'.
127. Fallujah. The key lessons learned from the US urban operations in Fallujah include:
a. Training.
(1) Where possible, those involved in urban ops should train with the
equipment with which they will fight.
(2) FIBUA training needs to be built into more training activity and not
simply be the preserve of light role infantry. All arms (and joint) integration is
essential.
(3) Language training is vital for urban ops where the ability to converse
with locals may provide instant clues to what is around the corner.
b. Tactics.
(1) The time taken to clear a single (two storey) house was about one and
a half hours – if fire support was not used.
(2) Clearing houses from the top down was preferred if easy access could
be gained to the roof. Methods of entry had to change constantly to avoid
setting patterns, sometimes entering stealthily, at other times ‘dynamically’ –
ie with all guns blazing.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-51

(3) Extensive rehearsals are required with all force elements and
equipment.
(4) Tanks proved vital in providing immediate fire support and suppression
capability.
(5) Fire support varied in effectiveness. Precision Guided Munitions

(PGM) represented a very effective method of prosecuting targets but could
not always be delivered in a timely manner. CAS was insufficiently reliable
but was good for destroying structures. Artillery, aviation and mortars were
effective but did not achieve the same degree of destructive power. AC-130
offered a good combination of precision and destructive power.
(6) The US managed to totally dominate the streets through the use of
ISTAR and fires. This forced the insurgents to fight in buildings rather try to
dominate the approaches to them. It also prevented mutual support being
achieved. The US was, however, required to force entry into virtually every
building. A considerable variety of methods of gaining entry – from tanks
down to sledgehammers – were used.
(7) Combat ID, especially for CAS, requires considerable thought and
practice. Avoidance of fratricide relies on clear instructions and detailed
knowledge of the ground and grids.
(8) Night time allowed re-supply and hot meals to be brought forward.
(9) CASEVAC required hardened vehicles, an in depth knowledge of a

robust plan by all and effective team medics.
c. Operations.
(1) Tactical surprise is still possible even if operational surprise is lost,

through the use of deception and with the committal of sufficient resources.
(2) Having taken the decision as to whether to de-populate the urban area
or not, it remains vital to seal the city effectively to prevent escape.
(3) When the population had been cleared from the city, methodical and
slow (‘swamp’) clearance proved more effective and reduced casualties, in
comparison to penetration/thrust where insurgents were missed and were
able to attack troops from behind.
(4) The tactical pause became an essential part of the battle rhythm,
allowing control to be re-established and CASEVAC and re-supply to take
place.
(5) Do not expect insurgents to abide by the LOAC. Anticipate booby-

traps, and the misuse of religious sites and hospitals.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-52

(6) 1st US Marine Division (1 MARDIV) proved willing to conduct
manoeuvre and kinetic strikes in support of intelligence collection operations,
especially EW. This yielded information on enemy strong points, C2 etc.
(7) Even with a fully night capable force, the US chose not to fight at night
due to the problems of fratricide and command and control. The risk of
insurgents infiltrating behind troops during darkness was mitigated by ISTAR
assets.
d. Equipment.
(1) Innovative use of war fighting equipment was essential. Line charges
(similar to Giant Viper) were used for the initial breach and to clear daisy-
chained IEDs.
(2) Eye protection in urban operations where the volume of dust and
debris is generally high led to a number of casualties being avoided.
Fig B-5-15 Eye Protection for Urban Operations
(3) Body armour proved particularly effective and minimised fatal

casualties.
(4) In order to prevent re-infiltration by insurgents the US used (but did not
distribute enough) gunpowder residue detection kits to separate civilians from
the Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF), particularly at food queues. The recommendation
is for five per battalion.
e. Communications.
(1) Line of sight communications posed problems. VHF performed better

than UHF for air/land communications. It became necessary for
communications hubs to be established on buildings as the advance
continued.
(2) Tank communications proved vital in providing a link back to company

HQs from squads61 on the ground.
(3) The infantry/tank telephone was extensively used.
61
Squad is the US term for an infantry section.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-53
(4) Maintaining crypto fills required close management. Signallers came
forward and filled half the channels with the new crypto while leaving old
crypto in the other channels so that those who could not be reached could still
be in communication.
(5) All levels of command have to be aware of the value of info ops to
exploit enemy excesses. The US did not always manage to get images back
quickly enough to meet the requirement.
Issue 4.1: Nov 09 B-5-54

CHAPTER 6
CONVENTIONAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION
‘Stalingrad: Urban Warfare favours the defence, 4:1 or 6:1. The prerequisite for a
successful attack on an urban area is an effective blockade, prior to the start of operations,
combined with comprehensive intelligence and reconnaissance and detailed contingency
planning.’
N.N.Novichkov, Kholveg-Infoglob, 1995
URBAN PENETRATION
1. Urban penetration is designed for operations against clearly defined objectives,

either enemy positions or specific terrain.
2. The tactical capture and holding of key terrain is critical to the manoeuvrist approach
to urban operations. Key urban terrain includes potential objectives such as power plants,
water plants, government buildings, communication centres and food storage and
distribution centres, the ownership and management of which should provide the means to
establish authority and control of the urban population and environment.
3. Urban penetration requires

the early and rapid seizure of the
objective by any means possible.
Having seized it, the objective will
need to be isolated, to be defended
against enemy action and counter-
attack and to be provided with
protection from illegal and
spontaneous action by the local
population. Movement to the
objective can be by air, land,
waterway or underground or a
combination of all available options.
Fig B-6-1 Saint Aubin-Sur-Mer, D Day, 6 June 1944
4. Forces committed to the penetration must be sufficient strong to physically seize the
objective, to overcome any opposition during the move to the area of the objective and to
provide sufficient security to the site once it has been captured. Sufficient firepower and
protection must be secured to reach the objective area in sufficient force to capture and
hold it with enough force in reserve to protect it and establish control. Stealth should be
considered as the preferred movement tactic in order to maximize surprise and force
protection, but this could be difficult to achieve. Any penetration operation should include
the maximum flexibility and initiative in supporting the commander's intent. Consideration
should be given to conducting the attack on multiple axes of advance by dispersed units, as
well as on several dimensions (subsurface, surface, structural, etc).
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-1

5. The defending force must be sufficiently strong to accomplish its mission and should
include elements with the capacity to call for direct, indirect fire and air support from outside
the objective. If the commander chooses to withdraw once his objective has been
achieved, the penetration will take on many of the characteristics of a raid and should be
executed accordingly. The withdrawal could take the form of a subsequent penetration to a
second objective.
URBAN THRUST
6. Urban thrust attacks an enemy on a narrow axis of advance. The thrust maximizes
combat power at the point of the attack. It can be described as a dagger thrust into the
enemy defence. As such an attack occurs the axis of advance must be defended in order
to protect each flank against enemy attacks. This can be accomplished through a
combination of forces, sensors and lethal or non-lethal barriers.
7. The urban thrust can be conducted on multiple axes simultaneously. These attacks
should be conducted in parallel and should be mutually supporting. Where possible, the
thrust should be conducted at an oblique axis to the street layout, which will reduce
exposure in open spaces that could provide the primary or principal killing zones for the
enemy.
8. In conducting urban thrust, a commander should consider periodically altering the

direction of advance in order to confuse the enemy and not establish a pattern that permits
the early preparation of obstacles, demolitions, mines and booby-traps. This requires a
high level of planning and co-ordination in an environment of communication and co-
ordination challenge. In an urban operation of this nature, the commander’s intent must be
known and understood down to the lowest level.
9. The urban thrust on multiple axes can present the commander with different options.
One thrust can be stopped at a certain point to form a ‘hammer’, while another may be
initiated to act as a ‘hammer’. Thrusts can also be orchestrated so that while one element
is stationary, a second element conducts a right or left hook to effect encirclement.
10. A well executed urban thrust avoids a linear assault, confuses the enemy, forces his
flanks, separates his forces and deceives him as to the objective. It could initiate the
enemy’s withdrawal before engaging in the necessity of a room-by-room clearance of the
town or city. If the enemy is forced to withdraw, his resulting exposure can be exploited by
tactical aviation and indirect fire.
URBAN SATURATION
11. Urban saturation involves the use of numerous fire-teams or section sized units
operating in a dispersed, non-contiguous fashion. As these force elements enter and
assimilate their assigned area, they should be prepared to respond rapidly to calls for
assistance by neighbouring teams. Their response to a call for assistance will depend on
their own situation, the distance from those making the request and their capacity to add
value to the task. The speed of reaction will be critical to the success of the concept. This
concept will most likely be employed in the capture of villages, small towns or suburbs.
12. A call for assistance should include a brief estimate of the support required. This
request should be transmitted up the chain of command and to all other teams on the net.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-2

The commander can then direct the appropriate number of teams to respond to the request
and adjust other units to fill the gaps created. Alternative methods can include the teams
closest to the supported unit responding without direction, simply reporting their intention to
respond. Good passage of information, accompanied by high levels of training,
professional skill and situational awareness, assisted by technical intelligence gathering
aids where available and appropriate, is critical to the success of saturation operations. As
in all urban operations, fratricide remains a risk that must be managed.
13. Command of the incident should remain

with the commander of the unit requesting
support as long as he retains the best and most
current awareness of the situation. He should
assume tactical command of responding units.
Command of the incident can be assumed by the
senior commander at the earliest appropriate
moment.
14. The key to saturation tactics is speed,

confidence and mutual support. The requesting
unit must offer rapid and concise information to
all potential responding units. Responding units
must enable the calling unit to manoeuvre them
to advantage as they arrive on the scene until the
Fig B-6-2 Street Fighting1 in Caen,
June 1944
commander can assume control of the situation. Responding units must have the flexibility
and training to enable early seizure of the initiative. Implicit in this concept is the capability
of junior leaders to assume increased levels of responsibility and command. The tactic also
requires the chain of command to respond quickly and effectively and to adjust forces to
cover gaps as required.
‘Benefiting considerably from the human intelligence network that MI6 had established in
Basra after the first Gulf War, UK commanders possessed an accurate and up-to date
picture of what was happening in the city. They realised that the Baath Party activists and
the fedayeen were firmly in control in the city. Defended by units of the regular army,
consisting of Shiite conscripts, its commander, Ali Hassan al-Majid, devised a political and
military approach that aimed to achieve two goals, to keep tight control over Basra’s Shiite
population right to the very end and to draw the UK into fighting within the city, hoping that
the confusing urban landscape would maximise civilian casualties and take a heavy toll on
UK forces. But the UK refused to be drawn into fighting in Basra until they were ready.
The UK intentionally kept the cordon around Basra loose. The down side of this strategy
was that the fedayeen could use the fleeing crowds as human shields, whom the Baathists
mortared enthusiastically as a warning to the others and to gain propaganda value. On the
other side, looser control of access, allowed the UK to infiltrate agents, sniper teams and
Special Forces in and out of the city. The defenders even sent out tanks to the edge of
their lines of control and then backed them into urban areas, teasing UK troops to follow.
UK commanders realised that only gradual, carefully calculated military and political action
would loosen the Baathist vice.
1
British troops using a French M 1914 Hotchkiss .30in (8mm) machine gun.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-3
By 27 March, the UK felt comfortable
enough to send more snipers into
the city and small raiding teams of
Warrior APCs attacked areas of
Basra supposedly free of significant
Iraqi military forces or irregulars.
The aim of these probing attacks
was at first psychological, but the
larger aim was to ensure that the city
could be taken without heavy losses
or extensive collateral damage. This
was followed up by swift raids on
Baathist hideouts in the city,
carefully coordinated with human
intelligence from the inside.
Fig B-6-3 Fighting in Basra, 2003
On Sunday April 6th, the UK launched a three-pronged attack with battle-groups of the 7th
Armoured Brigade consisting of Challenger 2s and Warrior. The initial plan was to punch
deep into the city and then pull out that night. The operation went so well that they
remained where they were and the main fighting took place in a factory complex where
there were no civilians and where the UK could call in air support.
Major General Brims decided to finish off the Iraqis with a final stroke. One battle group
now moved against the last stronghold, the university defended by 300 fedayeen.
Clearance of the stronghold took about four hours. The UK could not use air or artillery
support, nor could they identify clear military targets on the ground. Warrior infantry
sections, with supporting fire from Challengers and the Warriors themselves had to winkle
out the Iraqis room by room, building by building. In the words of one of their officers, “It all
came down to good old-fashioned bayonet and rifle work.”
Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr,

“The Iraq War”, Harvard University Press
SECTION 2 - PLANNING AN ATTACK
GENERAL
15. The conduct of urban operations demands the employment of specific tactical
concepts, and specialised skills and techniques. The principles of war remain extant and
the concepts of the manoeuvrist approach to operations and its tactical tenets should be
applied.
16. Offensive operations in built up areas can require large numbers of troops. Planning
must be centrally coordinated but execution should be decentralised where appropriate.
17. The following points are important when planning offensive operations:
a. Simplicity. Control is difficult and plans have to be simple and flexible.

Tactical planning must allow for the exploitation of local success and opportunity.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-4

Orders should cover the whole operation in outline and only the first stage in detail.
Plans for each subsequent stage should be made and detailed orders issued as the
preceding state is being completed. Passage of information to the lowest level is
important if control is to be maintained and success to be achieved.
b. Information. More than in any other operation of war, comprehensive IPB for
urban operations is critical to success and the minimization of casualties. The
maximum amount of information on the city infrastructure and the defender's
dispositions must be acquired and analyzed. The information sources will include:
(1) Maps2, town plans, guide books and plans of essential services. Street
maps, in particular, should be issued down to fire team level. These maps3
can include a building designation system.
(2) Technical information gathering means, including commercial imagery

services such as Google Earth Pro4, Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) and
Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV).
(3) Reconnaissance patrols, standing patrols and OPs.
(4) Overhead imagery and Electronic Warfare (EW) (including a SIGINT

capacity).
(5) HUMINT including PW, local agencies, including national territorial

forces, inhabitants and refugees.
THE PLANNING FRAMEWORK
18. The planning framework for offensive operations is as follows:
a. Force Ratios. Offensive operations are governed by the need to generate

high force ratios well in excess of 3:1. During the Battle for Berlin in 1945, the Red
Army planned its assault based upon a force ratio of 8:1.
b. Support. As soon as it seems likely that an assault on an urban area will

take place, there should be an early re-supply of large quantities of ammunition and
explosives of all appropriate natures. Engineer support and advice should be sought
early to identify all available sapper and assault equipment and decisions taken on
its distribution. Medical support and the casualty evacuation system should be
reinforced, including early decisions taken about the organisation and distribution of
armoured vehicles for casualty evacuation for assaulting units.
c. Objectives:
(1) In the case of an assault on an urban area defended in depth, the

attack should be planned so that progress to the final objective is made
2
Electronic mapping will be also needed to be distributed in a form and scale that will be useful to users with
User Data Terminals (UDTs).
3
There maybe a requirement in complex urban operations to show height above ground, ground level and
underground systems.
4
A subscription service. Includes Google Street View. Also available to the enemy.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-5
through a series of intermediate objectives. These intermediate objectives
provide the firm base for subsequent stage planning and operation.
Consideration should always be given to the retention in strength of
intermediate objectives to prevent re-occupation by the enemy. The selection
of buildings as objectives may be necessary but consideration must be given
to the factors of both ground and enemy to determine the tactical and
operational objectives. Buildings can be bypassed and commanders should
try to avoid buildings becoming objectives and becoming the focus of
operations.
(2) The selection of the final objective should ensure that its capture will
make any further defence untenable.
(3) The break-in battle may be conducted at night, either as a silent or

noisy attack, as an aid to security.
(4) Momentum must be maintained during the attack. Planning must

remain flexible and tactical success should always be exploited.
d. Re-grouping. Sufficient time should always be allowed for reinforcement,

regrouping, orders and rehearsals. At battlegroup level, the assaulting force is likely
to be organised as follows:
(1) Investment Force. Reconnaissance troops, armour, aviation and

indirect fire observers.
(2) Fire Support Group. Armour, anti-tank weapons, helicopters, GPMG

(SF) and indirect fire observers.
(3) Assault Force. Infantry sub-units, engineers, assault pioneers,

armour and indirect fire observers with some artillery in the direct fire role.
(4) Reserve. A reserve should ideally be a third of the total force. It must
be a minimum of an infantry sub-unit with combined arms support.
e. Control. Experience has shown that fratricide is a constant danger in urban

operations. Strict control by commanders and frequent re-briefing at all levels is vital
if fratricide is to be avoided. Axes of advance, objective, report lines, fire support
control measures and boundaries will assume particular importance.
f. Tempo. Success in offensive operations will be achieved by maintaining a

high operational tempo, and keeping the enemy off balance. An offensive operation
in an urban environment is a 24 hour battle, characterised by short bursts of violent
action followed by periods to regain balance. Failure to retain balance will lead to
unnecessary casualties. To locate (find) and immobilise (fix) the enemy can be a
matter of cunning and stealth and can be conducted at varying rates of operational
tempo. Destroying the enemy (strike) should be conducted at a tempo where the
defender remains immobilised and unable to deploy his reserves or his weapon
systems (fixed). The essential requirement is that commanders determine a
sustainable tempo of operations while achieving a higher operational tempo than the
enemy.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-6

g. Momentum. Momentum5 is the benefit gained by a judicious combination of
tempo and mass. Momentum must be maintained: delay or
insufficient/inappropriate/inefficient force gives the enemy opportunity to regroup,
react and regain the initiative. The plan should allow for:
(1) Successive units and sub-units taking over the advance doing so by a
passage of lines operation. Limitations on manoeuvre may oblige sub units to
be in echelon.
(2) Reserves being placed well forward in order to be able to react quickly
to the unexpected and exploit tactical advantage.
(3) Ammunition expenditure of all natures being heavy and requiring the
high prioritization of the organisation of the means of resupply. The same will
apply to other combat supplies and to the evacuation of casualties. The
difficulties of casualty evacuation must not be underestimated. There are
likely to be heavy casualties in all urban operations and the RAP will require
additional medical resources prior to the start of the operation. There could
be a requirement for medical teams to move up each axis closely behind the
leading assault forces if momentum is to be maintained. Their tasks would be
to administer immediate first aid, apply triage, mark casualties and move them
to suitable collection points. In addition a battlegroup may need to generate a
sufficient number of soldiers to act as stretcher bearers between the RAP and
the Collection Points. Consideration must be given to the use of AFVs for
ammunition resupply and casualty evacuation at every stage in the operation.
(4) Knowing exactly what is happening. There may be a need for the
configuration of increased number of communication systems to achieve the
required level of situational awareness. Consideration should be given to the
deployment of radio rebroadcast systems as units move forward.
SECTION 3 - THE STAGES OF AN OFFENSIVE ACTION
‘By the time it reached Berlin, Red Army forces had created special assault “storm” groups,
specifically developed for independent action in urban terrain. Each storm group included a
rifle battalion, a sapper company, and armour company or self-propelled assault gun
battery, two mortar batteries, a cannon or howitzer battery, one or two batteries of divisional
artillery, and a flamethrower platoon. A detachment was divided into three to six assault
groups, and a support group. Each assault group comprised a rifle company, included one
or two sapper detachments, an anti-tank rifle detachment, two to five individually carried
flamethrowers, smoke devices, three or four other man-portable weapons, and two or three
tanks or self-propelled assault guns. Sometimes, groups were further subdivided to better
focus on such missions as fire, command, reserves, reconnaissance, and obstacle
clearing.. Individual soldiers were supplied with a large number of grenades and
explosives. Training and preparation for the urban environment emphasised independent
thought and action from each soldier.’
Stalingrad, Anthony Beevor, Penguin Books
5
The linear momentum of a body is the product of its mass and its velocity. Oxford ‘A Dictionary of Physics’.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-7
ATTACKS ON BUILT-UP AREAS
19. General. The attack on a built-up area can be divided into five stages, although
some stages may overlap. There should be no pause between them and units should try to
immobilise (fix) the enemy and rapidly exploit any penetration before the defender can
react. The five stages are investment, the break-in, securing the objective, clearing the
objective and reorganisation.
20. Investment. The purposes of investing the urban area should be to isolate the area
occupied by the enemy, to seize the principal terrain features and to dominate the
approaches.
a. Grouping. Ideally the investment force, for which reconnaissance troops and
armour are best suited, should be grouped under a dedicated commander.
Controllers of indirect fire, aviation and air should included.
b. Tasks. The principal tasks in the investment are to:
(1) Provide information on enemy dispositions.
(2) Prevent enemy withdrawal or limit withdrawal options.
(3) Prevent enemy reinforcement.
(4) Support the break-in, including provision of direct and indirect fire
support.
c. Planning Considerations. The three principal planning considerations are:
(1) Careful planning of the deployment of the different elements of the

Investment Force to ensure surprise in timings and approach.
(2) Co-ordination of the employment of the Investment Force with the

subsequent stages of the operation.
(3) Consideration, direction and instruction on the treatment of civilian non-

combatants in the battlespace, the need and location of interpreters and
arrangements for PWs.
21. The Break-In. The break-in phase is the assault to seize a foothold in the urban
area. The attacker will be vulnerable to the killing zones, obstacles, mines, booby-traps
and deployed weapon systems of the defender who will have had time to prepare his
defended localities and their mutual support. It is a critical stage of the offensive operation,
and the attacker will be at his most vulnerable.
a. Grouping. The break-in force should comprise infantry and armour with
engineer or assault pioneer support and indirect fire controllers. The minimum
combat power necessary at battlegroup level is a rifle company group.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-8

(1) Armour6. Armour may be used to support the break-In but is
vulnerable to concealed anti-tank weapons.
(2) Artillery and Mortars. The use of HE and smoke to support the
break-in can destroy key points (particularly with precision munitions such as
GMLRS), neutralize enemy positions and cover the movement of assault
forces. In addition, artillery may be used to 'fix' any enemy out of direct
contact. Commanders must consider risk of injury to civilians and the
problems created by obscuration and rubble.
(3) Aviation. Aviation may be used to provide direct fire support and/or a
real-time, man in the loop, ISTAR feed on enemy dispositions or counter
moves.
(4) Air. Air support should be coordinated with indirect fire support. Early
consideration should be given to the use of precision guided munitions in
order to limit collateral damage.
(5) Technical Intelligence Gathering Assets. The use of UAV and UGV
can be considered to assist in information gathering, tactical awareness and
the enhancement of command and control.
b. Tasks. The main tasks of the break-in force are to:
(1) Establish a foothold in the urban area.
(2) Identify the principal enemy defended localities
(3) Determine the strength, location and future intentions of the enemy.
(4) Oblige the enemy to commit his reserve, if possible.
(5) Establish routes for forward passage of lines.
(6) Provide a fire support base for subsequent stages of the operation.
c. Planning Considerations. Consideration should be given to the following

planning considerations:
(1) The plan should be simple and, in the case of a large and well-
defended urban area, the objectives limited.
(2) The synchronization of direct and indirect fire support is critical.
(3) Effective engineer support is critical to success. Obstacle, mine and

route clearance, the construction of safe lanes and assistance to the
assaulting sub-units necessitate detailed coordination.
(4) Silent or noisy, the break-in can be conducted at night, as an

enhancement to security. Night time will increase the difficulties of command
6
Including armoured Engineer assets, eg TROJAN and TERRIER.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-9
and control, IFF issues for air, aviation and indirect fire controllers and the risk
of fratricide.
(5) Effective fire support at every level and in support of every sub-unit
move is critical during the break-In phase. Direct and indirect fire on the
immediate defended enemy localities, those providing mutual support and
those in depth is vital to both cover unavoidable movement in the open and
prevent the enemy from moving his assets.
(6) Consideration must be given to the concentration of combat power in

the successful break-In. In order to maintain momentum it may be necessary
to conduct frequent forward passage of lines.
(7) Consideration should be given to the use of deception as an aid to

surprise. To be effective it must be credible and coordinated, and the enemy
must be given time to react in accordance with the feint.
(8) The use of Anti-Structure Munitions (ASM) should be considered as an

aid to blocking enemy routes and limiting enemy arcs of fire.
22. Securing Objectives. The objective or objectives are secured from the foothold
gained by the break-in. The aim of this phase is to consolidate firm bases from which to
either launch assaults on subsequent objectives, or unhinge the enemy’s defence.
a. Grouping. Grouping for securing objectives should be similar to that for the
break-in (para 21.a.).
b. Tasks. The following tasks should be included:
(1) The seizure of key terrain and objectives. The ground must be
dominated, and the principal routes, bridges, buildings and subterranean
features of tactical significance seized.
(2) As a priority, the enemy’s freedom of movement and initiative should

be limited by observation and fire as much as possible.
(3) Enemy defensive localities must be identified and neutralized.
(4) Enemy withdrawal, administrative and logistic routes should be

blocked, although consideration should be given to subsequent own passage.
(5) Enemy reserves, command posts and communications should be

neutralized.
c. Planning Considerations. Planning considerations are:
(1) A systematic approach should adopted to ensure that the enemy’s

ability to influence the securing of each objective is limited. This demands
careful coordination between force elements.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-10

(2) Strict security and control of the objectives seized and the routes to,
from and between them must be maintained in order to prevent enemy re-
infiltration and counter attack.
(3) Consideration should always be given to the securing of objectives in

daylight when enemy positions can be clearly identified. Night operations can
be undertaken by troops that are trained and specifically equipped but the
dangers of fratricide and the chances of overlooking enemy positions
increased.
(4) Medical support needs to be as close as possible to fighting elements,

and safe routes constantly identified and reconnoitred for CASEVAC. The
demand for ammunition will be great, stocks will need to be well forward and
arrangements must be made for continuous resupply.
(5) The use of precision munitions to destroy known and clearly identified
defensive positions should be considered. Consideration should also be
given to having indirect fire controllers well forward to react to the unforeseen
and be well placed for subsequent phases.
23. Clearance. The purpose of clearance is to strip the enemy and associated threats
from the area around the objective or between the objectives in order to gain control of the
terrain. Clearance must be methodical and thorough. No enemy can be allowed to escape
or remain hidden. All civilians in the locality must have their non-combatant status
confirmed. Residual threats such as mines, booby-traps or IEDs must be rendered safe.
This role can be given to reserve or echelon forces if the original echelon is tasked to
continue the assault.
a. Grouping. Grouping for clearance should be similar to that for the break-in
(para 21. a.).
b. Tasks. The principal task will be to clear the area of enemy and associated
threats.
c. Planning Considerations. Consideration should be given to:
(1) The use of sectors, or similar control measures, to ensure the

clearance is systematic and no enemy, in pockets or as individuals, are left.
(2) Clearance tasks can be allocated to small groups of platoon or section

strength.
(3) Clearance tasks are most effective in daylight.
(4) Provision must be made for casualty collection, control of PWs and the
evacuation of civilians.
24. Reorganization. The reorganization will be no different to that for any other
offensive operation. The conduct and time available for reorganization will be dictated by
plans for subsequent operations. Nevertheless, the following points should be considered:
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-11

a. Despite systematic clearance of the defended location, the threat from snipers
and counter attack could remain. Care must be taken to cover every approach,
including tunnels, alleyways and rooftops, by observation and fire, if possible.
Immediately subsequent to the assault, temporary defensive measures should be
adopted at every level, including the preparation of direct and indirect-fire defensive
fire plans.
b. Regrouping must be considered if casualties have been high.
c. Immediate or early resupply of ammunition, water and fuel is critical.
d. The evacuation of casualties and civilians, and control of PWs requires

considerable manpower and time.
THE CAPTURE OF KEY OBJECTIVES
‘Time taken to clear a single (two storey) house was about one and a half hours – if fire
support was not used. The US managed to totally dominate the streets through the use of
ISTAR and fires. This forced the insurgents to fight the buildings from within rather try to
dominate the approaches to them. It also prevented mutual support being achieved. The
US was, however, required to force entry into virtually every building. A number of methods
of gaining entry – from tanks down to sledgehammers – were used. Clearing houses from
the top down was preferred if easy access could be gained to the roof. Methods of entry
had to be changed constantly to avoid setting patterns, sometimes entering stealthily, at
other times ‘dynamically’ – ie with all guns blazing. The infantry/tank telephone was
extensively used.’
‘A Tale of Free Cities’ by Russell Glenn (Fallujah, Iraq) 2004
25. Offensive operations to capture large towns and cities are likely to be conducted at
formation level. Battlegroups could be tasked to capture key objectives or features or to
secure certain areas. Large towns and cities are invariably centred on key features such as
rivers or road junctions and key objectives could include river or road bridges, close-
grouped government buildings or apartment blocks. Areas to be captured could be heavy
or light industrial, residential (suburb), office or city-centre.
26. The operational requirement may not allow time for a deliberate assault and the
commander could be required to plan a rapid advance through the built up area, leaving the
task of clearing to following units. In such instance, the following points should be noted:
a. This type of operation has the greatest chance of success when the enemy
has not had time to establish a proper defence. Maintenance of the momentum of
the assault and keeping the enemy off-balance is vital. The importance of the early
seizure of the objective, while the bridge, for example, is still intact, will allow the
commander to get through the area quickly before the enemy can react effectively.
b. In such cases, contact with the enemy should be avoided if possible. Enemy
resistance should be bypassed. Anything that delays the seizure of the objective
should be avoided.
c. In order to deceive and confuse the enemy as to his intentions, and to allow
himself sufficient flexibility in the case of resistance, the commander could organize
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-12

his forces for movement on multiple axes. The lead unit on each axis would need to
conduct reconnaissance on the move, possibly using armoured vehicles. Enemy
positions might be fixed by fire, and bypassed.
d. Momentum can be achieved by mounting infantry in armoured vehicles, albeit

at the risk of attack by anti-armour weapons. Elements of the force, in platoon or
section strength, should be dropped off to assume blocking positions, to provide
flank, route and rear protection to aid the advance. In such cases, it is important to
ensure effective command and control between the different elements. Plans must
be made for the deployment of a reserve in the case of counter-attack.
e. Once the objective is seized, a perimeter defence should be established.

Dismounted troops should clear the buildings and establish all round defence. The
objective should be defended with all available means, including indirect fire and
weapons mounted on vehicles. Plans should be made for the early relief of route
protection parties. Patrol plans should be made for listening posts, OPs and deeper
reconnaissance to forestall enemy movement and counter attack.
INFILTRATION
‘Much of the fighting consisted not of attacks, but of relentless, little battles. The battles
were fought by assault squads, generally six or eight strong, from the ‘Stalingrad School of
Street Fighting’. They armed themselves with knives and sharpened spades for silent
killing, as well as sub-machine guns and grenades.’
27. In certain cases, for example in the

case of a city or town not being strongly
defended, consideration could be given to
the use of infiltration to access the
objective. Identified defended localities
might not be mutually supporting. They
might consist of anti-tank positions on the
outskirts, defensive positions and
protective posts on the main approaches,
or blocking positions on the approaches to
the key features in town. Reserves and
strong-points might be located in depth
inside the towns or cites. The battle group
might seize its objective by infiltrating
platoons and companies between enemy
positions. By using the cover of the
town’s infrastructure, the buildings, the
alleyways and other covered approaches,
the battle group might be able to seize key
street junctions or terrain features, isolate
enemy positions, and enable following
Fig B-6-4
German Troops Fighting at Stalingrad
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-13
units to pass into the built-up area. Ideally, the tactic of infiltration is performed in poor
visibility or darkness. Consideration should be given to the following factors:
a. Control. Control of movement is important. Each sub-unit should use its own
infiltration ‘lane’. Depending on the way the built-up area is laid out, each infiltration
lane may need to be 500 to 1,500 metres wide.
b. Movement. The infiltrating companies should advance on foot, using stealth

and all available cover and concealment. Diversion can be effected by mortar and
artillery fire to cover the sound of infiltrating troops. Consideration can be given to
the use of real-time (down-linked) imagery from manned or unmanned aerial
platforms.
c. Armour Protection. Anti-tank weapons can be positioned to cover likely

avenues of approach for enemy armoured vehicles. Reconnaissance platoon
patrols, including elements using hand-held anti-tank weapons, can also provide a
screen for battle group flank protection.
d. Flank Protection. Companies moving into the built-up area must secure their
own flanks. Protective elements may be placed along the route as picquets.
Engineers can assist by providing counter mobility resources.
e. Action on the Objective. On arrival at the objective, infiltrating force

elements should consolidate, reorganize and organise the defence. Patrols be
mounted to dominate the ground, and ‘blind spots’ nullified by judicious sighting of
weapons and observers. A limit of exploitation can be established to ensure control
and security.
ASSAULTING A TOWN, VILLAGE OR HAMLET
28. Clearing Streets. Clearing streets and buildings incurs heavy ammunition
expenditure. Prophylactic fire using all available weapon systems is useful. To clear a
street, two sections or platoons should work in parallel along opposite sides. The third
section or platoon should be kept as an immediate reserve. Commanders should be well
forward, immediately behind the forward elements, able to observe progress and control
movement. Sub-units should move forward alternately with fire support given by the other.
Direct fire support can be given by tanks that should move between fire positions and be
able to provide fire at short notice. AFVs or artillery in the direct fire role can also be used
to provide fire support. The protection of tanks, AFVs and artillery must be balanced
against their effect.
29. Clearing Buildings. Prior to the assault of the block or building that is to be cleared,
ammunition should be re-supplied and covering fire organised from another sub-unit.
Regardless of how the building is captured, from top, bottom or from an alternative level, it
must be turned into a firm base from which to cover the seizure of a subsequent building.
Sections must be able to communicate by voice and hand signal. Buildings should be
marked to show entry points, whether or not they are clear, casualties, booby traps and the
location of the FLOT. The use of chalk or alternative methods of silent communication must
be taught, understood and practised.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-14

30. Individual House Clearing. Sections should move from building to building by
unpredictable routes such as through walls and sewers or over rooves. If possible, open
streets exposed to enemy fire should be avoided. Ideally each building should be entered
at the top and cleared downwards. Each building must be thoroughly search as it is
cleared, including the outhouses and cellars. Reorganisation can only take place when
each floor has been cleared, and ideally should take place on the ground floor, where
greater protection will be afforded against indirect fire. Casualty, PW collection and
ammunition re-supply points should be established at ground level.
SECTION 4 – URBAN STRIKE OPERATIONS
31. Urban strike operations are focussed against individuals or groups of people. They
normally involve the arrest and detention of insurgents or capture of enemy combatants.
32. Although the size of the force required to carry out urban strike operations may vary,
such operations are typically conducted at battlegroup or lower level.
33. The tenets of the Manoeuvrist Approach to urban operations remain extant for Strike
operations. To overcome or negate the enemy’s will to resist requires an attitude of mind
in which achieving surprise and using initiative is combined with high standards of
discipline, organisation and a ruthless determination to complete the arrest. The enemy’s
ability to react, flee or resist will be defeated by a combination of high grade current
intelligence, tempo, surprise, and simultaneity.
34. Urban strike operations are ‘simple’, where target buildings are adjacent and require
only one cordon. They are ‘complex’ when the converse situation pertains.
35. In order to achieve surprise, troops must be capable of reacting quickly to the timely
information provided by technical gathering assets, and high levels of competence and
readiness are thus essential.
PRINCIPLES
36. The principles of strike operations are:
a. Offensive spirit.
b. Flexibility.
c. Surprise and security.
d. Simultaneity.
e. Simplicity.
f. Service Support.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-15

TASK ORGANISATION
37. Groupings vary according to the size of the task and the number of troops available.
Normally a platoon-size operation for a single small building strike will comprise of the
following groupings/tasks:
a. A breaching team of one or two separate teams to gain entry, clear and
secure the compound. It may include a RE EMOE7 team. The team will provide the
inner cordon.
b. Assault group one, a minimum of two teams, each consisting of two pairs to
secure and clear the ground floor.
c. Assault group two, a minimum of two teams, each consisting of two pairs to
secure and clear the first floor and the roof top.
d. Command team, compromising platoon commander, signaller and the reserve

team. This can be the breaching team.
e. Platoon sergeant group comprising medics, Tactical Questioning (TQ) team,

RMP, interpreter and female searcher, if required.
Fig B-6-5 – Rangework, Shields, Pistols and Rifles
7
Explosive Method of Entry.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-16
ENTRY AND OPERATION
38. The operating procedures will depend on the threat, the commander’s plan and the
resources available. A typical sequence of events is illustrated below.
Fig B-6-6 – Urban Strike Procedure
39. The following additional points should be noted:
a. Troops should be ‘stacked’ out of sight until they are required to enter the
building. This aids protection and surprise.
b. The use of a hand grenade, burst of automatic fire or ‘flash bang’, depending
on rules of engagement, prior to entry to each room may neutralize any opposition.
c. The first soldier to enter each room should be equipped with a pistol and
shield.
d. Information such as arrests made and the number of occupants should be

passed to the command group, and subsequently up the chain of command, as
quickly as possible.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-17

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
40. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) governing the regulations for opening fire, the
arrest and detention of persons, and the actions of troops in civilian houses and vehicles
will be the determining discipline for the actions of the forces involved.
41. The ROE must be learned and understood by every member of the force involved,
and will be published in Theatre Standing Operational Instructions (SOI).
FACTORS
42. The following factors are critical to the success of the strike operation:
a. Current intelligence. Every soldier must be briefed on the best available

information regarding factors such as the layout of the building, the number of likely
occupants and the threat that they might pose.
b. Deception. In order to maximise surprise consideration should be given to all

possible means of deception.
c. Planning. Planning for a strike operation might include plans for the
positioning of inner and outer cordons, the domination of roof tops, fire support
coordination measures (including boundaries, No Fire Lines, identification markers),
rigorous command and control measures, preparation for follow up strikes on nearby
buildings and complex strikes where more than one building is to be assaulted.
d. Environment. A hostile environment may require a mixture of armour and

infantry to provide an iron sleeve through which the strike element can approach the
target building. In a helicopter delivered strike operation, consideration must be
given to the type of ground support required.
e. Combat Service Support.
(1) Equipment Recovery. Robust plans are necessary to ensure the

recovery of every vehicle involved in the operation, to understand the
capabilities of the recovery assets available and to rehearse elementary skills
such as wheel change and track repair, at night if necessary.
(2) Medical. Arrangements must be made for immediate medical support

and CASEVAC.
f. ‘Actions On’. Plans for ‘Actions On’ should include:
(1) Vehicle breakdown en route and on target, including plans for cross-
decking.
(2) Vehicle denial policy.
(3) Wrong target.
(4) Ambush.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-18

(5) Casualties.
(6) Withdrawal.
g. Attachments. A simple strike operation could include the following

attachments:
(1) Tactical questioner.
(2) Interpreter.
(3) Female searcher.
(4) RMP.
(5) RE search team.
(6) Dog handler and dog.
h. ISTAR. Consideration must be given to utilizing ISTAR capabilities to

establish patterns of life and reaction, track individuals, clear routes ahead of road
moves, provide deception measures, support cordon surveillance and provide
technical surveillance and ground and aerial fire power. Aerial assets could be used
to provide video image to the commander.
i. Command and Control. The location of the commander warrants

consideration. A choice should be made between commanding dismounted and
thereby intimately influencing events, and remaining mounted and being more able
to communicate and control wider aspects of the operation. All troops must know
the location of their immediate superior. Brevity codes, identification markers,
control measures and orders for opening fire must be known by all.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-6-19

CHAPTER 7
CONVENTIONAL DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION
1. Enemy Intentions. The principles of defence1 apply to urban operations as much

as to those in any other environment. Planning for an urban defence is best preceded by
consideration of the enemy’s intentions, which may include the following:
a. Pre-emption of the Defence. The enemy commander tasked with assaulting

a built-up area will try to prevent the defender from the preparation and consolidation
of a strong defensive position. He will try to achieve surprise, either by a rapid rate of
advance bringing his forces to bear before a defensive position can be effectively
established, by using an air-assault force or a forward mobile or mechanised
detachment to achieve early penetration, to by-pass unprepared opposition or to seize
vital ground in the urban area before it can be prepared for defence.
b. Avoidance of Attrition. The likely attrition rates and the time and resource
consumption of prolonged urban operations may lead the enemy commander to avoid
or to minimise his involvement in the urban battle. When time allows, consideration
should be given to the advantages of conducting a comprehensive defence of all the
approaches to the town or city using the long-range all arms and integral support
weapon capabilities to destroy or divert the enemy, and prevent the further preparation
of the defensive position before the urban battle is joined.
c. Bombardment. The enemy could use intense indirect and direct fire and air
bombardment to significantly reduce resistance in a defended urban area, anticipating
that subsequently inserted ground forces would face less effective resistance.
SECTION 2 - THE ELEMENTS OF A DEFENSIVE OPERATION
GENERAL
‘Chukov’s plan was to funnel and fragment German mass assaults with ‘breakwaters’.
Strengthened buildings, manned by infantry with anti-tank guns and machine-guns, would
deflect the attackers into channels where camouflaged T-34 tanks and anti-tank guns
waited, half buried in the rubble behind. When German tanks attacked with infantry, the
defenders’ main priority was to separate them. The Russian’s used trench mortars, aiming
to drop their bombs just behind the tanks to scare off the infantry while the anti-tank
gunners went for the tanks themselves. The channelled approaches would also be mined
in advance by sappers, whose casualty rate was the highest of any specialisation. Wearing
camouflage suits, when snow came, they crawled out at night to lay up anti-tank mines and
conceal them. An experienced sapper could lay up to 30 a night.
2. In any built-up area, defensive operations should be aggressive, mobile and should
exploit depth. The defender should concentrate on retaining the initiative, particularly in
terms of his capacity to move forces and locate those of the enemy, in order to counter
1
Offensive Action, All Round defence, Depth, Mutual Support, Concealment, Deception, Striking Forces.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-7-1
enemy penetration. The defender should seek to disrupt and frustrate enemy intentions in
every phase of battle. In the preparation for defence in the urban environment,
consideration should be given to the following:
a. The commander’s intentions should be made known as early as possible.

Early warning of an intention to defend a built-up area will enable the correct
grouping of his own forces and the necessary early pre-positioning of engineer
resources and combat supplies.
b. Preparation of the battlespace by the defender will be essential.

Consideration should be given to the clearing of fields of fire, the construction of
bunkers, the construction and reinforcing of obstacles, the laying of anti-tank mines
and booby-traps2, the construction of concealed routes and underground movement
systems, blocking possible enemy avenues of approach and the protection of civilian
and military communications and utilities. The defender should always seek to
exploit the three dimensional nature of urban operations.
c. Concealment and cover will be available but line-of-sight observation will be

difficult. Use should be made of observation devices to cover possible enemy
infiltration approaches. Close attention should be given to ensuring mutual support
and all-round defence. The nature of the terrain will lead to close-quarter combat.
Defensive measures may include the barricading of streets and the employment of
short-range direct fire weapons. Ideally the defence should be based on the
following:
(1) The Perimeter Battle. The aim of the perimeter battle is threefold: to
provide information about the enemy’s strengths, intentions and avenues of
approach, to delay his approach, and to allow more time for preparation for
defence of the battlespace. Information gathering should be carried out with
every technical means available and by troops committed to the perimeter
force. Delay can be provided by indirect fire, air and aviation support and
direct fire and aggressive operations by the perimeter force. The perimeter
force must move or withdraw when they can no longer influence the battle.
(2) The Disruption Battle. The aim of the disruption battle is to cause
attrition, to disrupt the enemy principal and subsidiary approaches, to confuse
the enemy about the strengths and dispositions of the defence and draw the
enemy towards selected ‘killing areas’. The disruption battle should be a co-
ordinated mobile battle that employs small forces in delaying operations.
(3) The Main Defended Area (MDA) Battle. The aim of the MDA battle is
to prevent the enemy from breaking in to the urban area. The MDA should
consist of a series of defended localities, ideally mutually supporting, with
each comprising strong points sited to defeat the enemy in selected
engagement areas. The use of mobile reserves is important at every level
and in each sector. This battle must be based on an aggressive defence and
the initiative must be wrested from the enemy at every opportunity. Unless
the enemy is moving unknowingly towards a designated killing area, every
enemy assault or advance should be counter-attacked by any available force
2
According to the Ottawa Convention 1997, the use of booby-traps is permitted if they are directed only.
against enemy combatants and not civilians, and their use is not indiscriminate.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-7-2
of any size, preventing the enemy from establishing a secure footing from
which he can exploit further advances.
(4) Reserves. A mobile reserve is essential to any defensive operation.
PERIMETER FORCE
3. The perimeter force should be the first element of the defence to encounter the
enemy. Its role will be vital to the intelligence preparation of the defensive battle and the
conduct of the initial phase of the battle. Consideration should be given to its grouping and
employment as follows:
a. Grouping. The perimeter force should dominate the approaches to the built-
up area and be grouped as tactically appropriate. Each group can comprise
reconnaissance, armour, anti-armour, and infantry support. Support from indirect
fire, air and aviation should be integral to the grouping. Engineers may be required
to provide mobility corridors for force withdrawal and can provide obstacle and mine-
laying support.
b. Tasks. Typical tasks for the perimeter force are:
(1) To identify enemy strengths, intentions and main effort.
(2) To delay and destroy enemy reconnaissance and investment forces.
(3) To delay and destroy assault forces in assembly areas and FUPs,
using and indirect fire and its integral offensive assets.
(4) To cover obstacles with observation and fire.
c. Planning Considerations. Planning considerations for the perimeter force

should include the following:
(1) Siting. Information gathering devices should be sited to give as early

and accurate warning of enemy intentions as possible. Perimeter force
elements can be sited both on the outskirts of the urban area and beyond.
The force must use camouflage and concealment to achieve the task of
providing information about the enemy. They are likely to be priority targets
for enemy indirect and air attack.
(2) Command. The Perimeter Force must have its own commander.
(3) Strength. The amount and type of combat and combat support in the
perimeter force must be balanced against the need to prepare the effective
defence of the urban area, to enable the collection of timely and accurate
information about the enemy and to minimise the loss of equipment and
capability before the start of the battle. Consideration must be given to the
importance of mobility and careful planning of the perimeter force withdrawal.
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DISRUPTION FORCE
4. The disruption force should cause attrition, disrupt the attack and draw the enemy
towards selected killing areas. The disruption force should cause significant delay to the
start of the enemy operation.
a. Grouping. The grouping of the disruption force should be based on small

infantry teams conducting fighting patrols, ambushes and tank-hunting patrols. Use
should be made of snipers, armoured support and indirect fire.
b. Tasks. Tasks for the disruption force may include the following:
(1) Cause enemy attrition.
(2) Delay and disrupt the enemy assault.
(3) Draw the enemy into the MDA killing areas.
(4) Confuse the enemy about the layout of the defence.
c. Planning Considerations. Planning considerations may include the

following:
(1) Location. The Disruption Force should operate between the perimeter
force and the MDA. It can operate outside and within the built up area and to
be effective it should be prepared to conduct mobile, offensive and aggressive
action.
(2) Obstacles. Maximum use should be made of indirect fire, obstacles

and mines to slow the enemy's movement and channel him onto selected
routes.
(3) Deception. The disruption force should use deception both before and
during the battle, to deceive the enemy as to the location, strength and
intentions of the defender.
(4) Command and Control. The disruption force conducts independent

operations, but effective control is essential if it is to contribute to the overall
defensive plan. Consideration can be given to the use of the fire support
company headquarters to command the force.
(5) Communication. Good communication between the disruption force

and the battlegroup HQ is essential.
THE MAIN DEFENSIVE AREA
The fighting in Ortona has become a classic example in the art of street fighting.
The. 3rd German Parachute Regiment was responsible for the Ortona Sector and
had made its 2nd Battalion under Captain Liebschev responsible for the town.
Liebschev prepared his defences with extraordinary thoroughness, choosing only to
defend the northern half of the town. The southern half was turned into a nightmare
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-7-4

of booby trapped and mined houses some blown into the streets to form road blocks
and others to create fields of fire. All his strong points were linked by mouse-holes
from house to house. All the approaches to defended sector were either heavily
mined or under concealed enfilade fire. The 2nd Canadian Brigade was given the
task of clearing a way through the town and was forced to fight its way from house to
house. Every building, when taken, had to be occupied to stop the Germans
infiltrating back into it. The fighting was at such close quarters that artillery support
was impossible3 and so ruthless that little quarter was given”.
The capture of Ortona, December 1943

Extract from a report by 1st Canadian Division
Fig B-7-2
1st Canadian Division Troops Fighting Through a Defended Town in Italy, 1943
5. The Main Defensive Area (MDA) consists of a series of defended localities, ideally
mutually supporting and of company group strength with armoured support. These
localities form the bulwark of the defence. Their construction should be the first priority for
preparation of the defensive position.
a. Grouping. Grouping should be primarily infantry supported by armour and

artillery in the direct or indirect fire role.
b. Tasks. The tasks of the defended localities may include the following:
(1) Destroy the enemy.
(2) Break up the momentum of the enemy attack.
(3) Prevent the break out of the enemy.
3
The capture of Ortona, December 1943. Extract from a report by 1st Canadian Division.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-7-5
c. Planning Considerations: Planning considerations should include the
following:
(1) Alternative Positions. If time permits, alternative positions for every

level of command should be prepared.
(2) Killing Areas. Defended localities should be sited to cover designated

killing areas. Mutual support between localities is important and covered
movement between defended localities essential.
(3) Reserves. Each defended sector or area requires a local reserve.
(4) Fire Plan. Where conditions allow, a defensive fire plan should be
prepared.
(5) Counter Attack. Plans should be made for counter attack at every
level of command and at every opportunity. Rehearsals should be conducted.
RESERVE
6. The reserve should be located centrally and should be mobile. It may be used to
support any part of the defence.
a. Grouping. The grouping of the reserve should be based on infantry and

armour. Engineers should be included if available.
b. Planning Considerations. Consideration should be given during planning to:
(1) Selection, maintenance and protection of covered routes for counter-

attacks and for movement between localities.
(2) The need for the reserve to be immediately available to the

commander and for its commanders to be aware of the current phase of the
defensive battle.
(3) Options for the employment of elements of the perimeter force after
their withdrawal.
THE CO-ORDINATION OF A DEFENSIVE OPERATION
7. The coordination of all forces involved in defensive operations is crucial to success.

The following points should be noted:
a. Planning. A well-planned defence in depth involving the mutual support of

defended buildings and localities, the use of obstacles, mines, booby-traps, cleared
fields of fire and the canalisation of the enemy into killing zones will demoralise the
enemy and can contribute to a successful defence.
b. Aggressive Action. The defender should exploit his intimate knowledge of

the built-up area to retain the initiative and act offensively. Aggressive patrolling,
raids, sniping and ambushes should be used continuously to confuse, surprise and
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-7-6

put strain on the enemy. His planning should be disrupted and his weaknesses and
failures exploited. The defender should be relentless in attempting to infiltrate into
areas behind the enemy, captured and cleared but not occupied, and should then
attack his headquarters and support areas.
c. Counter-Attacks. The battlegroup reserve can be used for counter-attack,

but in the urban environment such initiatives require careful and centralised planning,
not least to minimize the risk of fratricide. At every level, counter-attacks should be
as spontaneous and immediate as can be achieved, and should take advantage of
the cover and concealment afforded by the built-up area. Small elements, such as
fire-teams, can achieve surprise and recapture terrain and buildings against
elements of their own size or bigger when the enemy is disorganised.
d. Frontages. Defence of towns or cities requires a higher density of troops and

smaller defensive sectors than in open terrain. An infantry company occupying
1,500 to 2,000 metres in open terrain can be reduced to a frontage one-third the
size, 300 to 800 metres, in a built-up area. The tactical situation, the building
density, collateral damage and street patterns will dictate the frontage of the unit. As
an approximate guide the minimum frontages in built-up areas are as follows:
Unit Frontage Depth

(a) (b) (c)
Battle Group 4 to 8 blocks 3 to 6 blocks
Company Group 2 to 4 blocks 2 to 3 blocks
Platoon 1 to 2 blocks 1 block
Note: An average city block is taken to have a frontage of 175 metres. These
minimum figures apply in areas of dense, block-type construction, multi-storey
buildings and underground passages.
DEFENCE IN LIMITED VISIBILITY
8. The attacker may try to use limited visibility conditions, smoke or night-time activities,
to conduct operations to sustain or regain momentum. Plans to counter this threat should
be an integral part of the STAP4 and should employ the following measures to defend
against attacks at night or limited visibility.
a. Defensive positions and crew-served weapons can be moved just before

dark/stand-to to deceive the enemy as to their exact location. Individual, fire-team,
section and gun group positions can often be moved forward, or to an adjacent
building where they can cover the same likely enemy approach.
b. Unoccupied areas between force elements, which can be covered by

observed fire during daylight, should be occupied by standing or listening patrols or
secured by mobile patrolling at night.
c. Radar, remote sensors, and night observation devices including those of

artillery observers should be used to cover streets and open areas at all times.
4
Surveillance Target Acquisition Plan, made by the comd to coordinate STA resources.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-7-7
d. Nuisance mines, booby-traps, wire and OPs should be positioned on
secondary avenues of approach.
e. The irregular use of artillery and mortar DFs, OPs, planned direct fire, patrols
and anti-intrusion devices should be used to prevent infiltration.
f. Artificial illumination can be used where feasible, but it can provide help to
both sides.
g. Indirect fire weapons, grenade launchers and hand grenades should be used
where possible when defences are probed to avoid disclosure of firing positions.
h. During an enemy night assault, pre-planned DFs and FPFs should be

initiated. Crew-served weapons, AFV weapon platforms and individual riflemen
should fire within their assigned sectors. Grenades and command detonated mines
should be used to supplement fire during the approach and the attack. Rapid and
early counter-attack should be employed to exploit the enemy’s confusion.
i. Defenders should move back to daylight positions before first light/stand-to.
KEY TERRAIN
9. Key terrain is any place where seizure, retention or control affords a marked
advantage. Examples of key terrain are bridges over canals or rivers, building complexes,
public utilities, or open areas. The identification of key terrain allows the defender to select
his defensive positions and assists in determining the enemy's objectives.
OBSERVATION AND FIELDS OF FIRE
10. General. The attacker must cross streets and open areas between buildings to
advance, and will do so using fire and movement. The fire can be indirect mortar and
artillery fire: it can be direct tank, anti-tank, rocket-propelled grenade or machine-gun fire.
The defender must remain able to observe these open areas and bring effective fire to
bear. The use of concealed machine guns and snipers can be very effective against enemy
movement across streets or open areas.
11. Cover and Concealment. The cover and concealment provided by buildings,
rubble and the urban jungle should be used to prepare and improve defensive positions.
Positions may be easily and quickly improved by using materials at hand. When the
defender has to move, he can reduce his exposure by:
a. Using prepared breaches through buildings.
b. Moving through reconnoitred and marked underground systems.
c. Using trenches.
d. Using the concealment offered by smoke and darkness to cross open areas.
12. 5.56mm Bullet Penetration. The penetration that can be achieved with 5.56 mm
round against exterior walls of brick or concrete will be limited unless significant numbers of
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-7-8

rounds are fired. Inside buildings, lightly constructed interior walls and furniture are likely to
be penetrated. These effects should be considered both when firing at enemy positions
and when balancing the risk to friendly forces in the area. The following common barriers
in built-up areas stop a 5.56 mm round fired at less than 50 metres:
a. One thickness of sandbags.
b. 2 inch concrete wall (not reinforced).
c. 55 gallon drum filled with water or sand.
d. Small ammunition container filled with sand.
e. Hollow concrete building block filled with sand (block will probably shatter).
f. Brick veneer.
g. Car engine block.
13. 7.62mm Bullet Penetration. 7.62mm ammunition is considerably more penetrative

than the 5.56mm. The AK47 fires 7.62 x 39mm and is the most common assault rifle in the
world.
FIRE HAZARDS
14. Detailed knowledge of the terrain allows the defender to avoid potential fire hazards.
All built up areas are vulnerable to fire, especially, but not only, those with wooden
buildings. Special attention must be paid to the fire hazards of petroleum stores, gas tanks
and electricity stations. All defensive positions should have fire-fighting materials and
evacuation plans.
COMMUNICATIONS
15. Past operations in urban areas have demonstrated how easily VHF radios are
screened and how their range can be reduced. As a consequence, radios must be carefully
sited and maximum use must be made of rebroadcast stations and the remoting of
antennae to high points. The use of the upper end of the VHF band and high power
switches on radios, where these exist, will also assist. Commanders should be prepared to
encounter difficulty in establishing and maintaining communications; they should therefore
plan for the frequent re-siting of rebroadcast stations in order to ensure communications.
All radio users should be trained in and employ basic skills which are just as important in
the era of digital communications, such as movement to establish communications,
elevation where possible and avoidance of obscurance from walls or buildings.
Commanders should also be aware of the effect of environmental factors on range and plan
accordingly. If time and the battle situation allow, use can be made of civilian fixed and
mobile telephony, although it will be insecure and may only be used in accordance with
theatre specific mandates.
DEFENCE OF VILLAGES, STRIP AREAS AND TOWNS
16. Villages. Villages are often on choke points in valleys, dominating the only avenue
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-7-9

of approach through the terrain. If the buildings in such a village are well constructed and
provide good protection against both direct and indirect fire, a strong defensive position can
be created using a company group, while controlling close and dominating terrain with other
battalion elements. Villages on the approaches to large towns or cities may be used by a
commander to add depth to the defence or to secure the flanks. These villages are often
characterized by clusters of stone, brick or concrete houses and buildings. Company-sized
battle positions can be established in these small villages to block approaches into the main
defensive positions.
17. Strip Areas. Strip areas consist of houses, shops and factories and are built along
roads or down valleys between towns and villages. They afford the defender the same
advantages as villages. If visibility is good and suitable fields of fire are available, a unit
acting as a protective force need occupy only a few strong positions spread out within the
strip. This will deceive the enemy, when engaging at long ranges, into thinking the strip is
an extensive defensive line. Strip areas often afford covered withdrawal routes to the flanks
once the attacking force is deployed and before the protective force is engaged.
18. Towns and Cities. Advantage can be gained in the defence of a town or small
city/choke point by placing tanks, anti-tank resources and pre-planned indirect fire on the
critical approaches through the built up area. By denying the enemy the ability to bypass
the town or city, the defending force will retain control of the key terrain. Reserve forces
should always be placed to provide rapid reinforcement. Minefields, other obstacles and
indirect fire will assist in slowing and canalising an attack. Finding positions in towns and
cities that provide both good fields of fire and cover is frequently difficult. The forward
edges of a town will provide the best fields of fire but are obvious and will be targeted by the
enemy. Civic buildings, and other stronger structures which provide adequate cover and
are more suitable for defence, will more likely to be found in the centre of towns and will
have more limited fields of fire on likely avenues of approach. The city centre is likely to
consist of high rise buildings that will offer the defender observation, protection and good
fields of fire, but it will attract indirect and direct fire, limit egress and will be to the detriment
of mobility.
SECTION 3 - THE USE OF DELAY IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
GENERAL
19. Delay within a defensive operation is a sub-phase of conventional war that is

conducted against a numerically, and possible technically superior enemy in a situation of
wide scale hostilities. It should not be confused with other operations such as key point
defence in an urban environment.
THE PURPOSE OF DELAY
20. Delay is an operation in which a force under pressure can divert and slow down
enemy momentum and inflict damage without becoming decisively engaged. The defender
may be outnumbered, the air situation may well be unfavourable and the initiative is likely to
be with the enemy.
21. The use of an urban area to delay the enemy can provide the hinge around which
the enemy will be either required to manoeuvre and be channelled into an area favourable
for his destruction, or oblige him to assault the defended village, town or city to maintain or
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-7-10

regain his momentum. By using indirect and long-range fire effectively, exploiting the
restrictions on tactical movement, improving the obstacles generic to urban terrain and
using aggressive action to limit the enemy’s options and wrest the initiative away from the
enemy, a commander may conduct a successful delay from and in a built-up area.
22. A battle group is likely to be tasked to conduct a delaying operation as part of a

higher formation's plan in one of the following circumstances:
a. As a covering force during a withdrawal.
b. As an advance guard when encountering superior forces or in response to an

enemy counter-attack.
c. As a fixing force in mobile defence.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
23. When planning this type of operation, the formation commander attempts to satisfy
one or more of the following objectives:
a. To slow down the enemy's advance.
b. To determine the enemy's main effort.
c. To manoeuvre the enemy into areas where he is vulnerable to counter-attack.
24. A delay operation may be conducted in conditions of enemy ground and air
superiority. Command, control and communication could be difficult, particularly in a
multinational or coalition environment, and commanders should pay particular attention to
the cohesion of the force while the enemy retains the initiative. When making his plan the
commander should consider the following measures to aid the maintenance of cohesion
and control. He should:
a. Make a thoroughly aggressive plan using all available resources and forces.
b. Give the opportunity for offensive action at all levels.
c. Retain defensive mobility as long as possible.
d. Maintain a viable combat service support system.
25. The methods employed to conduct a delay operation are similar to those pertaining
to the perimeter force and disruption force. The ultimate intent is to oblige the enemy to
alter his line of advance or to delay him by inducing him to attack.
THE CONDUCT OF A DELAY
26. General. A delay operation is likely to be complicated and confused, but there will
be a number of separate and linked actions for which the commander should plan and
prepare. These stages or actions are:
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-7-11

a. Preparatory.
b. Delaying Action.
c. Breaking Contact.
27. Preparatory Action. The following procedures should be adopted:
a. Organisation. In delaying operations the organization of the area used is

similar to that of the defence. The delay normally starts on a line given in the
mission and extends rearward to a line where responsibility for the enemy is passed
to another force, or to a line where the type of operation changes (normally the
FEBA, a phase line forward of the FEBA, or possibly the handover line). Within the
area given, the forces will usually be assigned lateral boundaries. Unit and formation
frontages will tend to be larger than in the defence. The commander of a delaying
force has to decide which parts of the assigned area he will use for his operation,
which parts he may abandon earlier than others, and which ones need only be
monitored. In a built-up area less combat power may be required for each task and
the nature of the terrain lends itself to dispersed and more mobile operations,
however, this increases the problems of command and control.
b. Battle Procedure. Sufficient time should be allocated to:
(1) An early estimate of the enemy’s intentions.
(2) The deployment and employment of indirect and direct-fire weapon

systems, and the preparation of withdrawal routes.
(3) Selection and preparation of defended positions and routes through the
built-up area.
(4) Selection and preparation obstacles, barriers and killing areas.
(5) Coordination with superior and adjacent units.
28. Delaying Action.
a. Concept. The concept of the operation is to oblige the enemy to change his
routes, to divert his resources and to take offensive action in urban terrain that will
cause him delay. When conducting a delaying action, elements of the delaying force
will have to both attack and defend. The commander should therefore consider the
following points:
(1) Aggression. The delaying force must take every opportunity to initiate
aggressive action. Troops will be employed in maintaining surveillance,
engaging the enemy at long and at short range, delaying the enemy
aggressively, withdrawing to the next delaying position or being available as a
reserve.
(2) Frustration of Enemy Intentions. Frustrate the enemy's desire to

move quickly through the area by blocking roads. Destroy a committed
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-7-12

enemy by sealing routes behind him. Relatively small urban forces can
destroy an unprepared opponent.
(3) Depth. A delaying force should make use of the depth of the urban
area to ambush men and vehicles and to attack the enemy's flank and rear.
The majority of the defending troops can engage the enemy along his most
likely approach routes and bring a heavy weight of direct and indirect fire to
bear.
(4) Intelligence. The tactical situation will change frequently and rapidly.
The commander should ensure that he has well organized ISTAR assets
providing sound and timely intelligence, good communications and as strong
a reserve as possible.
(5) Counter-Attacks. Maintaining close contact with the enemy and using
counter-attacks at every level and every opportunity contributes significantly
to the success of the delaying operation.
b. Execution. The delaying force will normally consist of three elements:
(1) Screen. The screen might consist of reconnaissance forces, long-

range anti-tank teams, armour and aviation and indirect fire controllers. Its
task will be to provide early information on the location, strengths and
movement of the enemy, to engage and destroy enemy armour and the draw
the enemy into the built up area. Every opportunity should be taken to cause
delay and inflict casualties.
(2) Delaying Forces. Delaying forces in built-up areas should consist of a

combined arms grouping with infantry in the lead. Mobility, built around a
number of prepared positions, is the key to urban delay.
(3) Reserves. Reserves should be held available to deal with unexpected

reverses that threaten the cohesion of the defence.
c. Coordination. In order to oblige the enemy to take offensive action that will
prejudice his advance, the following points should be considered:
(1) Every advantage offered by the terrain should be exploited. The

enemy’s advance should be impeded and every opportunity should be taken
to surprise and ambush him, taking care to ensure timely disengagement.
(2) Elements of the delaying force in danger of being overrun or outflanked

should be prepared to disengage and withdraw.
(3) The fluid situation during delaying operations will necessitate constant
and close coordination between sub-units, and effective fire control.
d. Disengagement. Troops withdrawing from a defensive position should break

cleanly, if possible. Local counter-attacks can help achieve disengagement. The
use of subterranean routes, smoke, direct fire, hasty indirect fire plans and deception
may also be considered, but the need for good planning and control is paramount.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-7-13

29. Breaking Contact. The withdrawal of the delaying force is difficult, especially if the
force has been unable to disengage. The commander’s aim should be to prevent his force
from being 'fixed' by the enemy. Control of the withdrawal is critical and the enemy should
be given as little indication as possible of the intention to disengage. The withdrawing force
must provide accurate information to formation headquarters on its plans. Liaison elements
should be attached to superior and adjacent commands to identify withdrawing units as
they retire.
SUMMARY
30. In a high intensity conflict against numerically superior forces a unit or formation can
expect to be tasked with imposing delay on the enemy. Although the defender might be
outnumbered, the air situation unfavourable and the momentum and initiative with the
enemy, a large built up area can provide ideal terrain upon which to conduct a delaying
operation with a comparatively small force. The force will need to be a combined arms
grouping and will require long and short range anti-armour and anti-personnel weapon
systems and engineer support. The defence must be aggressive and should be based on
the principles of mobility, resolution, surprise and clean disengagement. Control will be
difficult to achieve but critical to success.
SECTION 4 - ENHANCED BLAST WEAPONS
31. Enhanced Blast Weapons (EBW) rely on blast to inflict damage, rather than
explosively driven metal projectiles, fragments or shaped charges. They may or may not be
thermobaric.5
32. Troops must be prepared to defend themselves against EBW without reducing their
defence capability against other weapons. Although the anti-personnel effect of the EBW
remains lethal at or near the point of impact, the intensity of the wave that passes into
adjacent rooms and the wider kinetic effect of the weapon will be reduced below the
lethality threshold. This will prevent damage to the structure and reduce the chance of
structural collapse.
33. The structural defensive measures against EBW are as follows:
a. Venting. ‘Venting' involves creating vents sufficiently big to reduce the

intensity of the blast wave. The creation of suitable ‘vents’ by removing the walls,
sections of walls, and/or roofs will have to be balanced against the consequent loss
of ballistic protection from other weapons.
b. Premature Detonation. Causing EBW warheads to detonate outside the

structure at a distance from the exterior wall will reduce the effects of the explosion
on the structure. Rocket screens similar to those once used in Northern Ireland
should cause the detonation of a single warhead, such as the RPO-A Schmel6.
Against a tandem warhead, such as RShG-17, the kinetic effect will also be reduced.
The detrimental effect on camouflage and concealment of the defended position
must be taken into consideration before screens are erected.
5
Denoting a very large fuel–air bomb which ignites into a fireball when detonated, creating a powerful wave of
pressure that sucks out oxygen from any confined spaces nearby. Concise OED.
6
Russian hand held thermobaric weapon.
7
Russian hand held tandem warhead thermobaric weapon.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-7-14
c. Building Selection. If the enemy are equipped with EBW, consideration
should be given to selecting only those buildings with a structural framework of steel
or reinforced concrete that will defeat the warhead.
d. Building Preparation. The preparation of prepared positions with lateral and

overhead cover should be considered.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-7-15

CHAPTER 8
STABILITY OPERATIONS
1. Stability operations are planned continuously and conducted concurrently with

offensive and defensive operations. They are defined as:
‘Military operations which contribute to order, security and control in order to set
the conditions to allow the primacy of non-military and indigenous organisations
to develop accountable institutions and mechanisms of government.1’
2. Stability operations form a key component of land tactical activities and have
become increasingly prevalent in recent years. Military involvement could range from
conflict prevention measures in failed or failing states to providing support to nation
building. Where the security situation is such that civilian actors2 (international or HN) are
unable to operate, the military may have to take initial responsibility for the provision of the
rule of law, basic utilities and governance until a handover of responsibility can be
achieved.
3. There are four interrelated groups of tactical activities associated with stability
operations and these cross all likely lines of operation:
a. Security and control.
b. Initial restoration of essential services and facilities.
c. Interim governance tasks.
d. Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR).
4. The detail on these activities is contained in AFM Vol 1 Pt 1,’Formation Tactics’,

Chapter 5, ‘Stability Operations’. This should be read in conjunction with AFM Vol 1 Pt 9,
‘Tactics for Stability Operations’, which provides detail on TTPs.
5. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the issues pertinent to the conduct of stability
operations in the urban environment.
1
AFM Vol 1 Part 9 Tactics for Stability Operations.
2
Civil actors is a collective term for the range of civil agencies, bodies and organisations that may be involved
in addressing the circumstances and conditions of a conflict or crisis situation. These include: OGDs,
International Organisations (IOs); international donors such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
European Union (EU); security forces such as the Civil Police; Non Government Organisations (NGOs); the
corporate sector; local authorities; and local populations.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-8-1
SECTION 2 – FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION DURING
URBAN STABILITY OPERATIONS
6. Demographics. A thorough understanding of the physical and cultural environment

is essential to the successful conduct of any stability operation. The following list provides
a flavour of some of the subjects requiring analysis in the urban environment:
Fig B-8-1
1 A&SH Protecting Roman Catholic Parents and Children Going to the Holy Cross
School, Belfast, October 2001.
a. The location of inter-ethnic, -social and -economic boundaries and any

resulting areas of contention or violence.
b. Cultural norms and attitudes.
c. The location of key infrastructure (government facilities, power and water

plants, schools, hospitals etc) and significant cultural/religious sites.
d. The key leaders and opinion formers amongst the population (these may
include political, tribal, religious, economic, criminal leaders) and how they
communicate with them.
e. Where the loyalties/sympathies of elements of the population lie.
f. Expectations and prejudices of the population (attitude towards police, foreign

troops, NGOs, HN government etc).
g. Standard of service provision (sewage, electricity, water, health care etc).
h. The movement of goods and people. How are they moved, where can
crowds gather easily, ingress and egress routes for adversaries etc.
7. Influence Activities. Support, or at least tolerance, for the military by the local
population is essential to success. Influence activities are required to influence local,
national and regional attitudes and perceptions in order to support the establishment of a
secure environment, the development of law and order and the establishment of a
legitimate form of government. Any information vacuum will be ruthlessly and rapidly
exploited by adversaries who are likely to have the advantage of local knowledge and who
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-8-2
are unconstrained by the need to tell the truth. The military must use influence activities in
support of all lines of operation. Methods include Key Leader Engagement (KLE), the use
of tactical PSYOPS teams and presence, posture and profile to shape the perceptions of a
variety of audiences. Understanding the environment, in its broadest sense, is essential to
ensuring that the correct message is delivered. Some examples of how Influence Activity
may be employed are given below:
a. Promote the authority of and generate popular support for legitimate HN

institutions and indigenous security forces.
b. Marginalise violent factions, criminals and other spoilers from the majority of
public support.
c. Develop and protect consent (or tolerance) towards the MNF by the local
population.
d. Explain the reason for operations and the use of force by the military.
e. Communicate instructions, provisions and rules to the population.
f. Shape conditions prior to military activity in order to pre-empt negative effects.
g. Reinforce and strengthen the will and resolve of the indigenous security
forces and allies.
8. Use of Force. The use of force will be governed by ROE. In the urban
environment, given the density of the population and buildings, there is a strong likelihood
of collateral damage and a subsequent effect on others besides the intended target.
Consideration must, wherever possible, be given to the appropriate use of force. It may be
legal to use a particular weapon system (eg JDAM) in response to a given threat (eg sniper
team in a minaret) but would it improve the overall situation?
9. The Adversary. Adversaries likely to be encountered in the complex terrain of the

urban environment will be highly diverse. They will be driven by different motives (eg
religious, political, criminal and ethnic), capable of and willing to employ a range of methods
to achieve their ends (including a mix of conventional and asymmetric attack, information
operations, intimidation and establishing shadow government) and willing to form alliances
of convenience to achieve common goals. Unconstrained by international law they will
ruthlessly exploit opportunities that present themselves, seek to undermine what we
perceive to be legitimate governance and compete for the support/compliance of the
population.
10. COIN. The conduct of stability operations in the urban environment is likely to bear
many of the hallmarks of a COIN operation. The principles of COIN3 provide a sound basis
for the conduct of stability operations.
11. Intelligence. Success in urban stability operations is normally dependent on the

acquisition of accurate and timely intelligence. The allocation of additional man-power and
resources to the collection and subsequent processing of information is therefore critical.
3
See AFM Vol 1 Part 10 Counter Insurgency Operations.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-8-3
a. HUMINT. In urban stability operations the most critical information and
subsequent intelligence comes from the population. The quantity and quality of this
data is dependent, to some extent, on the credibility of the military force, the security
that it can provide to the local population and the ability of as many ‘stability
operators’ as possible to understand and speak the local language. Every member
of the military force has to be aware of the overall intelligence requirements and how
his interactions and observations may assist in the Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP).
This awareness can and should be developed by regular briefings and debriefings.
b. IMINT. Exploitation of imagery intelligence is coordinated within the Joint

Intelligence Cell (JIC). Imagery from Tactical Air Reconnaissance (TAR) is
interpreted and distributed on request by a Joint Reconnaissance Intelligence Cell
(JRIC). Collection aircraft may be manned or unmanned, fixed wing, rotary wing or
ducted fan, and the product may be “wet film” TI or IR film, digital images or a real
time down-link. In addition there are a large number of ground based systems
ranging from the basic camera to highly sophisticated and specialized photographic
equipment. UAVs can and should be made available to provide real time situational
awareness to deployed troops.
c. SIGINT and EW. SIGINT and EW4 can provide a considerable advantage in
an urban environment, particularly if the assets are tactically placed well forward and
if the information gathered is fed directly to the forces engaged in the fighting by the
shortest possible loop. The possibilities have been demonstrated by the increased
use of Light EW Teams (LEWT) on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
d. Other Sources. Support to SSR involves working alongside the indigenous

security forces who will have their own intelligence capability and intimate knowledge
of the operating environment. A system for using information provided by the
indigenous security force should be established. Members of NGOs may also have
useful information. This should be obtained and used sensitively, without
compromising their neutrality or their relationship with the military, most likely
through CIMIC teams.
SECTION 3 - SECURITY AND CONTROL
12. Introduction. Security and control is likely to be the main focus of military activity
when conducting stability operations. The specific challenges posed by the urban
environment stem from the high densities of buildings and people. Such a complex
environment restricts fields of view, disrupts communications and requires significant
numbers of troops to control whilst providing adversaries with the opportunity to blend in
and move with impunity.
13. Aim. The aim of security and control operations is to provide individual security for
the population and set the conditions for civil actors to be able to operate. The main
challenge to progress on the security line of development is that it cannot progress in
isolation. Progress is also required simultaneously on governance, development and
economics if success is to be achieved. Military activity clearly needs to be coordinated
with the other lines of development and should not hamper their progress. Coordination of
activity through an ORT or other similar setup is required.
4
Further details are contained in Part B, Chapter 4, Section 5 – Electronic Warfare
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-8-4
14. Tasks. There are a number of tactical tasks associated with security and control.
Details for the TTPs for each task are provided in AFM Vol 1 Part 9 ‘Tactics for Stability
Operations’ and theatre-specific SOIs will provide additional guidance. Possible tasks may
include the following:
a. Patrolling. Patrolling enables the military force to dominate ground in order

to deny its use to hostile forces and gain information.
b. Convoy Protection. Convoys are often seen as soft targets by adversaries.

Their protection is required to maintain our own operations.
c. Public Order Operations. The military may need to conduct public order
operations to maintain law and order where the civilian police are unable to deal with
the situation.
d. Cordon and Search. Cordon and search operations may be required in

order to detain individuals, obtain evidence or deny weapons and equipment to
hostile elements within an area.
e. Route Protection. The protection of routes may be required as a Force

Protection (FP) measure or to deny freedom of movement to hostile elements.
Route Search and the use of Vehicle Check Points (VCP) provide the means by
which this is achieved. Current TTPs cover movement control measures, the
checking and search of routes, the use of ECM and IED counter-measures.
f. Enforcement of Out of Bounds Areas. Key infrastructure, government

buildings, vulnerable communities, food storage depots, armouries, magazines and
other sensitive locations may need to be kept out of bounds or protected.
g. Curfews. Curfews provide a means by which the movement of personnel can

be controlled during specific periods of time. The following points should be
considered:
(1) Design of Curfew-Timings. Curfew timings should support the

establishment of a secure and stable environment but not prevent the civil
community from going about its legitimate business (religious activity,
obtaining food, fuel etc).
(2) Communication. Curfew restrictions, the reason for them and the
consequences of breaches must be clearly communicated.
(3) Enforcement. Framework patrolling, Vehicle Check Points (VCP),

Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) triggered by observation posts, standing patrols
and other ISTAR assets provide the means by which the curfew may be
enforced.
15. Asymmetric Threats. The adversary faced in the urban environment will employ
asymmetric methods against conventional military forces, HN institutions, the civil
population, civil actors and opponents. Kidnapping, sniping, ambushes, beatings, torture,
intimidation are common tactics as are the use of IEDs. The latter has become increasingly
prolific and effective in recent years. Adversaries now employ devices with a range of
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-8-5

sophistication and means of delivery and are constantly adapting their TTPs to circumvent
countermeasures. A system to constantly evaluate the threat and conduct counter-IED
operations5 must be established. The TTPs and first principles to counter IEDs and suicide
IEDs are given in AFM Vol 1, Part 9, ‘Tactics for Stability Operations’, and these means
must be adapted by theatre specific methods aimed against the latest threat developments.
SECTION 4 – INITIAL RESTORATION OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES AND FACILITIES
16. Military effort may be required in the early stages of an operation, and subsequently
in periods or areas where the security situation deteriorates, to restore essential services
and facilities6. This is especially important in the urban environment for the following
reasons:
a. The urban population is reliant on municipal services.
b. Civil agencies and the instruments of government will be based in towns and
cities.
c. Civil agencies are incapable of delivering the required effect in a poor security
situation.
d. Security may be improved:
(1) Directly, for example by fixing populations (using methods such as the
provision of clean water in a given area), improving routes (permitting,
armoured vehicles/QRF and commercial access) and improving street
lighting.
(2) Indirectly, by removing causes for discontent amongst the civil

population, denying a ‘shadow government’ the opportunity to occupy a
vacuum and providing employment for disaffected elements of the population.
17. The restoration of essential services and facilities for a civilian population, linked to
an Info Ops campaign and other lines of activity, is an early measure that can be taken to
increase the chances of mission success. Restoration work must be linked to the Info Ops
messages in order to capitalise on goodwill from the local population and deny criminal
groupings unwarranted credit. It should be conducted in conjunction with security and
control activity, linked to plans for economic growth and complement the longer term
development plans of OGDs. Restoration activity is likely to be conducted primarily by
military engineers or contractors with CIMIC staff playing a coordinating role until such a
time as civilian actors can take responsibility. The military medical services may also be
involved where there is a requirement to restore medical facilities for the civilian population
and to provide advice on environmental health issues.
18. The nature and size of the military contribution will vary. In some circumstances it
may be appropriate to focus the military engineering effort on the restoration of services for
the population at the expense of the provision of facilities to the force.
5
Prevent, Detect and Neutralise, Mitigate, Exploit – JDN 05-06 C-IED.
6
Sewage, Water, Electrical and Trash (SWET).
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-8-6
SECTION 5 - INTERIM GOVERNANCE TASKS
19. It is accepted that the provision of governance is not generally a military

responsibility and if the military do get involved it is most likely to be in a supporting role.
However, in some circumstances, the military may be the only organisation that is able to
take responsibility for governing an area. JWP 3-50 – The Military Contribution to PSO,
identifies that the military may be required to undertake a range of civil administration tasks
in support of a weak HN government or in the absence of a working indigenous or
international administration. Such tasks may range from CIMIC liaison to the establishment
of an interim military government and are likely to include some degree of responsibility for
the provision of essential services. The military should seek to hand responsibility for
governance tasks to an appropriate indigenous or international civil organisation at the
earliest appropriate opportunity. Its primary role will be in establishing the environment in
which civil actors can operate.
SECTION 6 - MILITARY SUPPORT TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
20. Definition. Security Sector Reform (SSR)7 describes the overall (and largely
political) process by which effective security structures are developed in order to allow the
citizens of a state, including urban dwellers, to live in safety. SSR is likely to be a core task
in countries emerging from conflict but may also make a significant contribution to conflict
prevention in fragile or failing states. In all cases it is seen as a critical activity that provides
the basis for longer-term stability and will address two broad areas; the quality of
governance in the state (in terms of the relationships between security sector institutions,
wider government apparatus and the general public) and the technical competence and
professionalism of those in the security sector.8
21. The Security Sector. The composition of the security sector differs from country to
country so there is no universally applicable definition of it. The military are most likely to
be directly involved with a range of core security actors9 (not just the military) and will need
to understand their relationship with and the role of security management oversight bodies,
justice and law enforcement institutions and non-statutory security forces.
22. Tasks. The precise nature of tasks required to support SSR will vary according to a
range of factors. Broadly speaking military support will likely involve training tasks,
mentoring and then monitoring elements of the indigenous security force (through joint
patrols and joint operations), capacity building, equipping and developing the whole range
of G1-G9 skills as required10. Such activities must include consideration of urban
operations.
23. Opportunities. Working alongside indigenous security forces provides the

opportunity to give legitimacy to the operation by showing HN involvement and ownership
7
See AFM Vol 1 Part 1 Formation Tactics Chapter 5 for more detail.
8
Joint Doctrine Note – The Military Contribution to SSR provides the strategic level doctrine on SSR and
covers the comprehensive cross government approach.
9
Security Actors: armed forces; police and gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards;
intelligence and security services (military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities;
reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, government backed militias) and veterans
groups.
10
Details on how to approach the development of an indigenous security force and building military capacity
are contained in AFM Vol 1, Part 10, ‘Countering Insurgency’ and in AFM Vol, 1 Part 9, ‘Tactics for Stability
Operations’ and Doctrine Note 07/16 Developing Indigenous Armies.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-8-7
of security operations from the outset. It also provides the opportunity for external military
forces to capitalise on the local knowledge of the environment and low level HUMINT
provided by the security forces.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 B-8-8

URBAN OPERATIONS
PART C
URBAN COMBAT SKILLS
Issue 4.0: Oct 09

CHAPTER 9
URBAN COMBAT SKILLS
‘Russian and Chechen sources agree that non-standard squads (sections) were the basis
of the rebel force. Such a squad might include two men with RPG-7 or Mukha (RPG-18)
shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launchers, two with machine guns, and possibly a sniper.
Alternatively, it could comprise one man with a machine gun, one with a RPG, and a sniper,
backed up by one or more riflemen, automatic riflemen, ammunition bearers and medics.
Approximately three such squads, with support made up a larger 25-man cell. Three 25-
man groups made up a 75-man unit. Each of the latter was allocated one mortar crew.
This structure contributed significantly to the effectiveness of resistance ambushes. The
rebels divided the city into quadrants. Within those quadrants, 75-man units deployed
along parallel streets with the snipers in covering positions. One 25-man subgroup, which
included the unit command, deployed in smaller, six or seven-man formations in the lower
stories of buildings along one side of the street (to avoid crossfire and to establish escape
routes). The two other 25-man teams deployed similarly intro the basements and lower
stories at the point of entry to the ambush site. From there, they could seal the area and
reinforce their compatriots as needed. In some cases they mined the buildings at the point
of entry. As the Russian forces approached the entry teams informed the others by
Motorola.’
Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994-2000

Lessons from Urban Combat, Rand
SECTION 1 – CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT
GENERAL
1. Camouflage and concealment in built-up areas is as important to the survival of

troops and equipment as in any other environment. The changing patterns of terrain and
the differing nature of individual buildings make the task of blending with the terrain
significantly challenging.
APPLICATION OF CAMOUFLAGE
2. Urban areas provide plenty of cover from view which should, where possible and
practicable, be used to conceal soldiers and materiel. Where such concealment is not
possible, Urban Camouflage Material (UCM) and locally available materials should be
applied using innovation and initiative. The following points should be noted:
a. Buildings provide numerous concealed positions. Armoured vehicles can

often find isolated positions under archways or inside small industrial or commercial
structures. Thick masonry, stone, or brick walls offer excellent protection from direct
fire and provide concealed routes.
b. After camouflage is completed, the soldier should inspect a position from the
enemy's viewpoint. He should make routine and periodic checks to see if the
camouflage remains natural looking and actually conceals the position. If it does not
look natural, the soldier should rearrange or replace it.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-1

c. Positions have to be progressively camouflaged as they are prepared. Work
should continue until all camouflage is complete. When the enemy has air superiority,
work may be possible only at night. Shiny or light-coloured objects that attract
attention from the air should be hidden.
d. If the enemy has Thermal Imaging (TI) capability, soldiers have to be aware
that UCM and other drape materials will not, on their own, conceal vehicles. Thermal
Camouflage Woodland (TCW) has to be used in conjunction with the UCM. Care
should also be taken to avoid giving a heat signature to an obviously derelict building.
THE USE OF SHADOW
3. Buildings in built-up areas throw sharp shadows, which can be used to conceal
vehicles and equipment. Soldiers should avoid areas that are not in shadows. Vehicles
may have to be moved periodically as shadows shift during the day. Emplacements inside
buildings provide better concealment. Other features of shadows that can have useful
military application are that:
a. Soldiers should avoid the lighted areas around windows and loopholes. They
will be better concealed if they fire from the shadowed interior of a room.
b. A lace curtain or piece of cheesecloth provides additional concealment to

soldiers in the interior of rooms if curtains are common to the area. Interior lights
should not be used.
TEXTURE AND COLOUR
4. Standard camouflage pattern painting of equipment is not as effective in built-up

areas as a solid, dull, dark colour hidden in shadows. Since repainting vehicles before
entering a built-up area will not always be practical, the patterns should be subdued with
mud or dirt.
a. The need to break up the silhouette of helmets and individual equipment

exists in built-up areas the same as it does elsewhere, but care must be taken not to
negate the effectiveness of helmet-fitted night vision equipment. Predominant
colours are normally browns, tans and greys rather than greens, but each
camouflage location needs to be checked for texture and colour.
b. Weapons emplacements should use a wet blanket canvas, or cloth to keep

dust from rising when the weapon is fired.
c. Command posts and logistical emplacements are easier to camouflage and

better protected if located underground. Antennas can be remoted to upper stories
or to higher buildings based on remote capabilities. Field telephone wire should be
laid in conduits, in sewers, or through buildings.
d. Soldiers should consider the background to ensure that they are not
silhouetted or sky-lined, but rather blend into their surroundings. To defeat enemy
surveillance, soldiers should be alert for common camouflage errors such as the
following:
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-2

(1) Tracks or other evidence of activity. Vehicles should be kept to
hardened roads and tracks wherever possible.
(2) Shine or shadows.
(3) An unnatural colour or texture, camouflage net should not be used in

an urban environment.
(4) Muzzle flash, smoke, or dust.
(5) Unnatural sounds and smells.
(6) Movement.
e. Dummy positions can be used effectively to distract the enemy and make him
reveal his position by firing.
SUMMARY
5. Built-up areas afford cover, resources for camouflage, and locations for
concealment. The following basic rules of cover, camouflage, and concealment should be
followed:
a. Use the terrain and alter camouflage habits to suit your surroundings.
b. Employ dummy positions in buildings.
c. Continue to improve positions. Reinforce fighting positions with sandbags or

other fragment - and blast absorbent material.
d. Maintain the natural look of the area.
e. Keep positions hidden by clearing away minimal debris for fields of fire.
f. Choose firing positions in inconspicuous spots when available.
SECTION 2 - FIGHTING POSITIONS
GENERAL
6. One of the most important defensive tasks in urban operations is the preparation of
individual and fire-team fighting positions. Fighting in built-up areas is likely to be at short
range, fighting positions have limited arcs and casualties are caused as much by collateral
damage as by kinetic or Enhanced Blast Weapons (EBW). Consideration should also
always be given to the tactical advantages offered by fighting positions outside buildings.
FEATURES OF A FIGHTING POSITION
7. Commanders should consider the following factors when establishing fighting

positions:
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-3

a. Protection.
(1) Buildings. Buildings should be selected to suit the tactical plan and
consideration should be given to the value and amount of protection the
building can provide. Weak structures will require time, manpower and
resources to prepare them for defence. Where possible, solidly constructed
buildings able to provide maximum protection from conventional weapons
should be used first. Consideration should be given to the building's potential
for collapse if subjected to kinetic or EBW attack. Buildings with an integral
framework such as steel beam or reinforced concrete should be selected first.
Weak buildings with no integral framework, such as most modern domestic
dwellings, should be avoided. Firing positions should, where possible, be
positioned on the ground floor with their own structural integrity and should
include overhead protection. This will help protect the defender in the case of
structural collapse.
(2) Destroyed Buildings. The use of buildings that have been destroyed
to create fire positions affords the defender better protection and makes the
enemy’s task of identifying fire positions more difficult. Creation of such fire
positions can be improved by constructing reinforced bunkers on the ground
floor and collapsing the building around them. Routes in and fields of fire are
then created and camouflage improved. Although this option offers maximum
protection, it will be difficult and time-consuming to achieve and should not be
underestimated.
(3) Fighting Outside. Fire trenches outside buildings can provide

effective fire positions. Trenches can be incorporated into a trench system
linking fire positions, allowing communication and providing covered routes for
movement. Such systems will nevertheless require considerable preparation
and will be manpower and resource intensive.
b. Dispersion. Defending troops should be dispersed, with the minimum

personnel in any one building required to achieve the task. The dispersion of
individuals and fire-teams must not reduce the capacity for effective mutually
supporting fire. Consideration should be given to the use of alternative positions to
reduce the impact of casualties caused by collateral damage and building collapse.
Once a position is located by the enemy the defender must be able to use sufficient
heavy and accurate suppressive fire from concealed mutually supporting positions to
allow his rapid escape and redeployment.
c. Fields of Fire. In order to provide effective fields of fire over all approaches
to the position and to provide mutual support, it may be necessary to reduce or
destroy surrounding buildings and structures.
d. Identification of Enemy Firing Positions. Fields of fire should cover all

potential enemy firing positions. These firing positions should then be denied to the
enemy by the use of obstacles, booby traps or by their destruction.
e. Covered Routes. Firing positions should have at least one covered route to
allow resupply, casualty evacuation, reinforcement and withdrawal. Firing positions
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-4

paired with alternative positions should have connecting covered routes.
PREPARATION
8. Preparation of fighting positions requires careful planning.
a. Selecting Positions. Every rifleman and weapon system must be allocated a

primary arc of fire. Alternative positions should be selected that cover that same
primary arc. These positions can be located in adjacent rooms or nearby buildings.
Each firing position should have a secondary position covering a different arc in
order to engage attacks from other or unexpected directions.
Fig C-9-1 Selecting Positions
b. Weapon Positions. Individual resourcefulness should be encouraged when

establishing fighting positions in a building. Positions should be situated primarily on
the ground floor although the tactical plan must reflect the enemy’s modus operandi.
Positions should be sited as far back into a building as possible. The temptation to
fight from windows, doorways and the forward edge of buildings should be avoided
in spite of improved arcs of fire. Fields of fire should be obtained by firing from
alternate positions, perhaps from different rooms or buildings and should not be
achieved by siting the weapon closer to the window. Every firing position must be
designed to suit the firer, his weapon and the surroundings. Each position can be
improvised from furniture, sandbags or other material and debris available.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-5

Fig C-9-2 Weapon Positions
9. Other key considerations in the preparation of a firing position are as follows:
a. Positions should be situated as far back into the building as possible.
b. Dummy positions can be used to attract enemy fire.
c. Windows/openings that are not required should be blocked to prevent entry.

In the case of an EBW threat they should be of light construction so they blow out in
the event of an attack.
d. The forward apertures should be of the minimum size possible,

notwithstanding the requirement to provide firepower onto the likely avenues of
approach. The erection of rocket screens or the use of items such as chain link
fencing can negate the effects of Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) attack, although
this may negate concealment and hinder the use of certain weapons.
10. Fixed Installations. Fixed military installations in the urban environment must be
camouflaged and protected by direct and indirect fire and purpose-made or ad hoc rocket
screens.
11. Building Positions. There are many ways to establish a fighting position in a
building.
a. Window Position. Soldiers should kneel or stand on either side of a window.

To fire downward from upper floors, elevated firing positions should be constructed
back from the window using tables, sandbags or anything else available placed
against the wall, positioned to prevent the weapon from protruding through the
window. Junior commanders should inspect individual fire positions to determine the
arcs of fire available to each soldier.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-6

b. Loopholes. To avoid establishing a pattern of always firing from windows,
loopholes can be prepared in walls. Again, individual firing positions should be sited
back from loopholes in order to improve protection.
Fig C-9-3 Cone Shaped Loopholes
(1) Several loopholes are usually required for each weapon (primary,
alternative, and secondary positions). Loopholes can weaken walls and
reduce protection against grenades and small-arms fire. Loopholes should
not be obvious. Explosive blasting of loopholes can result in a large hole that
will provide insufficient protection and will be seen by the enemy.
(2) Loopholes should be cone-shaped to achieve the best arc of fire, to

facilitate engagement of high and low targets, and to reduce the size of the
exterior aperture. When not in use, loopholes should be concealed and
protected by sandbags to prevent their use by the enemy to throw grenades
or small arms fire.
(3) Loopholes should also be prepared in interior walls and ceilings of

buildings to permit fighting within the building. Interior loopholes should cover
stairs, halls, and rooms, and, if possible, be concealed by debris or furniture.
Loopholes in floors will allow the defender to engage the enemy on the floors
below with small-arms fire and grenades.
(4) Although walls will provide protection, they should be reinforced with
sandbags, furniture filled with dirt, rubble or other material. Each position
should have overhead and all-round protection.
c. Other Construction Tasks. There will be a requirement to complete other

construction tasks in basements, on the ground floor, and on upper floors.
(1) Basements and Ground Floors. Both basements and ground floor
levels will require the same amount of preparation. Every access to the
building, underground or through the attic, that could provide enemy access
must be blocked.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-7

(2) Doors. Unused doors should be locked, nailed shut, and blocked and
reinforced with furniture, sandbags, rubble, barbed wire or other suitable
material.
(3) Hallways and Stairs. While allowance must be made for the
defender's movement, hallways and stairs should be blocked with furniture,
barbed wire and if possible booby-trapped.
Fig C-9-4 Blocking Stairwells
(4) Windows. All glass should be removed from every window. Windows
not in use should be blocked with boards or sandbags.
(5) Fighting Positions. Individual primary and alternative fighting

positions should be constructed throughout the building. Fighting positions
must offer protection from direct-fire weapons and grenades.
d. Unoccupied Rooms. Rooms not being used should be sealed, and blocked
with wire or other obstacles.
(1) Upper Floors. Upper floors require the same preparation as ground
floors. Windows should be covered with wire mesh to block grenades thrown
from the outside. The defender must retain the ability to drop his own
grenades.
(2) Interior Routes. Defending troops must prepare and know their way
around the building. They must be able to deal with any threat and engage
the enemy from any direction. Withdrawal routes should be planned,
prepared and rehearsed to allow rapid evacuation from the room or the
building. ‘Mouseholes’ big enough to allow access to a crawling man should
be made through interior walls to allow movement between rooms.
Mouseholes can be booby-trapped and should be marked for both day and
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-8

night identification. Rehearsals should be conducted to allow everyone
familiarity with the internal routes around the building.
(3) Fire Prevention. Buildings that use wood in their construction require
comprehensive fire prevention measures. The attic and other wooden floors
should be covered with at least 2-3cms of sand or earth. Water containers
should be positioned around the building for immediate use. Fire-fighting
materials (earth, sand, fire extinguishers, and blankets) should be assembled
and placed on each floor. Available water basins and bathtubs should be
filled as a reserve for fire-fighting. All electricity and gas should be turned off.
Fire breaks can be created by the destruction of adjacent buildings.
(4) Communications. In urban defence, consideration should be given to

the extensive use of land-line. Telephone lines should be laid through
adjacent buildings or underground systems, or buried in shallow trenches.
Radio antennae can be concealed by placing them among other antennae or
along the sides of chimneys and towers. If possible they should be hidden
from ground observation. Telephone lines within the building can be laid
through walls and floors.
(5) Rubble. Destruction of parts of the building provides additional cover

and concealment for weapons emplacements, and impedes enemy progress.
Engineer advice and help should be sought to achieve this, if possible.
(6) Rooftops. Consideration should be given to the building of obstacles

on large flat-roofed buildings to prevent helicopter landings. Rooftops
accessible from adjacent structures can be covered by fire or with wire and
other obstacles. All obstacles should be covered by fire. Entrances to
buildings from rooftops should be sealed and blocked. Any structure on the
outside of a building that could assist scaling the buildings to gain access to
upper floors, or to the rooftop, should be removed or destroyed.
(7) Obstacles. Obstacles should be positioned in adjacent streets and

roads to buildings in order create killing areas and to impede enemy armoured
and infantry movement.
(8) Fields of Fire. Fields of fire should be maximised around the

defensive position. Buildings can be destroyed to enlarge fields of fire.
Obstacles to anti-tank guided missiles should be cleared. Dead space should
be covered with mines and obstacles.
FIGHTING POSITIONS FOR TANKS, AFVs AND OTHER ARMED VEHICLES
12. Fighting positions for tanks, AFVs1 and other armed vehicles are essential to
complete an effective defensive plan in built-up areas. Vehicle positions are selected and
developed to obtain the best cover, concealment, observation and fields of fire, while still
retaining the vehicle's ability to move.
1
For further details see Part B, Chapter 5 ‘All Arms Combat’, Section 1, Paragraphs 26-47.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-9

a. Vehicles should use hull-down positions to provide themselves additional
cover and routes to alternative firing positions must be kept clear. Collapsed
buildings may impede the movement and routes for some vehicles. It should be
remembered that armoured vehicles and their crews will remain most vulnerable to
top and rear deck attack.
b. Vehicle hide positions provide cover and concealment. Inevitably, structural

obscuration greatly limits or prevents the crew from seeing advancing enemy infantry.
Close co-ordination and good communications, by radio and telephone, is vital
between mounted and dismounted troops. Alternatively an observer from the vehicle
can be concealed in an adjacent building from where he can acquire the target and
direct the vehicle to move to its firing position. After firing, vehicles should move to
alternative positions to avoid compromise.
Fig C-9-5 Vehicle Hide Position, Utilising an Observer
FIGHTING POSITIONS FOR ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
13. Anti-tank weapons2 should be employed to maximize their capabilities in the built-up
area.
a. Whenever Javelin is fired in the urban environment, urban furniture, including

rubble, can interfere with missile flight. When firing down streets, missiles require at
least one metre of clearance over rubble. Other obstacles to missile flight can
include trees and large shrubs, vehicles, television antennae, buildings, power lines
and wires, walls, and fences.
b. NLAW is better suited for urban combat:. Its minimum arming distance (10-
20m) will allow close-range use. Elevated firing positions should be chosen to allow
engagement of the top and rear decks of armoured vehicles.
2
For further details see Part B, Chapter 5 ‘All Arms Combat’, Sect 1, Paragraphs 48-55.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-10

FIGHTING POSITIONS FOR SNIPERS
14. Snipers3 can be highly effective in urban operations. An effective sniper or pair of
snipers can cause considerable disruption to enemy movement and cause delay out of all
proportion to their numbers4. Particular points to note are:
a. General areas (a building or group of buildings) will be designated as the

sniper positions, but the sniper himself will select the best position for engagement.
Masonry buildings that offer the best protection, long-range fields of fire, and all-
round observation should be chosen. The sniper should also select several
alternative and secondary positions to cover his arcs and areas of responsibility.
b. Engagement priorities for snipers are determined by the relative importance of

the targets to the effective operations of the enemy. Sniper targets usually include
commanders, enemy snipers and the personnel of crew served weapons.
c. Built-up areas may limit snipers to firing down or across streets, while open
areas will allow engagements at long ranges. Snipers can be employed to cover
rooftops, obstacles, dead ground, and gaps.
d. Consideration can be given to using snipers on the flanks of a defensive

position to impede or interdict enemy movement.
SECTION 3 – MOVEMENT
INDIVIDUAL MOVEMENT
15. Movement in urban areas is restricted by poor communication, buildings, rubble and
obstacles. Movement is also limited by the difficulties of observation and the location of
enemy positions. All movement must be supported by accurate direct fire support. The
passage of good, clear information and intelligence on enemy positions is vital. This will
reduce casualties and avoid the natural tendency to focus on the nearest buildings.
17. Movement in built-up areas is a skill that every soldier must master and must be
learned, practised and rehearsed. Silhouette will be visible against blank walls as well as in
open areas and a soldier must select his next covered position before making any move.
a. Crossing a Wall. After he has reconnoitred the other side, the soldier should
roll over the wall, keeping a low silhouette. The speed of movement and a low
silhouette will deny the enemy a target. This method of movement must be practised
by all soldiers.
3
For further details see Part B, Chapter 5 ‘All Arms Combat’, Sect 1, paragraph 16-25.
4
Further details are contained in Infantry Training Volume 1 Pamphlet 4.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-11

Fig C-9-6 Low Silhouette Whilst Crossing a Wall
b. Movement Around Corners. The area around a corner should be observed

before a soldier moves to it. A common mistake is to allow a personal weapon to
extend beyond the corner, and expose a soldier’s position and intention.
Fig C-9-7 Looking Around a Corner
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-12

Fig C-9-8 Looking Around a Corner with a Mirror
c. Movement Past Windows. Movement past windows present another

hazard; the most common mistake is to expose the head. The correct technique to
pass a window is to stay below the window level. The same technique is used to
pass basement windows where the most common mistake is not being aware of it.
The correct procedure for negotiating a basement window is either to avoid it or to
stay close to the wall of the building and step or jump past the window and provide
minimum exposure to view.
d. Use of Doorways. Doorways should not be used if possible. They may be

covered by fire or booby-trapped. If a soldier has to use a doorway, he should move
quickly through it to his next position, staying as low as possible to avoid silhouetting
himself. Pre-selection of positions, speed, a low silhouette, and the use of covering
fire should be employed when using doorways.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-13

Fig C-9-9 Crouched Movement Past a Window
e. Moving Parallel to Buildings. Soldiers will not always be able to use the
inside of buildings to advance, so movement forward may be necessary outside
buildings. Movement should always be concealed and covered by smoke and
covering fire. Correctly moving outside a building, the soldier ‘hugs’ the side of the
building, stays in the shadow, present a low silhouette, and moves rapidly to his next
fire position. If an enemy inside the building fires on a soldier, he exposes himself to
fire from other fire-team and section members. Enemy further away or to a flank
should be engaged by flank sub-units or direct and indirect fire support.
f. Crossing Open Areas. Open areas, including streets and alleys, cannot be
avoided. They are natural killing areas, but can be crossed safely if certain
fundamental rules are applied:
(1) Preparation. Before moving, a soldier should select the next position
that offers the best cover. At the same time, he should select the best route
to take to get to that position, offering concealment or speed. He must ensure
his fire-team or section can provide direct fire support prior to any move.
(2) Least Exposure. The shortest distance across streets and between
buildings should be used and smoke from hand grenades can be used to
conceal movement. The cover provided by walls should be exploited for as
long as possible. By doing so, the individual will reduce the evidence of his
intentions and the time that he is exposed to enemy fire.
(3) Fire Support. Direct covering fire support is or can be provided.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-14

FIRE TEAM MOVEMENT
18. Moving as a fire team, from building to building, is the best method of tactical
movement. The fire team must ensure that every room is clear of enemy and should use
the protection of the buildings as cover for as long as possible. Fire team movement
between buildings must be covered by fire, preferably by another fire team. Bunching
should be avoided to minimize the effect of automatic weapons and booby-traps.
Movement can be made at street level or by using roofs and underground systems. The
hreat of an effective counter-attack will be most real immediately after the successful
capture of a building.
Fig C-9-10 Fire Team Movement Fig C-9-11 Soldier Firing from a
Covered Position
19. When moving from position to position, each soldier must ensure that he does not
mask his supporting fire. When he reaches the next position, he should be prepared to
cover the movement of other members of his fire team or section. The most common error
a soldier can make is to fire over the top of his cover and silhouette himself against the wall
or building to his rear, and provide the enemy with a clear target. The best technique for
firing from a covered position is to fire around the side of the cover, and reduce his
exposure to the enemy.
SECTION 3 - ENTRY TECHNIQUES
GENERAL
20. This section describes the tactics, techniques and procedures employed to gain
entry to a building, and to create and successfully exploit a breach. An exploitable breach
is one through which armed and equipped soldiers can move quickly, without hindrance
and able to use their personal weapons as they move.
21. Gaining entry to buildings or other structures will be necessary in war to engage and
destroy the enemy. In certain operations, it may be necessary to gain entry to enable the
arrest of wanted individuals and the search of the premises. In both cases, a breach to
assist or enable the entry to a building can be made manually or by using explosives.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-15

22. In conventional operations, breaches can be made using windows or doors, or using
large calibre direct or indirect fire weapons5. During strike (arrest and search) operations,
the surprise and momentum of the assault will be enhanced by the shock of the assault and
the rapid exploitation of the breach.
CONVENTIONAL ASSAULT
Fig C-9-12 Training on a Bomb Site,

London Docklands, 1942
SECTION 4 – ENTRY TECHNIQUES
23. Top Down Entry. Clearing a building from top down is the preferred method. To
get into a position to create such a breach, walls should be scaled and use can be made of
ladders and grappling hooks to gain entry. Consideration can be given to the use of
vehicles, abseiling and mechanical lifts to assist entry and casualty evacuation.
Fig C-9-13 Assaulting a Building Fig C-9-14 Using Grappling Hooks

Using Ladders
5
Tank fire, direct fire artillery, ASM (Anti-Structure Munitions), air or ground launched PGM (Precision Guided
Munitions).
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-16

24. Entry at Lower Levels. Top-down entry may not be feasible or realistic, for
instance when the building's upper storeys are either too high or exposed to enemy fire.
When entering at ground or lower levels from a stand-off position, the point of entry must be
clearly identified and known by every member of the assaulting section. The approach of
the assaulting section and its reinforcements to the building should be covered by smoke
and small arms fire.
Fig C-9-15 Soldiers from 40 Commando RM Gaining Access, Afghanistan 2007
25. Exploitation. The breach must be exploited quickly. The following two points
should be noted:
a. The Entrance. In conventional assaults, entry should be avoided through

windows and doors that can be booby-trapped and covered by enemy fire. Rapid
entry through the breach will maximise the effects of the blast, concussion and the
shock of the unexpected direction of the assault. Nevertheless, on reaching the
point of entry, the assaulting section should be prepared to enlarge the entry point.
When the only entry to a building is through a window or door, supporting fire,
including the use of grenade launchers, should be directed at it immediately prior to
its breach.
b. Grenades. Grenades should be used to clear the first room and reinforce
the kinetic effect of the breach.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-17

Fig C-9-16 Building Floor Exploitation
CREATION AND EXPLOITATION OF A BREACH
26. Whether or not the breach will be made manually or using explosives, the breaching
party must assemble (stack) as close as possible to the entry point to be able to exploit the
breach immediately. The commander should confirm the positions of the assault team,
stacking left or right of the entry point.
27. Whether making a manual or explosive breach to a building, the commander’s pre-
entry point recce must:
a. Clearly identify the entry point.
b. Confirm the position of the assault team.
c. Identify the cover available to the assault team.
d. Confirm what is on the other side of the entry point.
e. Know the floor plan behind the entry point.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-18

Fig C-9-17 An Exploitable Breach
26. The planning for an explosive breach must include the following:
a. Actions in the event that the breach is compromised.
b. Actions in the event that the breach is not possible.
c. The size and shape of the charge to be used and the charge preparation.
d. The safe stacking distance.
e. The identification of an alternate or reserve breach.
27. The following factors should be considered when planning to exploit a breach.
a. Previous explosive breaches should be avoided as they are likely to be mined

or booby-trapped.
b. Corners of rooms should similarly be avoided as fire positions for the same
reason.
c. To suppress defenders when entering a room, a series of rapid shots should

be fired at all identified targets and likely enemy positions. This is more effective
than long bursts or spraying the room with automatic fire.
d. When targets reveal themselves in buildings, the most effective engagement

is the quick-fire technique with the weapon up and both eyes open.
e. Within built-up areas, burning debris, reduced ambient light, shadows and
smoke all limit the effect of night vision and sighting devices. The use of aiming
stakes in the defence and of the pointing technique in the attack, both using bursts,
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-19

are night firing skills required of all infantrymen. A soldier using Head Mounted Night
Vision System (HMNVS) should be paired with a soldier not wearing HMNVS.
f. Shields should only be used where there is sufficient room to enable

unimpeded access. A shield man should be the first to enter the building. In spite of
the weight of the shield6 the shield man must carry his full complement of fighting
equipment to allow him to be fully integrated into the team should the shield need to
be passed to another team member. The shield man’s personal weapon will be
slung and his pistol employed to deal with any threat unless he sees fit to use his
rifle.
g. Exploiting the shock effect of the assault to its best effect, the assault team
should move into the first room at the same moment on either side of the shield.
Assaulting troops must be able to use their weapons to engage the enemy whilst on
the move, and training must reflect this requirement.
h. Ideally every member of the assault group should carry a pistol as his
secondary weapon. Strapped to his leg, each man must be trained to draw and use
his pistol in case of a stoppage on his primary personal weapon.
THE MANUAL BREACH
Fig C-9-18 Creating a Manual Breach
28. Breaching a Door. When planning a manual breach through a door, consideration
should be given to the following:
• The door itself:

o The purpose, type, height and thickness of the door.
o Inward or outward opening.
o Left or right action.
o The presence of glass panels.
6
Type 4 shield will provide protection from 7.62mm rounds at very short range.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-20

o Whether the door is barricaded.
• The door frame.
• The hinges.
• The locks.
29. Manual Methods of Entry. Manual methods of entry can be made using a variety
of tools and equipment, including the following:
• By shoulder, hand or boot.

• Sledge hammer.
• Enforcer7.
• Halligan Tool8.
• Thermal Cutters.
• Hydraulic Ram.
ASSAULT BREACHING USING EXPLOSIVES
29. Explosive breaching charges can be applied to walls, doors and windows to facilitate
entry to buildings. The components, construction and effect of the individual charges can
be found in Military Engineering Volume II, Field Engineering, Pamphlet No 4, Demolitions
(Army Code 71670).
30. Explosive breaching devices must be prepared by suitably qualified RE or assault

pioneers with access to the appropriate material and with the competence to construct the
necessary charge. The RE or assault pioneer Explosive Methods of Entry (EMOE) team
should be used to lay and prepare the charge for the breaching team in a house assault. In
order to create an exploitable breach, it is critical that:
a. As much of the shock and blast as possible should be used to apply the
maximum directed force to the explosion.
b. A number of charges should be distributed over the required area.
c. The individual charges must be initiated simultaneously.
SAFETY
31. General Safety Considerations. Reflecting surfaces, such as walls immediately in

the vicinity or opposite, can considerably increase harmful blast overpressure. RE or
assault pioneer advice on safety distances must always be sought.
32. Correct Charge. The net explosive quantity (NEQ) of the charge should be
adequate to defeat the target. Catastrophic structural failure caused by excessive
explosive charge might cause blast or other injury to the assaulting troops and hinder
successful exploitation9.
7
The Enforcer is a one man operated battering ram commonly used by police.
8
The Halligan Tool is a forcible entry combined lever and cutting edge commonly used by firefighters.
9
“You’re only supposed to blow the bloody doors off!”, Michael Caine, The Italian Job, 1969.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-21

Reflecting Surfaces & Blast Traps Reflecting Surfaces & Blast Traps
Fig C-9-19 Reflecting Surfaces and Blast Traps
33. Safety Distances. Safety distances will vary according to the NEQ of the charge
and the presence of opposite and adjacent blast reflecting surfaces. The minimum ‘safe
stacking’ distances for small and medium sized breaching charges in the open are10:
Ser Charge NEQ (g) Safe Distance (m)

(a) (b) (c)
1 125 5
2 250 6
3 500 7
4 750 8
5 1000 9
6 1500 10
7 2000 11
34. Charge Effect. The use of explosive breaching charges reinforces surprise, shock
and aggression. Consideration should be given by the commander to the blast and shock
effects of the charge on non-combatants, for instance during urban strike operations.
TERMINOLOGY
35. Coupling. Coupling describes the effect of the explosive device against the wall or
aperture so that the force of the blast is directed through and not parallel to the wall. As
much of the blast as possible should ‘couple’ with the target to apply the highest peak
shock load (‘punch’) and the highest and longest duration impulse (‘push’).
36. Initiation. Breaching charges on the same device must be detonated (“initiated”)
simultaneously. This will ensure that the peak shock against the target is maximised, un-
detonated charges are not decoupled and colliding shock waves from individual charges do
not interfere with each other.
37. Tamping. Tamping a charge implies packing the charge with water or other
materials to enhance the effectiveness of the explosive. Increasing the amount of tamping
material decreases the amount of uncoupled blast and increases the effectiveness of the
charge.
10
D/DGD&D/18/27/167 Military Engineering Volume II, Field Engineering. Army Code 71670.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-22

BREACHING CHARGES
38. Explosive breaching devices must be prepared by the RE or assault pioneers and
should be used to lay and prepare the charge for the breaching team in a house assault.
a. Breaching charges using in-service explosive stores. Charges using in-

service explosive stores include:
(1) Standard Frame Charge using ‘Charge Demolition Cutting’11. A

standard frame charge is a squared-off, hollow “D” with five sides. For ease
of carriage a hinged carrier frame is usually constructed, although a one-piece
frame can be used. Charge Demolition Cutting (CDLC), commonly known as
‘Blade’, is a robust, exceptionally flexible and explosive-efficient family of
linear shaped charge, designed to cut a wide range of engineering and
building materials. Blade is manufactured in various sizes specified by weight
of explosives per metre, 63 g/m, 100 g/m, 240g/m, 450g/m and 1150g/m. The
performance characteristics of CDLC (‘Blade’) are detailed in Table 1.
Ser Nature Max Cutting thickness (mm)

g/m Steel Aluminium Wood Laminated
(Oak) Glass
1 63 3 10 30 10
2 100 6 20 40 10
3 250 10 35 70 26
4 450 15 45 100 -
5 1150 30 150 200 -
Table 1 – CDCL (‘Blade’) Performance
Fig C-9-20
Standard Frame Charge The Effect
with CDLC (‘Blade’)
11
Commonly known as ‘Blade’.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-23

(2) ‘Gatecrasher’. Gatecrasher12 is a specialist breaching system,
consisting of pre-moulded plastic forms utilising water tamping. It consists
essentially of a plastic frame to which plastic explosive (PE) or detonating
cord is moulded into the recesses (depending on target thickness) and then
water is added to the tanks of the moulds to act as tamping. The
effectiveness of the explosive is enormously enhanced by heavy tamping
using water in an integral compartment.
Fig C-9-21 Gatecrasher
(3) ‘Gatecrasher’ Modular 1. Modular Gatecrasher is employed in a

similar manner to the original Gatecrasher but the pre moulded plastic form is
replaced by a flexible plastic sleeve. It consists of a plastic sleeve with a
series of containers which are loaded with explosive and filled with water.
The charge may then be rolled up and transported. To deploy the charge, it is
unrolled and placed against the target.
Fig C-9-22 Modular Gatecrasher
12
Gatecrasher is used predominately by US forces.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-24

(4) Bangalore Torpedo. The latest Bangalore torpedo was introduced
into service in 2009. Owing to the torpedo’s low NEQ and the secondary
fragmentation hazard of the steel body, the Bangalore torpedo should be only
be used as a breaching charge if nothing else is available.
b. Improvised Breaching Charges. Improvised charges include:
(1) Basic Improvised Cruciform Charge. Constructed from a simple “X”,

the cruciform charge, made of poles no longer than 750mm long, comprises
four plastic explosive (PE) charges at the extremities and a centrally placed
‘kicking charge. The charge is propped against the target. The performance
of the cruciform charge is unpredictable. The dimensions of each charge tend
to be small and may not produce an exploitable breach.
Fig C-9-23
Basic Improvised Cruciform Charge - Failed Breach due to Poor Charge
Size and Distribution
(2) Improvised Frame Charge. The improvised frame charge has a

softwood frame that is loaded with detonating cord in the manner of a
squared-off figure of eight, or can be loaded with sheet explosive with plastic
explosive charges taped on. The improvised frame charge offers superior
performance over improvised cruciform charges.
Fig C-9-24 Improvised Frame Charge
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-25

(3) Fracture Sheet Charge. The fracture sheet charge can be
constructed from a lightweight plastic sheet fitted with pockets into which
charges are loaded. To be effective, fracture sheet charges must make
intimate contact with the target over their entire surface, usually achieved by
using ‘Hydrogel’ or purpose-made Breacher’s Tape. Due to the difficulty in
achieving charge-to-target adhesion, fracture sheet charges tend to be used
as secondary or reserve charges.
Fig C-9-25
Fracture Sheet Charge The Effect
(4) Charges Using Inert Charge Container Systems. Inert charge

container systems are plastic or metal containers intended for other
applications, packed with explosives by the user. This example shows a
plastic mortar round container containing caving explosive, PE and detonating
cord. Such dedevices are very powerful, simple to construct, robust, easily
portable and can be propped or hung against the target.
Fig C-9-26 Charges Using Inert Charge Container Systems
(5) Improvised Slab Charges. Slab charges can be made by preparing

two plywood or rigid plastic frames approximately 250mm x 350mm and
taping three PE slabs on to each one.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-26

(6) Barmine Slab Charges. Barmines have been used extensively on
recent operations for breaching. To utilise a barmine for EMOE the fuse is
removed and either the full or half of the explosive quantity is used as a
charge to conduct a breach. A half barmine has a NEQ of approximately 4kg.
Fig C-9-27 Barmine Slab Charges
SECTION 5 - CLEARING BUILDINGS
PLATOON ORGANISATION
39. The basic manoeuvre unit for a building clearance is the platoon. The platoon
should be organised as follows:
a. Command Group. The command group includes the platoon commander

who is to co-ordinate the support to the assaulting fire-teams or sections. He should
give a clear achievable mission to the assaulting section commanders. The
command group should be a tactical bound behind the assaulting section and should
not become involved unless critical to the success of their mission. This is a matter
of judgement and the platoon commander must decide the best position from which
to co-ordinate the support to the assaulting section.
b. Assault Section. The assault section assaults the building and clears it. The
section should maintain two identical fire teams. The section commander is
responsible for the clearance of the building. The section 2IC should simultaneously
identify likely enemy counter attack options. The section commander decides if his
section has the combat power to successfully complete his mission. If more
manpower is required, another fire team should be allocated. He should not hand
over command until he has achieved his mission. If more than one additional fire
team is required the platoon commander needs to reassess the situation. Once the
mission is achieved the section commander is to be ready to provide a secure base
to launch the next section into the assault. If necessary they will provide fire support
to the next assaulting section until the echelon section takes over. The assaulting
section then becomes the reserve.
e. Manoeuvre Support Section. The manoeuvre support section provides fire

support to the assaulting section throughout. This must include depth positions and
they should avoid becoming totally focused on the building being cleared. They
should be in the best position to support the assaulting section and not necessarily in
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-27

the building next to them. They should be prepared to move at any time during the
assault.
d. Echelon Section. The echelon section is the next assaulting section. They
should be ready to move at all times. The echelon section should be prepared to
provide an additional fire team to the assaulting section if required.
e. Reserve Section. The reserve section may be tasked to assist the platoon
sergeant with ammunition re-supply or casualty evacuation.
CLEARANCE DRILLS
40. Ideally, each assault group should comprise at least four men. The basic procedure
to support this is as follows:
a. Cover Group. The cover group deploys to support to the assault.
b. First Assault Group. The first assault group effects entry into building.
c. Second Assault Group. As the section commander of the second assault

group enters the building, the commander of the first assault group (by shouting) tells
him what has been found in the room, for instance room clear, door leading to
cellars, manhole in ceiling. This allows the section commander to carry out a quick
appreciation and decide the next logical room to be cleared by the second assault
group.
ROOM CLEARANCE
41. Once the section commander has decided the next room to be cleared, he indicates
it to the next assault group. Blast shields should used if available. The next sequence of
action is:
a. The assault group leader will nominate who is to open/break down doors,
hatches, windows, post grenades and be the first to enter the room. The assault
group post a grenade in the room and enter immediately after it has exploded,
shooting into cupboards and likely hiding places. Automatic fire should not be used
unless required, as most modern houses are constructed of concrete which will
cause ricochets and in turn may cause friendly casualties. If furniture is in the room
the assault group should check behind to ensure it is not concealing an enemy
mousehole.
b. Once the room is clear, the assault group should cover any vulnerable points
such as doors, mouseholes and windows. At the same time, the assault group
leader is to ensure an exit point is nominated in case of an enemy grenade and
report room clear.
c. At this stage, the section commander and the next assault group move into
the cleared room. The link man will be left behind to pass on all information to the
remainder of the section/platoon, and mark the entry point. Once in the cleared
room, the section commander will once again decide the next logical room to be
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-28

cleared and task the next assault group to continue the clearance. This procedure
will be continued until the whole house has been cleared.
d. Each room has to be completely cleared and secured before moving into the
next room; likewise each floor before moving on to the next. If rooms do have
vulnerable points then soldiers have to be left behind to secure that room to prevent
an enemy counter attack.
CLEARING A STAIRWAY
42. When mounting stairs movement should be covered by fire and be swift. If possible
a tank machine gun or LMG should fire into the upper storey before the stairs are rushed.
In passages troops should keep to the sides and take cover in doorways. Blast shields
should be used if available. The drill to follow is as follows:
Fig C-9-28 Clearing a Stairway

Note Use of Shield by Front Soldier
a. A single assault group is chosen by the section commander to carry out the
clearance of the stairway.
b. Two soldiers move to the base of the stairs.
c. The first soldier throws a grenade up to the next hallway. After it has
detonated, he should be prepared to assault the stairs, firing if necessary. He should
position himself at the top of the stairs away from the wall in order to enable the next
member of the group to pass through without crossing in front of his line of sight.
d. Either the first assault group continues the clearance, or, the second assault
group can be called forward to clear the next flight of stairs. The same drill is used
until the whole of the stairs are clear. The same drill should be used if clearing the
stairs downwards.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-29

FIGHTING FLOOR TO FLOOR VIA MOUSEHOLES
43. At some stage during the clearance it may be necessary to use vertical mouseholes
to continue the clearance of the building. The following drill is carried out when fighting
from floor to floor, via vertical mouseholes:
a. The section commander decides to use a vertical mouse hole as an entry

point to the next floor.
b. The assault group chosen by the section commander drops, or throws, a

grenade through the mousehole into the next room.
c. After the grenade has detonated the assault group drops, or climbs up into the
room firing into likely hiding places and furniture. The assault group reports room
clear.
d. The section commander and second assault group then enter the room via
the mousehole, from this point normal room clearance drills are followed.
OTHER FACTORS IN HOUSE CLEARANCE
44. Crowding. The sections should avoid bunching in one room or stairwell for too long.
This is because a single grenade or contact could cause numerous casualties. Once a
room has been secured the assaulting sections should spread out as quickly as possible.
45. Use of Cover. Individual soldiers should select suitable cover when moving through
the building. They should keep to the walls and avoid windows, doors, floor and ceiling
openings. They have to realise it is their responsibility to select the cover, not the section
commander’s.
46. Booby Traps. Always beware of booby traps. If found they have to be left alone for
specialist attention. The exact location of the device should be marked and at the point of
entry a blue flag or blue marker should be displayed to indicated the requirement for
engineer assistance and to act as a warning that a booby trap is in that house. All other
members of the section/platoon need to be warned of the presence of booby traps.
47. Use of Grenades. Care must be taken when using grenades as they can be a
double edged weapon. If subject to grenade attack from the enemy, the immediate action
should be to move out or to take immediate cover by lying flat on the floor. This is because
the majority of the blast and fragmentation is directed upwards and outwards. When
clearing a house use dummy grenades whenever possible. Live grenades should only be
thrown when enemy are known to be in the room. If live grenades are used in every room,
the house would soon be weakened and clearance would become impossible due to dust
and rubble. Distraction (flash-bang) grenades should be used in the case of rooms known
to be occupied by civilians. The use of HE grenades increases the risk of fratricide.
48. Automatic Fire. The drill for assaulting a room may include the use of automatic
fire. Most modern houses have concrete floors, walls and even ceilings and these may
cause rounds to ricochet and cause fratricide. Similarly if automatic fire is used throughout
the house, ammunition expenditure would be high and increase the demand for resupply.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-30

Ideally, most shooting inside a house should be instinctive single shots which will be far
more accurate. Conversely, some houses have very thin internal walls, shots will penetrate
these walls and could again cause fratricide. Pistols can be used where possible.
49. Clearance. Each room needs to be completely cleared and secured before moving
on to the next room, likewise each floor before moving on to the next. If rooms do have
vulnerable points then soldiers should be left behind to secure them to prevent an enemy
counterattack.
50. The Marking of Buildings. During combat, there will be a need to mark buildings.
This is to show which buildings have been cleared, the location of entry points, the FLOT,
the location of casualties and booby traps. Below is the NATO colour coded marking
system:
a. Red - Forward line of own troops (facing forward).

- Entry point, building not clear (at entry point).
b. Yellow - Casualty in building, CASEVAC required.
c. Green - Entry point/building clear.
d. Blue - Engineers required, Booby Traps/obstacle in building.
51. Entering a Friendly Held Building. Movement through a building via mouseholes,
stairs and doors will be continuous after the attack; ideally the safe route through the
building should be marked. Troops passing from room to room known to be in friendly
hands should call out "COMING THROUGH" before entering as identification.
52. Difficult Points of Entry. If the assault group require assistance to gain entry into a
difficult entry point, an additional soldier from the team that has just cleared the last room
may be used. The drills remain the same.
53. Enhanced Blast Weapons. If the enemy has an effective EBW capability,
commanders should weigh the risk of occupying buildings against any benefit gained. If
buildings are to be occupied, the risk may be partially mitigated by minimising the number
of soldiers in any individual room or volume of space likely to be affected.
REORGANISATION
54. Immediately the house/building has been cleared the section commander should
start to reorganise. This should be done quickly in order to be ready for any possible
counter attack. Reorganisation drills are:
a. The section commander should:
(1) Immediately prepare the defence of the building.
(2) Allocate fire tasks to each rifleman, LMG, NLAW and any other section
weapon.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-31

(3) Check on casualties and ammunition, then report to the platoon
sergeant.
(4) Arrange for redistribution of ammunition.
(5) Deal with PWs and captured equipment.
b. Fire Support elements should:
(1) Rejoin the remainder of the section as quickly as possible.
(2) Check LMGs, NLAWs and any other platoon weapons are positioned in
the best location to provide fire support for counter-attack, the next phase and
for surprise enemy locations.
c. Riflemen should:
(1) Check weapons and equipment.
(2) Check ammunition and prepare grenades.
(3) Recharge magazines.
55. In principle, the section commander is responsible for the operational reorganisation
of the section, arcs, position etc, while the section 2IC deals with the administrative
reorganisation (ammunition and casualties). Casualties should be dealt with and evacuated
as quickly as possible once the whole objective has been cleared.
WEBBING AND EQUIPMENT
60. Webbing and equipment should be kept to a minimum. If webbing and equipment is
carried, it should be assembled to allow for quick release to improve entry.
SECTION 6 - DEFENDED LOCALITIES
GENERAL
61. A defended locality consists of a number of strong points sited in depth. They must
have good communications, all-round defence and be able to provide mutual support.
Counter attack plans should include providing a local reserve force. The decision as to
which buildings should be used is made by the local commander with engineer advice. The
selection has to be a trade-off between the tactical and engineer requirements.
STRONG POINT
62. A strong point must not be restricted to one building which can be isolated, and
cannot be defended without mutually supporting fire. Robust communications to other
strong points and headquarters are essential. Defensive strength can be achieved by
grouping strong points around an intersection, with fire positions in two or three different
buildings providing interlocking and mutually supporting fire. Strong points may be of at
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-32

least platoon strength and should include combined arms assets and direct and indirect fire
support.
BUILDING REQUIREMENTS
63. In principle, strong points that include a number of buildings improve the defender's
chances of survival. Choices between flats and single storey houses should be made with
survivability and defensive principles in mind. Consideration must be given to
a. Identifying Buildings. It is not easy to compare the attributes of buildings

from the ground. To determine the suitability of a building, it is helpful first to
determine what the building is used for because this will usually give a good guide as
to which are the strongest. Examples are:
(1) Department stores used by the public will have fairly strong floors and
the fire risk is usually low.
(2) Office blocks with large windows are usually built with a strong frame
but have weak walls.
(3) Apartment blocks can be deceptive and it is best to take engineer

advice as to their strength and weakness.
b. Small Buildings. Some buildings afford insufficient space for troops who
must occupy them, and thus concentrate them. A single direct hit, on the building
may destroy the whole group.
c. Large Buildings. Large buildings may force the defender to spread his
defences too thinly in terms of both manpower and resources.
TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS
64. Fields of Fire. There will always be some areas of ground around a building into
which the defenders will be unable to fire. These will often be close to the building itself
and in the concealed volumes formed by adjacent buildings. The attacker must be
prevented from reaching these areas of dead ground. The use of dannert wire is probably
the best method. The employment of all obstacles and their cover by direct or indirect fire
must be an integral part of the defensive plan.
65. Dominating Buildings. Denial of access to blocks of flats or multi-storey car parks
to the attackers can be accomplished by mines, booby-traps, wire or obstacles.
66. Covered Routes. Covered routes to and from defended locations allow freedom of
movement of own troops for casualty evacuation, reinforcement and resupply. Routes
should provide both cover from view and fire. Such routes should be improved during the
preparation of the defensive position.
67. External Fire Positions. External fire positions should be sited to engage the
enemy at up to the maximum effective range of the weapons used. Arcs should overlap
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-33

and each position should be mutually supporting. Fire positions and withdrawal routes
should have overhead cover where possible.
SECTION 7 - NAVIGATION IN BUILT UP AREAS
GENERAL
68. Navigation in built-up areas presents a unique challenge. In the centre of a city, the
normal terrain features depicted on maps may not apply - buildings become the major
terrain features and units become tied to streets. Whilst always trying to minimise collateral
damage, fighting in the city destroys buildings whose rubble blocks streets. Street and road
signs are destroyed during the fighting if they are not removed by the defenders.
Operations in subways and sewers present other unique challenges. However, maps and
photographs are available to help the unit overcome these problems. The Global
Positioning System (GPS) can aid navigation in built-up areas, although its performance
may be downgraded.
MISSION SPECIFIC MAPPING
69. The scale of a city map can vary from 1:2,500 to 1:50,000, depending on the
importance and size of the city, density of detail, and intelligence information available. The
mission specific military map can be a topographical map or an image map of a city that is
usually at a large scale (1:5,000, 1:10,000 and 1:12,500 are common), delineating streets
and showing street names, important buildings, and other urban elements
a. Mission specific map products, prepared by supporting geospatial engineers,

can assist navigation in built-up areas. Usually put together using the latest imagery
available, these maps have been designed or modified to give information not
covered on a standard map, which includes attribution of road and bridge networks,
railways, built-up areas, and essential services. They can be used to supplement
military city maps and topographical maps.
b. Once in the built-up area, soldiers should use street intersections as reference
points much as hills and streams in rural terrain. Again special mapping products
can supplement or replace topographic maps as the basis of navigation and are
often called “Spot Maps” due to them having coloured routes and numbered spots
providing those reference points. These maps enable units to better articulate their
position and movement improving command and control, particularly in areas with
destroyed buildings and blocked routes.
c. The techniques of compass reading and pace counting can still be used,
especially in a blacked-out city where street signs and buildings may not be present.
The presence of steel and iron in this environment may cause inaccurate compass
readings. Sewers have to be navigated in much the same way. Maps providing the
basic layout of the sewer system are normally maintained by the civil authorities.
This information includes the sewer lines and distances between manhole covers.
Along with basic compass and pace count techniques, such information could enable
troops to move through city sewers.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-34

d. Operating in a built-up area can adversely affect the performance of electronic
devices such as GPS and data distribution systems. These systems function in a
similar way to communications equipment by line-of-sight. They cannot determine
underground locations or positions within a building. Such systems should be
employed on the tops of buildings, in open areas, and down streets where obstacles
will not affect line-of-sight readings.
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY
70. Aerial photography can supplement military city maps and is an excellent aid to
detailed planning, by virtue of its currency.
SECTION 8 - CASUALTY EVACUATION
GENERAL
71. Experience has shown that the number of casualties in urban combat is likely to be
high. Every effort should be made to evacuate casualties as quickly as possible, although
casualty evacuation will be difficult and will consume manpower. Suitable drills need to be
practised at all levels. Every soldier has to know how to give first aid and assist in the
evacuation of casualties, and there must be a co-ordinated and effective CASEVAC plan at
all levels of command.
CASEVAC AT PLATOON LEVEL
72. There are three stages to casualty evacuation as follows:
a. Stage One - Extraction. Stage one is the immediate protection of the

casualties and their extraction out of the contact area. A robust and rapid approach
towards CASEVAC is needed, especially if there are multiple casualties. Anyone
able to walk should be ordered back through the safest line of communication, to
enable medics and available manpower to concentrate on more serious casualties.
At this stage it is likely to take at least two men to extract a serious. When in
contact, the best method is to drag the casualty by the shoulders of the body armour.
Due to the bulky and cumbersome nature of personal equipment, some of it may
have to be removed by cutting webbing straps to ease extraction, especially through
confined spaces such as mouseholes.
b. Stage 2 - Treatment. Once casualties have been extracted from the

immediate contact area, life saving first aid can be administered. Vital equipment
such as radios, maps and weapons should be recovered from the casualties and if
possible returned to the fighting force. Whilst first aid is being administered,
preparation for the move back should start. Stretchers need to be prepared and the
triage state should be reported as soon as possible. A light-weight stretcher will
need four men to carry the casualty. Consideration should be given to the use of
reserve platoons to deal with this stage of evacuation. Friendly dead must be
covered up, kept separate from the other casualties and prepared for evacuation.
c. Stage Three - Evacuation. Stage three involves the movement of the

casualties to a Helicopter landing Sight (HLS) or a Casualty Exchange Point (CEP).
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-35

The sub-unit sergeant major must ensure that the RMO is waiting to receive and
treat the casualties at the CEP. The transfer of casualties to the CEP may be
physically challenging and involve moving them down stairs, over obstacles and
open ground, through mouseholes and over ditches in order to provide cover from
enemy fire. Good communication is vital.
MARKING CASUALTIES
73. Casualties that cannot be evacuated must be marked. Using the standard NATO
marking system, a yellow marker should be positioned at the point of entry to indicate a
casualty in a particular building. A casualty in the open should be moved under cover for
protection and his position indicated. If necessary this should be done by sticking a
weapon into the ground, bayonet first. The helmet should remain on the casualty.
STRETCHER IMPROVISATION
74. Improvisation may be necessary to provide a stretcher. An improvised stretcher

should be strong, light and narrow with some form of handles or grips. The following items
might be considered for use:
a. Doors/tables/gates.
b. Ladders.
c. Bedding/carpets.
d. Furniture, ie chairs/bed frames.
e. Poncho, IPE, combat jackets.
f. Cables/ropes.
CASUALTY PROCEDURES
75. Redistribution of Equipment. All personal equipment, including rifle and helmet,
should travel with the casualty to the CAP. The following equipment should be considered
for redistribution:
a. Radios.
b. Medical supplies.
c. Platoon weapons such as LMGs or NLAWs.
c. Ammunition and explosives.
d. Maps.
76. Movement. When moving casualties back to the CAP, the casualty evacuation
party must avoid exposing themselves or the casualty to enemy fire or danger. The
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-36

following should be considered:
a. Movement of an unwieldy stretcher weighed down by a casualty is extremely

difficult within a building. Progress will be hampered by narrow corridors, doorways,
mouseholes, stairs, rubble, other troops, resupply parties, reinforcements, resting
sections and reserves. Movement should be controlled and organised so that
normal triage can take place.
b. Movement between buildings is again hazardous and difficult. Use must be

made of any cover, such as walls, dead ground and smoke. If under contact,
covering fire from a section must cover any movement. Movement should be made
along existing safe routes.
c. If secured, underground systems can be used as safe routes for evacuation of

casualties. Movement may be restricted by the confined space of some tunnels, but
it may be the quickest, safest and least congested option.
d. Whenever possible, vehicles (particularly armoured vehicles) should be used

for casualty evacuation.
e. In a defensive position the priority for the use of safe lanes for casualty
evacuation should be covered in orders. Use of safe lanes will need to be controlled
in order to allow for the movement of reinforcements, ammunition re-supply as well
as casualty evacuation.
77. Medical Supplies. Section, platoon and company commanders must ensure that
sufficient first aid supplies are carried at every level. First field dressings, morphine, crepe
bandages and Intravenous (IV) drips should be carried and all ranks must be trained in first
aid, self aid and treatment of the most likely injuries.
78. Casualties.
a. Dead. All dead bodies, friendly or enemy, should be processed, including the
redistribution of all weapons and equipment. The bodies should then be placed
separately and preferably out of sight.
b. Wounded. All casualties, enemy or friendly, should be given first aid and
evacuated. Use can be made of enemy equipment, ammunition and weapons.
SECTION 9 - AMMUNITION RESUPPLY
79. Ammunition Carriage. The amount of ammunition and explosives expended in any
urban battle is likely to be high. The need for an efficient system of ammunition resupply13
is thus vital. The following factors need to be considered:
a. In urban combat each man is likely to require more ammunition than in any
other environment. A minimum of eight magazines per man should be issued. Each
man should also carry at least two bandoliers (clipped ammunition) and as many
13
This section should be read in conjunction with the paragraph on Ammunition Resupply on p B-5-48.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-37

grenades as possible. If possible, magazine for magazine exchanges should be
organised. In addition magazine chargers should be issued to enable rapid
charging.
b. Plans must be made for the carriage of extra ammunition. All spare
ammunition should be carried individually in a small sack or by sandbags attached
by string. If a protracted battle is likely, consideration should be given to dedicated
ammunition carriers with bergens or ammunition boxes stacked on metal frames (for
ease of carriage). These will act as either platoon or company ammunition reserves.
c. Explosive breaching entry charges should be prepared in advance and should

be distributed to the assaulting sections. All preparation should be completed as a
part of battle procedure in the assembly area. As with any other ammunition
natures, explosives must be controlled and resupplied as required.
d. The only practical way of achieving a constant and timely resupply of

ammunition throughout the battle may be to allocate ammunition parties. These
parties should be organised at platoon, company and battle group levels.
80. Fire Discipline. Throughout the battle, there is a need for fire discipline to prevent
unnecessary wastage of ammunition. The employment of automatic fire should be strictly
controlled in the urban environment; quick accurate single shots (rapid fire) are normally far
more effective.
81. Resupply14. Each section should carry enough ammunition for its initial task. The
platoon sergeant with the aid of the reserve section should carry out the resupply task. The
following points should be considered:
a. It is the responsibility of individuals to inform their section 2IC when their

ammunition is low. It is the responsibility of each section 2IC to give the platoon
sergeant an accurate ammunition state and inform him when the section requires a
resupply.
b. Any resupply should be along a safe route and, whenever possible, the same
route as the assaulting forces. If this is not possible, a separate route should be
reconnoitred and marked. Possible markings could be a green coloured symbol or
cylume, at the entry point of each cleared building. Red and white mine tape can be
used to mark the clear and safe route between buildings.
c. Extra mousehole and satchel charges should be prepared prior to battle.

These should be stored close to the assaulting sections to ensure a quick resupply is
possible.
d. Ammunition is heavy and bulky and plans must be made for its carriage in the
built up area. The use of stretchers and ladders are an option. Any ammunition
party must have a group dedicated to providing local protection.
14
This paragraph should be read in conjunction with Part B, Chapter 5, Section 3 ‘Combat Supplies’.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-38

e. If available, armoured vehicles should be used for ammunition resupply.
However, the local area has to be free from the threat of hand held anti-armour
weapons out to a minimum range of 400m.
f. The supply of ammunition can be linked to the casualty evacuation plan.

Stretchers, or vehicles, used for ammunition resupply should be used on the return
journeys for any casualties.
g. In defence, carefully planned ammunition dumps can reduce the need for
resupply.
h. In the assault a reserve pack of ammunition should be prepared in the

assembly area. This should include spare LAWs, mouseholes, satchel charges,
sacks full of charged magazines and bandoliers. It should be carried by the reserve
platoon or ammunition parties ready for quick deployment.
SECTION 10 - ISOLATED PERSONNEL IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
82. General. The urban environment places significantly different and potentially far
greater demands and stress upon an evader15. Everything will happen much faster, and
the consequences of getting it wrong will be far more immediate. Furthermore, unlike other
specific environments such as arctic and jungle, the urban environment covers a wide
spectrum of potential evasion locations, from small shanty towns, through areas of heavy
rubble, to large high-density modern cities. A standard urban evasion scenario is thus
difficult to define. The nature of urban conflict is such that the risk of isolation is no longer
the exclusive premise of the teeth arms, and all personnel should be prepared accordingly.
83. Civilians. Large numbers of civilians may be alerted to the initial location of the
evader, particularly if the isolation event is caused by asymmetric or paramilitary attack
close to a densely populated area. Once the immediate danger has passed, the vast
majority of such personnel move toward an ambush or vehicle crash site. Evaders may be
confronted by a crowd whose actions cannot be predicted. Even members of the same
tribal, ethnic social or religious group may be motivated by a broad mixture of intent, and as
such an evader cannot hope to predict their actions.
a. Assessment of Intent. Evaders must assume the worst case should a

situation arise. Their aim must therefore be to place a barrier between themselves
and a crowd and thus try to prevent themselves falling into the hands of hostile
civilians. Such a barrier may be a physical (eg hard cover) of psychological (eg the
threat of violence). The crowd should perceive the barrier as a risk should they
approach the evader.
b. Investment of Buildings. Urban evaders should adopt hard cover, such as a

corner in an exterior wall, an entrance to a deserted warehouse or pedestrian
underpass, or any appropriate protection. Although every situation will be different,
evaders are generally discouraged from entering and taking over houses or occupied
buildings for the following reasons:
15
See Doctrine Note 06/06 Isolated Personnel in Urban Environments.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-39

(1) Occupation of a building may seriously restrict recovery force options.
(2) House owners in many operational theatres are routinely armed and
likely to use force to defend their property.
(3) It is morally questionable to enter an occupied building while in contact

and thus taking the fire fight to the occupants.
(4) The investment and defence of an occupied building will often require
resources and capability not necessarily available to the evader.
c. Use of Lethal Force. Evaders should also be aware that, should the use of
personnel weapons become necessary, warning shots are only likely to work once.
A crowd should perceive that evaders can and will use lethal force to protect their
own lives if it becomes necessary to do so.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-9-40

CHAPTER 10
WEAPON EFFECTS
‘First Chechen War, 1994 - Russian Errors:

- Significant numbers of Russian soldiers were untrained, did not know or properly
understand their weaponry, night-vision equipment, armour, etc. Moreover, much of the
equipment was in poor condition, and military professionalism was sorely lacking in all
ranks.
- Ad hoc units were assembled hastily, and did not train together before they went into
combat. Soldiers did not understand the effects of the weapons the insurgents were
using against them, in spite of the fact that many of the weapons they were using
themselves.’
Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000, Rand
1. The characteristics and nature of combat in built-up areas affects the choice of
weapon required. Commanders at all levels should consider the following factors when
selecting the effect they need:
a. Hard, smooth, flat surfaces are characteristic of urban targets. Rarely do

rounds impact perpendicular to these flat surfaces. This reduces the effect of a
round and increases the threat of ricochets. The tendency of rounds to strike
glancing blows against hard surfaces means that up to 25% of impact-fused
explosive rounds may not detonate.
b. Engagement ranges are close. Studies and historical analyses have shown
that only five percent of all targets are more than 100 metres away. About 90
percent of all targets are located 50 metres or less from the identifying soldier. Few
personnel targets are visible beyond 50 metres and usually occur at 35 metres or
less. Minimum arming ranges and troop safety from back-blast or fragmentation
effects should be considered.
c. Engagement times are short. The enemy presents only fleeting targets.
Enemy-held buildings or structures are normally covered by fire and often cannot be
engaged with deliberate, well-aimed shots.
d. Depression and elevation limits for some weapons create dead space. Tall
buildings form deep canyons that are often safe from indirect fire. Some weapons
can fire rounds to ricochet behind cover and inflict casualties. Accurate target
engagement from oblique angles, both horizontal and vertical, demands superior
marksmanship skills.
e. Smoke from burning buildings, dust from explosions, shadows from tall
buildings, and the lack of light penetrating inner rooms all combine to reduce visibility
and to increase a sense of isolation. Added to this is the masking of fire caused by
rubble and man-made structures. Targets, even those at close range, tend to be
indistinct.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-10-1

f. Conventional urban fighting often becomes confused mélées with several
small units attacking on converging axes. The risks from friendly fire, ricochets, and
fratricide have to be considered during the planning phase of operations and control
measures continually adjusted to lower these risks. Commanders and soldiers alike
have to be aware of the locations and intentions of friendly forces and clearly mark
their own progress to avoid the potential for fratricide.
g. Both the firer and target may be inside or outside buildings, or they may both
be inside the same or separate buildings. The enclosed nature of combat in built-up
areas means that the weapon's effect, such as muzzle blast and back blast, has to
be considered as much as the round's impact on the target.
h. Modern engineering and design improvements mean that most large buildings
constructed since WW2 are resilient to the blast effects of bomb and artillery attack.
Even though modern buildings may burn easily, they often retain their structural
integrity and remain standing. Once high-rise buildings burn out, they are still useful
for combat purpose and are almost impossible to damage further. A large structure
can take 24 to 48 hours to burn out and become cool enough for soldiers to enter.
SECTION 2 – SMALL ARMS
9MM PISTOL
2. The pistol enables the individual to engage targets at close range, to an effective
range of 45m. It is effective in buildings and room clearance.
RIFLE AND LIGHT MACHINE GUN
3. Close combat is the predominant characteristic of urban engagements and the rifle
and Light Machine Guns (LMG)1 are the most common weapons fired in built-up areas.
Small, fleeting targets are difficult to hit from bunker apertures, windows, and loopholes.
This requires pinpoint accuracy with weapons fired in the semi-automatic mode. Killing an
enemy through an 20 cm loophole at a range of 50 metres is a challenge, but one that may
be common in combat in built-up areas.
4. The performance of ball ammunition is affected by a number of variables including

range from the target, material against which it is fired, manufacture quality and age. The
penetrative effect of ammunition depends on both the velocity and stability of the round; the
greater the range, the lower the velocity. Consequently, at very short ranges a round will
not be fully stable, and this may lessen the effect of the greater velocity.
5. Weapon Penetration. The penetration that can be achieved with 5.56 mm rifle
ammunition round against exterior walls of brick or concrete is limited unless significant
numbers of rounds are fired. Nevertheless, inside buildings the 5.56 mm round may
penetrate interior walls and furniture. Consideration should be given to the risk of ricochet
to friendly forces both when firing at enemy positions.
1
LMGs fires 5.56 mm ammunition and include the MINIMI and Light Support Weapon (LSW).
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-10-2

6. Protection. The following common barriers in built-up areas stop a 5.56 mm round
fired at less than 50 metres:
a. One thickness of sandbags.
b. 5 cm concrete wall (not reinforced).
c. 55 US gallon drum filled with water or sand.
d. Small ammunition can filled with sand.
e. Cinder block filled with sand (block will probably shatter).
f. Brick veneer.
g. Car engine block
MEDIUM AND HEAVY MACHINE GUN
7. Weapon Penetration. Like the 5.56 mm round, the ability of 7.62 mm and 12.7 mm
(0.5 inch) rounds to penetrate is affected by the range to the target and type of material it is
fired against. The 7.62 mm round is affected less by range than the 5.56 mm, whilst the
12.7 mm's penetration is reduced least of all. The table below explains the penetration
capabilities of a single 7.62 mm (ball) round at closer ranges:
Range Pine Board Dry Loose Sand Cinder Box Concrete

(metres)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
25 33 cm/13 inches 13 cm/5 inches 20 cm/8 inches 5 cm/2 inches
100 46 cm/18 inches 11 cm/4.5 inches 25 cm/10 inches 5 cm/2 inches
200 104 cm/41 inches 18 cm/7 inches 20 cm/8 inches 5 cm/2 inches
For hard targets, 12.7 mm penetration is affected by obliquity and range. Both armour
piercing and ball ammunition penetrate 36 cm/14 inches of sand or 71 cm/28 inches of
packed earth at 200 metres, if the rounds impact perpendicular to the flat face of the target.
8. Weapon Effects. It should be noted that the AK47 (7.62 x 39mm) is the most
common assault rifle in the world and that the penetrative qualities of its ammunition are
significantly greater than those of 5.56 mm ball. The 12.7 mm heavy machine gun can be
fitted to a number of different platforms, and in view of the excellent penetrative capacity of
its ammunition, it can be the weapon of choice in the urban environment.
SNIPER RIFLE (L115A3)2
9. Snipers exploit the long range, high hit rate probability and penetrative effect of the
8.59mm round fired from the L115A3 rifle to achieve significant physical and psychological
effect. Commanders should have an understanding of the effects of the weapons and
2
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-10-3

optics that a sniper carries in order to fully utilize this capability. The table below
summarises the capabilities of the equipment employed by snipers:
System Weapon Capability

(a) (b) (c)
Sniper Rifle L115A3 8.59mm Accuracy Probability hit rate:
International Under 600m – 70%
600m-800m – 50%
800m-1000m – 30%
Harassing fire from 1500m+
Ammunition Type 8.59mm Ball Defeat CRISAT3 man at 800m
8.59mm Armour Piercing
Optics 5 x 25 x 56 Schmitt and Bender Excellent daytime optics with large
Telescopic Sight zoom capability
x 40 Leopold Spotting Scope
SIMRAD KN203 Image Intensifier Sniper Engagement range 400m
Sight upwards
Sniper Thermal Imaging Capability Detect heat source:
(STIC) (Weapon and Spotter) Man size target: 1200m-1400m
MBT size target: 2500m-3000m
SECTION 3 – GRENADES4
10. Grenades. Grenades, whether thrown by hand or projected by a weapon, provide a

useful method of delivering significant effect very quickly. HE hand grenades are an
essential weapon for assaulting and clearing buildings. Grenade ammunition expenditure is
likely to be heavy5. The overuse of HE grenades in lightly constructed buildings may cause
total, or partial, collapse of walls. There is a risk that fragments may penetrate internal
walls, risking injury to friendly forces in adjacent rooms.
a. Effects6.
(1) L109A1, Hand Grenade. The hand grenade L109A1 incapacitates a

protected man at five metres and an unprotected man at 20 metres7.
(2) Under-slung Grenade Launcher (UGL). On impact, the UGL

projectile explodes and is designed to penetrate up to 45mm of steel, 300mm
of concrete and cause casualties to a distance of 5m from the explosion. The
UGL burst safety distance of 450m in the open may be reduced by the nature
of urban terrain.
(3) Grenade Machine Gun (GMG). On impact, the projectile explodes

and is designed to penetrate up to 50mm of steel, 350mm of concrete and
cause casualties to a distance of 5m from the explosion. The GMG burst
3
CRISAT - Collaborative Research Into Small Arms Technology, is the EU/NATO standard in the manufacture
of military equipment.
4
5
During WW2, it was common for a battalion fighting in urban areas in Italy in 1943 to use in excess of 500
hand grenades in a day.
6
Infantry Training Manual Vol III, SAA (Sect and Pl Weapons).
7
Infantry Training Manual Vol III, SAA (Sect and Pl Weapons).
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-10-4

safety distance of 165m in the open may reduced by the nature of urban
terrain.
(4) CS Grenade (C13). The anti-riot, irritant hand grenade (CS) is

effective 25-35 metres (dependent on wind) from burst.
SECTION 4 – HEAVIER INFANTRY DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS
ANTI TANK WEAPONS8
11. Javelin. The primary role of Javelin is to defeat main battle tanks and other
armoured vehicles, although it is also effective against structures. The warhead will
penetrate 1500mm of concrete or sandbag structure and create an over-pressure effect
inside. If fired against soft surfaces (ie glass, wood, etc.) the larger secondary charge may
not detonate. Against a robust structure the penetration will only create a fist size hole.
Although such a hole cannot provide access for a man, it may provoke collapse.
12. NLAW. NLAW is primarily used to defeat light armoured vehicles and neutralize
fortified firing positions. Because the shaped charge warhead has a narrow blast effect,
NLAW has limited anti-structure effect. However, blast and shock may be sufficient to
neutralize the personnel within a building for a short period. Against structures, shaped-
charge weapons such as NLAW should be aimed about six inches below or to the side of a
firing aperture in order to increase the probability of killing the enemy behind a wall.
ANTI-STRUCTURE MUNITIONS9
13. The UK Army will use the Anti-Structure Munition (ASM) from 2009. Lighter but the
same length as the NLAW, the ASM is also a one-man disposable, fire and forget weapon
for use primarily against urban structures and bunkers and in a secondary role against light
AFVs and soft skinned vehicles. With a combat effective range of between 15m-400m, the
ASM has a tandem warhead break-in charge (BIC) and a follow-through bomb (FTB) that
will penetrate concrete structures and enable physical access. The purpose of the BIC is to
create a hole sufficiently large to enable the FTB to detonate within a wall, thereby both
neutralizing any occupants and creating access for fighting troops.
Fig C-10-1 Anti-Structure Munition
8
9
See also Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’, Para 48.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-10-5

30MM CANNON FIRE10
14. General. The 30mm Rarden cannon and 7.62 mm coaxially mounted machine gun,
mounted on CVR(T) Scimitar and Warrior 510/511, can provide substantial firepower to the
infantry. The 30mm cannon can be utilised from either a stand-off or from an intimate
support position. Two types of ammunition are available as follows:
a. Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS). APDS is the main anti-armour

round available for use with the 30mm cannon. It is suitable for engaging light
armoured and soft-skinned vehicles out to 1500m.
b. High Explosive (HE). HE rounds are suitable for engaging soft-skinned

vehicles, bunkers and dismounted infantry out to 1500m. HE has the most utility in
an urban environment, providing assistance to assault troops without the more
extensive collateral damage associated with a tank HESH round.
15. Limitations. There are several limitations to the use of 30mm cannon in the urban
environment:
a. 30mm cannon may be restricted in elevation and traverse within a built up

area.
b. HE rounds can have limited effect against harder structures, ie concrete or

reinforced buildings.
c. The weapon platforms may have difficulty in manoeuvring in an urban

environment due to size restriction and weight. Obstacles will also prove more
difficult to negotiate in an urban setting. This will be more prevalent for Warrior
variants than CVR(T) Scimitar.
SECTION 5 – TANK WEAPONS11
16. In spite of the tank’s vulnerability to short-range anti-tank weapons, the physical and
psychological impact and the shock effect of armour, at close range, in conjunction with
infantry, can be overwhelming in urban close combat12. The range, accuracy, destructive
potential and absence of minimum range of the tank armament are enhanced by the tank’s
protection and mobility.
17. Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) is the principal anti-
armour round for the L30 120 mm rifled gun and is designed for engaging enemy armoured
vehicles out to a range of >2000 m. Its utility against buildings and bunkers is limited.
18. High Explosive Squash Head (HESH). HESH rounds are suitable for engaging
bunkers, armoured and soft-skinned vehicles out to a range of 1500 m or area targets out
to 8000m. HESH has great utility in an urban environment due to its explosive effect and is
particularly useful against concrete reinforced urban structures in support of assaulting
troops.
10
11
12
See Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-10-6

19. The smoke round has a range of up to 8000m and provides excellent cover for
defiles and choke points in urban areas. However, the smoke is generated by white
phosphorus and the use of such ammunition may therefore be restricted by extant ROE.
20 The two 7.62 mm machine guns mounted on the Challenger II tank, one coaxially
mounted with the main armament and one located above the loader’s hatch, are particularly
effective for suppressive fire.
SECTION 6 – INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS13
21. General. The urban environment greatly restricts low angle indirect fire. Mortars
and artillery operating in the high angle are less affected. For low angle artillery fire, dead
space is about five times the height of the building behind which the target sits. For mortars
and artillery operating in the high angle, dead space is only about one-half the height of the
building. Both mortars and artillery firing in the high angle can therefore provide effective
indirect fire support during urban operations.
22. Lethality. In open terrain the 105 mm shell has a lethal radius of 40m (ground burst)
and 50m (air burst) , and the 155 mm shell 55m (ground burst) and 85m (air burst).
GMLRS rockets have a lethal radius of 80m for ground burst, which varies with altitude for
air burst. In built up areas the range of the blast and fragmentation of the shell or rocket
may be lessened by the physical obstruction of the buildings, although hard surfaces may
increase the ricochet range and effect of the explosion.
MORTARS (60MM AND 81MM)
23. The multi-option fuze on mortar rounds makes them particularly effective weapons in
urban terrain. Delay settings can slightly increase penetration and proximity bursts can
increase the lethal area covered by fragments. Tall buildings can cause proximity-fused
mortar rounds to detonate prematurely if they pass too closely. The 60 mm mortar round
will not penetrate most rooftops, even with a delay setting. HE rounds are effective,
however, in suppressing snipers on rooftops and preventing roofs from being used by
enemy observers. 60 mm smoke may be effective when two or three mortars are grouped
together.
SECTION 7 – CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR (CBRN)14
24. General. Commanders should be aware of how the urban environment affects the
response to a CBRN threat15. Buildings will provide some protection against liquid
contamination and fallout. However, in a post-attack situation, hazards may be increased
by the tendency for contamination to remain in enclosed spaces and sheltered areas. In
addition, urban areas represent an increased risk from Environmental and Industrial
Hazards (EIH).
25. Detection, Identification and Monitoring. Inconsistent wind conditions and

variations from one building to the next may mean that detectors are better employed inside
13
14
See also Chapter 3, Section 4 ‘Civilian Factors’ Paras 35-36 – ‘Toxic Waste’.
15
Details are in AFM Vol 1 Pt 5: Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)
conditions.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-10-7

a sheltered space than in an assessed upwind location. The vapour hazard may vary from
one room to the next and the use of LCAD16 will be essential when outside the protection
offered by MCAD17. Buildings must be surveyed before being occupied.
26. Warning and Reporting. The behaviour of down-wind hazards will be greatly
affected by built-up areas. Plumes may be channelled, reducing the spread of vapour.
Conversely, eddying and turbulence may cause vapour hazards to spread more widely in
an unpredictable way. Only survey and reconnaissance will determine the actual extent of
contamination.
27. Physical Protection. Protection may be enhanced in a built up area. Overhead

cover and some protection from blast is an advantage. Risk taking may allow some troops
to reduce their dress state where liquid contamination has been avoided and only a vapour
hazard remains.
28. Hazard Management. In general terms hazard management is complicated by an

urban environment. The effects of weathering are reduced due to shelter provided from
sunlight and wind. Complicated surfaces, spaces and objects are more likely to harbour
contamination. Conversely, access to some essential counter measure resources such as
water may be easier in an urban environment, and it may be possible to identify areas of
shelter which have been unaffected by the CBRN agent used.
16
Lightweight Chemical Agent Detector.
17
Manportable Chemical Agent Detector.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-10-8

CHAPTER 11
SUBTERRANEAN OPERATIONS
“As it became increasingly difficult to move above ground, the Poles soon took to using the
sewers to send messages, move units and conduct supply operations throughout Warsaw.
Soon after, the struggle in the sewers matched the intensity of what was transpiring on the
streets above and quickly changed the nature of the fighting.”
Warsaw in 1944 from City Fights by Maj David M. Toczek, Ballantine Books
GENERAL
1. Knowledge of the nature and location of underground facilities is of great value to

both the attacker and defender. To exploit the advantages of underground facilities,
detailed maps and plans should be used and, if possible a reconnaissance undertaken.
This chapter describes the techniques used to deny the enemy use of these features, the
tactical value of subterranean passages, and stresses the psychological aspects of
extended operations in the underground environment.
TACTICAL FACTORS
2. In larger cities, subterranean features include sunken garages, underground

passages, railway lines, utility tunnels, sewers, and storm drains. Many of these features
will allow the movement of troops. Even in smaller European towns, sewers and storm
drains permit soldiers to move beneath street level during operations.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3. Subterranean passages provide the attacker with covered and concealed routes into
and through built-up areas. The attacker may launch his main attack at street level while
using subterranean passages to infiltrate a smaller force. The objective of such an attack
may be to insert a unit into the defender’s rear, thereby, disrupting his defence and
obstructing the avenues of withdrawal for his forward defence. Even if a subterranean
effort is not immediately successful, it forces the defender to fight on two levels and to
extend his resources to more than just street-level fighting. The attacker has to consider:
a. The need for plans and maps of subterranean passages and, if possible,
reconnaissance.
b. The threat from ambush and the ease with which the defender may employ
obstacles to block subterranean passages.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
4. The existence of subterranean passages forces the defender to defend the built-up
area above and below ground, but the defender may use subterranean passages to his
advantage. When thoroughly reconnoitred and controlled by the defender, subterranean
passages provide excellent covered and concealed routes to move reinforcements or to
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-11-1

launch counterattacks. They also provide ready-made lines of communication for the
movement of supplies and evacuation of casualties, and provide places to cache supplies
for forward companies. The defender needs to consider:
a. Tunnels afford the attacker little cover and concealment except for the
darkness and any man-made barriers. The passageways provide tight fields of fire
and amplify the effect of grenades. Obstacles at intersections in the tunnels provide
excellent ambush sites. Booby-traps can turn the subterranean passages into a
deadly maze.
b. A thorough reconnaissance of the subterranean or sewer system should be

made. To be effective, obstacles be located at critical intersections in the passage
network so that they trap attacking troops in a killing area while allowing the
defenders freedom of movement.
c. There will be a requirement for escape routes in case of bypass by the enemy
or the collapse of the subterranean system.
Fig C-11-1 Subterranean Operations
RECONNAISSANCE PATROL TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
5. Reconnaissance of the subterranean passages of a platoon or company area should

normally be the responsibility of a patrol of section size. Only in extremely large
subterranean features should the size of a patrol be increased.
a. The patrol commander should organize his patrol with one soldier tasked with
security to the front (the lead scout man) and one tasked with security to the rear.
The patrol commander moves directly behind the lead scout, and navigates and
records data collected by the patrol. The grenadier should follow the lead scout, and
the demolitions man should follow the grenadier. Two riflemen should be left as a
security post at the point of entry. They are responsible for detecting enemy who
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-11-2

come upon the patrol unit's rear and for acting as the communications link between
the patrol commander and his headquarters. Communications with platoon
headquarters will be difficult.
b. The patrol commander should carry a map, compass, street plan, and
notebook in which he has written the information he has to gather for the higher
commander. The grenadier should carry the tools needed to open manhole covers.
If the patrol is to move more than 200 to 300 metres or if the patrol commander
directs, the grenadier should also carry a suitable telephone and line for
communications. The whole section should be equipped with night vision devices,
and an infra red source, to maintain surveillance within the sewer. In addition, the
lead scout will need a ‘feeler’ for trip wires.
c. All soldiers entering the sewer should carry a sketch of the sewer system to
include magnetic north, azimuths, distances, and manholes. They should also carry
protective masks, gloves, flashlights and chalk for marking features along the route.
Ideally, the patrol should also take a safety rope to which each man is tied. To
improve their footing in slippery sewers and storm drains, the members of the patrol
can wrap chicken wire or screen wire around their boots.
d. A constant concern to troops conducting a subterranean patrol is chemical

defence. Chemical agents if used in tunnels are normally encountered in dense
concentrations, with no chance of dissipation. A suitable CBRN detection system
carried by the lead scout could provide warning of the presence of chemical agents.
Detector paper can also be used to detect chemical agents. At the first indication
that harmful gases are present, the patrol should put on their respirators.
e. In addition to chemical agents, noxious gases from decomposing sewage,

especially methane gas, can also pose a threat. These gases are not detected by
the CBRN detection system, nor are they completely filtered by the protective mask.
Physical signs that indicate their presence in harmful quantities are nausea and
dizziness. The patrol commander should be constantly alert to these signs and
know the shortest route to the surface for fresh air.
f. Once the patrol is organized and equipped, it moves to the entrance of the
tunnel, which is usually a manhole. With the manhole cover removed. The patrol
should wait 15 minutes before entry to allow any gases to dissipate. Then the lead
scout descends into the tunnel to determine whether the air is safe to breathe and if
movement is restricted. The lead scout should remain in the tunnel for 10 minutes
before the rest of the patrol follows. If he becomes ill or is exposed to danger, he
can be pulled out by the safety rope.
g. When the patrol is moving through the tunnel, the lead scout moves about 10
metres in front of the patrol commander. Other patrol members maintain 5 metre
intervals. If the water in the tunnel is flowing fast or if the sewer contains slippery
obstacles, those intervals should be increased to prevent all patrol members from
falling if one man slips. All patrol members should stay tied to the safety rope so that
they can easily be retrieved from danger. The rear security man marks the route
with chalk or spray paint so that other troops can find the patrol.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-11-3

h. The patrol leader should note the azimuth and pace count of each turn he
takes in the tunnel. When he encounters a manhole to the surface, the grenadier
should open it and determine the location, which the patrol leader then records. The
use of recognition signals should prevent friendly troops from accidentally shooting
at the grenadier as he appears at a manhole.
i. The patrol should carry a field telephone in addition to radios and lay line for
communications in order to establish a series of tap-in points. Plans have to be
made to deny the enemy use of the line.
j. Once the patrol has returned and submitted its report, the commander should
decide how to use the tunnel. In the offence, the tunnel could provide a covered
route to move behind the enemy's positions. In defence, the tunnel could provide a
covered passage between positions. In either case, the patrol members should act
as guides along the route.
WEAPON SYSTEMS IN TUNNELS
6. The confined space of tunnels and sewers amplifies the sounds of weapons firing to
a dangerous level. The overpressure from grenades and mines exploding in a sewer or
tunnel can have adverse effects on friendly troops such as ruptured eardrums and wounds
from flying debris. Additionally, gases found in sewers can be ignited by the blast effects of
these munitions. For these reasons, small-arms weapons should be the principal weapon
systems employed in tunnels and sewers. Friendly troops should be outside tunnels or out
of range of the effects when mines or demolitions are detonated. The provision of
additional ear protection for subterranean operations should be considered.
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
7. Combat operations in subterranean passages are much like night combat

operations. The psychological factors that affect soldiers during night operations reduce
confidence, cause fear, and increase a feeling of isolation. This feeling of isolation is
further magnified by the tight confines of the tunnels. The layout of tunnels could require
greater dispersion between positions than is usual for other operations.
8. Commanders should enforce measures to dispel the feelings of fear and isolation
experienced by soldiers in tunnels. These measures include leadership training, physical
and mental fitness, sleep discipline and stress management.
9. Commanders should maintain communication with soldiers manning positions in the

tunnels either by personal visits or by field telephone. Soldiers manning positions below
ground should be given as much information as possible on the organization of the tunnels
and the importance of their task. They should be briefed on plans and other positions if
their primary positions become untenable.
10. Physical and mental fitness can be maintained by periodically rotating soldiers away
from tunnels so they can stand and walk in fresh air and sunlight. Stress management is
also a factor of operations in tunnels. Historically, combat in built-up areas has been one of
the most stressful forms of combat. Continuous darkness and restricted manoeuvre space
can cause more stress to soldiers than street fighting.
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 C-11-4

CHAPTER 12
NIGHT OPERATIONS
THE CHALLENGES OF NIGHT
1. Night-time and limited visibility degrades all the senses, but particularly the primary
sense, sight. Night vision devices (NVD) are of great value but they do not replace
continuous all-round visual awareness. Darkness gives an unqualified advantage to an
enemy who knows the ground well1. These disadvantages can be overcome by discipline,
mental strength, enlightened leadership and professional experience. Training and
preparation for night operations in the urban environment might be protracted and rigorous,
but they are essential to success.
2. At night-time, the human body needs time to recover from daytime activities. During
prolonged operations, it is necessary to allow for the movement of combat supplies,
equipment and vehicle maintenance and rest. Night-time may provide that opportunity and
a lower activity regime.
3. There is a need for a different form of discipline at night-time. Day-time reactions,

small team drills, hand-signals and the use of oral commands are conducted differently.
Training at night must include the night-time passage of information between individual
soldiers.
4. The difficulties of conducting urban operations are exacerbated at night.

Commanders must anticipate the physical effects of night conditions on soldiers and the
technical restraints on their operations while training and preparing soldiers for unbroken
day/night operations. There is a need for greater control and rehearsal to overcome the
problems of operating at night.
5. Night operations in the urban environment increases risk. The risk of fratricide is
higher, the risk of failure to anticipate or understand the enemy’s movement or intentions is
higher and the risk of plans being misunderstood or going wrong is greater. These factors
increase the need for greater control and the restriction on individual action.
6. Vehicle Mounted Operations.
a. Confusion. All night urban operations, even simple ones but particularly
those conducted in vehicles, can lead to confusion and disorientation on the part of
individual soldiers. Changes to plan, changes to timings, and changes to vehicle
manning must be understood and rehearsed every time by all ranks. Briefing must
be comprehensive, the control and counting of individual team members at junior,
senior NCO and junior officer level is vital. Count them out, check, count them in,
check, count them back.
b. Task Flexibility. All ranks, all trades, all soldiers must be able to carry out
the all tasks of their immediate colleagues. Driver, commander, signaller, gunner,
1
This was particularly well understood by the Russians in Stalingrad who defeated a more technically superior
enemy by ‘hugging’ him close, separating the infantry from his indirect fire support and wearing him out. The
same applies to the Taliban attacking defended outposts in Afghanistan.
C-12-1
each soldier must know how to operate the vehicle, the radios, the weapons in his
vehicle and be able to replace and carry out the duties of his comrades.
c. Actions On. The potential confusion that limited visibility brings will amplify
the difficulties in nearly every situation. Armoured vehicles might be ambushed,
might get lost, might get separated and will break down. Tactical commanders must
plan for the actions on vehicle breakdown and recovery, at night, in contact, with
casualties and in a confined and hostile environment. Vehicle commanders and
crews must rehearse and be confident in the plan and their part in it.
7. Surprise and Operational Tempo. Contemporary experience shows that in urban

operations disciplined conventional forces can use the surprise that the cover of night
provides to conduct operations at night-time with less restriction than they might be able to
by day. The civilian population may be subject to some form of curfew; there may not the
same opportunity for the enemy to mingle and hide amongst the civilian population. There
may be a greater opportunity for aggressive and kinetic response to enemy activity. Urban
strike operations, for example, can be carried out at night-time with an element of surprise
and freedom of movement. Operations involving military interaction with the civilian
population may only be possible during the daytime, when there is no curfew and the
population can be fully and peacefully engaged.
‘A more general tactic evolved, based on the realisation that the Germans were short of
reserves. Chuikov ordered an emphasis on night attacks, mainly for the practical reason
that the Luftwaffe could not react to them, but also because he was convinced that the
Germans were more frightened in the hours of darkness, and would become exhausted.
The German Landser came to harbour a special fear of the Siberians from Colonel Batyuk’s
284th Rifle Division, who were considered to be natural hunters of any sort of prey. ‘If only
you could understand what terror is; at the slightest rustle, I pull the trigger and fire off
tracer in bursts from the machine-gun’. The Russians also kept up the tension by firing
flares into the night sky from time to time to give the impression of an imminent attack. Red
Army aviation, partly to avoid the Messerschmitts by day, kept up a relentless series of
raids every night on German positions. It also served as another part of the wearing down
process to exhaust the Germans and stretch their nerves.’‘
“OWNING THE NIGHT”
8. The advantages brought by technology, discipline, the training advantage and

professionalism can give conventional armed forces the opportunity to close with and
defeat the urban enemy at night.
9. Tactical Night Vision Technology. Combined Arms urban warfare brings a

variety of NVD technology to the battlegroup. The soldier’s Thermal Imaging Head
Mounted Night Vision Systems ((TI)HMNVS) improves individual night-time vision.
Information available to the battlegroup is aided by infantry, artillery and engineer armoured
vehicles’ short and long range Thermal Imaging (TI), and in the case of tanks, longer range
Image Intensification (II). Sensor pods mounted on AH and fast-air platforms can bring
overhead TI imagery as far down as the battlegroup.
C-12-2
10. ISTAR. By observing a wide portion of the electromagnetic spectrum and
communicating this to deployed HQs, ISTAR assets deliver information that can be
translated into intelligence. ISTAR gathering sensors in satellites, fixed and rotary wing
aircraft with cameras, manned and unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), balloons, overt and
covert ground vehicles, masts, unattended covert systems and ground sensors (UGS) are
used to provide such information.
‘Operating in urban terrain in Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Operation

Iraqi Freedom at night places a premium on training, skilled small unit leaders, and
technology necessary to acquire and engage the enemy. Maintaining situational
awareness to see the enemy, ourselves, and terrain, is difficult but mission essential.
In the COIN fight, we use the night to maneuver unimpeded, to infiltrate and to set the
conditions for operations. The urban fight at night will make an already difficult task doubly
so. Thermals and passive NVGs don't excel at telling the difference between an armed
and unarmed man in the dark. In all but the most high-intensity scenarios this places a
premium on good leadership and judgement.
In the urban fight, owning the night is the ultimate high ground; it offers a decisive
advantage to those who can seize it, but to get to that point requires a great level of
preparation in leader development, training, and use of technology.’
LTC John W Karagosian; XO, 1-506th, 101st ABN (AASLT)
ADVANTAGES OF NIGHT OPERATIONS
11. When fighting in built-up areas at night, attacking or defending forces have certain
advantages as follows:
a. In all operations, advantage should be taken of the technology offered by

thermal imagery and image intensification. The ability to identify, engage and
destroy targets before detection by an enemy may favour night operations.
b. In periods of limited visibility, attacking forces should take advantage of the

enemy's reduced awareness and approach and engage before being detected.
c. Night-time and limited visibility gives the attacker a greater chance of surprise.
d. There may be a greater opportunity at night for conducting covert, small- or

large-scale operations or aggressive or kinetic response to enemy activity.
DISADVANTAGES OF NIGHT OPERATIONS
12. When fighting in built-up areas during night operations, attacking and defending
forces face the following disadvantages:
a. The cover of night can give an advantage to the enemy, and particularly the
insurgent, to move, to mount surprise attacks, to escape and to prepare ambushes
without being seen.
C-12-3
b. Fighting through noisy, dark and unfamiliar rooms and houses by torchlight is
chaotic and command and control difficult. The risk of casualties and fratricide is
increased.
c. Soldiers have an instinctive tendency to bunch during night operations,

increasing individual and collective vulnerability.
d. The characteristics of built-up areas at night-time and in reduced visibility can

be disorientating. Target identification and indication is difficult at night and may
result in indiscriminate engagement and loss of fire discipline.
NIGHT VISION DEVICES (NVD)
13. The characteristics of built-up areas may degrade NVDs and sights. Both operators
and commanders must allow for the degradation of their own systems whilst attempting to
utilise the impact on the enemy's systems to their own advantage.
a. Most built-up areas will have electric power, street lights and building lights.
These can cause a "white out" on image intensification devices.
b. The chance that fires will be burning in the area of operations is high. This
will potentially cause problems for both light intensification and thermal devices.
c. Subterranean areas and the interiors of buildings will not have ambient light if
the power is off. Passive II require an artificial light source2 to provide enough
ambient light for the devices to work.
d. The many reflective surfaces found in built-up areas may cause false images,
especially for laser range finders and laser target designators.
e. Dust, smoke and fog degrades the performance of thermal imaging devices.
f. Weapons flashes within enclosed areas appear much brighter than by day.
Soldiers can lose their night vision and light intensification devices can be
overloaded.
g. Flares, mortar and artillery illumination and spotlights (visible light or infrared)
can be used to blind enemy NVDs or to artificially illuminate the battlefield.
FEATURES OF URBAN OPERATIONS AT NIGHT
14. General. Before conducting any urban operations at night the commander should
balance the risks and complexity of such operations against the requirements of the
mission. Rehearsals will be important; sound command and control measures can reduce
mistakes and casualties. Specific points to note are:
2
Such as infrared.
C-12-4
a. Soldiers should clear buildings and rooms using the same techniques they
use during daylight to reduce confusion. The soldiers should be practised and
confident in techniques and equipment.
b. Movement will be slower. The problems of night-time target acquisition,

clearing buildings, and command, control and communication at night may cause
significant delay. Commanders should allocate sufficient time to achieve their
planning, preparation and mission.
c. NVD should be made available to every single soldier involved in urban

operations at night. White light should be used with caution since it might benefit the
enemy.
15. Fratricide. The key to avoiding fratricide is good training and a high level of
situational awareness. Other considerations include:
a. Fire Support Control Measures should be clearly defined by the use of

obvious features on the ground, such as motorways, railway lines, overpasses,
distinct buildings, and rivers.
b. Fire control and movement should similarly be tightly controlled.
c. Cleared rooms and buildings should be clearly marked to identify cleared

areas to friendly troops. The use of cylumes can be particularly effective.
d. Visible markers (for example glint tape or thermal strips) can be attached to
individual soldiers and buildings.
e. Safe routes between and through buildings should be marked.
f. Indirect fire and close air support needs careful co-ordination.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
16. In principal, the provision of CSS for night operations differs little from day-time
operations. The following points require particular attention:
a. Night-time provides the best opportunity for troops for the maintenance and
repair of weapons and equipment. CSS operations may perforce be carried out
principally at night-time and commanders should plan on periods of enforced rest for
soldiers during the day to allow for effective administration at night.
b. Casualty collection may be significantly more difficult at night-time. Clear

methods for marking any casualties must be established before the start of the
operation. Commanders should allow for sufficient time for the movement of
casualties and the marking of evacuation routes.
c. Collection and control of PWs may require more manpower at night.

Additional personnel should be nominated before the start of the operation.
C-12-5
d. CSS relies on the movement of vehicles. Apart from normal night discipline
for vehicle movement, the allocation of additional NVD to vehicle crews and detailed
route marking may be necessary.
17. Operations in the dense human terrain of the urban environment can be different at
night-time. The civilian population may be subject to curfew; there may not the same
opportunity fore the enemy to mingle amongst the civilian population nor the immediate
possibility, for example, of spontaneous civilian reaction or civil unrest. There may be a
greater opportunity for aggressive and kinetic response to enemy activity.
C-12-6
CHAPTER 13
THE USE OF OBSTACLES IN URBAN OPERATIONS
1. This chapter is intended to give an overview of obstacles and how they might be
used.
It provides the all arms commander with an insight into what obstacles he might face in the
assault and how he might use obstacles in defence. Further detail and advice will be
available from the brigade close support engineer regiment1.
2. In the contemporary operating environment and for the foreseeable future, possibly
even in major combat operations, UK forces will wish to minimise permanent damage to
urban environments and avoid killing or injuring the local population. Whether assaulting
into or operating within an urban area we must assume that much of the indigenous
population will remain. Causing damage to enhance our own manoeuvre or to deny
adversary manoeuvre may well be counter-productive, attracting adverse media, losing the
consent of the people or even causing humanitarian problems and displacing the
population. Furthermore, the UK may well need to repair any damage in order to win the
consent of the people thus adding to the workload. As such, it is unlikely that UK forces
would use demolitions, or other destructive methods of making obstacles, lay mines/booby-
traps or use methods that could injure or kill. Non-lethal barriers, probably pre-fabricated
and relatively easy to move (with plant equipment if necessary), will be the preferred
method of denying adversary manoeuvre.
3. Conversely, adversaries may not operate under the same constraints so UK forces
need to be aware of the possible threats from mines, booby traps and other lethal and non-
lethal systems. This chapter is intended to give an overview of obstacles and how they
might be used.
4. Both man-made and natural obstacles are used extensively in urban operations to
allow the defender to canalize the enemy, impede his movement and disrupt his attack.
Obstacles are designed to prevent movement by personnel, separate infantry from tanks
and slow or stop armour/other vehicles. The UK will not use AP mines as these have been
banned under international law. The use of AT mines by UK forces will be subject to ROE
and it is unlikely that their use will be widespread.
SECTION 2 - LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL OBSTACLES
5. Obstacles may be constructed using pre-fabricated concrete sections to create walls,

other pre-fabricated or equipment systems, barbed wire, knife rests etc. Depending on the
nature of the operation, they may incorporate anti-tank mines or other explosive hazards
and, when few constraints are imposed, could be created with craters, building rubble or
destroyed vehicles. All obstacles should be covered by fire and view.
1
Useful references include ME Vol 2, Filed Engineering – Pam 3 Obstacles, Pam 5 Minelaying
Issue 4: Oct 09 C-13-1
Fig C-13-1 The Use of Obstacles in Streets
a. Buildings. Obstacles in buildings are constructed to deny covered routes or

positions to the enemy. They can be developed by destroying the building with
explosives or flame, constructing wire obstacles within the building, or preparing the
building as a trap (with explosives or flame to be fired after the enemy has occupied
it).
b. Dead Space. Obstacles in these areas are designed to inflict casualties and
restrict infantry movement in areas that are concealed from observation and
protected from direct fire.
c. Underground Systems. Exits from underground systems that could provide

adversaries with advantageous positions within or behind the defence must be
denied.
Fig C-13-2 Underground Obstacles
SECTION 3 - MINES
5. General. Anti-tank mines may be used individually to reinforce other barriers but are
normally used in quantity to form minefields. In the context of urban operations they would
usually be used on the approaches, rather than within an urban area. They can be laid
where no natural obstacle exists, but are more effective when laid to strengthen other
obstacles. They should always be sited to fit the overall tactical plan and form part of the
combined arms obstacle integration plan. It is only by dominating a minefield and
preventing interference with it that the defenders can rely on it as an obstacle; it must be
under observation and preferably covered by direct fire, though indirect fire may suffice.
The location of mines must be correctly recorded.
6. Considerations for the use of Mines in Urban Areas. Many of the factors and
principles normally considered in the siting and design of minefields in rural areas have to
be adapted in order to be fully effective within the urban environment. Vehicular movement
is far more restricted in a built up area where channelling is often unavoidable and the
selected route of a vehicle more predictable. Fields of fire will be reduced requiring greater
use of mines in denying dead ground to the enemy. Concealment of mines will also
become more difficult and different techniques will need to be employed if the mines are to
be successfully deployed. There are four types of minefield. Due to the many limiting
factors, large tactical minefields do not normally have a place in the urban battlefield. The
remaining 3 types of minefield can all be used to great effect.
a. Tactical. A minefield which is part of a formation obstacle plan, the aim of

which will normally be to break up the enemy's advance, deflect him into a killing
area or delay him to give the anti-tank weapons better targets. They are usually laid
mechanically by engineers and are of a considerable size, often being several
kilometres in length and many hundreds of metres in depth.
b. Protective. These are for the close in protection of a defensive position or

installation and their laying is an all arms responsibility. They are usually laid by
hand and play an important part in enhancing the effectiveness of a defended locality
in a built up area.
c. Nuisance. These are laid by engineers or assault pioneers. They are used
in an effort to delay and disorganise the enemy and to hinder his use of an area or
route. This is the type of minefield most likely to be encountered in the urban
environment.
d. Phoney. An area free of live mines that is usually fenced and marked as a
minefield with the object of deceiving the enemy. When used effectively they can
impose similar delays as the real thing as the enemy will treat it in the same way as
a live minefield. Phoney minefields also enable friendly forces freedom of
manoeuvre (for example a counter attack through a phoney minefield).
SECTION 4 - DEMOLITIONS
7. The use of demolitions on offensive or defensive operations in urban terrain is likely

to be far more common than during operations in open, natural terrain. Demolitions should
be carried out by engineers or assault pioneers. However, if engineers are involved in
higher priority tasks, the preparation of mousehole charges, breaching of walls and
destruction of buildings may be accomplished by infantry assault pioneers. When
assaulting or clearing a built-up area, demolitions will enable the commander to create an
avenue of approach through buildings. The creation of mouse holes provides the safest
method of moving between rooms and floors

SECTION 5 - BOOBY TRAPS
8. General. Booby traps have been employed over the years to prevent forces from
freely moving into certain areas and restricting their actions once they get there. The
military aims of a booby trap are:
a. Restrict enemy movement.
b. Create casualties.
c. Stretch medical resources.
d. Lower morale.
e. Create confusion and uncertainty.
f. Deny comfort and facilities to the enemy.
All of these points help to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy. A small well motivated
booby trap/sabotage team can create havoc. Unfortunately most armies use these tactics
and whilst the UK Army controls its deployment of booby traps, many adversaries may
deploy them at random. With no records kept, no knowledge of devices used, often the first
indication of devices is when you take your first casualty. Always assume booby traps have
been deployed until proved otherwise.
9. Offensive Operations. During raids, delay charges may be used to cause damage
and casualties and also to create confusion. Traps may be left behind to delay a counter-
attack.
10. Defensive Operations. In addition to their use with nuisance mines on likely lines of
approach for men and vehicles, booby traps may be laid in advance of an enemy
interspersed amongst tactical obstacles, for instance minefields, wire fences and
roadblocks, to impede infantry and prevent detailed reconnaissance and attempted
neutralization. Within built up areas traps may be laid where platoons are likely to have
RVs, such as empty buildings, and also areas likely to be used as fire positions.
11. Delay Operations. Booby traps are a particularly valuable weapon to withdrawing
troops as they will slow down any pursuit by inflicting casualties and instilling caution into
their movements. Traps will be laid in much the same way as nuisance mines, being sited
in locations which will deny the enemy the use of buildings, approach routes and attractive
harbour areas. The presence of booby traps will make troops wary and they are likely to
treat many harmless situations with extreme caution thereby reducing the rate of advance
unduly.
12. Detection. The detection of enemy booby traps and the reduction of casualties from
them is largely a matter of discipline and training. Knowledge of the subject must be
combined with keen eyesight and a suspicious mind. Every soldier needs to learn to look
for the signs of unusual activity which will warn of traps, such as absence of people, battery
wrappings, wire clippings, loose floorboards etc.

13. Laying. Booby traps and anti-lift devices may only be employed on the orders of the
formation commander. If authorised, booby traps should only be laid by Royal Engineers
and infantry assault pioneers.
14. Recording. Units setting booby traps are responsible for recording them. It is
essential that accurate records be kept so that traps may be recovered should friendly
troops be required to move to the area. Records should be kept at Divisional HQ which is
responsible for informing neighbouring units of the location of booby traps.
15. Marking. Booby traps are to be marked as soon as they are encountered in an
effort to warn troops and prevent casualties. Signs should, whenever possible, be fixed
above ground and in a prominent place to avoid confusion. Policy and method of marking
will be decided by the appropriate commander. It will usually be the same as a mine
marking sign (NATO mine triangle).
16. Clearance. Although the responsibility for detection and clearance of traps rests
primarily with the Royal Engineers and assault pioneers, other arms are required to
maintain detachments trained for the work for the immediate protection of the unit.
17. Traps. In offensive operations all arms must be prepared to accept the danger
arising from traps and Royal Engineers should, if possible, accompany the detailed
reconnaissance to discover the existence of traps. Even where time and personnel are not
available to clear the traps, dangerous sites should be marked for the benefit of other
troops.

ABBREVIATIONS
1BW 1st Battalion, The Black Watch

2IC Second-in-Command
‘A’ Vehicle Armoured Vehicle

AA Avenue of Approach
ABCA American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand
AD Air Defence
AFV Armoured Fighting Vehicle
AFM Army Field Manual
AIF Anti-Iraqi Forces
AH Attack Helicopter
AO Area of Operations
AOP Air Observation Posts
APFSDS Armour Piercing, Fin Stabilised, Discarding Sabot
APC Armoured Personnel Carrier
APDS` Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot
AR (US) Armored Reconnaissance
ASM Anti-Structure Munition
Avn Aviation
BAE Battlefield Area Evaluation

BC (RA) Battery Commander
BCU Battery Coolant Unit
BE Base Ejecting
BEMA Bulk Earth Moving Attachment
BG Battlegroup
BGE Battlegroup Engineer
BIC Break-In Charge
BMP Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (Боевая Машина Пехоты - Fighting Vehicle of
Infantry)
C2 Command and Control

C3 Command, Control, Communications
C4IRM Medical Command, Control, Communication, Computerisation, Information,
Recording and Management and Medical Logistics.
CAP Combat Air Patrol
CAP Combat Aid Post
Cart Cartridge
CAS Close Air Support
CASEVAC Casualty Evacuation
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CCA Close Combat Attack
CDE Collateral Damage Estimate
CDLC Charge Demolition Cutting
Cdo Commando
CEP Casualty Exchange Point
CI Counter-Intelligence
CIDNE Combined Information Data Network Exchange
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 1

CIMIC Civil Military Co-operation
CLP Combat Logistic Patrol
CLU Command Launch Unit
CM Centimetre
CNO Computer Network Operation
CO Commanding Officer
COH Coalition Operations Handbook
COIN Counter Insurgency
COP (US) Combat Outpost
Coy Company
CP Command Post
CPERS Captured Personnel
CR Combat Recovery
CS Close Support
CSM Company Sergeant-Major
CSS Combat Service Support
CTA Closed Telescope Ammunition
CVR(T) Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked)
CVR(T) Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked
CWS Crew-Served Weapon Sight
Cylume Fluorescent Light Marker
DA Direct Attack
DAS Defensive Aids Suites
DD Delay Deep
Det Cord Detonation Cord
DF Direct Fire
DF Defensive Fire
DfID Department for International Development
DHC Deployed Health Care (DHC)
DS Delay Shallow
DSO Decision Support Overlay
EBW Enhanced Blast Weapon

ECM Electronic Counter Measures
EEO Emplaced Explosive Ordnance
EHLS Emergency Helicopter Landing Site
EIH Environmental and Industrial Hazard
EMOE Explosive Method of Entry
EO Electro-Optical
EOD Exploded Ordnance Disposal
ERW Explosive Remnants of War
ES Equipment Support
FAC Forward Air Controller

FFD First Field Dressing
FIBUA Fighting in Built Up Areas
Fig Figure
FLOT Forward Line, Own Troops
FMV Full Motion Video
FOO (RA) Forward Observation Officer
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 2

FP Force Protection
FPF Final Protective Fire
FPM Force Provost Marshal
FR Formation Reconnaissance
FRT Forward Repair Team
FSC Fire Support Centre
FST Fire Support Team
FTB Follow-Through Bomb
Fwd AE Forward Aero-Medical Evacuation
G2 General (Staff Operations) Two (Intelligence)

GC Geneva Convention
GBAD Ground Based Air Defence
GCS Ground Control Station
GEOINT Geospatial Intelligence)
GM Guided Missile
GMG Grenade Machine Gun
GMLRS Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems
GPMG General Purpose Machine Gun
GPMG (SF) General Purpose Machine Gun (Sustained Fire)
GPS Global Positioning System
GR Grid Reference
HE High Explosive
HEDP High Explosive (Dual Purpose)
HESH High Explosive (Squash Head)
HLS Helicopter Landing Site
HMNVS Head Mounted Night Vision System
HN Host Nation
HQ Headquarters
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HVTL High Value Target List
ICP Intelligence Collection Plan

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ID Identification
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IFF Identification (Friend of Foe)
IFV Infantry Fighting Vehicle
II Image Intensifier
Illum Illumination
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
IPE Individual Protection Equipment
IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
IR Infra-Red
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
IST Intimate Support Team
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Reconnaissance
IT Information Technology
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 3

JARIC Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition
JDP Joint Doctrine Publication
JF Joint Force
JIC Joint Intelligence Cell
JOA Joint Area of Operations
JRIC Joint Reconnaissance Intelligence Cell
JSP Joint Service Publication
JWP Joint Warfare Publication
KG Kilogram
KLE Key Leader Engagement
LAW Light Anti-Tank Weapon

LCAD Lightweight Chemical Agent Detector
LEGAD Legal Advisor
LM Light Manoeuvre
LMG Light Machine Gun
LO Liaison Officer
LOAC Law of Armed Conflict
LofC Line of Communication
LM Loitering Munition
LOO Line of Operation
LOS Line of Sight
LSM Last Safe Moment
LSW Light Support Weapon
LTD Laser Target Designator
LWT Light Wheeled Tractor
MACE Military Assistance to Civil Effect

MANPAD Man-Pack Air Defence Missile System
MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MBT Main Battle Tank
MC Mobility Corridor
MCAD Manportable Chemical Agent Detector
MD Most Dangerous (COA)
MDA Main Defensive Area
MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC
MERT Medical Emergency Response Team
MFC Mortar Fire Controller
ML Most Likely (COA)
MM Millimetre
MNF-I Multinational Force - Information
MO Modus Operandi
MPS Military Provost Service
MSR Main Supply Route
MWT Medium Wheeled Tractor
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NEQ Net Explosive Quality
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 4

NGS Naval Gunfire Support
NLAW New Light Anti-Tank Weapon
NOE Nap of the Earth
NVD Night Vision Device
OAS Offensive Air Support

OC Officer Commanding
Off Ops Offensive Operations
OGD Other Government Department
OP Observation Post
OPCOM Operational Command
OPCON Operational Control
Ops Operations
OPSEC Operations Security
OS Offensive Support
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSINT Open-source intelligence
OTS Over-fly Target Attack
Pam Pamphlet
PAR Population at Risk
PD Point Detonating
PE Plastic Explosive
PH Prisoner Handling
PHC Primary Health Care
PHEC Pre Hospital Emergency Care
PHF Prisoner Handling Force
PHO Prisoner Handling Organisation
PID Positive Identification
PIR Priority Intelligence Requirements
Pl Sgt Platoon Sergeant
PM Provost Marshal
PPP Presence, Posture and Profile
PREE Plan Review Execute Evaluate
PRR Personal Role Radio
PSO Peace Support Operation
Psyops Psychological Operations
PW Prisoner of War
QRF Quick Reaction Force
RAP Regimental Aid Post

RE Royal Engineers
Recce Reconnaissance
REME Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
RF Radar Frequency
RGJ Royal Green Jackets
RM Royal Marines
RMO Regimental Medical Officer
RMP Royal Military Police
ROE Rules of Engagement
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 5

RP Red Phosphorous
RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade
RPO-A (Russia) Schmel Rocket Launcher (РПО-А Шмель) (" Bumblebee" )
RShG-1 (Russia) Assault Rocket-Propelled Grenade
RUSI Royal United Services Institute
RV Rendezvous
SA Situational awareness
SA Small Arms
SA80 Small Arms 80 (UK Army Rifle)
SAL Semi-Active Laser
SAM Surface to Air Missile
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defence
Ser Serial
SF Security Force
SF Special Forces
SH Support Helicopter
SIB Special Investigation Branch
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SMK Smoke
SOHB (UK Army) Staff Officers’ Handbook
SOI Standing Operational Instructions
SOP Standing Operational Procedures
SSA Shared Situational Awareness
SP Pol Services’ Personnel Policy
SSR Support to Security Sector Reform
STAP Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan
STIC Sniper Thermal Imaging Capability
SVR Secure Voice Rebroadcast
TACOM Tactical Command

TACSAT Tactical Satellite
TAR Tactical Air Reconnaissance
TCM Thermal Camouflage Material
TE Threat Evaluation
TI Thermal Imagery
TI Threat Integration
TIH Toxic Industrial Hazard
TriM Trauma Risk Management
TQ Tactical Questioning
TTPs Tactics, Techniques, Procedures
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UCM Urban Camouflage Material
UDT User Data Terminals
UGL Under-Slung Grenade Launcher
UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicle
UHF Ultra High Frequency
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
US United States
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 6

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
USMC United States Marine Corps
UXO Unexploded Ordnance
VBIED Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive

VCP Vehicle Check Point
VHF Very High Frequency
Wks Gp RE Works Group Royal Engineers

WP White Phosphorous
Issue 4.0: Oct 09 7

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Army Code 71657

ARMY FIELD MANUAL

This publication supersedes AC 71657

Issue 4.0: October 2009

Amendment Amendment No Date Amendment No Date

Distribution As directed by Colonel Warfare Development, sponsor of this

Issue 4.0: Oct 09

1. The increasing complexity of the contemporary and future operating environments,

Issue 4.0: Oct 09 i

7. The degeneration of urban operations into a series of small group or even of

a. Part A. Part A describes Urban Warfare, the environment, issues relating to

Issue 4.0: Oct 09 ii

THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

APPLICATION THROUGH LEADERSHIP

Issue 4.0: Oct 09 iii

VOLUME 2 OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS

PART 5 URBAN OPERATIONS

PART A – URBAN WARFARE

CHAPTER 1 THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

Section 1 The Military Significance of Urban Warfare A-1-1

CHAPTER 2 URBAN COALITION OPERATIONS

Section 1 Urban Coalition Operations A-2-1

CHAPTER 3 MILITARY INTERACTION WITH THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

Section 1 The Status of Civilians A-3-1

ANNEX A TO PART A TYPES OF BUILDING CONSTRUCTION A-A-1

PART B – FIGHTING THE URBAN BATTLE

CHAPTER 4 PREPARING FOR THE URBAN BATTLE

Section 1 Operational Planning B-4-1

CHAPTER 5 ALL ARMS COMBAT

Section 1 Close Combat B-5-1

Issue 4.0: Oct 09 v

Section 1 Introduction B-6-1

CHAPTER 7 CONVENTIONAL DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Section 1 Introduction B-7-1

CHAPTER 8 STABILITY OPERATIONS

Section 1 Introduction B-8-1

PART C – URBAN COMBAT SKILLS

CHAPTER 9 COMBAT SKILLS

Section 1 Camouflage and Concealment C-9-1

CHAPTER 10 WEAPON EFFECTS

Section 1 Introduction C-10-1

Issue 4.0: Oct 09 vi

CHAPTER 12 NIGHT OPERATIONS C-12-1

CHAPTER 13 THE USE OF OBSTACLES IN URBAN OPERATIONS

Section 1 Introduction C-13-1

Issue 4.0: Oct 09 vii

Issue 4.0: Oct 09

SECTION 1 – THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF URBAN WARFARE

General Charles C Krulak, USMC

4. The same skills required to defeat an enemy in a complex, modern urban

5. Non-combatants present a particular difficulty in urban warfare as operations are

SECTION 2 – THE NATURE OF URBAN OPERATIONS

10. Contemporary operations have been characterized as being ‘...confronted by the

THE SPECTRUM OF OPERATIONS

12. Offensive Operations. Conventional operations in an urban environment heavily

a. Penetration. Urban penetration is designed for operations against clearly

b. Thrust. Urban thrust is focused on attacking an enemy on a narrow axis

c. Saturation. Urban saturation is a similar tactic to that used by police forces

a. To give early warning of the intention to defend a built-up area. This is

SECTION 3 – THE NATURE OF URBAN TERRAIN

Fig A-1-1 The Surge of Urbanisation

Fig A-1-2 Example of a Town Centre, Newry, Northern Ireland, 2006

b. Commercial Ribbon. Commercial ribbon development includes rows of