SAINT ANTHONY MARY CLARET COLLEGE

Axiel M. Engracial

Claretian

“Spinoza’s Distinction of Attributes and Modes”

I. Introduction

How does Attributes distinct on Modes? How the Substance does connect with Attributes and
Modes? Spinoza claims that (1) there is only one substance; (2) this substance has many has infinitely
many attributes; (3) this substance is God or nature; (4) each of these attributes express the divine
essence; and (5) all else is a mode of the one substance.  These claims have so astonished many of his
readers that some of them have surely concluded that they must not know what Spinoza means by
“substance”, “attribute,” and “mode.” Attributes are at the very heart of Spinoza's metaphysics. They
enable us to understand and talk about an extended world and a thinking world in terms of which we
understand bodies and minds. Furthermore, it is due to the relation of attributes to one another and to
the one substance that an elegant resolution to the Cartesian mind–body problem is possible. It is
Modes that we humans can perceive and classify with our Senses and Imagination, and these
classifications give rise to our concepts of Quantity, Measure, and Time. When it comes to measuring
(is it size or weight or time or whatever), Spinoza says that such divisions are “nothing other than
modes of thinking, or rather modes of imagining.” Dividing, counting, measuring– these are just ways
in which we experience our world.
These Attributes and Modes are the great parts on the Substance for without these two,
nothing can grasp reality it only for Spinoza through Conceptual Connection because all of these
participate on Substance (God) and God is everything we are all part of God and every one of us has
the part of God which can describe that we belong to this world and we participate with God. Does
the Attributes and Modes distinct with each other? Or maybe they also related to each other in what
way? The researcher will be an Spinozistic in order to have a deeper understanding of Spinoza
because the researcher believe that Spinoza is one of the powerful philosopher because of the beauty
of his mind that no one can go beyond and so the researcher will have an Spinozistic mind in order to
have a profound understanding on Attributes and Modes.

II. Commentaries

Substance, Attribute, and Mode in Spinoza

In 1d4, Spinoza defines an attribute as “that which the intellect perceives

as constituting the essence of a substance.” There are many serious
interpretative issues surrounding Spinoza understands of the attributes. In
this article I shall focus on the question of what if anything distinguishes
an attribute from a substance. There is considerable textual evidence that
 suggests that attributes inhere in and are conceived through themselves.
Given Spinoza’s definition of substance as that which is in and
conceived through itself, this would appear to entail that every attribute
is a substance. Many commentators (e.g., Curley 16–18, Gueroult 48,
Loeb 160–6) have accordingly concluded that attributes are substances
and God is the substance that is composed of all substances constituted
by single attributes. If this were correct, we could see Spinoza as a
bundle theorist about substance. Every substance, on this interpretation,
would be a bundle of attributes and every individual attribute would be a
bundle with a single element and hence a substance. Call this the
substantival interpretation of Spinozistic attributes.1

Ethics (1677)

To this we might add that Spinoza also claims to show in Part I that
infinitely many modes follow from the necessity of the divine nature.
Some of these modes follow from God’s absolute nature – that is, follow
from God’s nature unconditionally – and hence are themselves infinite
and eternal. Other things – particular, finite things – express God’s
attributes in a determinate way, and do not follow from God’s absolute
nature, but from one of God’s attributes insofar as it is modified by
another modification which is also finite. So each finite mode has as part
of its causal history an infinite series of other prior, particular, finite
things. Spinoza is often referred to as a pantheist, a term usually taken to
mean that God is identical with nature, understood as the totality of
things. But Spinoza identifies God with nature only in the sense that he
identifies God with His attributes, those eternal elements in nature which
exist in themselves and are conceived through themselves. When
Spinoza identifies God with Nature, it is with what he calls Natura
naturans (active or productive nature). The modes which follow from
and express God’s attributes he calls Natura naturata (passive or
produced nature) (Ethics I, Prop. 29, Schol.). They are not God. Their
defining properties are logically opposed to God’s: they exist in another,
through which they are conceived. Nor are they a part of God, since it is
incompatible with God’s nature to have parts (Ethics I, Prop. 29, Schol.).
Because everything which exists is either an attribute, whose
existence is absolutely necessary, or a mode, and because all modes
either follow from God unconditionally or else are necessary in relation
to other modes of God, Spinoza concludes that there is nothing

1
Martin Lin, Philosophy Compass 1/2 (2006): 144–153, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00015.x, University of Toronto
http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Courses/Spinoza/Texts/j.1747-9991.2006.00015.pdf (accessed May 18,
2017)
 contingent in nature. All things are determined by the necessity of the
divine nature to exist and act as they do. God could not have produced
them in any other way than He did.2
The Guéroult-Loeb Interpretation

In support of (i), Loeb cites two passages from part one: “God is
eternal, that is, all the attributes of God are eternal” (Proposition 19) and
“God is immutable; that is, all the attributes of God are immutable”
(Proposition 20C2). God is immutable insofar as he has immutable
attributes, and God is eternal insofar as his attributes are eternal. These
suggest that God consists of and is understood in terms of the totality of
his attributes. Each of the infinitely many attributes that God possesses
individually contributes to God’s total nature. So, because the set of
attributes God possesses are of some nature, God is of some nature. In
support of (ii), Loeb turns to Spinoza’s written correspondences. In a
letter Spinoza wrote to Henry Oldenburg he states, “by attribute I mean
everything that is conceived in itself and through itself, so that its
conception does not involve any other thing” (“Oldenburg” 253). And in
a letter to Simon de Vries he writes: “By substance I understand that
which is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, whose
conception does not involve the conception of some other thing. I
understand the same by attribute, except that it is called attribute in
respect to the intellect, which attributes to substance a certain specific
kind of nature. This definition, I repeat, explains clearly what I mean by
substance or attribute.” (“De Vries” 262) It is clear from the above
passage that Spinoza gives the same definition for both attribute and
substance, and this same definition of substance makes its way into the
Ethics (Definition 3).3 So, if attributes are given the same definition as
substances, then attributes are substances. If each attribute is distinct
from another attribute and there are infinitely many of them, then there
are infinitely many distinct substances. Extension is just as much an
independent substance as thought, and since God consists of infinitely
many attributes, God consists of infinitely many substances. God,
therefore, must be a compound substance made up of infinitely many
constituent substances. With this understanding, we can appreciate
Kulstad’s use of the interpretation in his argument. 3

2
Edwin Curley, Spinoza, Benedict (Baruch) de 1632-1677
http://caute.ru/spinoza/aln/curley.htm (accessed May 19, 2017)
3
Taylor-Grey Miller, Spinoza’s Monism: A Critique of the Guéroult-Loeb Interpretation, Aporia vol. 25 no. 1—2015
http://aporia.byu.edu/pdfs/miller-spinoza_monism.pdf (accessed May 19, 2017)
 III. Assessment

(Martin Lin)

If the commentators have concluded that attributes are just substances then it would be a
contradiction to Spinoza’s monism doctrine that there is only one substance which is God. It is true that
God exist and God has infinitely attributes but it does not denote that attributes are substances; attributes
only participate to the substance. Everything has its own way these attributes has its own way of carrying
itself in the world it is not necessarily equal to substance for substance is only one and there can be other
substances except God. I can say that Spinoza has a powerful mind it is because he made a conceptual
connection that would grasp the reality. Attributes cannot be substances even if the inhere in and are
conceived through themselves they are part of the reality in which we can grasp by the conceptual
connection of Spinoza. Attributes are not objects they are possessions by the substance but it has its own
way. For me, attributes are perfect because of the participation to substance which is God. God is perfect
in such way that he gives us freedom/options it is how we act or understand attributes but from the
possession itself of substance to attributes it is already perfect and if it is perfect it gives hope that
attributes participate not only to substance but to us and to know and grasp reality. The more Attributes I
attribute to an entity, the more existence I am bound to attribute it.

(Edwin Curley)

It is true that modes are finite and they express God’s attributes but to say that modes do not follow
from God’s absolute nature I think it is wrong For me they do follow, modes are finite but it has an
important part in God’s nature for it determined God and what if modes would not participate on Nature
or they are not part of it then, Spinoza’s Ethics would be weak. Another thing, it is stated that modes are
not God and denying that it is part of God’s nature or it is incompatible to God’s nature. I would disagree
for this and I would fight for this because first of all knowing that attributes and modes are being part of
nature, both contributes to determine God and they come from God hence, if they came from God would
God create or make attributes and modes that would not be incompatible to his nature? I mean, using our
common sense a person would not make something if it is not compatible to his nature. God has attributes
and modes because it matters to him. Considering that Spinoza is a pantheist meaning God for him is
everything. The blackboard is God, I am now holding a mouse who is God, the pen is God. Meaning,
everything is God things that are existing in this world is God it is because they all participate on God’s
nature, we all participate on God’s nature therefore, mode is God because they participate and belong to
God although they are possess by God but because they participate to God they are God.

(Taylor-Grey Miller)

God really possesses not some of the nature but God possesses all in the nature including attributes
and modes. On the Guéroult-Loeb model, attributes and substances are equivalent. So, if God’s attributes
are produced by the attributes of its constituent substances, God as a substance is produced by other
substances. This, however, contradicts the Proposition 6 which states that “one substance cannot be
produced by another substance.” If this relationship cannot obtain between substances, God cannot be a
compound, for “if God were composed of parts, the parts would have to be at least prior in nature to God,
which is absurd.” Therefore, God must be a completely simple being. And also attributes has a great
contribution to the nature for it defines God. Again, attributes are not equivalent to substance for there is
only one substance and that is God. So, if attributes are equal to substance meaning it contradicts again to
Spinoza’s monism that there is only one Substance which is God. Attributes are parts of nature, they
participate to God but they are not substance themselves.

IV. Conclusion

The attributes really exist and distinct. Indeed are distinct ways in modes are conceived and they
are distinct ways in which the essence of God is conceived. Many would confused about the attributes
that it is equivalent to substance but they are all wrong for substance is only one likewise, modes
sometimes considered weak because they are finite and as if they do not have part on Spinoza’s
Ethics but the distinction of these attributes and modes does not pertain that they are distinct therefore
they would not agree with =each other in some way that would contradict Spinoza rather they play a
big part because attributes and modes participate on Go’s nature which determined God and prove
that God exists. Spinoza has a powerful mind which I admire him most because of his philosophy
especially on attributes and modes. He also said that everything has its own way. I understood it as
attributes has its own way of participating to God’s nature as well as the mode. Everything meaning, I
myself have my own way, the mind, the tree has its own way of participation on God’s nature.
However, attributes and modes does not just distinct with each other, many researches failed to see
that these attributes and modes are also related to each other for attributes has a possession of modes
and modes has its own as well but they are both related and connected to substance. It will go back to
where it came from God.

This distinction made the ethics of Spinoza stronger because imagine Spinoza’s ethics without
these two that attributes is infinite who is connected to substance and modes who as well participated
on God or substance then Spinoza’s ethics will be weak and would be nothing. Their distinction does
not tell that our capacity of knowing the world or reality will be difficult to understand rather Spinoza
made a powerful framework which is the conceptual connection that would have an easy way for us
to understand or grasp the reality therefore, attributes and modes that makes us easy to grasp reality
by Spinoza’s Conceptual Connection.