Contents

CASE#91 People v. Layag – G.R. No. 214875, 2016...........................................................................................................................................1

CASE#92 Donato v. Luna - 160 SCRA 441..........................................................................................................................................................1
CASE#93 Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis -336 SCRA 750...........................................................................................................................................2
CASE#94 Umali v. IAC - 186 SCRA 680.............................................................................................................................................................2
CASE#95 Dreamworks Construction Inc. v. Janiola- 30 June 2009................................................................................................................3
CASE#96 People v. Armbulo – G.R. No. 186597, 2015.....................................................................................................................................4
CASE#97 San Miguel Properties v. Perez – G.r. No. 166836 (192253), 2013...................................................................................................5
CASE#98 People v. Monteverde, 142 SCRA 668................................................................................................................................................6
CASE#99: Doromol v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354......................................................................................................................................6
CASE#100 People v. CA, 301 SCRA 475.............................................................................................................................................................7
CASE#101 Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652......................................................................................................................................................7
CASE#102 Santos v. Orda, G.R. No. 189402, May 6, 2010...............................................................................................................................9
CASE#103 Manibo v. Acosta – G.R. No. 16955, 2009......................................................................................................................................11
CASE#104 Solado Law Offices v. CA, G.R. No. 219914, 2016..........................................................................................................................11
CASE#105 Estrada v. Ombudsman – G.R. No. 212140, 2015..........................................................................................................................13
CASE#106 George Miller v. Sec. Hernando B. Perez - May 30, 2011..............................................................................................................14
CASE#107 Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 161602, July 13, 2010.....................................................................................................15
CASE#108 Tamargo v. Awingan. G.R. No. 177727, Jan. 19. 2010...................................................................................................................16

Topic:

CASE#91 People v. Layag – G.R. No. 214875, 2016

Ruling:

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability [,] as well as the civil liability [,] based solely
thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source
of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the
civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription. 10

Thus, upon Layag's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that Layag's civil liability in connection with his acts
against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the
estate of Layag, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a) SET ASIDE the Court's Resolution dated August 3, 2015 in connection with this case; (b)
DISMISS Crim. Case Nos. 2007-9591-MK, 2007-9592-MK, 2007-9593-MK, and 2007-9594-MK before the Regional Trial Court of
Marikina City, Branch 156 by reason of the death of accused-appellant Ariel Layag; and (c) DECLARE the instant case CLOSED and
TERMINATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED

CASE#92 Donato v. Luna - 160 SCRA 441

Facts:

On September 28, 1979, respondent Paz B. Abayan filed before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for
the declaration of nullity of marriage with petitioner Donato. Abayan contends that she had no idea that Donato has been married prior
to the contracted marriage. Donato on the other hand interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized
without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation, and undue influence were employed by Abayan to obtain petitioner’s
consent on the marriage. Petitioner subsequently filed for the suspension of the proceedings of the said case contending that civil case
filed for the nullity of his marriage with respondent raises a prejudicial question which must be determined or decided before the
criminal case can proceed. Hon. Artemon D. Luna on the other hand ruled otherwise directing the proceedings in he criminal case to
proceed as scheduled.

Issue:

Whether or not criminal case proceedings should be suspended in view of the prejudicial question raised by the filed civil case.

Ruling:

A prejudicial question is defined to be one in which resolution is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the said case, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The requisites of a prejudicial question was not obtain in the case at bar. It must be
noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not
determinative of petitioner Donato’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. The records reveal that prior to petitioner’s second
marriage, he had been living with private respondent as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage.
Thus, petitioner’s averments that his consent was obtained through force and undue influence is belled by the fact that both petitioner
and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage for more than five years before the subsequent marriage was contracted. As such, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

CASE#93 Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis -336 SCRA 750

Facts:

On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce. Without said marriage having been
annulled, Isagani contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain
Julia. An information for bigamy was filed against Isagani based on Imelda's complaint. Sometime thereafter, Isagani initiated a civil
action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage
license. Isagani then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity
of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case.

Issue:

Does the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a
criminal case for bigamy?

Held:

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that
the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the defense
must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of
whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its two essential elements are:

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration
of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the
accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage.

Isagani, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into
the second marriage. He was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage
with petitioner. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It
is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

Respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same
judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has
to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that
the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A
party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such
scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to
such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

CASE#94 Umali v. IAC - 186 SCRA 680

Facts:

Petitioners are the officers of the Orosea Development Corporation (OROSEA). On September 4. 1979, petitioners purchased from the
spouses Honorio and Salina Edano, Lot No. 49 of the Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, Bo. Casay, Mulanay, Province of Quezon, covered by
TCT No. RT-(T-36471), in the name of spouses Edano. for the sum of P1.036,500.00 payable in four installments. The first check for
P225,000.00 was honored upon its presentment. By arrangement of the petitioners with the Edano spouses, a deed of absolute sale was
executed by the vendors. In the first deferment petitioners issued a check that matured on June 30, 1980 to replace the check that
matured on March 31. 1980. On the second deferment petitioners issued another check dated July 31. 1980 to replace the check dated
June 30, 1980.This second renewal check was presented with the bank but it was dishonored due to lack of funds. So were the checks
postdated September 30, 1980 and March 31. 1981. They were also dishonored upon their presentment for lack of funds. On May 21.
1981the Edano spouses filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1423-1, as a consequence of the
dishonor of the checks. On October 14. 1981, OROSEA filed a Complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon against the Edano
spouses, docketed as Civil Case No. 8769, for the annulment/rescission of the Contract of Sale executed on September 4. 1979 by and
between OROSEA and the Edano spouses covering Lot No. 49 of the Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, and for which the petitioners issued
the checks.

Issue:

Whether CV No. 8769 involves a prejudicial question in relation to CR No. 1423-I so as to require a suspension of proceedings in the
latter case, until the civil case is disposed of

Ruling:

At the time the acts complained of in CR No. 1423-I were committed. the deed of sale sought to be later annulled in CV No. 8769 was
binding upon the parties thereto. including the petitioners. The two (2) essential elements for a prejudicial question to exist are: (a) the
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
in the civil action determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Given the nature of a prejudicial question, and
considering the issues raised in CV No. 8769 and CR No. 1423-1, we agree with the ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals that the
resolution of the issues in CV No. 8769 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners-accused in CR No. 1423-I, hence,
no prejudicial question is involved between the said two (2) cases. What private respondents complained of in CR No. 1423-I is that the
checks issued by petitioners in their favor were dishonored for lack of funds upon due presentment to the drawee bank. Undeniably, at
the time of said dishonor, petitioners' obligation to pay private respondents pursuant to the deed of sale, continued to subsist. And
because petitioners' checks were dishonored for lack of funds. petitioners are answerable under the law for the consequences of their
said acts. And even if CV No. 8769 were to be finally adjudged to the effect that the said deed of sale should be annulled; such
declaration would be of no material importance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of petitioners-accused in CR No. 1423-I.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

CASE#95 Dreamworks Construction Inc. v. Janiola- 30 June 2009

Facts:

This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision on the suspension of the criminal proceeding filed by the petitioner in the MTC for
the ground that there is a presence of prejudicial question with respect to the civil case belatedly filed by the respondent.

The petitioner appealed to RTC but denied Dreamwork, through its President, and Vice-President, filed a Complaint Affidavit against
Janiola for violation of BP 22 at the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City.

Correspondingly, the former also filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20, 2006, Janiola instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages.

Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case for the ground that private respondent claim that
the civil case posed a prejudicial question against the criminal case. Petitioner opposed the Respondent’s Motion to Suspend criminal
proceeding based on juridical question for the following grounds:

(1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate
and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and

(2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that “the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action”; thus, this element is missing
in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.

The MTC granted the Respondents Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC but denied the petition.
Hence, this petition raised.

Issue:

Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its discretion to suspend proceedings in Criminal Case on the basis of “Prejudicial
Question “, with respect to the Civil Case belatedly filed.

Held:

This petition must be granted, pursuant to SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.

The elements of a prejudicial question are:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a
decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the
criminal action.

In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case filed by the State with the RTC.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists. The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action.
Even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this
would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent issued
checks that were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22. Therefore, it is
clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, is absent. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.

CASE#96 People v. Armbulo – G.R. No. 186597, 2015

Facts:

Records show that respondent Victoria R. Arambulo (Victoria), Emerenciana R. Gungab, Reynaldo Reyes (Reynaldo), Domingo Reyes
(Domingo), Rodrigo Reyes and Oscar Reyes (Oscar) are the heirs of Spouses Pedro C. Reyes and Anastacia Reyes. Anaped Estate Inc.
(Anaped) was... incorporated as part of the estate planning or as conduit to hold the properties of the estate of Pedro Reyes for and in
behalf of his heirs.
Jose Buban (Buban), as Vice-President and General Manager of Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped), filed a complaint for estafa against
Victoria and her husband Miguel Arambulo, Jr. (Miguel) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City. He alleged that
Victoria failed... to remit the rentals collected from the time the ownership of the commercial apartments was transferred to Anaped.

On 14 April 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in view of the pendency of
two intra-corporate cases pending before the RTC of Quezon City and Makati City.

In their motion to suspend proceedings, respondents asserted that the resolution of the SEC cases in their favor particularly the issues
of whether of the group of Rodrigo and Buban are the lawful representatives of the corporation and whether they are duly authorized to
make a... demand for remittance would necessarily result in their acquittal in the criminal case.

the trial court, through Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, granted the motion for suspension of the proceedings. The trial court
reasoned that the issue in the SEC cases, i.e., who between the groups has the right to act for and in behalf of... the corporation, has a
direct link to the issue of the culpability of the accused for estafa

The appellate court added that since respondents are challenging the authority of Buban, then the validity of Buban’s demand to turn
over or remit the rentals is put in question. The appellate court concluded that if the supposed authority of Buban is found to be
defective, it... is as if no demand was ever made, hence the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.

Issues:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that there exists a prejudicial question which calls for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings before the trial court.

Ruling:

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution... of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 does not present a prejudicial question to the criminal case for
estafa. It is an action for accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and...
damages. Even if said case will be decided against respondents, they will not be adjudged free from criminal liability. It also does not
automatically follow that an accounting of corporate funds and properties and annulment of fictitious sale of corporate assets would
result in... the conviction of respondents in the estafa case

With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, however, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ finding that a prejudicial question exists.

prays for the nullification of the election of Anaped directors and officers, including Buban. Essentially, the... issue is the authority of
the aforesaid officers to act for and behalf of the corporation.

it is clear that, should respondents herein prevail in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, then Buban, who does not own either by himself or in
behalf of Anaped which is the owner, the property heretofore managed by Victoria, cannot demand remittance of the rentals on... the
property and Victoria does not have the obligation to turn over the rentals to Buban.

Verily, the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 will determine the innocence or guilt of respondents in the criminal case for estafa.

Principles:

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.

It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately... connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the... resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

CASE#97 San Miguel Properties v. Perez – G.r. No. 166836 (192253), 2013
Facts:

Petitioner San Miguel Properties (SMP) purchased from BF Homes Inc., represented by Atty. Orendain as its duly authorized
rehabilitation receiver, 130 residential lots in its subdivision in BF Homes Parañaque. However, 20 TCTs (out of 40) were withheld
delivery by BF Homes since Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions; BF Homes refused
to deliver the TCTs despite demands. Because of this, SMP filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the Prosecutor (OCP) of Las Pinas
charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Sec. 25 in relation to Sec. 29 both of
PD No. 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree). Simultaneously, SMP sued BF Homes for specific
performance in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
The OCP dismissed SMP’s criminal complaint for violation of PD No. 957 on the ground, among others, that there existed a prejudicial
question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first
determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB. SMP appealed the resolution of the OCP to the DOJ, which denied the same. Upon
elevation of the case to the CA via Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, SMP submitted the issue of whether or not HLURB Case
presented a prejudicial question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for violation of PD No. 957. CA dismissed SMP’s
petition.

Issue:

Whether the HLURB administrative case for specific performance could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal
complaint for the violation of PD No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.

Held:

YES, an action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question that
must first be determined before the criminal case for violation of Sec. 25 of PD No. 957 could be resolved.

Prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal
case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and
resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected
with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid conflicting decisions.

The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to SMP’s submission that there could be
no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific
performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the
criminal violation of PD No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could
not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original. The determination of
whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the
pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of PD No.
957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case.

Here, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not SMP was legally entitled to demand the
delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former (admin case) must obviously precede that of the latter, for
should the HLURB hold SMP to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to
represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the
violation of Sec. 25 of PD No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.

Hence, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the dismissal of SMP’s criminal complaint for
violation of PD No. 957 for lack of probable cause and for reason of a prejudicial question

Another contention of SMP:

SMP further submits that respondents could not validly raise the prejudicial question as a reason to suspend the criminal proceedings
because respondents had not themselves initiated either the action for specific performance or the criminal action. It contends that the
defense of a prejudicial question arising from the filing of a related case could only be raised by the party who filed or initiated said
related case. The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no distinction as to who is allowed to raise the
defense. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we ought not to distinguish.

CASE#98 People v. Monteverde, 142 SCRA 668

Facts:

Petitioner Aurea A. Monteverde was from 1991 to 1993 the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 124 of Zone 10, District 1, Malaya, Balut,
Tondo, Manila. In that capacity, she received the amount of P44,800.00 from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR). The amount... was spent for lighting, cleanliness and beautification programs of the Barangay. To liquidate the amount, she
submitted a financial statement (Exhibits '1 to 1-A-3') with copies of sales invoices/receipts to PAGCOR.

"Sometime in August 1991, Antonio R. Araza, Jose Salvatierra, Santos L. Lopez, and Narciso Cruz, residents of Brgy. 124, charged
Petitioner and Bella Evangelista, then Barangay Treasurer, with Malversation of the following funds: 1.) P82,500.00 from [the]
Barangay General

Fund; 2.) P44,800.00 from the PAGCOR; and 3.) P600.00 allowance of Kagawad Lito Galinda for the period July 16, to December
1990. The complaints were docketed as OMB-0-91-12694 and OMB-0-92-0643 (Exhs. A, B and C)
Issues:

Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in... finding petitioner guilty of falsification despite its finding that no estafa was committed...
applying the presumption that petitioner was the author of falsification in the absence of any proof that she benefited from it.

Ruling:

The Petition is meritorious.

Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,... complex crime refers to (1) the commission of at least two grave or less grave felonies that
must both (or all) be the result of a single act, or (2) one offense must be a necessary means for... committing the other (or others).

Negatively put, there is no complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are committed, but not by a single act; or (2) committing one
crime is not a necessary means for committing the other (or others).

Using the above guidelines, the acts attributed to petitioner in the present case cannot constitute a complex crime. Specifically, her
alleged actions showing falsification of a public and/or a commercial document were not necessary to commit estafa. Neither were the
two... crimes the result of a single act.

Let us assume that petitioner has correctly been charged with a complex crime, as the SBN supposed. Still, acquittal from a component
offense will not necessarily lead to an acquittal from the other (or others).

When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege in the
information and prove during the trial all the elements of all the offenses constituting the complex crime.

We stress that the failure of the prosecution to prove one of the component crimes and the acquittal arising therefrom will not
necessarily lead to a declaration of innocence for the other crimes. Settled is the rule that when a complex crime is charged and the
evidence fails... to establish one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the others, so long as they are proved.

Principles:

Well-known is the principle that an information "must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for
various offenses."

When more than one offense is charged, the accused may move to quash the information.

when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information, but the accused fail to... object to the defect before trial, the
trial court may convict them of as many offenses as are charged and proven, and impose on them the penalty for each offense, setting
out separately the findings of fact and law in each.

CASE#99: Doromol v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354

Facts:

Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the
Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical,
automotive, mechanical and air conditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the
National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).

An information was then filed by the “Tanodbayan” against Doromal for the said violation and a preliminary investigation was
conducted.

The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the “Tanodbayan” to file the information
without the approval of the Ombudsman.

The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed
to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to
direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the
information filed by the “Tanodbayan”.

A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer,
being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there willfully and unlawfully,
participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and
which company participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National
Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution.

The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid since there had been no preliminary
investigation for the new information that was filed against him.
The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because both old and new
information involve the same subject matter.

Issues:

Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.

Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both information involve the same subject matter.

Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of preliminary investigation.

Held:

Yes, as to the first and second issues. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the Supreme Court.

Ratio:

(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the application to bid shows that he can rightfully be
charged with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution"
because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their
deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any business.

(2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in
that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" provided by the Constitution.

Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that time shall also be considered as void. Due to
that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted.

(3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their
plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be
conducted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand Criminal Case No.
12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the
result of such investigation.

CASE#100 People v. CA, 301 SCRA 475

CASE#101 Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652

Facts:

Accused Hubert Webb et. Al, the prime suspects of the sensational Visconde Rape with Homicide case filed petitions for the issuance of
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with an application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. The DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuño to conduct the
preliminary investigation.During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the following:

(1) the sworn statement dated May 22, 1995 of their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who allegedly saw the
commission of the crime;

(2) the sworn statements of two (2) of the former housemaids of the Webb family in the persons of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila
S. Gaviola;

(3) the sworn-statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who alleged that on March 9, 1991 he was a passenger of United Airlines Flight
No. 808 bound for New York and who expressed doubt on whether petitioner Webb was his co-passenger in the trip;

(4) the sworn statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who narrated the manner of how Biong
investigated and tried to cover up the crime at bar;

(5) the sworn statements of Belen Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids, and the sworn statements of
Normal White, a security guard and Manciano Gatmaitan, an engineer. The autopsy reports of the victims were also submitted
and they showed that Carmela had nine (9) stab wounds, Estrellita twelve (12) and Jennifer nineteen (19). The genital
examination of Carmela confirmed the presence of spermatozoa.
Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for Production and Examination of
Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce the documents he’s asking. The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI
submitted photocopies of the documents. Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the
crime at bar as he went to the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on October 27, 1992.His alibi was
corroborated by Honesto Aragon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and Pamela
Francisco. To further support his defense, he submitted documentary evidence that he bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car.

While in the United States on said dates and that he was issued by the State of California Driver's License No. A8818707 on June 14,
1991. Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated July 25, 1995 of Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal Attache of the US Embassy, citing
certain records tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at San Francisco, California on March 9, 1991 as a passenger in United
Airlines Flight No. 808.

On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and
recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed against petitioners and their co-respondents. Judge Raul de Leon
(J.Escano’s pairing judge) issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of
arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused because Judge Escano inhibited himself to the case. Webb, Lejano and Gatchalian
voluntary surrendered to the police authorities. Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They insist that the
May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak and uncorroborated. They hammer on alleged material
inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They assail her credibility for her misdescription of
petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blonde. They also criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to
clarify the alleged incredulities and inconsistencies in the sworn statements of the witnesses for the NBI.

Issues:

WHETHER OR NOT:

1. l Respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them:
2. l the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of
rape with homicide;
3. l the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and
4. l the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an
accused.

Held:

1. NO. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is
not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.

 Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusions as to the existence of probable cause.
 Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise, judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
 Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law34 repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent
judges should have conducted "searching examination of witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest against them. They also
reject petitioners' contention that a judge must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law
or rule requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.

2. NO. The DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners.

 Petitioners belittle the truthfulness of Alfaro on two (2) grounds: (a) she allegedly erroneously described petitioner Webb's hair
as semi-blond and (b) she committed material inconsistencies in her two (2) sworn statement.
 The DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged misdescription and inconsistencies did not erode the credibility of Alfaro.
 In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that Alfaro was then having reservations when she first executed the first
statement and held back vital information due to her natural reaction of mistrust. This being so, the panel believes that the
inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements have been sufficiently explained especially especially so where there is no
showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth. Consequently, the probative value of Alfaro's
testimony deserves full faith and credit.
 As it has been often noted, ex parte statements are generally incomplete because they are usually executed when the affiant's
state of mind does not give her sufficient and fair opportunity to comprehend the import of her statement and to narrate in full
the incidents which transpired;
 In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has been committed and what is clear before us is that the totality of the
evidence submitted by the complainant indicate a prima facie case that respondents conspired in the perpetration of the
imputed offense.
  The DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v.
United States,31 while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would
justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of
guilt.

3. NO. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were
given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them.

 Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary investigation by appearing in the initial hearing, second hearing, by
filing a "Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents" , "Reply to the compliance and
Comment/Manifestation to the Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence" , "Comment and Manifestation",
"Counter-Affidavit", and a "Motion to Resolve", ETC.
 Moreover, It must also be pointed out that despite the declaration by the DOJ Panel that the preliminary investigation was to
be terminated after the hearing held on July 14, 1995, the panel continued to conduct further proceedings.
 The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence
submitted more fully. This directly disputes the allegation of the petitioners that the resolution was done with indecent haste in
violation of the rights of the petitioners. During the period of twenty-seven (27) days, the petitioners were free to adduce and
present additional evidence before the DOJ Panel.
 This notwithstanding the directive of Section 3(f) Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court that the investigating officer shall
resolve the case within ten (10) days from the termination of the preliminary investigation.
 Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process during the conduct of the preliminary investigation
simply because the DOJ Panel promulgated the adverse resolution and filed the Information in court against them.

4. NO. The non-inclusion of Alfaro is anchored on Republic Act No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing for A Witness Protection, Security
And Benefit Program And For Other Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its Section 10.

 Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section 12 of the said law mandates her non-inclusion in the criminal Complaint
or Information.
 The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 11938 which gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge of an accused to
be a state witness. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is
a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of
crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws
are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The
right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion — the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge,
the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.

CASE#102 Santos v. Orda, G.R. No. 189402, May 6, 2010

Facts:

On April 2, 2001, Francis Orda, the son of respondent Domingo Orda Jr., was shot to death in Paranaque City.

1. Gina Azarcon, an eyewitness in the crime, executed her sworn statement that she saw 3 male persons commit the crime and later
identified two of the assailants as Roily Tonion and Jhunrey Soriano. Thus, an Information for the crime of murder was filed against
Tonion and Soriano and docketed as Criminal Case no. 01-0425

2. Emesto Regala and his son, Dennis Regala, also came out as witnesses. On the day before Francis was shot to death (April 1, 2001),
Ernesto saw petitioner Santos hand a gun to Tonion, saying -Gusto ko malinis ang trabaho at w alang bulilyaso, baka makaligtas na
naman si Orda' For his part, Dennis alleged Tonion asked him to return the gun to Santos a few days after the incident. Santos also
instructed him to monitor the activities of respondent

3. Based on the accounts of Ernesto and Dennis, an Information was filed against Santos and Edna Cortez. Upon further testimony of
Azarcon, the information was amended to include petitioner Robert Bunda

4. Gina, Ernesto and Dennis later recanted their testimonies. In June 2002, DOJ issued a joint resolution directing the city prosecutor
to cause the withdrawal of the Informations filed against the accused on the ground that testimonies of the witnesses were not credible
because of their recantation.

5. On motion of the prosecution, the trial court issued an order allowing the withdrawal of the Information against the accused and
consequently recalling the warrants for their arrest

6. This prompted respondent Orda to elevate the matter to CA. CA nullified the trial court's orders and declared that the that court
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the withdrawal of the information without making an independent evaluation on the
merits of the case
7. Petitioner argues that the that court did not abuse its judicial discretion when it granted the motion of the prosecutor to withdraw the
two information as ordered by DOJ. Petitioner avers that CA erred in relying on the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul since the case involves the
withdrawal of the information and the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence. In contrast, the public prosecutor filed a
motion to withdraw the information and not to dismiss the case for lack of evidence. Moreover, the trial court could not dismiss the case
since the it had yet to acquire complete criminal jurisdiction over the persons of all the accused

8. On the other hand, OSG avers that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the accused, either by their
respective arrests or by the filing of pleadings before the court praying for affirmative relief

Issue:

WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the public prosecutor's motion to withdraw the Information and in
lifting the warrant of arrest against the petitioners on the DOJ's finding that there was no prob able cause for the filing of said
information

Ruling:

if the trial court has failed to make an independent finding of the merits of the case or make an independent evaluation or assessment
of the merits of the case, but merely anchored the dismissal of the case on the revised position of the prosecution,... the trial court has
relinquished the discretion he was duty-bound to exercise because, in effect, it is the prosecution through the Department of Justice
which decides what to do and that the trial court was reduced into a mere rubber stamp

Moreover, public respondent having already issued the warrants of arrest on private respondents which, in effect, means that a probable
cause exists in those criminal cases, it was an error to dismiss those cases without making an independent evaluation. We agree with the
appellate court.

Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before
or after arraignment of the accused. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial... rights of the
accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to due process of law. When the trial court grants a motion of the public
prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in... compliance with the directive of the
Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of
Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.

In resolving a motion to dismiss the case or to withdraw the Information filed by the public prosecutor on his own initiative or pursuant
to the directive of the Secretary of Justice, either for insufficiency of evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or for lack of...
probable cause, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice that
no crime was committed or that the evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of
conviction... of the accused.

Trial court must make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case and the evidence on record of the
prosecution... the trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently
evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine
a prima facie case.

trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or
evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce before the...
court;[46] or any evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.

In this case, the trial court failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of the cases and the evidence on record or in the
possession of the public prosecutor. In granting the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations, the trial court
relied... solely on the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice, as gleaned from its assailed order:

In granting the public prosecutor's motion, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of
Justice.

Worse, as gleaned from the above order, the trial court knew that the Joint Resolution of the Secretary of Justice had not yet become
final and executory because the respondent, the private complainant, had filed a timely motion for the reconsideration thereof which
had not yet... been resolved by the Secretary of Justice. It behooved the trial court to wait for the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
on the motion for reconsideration of the respondent before resolving the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations.
In... fine, the trial court acted with inordinate haste.

Had the trial court bothered to review its records before issuing its assailed order, it would have recalled that aside from the affidavits of
Azarcon, Ernesto and Dennis, there was also the affidavit of Frias implicating the petitioner and the other accused to the killing of

Francis and that it even gave credence to the testimony and affidavit of Azarcon when it denied Tonion and Soriano's petition for bail.
Moreover, the trial court found probable cause against the petitioner and issued a warrant for her arrest despite the pendency of her...
petition for review in the Department of Justice, only to make a complete volte face because of the Joint Resolution.
The bare fact that the trial court had issued warrants of arrest against Santos, Cortez, the Castillo brothers, and Bunda, who were the
petitioners in the Department of Justice, did not warrant an outright grant of the public prosecutor's motion to withdraw the
Informations. The court had already acquired jurisdiction over the cases when the Informations were filed; hence, it had jurisdiction to
resolve the motion of the public prosecutor, one way or the other, on its merits petition is DENIED DUE COURSE

CASE#103 Manibo v. Acosta – G.R. No. 16955, 2009

Facts:

On May 4, 2000, at 6:30 p.m. at Barangay San Mariano, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, Bernadette M. Dimatulac, the victim, and Flordeliza V.
Bagasan were seated beside each other on a papag watching television inside the church of the Kaibigan Foundation, Inc. Suddenly, a
man later identified as SPO1 Roel Acosta (respondent Acosta), with an unidentified male companion, both with short firearms, entered
the church premises. Respondent Acosta approached the victim and Bagasan and, at an arm's length distance, respondent Acosta shot
the victim several times on the head and body causing her instantaneous death.

 Nieva Manebo, sister of the victim, filed a complaint for murder against Acosta and Sapiandante before the Special Action Unit
(SAU) of the NBI
 SAU recommended filing a muder case against respondents and a certain John Doe with the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor (OCSP), Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary investigation
 Respondents filed with DOJ a counter-charge of perjury offering false witness and violation of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1829 against Manebo, Bagasan, and Sardia.
 Respondents denied accusations against them
 On January 22, 2001, State Prosecutor Melvin J. Abad issued a Joint Resolution, approved by the Chief State Prosecutor and
on the same day, an Information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Cabanatuan City against
respondents and a certain John Doe.
 Respondents filed their motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution[8] dated March 2, 2001.
 On March 23, 2001, respondents filed their appeal with the DOJ Secretary.
 On June 27, 2003, the DOJ Secretary issued his Resolution[10] reversing the appealed resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution is hereby REVERSED. The Chief State Prosecutor is directed to move for the
withdrawal of the information filed against respondents and to report the action taken hereon within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof

In so ruling DOJ said:

All told, the evidence against respondents Acosta and Sapiandante lack the required quantum of proof sufficient to
indict them for the offense charged.

Pursuant to the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw the Information.

 Petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President (OP), which was dismissed. The OP found that the findings of fact
and conclusions of law of the DOJ Secretary to be amply supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by OP.
 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 43 with the CA, which rendered the assailed Decision dismissing
the petition for lack of merit.
The CA said that the OP committed no error in affirming the resolution of the DOJ Secretary; that courts will not interfere in
the conduct of preliminary investigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor a sufficient latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against the
offender. The CA found that all was not lost for petitioner, since the denial of her petition did not mean an automatic dismissal
of the information following the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, as the RTC was mandated to independently evaluate the
merits of the case; and it may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the DOJ Secretary, since reliance on the latter
alone would be an abdication of the RTC's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Justice committed grave errors in the
appreciation of facts and of laws in recommending the dismissal of the complaint based solely on the matters, which are best,
determined during a full-blown trial.

Whether or not the Secretary of Justice may disregard the provisions of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which became
effective on September 1, 2000, particularly Sections 5 and 6.

Whether or not there is probable cause to charge the respondents for the crime of murder.

Ruling:

For the second issue;

 Section 5. Contents of the Petition.

If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, a copy of the motion to defer proceedings filed in
court must also accompany the petition.

Section 6. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. - The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall constitute sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

Respondents filed their petition for review with the DOJ Secretary on March 23, 2001. On August 20, 2001, they filed with the RTC of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, a Motion to Suspend Proceedings pending a final determination of the merits of their petition by the DOJ
Secretary. On August 27, 2001, respondents filed with the DOJ a document captioned as Compliance where they submitted the motion
to suspend proceedings filed in the RTC. Notably, the motion to suspend proceedings was only filed with the RTC after respondents had
already filed their petition for review with the DOJ which explains why the petition was not accompanied by a motion to suspend
proceedings. Notably, immediately after the motion to suspend proceeding was filed with the RTC, respondents submitted a copy of
such motion with the DOJ. Under the circumstances, we hold that there was substantial compliance with the requirements
under Section 5 of Department Circular No.70.

The first and third issues refer to the question of whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the Office of the President, which
adopted the finding of the DOJ Secretary that there was no probable cause to indict respondents for murder.

In this case, we find that the DOJ committed a manifest error in finding no probable cause to charge respondents with
the crime of murder.

In reversing the findings of the prosecutor, the DOJ Secretary found that the police report prepared after the killing incident stated that
the person seated beside the victim, who was watching television when shot, was Liza Gragasan. However, the DOJ Secretary continued
that more than four months after the incident, a witness appeared in the person of Flordeliza Bagasan who claimed to be seated beside,
and witnessed the actual shooting of, the victim. The DOJ Secretary found Flordeliza's description of respondent Acosta different from
the latter's physical attributes. He then ruled that Flordeliza's delayed testimony, coupled with her erroneous description of respondent
Acosta, cast a cloud of doubt on her credibility.

The DOJ Secretary also did not give credence to witness Sardia's testimony on respondent Sapiandante's participation in the incident.
He found that Sardia was not among those mentioned in the police report, and that his testimony was likewise belatedly executed
without any reason given for such delay; that fear could not have been Sardia's reason, since in June 1998, he had already filed a
complaint for attempted murder against respondent Sapiandante, which was later dismissed; and that Sardia did not witness the actual
shooting of the victim.

We are not persuaded.

While the initial police report stated that the name of the person who was seated beside the victim when the latter was shot was Liza
Gragasan, such report would not conclusively establish that Liza Gragasan could not have been Flordeliza Bagasan, the
witness who executed an affidavit four months after the incident. Notably, Flordeliza's nickname is Liza, and her surname Bagasan
sounds similar to Gragasan. Under the rule of idem sonans, two names are said to be "idem sonantes" if the attentive ear finds
difficulty in distinguishing them when pronounced. The question whether a name sounds the same as another is not one of
spelling but of pronunciation. While the surname Bagasan was incorrectly written as Gragasan, when read, it has a sound similar
to the surname Bagasan. Thus, the presence of Bagasan at the crime scene was established, contrary to the conclusion arrived at by the
DOJ Secretary.

The execution of Bagasan's affidavit four months after the incident should not be taken against her, as such reaction is within the
bounds of expected human behavior. Notably, the police report stated that during the conduct of the investigation, Bagasan was
shocked after the incident and could not possibly be interviewed. Initial reluctance to volunteer information regarding a crime due to
fear of reprisal is common enough that it has been judicially declared as not affecting a witness' credibility. Bagasan's action revealed a
spontaneous and natural reaction of a person who had yet to fully comprehend a shocking and traumatic event. Besides, the workings of
the human mind are unpredictable. People react differently to emotional stress. There is simply no standard form of behavioral
response that can be expected from anyone when confronted with a strange, startling or frightful occurrence.

Moreover, a witness' delay in reporting what she knows about a crime does not render her testimony false or
incredible, for the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case.

The DOJ Secretary's finding that the description given by Bagasan did not fit the physical attributes of respondent Acosta is not
persuasive, since Bagasan was able to positively identify respondent Acosta. She did so when a cartographic sketch of respondent Acosta
was shown to her and later when she was asked to identify him from among the three pictures of men shown to her during the
investigation at the NBI. Notably, there was nothing in the records that showed that Bagasan was impelled by any improper motive in
pointing to respondent Acosta.

The identification made by Bagasan, with respect to respondent Acosta was corroborated by another witness, Sardia, who saw Acosta
with another unidentified male companion rushing out of the chapel where the killing incident took place. Sardia was familiar with the
face of respondent Acosta, since the latter was a witness in a case of frustrated murder against Sapiandante. Although Sapiandante
denied in his counter-affidavit that respondent Acosta ever became such witness, this allegation should be proven during the trial of the
case. Sardia was also able to positively identify Sapiandante as the driver of the get-away vehicle.sss

The DOJ Secretary did not also find the statements given by Sardia as credible, as the latter was not among those mentioned as a
witness in the police report.

We do not agree.

The failure of the police report to mention Sardia's name as a witness would not detract from the fact that he saw respondent Acosta
with an unidentified man running away from the chapel and riding the waiting get- away vehicle driven by Sapiandante. Entries in a
police blotter, though regularly done in the course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such
entries and should not be given undue significance or probative value for they are usually incomplete and inaccurate.[38]

The matter of assigning value to the declaration of a witness is best done by the trial court, which can assess such testimony in the light
of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witness at the trial stage.

Finally, we also do not agree with the DOJ Secretary's finding that since Sardia's affidavit was also belatedly executed, the same is not
credible. As we have said, witnesses are usually reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case or are unwilling to be involved
in or dragged into criminal investigations due to a variety of valid reasons. Fear of reprisal and the natural reluctance of a witness to get
involved in a criminal case are sufficient explanations for a witness' delay in reporting a crime to authorities. The DOJ ruling -- that fear
could not have been the reason, because as early as 1998 Sardia had already filed a complaint for attempted murder against
Sapiandante, which was already dismissed -- is merely speculative.

We need not over-emphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable
cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. Considering the foregoing, we find that the CA erred in affirming the DOJ's finding of
the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for murder.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 83300 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Secretary of Justice is hereby ORDERED to direct the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila to withdraw the Motion to Withdraw the Information for Murder already filed in the trial court.

CASE#104 Solado Law Offices v. CA, G.R. No. 219914, 2016

Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices vs. The Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 216914. December 6, 2016

Facts:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A
No. 9160, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended, specifically the Anti-Money Laundering Council's authority to file with the
Court of Appeals (CA) in this case, an ex-parte application for inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments, including related
accounts based on probable cause.

In 2015, a year before the 2016 presidential elections, reports abounded on the supposed disproportionate wealth of then Vice President
Jejomar Binay and the rest of his family, some of whom were likewise elected public officers. The Office of the Ombudsman and the
Senate conducted investigations and inquiries thereon.

From various news reports announcing the inquiry into then Vice President Binay's bank accounts, including accounts of members of
his family, petitioner Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm (SPCMB) was most concerned with the article published in
the Manila Times on 25 February 2015 entitled "Inspect Binay Bank Accounts" which read, in pertinent part:

xxx The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the Court of Appeals (CA) to allow the [C]ouncil to peek into
the bank accounts of the Binays, their corporations, and a law office where a family member was once a partner.

xx xx
Also the bank accounts of the law office linked to the family, the Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm,
where the Vice President's daughter Abigail was a former partner.

By 8 March 2015, the Manila Times published another article entitled, "CA orders probe of Binay 's assets" reporting that the appellate
court had issued a Resolution granting the ex-parte application of the AMLC to examine the bank accounts of SPCMB. Forestalled in the
CA thus alleging that it had no ordinary, plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to protect its rights and interests in the purported ongoing
unconstitutional examination of its bank accounts by public respondent Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), SPCMB undertook
direct resort to this Court via this petition for certiorari and prohibition on the following grounds that the he Anti-Money Laundering
Act is unconstitutional insofar as it allows the examination of a bank account without any notice to the affected party: (1) It violates the
person's right to due process; and (2) It violates the person's right to privacy.

Issues:
Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates substantial due process.

Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates procedural due process.

Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 is violative of the constitutional right to privacy enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution.

Rulings:

1. No. We do not subscribe to SPCMB' s position. Succinctly, Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex-parte application and inquiry by
the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive due process, there being no physical seizure of
property involved at that stage.

In fact, .Eugenio delineates a bank inquiry order under Section 11 from a freeze order under Section 10 on both remedies' effect on the
direct objects, i.e. the bank deposits and investments:

On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical seizure of property of the account
holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or
non-bank financial institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not
seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder's record of deposits and transactions.
Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the records to be inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically seized or
hidden by the account holder. Said records are in the possession of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of the
account holder alone as that would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank.

At the stage in which the petition was filed before us, the inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments by the AMLC still does not
contemplate any form of physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property.

2. No. The AMLC functions solely as an investigative body in the instances mentioned in Rule 5.b.26 Thereafter, the next step is for the
AMLC to file a Complaint with either the DOJ or the Ombudsman pursuant to Rule 6b. Even in the case of Estrada v. Office of the
Ombudsman, where the conflict arose at the preliminary investigation stage by the Ombudsman, we ruled that the Ombudsman's denial
of Senator Estrada's Request to be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents did not violate Estrada's
constitutional right to due process where the sole issue is the existence of probable cause for the purpose of determining whether an
information should be filed and does not prevent Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents during
the pre-trial or even during trial.

Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its determination of possible money laundering offenses,
specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it into an investigative body exercising
quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to violate SPCMB's
constitutional right to due process.

3. No. We now come to a determination of whether Section 11 is violative of the constitutional right to privacy enshrined in Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution. SPCMB is adamant that the CA's denial of its request to be furnished copies of AMLC's ex-parte
application for a bank inquiry order and all subsequent pleadings, documents and orders filed and issued in relation thereto, constitutes
grave abuse of discretion where the purported blanket authority under Section 11: ( 1) partakes of a general warrant intended to aid a
mere fishing expedition; (2) violates the attorney-client privilege; (3) is not preceded by predicate crime charging SPCMB of a money
laundering offense; and ( 4) is a form of political harassment [of SPCMB' s] clientele.

We thus subjected Section 11 of the AMLA to heightened scrutiny and found nothing arbitrary in the allowance and authorization to
AMLC to undertake an inquiry into certain bank accounts or deposits. Instead, we found that it provides safeguards before a bank
inquiry order is issued, ensuring adherence to the general state policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine
bank accounts:

The AMLC is required to establish probable cause as basis for its ex-parte application for bank inquiry order;

The CA, independent of the AMLC's demonstration of probable cause, itself makes a finding of probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to an unlawful activity under Section 3(i) or a money laundering offense under Section 4 of the AMLA;

A bank inquiry court order ex-parte for related accounts is preceded by a bank inquiry court order ex-parte for the principal account
which court order ex-parte for related accounts is separately based on probable cause that such related account is materially linked to
the principal account inquired into; and

The authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal account and the related accounts shall comply with the requirements of
Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution. The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and examination into the bank account are
not undertaken whimsically and solely based on the investigative discretion of the AMLC. In particular, the requirement of
demonstration by the AMLC, and determination by the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the limits of such governmental action. We
will revert to these safeguards under Section 11 as we specifically discuss the CA' s denial of SPCMB' s letter request for information
concerning the purported issuance of a bank inquiry order involving its accounts.
All told, we affirm the constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing the ex-parte application by the AMLC for authority to inquire
into, and examine, certain bank deposits and investments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, is declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

CASE#105 Estrada v. Ombudsman – G.R. No. 212140, 2015

Facts:

Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for plunder, among
others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013
and 14 March 2014.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents,
Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a
respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman).”

The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case.

Issue:

WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law

Held:

NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.

First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents.

The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative
Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, for ready reference.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to due
process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a
preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section
3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the
Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order
to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have been secured, the investigating
officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to
submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted
by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-
respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No
grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen.
Estrada’s Request.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and
“probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not
a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to
those granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt
thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of
petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts
obtaining therein.

Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a
strict application of the evidentiary rules.
Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in administrative proceedings as laid down in the
landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence
needed in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant
the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than
‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of
probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of
proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary,
and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are
finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence.
Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis
can include hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change
the quantum of evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial
evidence of guilt.

Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the counter-affidavits of some of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint
Order, the Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted Sen.
Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The
Ombudsman faithfully complied with the existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond
what the Rules required. Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to preliminary
investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations
without running afoul of the constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present
procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply and were never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS.
Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed
by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a decision against
the respondent in the administrative case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause. The
respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such rights.

Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer must be impartial and cannot be the
fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the
investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and hearing officer may be under the control and
supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS,
does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental
and essential requirements in preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary investigations invalid for violation
of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout the
country. No preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public officer, outside of the prosecution service, to
determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final judgment would have to be released from prison because their
conviction violated constitutional due process.

Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes forum shopping.

CASE#106 George Miller v. Sec. Hernando B. Perez - May 30, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner George Miller is a British national and an inmate at the Maximum Security Compound of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) in
Muntinlupa City. He wrote two confidential letters addressed to NBP Superintendent Col. Gregorio Agalo-os which contain a report on
alleged irregularities and drug activities of respondent Bernardino and Rodolfo Bernardo (Bernardo). On January 6, 1999, at around
2:00 p.m, Miller was stabbed at back of his head. An investigation was thereafter conducted. In the course of the investigation, Quirante
and Ceballos admitted their participation in the attack on petitioner. PGIII Lopez recommended that Quirante and Ceballos be charged
with Frustrated Murder and the case be placed under further investigation "pending the establishment of sufficient evidence to indict
inmates Rodolfo Bernardo, Giovan Bernardino and Ace Aprid. Prosecutor Antonio V. Padilla issued his resolution finding the evidence
sufficient to charge Quirante with attempted murder while dismissing the case against Ceballos for insufficiency of evidence. Thereafter,
an information attempted murder was filed against Quirante.

On December 2, 1999 Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo executed new affidavits which contained a more detail of the incident and pointed
to Bernardo and Aprid allegedly planned the killing of petitioner together with Toledo. Prosecutor Leopoldo Macinas issued his
Memorandum addressed to the City Prosecutor finding probable cause against Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo in conspiracy with
Bernardino, Aprid and Bernardo, for the crime of attempted murder. Consequently, an Amended Information was filed with the RTC.

Bernardino filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) arguing that there was no sufficient evidence presented to
support a claim of conspiracy, which was based merely on conflicting testimonies or affidavits in a language foreign to the affiants.
Petitioner filed his opposition, alleging that contrary to the claim of Bernardino, the Bureau's investigation was far from complete as the
Report of PGIII Lopez itself stated that the case is recommended for further investigation "pending the establishment of sufficient
evidence to indict inmates Rodolfo Bernardo, Giovan Bernardino and Ace Aprid". Public respondent, then Secretary of Justice
Hernando B. Perez, issued his Resolution finding merit in the petition. According to Secretary Perez, the new affidavits of Quirante,
Ceballos and Toledo are not credible considering "the length of time they were executed since the commission of the crime" and also
because said documents cannot be considered newly discovered evidence. Motion to Admit Second Amended Information, which
dropped the name of respondent Bernardino as one of the accused, was filed in court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied under Resolution. On appeal, CA rendered its Decision sustaining the ruling of the Secretary of Justice, finding no
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the questioned resolutions. Hence this case.

Issue:

Whether CA erred in sustaining the ruling of secretary Peres for exclusion of Bernardino in the information of attempted murder as
accused.

Ruling:

Yes. In a preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence is not required, but only such as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Certainly, it does
not involve the determination of whether or not there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to the guilt of the person. Only
prima fade evidence is required; or that which is, on its face, good and sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts
constituting the party's claim or defense; and which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. Therefore, matters of
evidence, such as who are the conspirators, are more appropriately presented and heard during the trial. The term "probable cause"
does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus,
a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough
that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of
evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. While it is this Court's general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, leaving the investigating officers’ sufficient discretion to determine probable cause, courts are nevertheless empowered
to substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice when the same was rendered without or in excess of authority. Where
the Secretary of Justice dismissed the complaint against the respondent despite sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable
cause, such clearly constitutes grave error, thus warranting a reversal. The CA thus clearly erred in sustaining the ruling of Secretary
Perez for the exclusion of respondent Bernardino from the charge of attempted murder despite a prima facie case against him having
been established by the evidence on record

CASE#107 Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 161602, July 13, 2010

Facts:

On March 6, 1996 respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an action for the forfeiture of alleged unlawfully acquired
property with the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case 0167 against petitioner Alfredo T. Romualdez and his wife Agnes Sison Romualdez as
well as against Romson Realty, Inc., R & S Transport, Inc., Fidelity Management, Inc., and Dio Island Resort, Inc. (collectively, the
Romualdezes) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) 1379.[1]

On January 16, 2000 the Romualdezes filed a motion to dismiss the action on grounds of a) violation of their right to a speedy
disposition of their case; b) lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the action; c) prematurity; d) prescription; and e) litis
pendentia. On September 11, 2002 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion. It also denied on March 10, 2003 their subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

On March 31, 2003 the Romualdezes next filed a motion for preliminary investigation and to suspend proceedings.[2] They claim that
since Civil Case 0167 was a forfeiture proceeding filed under R.A. 1379, the Ombudsman should have first conducted a "previous inquiry
similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases" before the filing of the case pursuant to Section 2 of the law.[3]

In its Comment[4]on the motion, the Republic pointed out that the Office of the Ombudsman in fact conducted such a preliminary
investigation in 1991 in OMB-0-91-0820[5] and issued on January 22, 1992 a resolution, recommending the endorsement of the matter
to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for the filing of the forfeiture case.

On August 13, 2003 the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution,[6] denying the Romualdezes' March 31, 2003 motion. It also denied by
resolution on December 3, 2003 their subsequent motion for reconsideration.[7] Thus, the Romualdezes filed the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul the Sandiganbayan's rulings and prevent it from further proceeding with Civil Case 0167
until another preliminary investigation is conducted in their case.

Issue:
The sole question presented in this case is whether or not the preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman conducted in OMB-0-91-
0820 in 1991 satisfied the requirement of the law in forfeiture cases.

Ruling:

The Romualdezes point out that the Office of the Ombudsman should not have conducted an investigation of their case, since its
authority to investigate ill-gotten or unexplained wealth cases pertained only to wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and not before
that date.[8] Since the Romualdezes acquired the allegedly ill-gotten wealth involved in their case as early as 1970, then the
Ombudsman had no authority to conduct the investigation that it did in OMB-0-91-0820. In the absence of a prior valid preliminary
investigation, the forfeiture proceedings in Civil Case 0167 cannot continue.

In addition, the Romualdezes insist that it was improper for the Ombudsman to have conducted its investigation in their absence. The
spouses Alfredo and Agnes Romualdez were in the United States when that investigation took place. They were thus denied their right
to be heard in that investigation.

But, as the Sandiganbayan correctly pointed out, quoting Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[9] the Ombudsman has under its general
investigatory powers the authority to investigate forfeiture cases where the alleged ill-gotten wealth had been amassed before February
25, 1986. Thus:

Nonetheless, while we do not discount the authority of the Ombudsman, we believe and so hold that the exercise of his
correlative powers to both investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth is
restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth which were amassed after February 25, 1986.
Prior to said date, the Ombudsman is without authority to initiate such forfeiture proceedings. We, however, uphold his
authority to investigate cases for the forfeiture or recovery of such ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed even before
the aforementioned date, pursuant to his general investigatory power under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770.[10]
(Emphasis supplied)

And, although it was the Ombudsman who conducted the preliminary investigation, it was the OSG that instituted the action in Civil
Case 0167 in line with the Court's ruling in the above-cited Republic and other cases that followed.

The Court cannot also subscribe to the Romualdezes' claim that they are entitled to a new preliminary investigation since they had no
opportunity to take part in the one held in 1991, in OMB-0-91-0820. They admit that the subpoena for that investigation had been sent
to their last known residence at the time it was conducted.[11] The Republic categorically insists that the appropriate subpoena had
been served on the Romualdezes.[12]

Actually, the lament of the spouses was that they left the Philippines because of danger to their lives after the EDSA revolution of
February 1986 and so could not take part in the proceedings against them. While it is true that the Court characterized the departure of
the Romualdezes as forced upon them by the uncertainty of the situation in 1986, it also said that such was the case only until things
shall have stabilized.[13] The Court will take judicial notice of the fact that the people's ratification of the 1987 Constitution on February
2, 1987 signaled the return to normalcy of the political situation in the Philippines. Consequently, the Romualdezes had no valid excuse
for not responding to the subpoena served on them at their last known address in 1991, which they do not deny having received.

The Ombudsman could not be faulted for proceeding with the investigation of the Romualdezes' cases when they did not show up
despite notice being sent to them at their last known residence. As the Court held in a case:

The New Rules on Criminal Procedure "does not require as a condition sine qua non to the validity of the proceedings [in the
preliminary investigation] the presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach him were made, and an opportunity to
controvert the evidence of the complainant is accorded him. The obvious purpose of the rule is to block attempts of
unscrupulous respondents to thwart the prosecution of offenses by hiding themselves or by employing dilatory tactics."[14]

In sum, no reason exists for suspending or interrupting the conduct of the forfeiture proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

CASE#108 Tamargo v. Awingan. G.R. No. 177727, Jan. 19. 2010

Facts:

Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his 8-year-old daughter were shot and killed in 2003. The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the
crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit wherein, he stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him
during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed
Atty. Tamargo. Columna was arrested.

On March 8, 2004, Columna executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as “lookout” during the shooting and
implicated Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son,
Lloyd Antiporda, ex-mayor and mayor, respectively, of Buguey, Cagayan.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated by
Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor.

During the preliminary investigation, Licerio presented Columna’s handwritten letter wherein the latter disowned the contents of his
earlier affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. Licerio also submitted an affidavit
of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter. The investigating
prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing so that Columna could clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During
the hearing, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. Thus, the investigating
prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges.

In another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor, however, Columna said that he wasonly forced to withdraw all his
statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail. The RTC judge denied
the motion to withdraw the information and held that based on the March 8, 2004 affidavit which Columna affirmed before the
investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. CA reversed the decision. Tamargo appealed. Petitioner
argues that, based on the independent assessment of the Judge Daguna, there was probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of
Columna. Awingan and the Antiporda’s, on the other hand, contend that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible
against them because of the rule on res inter alios acta.

Issue:

Whether or not the admission of Columna is admissible against Awingan and the Antipordas

Held:

Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view
of the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given
in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial
confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a)
the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b)the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has
been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-
conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the
alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could
corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no
probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.