G.R. No.
L-49084 October 10, 1985
MATILDE ALAVADO in her own right and as natural guardian of IDA VILMA,
IMELDA AND ROLANDO, all surnamed ALAVADO petitioner,
vs.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF TACLOBAN (ENGINEER'S OFFICE AND
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, now the LABOR APPEALS
AND REVIEW STAFF), respondents.
Bonifacio L. Ramo for petitioner.
Francisco C. Pedrosa for respondent City Government.
Ernesto H. Cruz and Emilia Andres for respondent labor.
CUEVAS, J.:
Assailed in the instant petition is the decision1 dated November 29, 1975 of the defunct
Workmen's Compensation Commission which dismissed petitioner's death benefits
claim for the death of her husband, Ricardo Alavado, a former employee of the City
Engineer's Office in Tacloban City.
The evidence on record discloses that the late Ricardo A. Alavado was employed as a
carpenter-foreman by the City Engineer's Office, Tacloban City with a daily wage of
P13.12. His last day of service was on April 19, 1974 since he was on leave from April
23, 1974 to May 23, 1974. On August 6, 1974 when he reported for work, he was no
longer under the supervision of respondent city. He suffered severe headache when he
was supervising laborers on a construction project in Tolosa, Leyte. He died the
following day of CVA-Cerebral Hemorrhage.
Petitioner, the surviving spouse, filed a claim for death benefits in her own behalf and in
behalf of her minor children. Respondent city filed a notice of controversion of the
claimant's right to compensation on December 10, 1974. On March 31, 1975, the
hearing officer of Regional Office No. 9 in 'Tacloban City issued an award granting
petitioner the sum of P5,200.00 as death benefits and P200.00 as reimbursement of
burial expenses.
Respondent city appealed. On November 29, 1975, a decision was rendered by the
Commission dismissing petitioner's death benefits claim, holding that—
xxx xxx xxx
While it is true that the deceased has suffered from the ailment which
resulted in his death while he wall the performance of his work as a
Carpenter Foreman this case must be denied on tile ground of lack of
filiation between the herein claimant and the deceased. It is a settled
rule that the status of dependency of a spouse arises from the fact that
a marriage exists. A showing of marital status is essential. In this case
the herein claimant Matilde Alvarado presented a marriage certificate
issued by the Sto. Nino Parish of Tacloban City as proof of her
marriage to t he deceased. This certification is not an authentic proof
of marital status. To prove filiation as a spouse and, therefore claim as
a dependent 'within the meaning of the Act, the suviving spouse-
claimant must show either the original of the marriage contract or the
marriage certificate duly issued by the local Civil Registrar of the
place where the marriage was solemnized. In the absence thereof, as
when the records are destroyed or not available due to fire or other
causes, secondary evidence may be presented consisting of an
affidavit of the claimant and at least three witnesses to the marriage
cohabitation. As to the filiation of the children the same is establish
by the presentation of the birth certificate. In this case only the
baptismal certificates of all the children were presented in evidence
by the claimant. A baptismal certificate is not sufficient because it
merely proves the fact that originated its execution, and the date of
the same, namely the administration of the sacrament of baptism on
the date specified. It is not an authentic proof as to the statements
made therein respecting the kinsfolk of the person baptized and the
presentation of such baptismal certificate does not prove filiation for
the purpose of establishing the status of dependency.
Dissatisfied with respondent Commission's decision, claimant spouse filed the instant
petition raising the following issues:
I
May a marriage certificate attesting to the fact that claimant and
deceased were in fact married be considered satisfactory proof of
marital status in the absence of any evidence to the contrary? and
II
Whether or not the respondent commission committed a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the matter.
The petition is impressed with merit. Its grant is therefore in order. While admitting the
compensability of the claim, respondent Commission nevertheless dismissed the same
due to the alleged failure of petitioner claimant to prove that she was legally married to
the deceased. In making the said pronouncement, respondent Commission relied solely
on the absence of a copy, or a certified copy of petitioner's marriage contract with the
deceased Alavado. What was submitted by her is a mere copy issued by the church
authorities where the questioned marriage was solemnized. 2 The said document shows
that petitioner claimant and the deceased were married on August 9, 1939. Since then,
they lived together as man and wife continuously for a period of 35 years in their
conjugal abode up to the time of Alavado's death.
Section 5(bb) of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Disputable Presumptions.—The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Courts look upon this presumption with great favor and it could not be lightly repelled.
It may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary or by evidence of a higher than
ordinary quality. The rationale behind this presumption could be found in the case of
Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee,3 which runs this wise—
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract but
it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the
law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
qwere not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be
living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper —
praesumitur pro matrimonio —Always presume marriage.
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such
relationship is not denied nor contradicted the presumption of their being married must
be admitted as a fact. 4
Likewise, the declaration of the husband is competent evidence to show the fact of
marriage. Similarly a witness who was present at the time the marriage was solemnized,
is a competent witness to establish the existence of said marriage. 5 Indeed, public and
open cohabitation as husband and wife, birth and baptismal certificates of children born
unto them after the celebration of the questioned marriage, and a statement of such
marriage in subsequent document were held to be competent evidence as proof of said
marriage . 6
A review of the records of this case failed to disclose any evidence whatsoever which
will overthrow the aforementioned presumption in favor of claimant's marriage to the
deceased Alavado. But what wrote finish to this issue-legality of the claimant's marriage
to the deceased is the marriage certificate submitted later by the claimant.7In the said
document. the contracting parties appeared to be Ricardo Alavado and Matilde
Valdesco The marriage was solemnized on August 19, 1939 by Fr. Ignacio Mora, priest
of Tacloban, Leyte. It is certified to be a true copy of the original issued by the local
Civil Registrar of the City of Tacloban. The said document indubitably establishes
claimant marriage to the deceased Alavado,
In the answer filed by City Fiscal Pedroza for respondent City, he averred that Alavado
was on longer an employee of respondent city government at the time of his death,
hence the city is not liable to pay compensation benefits.
We find respondent city's contention untenable. Such a defense should have been raised
before the Commission within the period prescribed by the Workmen's Compensation
Act 8 within fourteen (14) days from death or within ten (10) days from knowledge
thereof. Having failed to controvert the said claim within the prescribed reglementary
period, its compensability is now beyond challenge. Respondent city's failure to
controvert the claim within the aforesaid period is a waiver of its right to do so.9
The Workmen's Compensation Act, being a social legislation, aimed at protecting the
rights of the workingmen in consonance with the social justice guarantee of the
Constitution, its provision must be interpreted liberally in favor of laborers or workers.
This basic mandate should guide all tribunals and agencies in the resolution of cases of
this nature more specially those involving poor claimants who have come to court as
pauper litigants.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 29, 1979 of the defunct Workmen's
Compensation Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. The award of the Hearing Officer of
Regional Office No. 9 of Tacloban City is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 96602, Nov 19, 1991 ]
EDUARDO ARROYO v. CA +
RESOLUTION
G.R. No. 96602
FELICIANO, J.:
In G.R. No. 96602, the Court summarized the facts of the case in this manner:
"Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 4, of Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo
Arroyo committed on 2 November 1982 in the City of Baguio.
Both defendants pleaded not guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted petitioner and
Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery as defined under Article 333 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The essential facts of the case, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:
'x x x. On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs.
Linda Sare and witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around
11:00 a.m., they dropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at
Crystal Cave, Baguio City then proceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium of the
Neri spouses. At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at
the Neris' condominium. Witness opened the door for Arroyo who entered, he went
down to and knocked at the master's bedroom where accused Ruby Vera Neri and her
companion Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Vera Neri's request, Linda Sare left the
master's bedroom and went upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused. About forty-
five minutes later, accused Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she could
already come down. Three of them, thereafter, went up to the sala then left the
condominium.' (Court of Appeals Decision, p. 4)"[1]
Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision.
Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for reconsideration or a new trial, contending
that a pardon had been extended by her husband, private complainant Dr. Jorge B. Neri,
and that her husband had later contracted marriage with another woman with whom he
is presently co-habiting. Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner Arroyo filed a Petition for Review (G.R. No. 96602) dated 8 February 1991
which this Court denied in a Resolution dated 24 April 1991.
In the meantime, petitioner Neri filed a separate Petition for Review (G.R. No. 96715)
dated 19 February 1991.
Petitioner Arroyo filed a motion for reconsideration dated 14 May 1991 and a motion
dated 23 May 1991 for consolidation of G.R. No. 96602 with G.R. No. 96715.
On 3 June 1991, G.R. No. 96715 was consolidated with G.R. No. 96602 in the Third
Division in accordance with long-standing practice of the Court.
On 29 July 1991, the Third Division deliberated upon the case which was then assigned
to the ponente for the writing of the Court's Resolution.[2]
On 26 August 1991, Dr. Neri filed a manifestion, dated 14 May 1991,[3] praying that the
case against petitioners be dismissed as he had "tacitly consented" to his wife's
infidelity.[4]
Petitioners then filed their respective motions praying for the dismissal or for the
granting of new trial of the case claiming as basis for their motions Dr. Neri's
manifestation. The Solicitor-General was then asked to comment on the manifestation;
his comment was filed with this Court on 18 October 1991.[5]
In October 1991, the consolidated cases were, again in accordance with long-standing
practice of the Court, assigned to the First Division upon the assignment of
the ponente to that division. On 4 November 1991, the consolidated cases were re-
deliberated upon by the members of the First Division who reached the same conclusion
as the members of the Third Division of the Court.
In his Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602, petitioner Arroyo made the
following contentions:
1. Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance which states that the case was filed out of "pure
misunderstanding" raises questions as to the truth of the alleged admission made by
Mrs. Neri;
2. The other prosecution witnesses' corroborative testimonies merely proved the
existence of an illicit affair but not that adultery was committed on the date and place in
question;
3. Mrs. Neri's separate petition for review raised the issue of Dr. Neri's alleged
subsequent marriage to another woman which, if proven, would preclude either of the
spouses from filing charges of adultery or concubinage against each other.
In G.R. No. 96715, petitioner Neri imputes the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
"1. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in not granting the motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial of the petitioner;
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred by violating the constitutional rights
of petitioner against self-incrimination;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in failing to take into consideration the
material inconsistencies of the testimony of the complaining witness; and
4. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in discarding medical testimony as to
the physical impossibility of the petitioner to have committed the crime charged."[6]
The issues in the consolidated cases may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether or not Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance is sufficient to cast reasonable
doubts on his credibility;
2. Whether or not Mrs. Neri's constitutional right against self-incrimination had been
violated;
3. Whether or not Dr. Neri's alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from filing the
criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto; and
4. Whether on not Dr. Neri's manifestation is sufficient basis for the granting of a new
trial.
Deliberating on the:
1. Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602, the Court believes that petitioner
Arroyo has failed to show any ground that would warrant the Court reversing its
Resolution dated 24 April 1991; and on the
2. Petition for Review docketed as G.R. No. 96715, the Court considers that petitioner
Ruby Vera Neri has failed to show reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals
in issuing its Decision dated 21 May 1990 and its Resolution, dated 18 December 1990.
Petitioner Arroyo did not convince this Court in G.R. No. 96602 to dismiss the criminal
case on the basis of Dr. Neri's pardon. He, together with petitioner Neri, now cites the
same affidavit in the effort to cast doubts on the credibility of Dr. Neri's testimony
given before the trial court. However, in the Court's Resolution, dated 24 April 1991,
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 96602, the Court held that:
"It has been our constant holding that:
'In certiorari proceedings under Rule 45, the findings of fact of the lower court as well
its conclusions on credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed, the question
before the court being limited to questions of law (Rule 45, Sec. 2). Specifically, the
conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are given considerable
weight, since said court is in the best position to observe the demeanor, conduct and
attitude of witnesses at the trial. (Aguirre v. People, 155 SCRA 337 [1987]; under-
scoring supplied)'
Thus, the claim that Dr. Neri's testimony is incredible is unavailing at this
stage. Besides, the Court does not believe that such an admission by an unfaithful wife
was inherently improbable or impossible."[7] (Underscoring partly in the original and
partly supplied)
The Court, in the said Resolution of 24 April 1991, had likewise ruled on the claim that
Mrs. Neri's constitutional right against self-incrimination had been disregarded when
her admission to her husband in the privacy of their conjugal home that she had indeed
lain with petitioner Arroyo was taken into account by the trial court, to wit:
"Dr. Jorge Neri was also presented as a witness and he testified that sometime in
December of 1982, he surprised his wife while she was looking at some photographs in
their bedroom in their house in Dasmariñas Village, Makati. Accused Ruby Vera Neri
then turned pale and started for the door. Struck by this unusual behavior, Dr. Neri
started looking around the dressing room and he came upon a Kodak envelope with film
negatives inside. He took the negatives for printing and a few days later, armed with the
photographs which showed his wife in intimate bedroom poses with another man,
confronted Ruby Vera Neri. It was at this point that Ruby Vera Neri admitted to her
husband that Eduardo Arroyo was her lover and that they went to bed in Baguio on 2
and 3 November 1982.
x x x x x
x xxx
As to the constitutional issue, we held in Gamboa v. Cruz (162 SCRA 642 [1988]) that:
'The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when
the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confession or
admissions from respondent-accused.' (Underscoring supplied)
In the present case, Dr. Neri was not a peace officer nor an investigating officer
conducting a custodial interrogation, hence, petitioner cannot now claim that Mrs.
Neri's admission should have been rejected.
In the case of Aballe v. People (183 SCRA 196 [1990]), the Court held:
'The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be
given in evidence against him.
The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as witness, who heard the confession,
is competent to testify as to substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of
it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given
in its substance.
Compliance with the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation is not
applicable to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning, but given in an
ordinary manner, whereby the accused orally admitted having slain the victim.'
We also note that the husband is not precluded under the Rules of Court from testifying
against his wife in criminal cases for a crime committed by one against the other
(Section 22, Rule 129, Revised Rules of Court).
In short, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting Dr. Neri's
testimony as he was a competent witness. Neither was said testimony rendered
inadmissible by the constitutional provision on the right to remain silent and the right to
counsel of a 'person under investigation for the commission of an offense.'
Petitioner next claims that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the
failure of Ruby Vera Neri to take the witness stand. In People v. Gargoles (83 SCRA
282 [1978]), it was held that:
'We have held that an accused has the right to decline to testify at the trial without
having any inference of guilt drawn from his failure to go on the witness stand. Thus, a
verdict of conviction on the basis, solely or mainly, of the failure or refusal of the
accused to take the witness stand to deny the charges against him is a judicial heresy
which cannot be countenanced. Invariably, any such verdict deserves to be reversed.
Such situation does not obtain, however, in the case at bar. For while the trial court took
note of the failure of defendant to take the witness stand to deny the charge against
him, the same was not the main reason, much less the sole basis, of the trial court in
holding, as credible the testimony of complainant, and in ultimately concluding that the
crime of rape had been committed by the accused-appellant. (Underscoring supplied)'
Examination of the trial court decision here shows that said failure to testify was not the
sole nor the main basis of the conviction. Aside from accused's failure to deny Dr.
Neri's testimony, the trial court also considered the testimonies of Dr. Neri and other
prosecution witnesses and the photographs of the two accused in intimate poses (and
three of which showed them half naked in bed)."[8](Underscoring partly in the original
and partly supplied)
We turn to the contention that pari-delicto "is a valid defense to a prosecution for
adultery and concubinage and that in such a case 'it would be only a hypocritical
pretense for such spouse to appear in court as the offended spouse'."[9]
In the first place, the case cited does not support petitioner Neri's position. In
the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining husband, by entering into an
agreement with his wife that each of them were to live separately and could marry other
persons and by filing complaint only about a year after discovering his wife's infidelity,
had "consented to, and acquiesced in, the adulterous relations existing between the
accused, and he is, therefore, not authorized by law to institute the criminal
proceedings." In fine, the Guinucud case refers not to the notion of paridelicto but to
consent as a bar to the institution of the criminal proceedings. In the present case, no
such acquiescence can be implied: the accused did not enter into any agreement with
Dr. Neri allowing each other to marry or cohabit with other persons; and Dr. Neri
promptly filed his complaint after discovering the illicit affair.
Moreover, the concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but only
in Article 1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of
the Civil Code relates only to contracts with illegal consideration.[10] The case at bar
does not involve any illegal contract which either of the contracting parties is now
seeking to enforce.
Petitioners also contend that Dr Neri's manifestation which reads:
"2. Even before I filed the complaint in court and before the pardon that I had extended
to my wife and her co-accused, I was in reality aware of what was going on between
and therefore, tacitly consented to my wife's infidelity, x x x."
should result in the dismissal of the case or, at the very least, the remand of the case for
new trial claiming that in People v. Camara[11] it was held that "the consent of the
spouse is valid defense to a prosecution for adultery and/or concubinage."[12]
Dr. Neri's manifestation amounts in effect to an attempted recantation of testimony
given by him before the trial court. It is settled that not all recantations by
witnesses should result in the granting of a new trial.[13] In People v. Follantes and
Jacinto,[14]it was held that:
"x x x. [R]ecantation by witnesses called on behalf of the prosecution does not
necessarily entitle defendant to a new trial. The question whether a new trial shall be
granted on this ground depends on all the circumstances of the case, including the
testimony of the witnesses submitted on the motion for the new trial.
Moreover, recanting testimony is exceedingly unreliable, and it is the duty of the court
to deny a new trial where it is not satisfied that such testimony is true. x x
x."[15] (Underscoring supplied)
Succinctly put, the Court doubts the truthfulness and reliability of Dr. Neri's belated
recantation. Dr. Neri had two (2) previous occasions to make the claim contained in his
manifestation: first, in the compromise agreement[16] dated 16 February 1989 submitted
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 in relation to Civil Case No. M-
001; and second, his affidavit[17] dated 23 November 1988 submitted to the Court of
Appeals. Instead, however, these two (2) documents merely stated that Dr. Neri had
pardoned petitioners[18] and the complaint was filed out of "pure
misunderstanding"[19] without hinting that Dr. Neri knew of the adulterous relations. It
appears to the Court that Dr. Neri's manifestation was so worded as to attempt to cure
the deficiency noted by the Court in the two (2) previous documents in the disposition
of the petition in G.R. No. 96602:
"Petitioner will find no solace in the cases he cites, in support of his prayer to dismiss
the case based on Dr. Neri's pardon. People v Camara (100 Phil. 1098 (1957) is
inapplicable as the affidavit there expressly stated that the wife had consented to the
illicit relationship. In Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court(135 SCRA 620 [1985]) a
case involving estafa, the criminal case was dismissed as the affidavit of desistance
specifically stated that the accused had nothing to do whatsoever with the crime
charged. In the present case, the pardon did not state that Dr. Neri had consented to the
illicit relationship of petitioner and Mrs. Neri. Neither did it state that the case was filed
against the wrong parties."[20]
Moreover, while the manifestation is dated 14 May 1991, which incidentally is also the
date of petitioner Arroyo's motion for reconsideration, it was subscribed to only on 23
August 1991.
Petitioner Neri also contends that Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance and the compromise
agreement operate as a pardon meriting a new trial. The Court notes that the cases
of People v. Camara (supra) and Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court(supra) were
the very same cases which petitioner Arroyo cited in G.R. No. 96602 which the Court
has already held to be inapplicable in the present case.
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
"ART. 344. x x x. -- The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both parties,
if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders.
xxx xxx x x x"
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that
consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit
affair,[21] nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be
given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint.[22] In the present case, the affidavit of
desistance was executed only on 23 November 1988 while the compromise agreement
was executed only on 16 February 1989, after the trial court had already
rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987 finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Dr. Neri's manifestation is both dated and signed after issuance of our
Resolution in G.R. No. 96602 on 24 April 1991.
It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's complaint,
once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public
prosecutor.[23] Enforcement of our law on adultery is not exclusively, nor even
principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of the offended spouse; much
less is it a matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy. Such enforcement relates,
more importantly, to protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the
family in the preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy
here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
"The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x"
The same sentiment has been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article
149:
"The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which
public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by
law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized
or given effect."
In U.S. v. Topiño,[24] the Court held that:
"x x x. The husband being the head of the family and the only person who could
institute the prosecution and control its effects, it is quite clear that the principal object
in penalizing the offense by the state was to protect the purity of the family and the
honor of the husband, but now the conduct of the prosecution, after it is once
commenced by the husband, and the enforcement of the penalties imposed is also a
matter of public policy in which the Government is vitally interested to the extent of
preserving the public peace and providing for the general welfare of the community. x x
x."[25] (Underscoring supplied)
As to the claim that it was impossible for petitioner Neri to engage in sexual intercourse
a month after her ceasarian operation, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that
this is a question of fact which cannot be raised at this stage. In any case, we find no
reason to overturn the Court of Appeals' finding that "a woman who has the staying
power to volley tennis balls for fifteen minutes at the [John Hay] tennis court would not
be incapable of doing the sexual act" which ball play was followed, as noted by the
Court of Appeals "by a picture taking of both accused in different intimate poses."[26]
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602 is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit and this denial is FINAL. The Petition for Review in G.R.
No. 96715 is hereby similarly DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
Let a copy of this Resolution and of Dr. Neri's Manifestation and Motion subscribed on
23 August 1991 be forwarded to the Department of Justice for inquiry into thepossible
liability of Dr. Neri for perjury.
 G.R. No. L-28394 November 26, 1970
PEDRO GAYON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.SILVESTRE GAYON and GENOVEVA
DE GAYON, defendants-appellees.
German M. Lopez for plaintiff-appellant.
Pedro R. Davila for defendants-appellees.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal, taken by plaintiff Pedro Gayon, from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. 7334
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the
spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially that, on
October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed - copy of which was attached to the
complaint, as Annex "A" - whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a
parcel of unregistered land therein described, and located in the barrio of Cabubugan,
municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the improvements thereon,
subject to redemption within five (5) years or not later than October 1, 1957; that said
right of redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or
any of their heirs or successors, despite the expiration of the period therefor; that said
Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of sale - copy of
which was attached to the complaint, as Annex "B" - dated March 21, 1961, sold the
aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff had,
since 1961, introduced thereon improvements worth P1,000; that he had, moreover,
fully paid the taxes on said property up to 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our
Civil Code require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to a land
acquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying that an order be issued in
plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to the aforementioned
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon,
died on January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case; that Annex "A" to the
complaint is fictitious, for the signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not
hers; that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever executed "any document of
whatever nature in plaintiff's favor"; that the complaint is malicious and had
embarrassed her and her children; that the heirs of Silvestre Gayon had to "employ the
services of counsel for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses of at least P200.00"; and
that being a brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not exert efforts for
the amicable settlement of the case" before filing his complaint. She prayed, therefore,
that the same be dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay
damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Soon later, she filed a motion to dismiss, reproducing substantially the averments made
in her answer and stressing that, in view of the death of Silvestre Gayon, there is a
"necessity of amending the complaint to suit the genuine facts on record." Presently, or
on September 16, 1967, the lower court issued the order appealed from, reading:
Considering the motion to dismiss and it appearing from Exhibit "A" annexed to the
complaint that Silvestre Gayon is the absolute owner of the land in question, and
considering the fact that Silvestre Gayon is now dead and his wife Genoveva de Gayon
has nothing to do with the land subject of plaintiff's complaint, as prayed for, this case
is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. 1chanrobles virtual law library
A reconsideration of this order having been denied, plaintiff interposed the present
appeal, which is well taken.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Said order is manifestly erroneous and must be set aside. To begin with, it is not true
that Mrs. Gayon "has nothing to do with the land subject of plaintiff's complaint." As
the widow of Silvestre Gayon, she is one of his compulsory heirs 2and has, accordingly,
an interest in the property in question. Moreover, her own motion to dismiss indicated
merely "a necessity of amending the complaint," to the end that the other successors in
interest of Silvestre Gayon, instead of the latter, be made parties in this case. In her
opposition to the aforesaid motion for reconsideration of the plaintiff, Mrs. Gayon
alleged, inter alia, that the "heirs cannot represent the dead defendant, unless there is a
declaration of heirship." Inasmuch, however, as succession takes place, by operation of
law, "from the moment of the death of the decedent" 3and "(t)he inheritance includes all
the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his
death," 4it follows that if his heirs were included as defendants in this case, they would
be sued, not as "representatives" of the decedent, but as owners of an aliquot interest in
the property in question, even if the precise extent of their interest may still be
undetermined and they have derived it from the decent. Hence, they may be sued
without a previous declaration of heirship, provided there is no pending special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the decedent. 5chanrobles virtual law
library
As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present
case, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides:
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.
It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits "filed or
maintained between members of the same family." This phrase, "members of the same
family," should, however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code,
pursuant to which:
Family relations shall include those:chanrobles virtual law library

(1) Between husband and wife;chanrobles virtual law library

(2) Between parent and child;chanrobles virtual law library

(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;chanrobles virtual law library

(4) Among brothers and sisters.

Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or
nieces. Inasmuch as none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art.
217 - which should be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule - and
Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that
the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a
compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the
same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to
the lower court for the inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of the
administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent,
or, in the absence of such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the deceased
Silvestre Gayon, and for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision, with
the costs of this instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de Gayon. It is so
ordered.
G.R. No. L-25609 November 27, 1968
MARGARET ANN WAINRIGHT VERSOZA, JOSE MA. VERSOZA, JR.,
CHARLES JOHN VERSOZA and VIRGINIA FELICE VERSOZA, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
JOSE MA. VERSOZA, defendant-appellee.
William H. Quasha and Associates for plaintiffs-appellants.
Deogracias T. Reyes and Associates and Jose M. Luison for defendant-appellee.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question before us, framed in legal setting, is the correctness of the lower court's
order dismissing, without prejudice, the complaint seeking, inter alia, future support
upon the ground that there is no allegation therein that earnest efforts toward a
compromise were made but that the same have failed, in infringement of Article 222 of
the Civil Code.
With this problem in mind, we turn to the pivotal facts.
On March 4, 1964, a verified complaint, later amended, for P1,500.00 monthly support,
support in arrears, and damages, and custody of children, with a petition for
support pendente lite1 was lodged against Jose Ma. Versoza by his wife, Margaret Ann
Wainright Versoza, and their three minor children, Jose Ma. Versoza, Jr., Charles John
Versoza and Virginia Felice Versoza. Reasons given are that defendant has abandoned
plaintiffs without providing for their support and maintains illicit relations with another
woman.
Defendant's answer attacked the complaint on the claim that it is premature and/or that
it states no cause of action. Because, the complaint which involves members of the
same family2 does allege earnest efforts toward a compromise before the complaint was
filed as set forth in the statute mentioned at the start of this opinion. Then followed
defendant's motion for preliminary hearing on jurisdiction. Defendant there argued that
compliance with Article 222 of the Civil Code aforesaid was a condition precedent and
should have been alleged in the complaint.
On February 22, 1965, following appropriate proceedings, the lower court came out
with its first appealed order. It there resolved to dismiss the complaint without
prejudice, upon the ground that there was no showing that efforts have been exerted to
settle the case amicably before suit was started.
Plaintiffs moved to reconsider. Annexed to its motion was an affidavit of their counsel
to the effect that before court action was taken efforts were made to settle the case
amicably, but which were fruitless.
On March 30, 1965, the lower court brushed aside this motion.
In an effort to conform to the position taken by the lower court, plaintiffs filed a second
motion for the reconsideration of the orders of February 22, and March 30, 1965.
Plaintiffs at the same time sought admission of their second amended complaint in
which the required averment was made to obviate the objection to their complaint. They
there alleged that before starting the present suit, they sought amicable settlement but
were unsuccessful.
On June 22, 1965, the second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the
lower court "(f)or lack of merit."
The dismissal orders are now the subject of appeal.
1. Plaintiffs argue that the Civil Code requirement of attempt to reach a compromise
and of its failure need not be alleged in the complaint. They claim that some such fact
may be proved either at the main hearing or at the preliminary hearing on the motion to
dismiss.
The text of Article 222 of the Civil Code is this: "No suit shall be filed or maintained
between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations
in article 2035."3 The requirement in Article 222 has been given more teeth by Section
1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which states as ground for a motion to dismiss that
"(t)he suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made."
The cumulative impact of the statute and the rule just adverted to is that earnest efforts
to reach a compromise and failure thereof must — ordinarily — be alleged in the
complaint. The Civil Code provision that "(n)o suit shall be filed or maintained" simply
means that the attempt to compromise and inability to arrive thereat is a condition
precedent to the filing of the suit. As such it is a part of plaintiffs' cause of action.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes and Judge Puno4bolstered this view with their statement that "(t)he
terms of article 222 require express allegation of an attempt to compromise and its
failure; otherwise there is no cause of action stated."
2. The foregoing, however, is but a statement of the general rule. Future support
operates outside the ambit thereof. Mucius Scaevola5 expresses the view that no
objection can be made to a compromise "cuando el derecho es renunciable,
eminentemente privado." Scaevola, however, emphasizes: "(P)ero el derecho a la vida
no lo es." This brings us to the legal provision Scaevola commented upon, namely,
Article 1814 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, which reads:
Art. 1814. No puede transigir sobre el estado civil de las personas, ni sobre las
cuestiones matrimoniales, ni sobre alimentos futuros.6
So it is, that Colin y Capitant7 observed: "Una cosa es que la transaccion sea en
principio un acto licito, con exclusion de aquellas materias a que se refiere el art. 1814
del Codigo civil.
The philosophy behind the rule is best expressed by Manresa8 in the following terms:
Aunque el Codigo no lo diga expresamente, desde luego se comprende que,
por regla general, pueden ser objeto de transaccion todas las cosas que estan en
el comercio de los hombres, siempre que no se halle prohibido por la ley. Esta
es la regla general; pero hay casos en que, por razones de moralidad o por
otras consideraciones no menos atendibles, no puede admitirse la transaccion,
como sucede, por ejemplo, en materia de estado civil de las personas, de
cuestiones matrimoniales y de alimentos, y otros que tampoco son susceptibles
de transaccion por afectar al interes publico o social y no estar en el dominio o
en la potestad de los particulares el sustraerlos, a los efectos rigurosos de la
ley, segun ocurre con los delitos y demas transgresiones punibles del derecho.
xxx xxx xxx
Restanos ocuparnos de otra prohibicion impuesta tambien por el art. 1814 en
su ultima parte. Nos referimos a la establecida por el mismo respecto de la
transaccion sobre los alimentos futuros; prohibicion que se funda en poderosas
razones de moralidad que no pueden ocultarse, ni pasar desapercibidas para
nadie que detenidamente medite sobre ello.
En efecto, en rigor de principios, la lay concede los alimentos en razon a
la necesidad que de ellos tiene el alimentista pora vivir, y es evidente que
transigir sobre ellos, equivaldria a renunciar en parte a la vida, como ha dicho
un autor ("Coleccion de las Instituciones jurisdicas politicas de los pueblos
modernos," Tomo 13, pag. 792); y si no le fueran necesarios pudiendo por tal
motivo renunciarlos, no cabria tampoco transaccion, porque no tendria
derecho a percibirlos.
The foregoing but emphasizes the concept of support. For, support is, amongst others,
everything that is indispensable for sustenance.9 The right to support cannot be: (1)
renounced; (2) transmitted to third persons; nor (3) compensated with what the recipient
owes the obligor.10 Compensation may not even be set up against a creditor who has a
claim for support due by gratuitous title.11 Of course, support in arrears is a different
thing altogether. It may be compensated, renounced and transmitted by onerous or
gratuitous title.12 In Coral vs. Gallego,13 the Court of Appeals has had occasion to
declare that the right to support is not susceptible of future transactions under Article
1814 of the old Civil Code.
Article 1814 of the Spanish Civil Code was reproduced in Article 2035 of the new Civil
Code — in an expanded form — as follows:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
It thus appears that Article 2035 has roots deeper than Article 222. For, whereas Article
222 is inserted as a new concept in the present Code in a laudable effort to obviate a sad
and tragic spectacle occasioned by a litigation between members of the same family.
Article 2035 firmly maintains the ancient injunction against compromise on matters
involving future support. And this is as it should be. For, even as Article 222 requires
earnest efforts at a compromise and inability to reach one as a condition precedent to
the filing and maintenance of a suit "between the members of the same family", that
same article took good care to add: "subject to the limitations in article 2035."
Plaintiffs ask for support past, present and future. There is also the prayer for
alimony pendente lite. Since the present action also revolves on the right to future
support and because compromise on future support is prescribed,14 then the conclusion
is irresistible that an attempt at compromise of future support and failure thereof is not a
condition precedent to the filing of the present suit. It need not be alleged in the
complaint. The very opening statement in Article 2035 unmistakably confirms our
view. It says that "(n)o compromise upon the following question shall be valid: ... (4)
Future support."15 We cannot afford to give a loose view to this controlling statute. We
may not disregard it. To do so is to misread the law, to write off an explicit
congressional will, to cross the line which circumscribes courts of justice and step into
legislative area.
Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, 1967B Phild. 82, is to be read as controlling here. In that
case, the wife filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija an action for support
against her husband who was then employed in a hospital in the United States.
Defendant, by counsel, moved to dismiss, for the reason that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action "because it contained no allegation that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made before the filing of the suit, and invoking the provisions of
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines." The Court of First Instance refused to
entertain the motion to dismiss. Defendant petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of
prohibition. The appellate court denied the writ prayed for Defendant petitioned this
Court for review. We affirmed. In that first judicial test, this Court, speaking thru Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held:
While we agree that petitioner's position represents a correct statement of the
general rule on the matter, we are nevertheless constrained to hold that the
Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance committed no error in
 refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its face, the same involved a claim
for future support that under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
can not be subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere
of application of Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies. This
appears from the last proviso of said Article 222, already quoted....
xxx xxx xxx
Since no valid compromise is possible on these issues, a showing of previous
efforts to compromise them would be superfluous.
It may be that the complaint asks for both future support and support in
arrears, as petitioner contends. But, the possibility of compromise on the
latter does not negate the existence of a valid cause of action for future
support, to which Article 222 can not apply.16
Although the complaint herein seeks custody of minor children and damages as well,
the prime object is support. And, of importance, of course, is future support. The reliefs
sought are intimately related to each other. They all spring from the fact that husband
and wife are separated from each other. So it is, that expediency dictates that they be, as
they are now, placed together in one complaint. For, multiplicity of suits is not favored
in law. Since one of the causes of action, that for future support, may be lodged in court
without the compromise requisite in Article 222 of the Civil Code, the complaint herein,
as we have ruled in Mendoza, may not be dismissed.
We, accordingly, hold that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint.
3. But even on the assumption that it was error on the part of plaintiffs to have failed to
so allege, plaintiffs should not be barred from making an amendment to correct it.
Parenthetically, after a responsive pleading has been served, amendments may be made
only upon leave of court.17 But, in the furtherance of justice, the court "should be liberal
in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the
real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the case
decided on the merits without unnecessary delay."18
Thus, the instances wherein this Court considered allowance of an amendment not
justified are limited. As defendant correctly points out, a proposed amendment may be
refused when it confers jurisdiction on the court in which it is filed, if the cause of
action originally set forth was not within that court's jurisdiction.19 An amendment may
also be refused when the cause of action is substantially altered.20
A typical case which merited refusal of an amendment is Rosario vs. Carandang, supra.
There, the original complaint was one for forcible entry and detainer over which the
Court of First Instance, where the complaint was filed, had no jurisdiction. The
amendment sought by plaintiff was the inclusion of an allegation that the defendants
were claiming ownership over the land in dispute. The proposed amendment would thus
convert the case from one of forcible entry and detainer into one of recovery of
possession, which is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The court
properly denied the amendment.
The alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state a cause of action. The
proposed amendment seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect that the
requirements of Article 222 have been complied with does not confer jurisdiction upon
the lower court. With or without this amendment, the subject-matter of the action
remains as one for support, custody of children, and damages, cognizable by the court
below.
To illustrate, Tamayo vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.,21 allowed an amendment which
"merely corrected a defect in the allegation of plaintiff-appellant's cause of
action, because as it then stood, the original complaint stated no cause of action." We
there ruled out as inapplicable the holding in Campos Rueda Corporation vs. Bautista,
supra, that an amendment cannot be made so as to confer jurisdiction on the court.
The lower court, in the interest of justice, should have allowed plaintiffs to amend their
complaint instead of granting the motion to dismiss. This it could have done under
Section 3 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. For, the defect in the complaint is curable.
For the reasons given —
(1) the orders of the lower court of February 22, 1965, March 30, 1965, and June 22,
1965 are hereby set aside; and
(2) the record of this case is hereby remanded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City, Branch IX, with instructions to admit the second amended complaint and
to conduct further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion herein. Costs against
defendant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 185922 January 15, 2014
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR. represented by their co-heirs and
Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. FAVIS and NELLY FAVIS-
VILLAFUERTE, Petitioners,
vs.
JUANA GONZALES, her son MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D.
FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, all minors represented herein by their parents
SPS. MARIANO FAVIS and LARCELITA D. FAVIS,Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review assailing the 10 April 2008 Decision1 and 7
January 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86497
dismissing petitioners’ complaint for annulment of the Deed of Donation for failure to
exert earnest efforts towards a compromise.
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina) with
whom he had seven children named Purita A. Favis, Reynaldo Favis, Consolacion
Favis-Queliza, Mariano A. Favis, Jr., Esther F. Filart, Mercedes A. Favis, and Nelly
Favis-Villafuerte. When Capitolina died in March 1944, Dr. Favis took Juana Gonzales
(Juana) as his common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis
(Mariano). When Dr. Favis and Juana got married in 1974, Dr. Favis executed an
affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is married
to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four children, named Ma. Theresa
Joana D. Favis, Ma. Cristina D. Favis, James Mark D. Favis and Ma. Thea D. Favis.
Dr. Favis died intestate on 29 July 1995 leaving the following properties:
1. A parcel of residential land located at Bonifacio St. Brgy. 1, Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, consisting an area of 898 square meters, more or less, bounded on the
north by Salvador Rivero; on the East by Eleutera Pena; on the South by
Bonifacio St., and on the West by Carmen Giron; x x x;
2. A commercial building erected on the aforesaid parcel of land with an
assessed value of ₱126,000.00; x x x;
3. A parcel of residential land located in Brgy. VII, Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
containing an area of 154 sq. ms., more or less, bounded on the North by the
High School Site; on the East by Gomez St., on the South by Domingo [G]o;
and on the West by Domingo Go; x x x;
4. A house with an assessed value of ₱17,600.00 x x x;
5. A parcel of orchard land located in Brgy. VI, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, containing
an area of 2,257 sq. ma. (sic) more or less, bounded on the North by Lot 1208;
on the East by Mestizo River; on the South by Lot 1217 and on the West by
Lot 1211-B, 1212 and 1215 x x x.3
Beginning 1992 until his death in 1995, Dr. Favis was beset by various illnesses, such
as kidney trouble, hiatal hernia, congestive heart failure, Parkinson’s disease and
pneumonia. He died of "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to multi-organ/system failure
secondary to sepsis secondary to pneumonia."4
On 16 October 1994, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation5 transferring and
conveying properties described in (1) and (2) in favor of his grandchildren with Juana.
Claiming that said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis’ children with
Capitolina, petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation,
inventory, liquidation and partition of property before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20 against Juana, Spouses Mariano and Larcelita and their
grandchildren as respondents.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents assert that the properties donated do
not form part of the estate of the late Dr. Favis because said donation was made inter
vivos, hence petitioners have no stake over said properties.6
The RTC, in its Pre-Trial Order, limited the issues to the validity of the deed of
donation and whether or not respondent Juana and Mariano are compulsory heirs of Dr.
Favis.7
In a Decision dated 14 November 2005, the RTC nullified the Deed of Donation and
cancelled the corresponding tax declarations. The trial court found that Dr. Favis, at the
age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of his mental
capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation. Holding that the subsequent marriage of
Dr. Favis and Juana legitimated the status of Mariano, the trial court also declared Juana
and Mariano as compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. The dispositive portion
reads:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Deed of Donation
dated October 16, 1994 is hereby annulled and the corresponding tax declarations
issued on the basis thereof cancelled. Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. having died without a will,
his estate would result to intestacy. Consequently, plaintiffs Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis,
Sr., namely Purita A. Favis, Reynaldo A. Favis, Consolacion F. Queliza, Mariano A.
Favis, Jr., Esther F. Filart, Mercedes A. Favis, Nelly F. Villafuerte and the defendants
Juana Gonzales now deceased and Mariano G. Favis, Jr. shall inherit in equal shares in
the estate of the late Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. which consists of the following:
 1. A parcel of residential land located at Bonifacio St. Brgy. 1, Vigan City,
Ilocos Sur, consisting an area of 89 sq. meters more or less, bounded on the
north by Salvador Rivero; on the East by Eleutera Pena; on the South by
Bonifacio St., and on the West by Carmen Giron;
2. A commercial building erected on the aforesaid parcel of land with an
assessed value of ₱126,000.00;
3. One-half (1/2) of the house located in Brgy. VI, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur[,]
containing an area of 2,257 sq. meters more or less, bounded on the north by
Lot 1208; on the east by Mestizo River; on the South by Lot 1217 and on the
West by Lot 1211-B, 1212 and 1215.
4. The accumulated rentals of the new Vigan Coliseum in the amount of One
Hundred Thirty [Thousand] (₱130,000.00) pesos per annum from the death of
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr.8
Respondents interposed an appeal before the Court of Appeals challenging the trial
court’s nullification, on the ground of vitiated consent, of the Deed of Donation in favor
of herein respondents. The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners’
nullification case. However, it did so not on the grounds invoked by herein respondents
as appellant.
The Court of Appeals motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of
petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Code. The appellate court justified its
order of dismissal by invoking its authority to review rulings of the trial court even if
they are not assigned as errors in the appeal.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the case is not subject to
compromise as it involves future legitime.
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ contention when it ruled that the prohibited
compromise is that which is entered between the decedent while alive and compulsory
heirs. In the instant case, the appellate court observed that while the present action is
between members of the same family it does not involve a testator and a compulsory
heir. Moreover, the appellate court pointed out that the subject properties cannot be
considered as "future legitime" but are in fact, legitime, as the instant complaint was
filed after the death of the decedent.
Undaunted by this legal setback, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the
following arguments:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals GRAVELY and SERIOUSLY ERRED in
DISMISSING the COMPLAINT.
2. Contrary to the finding of the Honorable Court of Appeals, the verification
of the complaint or petition is not a mandatory requirement.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously failed to appreciate that the filing
of an intervention by Edward Favis had placed the case beyond the scope of
Article 151 of the Family Code.
4. Even assuming arguendo without admitting that the filing of intervention by
Edward Favis had no positive effect to the complaint filed by petitioners, it is
still a serious error for the Honorable Court of Appeals to utterly disregard the
fact that petitioners had substantially complied with the requirements of Article
151 of the Family Code.
5. Assuming arguendo that petitioners cannot be construed as complying
substantially with Article 151 of the Family Code, still, the same should be
considered as a non-issue considering that private respondents are in estoppel.
6. The dismissal of the complaint by the Honorable Court of Appeals amounts
to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction and a
complete defiance of the doctrine of primacy of substantive justice over strict
application of technical rules.
7. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely and seriuosly erred in not
affirming the decision of the Court a quo that the Deed of Donation is void.9
In their Comment, respondents chose not to touch upon the merits of the case, which is
the validity of the deed of donation. Instead, respondents defended the ruling the Court
of Appeals that the complaint is dismissible for failure of petitioners to allege in their
complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been exerted.
The base issue is whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal
of the complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise
have been made. The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the
complaint. The appellate courts’ decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code,
viz:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in
fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the
Civil Code.
The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint
or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:
xxxx
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
The appellate court’s reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the
grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the
grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of the
claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. − Defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio
dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis
pendentia ; (c) res judicata ; and (d) prescription of action.10Specifically in Gumabon v.
Larin,11 cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr.,12 the Court held:
x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when
the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did
not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time
or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these
instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the
plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and
Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu
proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a
prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x.13
The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if the consideration of the issue is kept
within the confines of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and Section 1 of Rule 9.
That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, a ground for
a motion to dismiss emanating from the law that no suit between members from the
same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but had failed, is, as the Rule so
words, a ground for a motion to dismiss. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a
motion should be filed "within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint
or pleading asserting a claim." The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to
dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from
the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as
just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; litis pendentia ; res judicata ; and prescription of action. Failure to allege
in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not
one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived.
It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas14 cited in P.L. Uy Realty Corporation v.
ALS Management and Development Corporation15 where we noted that the second
sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 does not only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also
allows courts to dismiss cases motu propio on any of the enumerated grounds. The tenor
of the second sentence of the Rule is that the allowance of a motu propio dismissal can
proceed only from the exemption from the rule on waiver; which is but logical because
there can be no ruling on a waived ground.
Why the objection of failure to allege a failed attempt at a compromise in a suit among
members of the same family is waivable was earlier explained in the case of Versoza v.
Versoza,16 a case for future support which was dismissed by the trial court upon the
ground that there was no such allegation of infringement of Article 222 of the Civil
Code, the origin of Article 151 of the Family Code. While the Court ruled that a
complaint for future support cannot be the subject of a compromise and as such the
absence of the required allegation in the complaint cannot be a ground for objection
against the suit, the decision went on to state thus:
The alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state a cause of action. The
proposed amendment seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect that the
requirements of Article 222 have been complied with does not confer jurisdiction upon
the lower court. With or without this amendment, the subject-matter of the action
remains as one for support, custody of children, and damages, cognizable by the court
below.
To illustrate, Tamayo v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.,17 allowed an amendment which "
merely corrected a defect in the allegation of plaintiff-appellant’s cause of action,
because as it then stood, the original complaint stated no cause of action." We there
ruled out as inapplicable the holding in Campos Rueda Corporation v. Bautista,18 that
an amendment cannot be made so as to confer jurisdiction on the court x x x. (Italics
supplied).
Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise
in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but
merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action. Versoza was cited in a later case as
an instance analogous to one where the conciliation process at the barangay level was
not priorly resorted to. Both were described as a "condition precedent for the filing of a
complaint in Court."19 In such instances, the consequence is precisely what is stated in
the present Rule. Thus:
x x x The defect may however be waived by failing to make seasonable objection, in a
motion to dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere procedural imperfection which
does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.20 (Underscoring supplied).
In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The
complaint of petitioners was answered by respondents without a prior motion to dismiss
having been filed. The decision in favor of the petitioners was appealed by respondents
on the basis of the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having been
made about any defect in the statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion
to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was
filed in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that
respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is
wholly applicable to respondent.1âwphi1 If the respondents as parties-defendants could
not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioner’s complaint, invoke the objection
of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate
court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order the
dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.
Indeed, even if we go by the reason behind Article 151 of the Family Code, which
provision as then Article 222 of the New Civil Code was described as "having been
given more teeth"21 by Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rule of Court, it is safe to say that
the purpose of making sure that there is no longer any possibility of a compromise, has
been served. As cited in commentaries on Article 151 of the Family Code –
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sudden and more tragic
spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that
every effort should be made towards a compromise before a litigation is allowed to
breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives
generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.22
The facts of the case show that compromise was never an option insofar as the
respondents were concerned. The impossibility of compromise instead of litigation was
shown not alone by the absence of a motion to dismiss but on the respondents’
insistence on the validity of the donation in their favor of the subject properties. Nor
could it have been otherwise because the Pre-trial Order specifically limited the issues
to the validity of the deed and whether or not respondent Juana and Mariano are
compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. Respondents not only confined their arguments within
the pre-trial order; after losing their case, their appeal was based on the proposition that
it was error for the trial court to have relied on the ground of vitiated consent on the part
of Dr. Favis.
The Court of Appeals ignored the facts of the case that clearly demonstrated the refusal
by the respondents to compromise. Instead it ordered the dismissal of petitioner’s
complaint on the ground that it did not allege what in fact was shown during the trial.
The error of the Court of Appeals is patent.
Unfortunately for respondents, they relied completely on the erroneous ruling of the
Court of Appeals even when petitioners came to us for review not just on the basis of
such defective motu propio action but also on the proposition that the trial court
correctly found that the donation in question is flawed because of vitiated consent.
Respondents did not answer this argument. The trial court stated that the facts are:
x x x To determine the intrinsic validity of the deed of donation subject of the action for
annulment, the mental state/condition of the donor Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. at the time of
its execution must be taken into account. Factors such as his age, health and
environment among others should be considered. As testified to by Dr. Mercedes Favis,
corroborated by Dr. Edgardo Alday and Dra. Ofelia Adapon, who were all presented as
expert witnesses, Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. had long been suffering from Hiatal Hernia and
Parkinson’s disease and had been taking medications for years. That a person with
Parkinson’s disease for a long time may not have a good functioning brain because in
the later stage of the disease, 1/3 of death develop from this kind of disease, and or
dementia. With respect to Hiatal Hernia, this is a state wherein organs in the abdominal
cavity would go up to the chest cavity, thereby occupying the space for the lungs
causing the lungs to be compromised. Once the lungs are affected, there is less
oxygenation to the brain. The Hernia would cause the heart not to pump enough oxygen
to the brain and the effect would be chronic, meaning, longer lack of oxygenation to the
brain will make a person not in full control of his faculties. Dr. Alday further testified
that during his stay with the house of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (1992-1994), he noticed
that the latter when he goes up and down the stairs will stop after few seconds, and he
called this pulmonary cripple – a very advanced stage wherein the lungs not only one
lung, but both lungs are compromised. That at the time he operated on the deceased, the
left and right lung were functioning but the left lung is practically not even five (5%)
percent functioning since it was occupied by abdominal organ. x x x.
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. during the execution of the Deed of Donation was already 92
years old; living with the defendants and those years from 1993 to 1995 were the
critical years when he was sick most of the time. In short, he’s dependent on the care of
his housemates particularly the members of his family. It is the contention of the
defendants though that Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. had full control of his mind during the
execution of the Deed of Donation because at that time, he could go on with the regular
way of life or could perform his daily routine without the aid of anybody like taking a
bath, eating his meals, reading the newspaper, watching television, go to the church on WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
Sundays, walking down the plaza to exercise and most importantly go to the cockpit and the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20 is
arena and bet. Dr. Ofelia Adapon, a neurology expert however, testified that a person AFFIRMED.
suffering from Parkinson’s disease when he goes to the cockpit does not necessarily
mean that such person has in full control of his mental faculties because anyone, even a SO ORDERED.
retarded person, a person who has not studied and have no intellect can go to the
cockpit and bet. One can do everything but do not have control of his mind. x x x That
Hiatal Hernia creeps in very insidiously, one is not sure especially if the person has not
complained and no examination was done. It could be there for the last time and no one
will know. x x x.

The Deed of Donation in favor of the defendants Ma. Theresa, Joana D. Favis, Maria
Cristina D. Favis, James Mark D. Favis and Maria Thea D. Favis, all of whom are the
children of Mariano G. Favis, Jr. was executed on [16 October] 1994, seven (7) months
after Dra. Mercedes Favis left the house of Dr. Favis, Sr. at Bonifacio St., Vigan City,
Ilocos Sur, where she resided with the latter and the defendants.

Putting together the circumstances mentioned, that at the time of the execution of the
Deed of Donation, Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. was already at an advanced age of 92,
afflicted with different illnesses like Hiatal hernia, Parkinsons’ disease and pneumonia,
to name few, which illnesses had the effects of impairing his brain or mental faculties
and the deed being executed only when Dra. Mercedes Favis had already left his
father’s residence when Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. could have done so earlier or even in the
presence of Dra. Mercedes Favis, at the time he executed the Deed of Donation was not
in full control of his mental faculties. That although age of senility varies from one
person to another, to reach the age of 92 with all those medications and treatment one
have received for those illnesses, yet claim that his mind remains unimpaired, would be
unusual. The fact that the Deed of Donation was only executed after Dra. Mercedes
Favis left his father's house necessarily indicates that they don't want the same to be
known by the first family, which is an indicia of bad faith on the part of the defendant,
who at that time had influence over the donor.23

The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The
respondents opted to rely only on what the appellate court considered, erroneously
though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial court's factual finding, therefore, stands
unreversed; and respondents did not provide us with any argument to have it reversed.

The issue of the validity of donation was fully litigated and discussed by the trial court.
Indeed, the trial court's findings were placed at issue before the Court of Appeals but
the appellate court chose to confine its review to the procedural aspect. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals, even if it dealt only with procedure, is deemed to have covered all
issues including the correctness of the factual findings of the trial court. Moreover,
remanding the case to the Court of Appeals would only constitute unwarranted delay in
the final disposition of the case.
 G.R. No. 213972, February 05, 2018
FELICITAS L. SALAZAR, Petitioner, v. REMEDIOS FELIAS, ON HER OWN
BEHALF AND REPRESENTATION OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF CATALINO
NIVERA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
The movant's claim that his/her property is exempt from execution for being the family
home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the execution of
a final and executory ruling. It is imperative that the claim for exemption must be set up
and proven.
This treats of the petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision2 dated December 62013, and
Resolution3 dated August 7, 2014, rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 97309, which affirmed the execution of the final and executory judgment
issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Alaminos, Pangasinan (RTC Branch 55).
The Antecedent Facts
On February 28, 1990, private respondent Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of
Catalino Nivera (Heirs of Nivera) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership,
Possession and Damages against the Spouses Romualdo Lastimosa (Romualdo) and
Felisa Lastimosa (Fe1isa). The former sought to recover from the latter four parcels of
land located in Baruan, Agno, Pangasinan (subject property).
On March 3, 1997, during the trial of the case, Romualdo died.
Consequently, on July 6, 1998, a Motion for Substitution4 was filed by the decedent's
wife, Felisa, and their children Flordeliza Sagun, Reynaldo Lastimosa, Recto Lastimosa
(Recto), Rizalina Ramirez (Rizalina), Lily Lastimosa, and Avelino Lastimosa (Heirs
ofLastimosa).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC Branch 55 rendered a Decision,5 declaring the Heirs of
Nivera as the absolute owners of the parcels of land in question, and thereby ordering
the Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate the lands and to surrender possession thereof. The
dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC Branch 55, reads:
WHEREFORE, this Honorable Court renders judgment:
a. Declaring the [Heirs of Nivera] absolute owners of the parcels of land in question as
described in the Amended Complaint, and ordering the [Heirs of Lastimosa] to
surrender possession thereof and vacate the same;
b. Ordering the [Heirs of Lastimosa], jointly and severally, to pay the [Heirs of Nivera]
actual damages in the amount of Php 270,000.00 for 1975 to 1995, and Php 10,000.00
annually from 1996 and through all the subsequent years until actual possession shall
have been restored to the [Heirs of Nivera]; attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the
amount of Php 21,000.00; and costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The Heirs of Lastimosa did not file an appeal against the trial court's ruling.
Meanwhile, Felicitas Salazar (Felicitas), daughter of Romualdo, along with Recto and
Rizalina filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated June 22, 2006 with the CA.
Felicitas sought the nullification of the RTC Branch 55's Decision dated March 16,
2004, and the corresponding Writs of Execution and Demolition issued pursuant
thereto.7 In her Petition for Annulment of Judgment, Felicitas claimed that she was
deprived of due process when she was not impleaded in the case for Recovery of
Ownership, before the RTC Branch 55.8
On June 5, 2008, the Former Tenth Division of the CA rendered a Decision,9 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 95592, dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment. The CA
refused to give credence to the contention that the Heirs of Nivera are at fault for failing
to implead Felicitas as a party defendant in the action for recovery of ownership.
Rather, the failure to include Felicitas in the proceedings was due to the fault of the
Heirs of Lastimosa, who neglected to include her (Felicitas) in their Motion to
Substitute. The CA further ratiocinated that since the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the original defendants Romualdo and Felisa, the outcome of the case is
binding on all their heirs or any such persons claiming rights under them.10
On June 3, 2009, this Court affirmed the CA decision in the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment.11 The Court's ruling became final, as per Entry of Judgment, on October 5,
2009.
Meanwhile, the Heirs of Lastimosa filed with the RTC Branch 55 an Urgent Motion to
Order the Sheriff to Desist from Making Demolition dated April 24, 2010. The Motion
to Desist was premised on the fact that the Sheriff cannot execute the lower court's
decision considering that Felicitas had an aliquot share over the property, which had not
yet been partitioned.12
At about the same time, the Heirs of Nivera filed a Motion for Execution and
Demolition dated May 28, 2010. The Motion for Execution was anchored on the fact
that the Decision dated March 16, 2004, in the case for recovery of ownership,
possession and damages had long attained finality.13
On July 9, 2010, the RTC Branch 55 issued an Order granting the Motion for Execution
and Demolition, and denying the Motion to Desist.14 The dispositive portion of the
order reads:
After going over the allegations in both motions, the Court resolves to deny the motion,
to order the Sheriff to desist from making demolition filed by the defendants through
counsel, it appearing that the grounds raised in the said motion are already mooted by
the subsequent filing of the motion for execution and demolition filed by plaintiff
through counsel.
The motion for execution and demolition is hereby granted.
Accordingly, let [a] Writ of Execution and Demolition issue to satisfy judgement
rendered in this case.
SO ORDERED.15
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the Heirs of Lastimosa16 filed an appeal before the CA,
questioning the Writ of Execution and Demolition issued by the lower court.
On December 6, 2013, the Fifteenth Division of the CA rendered the assailed
Decision17 dismissing the appeal on the following grounds, to wit: (i) the Heirs of
Lastimosa availed of the wrong remedy by filing an appeal, instead of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65; (ii) the matter pertaining to the non-inclusion of Felicitas
is already barred by res judicata, as it has been settled with finality in CA-G.R. SP No.
95592, and affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 185056; and (iii) the execution
of the decision rendered by the RTC Branch 55 is proper considering that case has long
attained finality. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Order dated April 6, 2011 is
AFFIRMED.18
Felicitas filed a Motion for Reconsideration against the same Decision, which was
denied by the CA in its Resolution19 dated August 7, 2014.
Undeterred, Felicitas filed the instant petition for review on certiorari20 under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed CA decision and
resolution.
The Issue
The main issue for this Court's resolution rests on whether the CA erred in ordering the
execution of the Decision dated March 16, 2004.
In seeking the reversal of the assailed decision, Felicitas claims that the Writ of
Execution and Demolition issued by the RTC Branch 55 was executed against the
wrong party.21 She points out that she was not impleaded in the case for recovery of
ownership and possession, and thus the decision cannot bind her.22Felicitas argues that
she was deprived of her property as an heir without due process, as she was left out of
the proceedings, "completely unable to protect her rights."23 In addition, Felicitas
contends that the execution cannot continue as the Writ of Execution is being enforced
against property that is exempt from execution, as what is sought to be demolished is
her family home. In this regard, Article 155 of the Family Code ordains that the family
home shall be exempt from execution.24
On the other hand, the Heirs of Nivera counter that the petition for review
on certiorari is nothing but a dilatory tactic employed by Felicitas to overthrow and
delay the execution of the judgment rendered in as early as March 16, 2004.25 The Heirs
of Nivera maintain that Felicitas' claim that she was deprived of her property as an heir
without due process of law has already been settled with finality in the Petition for
Annulment of Judgement, which was dismissed by the CA, and this Court.26 Likewise,
anent the claim that the subject property is exempt from execution, the Heirs of Nivera
aver that Felicitas failed to present an iota of evidence to prove her claim. On the
contrary, Felicitas herself admitted in her pleadings that she does not reside in the
subject property in Alaminos, but actually lives in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.27 Moreover, the
subject property belonged to the Heirs of Nivera in as early as the 1950s, thereby
negating Felicitas' claim that it is her family home.28
Ruling of the Court
The petition is bereft of merit.
Nothing is more settled than the rule that a judgment that is final and executory is
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, except when
the judgment is void, or to correct clerical errors or to make nunc pro tunc entries. In
the same vein, the decision that has attained finality becomes the law of the case,
regardless of any claim that it is erroneous. Any amendment or alteration which
substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.29 Accordingly, the
court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, or
quash it, or stay its implementation.30
Concomitantly, neither may the parties object to the execution by raising new issues of
fact or law. The only exceptions thereto are when: "(i) the writ of execution varies the
judgment; (ii) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution
inequitable or unjust; (iii) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt
from execution; (iv) it appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment
of the court; (v) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room
for interpretation thereof; or (vi) it appears that the writ of execution has been
improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or issued against the wrong
party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was
issued without authority."31
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that in as early as March 16, 2004, the RTC
Branch 55 of Alaminos, Pangasinan rendered a Decision in the case for Recovery of
Ownership, Possession and Damages, ordering the Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate the
subject properties and surrender them to the Heirs of Nivera. There is no dispute that
this ruling of the RTC had become final and executory. Pursuant thereto, the lower
court issued a Writ of Execution and Demolition.

This notwithstanding, Felicitas seeks to prevent the execution of the same order,
arguing that the writ was issued against the wrong party; and that the property sought to
be executed is exempt from execution.
The Court is not persuaded.
It must be noted at the outset that the matter of whether Felicitas was deprived of due
process of law for not having been impleaded in the case for recovery of ownership and
possession has long been settled with finality.
In the decision of the CA in the case for Petition for Annulment of Judgment (CA-G.R.
SP No. 95592),32the Former Tenth Division of the CA squarely and judiciously passed
upon the issue of whether the. judgment of the lower court in the action for recovery of
ownership and possession was void for failure to implead Felicitas. The CA held that:
Finally, the intimation of the petitioners that private respondent is at fault for failing to
implead [Felicitas] as party defendant in this case is patently without basis. It must be
recalled that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the original
defendants Romualdo and Feliza Lastimosa. Hence, the outcome of this case is binding
on all the heirs or persons claiming rights under the said defendants. When [Romualdo]
died on March 3, 1997, the defendants filed an Urgent Motion to Substitute Other Heirs
of the said defendant listing the names of the heirs to be substituted. It is therefore
crystal clear that if [Felicitas] was not impleaded in this case as party defendant being
the daughter of [Romualdo], that omission could not be attributed to the private
respondent but the defendants themselves.33 (Underscoring in the original)
This ruling of the CA was affirmed by this Court in the Resolution dated June 3, 2009,
and attained finality as per Entry of Judgment. Markedly, it is crystal clear that the
issues pertaining to Felicitas' non-inclusion in the proceedings, and the consequent
validity of the lower court's judgment have long attained finality. It bears reiterating that
a judgment that is final and executory cannot be altered, even by the highest court of the
land. This final judgment has become the law of the case, which is now immutable.
Additionally, as an heir of the original defendants in the action for recovery of
ownership, Felicitas is bound by the decision rendered against her predecessors-in-
interest. Thus, there is nothing that exempts her from the enforcement of the Writ
ofExecution.
In another attempt to thwart the execution of the RTC's final and executory judgment,
Felicitas claims that the execution cannot proceed, as the subject property is her family
home and is therefore exempt from execution.
Indeed, the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated. It
confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties.34 It cannot be seized
by creditors except in certain special cases.35
However, the claim that the property is exempt from execution for being the movant's
family home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the
execution of a final and executory ruling. It must be noted that it is not sufficient for the
claimant to merely allege that such property is a family home. Whether the claim is
premised under the Old Civil Code or the Family Code, the claim for exemption must
be set up and proved.36
In fact, in Ramos, et al. v. Pangilinan, et al.,37 the Court, citing Spouses Kelley, Jr. v.
Planters Products, Inc., et al.,38 laid down the rules relative to the levy on execution of
the family home, viz.:
No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly
constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted
jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the
house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The
family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or
on the property of the unmarried head of the family. The actual value of the family
home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000 in urban
areas and P200,000 in rural areas.39
In addition, residence in the family home must be actual. The law explicitly mandates
that the occupancy of the family home, either by the owner thereof, or by any of its
beneficiaries must be actual. This occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as
opposed to something merely possible, or that which is merely presumptive or
constructive.40
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential tenets, it becomes all too apparent that Felicitas
cannot conveniently claim that the subject property is her family home, sans sufficient
evidence proving her allegation. It bears emphasis that it is imperative that her claim
must be backed with evidence showing that the home was indeed (i) duly constituted as
a family home, (ii) constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head
of a family, (iii) resided in by the family (or any of the family home's beneficiaries), (iv)
forms part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of
the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or property of the
unmarried head of the family, and (v) has an actual value of Php 300,000.00 in urban
areas, and Php 200,000.00 in rural areas.
A perusal of the petition, however, shows that aside from her bare allegation, Felicitas
adduced no proof to substantiate her claim that the property sought to be executed is
indeed her family home.
Interestingly, Felicitas admitted in her Motion for Reconsideration dated December 23,
2013, and her Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated June 22, 2006, that she is, and
has always been a resident of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.41 Similarly, the address indicated in
Felicitas' petition for review on certiorari is Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.42
Equally important, the Court takes judicial notice of the final ruling of the RTC Branch
55 in the case for recovery of ownership, that the subject property has belonged to the
Heirs of Nivera since the 1950s.43This automatically negates Felicitas' claim that the
property is her family home.

Undoubtedly, Felicitas' argument that the property subject of the writ of execution is a
family home, is an unsubstantiated allegation that cannot defeat the binding nature of a
final and executory judgment. Thus, the Writ of Execution and Demolition issued by
the RTC Branch 55 must perforce be given effect.

In fine, an effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment
has become final, the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
The case at bar reveals the attempt of the losing party to thwart the execution of a final
and executory judgment, rendered by. the court thirteen (13) long years ago. The Court
cannot sanction such vain and obstinate attempts to forestall the execution of a final
ruling. It is high time that the case be settled with finality and the ruling of the RTC
Branch 55 be given full force and effect.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated December 6, 2013 and Resolution dated August
7, 2014, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97309
are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER ABELLAN-
SALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-CULAN and DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO
PLATA respondents.
Josefina Brandares-Almazan for petitioner.
ABC Law Offices for private respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue in this petition is whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in
an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a family home
constituted under the Family Code.
The facts are undisputed.
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 09218 entitled "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.," the dispositive
part of which read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be, as it is hereby,
reversed and set aside. Judgment is hereby rendered finding the
defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly
and severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as hereinbelow set forth.
Accordingly, defendants-appellees are ordered to pay jointly and
severally to:
1. Plaintiffs-appellants, the Salinas spouses:
a. the amount of P30,000.00 by way of compensation for the death of
their son Audie Salinas;
b. P10,000.00 for the loss of earnings by reason of the death of said
Audie Salinas;
c. the sum of P5,000.00 as burial expenses of Audie Salinas; and
d. the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.
2. Plaintiffs-appellants Culan-Culan:
a. the sum of P5,000.00 for hospitalization expenses of Renato Culan-
Culan; and
b. P5,000.00 for moral damages.
3. Both plaintiff-appellants Salinas and Culan-Culan, P7,000.00 for
attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
All counterclaims and other claims are hereby dismissed. 1
The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and
chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao del
Sur.
On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion
Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 600 square meters with a market value of
P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359,
registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of
Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag,
Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00 and
assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in the
name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. 2
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose
Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is
where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and
as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153
of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the
judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of
those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the agricultural land
although it is declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be still part of the public
land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a
member of a cultural minority was not approved by the proper government agency. An
opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.
In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for
reconsideration thereof was filed by defendant and this was denied for lack of merit on
September 2, 1988.
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein it is alleged that the trial
court erred and acted in excess of its jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to quash
and/or to set aside levy on the properties and in denying petitioner' motion for
reconsideration of the order dated August 26, 1988. Petitioner contends that only a
question of law is involved in this petition. He asserts that the residential house and lot
was first occupied as his family residence in 1969 and was duly constituted as a family
home under the Family Code which took effect on August 4, 1988. Thus, petitioner
argues that the said residential house and lot is exempt from payment of the obligation
enumerated in Article 155 of the Family Code; and that the decision in this case
pertaining to damages arising from a vehicular accident took place on March 16, 1976
and which became final in 1988 is not one of those instances enumerated under Article
155 of the Family Code when the family home may be levied upon and sold on
execution. It is further alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the said house
and lot became a family home only on August 4, 1988 when the Family Code became
effective, and that the Family Code cannot be interpreted in such a way that all family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupancy prior to the effectivity of the said Code and that they are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of said Code;
and that it also erred when it declared that Article 162 of the Family Code does not state
that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the
wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where
they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided
and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same
judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides
in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the
creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending
credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material
men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for
the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of
the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a
family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a
family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August
4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it
was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162
of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean
that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of
their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment
aforecited No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was
incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money
judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988.
Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not
fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that
the levy to be made by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on
the land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-11005 October 31, 1957
SIARI VALLEY ESTATES, INC.,Petitioner, vs. FILEMON LUCASAN and Hon.
W. M. ORTEGA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte, Respondents.
Orendain and Sarmiento for petitioner.
Hon. Wenceslao M. Ortega in his own behalf.
Barrios, Barrios and Lucasan for respondents.
BENGZON, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
This is an offshoot of our decision in G.R. No. L-7046, Siari Valley Estate Inc, vs.
Filemon Lucasan, 1 wherein we affirmed, on appeal, the judgment of Hon. Patricio
Ceniza, of the Zamboanga court of first instance in its Civil Case No. 134. The
dispositive part of such affirmed judgment read as follows:
Valley Estate all the cattle that may be found in the cattle ranch ". . . judgment is hereby
rendered adjudicating to the Siari of Filemon Lucasan specially the 321 heads that had
been entrusted to his care as receiver or trustee of this Court and ordering the defendant
to deliver to the plaintiff all said cattle or their value amounting to P40,000 to pay
damages to the Siari Valley Estate for the 400 heads of cattle that he sold since 1946 up
to the date of the trial at the rate of P100 per head or P40,000 plus interest at the rate of
6 per cent from the date of the trial of this case in January, 1951 and to pay the cost of
the proceeding. In addition, the defendant is hereby ordered to allow the Siari Valley
Estate to round up all the buffaloes that may be found in his cattle ranch after the Siari
Valley Estate shall have posted a bond in the amount of P5,000 to answer for whatever
damages the operation may cause to him.
With regard to the contempt proceedings, Filemon Lucasan is hereby found guilty of the
charges and he is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P500 pursuant to section 6 Rule 64
of the Rules of Court or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate
of one day every P2.50 that he falls to pay.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
With regard to the three causes of action the counter-claim of the defendant, all of them
are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Upon petition by the intervenors, the intervention had been dismissed in a previous
order of this Court, without prejudice to the filing of an independent action. (emphasis
ours.)chanrobles virtual law library
After our decision had become final, the expediente was returned to the court below for
execution. Thereupon a dispute arose whether we had affirmedalso that part of Judge
Ceniza's judgement underlined in the above quotation (concerning buffaloes) Lucasan
pointed out that, in quoting the dispositive paragraphs of the appealed judgment, our
decision had omitted the underlined portion. Therefore, he argued, the affirmance of the
judgment did not include the directive about buffaloes. As the respondent judge
sustained Lucasan's contention, this petition for mandamus and other auxiliary remedies
was promptly filed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Knowing the extent and scope of our decision in said appealed case, we issued a
preliminary injunction designed to protest petitioner's interests. And now, after the
parties have been heard, we turn to the principal question, which is: did we uphold the
right given to plaintiff by the court below "to round up the buffaloes"? The answer must
be: we did. In the concluding part of our decision we found the appealed judgment to be
substantially in accordance with the facts and the law; and then we adjudged:
"Therefore it is hereby affirmed with appellant."chanrobles virtual law library
Ordinarily the affirmed judgment is that contained in its dispositive part; in the said
Siari Valley appealed case, the above-quoted four
paragraphs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is true that in the opening statements our decision quoted the dispositive part of the
appealed judgment as follows:
Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudicating to the Siari Valley
Estate all the cattle that may be found in the cattle ranch of Filemon Lucasan, specially
the 321 heads that had been entrusted to his care as receiver or trustee of this Court and
ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff all said cattle or their value amounting
to P40,000, to pay damages to the Siari Valley Estate for the 400 heads of cattle that he
sold since 1946 up to the date of the trial at the rate of P100 per head or P40,000 plus
interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of the trial of this case in January, 1951
and to pay the costs of the proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
With regard to the contempt proceedings, Filemon Lucasan is hereby found guilty of the
charges and he is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P500 pursuant to section 6, Rule 64,
of the Rules of Court or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate
of one day for every P2.50 that he fails to pay.
thereby omitting the portion regarding buffaloes. But observe that we used elliptical
signs, i. e. several *'s which indicated the omission of some portion or portions. This did
not evince any intention to "modify" the judgment by eliminating the omitted
portion. 2 The judgment, we decreed in concluding, "is hereby affirmed". We did not
say, it is hereby modified. Neither did we say, "the quoted portion of the judgment is
hereby affirmed". For that matter, would respondents maintain likewise the last two
paragraphs of the dispositive part of the appealed judgment (regarding the counterclaim
and the intervenors) were not equally affirmed, because they were not remembering that the power to punish for contempt should be conservatively
quoted?chanrobles virtual law library exercised.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We explained in Contreras vs. Felix, 78 Phil., 570, 44 Off. Gaz., 4306 that "the final
judgment as rendered is the judgment of the court, irrespective of all seemingly contrary
statements in the decision", and that the judgement must be distinguished from the
opinion. Our decree was one affirming the appealed judgment. If any statement in the
opinion preceding the decree seemingly excluded a portion (which we deny), it must be
overlooked, because the judgment or the decree prevails over the
opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Wherefore, the petition for mandamusis granted, the respondent judge, and whoever
may be acting in his place, is hereby ordered to enforce, and the other respondent
Filemon Lucasan is ordered to obey, the aforementioned judgment in full of Judge
Ceniza which was totally affirmed by this Court on appeal. Costs of this proceeding
shall be paid respondent Lucasan. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles v

In construing confirmatory decisions of appellate courts the practice is to regard the

whole of the appealed judgment to have been upheld 3 even if several points thereof
have not been discussed "or touched upon such confirmatory decision." 4 chanrobles
virtual law library

The truth is, as may be verified from our decision itself, our statement omitted the
portion concerning buffaloes because it was immaterial for the purpose of the appeal. It
was not a point necessary to understand or decide the questions then before us. 5 Indeed
the whole decision made no reference to the subject of buffaloes, even as appellant's
brief (Lucasan) failed to debate such aspect of the appealed
judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The argument is advanced that inasmuch as the plaintiff "never claimed the buffaloes in
its amended complaint (and) the (lower) court could not have granted that which was
not prayed", therefore the Supreme Court most probably had excluded the matter (of
buffaloes) from its confirmatory order. Such reasoning has no valid foundation because
Lucasan was not in default, there was trial, and under the circumstances the plaintiff
could be granted any relief that was supported by the evidence "although not specified
in his pleadings." 6 The other argument addressed to the proposition that the Court
shouldn't have, and couldn't have affirmed that phase of the judgment is too late, if not
impertinent. The affirmance without modification of the judgment is final. And the
parties should realize that the matter of buffaloes was not such plain error (supposing it
was error) as to call for special consideration by this Court even if ignored 7 by
appellant's counsel in his brief.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

All the foregoing shows the respondent judge's mistake in declining to permit Siari
Valley Inc. to round up its buffaloes roaming on Lucasan's ranch. But the latter's
resistance to such rounding-up, founded on a rather technical plea, despite his
knowledge that he had complained of such buffaloes grazing on his land (R. A. in L-
7046 p. 140), was not a mere mistake but a rather sharp practice transcending the limits
of good faith. However-overruling petitioner's contention-Lucasan will not be declared
to have committed contempt of court considering on the one hand that his ground of
objection appeared to be not so flimsy 8 as to make his conduct a "willful disregard or
disobedience" 9 or a "clear and contumacious refusal to obey" 10 and on the other hand
G.R. No. 185064 January 16, 2012 On October 21, 1992, the RTC rendered a Decision3 acquitting the petitioners but
ordering them to pay Claudio the amount of ₱100,000.00 with legal interest from date
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA, Petitioner, of demand until fully paid.
vs.
SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and MA. RUFINA D. ACERO, SHERIFF On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte
FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and REGISTRAR ALFREDO (Sheriff Samonte) levied upon the subject property. On March 9, 1994, the subject
SANTOS, Respondents. property was sold on public auction; Claudio was the highest bidder and the
corresponding certificate of sale was issued to him.
DECISION
Sometime in February 1995, Claudio leased the subject property to the petitioners and a
REYES, J.: certain Juanito Oliva (Juanito) for a monthly rent of ₱5,500.00. However, the petitioners
and Juanito defaulted in the payment of the rent and as of October 3, 1998, their total
accountabilities to Claudio amounted to ₱170,500.00.
Nature of the Petition

Meanwhile, on March 24, 1995, a Final Deed of Sale4 over the subject property was
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
issued to Claudio and on April 4, 1995, the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan
the Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa (Araceli) and Ernesto S. De Mesa (Ernesto),
assailing the Court of Appeals’ (CA) Decision1 dated June 6, 2008 and cancelled TCT No. T-76.725 (M) and issued TCT No. T-221755 (M)5 in his favor.
Resolution2 dated October 23, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 79391 entitled "Spouses
Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto De Mesa v. Spouses Claudio Acero, Jr., et al." Unable to collect the aforementioned rentals due, Claudio and his wife Ma. Rufina
Acero (Rufina) (collectively referred to as Spouses Acero) filed a complaint for
ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan against the
The Antecedent Facts
petitioners and Juanito. In their defense, the petitioners claimed that Spouses Acero
have no right over the subject property. The petitioners deny that they are mere lessors;
This involves a parcel of land situated at No. 3 Forbes Street, Mount Carmel Homes on the contrary, they are the lawful owners of the subject property and, thus cannot be
Subdivision, Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan, which was formerly covered by Transfer evicted therefrom.
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-76.725 (M) issued by the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan and registered under Araceli’s name. The petitioners jointly
On July 22, 1999, the MTC rendered a Decision,6 giving due course to Spouses Acero’s
purchased the subject property on April 17, 1984 while they were still merely
complaint and ordering the petitioners and Juanito to vacate the subject property.
cohabiting before their marriage. A house was later constructed on the subject property,
which the petitioners thereafter occupied as their family home after they got married Finding merit in Spouses Acero’s claims, the MTC dismissed the petitioners' claim of
ownership over the subject property. According to the MTC, title to the subject property
sometime in January 1987.
belongs to Claudio as shown by TCT No. T-221755 (M).
Sometime in September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr.
The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was
(Claudio) in the amount of ₱100,000.00, which was secured by a mortgage over the
subject property. As payment, Araceli issued a check drawn against China Banking issued in Claudio’s name up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the
petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made by Sheriff Samonte, the
Corporation payable to Claudio.
regularity of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of
Claudio’s Torrens title that was resultantly issued.
When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored as the account from
which it was drawn had already been closed. The petitioners failed to heed Claudio’s
The petitioners appealed the MTC’s July 22, 1999 Decision to the RTC. This appeal
subsequent demand for payment.
was, however, dismissed in a Decision dated November 22, 1999 due to the petitioners’
failure to submit their Memorandum. The petitioners sought reconsideration of the said
Thus, on April 26, 1990, Claudio filed with the Prosecutor's Office of Malolos, Bulacan decision but the same was denied in an Order dated January 31, 2000.
a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) against the petitioners.
After preliminary investigation, an information for violation of B.P. 22 was filed against
Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for review7 with the CA assailing the
the petitioners with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan.
RTC’s November 22, 1999 Decision and January 31, 2000 Order. In a December 21,
2006 Decision,8 the CA denied the petitioner’s petition for review. This became final on
July 25, 2007.9
In the interregnum, on October 29, 1999, the petitioners filed against the respondents a
complaint10 to nullify TCT No. T-221755 (M) and other documents with damages with
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Therein, the petitioners asserted that the subject property
is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus,
could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the March 15, 1993
writ of execution.
On September 3, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision,11 which dismissed the petitioners’
complaint. Citing Article 155(3) of the Family Code, the RTC ruled that even assuming
that the subject property is a family home, the exemption from execution does not
apply. A mortgage was constituted over the subject property to secure the loan Araceli
obtained from Claudio and it was levied upon as payment therefor.
The petitioners sought reconsideration of the RTC’s September 3, 2002 Decision but
this was denied in a Resolution12 dated January 14, 2003.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s disposition in its Decision13 dated June 6, 2008.
The CA ratiocinated that the exemption of a family home from execution, attachment or
forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is not automatic and should
accordingly be raised and proved to the Sheriff prior to the execution, forced sale or
attachment. The appellate court noted that at no time did the petitioners raise the
supposed exemption of the subject property from execution on account of the same
being a family home.
The petitioners then sought reconsideration of the said June 6, 2008 Decision but the
same was denied by the CA in its Resolution14 dated October 23, 2008.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant petition for review, praying for the
cancellation of TCT No. T-221755 (M). They insist that the execution sale that was
conducted is a nullity considering that the subject property is a family home. The
petitioners assert that, contrary to the disposition of the CA, a prior demonstration that
the subject property is a family home is not required before it can be exempted from
execution.
In their Comment,15 Spouses Acero claimed that this petition ought to be denied on the
ground of forum-shopping as the issues raised had already been determined by the MTC
in its July 22, 1999 Decision on the complaint for ejectment filed by them, which had
already become final and executory following the petitioner’s failure to appeal the CA’s
December 21, 2006 Decision affirming it.
Issues
The threshold issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether the petitioners are
guilty of forum-shopping; and (b) whether the lower courts erred in refusing to cancel
Claudio’s Torrens title TCT No. T-221755 (M) over the subject property.
The Court’s Ruling
First Issue: Forum-Shopping
On the first issue, we find that the petitioners are not guilty of forum-shopping.
There is forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in
anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means
other than an appeal or certiorari. Forum-shopping exists when two or more actions
involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances; and raise identical
causes of action, subject matter, and issues.16
Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. The elements of
forum-shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent
the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding particulars
such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.17
There is no identity of issues and reliefs prayed for in the ejectment case and in the
action to cancel TCT No. T-221755 (M). Verily, the primordial issue in the ejectment
case is who among the contending parties has a better right of possession over the
subject property while ownership is the core issue in an action to cancel a Torrens title.
It is true that the petitioners raised the issue of ownership over the subject property in
the ejectment case. However, the resolution thereof is only provisional as the same is
solely for the purpose of determining who among the parties therein has a better right of
possession over the subject property.
Accordingly, a judgment rendered in an ejectment case is not a bar to action between
the same parties respecting title to the land or building. Neither shall it be conclusive as
to the facts therein. This issue is far from being novel and there is no reason to depart
from this Court’s previous pronouncements. In Malabanan v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao,
Inc.,18 this Court had previously clarified that a decision in an ejectment case is not res
judicata in an annulment of title case and vice-versa given the provisional and
inconclusive nature of the determination of the issue of ownership in the former.
Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a)
identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res
judicata in the other.
Petitioner and respondent are the same parties in the annulment and ejectment cases.
The issue of ownership was likewise being contended, with same set of evidence being
presented in both cases. However, it cannot be inferred that a judgment in the ejectment
case would amount to res judicata in the annulment case, and vice-versa.
This issue is hardly a novel one. It has been laid to rest by heaps of cases iterating the
principle that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action between
the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be conclusive as to
the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of
action involving possession.
It bears emphasizing that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the physical
or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership
by any of the party litigants. However, the issue of ownership may be provisionally
ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.
Therefore, the provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be
clothed with finality.
Corollarily, the incidental issue of whether a pending action for annulment would abate
an ejectment suit must be resolved in the negative.
A pending action involving ownership of the same property does not bar the filing or
consideration of an ejectment suit, nor suspend the proceedings. This is so because an
ejectment case is simply designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece
of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without
prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in
appropriate proceedings.19(citations omitted)
Second Issue: Nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M)
Anent the second issue, this Court finds that the CA did not err in dismissing the
petitioners’ complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M).
The subject property is a family home.
The petitioners maintain that the subject property is a family home and, accordingly, the
sale thereof on execution was a nullity. In Ramos v. Pangilinan,20 this Court laid down
the rules relative to exemption of family homes from execution:
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what
law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied
with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets
of rules are applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before
August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-
judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code.
Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before
the courts and the registration of the court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area
where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by
Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument
which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with
either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing
of the privilege.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially,
and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any
of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home
should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by
one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must
not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the
debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for
which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3,
1988.21 (citations omitted)
In the earlier case of Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.,22 we stressed that:
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
(August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family
residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family
Code.23 (emphasis supplied and citation omitted)
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from
execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code
or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially
or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order
to be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus
 exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially
constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but
were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under
the Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There
was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as
a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home
by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners
were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.
The family home’s exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the
Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been
exempt from execution, we nevertheless rule that the CA did not err in dismissing the
petitioners’ complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M). We agree with the
CA that the petitioners should have asserted the subject property being a family home
and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable
time thereafter. As the CA aptly pointed out:
In the light of the facts above summarized, it is evident that appellants did not assert
their claim of exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time, for
purposes of the law on exemption, does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-
year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for judgment
debtors to redeem the property sold on execution, otherwise it would render nugatory
final bills of sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of execution – to put an end
to litigation. x x x.24
The foregoing disposition is in accord with the Court’s November 25, 2005 Decision
in Honrado v. Court of Appeals,25 where it was categorically stated that at no other time
can the status of a residential house as a family home can be set up and proved and its
exemption from execution be claimed but before the sale thereof at public auction:
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under
Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved
to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in Gomez v.
Gealone:
Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the
exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by
the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable
period thereafter;
"In the absence of express provision it has variously held that claim (for exemption)
must be made at the time of the levy if the debtor is present, that it must be made within
a reasonable time, or promptly, or before the creditor has taken any step involving
further costs, or before advertisement of sale, or at any time before sale, or within a
reasonable time before the sale, or before the sale has commenced, but as to the last
there is contrary authority."
In the light of the facts above summarized, it is self-evident that appellants did not
assert their claim of exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time, for
purposes of the law on exemption, does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-
year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for judgment
debtors to redeem the property sold on execution, otherwise it would render nugatory
final bills of sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of execution—to put an end
to litigation.1awphil We said before, and We repeat it now, that litigation must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of
justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. We now rule that claims for exemption
from execution of properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be
presented before its sale on execution by the sheriff.26 (citations omitted)
Reiterating the foregoing in Spouses Versola v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court stated
that:
Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence; there is no need to constitute the same
judicially or extrajudicially.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of
the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as
such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the
sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming
exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for
exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. x x x.28 (emphasis supplied and
citations omitted)
Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject
property before the sale thereof at public auction, the petitioners now are barred from
raising the same. Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption.
Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of
cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime.29 It is likewise without dispute that
the family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.30

The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.31 However,
this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the
status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time
thereafter.

In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners allowed a considerable time to lapse
before claiming that the subject property is a family home and its exemption from
execution and forced sale under the Family Code. The petitioners allowed the subject
property to be levied upon and the public sale to proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the
time the subject property was sold until a Final Deed of Sale was issued to Claudio and,
later, Araceli’s Torrens title was cancelled and a new one issued under Claudio’s name,
still, the petitioner remained silent. In fact, it was only after the respondents filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer, or approximately four (4) years from the time of the
auction sale, that the petitioners claimed that the subject property is a family home,
thus, exempt from execution.

For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence or omission to assert their right
within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned,
waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family
Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the
same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the
status of the subject property as a family home.

The petitioners’ negligence or omission renders their present assertion doubtful; it

appears that it is a mere afterthought and artifice that cannot be countenanced without
doing the respondents injustice and depriving the fruits of the judgment award in their
favor. Simple justice and fairness and equitable considerations demand that Claudio’s
title to the property be respected. Equity dictates that the petitioners are made to suffer
the consequences of their unexplained negligence.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition

is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 79391, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. 1058-M-99 and dismissed the
complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT No. 221755 (M) and other documents, and
the October 23, 2008 Resolution denying reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R.
No. 37034-R, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
in Civil Case No. 6529.
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His
first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael,
and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had
five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in
1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still
living. Her deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia,
Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido. Nicanora
Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons,
Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely:
Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is
dead, but survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely:
Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido,
Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is
survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of
Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-
judicial Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471,
506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan,
Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second
thoughts about the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, which complaint was later amended on February
22, 1963, against the children of the second marriage, praying for the annulment of the
so-called "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another partition
of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone. They alleged, among other
things, that they had been induced by the defendants to execute the document in
question through misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that the lots
which were partitioned in said document belonged to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido
with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to
the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The defendants denied the foregoing
allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the
"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition." However, it did not order the
partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that
the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were
legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio
Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of Lucio
Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment
as follows: declaring the following as the legitimate children and
grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong: Felix
Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Inocencia Perido, Leonora Perido,
Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia
Perido; Nicanora Perido, deceased; great grandchildren: Rolando
Salde and Eduardo Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased; grandchildren:
Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano Perido, deceased; great
grandson: George Perido; Amparo Perido and Wilfredo Perido; and,
Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as the legitimate
children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat: Eusebio Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Pacita Perido,
Magdalena Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa
Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B. Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A.
Perido; Maria Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3)
declaring all lots (471, 506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except
Lot No. 458 as exclusive properties of Lucio Perido so that each of
them should be divided into eight (8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix
Perido, but because of his death leaving eight (8) children, the same
should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/64 to Inocencia Perido of
age, widow; 1/64 to Leonora Perido, of age, married to Manuel
Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age, married to Honorata Villasana;
1/64 to Paulino Perido, of age, married to Norma Villalba 1/64 to
Letia Perido, of age, married to Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia
Perido, of age, married to Felix Villaruz; 1/64 to Eufemia Perido, of
age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but because she is now dead the
same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/128 to Rolando
Salde, of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde, of age, single; 1/8
belongs to Ismael Perido, but because he is already dead leaving five
 children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/40 to
Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to Alfredo Perido, of age
married to Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano Perido, but he is already
dead with one son, the same goes to George Perido, of age, single;
1/40 to Wilfredo Perido, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita
Perido, of age, widow; 1/8 belongs to Eusebio Perido, but because he
is already dead with seven children, the same should be divided and
alloted as follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age, single; 1/56
goes to Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido,
of age, married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age,
married to Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age, single;
1/56 goes to Teresa Perido, of are single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of
age, married to Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to Juan B. Perido, but
because he is already dead with one child, the same 1/8 goes to Juan
A. Perido, of age, married to Salud Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria Perido.
of age, married to Julio Pirote; 1/8 goes to Sofronia Perido, of age,
widow; and, 1/8 goes to Gonzalo Perido, of age, married to
Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the 11/12 shares in Lot No.
458 as conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat, which should be divided and alloted as follows: 11/24 goes
to Lucio Perido to be divided into eight (8) equal shares and 11/24
goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into five (5) equal shares or
11/120 for each of the children and again to be divided by the
children of each child now deceased; (6) declaring Fidel Perido owner
of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among his heirs to be
determined accordingly later; and (6) declaring null and void Exhibit
"J" of the plaintiffs which is Exhibit "10" for the defendants, without
costs and without adjudication with respect to the counterclaim and
damages, they being members of the same family, for equity and
justice.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred: (1) in
declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo
Perido, were the legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat; (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471,
506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807, and 808 of Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental, and in not declaring that said lots were the conjugal partnership property of
Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong; and (3) in holding that 11/12 of Lot
458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals
affirmed it in toto. The appellants moved to reconsider but were turned down.
Thereupon they instituted he instant petition for review reiterating in effect the
assignments of error and the arguments in the brief they submitted to the appellate
court.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with
Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on the
theory that the first three were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio
Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and were not
recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. In support of their contention
they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three children were born, as
testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by petitioner Leonora
Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on the face of
the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his second
wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony
of petitioner Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to
show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This
finding conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the circumstance,
Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of
their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued
to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the statement was not
conclusive to show that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat.
Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living
together husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption, especially
where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by
cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs.
Cheong Seng Gee1 this Court explained the rationale behind this presumption, thus:
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant violation of decency and
of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume
marriage."
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the
presumption of marriage arising from previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that both
the trial court and the appellate court did not even pass upon the uncorroborated
testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on the matter. The reason is obvious. Said
witness, when asked why she knew that Marcelina Baliguat was married to Lucio
Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it because "during the celebration of
the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from (their) garden and placed
in the altar." Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five
children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and,
therefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or not Lots Nos.
471, 506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807 and 808 were the exclusive properties of Lucio
Perido. In disposing of the contention of the petitioners that said lots belong to the
conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court of
Appeals said:têñ.£îhqwâ£
... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that
the lands covered by the certificates of title (Exhs. B to G) were all
declared in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there is evidence showing
that the lands were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother
(t.s.n., p. 21, Feb. 20, 1964). In other words, they were the exclusive
properties of the late Lucio Perido which he brought into the first and
second marriages. By fiat of law said Properties should be divided
accordingly among his legal heirs.
stronger when the document recites that the spouse in whose name the
land is registered is married to somebody else, like in the case at bar.
It appearing that the legal presumption that the No. 458 belonged to
the conjugal partnership had not been overcome by clear proofs to the
contrary, we are constrained to rule, that the same is the conjugal
property of the deceased spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat.
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they were able to prove
that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was the conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first
wife, Benita Talorong, and that the purchase price of the additional 5/12 of said lot
came from the proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido and his
three children of the first marriage. As in the second assignment of error, the issue
raised here also involves appreciation of the evidence and, consequently, the finding of
the appellate court on the matter is binding on this Court. Indeed, a review of that
finding would require an examination of all the evidence introduced before the trial
court, a consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of the circumstances
surrounding the case, their relevancy or relation to one another and to the whole, as well
as an appraisal of the probabilities of the entire situation. It would thus abolish the
distinction between an ordinary appeal on the one hand and review on certiorari on the
other, and thus defeat the purpose for which the latter procedure has been established.2

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the
aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother and contend against the petitioners.
that they were able to establish through the testimonies of their witnesses that the
spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong acquired them during their lifetime. Again,
the petitioners cannot be sustained. The question involves appreciation of the evidence,
which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals, the factual findings of which are
not reviewable by this Court.

The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal
partnership property of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Said the
appellate court:têñ.£îhqwâ£

With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original

Certificate of Title No. 21769 issued in 1925 the same should be
considered conjugally owned by Lucio Perido and his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the lower court on this point need
not be disturbed. It is expressly stated in the certificate of title (Exh.
L) that Lucio Perido, the registered owner, was married to Marcelina
Baliguat unlike in the previous land titles. If the law presumes a
property registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be
conjugal (Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48 Phil. 144; Flores vs. Flores, 48
Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922), the presumption becomes
G.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA DE LA
PUERTA, respondents.
Isabel de la Puerta for and in her own behalf.
Gilbert D. Camaligan for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation of private respondent Carmelita de
la Puerta, who claims successional lights to the estate of her alleged grandmother.
Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will leaving her
properties to her three surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all
surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and
was appointed executrix of the will.1
The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by her brothers, who
averred that their mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will and
did not fully comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some of the properties listed in the
inventory of her estate belonged to them exclusively. 2
Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the probate court. 3 Alfredo
subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. 4
On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First Instance of
Quezon a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta. After hearing, the petition was
granted. 5 However, the decision was appealed by Isabel to the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move for the
dismissal of the case 6
On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate
proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the
acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta.7 At the hearing on her motion,
Carmelita presented evidence to prove her claimed status to which Isabel was allowed
to submit counter-evidence.
On November 12,1982, the probate court granted the motion, declaring that it was
satisfied from the evidence at hand that Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la
Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support. The court added that
"the evidence presented by the petitioner against it (was) too weak to discredit the
same.8
On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the respondent court,9 which is
now in turn being challenged in this petition before us.
The petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not the natural child of Vicente de
la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and remained his wife
until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan.
Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she argues that Carmelita was the legitimate
child of Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan, who were legally or presumably married.
Moreover, Carmelita could not have been a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta
because he was already married at the time of her birth in 1962.
To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado Magpantay, who testified that he was a
neighbor of Austrial and Jordan. According to him, the two were living as husband and
wife and had three children, including a girl named "Puti," presumably Carmelita. He
said though that he was not sure if the couple was legally married.10
Another witness, Genoveva de la Puerta, Identified herself as Vicente de la Puerta's
wife but said they separated two years after their marriage in 1938 and were never
reconciled. In 1962, Gloria Jordan started living with Vicente de la Puerta in his house,
which was only five or six houses away from where she herself was staying. Genoveva
said that the relationship between her husband and Gloria was well known in the
community.11
In finding for Carmelita, the lower court declared that:
. . . By her evidence, it was shown to the satisfaction of the Court that
she was born on December 18, 1962 per her birth certificate (Exh. A);
that her father was Vicente de la Puerta and her mother is Gloria
Jordan who were living as common law husband and wife until his
death on June 14, 1978; that Vicente de la Puerta was married to, but
was separated from, his legal wife Genoveva de la Puerta; that upon
the death of Vicente de la Puerta on June 14, 1978 without leaving a
last will and testament, she was the only child who survived him
together with his spouse Genoveva de la Puerta with whom he did not
beget any child; that she was treated by Vicente de la Puerta as a true
child from the time of her birth until his father died; that the fact that
she was treated as a child of Vicente de la Puerta is shown by the
family pictures showing movant with Vicente de la Puerta (Exhs. D,
 D-1 and D-2) and school records wherein he signed the report cards
as her parent (Exh. E and E-1); that during the hearing of her adoption
case in Special Proceeding No. 0041 in Branch V of this Court at
Mauban, Quezon, Vicente de la Puerta categorically stated in court
that Carmelita de la Puerta is his daughter with Gloria Jordan (Exhs.
B and B-1); that it was Vicente de la Puerta during his lifetime who
spent for her subsistence, support and education; . . . 12
This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to disturb, absent any of those
circumstances we have laid down in a long line of decisions that will justify
reversal.13 Among these circumstances are: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of facts are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
The petitioner insists on the application of the following provisions of the Civil Code to
support her thesis that Carmelita is not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta but the
legitimate child of Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following
the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than
that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his
wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress.
These rules are in turn based on the presumption that Juanito and Gloria were married at
the time of Carmelita's birth in 1962, pursuant to Rule 131, Sec. 5(bb) of the Rules of
Court, providing that:
Sec. 5. Disputable presumptions.—The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(bb) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
But this last-quoted presumption is merely disputable and may be refuted with evidence
to the contrary. As the Court sees it, such evidence has been sufficiently established in
the case at bar.
The cases 14 cited by the petitioner are not exactly in point because they involve
situations where the couples lived continuously as husband and wife and so could be
reasonably presumed to be married. In the case before us, there was testimony from
Vicente's own wife that her husband and Gloria lived together as a married couple,
thereby rebutting the presumption that Gloria was herself the lawful wife of Juanita
Austrial.
Such testimony would for one thing show that Juanito and Gloria did not continuously
live together as a married couple. Moreover, it is not explained why, if he was really
married to her, Juanito did not object when Gloria left the conjugal home and started
openly consorting with Vicente, and in the same neighborhood at that. That was
unnatural, to say the least. It was different with Genoveva for she herself swore that she
had separated from Vicente two years after their marriage and had long lost interest in
her husband. In fact, she even renounced in open court any claim to Vicente's estate.15
The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria having been destroyed, it
became necessary for the petitioner to submit additional proof to show that the two were
legally married. She did not.
Turning now to the evidence required to prove the private respondent's filiation, we
reject the petitioner's contention that Article 278 of the Civil Code is not available to
Carmelita. It is error to contend that as she is not a natural child but a spurious child (if
at all) she cannot prove her status by the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or any authentic writing. On the contrary, it has long been settled that:
 The so-called spurious children or illegitimate children other than
natural children, commonly known as bastards, include adulterous
children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting
with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting
with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and
successional rights (Art. 287, CC). But their filiation must be duly
proven.(Ibid, Art. 887)
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code
allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity of spurious
children under the circumstances specified in Articles 283 and 284 of
the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory
recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural
children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rule
on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children
may be applied to spurious children. 16
This being so, we need not rule now on the admissibility of the private respondent's
certificate of birth as proof of her filiation. That status was sufficiently established by
the sworn testimony of Vicente de la Puerta at the hearing of the petition for adoption
on September 6, 1976, where he categorically declared as follows:
Q What relation if any do you have with Carmelita
de la Puerta?
A She is my daughter. 17
Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to wit: May Carmelita de la Puerta claim
support and successional rights to the estate of Dominga Revuelta?
According to Article 970 of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue
of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would
have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The first reason is that
Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and the second is that Carmelita is a
spurious child.
It is settled that —
In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place
only in the following cases: first, when the person represented dies
before the testator; second, when the person represented is incapable
of succeeding the testator; and third, when the person represented is
disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases, since there is a
vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children or descendants
of the person represented to succeed by right of representation. 18
xxx xxx xxx
The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a
deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he would have
had if still living. In the present case, however, said deceased had
already succeeded his aunt, the testatrix herein. . . . It is a fact that at
the time of the death of the testatrix, Reynaldo Cuison was still alive.
He died two months after her (testatrix's) death. And upon his death,
he transmitted to his heirs, the petitioners herein Elisa Cuison et al.,
the legacy or the right to succeed to the legacy. . . . In other words, the
herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to succeed to the right to
the property of the testatrix, but rather to the right of the legatee
Reynaldo Cuison in said property. 19
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to inherit
from her directly or in his own right. No right of representation was involved, nor could
it be invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death, which came after his own mother's
death. It would have been different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga
Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited from her in representation of her
father Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir.
But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is
barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which
lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. This article
provides quite clearly:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
Applying this rule in Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court declared:
. . . even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo,
still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate
left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again
by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by
 the fact that when he was born, his alleged putative father and mother WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed decision is hereby
were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It is so
marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an ordered.
illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased
Francisca Reyes.

The reason for this rule was explained in the recent case of Diaz v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 21 thus:

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in
that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie
of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article
992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former in turn sees in the illegitimate
child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish
broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further ground of resentment. 22

Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting from
Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between them and
consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. As aptly pointed out by Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino:

If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter
cannot represent the former in the inheritance from the parents or
ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is not related to the
deceased in that case, because the filiation created by fiction of law is
exclusively between the adopter and the adopted. "By adoption, the
adopters can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus make
one for their kindred. 23

The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has
successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga
Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be filed in the
proceedings for the settlement of her own father's
estate 24 and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta's Will.
 SECOND DIVISION
[ AC No. 2115, November 27, 1990 ]
FELICIDAD BARIÑAN TAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. GALILEO J. TROCIO,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint, filed on 9 November 1979, complainant Felicidad BariñanTan
seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Galileo J. Trocio for immorality and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer.
Complainant, owner and directress of Harlyn Vocational School in Baroy, Lanao del
Norte, declares that sometime in April, 1971, at about 8:30 PM, after classes were
dismissed, respondent, who is the legal counsel of the school, overpowered her inside
the office and, against her will, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
her. As aresult, she begot a son on 5 February 1972 whom she named and registered as
Jewel Tan. She avers that respondent used to support Jewel but subsequently
lost interestin doing so thereby neglecting to defray the needed expenses for Jewel's
well-being. Complainant also alleges that the respondent threatened her with the
deportation of her alien husband if she complained to the authorities since she was
violating the Anti-Dummy Law in operating the vocational school. This threat, aside
from the factthat Complainant is a married woman with eight children and a school
directress at the time of the sexual assault, made her desist from filing a charge against
the respondent. However, after eight years and thorough soul-searching, she decided to
file this administrative complaint.
Respondent, in his Answer, admits having acted as a lawyer of the vocational school. In
fact, he contends that he had also served as the lawyer of the Complainant, her family
and her parents-in-law. Thus, in 1971, he helped prosecute a case for robbery
committed against Complainant's mother and sisters. Also, in March of 1976, when a
fire of unknown origin gutted the school, he assisted the complainant in collecting
P10,000.00 from FGU Insurance Group, and P40,000.00 from Fortune Insurance
Corporation as indemnities. With regard to the same case, he also represented
complainant in a suit involving a P130,000.00 claim against the
Workmen's Insurance Corporation before the then Court of First Instance
of Lanao del Norte. Then in 1978, he was retained as a collaborating attorney by
Complainant's family in an inheritance case. Further, her father-in-law had always
consulted him in matters affecting the former's store.
But respondent vehemently denies that he had sexually assaulted the Complainant. He
argues that her motivation in filing this charge was to get even with him after having
been humiliated when he declined her request to commit a "breach of trust." He states
that in the inheritance case he handled for her family. Complainant insisted that he
report to her mother and sisters that he had charged a fee of P15,000.00 instead of the
P2,500.00 he actually received so that she could pocket the difference. He refused and
told the Complainant to look for another lawyer. She tried twice to make peace with
him but was unsuccessful. Rebuffed, she promised to get even with him. Thus, this
complaint.
Another reason why Complainant filed the present case, respondent claims, is to escape
her indebtedness to him representing his services as legal counsel of the school which
were unpaid since 1974 and the accumulated honoraria from her fire insurance
claims. These obligations were left unpaid despite demand made when respondent
learned that Complainant had sold a piece of land in Agusan.
On 2 June 1980, the Court, acting upon the Complaint and the Answer already filed,
referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On 19 August 1980, said Office, upon the request of the Complaint that the
investigation be held in Lanao del Norte as she and her witnesses could not afford
to come to Manila, referred the case to the Provincial Fiscal of said province for the
necessary proceedings.
Between September and October of 1980, hearings were conducted on the case. In a
Report and Recommendation, dated 16 January 1981, the Provincial Fiscal stated
that respondent failed to attend the hearing despite the issuance of subpoenae; that
there was prima facie evidence showing that respondent had committed acts violative of
his professional decorum; and, that he was recommending disciplinary action against
him. The records of the case were then forwarded to the Office of the Solicitor General.
On 1 September 1982, the Office of the Solicitor General returned the records to the
Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte for re-investigation on the ground that
the investigation was conducted in the absence of respondent, who did
not appear despite subpoenas sent to him. Thus, further proceedings were conducted by
the Provincial Fiscal wherein Respondent was allowed to submit a sworn
letter, dated 13 December 1985, amplifying on the defenses contained in his Answer.
On 13 February 1986, the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte issued a Resolution
adopting his previous Report and Recommendation of 16 January 1981, which
found prima facie evidence to hold Respondent administratively liable. On the same
day, the records of the case were referred back to the Office of the Solicitor General.
On 16 May 1986, the Office of the Solicitor General came up with its own Report
recommending that Respondent be disbarred for gross immoral conduct. On 17 July
1986, as directed by the Court, the Solicitor General filed a formal Complaint for
disbarment against Respondent. On 29 May 1990, the case was raffled to this Second
Division and was included in the latter's agenda on 13 June 1990.
Respondent has filed an Answer, Complainant her Reply, while Respondent's
Rejoinder, as required by the Court, was received on 3 October 1990. The required
pleadings being complete, this case is now ripe for resolution.
The issue for determination is whether or not Respondent should be disbarred for "Q - What did you notice of Mrs. Felicidad Bariñan Tan when you responded to her
immoral conduct. This in turn, hinges on the question of whether he had, in fact, shout for help?
sexually assaulted the Complainant as a consequence of which the latter begot a child "A - She was crying and trying to fix her dress.
by him. "xxx (p. 52-53, Rollo)."
However, how near to the crime scene said witness was, considering that it allegedly
We find insufficient basis to sustain Complainant's charge. happened in school premises, has not been shown. Her credibility is thus also put in
The outrage allegedly took place during the last week of April, 1971. Yet, no criminal issue.
charge was filed, and it was only about eight years later, on 5 November 1979, that an The testimonies of Complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman, another
administrative complaint was presented before this Court. Complainant's explanation maid, to show unusual closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him
that Respondent's threat to cause the deportation of her alien husband should she report andgiving him toys, are not convincing enough to prove paternity, as
to anyone made her desist from filing a charged is not credible as she had admitted Complainant would want us to believe. The same must be said of Exhibits A, A1, B
having lost contact with her husband when he learned of respondent's transgression that and B1, which are pictures of Jewel and the Respondent showing allegedly their
very same evening (p. 3, TSN, 16 October 1980, p. 46,Rollo). The fear that she speaks physical likeness to each other. Such evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity, and
of, therefore, had become inexistent. much less would it prove violation of Complainant's person and honor.
Another factor that engenders doubt in the mind of the Court is the fact that after the More importantly, Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock of Complainant and her
alleged incident, she continued having dealings with the Respondent as if nothing had husband and the presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access
happened. Thus, by Respondent's own account, which was left uncontroverted by the between the couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, that presumption
Complainant, the former assisted her mother and sisters prosecute a robbery has not been overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewelwas registered
case. Then in March, 1976, she secured respondent's services in claiming indemnity in his birth certificate as the legitimate child of the Complainant and her husband, Tan
from three insurance companies when a fire burned the school down. Finally, Le Pok.
respondent was retained as a collaborating attorney by complainant's family in an
inheritance case. These subsequent dealings are far from being the normal reaction of WHEREFORE, this Complaint for disbarment must be, and is hereby DISMISSED,
a woman who has been wronged. for lack of convincing substantiation.
Complainant's contention that Respondent continued supporting the child for several SO ORDERED.
years for which reason she desisted from charging him criminally, has not been
substantiated. Truth to tell, the fact that she kept her peace for so many years can even
be construed as a condonation of his alleged "immoral conduct." It is likewise strange
that an unwanted son, as the child would normally have been, should, of all names, be
called "Jewel."
During the investigation before the Provincial Fiscal, the complainant, aside from
herself, presented two other witnesses, Eleuteria Garcia and Marilou Pangandaman,both
her domestic help, to testify. Among the three, it was Eleuteria who tried to establish
the manner in which the sexual assault took place. Thus:
"xxx
"Q - You stated in your affidavit marked Annex A that you
heard FelicidadBariñan Tan shouted (sic) for help on the evening of last week of April,
1971, can you tell me or do you know why Mrs. Tan shouted for help?
"A - Yes sir. When I responded to the shout for help of Tan I noticed that Atty.
Galileo Trocio hurriedly left the office leaving behind Mrs. Felicidad BariñanTan.
"Q - Did you ask Mrs. Felicidad Bariñan Tan why she was shouting for help?
"A - Before I could ask her the reason why she shouted for help, she told me
and Marilou Pangandaman that she was sexually abused by Atty. Galileo J.Trocio.
G.R. No. L-18407 June 26, 1963 surname of the father, and considering by analogy the effect of a decree of divorce, it
concluded that the children who are conceived before such a decree should also be
ELAINE A. MOORE, petitioner-appellant, understood as carrying the surname of the real father, which, in this case, is Velarde.
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee. We find tenable this observation of government's counsel. Indeed, if a child born out of
a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother,
Fidel A. Sandoval for petitioner-appellant. should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee. confusion to his real paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice
of the child in the community.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
While the purpose which may have animated petitioner is plausible and may run along
the feeling of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades among the members of
Elaine A. Moore filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that
the Moore family, our hand is deferred by a legal barrier which we cannot at present
her child by a former marriage, William Michael Velarde, be permitted to change his
overlook or brush aside.1äwphï1.ñët
name so as to read William Michael Velarde Moore.

Another factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child concerned is still a minor
After publishing the petition as required by law, trial was held during which the parties
who for the present cannot fathom what would be his feeling when he comes to mature
submitted a stipulation of facts. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order denying the
age. Any way, if the time comes, he may decide the matter for himself and take such
petition whereupon petitioner interposed the present appeal.
action as our law may permit. For the present we deem the action taken by petitioner
premature.
Petitioner is an American citizen formerly married to Joseph P. Velarde, also an
American citizen, out of whose wedlock a child by the name of William Michael
Velarde was born. This child, now 14 years old, was born on January 19, 1947 at Los WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Angeles, California, U.S.A.

The marriage of petitioner to Velarde was subsequently dissolved by a decree of

divorce issued by the Superior Court of the State of California on May 31, 1949. After
said decree became final, petitioner contracted a second marriage with Don C. Moore
on September 29, 1956 at Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and thereafter the minor
lived continuously with the spouses up to the present time. He was supported by Moore
who has always treated him with love and affection as if he were his true father. In view
of this harmonious relation it is petitioner's desire that the minor be able to use the name
Moore after his family name Velarde.

The government opposes the petition and now poses the following issues: (1) whether
under our laws a minor may be permitted to adopt and use the surname of the second
husband of his mother; (2) whether justifiable reasons exist to allow such change of
name; and whether petitioner, as mother of the minor, has the authority or personality to
ask for such a change.

Anent the first issue, the government sustains a negative stand for the reason that our
laws do not authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is not his
father, for, as a matter of fact, Article 364 of Civil Code specifically provides that
legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father. Mention is also
made of Article 369 of the same Code which provides that in case of annulment of
avoidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment she principally use the
G.R. No. L-55538 March 15, 1982
In the Matter of the Change of Names of DIONESIO DIVINAGRACIA, JR., and
BOMBI ROBERTO DIVINAGRACIA to DIONESIO NALDOZA and BOMBI
ROBERTO NALDOZA, respectively. ZOSIMA NALDOZA, as natural guardian
and guardian ad litem of said minors, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUDGE FERNANDO S. RUIZ of the
Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch IV, respondents-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
The issue in this case is whether two minors should be allowed to discontinue using
their father's surname and should use only their mother's surname.
Zosima Naldoza was married to Dionesio Divinagracia on May 30, 1970. They begot
two children named Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto who were born on October 23,
1970 and July 22, 1973, respectively.
Zosima's husband left her after she confronted him with his previous marriage with
another woman. He never returned to the conjugal abode. He allegedly swindled
Congressman Maglana in the sum of P50,000.00, one Galagar in the sum of P10,000.00
also Eloy Gallentes and other persons.
The classmates of Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto allegedly teased them about their
father being a swindler. Two criminal cases for estafa were filed in court against the
father.
Desirous of obliterating any connection between her two minor children and their
scapegrace father, Zosima, on August 10, 1978, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Bohol a petition wherein she prayed that the surname of her two children be changed
from Divinagracia to Naldoza, her surname (Special Proceeding No. 768). After due
publication and hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition.
The trial court did not consider as sufficient grounds for change of surname the
circumstances that the children's father was a swindler, that he had abandoned them and
that his marriage to Zosima was a second marriage which, however, had not been
annulled nor declared bigamous. It reasoned that the children's adoption of their
mother's surname would give a false impression of family relationship.
From that decision, Zosima Naldoza appealed to this Court under Republic Act No.
5440. Appellant's seven assignments of error may be reduced to the question of whether
there is a justification for the two children to drop their father's surname and use their
mother's surname only.
The minors Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto, who are presumably legitimate, are
supposed to bear principally the surname Divinagracia, their father's surname (Art. 364,
Civil Code).
To allow them, at their mother's behest, to bear only their mother's surname (which they
are entitled to use together with their father's surname) and to discard altogether their
father's surname thus removing the prima-facie evidence of their paternal provenance or
ancestry, is a serious matter in which, ordinarily, the minors and their father should be
consulted. The mother's desire should not be the sole consideration.
The change of name is allowed only when there are proper and reasonable causes for
such change (Sec. 5, Rule 103, Rules of Court). Where, as in this case, the petitioners
are minors, the courts should take into account whether the change of name would
redound their welfare or would prejudice them.
Where the petitioner, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother and a Japanese, elected
Philippine citizenship, and her older brother and sister were using their mother's
surname, and the petitioner felt embarrassed in using her Japanese father's surname
(Oshita) because of the ill-feeling harbored by some Filipinos against the Japanese, and
there was no showing that her desire to use the maternal surname (Bartolome) was
motivated by any fraudulent purpose or that the change of surname would prejudice
public interest, her petition to change her surname from Oshita to Bartolome was
granted (Oshita vs. Republic, L-21180, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 700).
Where the petitioner's name in the civil registry is Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte, Duterte being the surname of her father Filomeno, who was married to her
mother, Estrella Alfon, but the petitioner since infancy has used the name Estrella S.
Alfon, particularly in the school and voting records, there is reasonable ground for
allowing her to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon. Such a change would avoid
confusion (Alfon vs. Republic, G.R. No. 51201, May 29, 1980,97 SCRA 858).
The instant case is easily distinguishable from the Oshita and AIfon cases where the
petitioners were already of age.
We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for change of name. The
reasons adduced for eliminating the father's surname are not substantial enough to
justify the petition. To allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the
minors' parentage and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate since
they would carry the maternal surname only. That would be inconsistent with their
legitimate status as indicated in their birth records (Exh. C and D).
As was said in that In re Epstein 200 N.Y.S. 897, "the child should, and in the course of
time must, know of his parentage. " If, when he fully appreciates the circumstances and
is capable of selecting a name for himself, he wants to use his mother's surname only
and to avoid using his father's surname, then he should be the one to apply for a change
of surname. See Anno., 53 ALR2d 914.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 71994 May 31, 1990
EDNA PADILLA MANGULABNAN as guardian ad litem for minor ALFIE
ANGELO ACERO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND
AMBROCIO TAN CHEW ACERO, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a case of an illegitimate child who was denied support pendente lite by the
appellate court. The child is confused as to what he is supposed to do. Petitioner
pictured a big man eating a small child which will not fail to repel and horrify all decent
men. She contends that this very image readily forms itself in the mind when we
consider this case.
Petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City an action for actual,
compensatory and moral damages and support for her child Alfie Angelo. Pending the
litigation an application for support pendente lite was filed to which an opposition was
filed by private respondent. On November 2, 1984 the trial court ordered private
respondent to pay monthly support in the amount of P1,500.00 to the minor child, Alfie.
Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but his motion was denied on December
5, 1984.
Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed in the Court of Appeals questioning the said
order of the trial court.
In a decision dated March 29, 1984 1 the petition was granted and the orders of the trial
court dated November 2, 1984 were annulled without pronouncement as to costs. A
motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioner was denied on September 12,
1985.
Hence, the herein appeal by way of certiorari wherein petitioner raises the following
issues:
I
THE QUESTIONED JUDGMENT INSISTED IN IGNORING THE
STATUTORY DISTINCTION BETWEEN A NATURAL CHILD
AND OTHER ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN;
II
THE APPELLATE COURT REFUSED TO ACCEPT THAT THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE IN THIS CASE CONSTITUTED
VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION;
III
THE APPELLATE COURT IN ONE STROKE PUT TO NAUGHT
THE REMEDY OR RELIEF PROVIDED BY
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE. 2
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the questioned decision of the appellate court, the following disquisitions were made:
The petitioner's contention is well taken. While the child's paternity
appears to have been established by the affidavits of the respondent
Edna Padilla Mangulabnan as well as by the affidavits of her two
witnesses, this fact alone would not be sufficient to order the
petitioner to pay support to the child. In addition, it is necessary to
prove that the petitioner has recognized the child. For these are two
distinct questions. (Crisolo v. Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862 [1954]; Cruz v.
Castillo, 28 SCRA 719 [1969]).
As the civil status of the child is the source from which the right to
support is derived, there must be a declaration to that effect before
support can be ordered. Such a declaration may be provisional, it
being sufficient that affidavits are considered. (Crisolo v.
Macadaeg, supra; Mangoma v. Macadaeg, 90 Phil. 508 [1951];
Sanchez v. Francisco, 68 Phil. 110 [1939]). But the question must
nevertheless be squarely resolved. It may be that the birth certificate
is prima facie evidence of acknowledgment of the child, so that until
it is finally shown to be spurious it must be upheld. (Civil Code, Art.
410; Art. No. 3753, sec. 13). On the other hand, it may be that its
probative value is impaired by the verified opposition of the
petitioner. These are, however questions for the trial court to resolve
in passing on the application for support pendente lite
In the subsequent resolution dated September 12, 1985, the appellate court also made
the following observations:
The contention has no merit. Although Art. 291, in enumerating those
entitled to support, refers in paragraph 3 to 'acknowledged natural
children,' and in paragraph 5 simply to 'illegitimate children who are
not natural' nonetheless there is a need for the latter class of children
(spurious) to be recognized either voluntarily or by judicial decree,
 otherwise they cannot demand support. The private respondent
contends that the cases cited in the decision (Crisolo v. Macadaeg, 94
Phil. 862 [1954]; Cruz v. Castillo, 28 SCRA 719 [l969]) refer to the
right of natural children to support. The principle, however, is the
same. Thus in Paulino v. Paulino, 113 Phil. 697 [1961], which
involves a claim to inheritance by a spurious child, it was held:
An illegitimate (spurious) child to be entitled to support and
successional rights from his putative or presumed parents must prove
his filiation to them. Filiation may be established by the voluntary or
compulsory recognition of the illegitimate (spurious) child.
Recognition is voluntary when made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing.' It is
compulsory when by court action the child brings about his
recognition.
Article 291 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
ART 291. The following are obliged to support each other to the
whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and acknowledged natural children and
the legitimate descendants of the latter;
(4) Parents and natural children by legal fiction and
the legitimate and illegitimate descendants of the
latter;
(5) Parents and illegitimate children who are not
natural.
Brothers and sisters owe their legitimate and natural brothers and sisters, although they
are only of the half blood, the necessaries of life when by a physical or mental defect, or
any other cause not imputable to the recipients, the latter cannot secure their
subsistence. This assistance includes, in a proper case, expenses necessary for
elementary education and for professional or vocational training.
From the foregoing provision it is clear that parents and illegitimate children who are
not natural children are also obliged to support each other as specified in paragraph No.
5 abovecited. It is to be distinguished from the obligation to support each other as
between the parents and acknowledged natural children and the legitimate or
illegitimate children of the latter; and that between parents and natural children by legal
fiction and the legitimate and illegitimate descendants of the latter under paragraphs (3)
and (4) abovecited.
Under Article 287 of the Civil Code it is provided:
ART. 287. Illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with
Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled
to support and such successional rights as are granted in this Code.
In this case petitioner established the paternity of the child, Alfie not only by her own
affidavit but also by the affidavits of two (2) witnesses. In addition thereto petitioner
submitted a birth certificate of the child. The private respondent claims that the same is
spurious as it was sworn before a notary public in Manila when the child was born in
Cavite Maternity Clinic in Las Pinas Rizal.
There must be a declaration of the status of the child from which the right to support is
derived and before support can be ordered. Such a declaration may be provisional, that
is, by affidavits. 3
While the appellate court claims that the birth certificate is prima facie evidence of
acknowledgment of the child, and that until it is finally proved to be spurious it must be
upheld, 4 it nevertheless observed that its probative value is impaired by the verified
opposition of the private respondent.
Petitioner contends, however, that the child is entitled to support upon proof of filiation
to private respondent without need of acknowledgment.
The appellate court disagrees and holds that even as to illegitimate children who are not
natural children, there is a need for the latter class of children (spurious children) to be
recognized either voluntarily or by judicial decree, otherwise they cannot demand
support, as in the case of an acknowledged natural child.
The Court disagrees. The requirement for recognition by the father or mother jointly or
by only one of them as provided by law refers in particular to a natural child under
Article 276 of the Civil Code. Such a child is presumed to be the natural child of the
parents recognizing it who had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of
conception. 5 Thus, an illegitimate child like the minor Alfie in this case whose father,
the private respondent herein, is married and had no legal capacity to contract marriage
at the time of his conception is not a natural child but an illegitimate child or spurious
child in which case recognition is not required before support may be granted. 6
However, under Article 887 of the Civil Code, in all cases of illegitimate children, their
filiation must be proved. Such filiation may be proved by the voluntary or compulsory
recognition of the illegitimate (spurious child). Recognition is voluntary when made in
the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing. 7 It is compulsory when by court action the child brings out his recognition. 8

As above related the affidavits of petitioner and the two (2) witnesses were presented to
prove the paternity of the child, and a birth certificate was also presented to corroborate
the same. The Court agrees with the court a quo that the status of the minor child had
been provisionally established.

Indeed, in response to the resolution of this Court dated February 14, 1989, if the parties
are still interested in prosecuting this case, petitioner in a manifestation filed on March
22, 1990, asserted that she is still interested and that in fact the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No. A-39985 has rendered a decision dated April 9, 1987 granting to
petitioner-appellant minor a monthly support of P5,000.00 to be paid on or before the
fifth day of every month. 9

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the appellate

court dated March 29, 1985 and its resolution dated September 12, 1985 are hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the order of the trial court dated November 2, 1984
granting a monthly support pendente lite in favor of the minor child, Alfie in the amount
of P1,500.00 is reinstated and AFFIRMED with costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-1261 August 2, 1949

CATALINA OSMEÑA DE VALENCIA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
EMILIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Sato and Repollo for appellants.

Filemon Sotto for appellees.

PARAS, J.:

In an action instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the plaintiffs prayed for an
injunction restraining the defendants, from using the surname "Valencia." The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and this sustained by the lower court. Hence this
appeal by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs allege, on the hand, that they (except Catalina Osmeña) are the legitimate
children of the defendant Pio E. Valencia in the latter's lawful wedlock with plaintiff
Catalina Osmeña; and, upon the other hand, that the defendants, (except Emilia
Rodriguez and Pio E. Valencia) are the illegitimate children of Pio E. Valencia with his
common-law-wife, defendant Emilia Rodriguez. It is accordingly contended by the
plaintiffs that they alone have the right to bear the surname "Valencia," in accordance
with article 114 of the Civil Code which provides that legitimate children have the right
to bear the surname of the father. To complete their argument, the plaintiffs point out
that, under articles 139 and 845 of the Civil Code, illegitimate children (who are not
natural) are entitled only to support.

We concede that the plaintiffs may use the surname of their farther as a matter of right
by reason of the mere fact that they are legitimate children; but we cannot agree to the
view that article 114 of the Civil Code, without more, grants monopolistic proprietary
control to legitimate children over the surname of their father. In other words, said
article has marked a right of which legitimate children may not be deprived, but it
cannot be interpreted as a prohibition against the use by others of what may happen to
be the surname of their father. If plaintiff's theory were correct, they can stop countless
inhabitants from bearing the surname "Valencia."

The defendants' case becomes the stronger when it is remembered that, from all
appearances, Pio E. Valencia (the father) acquiesces in the adoption of his surname by
the defendants. But even if he objects, the defendants can still use the surname
"Valencia," in the absence of any law granting exclusive ownership over a surname.

The appealed order is affirmed, and it is so ordered with costs against the plaintiffs and
appellants.
 August 7, 2017 However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the births to the
NSO, Barcelote was informed that there were two certificates of live birth (subject birth
G.R. No. 222095 certificates) with the same name of the mother and the years of birth of the children in
their office. The subject birth certificates registered by the Local Civil Registrar of
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATES Davao City state the following:
OF LIVE BIRTH OFYUHARES JAN BARCELOTE TINITIGAN AND AVEE
KYNNA NOELLE BARCELOTE TINITIGAN JONNA KARLA BAGUIO 1. Birth Certificate with Registry No. 2008-21709:
BARCELOTE, Petitioner,
vs. a. Name: Avee Kyna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan;
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RICKY O. TINITIGAN, and LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR, DAVAO CITY,Respondents, b. Date of Birth: June 4, 2008;

DECISION c. Place of Birth: EUP Family Care Clinic, Holy Cross Agdao Davao
City;
CARPIO, J.:
d. Informant: Ricky O. Tinitigan.
The Case
2. Birth Certificate with Registry No. 2011-28329:
This petition for review1 assails the 5 March 2015 Decision2 and the3 December 2015
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 03223-MIN reversing a. Name: Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan;
the 28 February 2013 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15
(RTC) in SPC. PROC. No. 12,007-12.
b. Date of Birth: August 14, 20116

The Facts c. Place of Birth: EUP Family Care Clinic, Holy Cross Agdao Davao
City;
In an Amended Petition5 dated 20 September 2012 filed before the RTC, petitioner
Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote (Barcelote) stated the following facts:
d. Informant: Ricky O. Tinitigan.

On 24 June 2008, she bore a child out of wedlock with a married man named Ricky O.
Thus, Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subject birth
Tinitigan (Tinitigan) in her relative's residence in Sibulan, Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur.
certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation, and for
She was not able to register the birth of their child, whom she named Yohan Grace
containing erroneous entries.
Barcelote, because she did not give birth in a hospital. To hide her relationship with
Tinitigan, she remained in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur while Tinitigan lived with his
legitimate family in Davao City and would only visit her. On 24 August 2011, she bore After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, Barcelote was allowed to present
another child with Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua Miguel Barcelote. Again, she evidence ex parte. In her testimony, Barcelote reiterated her allegations in the petition
did not register his birth to avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible criminal charges. and emphasized that the subject birth certificates were registered by her children's
Thereafter, she lost contact with Tinitigan and she returned to Davao City. biological father, Tinitigan, without her knowledge. She also testified that the subject
birth certificates reflected wrong entries, but she did not present any other evidence.
When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school admission, Barcelote
finally decided to register the births of both children. She, then, returned to Santa Cruz, The Ruling of the RTC
Davao del Sur to register their births. The Local Civil Registrar of Santa Cruz approved
the late registration of the births of Yohan Grace Barcelote and Joshua Miguel On 28 February 2013, the RTC ruled in favor of Barcelote and ordered the cancellation
Barcelote, with Registry Nos. 2012-1344 and 2012-1335, respectively, after submitting of the subject birth certificates, to wit:
proof that the National Statistics Office (NSO) has no record of both births on file.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the registration of the Certificate of Live Birth of Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan and
Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan, respectively intended for Joshua Miguel
Barcelote and Yohan Grace Barcelote, by their putative father Ricky Tinitigan at the
Local Civil Registrar of Davao City without the con[ s ]ent or knowledge of their
mother, herein petitioner, Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote, is hereby ordered cancelled.
The Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Davao City is
directed/ordered to cause the cancellation of:
[i] the birth certificate of Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan under
Registry No. 2008-21709, and
[ii] the certificate of live birth of Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan under
Registry No. 2011-28329.
SO ORDERED.7
The RTC ruled that the subject birth certificates are legally infirm, because they were
registered unilaterally by Tinitigan without the knowledge and signature of Barcelote in
violation of Section 5, Act No. 3753. The RTC also held that the subject birth
certificates contain void and illegal entries, because the children use the surname of
Tinitigan, contrary to the mandate of Article 176 of the Family Code stating that
illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother.
Moreover, the RTC found that it is not for the best interest of the children to use the
surname of their father, for there is always a possibility that the legitimate children or
wife may ask the illegitimate children to refrain from using the surname of their father.
The RTC further held that the subject birth certificates are not reflective of the correct
personal circumstances of the children because of the glaring differences in the names
and other vital information entered in it.
The Ruling of the CA
On 5 March 2015, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled
that the registrations of the children's births, caused by Tinitigan and certified by a
registered midwife, Erlinda Padilla, were valid under Act No. 3753, and such
registrations did not require the consent of Barcelote. The CA further ruled that the
children can legally and validly use the surname of Tinitigan, since Republic Act No.
(RA) 9255, amending Article 176 of the Family Code, allows illegitimate children to
use the surname of their father if the latter had expressly recognized them through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register,. such as in this case where Barcelote
admitted that Tinitigan personally registered the children's births and affixed his
surname on the subject birth certificates.
Moreover, the CA found that Barcelote failed to discharge the burden of proving the
falsity of the entries in the subject birth certificates and to adduce evidence that the
information she provided in the late registration are the true personal circumstances of
her children.
The dispositive portion of the decision states:
FOR THESE REASONS, the Decision dated 28 February 201[3] of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 15, Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 12,007-12 for cancellation of certificates of live
birth of her children, registered as Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan and Avee Kynna
Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.8
In a Resolution dated 3 December 2015, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration.9
Hence, this present petition.
The Issues
Barcelote raises the following issues for resolution:
I
The CA erred in not cancelling the certificates of live birth for YUHARES JAN
BARCELOTE TINITIGAN and AVEE KYNNA BARCELOTE TINITIGAN.
A. Under the Family Code, illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Being the mother with
parental authority, [Barcelote]'s choice of names for her children upon birth
should prevail.
B. The CA gravely erred and abused its discretion when it ruled that the RTC
did not have basis for its ruling that the certificates of birth registered by
[Tinitigan] are not reflective of the true and correct personal circumstances of
the [children].
C. The CA misinterpreted the provisions of Act No. 3753, otherwise known as
the Law on Registry of Civil Status. It is clear under this law that in case of an
illegitimate child, the birth certificate must be signed and sworn to by the
mother. Since the certificates of live birth registered by [Tinitigan] were not
signed by [Barcelote], the same are void.
 D. The cancellation of the certificates of live birth, registered by a father who
is married to another and who abandoned his illegitimate children, is for the
interest and welfare of [the children].
II.
In the alternative, the CA was incorrect in dismissing the petition for cancellation on the
procedural ground that [Barcelote] could have filed a petition for correction of entries
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In this case, the petition for cancellation was filed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which governs both "Petition for Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry". Under this rule, even ubstantial errors in a
civil register may be corrected and the true facts established, provided the party
aggrieved by the error avail of the appropriate adversary proceeding, which [Barcelote]
did. Instead ofdismissing the petition outright, considering that the jurisdictional
requirements for correction [have] also been complied with, at the very least, the CA
should have treated the petition for cancellation as one for correction and ordered the
necessary corrections, especially as to thenames of [the children].10
We grant the petition.
Prior to its amendment, Article 176 of the Family Code11 reads:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of
a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code
governing successional rights shall remain in force. (Emphasis supplied)
This has been implemented in the National Statistics Office Administrative Order No.
1-93 or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Act No. 3753 and Other Laws on
Civil Registration (IRR of Act No. 3753),12 to wit:
RULE 23. Birth Registration of Illegitimate children. - (1) Children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived and born outside a
valid marriage unless otherwise provided in the Family Code are illegitimate.
(2) An illegitimate child born before 3 August 1988 and acknowledged by both parents
shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents,
the illegitimate child shall carry the surname of the acknowledging parent. If no parent
acknowledged the child, he shall carry the surname of the mother.
(3) The name/s of the acknowledging parent/s, shall be indicated in the Certificate of
Live Birth.
(4) An illegitimate child born on or after 3 August 1988 shall bear the surname of
the mother.(Emphasis supplied)
Upon the effectivity of RA 9255,13 the provision that illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother was retained, with an
added provision that they may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by their father. Thus, Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended
by RA 9255, provides:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime.
The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied)
In Grande v. Antonio, 14 we held that "the use of the word 'may' in [Article 176 of the
Family Code, as amended by RA 9255] readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father.
The word 'may' is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate
children."15Thus, the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,
which apply to all illegitimate children born during the effectivity of RA 9255, state:
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition.
8.1 As a rule, an illegitimate child not acknowledged by the father shall use the surname
of the mother.
8.2 Illegitimate child acknowledged by the father shall use the surname of the mother if
no [Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father] (AUSF) is executed.1âwphi1
8.3 An illegitimate child aged 0-6 years old acknowledged by the father shall use the
surname of the father, if the mother or the guardian, in the absence of the mother,
executes the AUSF.
8.4 An illegitimate child aged 7 to 17 years old acknowledged by the father shall use the
surname of the father if the child executes an AUSF fully aware of its consequence as
attested by the mother or guardian.
8.5 Upon reaching the age of majority, an illegitimate child acknowledged by the father
shall use the surname of his father provided that he executes an AUSF without need of
any attestation.
The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother. The use of the word "shall" underscores its
mandatory character. The discretion on the part of the illegitimate child to use the
surname of the father is conditional upon proof of compliance with RA 9255 and its
IRR.
Since the undisputed facts show that the children were born outside a valid marriage
after 3 August 1988, specifically in June 2008 and August 2011, respectively, then they
are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote. The children shall use the
surname of their mother, Barcelote. The entry in the subject birth certificates as to the
surname of the children is therefore incorrect; their surname should have been
"Barcelote" and not "Tinitigan."
We do not agree with the CA that the subject birth certificates are the express
recognition of the children's filiation by Tinitigan, because they were not duly registered
in accordance with the law.
Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law,16 states:
Section 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. -The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent
of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax and shall be
sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician,
or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born child.
In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a)
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; (f) and such other data may be
required in the regulation to be issued.
In the case of an exposed child, the person who found the same shall report to the local
civil registrar the place, date and hour of finding and other attendant circumstances.
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses.
In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name
of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information
by which such father could be identified.
Any fetus having human features which dies after twenty four hours of existence
completely disengaged from the maternal womb shall be entered in the proper registers
as having been born and having died. (Emphasis supplied)
In Calimag v. Heirs of Macapaz, 17 we held that "under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, the
declaration of either parent of the [newborn] legitimate child shall be sufficient for the
registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the registration of birth of an
illegitimate child does the law require that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to
acknowledge the child."18
The first paragraph of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 assumes that the newborn child is
legitimate since our law accords a strong presumption in favor of legitimacy of
children.19 On the other hand, the fourth paragraph of Section 5 specifically provides
that in case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. The fourth
paragraph of Section 5 specifically applies to an illegitimate child and likewise
underscores its mandatory character with the use of the word "shall." Lex special is
derogat generali. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a
general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in
the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must
be taken to affect only such cases within its general language which are not within the
provision of the particular enactment.20
Thus, it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate
of her child in all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his or
not. The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is
the mother of the child who conclusively carries the blood of the mother.21 Thus, this
provision ensures that individuals are not falsely named as parents.22
The mother must sign and agree to the information entered in the birth certificate
because she has the parental authority and custody of the illegitimate child. In Briones
v. Miguel, 23 we held that an illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the
mother, and the mother is entitled to have custody of the child. The right of custody
springs from the exercise of parental authority.24 Parental authority is a mass of rights
and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children's
physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and
the education of their heart and senses.25
Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the mother did not sign
the documents, the local civil registrar had no authority to register the subject birth
certificates. Under the IRR of Act No. 3753, the civil registrar shall see to it that the
Certificate of Live Birth presented for registration is properly and completely filled up,
and the entries are correct.26 In case the entries are found incomplete or incorrect, the
civil registrar shall require the person concerned to fill up the document completely or
to correct the entries, as the case may be.27
Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with the provisions of
the law respecting the registration of birth of illegitimate children.1âwphi1 Aside from
the fact that the entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is
incorrect since it should have been that of the mother, the subject birth certificates are
also incomplete as they lacked the signature of the mother.

Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be

void.28 In Babiera v. Catotal, 29 we declared as void and cancelled a birth certificate,
which showed that the mother was already 54 years old at the time of the child's birth
and which was not signed either by the civil registrar or by the supposed mother.

Accordingly, we declare the subject birth certificates void and order their cancellation
for being registered against the mandatory provisions of the Family Code requiring the
use of the mother's surname for her illegitimate children and Act No. 3753 requiring the
signature of the mother in her children's birth certificates.

In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social

welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration.30

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the 5

March 2015 Decision and the 3 December 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 03223-MIN. We REINSTATE the 28 February 2013 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15, in SPC. PROC. No. 12,007-12. The
Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Davao City is ordered
to CANCEL: (1) the Certificate of Live Birth of Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote
Tinitigan under Registry No. 2008-21709 and (2) the Certificate of Live Birth of
Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan under Registry No. 2011-28329.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951
MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas as guardian ad litem, and
MARIA DUEÑAS, plaintiffs,
vs.
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant.
Reyes and Dy-Liaco for appellants.
Tible, Tena and Borja for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad
litem, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the recovery
of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talacop,
Calabanga, Camarines Sur.
The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and
Maria Dueñas; that Emiliano Andal died on September 24, 1942; that Emiliano Andal
was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother
Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in
favor of the former; that Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the land from 1938
up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the abnormal situation then
prevailing, entered the land in question.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano
Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in
question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the
defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea
that only question of law are involved.
It appears undisputed that the land in question was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to her
son Emiliano Andal by virtue of a donation propter nuptias she has executed in his
favor on the occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueñas. If the son born to the couple is
deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If otherwise, then
the land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to succeed
him under the law. The main issue, therefore, to be determined hinges on the legitimacy
of Mariano Andal in so far as his relation to Emiliano Andal is concerned. The
determination of this issue much depends upon the relationship that had existed between
Emiliano Andal and his wife during the period of conception of the child up to the date
of his birth in connection with the death of the alleged father Emiliano Andal.
The following facts appear to have been proven: Emiliano Andal became sick of
tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his
house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became
worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he could hardly
move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped
with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of
1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other
as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his
wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas gave birth to
a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. Under these facts, can the child be
considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano?
Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:
Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the
celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred next preceding the birth of the
child.
Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943,
that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been
born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This
presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the
husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next
preceding the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to prove that it was physically
impossible for Emiliano to have such access? Is the fact that Emiliano was sick of
tuberculosis and was so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed
sufficient to overcome this presumption?
Manresa on this point says:
Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence during
the initial period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continuing and
incurable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took
place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Manresa, 492-500, Vol.
I, cited by Dr. Arturo Tolentino in his book "Commentaries and Jurisprudence
on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p.90)."
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial
period of conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942
and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding
the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to show
that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still living under the
marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he and the
wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude
cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. We admit that Emiliano was already
suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly
move and get up from bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience
shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons
suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage because
they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. As an author has said, "the reputation of
the tuberculosis towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably dependent more upon
confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease." (An Integrated Practice of
Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202). There is neither evidence to show that Emiliano
was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable, nor was there evidence
that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor of
the child has not, therefore, been overcome.

We can obtain the same result viewing this case under section 68, par. (c) of Rule 123,
of the Rules of Court, which is practically based upon the same rai'son
d'etre underlying the Civil Code. Said section provides:

The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not impotent, is
indisputably presumed to be legitimate, if not born within one hundred eighty
days immediately succeeding the marriage, or after the expiration of three
hundred days following its dissolution.

We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had
access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within
three (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other
presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. We have also seen that this
presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or naturally
impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such proof.
The fact that Maria Dueñas has committed adultery can not also overcome this
presumption (Tolentino's Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 92).

In view of all the foregoing, we are constrained to hold that the lower court did not err
in declaring Mariano Andal as the legitimate son of the spouses Emiliano Andal and
Maria Dueñas.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-49542 September 12, 1980
ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH
MEJIAS, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This petition for review seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 54618-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch IX dismissing the action for recognition and support filed by respondent
Elizabeth Mejias against petitioner Antonio Macadangdang, and which found minor
Rolando to be the illegitimate son of petitioner who was ordered to give a monthly
support of P350.00 until his alleged son reaches the age of majority (p. 47, rec.; p. 10,
ROA).
The records show that respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband
being Crispin Anahaw (pp. 61-62, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972; pp. 10-11, Brief for
Respondent [P. 198, rec.]) She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio
Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967 (p. 38, t.s.n., June 7, 1972 in CC No. 109).
She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967 (p. 63,
t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit
encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in
baptismal rites held on December 24,1967 (Annex "A", List of Exhibits).
The records also disclose that on April 25, 1972, respondent (then plaintiff) filed a
complaint for recognition and support against petitioner (then defendant) with the Court
of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 263 (p.
1, ROA).
Defendant (now petitioner) Macadangdang filed his answer on June 30, 1972, opposing
plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal (p. 3, ROA).
On August 9, 1972, the lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order
formalizing certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which both parties
agreed (pp. 4, 5, and 6, ROA). Correspondingly, upon agreement of the parties, an
amended complaint was filed by plaintiff on October 17, 1972 (pp. 7,8 and 9, ROA).
In its decision rendered on February 27, 1973, the lower court dismissed the complaint,.
The decision invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and
authorities (pp. 10-18, ROA).
On April 18, 1973, plaintiff appealed the CFI decision to the Court of Appeals (p. 59, In
her appeal, appellant assigned these errors:
1. The Honorable Trial Court erred in applying in the instant case the
provisions of Arts. 255 and 256 of the Civil Code and Secs. 4[a], 4[b]
and 4[c], Rule 131, of the Revised Rules of Court (p. 18, rec.);
2. The Honorable Trial Court erred in holding that plaintiff-appellant
cannot validly question the legitimacy of her son, Rolando
Macadangdang, by a collateral attack without joining her legal
husband as a party in the instant case (p. 18, rec.).
In its decision handed down on June 2, 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's decision (p. 47, and thus declared minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son of
Antonio Macadangdang (p. 52, rec.).
On November 6, 1978, the Court of Appeals denied appellant's motions for
reconsideration for lack of merit. (p. 56, rec.).
Hence, petitioner filed this petition on January 12, 1979.
The issues boil down to:
1. Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the
legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw;
and
2. Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would
bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed
father, an opportunity to be heard.
The crucial point that should be emphasized and should be straightened out from the
very beginning is the fact that respondent's initial illicit affair with petitioner occurred
sometime in March, 1967 and that by reason thereof, she and her husband separated.
This fact surfaced from the testimony of respondent herself in the hearing of September
21, 1972 when this case was still in the lower court. The pertinent portions of her
testimony are thus quoted:
By Atty. Fernandez:
Q — What did you feel as a result of the incident where
Antonio Macadangdang used pill and took advantage of your
womanhood?
 A — I felt worried, mentally shocked and
humiliated.
Q — If these feelings: worries, mental shock and
humiliation, if estimated in monetary figures, how much win
be the amount?
A — Ten thousand pesos, sir.
Q — And because of the incidental what happened
to your with Crispin Anahaw.
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A — We separate, sir. (pp. 61-63, T.s.n., Civil Case No. 263,
Sept. 21, 1972; emphasis supplied).
From the foregoing line of questions and answers, it can be gleaned that respondent's
answers were given with spontaneity and with a clear understanding of the questions
posed. There cannot be any other meaning or interpretation of the word "incident" other
than that of the initial contact between petitioner and respondent. Even a layman would
understand the clear sense of the question posed before respondent and her categorical
and spontaneous answer which does not leave any room for interpretation. It must be
noted that the very question of her counsel conveys the assumption of an existing
between respondent and her husband.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that respondent and her husband were separated in
1965 cannot therefore be considered conclusive and binding on this Court. It is based
solely on the testimony of respondent which is self-serving. Nothing in the records
shows that her statement was confirmed or corroborated by another witness and the
same cannot be treated as borne out by the record or that which is based on substantial
evidence. It is not even confirmed by her own husband, who was not impleaded.
In the case of Tolentino vs. De Jesus (L-32797, 56 SCRA 167 [1974], this Court
restated that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties
and on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise, and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record [Pioneer
Insurance and Surety Corporation vs. Yap, L-36232, December 19, 1974; Roque vs.
Buan, L-22459, 21 SCRA 642 (1967); Ramos vs. Pepsi-cola Bottling Company of the
Philippines, L-225533, 19 SCRA 289 (1967); emphasis supplied].
Again, in Roque vs. Buan, supra, this Court reiterated the aforestated doctrine adding
four more exceptions to the general rule. This case invoked the same ruling in the
previous case of Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company, etc., supra.
In the recent case of Francisca Alsua-Betts, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (L-46430-
31, July 30, 1979), which petitioner aptly invokes, this Court thus emphasized:
... But what should not be ignored by lawyers and litigants alike is the
more basic principle that the "findings of fact" described as "final" or
"conclusive" are those borne out by the record or those which are
based upon substantial evidence. The general rule laid down by the
Supreme Court does not declare the absolute correctness of all the
findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. There are exceptions
to the general rule, where we have reviewed the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals ... (emphasis supplied).
The following provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court should be borne in
mind:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following
the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than
that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his
wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were separately, in such a
way that access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress.
Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the
conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of
access between her and her husband as set forth in article 255, the
child is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly
improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband.
For the purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved
in a criminal case.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy —
(a) Children born after one hundred eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following
its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed
legitimate.
Against presumption no evidence be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife
within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
[1] By the impotence of the husband
[2] By the fact that the husband and the wife were living separately, in
such a way that access was not possible;
[3] By the serious illness of the husband;
(b) The child shall be presumed legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
(c) Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the
conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of
access between her and her husband as set forth above, the child is
presumed legitimate, unless it appears highly improbable, for ethnic
reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purpose of the
rule, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case. ...
(Rule 131, Rules of Court).
Whether or not respondent and her husband were separated would be immaterial to the
resolution of the status of the child Rolando. What should really matter is the fact that
during the initial one hundred twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the
birth of the renamed child, no concrete or even substantial proof was presented to
establish physical impossibility of access between respondent and her spouse. From her
very revealing testimony, respondent declared that she was bringing two sacks of rice to
Samal for her children; that her four children by her husband in her mother's house in
the said town; that her alleged estranged husband also lived in her mother's place (p. 73,
pp. 21 & 22, 64 & 65, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). It should also be noted that even during
her affair with petitioner and right after her delivery, respondent went to her mother's
house in Samal for treatment. Thus, in the direct examination of Patrocinia Avila (the
boy's yaya), the following came out:
Q — Why were you taking care of the child
Rolando, where was Elizabeth Mejias?
A — Because Elizabeth went to her parents in Same Davao
del Norte for treatment because she had a relapse (p. 13,
t.s.n., of Sept. 21, 1972).
From the foregoing and since respondent and her husband continued to live in the same
province, the fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to each other.
As has already been pointed out, respondent's self-serving statements were never
corroborated nor confirmed by any other evidence, more particularly that of her
husband.
The baby boy subject of this controversy was born on October 30, 1967, only seven (7)
months after March, 1967 when the "incident" or first illicit intercourse between
respondent and petitioner took place, and also, seven months from their separation (if
there really was a separation). It must be noted that as of March, 1967, respondent and
Crispin Anahaw had already four children; hence, they had been married years before
such date (t.s.n., pp. 21-22, Sept. 21, 1972). The birth of Rolando came more than one
hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said marriage and before 300
days following the alleged separation between aforenamed spouses.
Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively
presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband.
The fact that the child was born a mere seven (7) months after the initial sexual contact
between petitioner and respondent is another proof that the said child was not of
petitioner since, from indications, he came out as a normal full-term baby.
It must be stressed that the child under question has no birth certificate of Baptism
(attached in the List of Exhibits) which was prepared in the absence of the alleged
father [petitioner]. Note again that he was born on October 30, 1967. Between March,
1967 and October 30, 1967, the time difference is clearly 7 months. The baby Rolando
could have been born prematurely. But such is not the case. Respondent underwent a
normal nine-month pregnancy. Respondent herself and the yaya, Patrocinia Avila,
declared that the baby was born in the rented house at Carpenter Street, which birth was
obvisouly normal; that he was such a healthy baby that barely 5 days after his birth, he
was already cared for by said yaya when respondent became sick (pp. 28, 29 & 43,
t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972); and that when he was between 15 days and 2 months of age,
respondent left him to the care of the yaya when the former left for Samal for treatment
and returned only in February, 1968 (pp. 30-32, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). From the
aforestated facts, it can be indubitably said that the child was a full-term baby at birth,
normally delivered, and raised normally by the yaya. If it were otherwise or if he were
born prematurely, he would have needed special care like being placed in an incubator
in a clinic or hospital and attended to by a physician, not just a mere yaya. These all
point to the fact that the baby who was born on October 30, 1967 or 7 months from the
first sexual encounter between petitioner and respondent was conceived as early as
January, 1967. How then could he be the child of petitioner?
In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the
value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage
certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified — but not the veracity of
the states or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship
(Paa vs. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus vs. Novero (L-
22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal administered, in
conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child,
but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the
certificate that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and
statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by
proof recognized by law.
The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse.
This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical
impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which
preceded the birth of the child. This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may
be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence — the physical impossibility of access
between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth
of the child. This physical impossibility of access may be caused by any of these:
1. Impotence of the husband;
2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible and
3. Serious illness of the husband.
This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in
marriage, particularly during the period of conception. Hence, proof of the physical
impossibility of such sexual union prevents the application of the presumption
(Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p. 513 citing
Bevilaqua, Familia p. 311).
The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled the
husband to be the father of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where
personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the
contrary; where sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband must be taken to
be the father of the child (Tolentino, citing Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations,
pp. 340-341).
To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore, there must be physical impossibility
of access by the husband to the wife during the period of conception. The law expressly
refers to physical impossibility. Hence, a circumstance which makes sexual relations
improbable, cannot defeat the presumption of legitimacy; but it may be proved as a
circumstance to corroborate proof of physical impossibility of access (Tolentino, citing
Bonet 352; 4 Valverde 408).
Impotence refers to the inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper
function (Bouvier's Law Dictionary 514). As defined in the celebrated case of Menciano
vs. San Jose (89 Phil. 63), impotency is the physical inability to have sexual intercourse.
It is not synonymous with sterility. Sterility refers to the inability to procreate, whereas,
impotence refers to the physical inability to perform the act of sexual intercourse. In
respect of the impotency of the husband of the mother of a child, to overcome the
presumption of legitimacy on conception or birth in wedlock or to show illegitimacy, it
has been held or recognized that the evidence or proof must be clear or satisfactory:
clear, satisfactory and convincing, irresistible or positive (S.C. — Tarleton vs.
Thompson, 118 S.E. 421, 125 SC 182, cited in 10 C.J.S. 50).
The separation between the spouses must be such as to make sexual access impossible.
This may take place when they reside in different countries or provinces, and they have
never been together during the period of conception (Estate of Benito Marcelo, 60 Phil.
442). Or, the husband may be in prison during the period of conception, unless it
appears that sexual union took place through corrupt violation of or allowed by prison
regulations (1 Manresa 492-500).
The illness of the husband must be of such a nature as to exclude the possibility of his
having sexual intercourse with his wife; such as, when because of a injury, he was
placed in a plaster cast, and it was inconceivable to have sexual intercourse without the
most severe pain (Tolentino, citing Commissioner vs. Hotel 256 App. Div. 352, 9 N.Y.
Supp. p. 515); or the illness produced temporary or permanent impotence, making
copulation impossible (Tolentino, citing Q. Bonet 352).
Thus, in the case of Andal vs. Macaraig (89 Phil. 165), this Court ruled that just because
tuberculosis is advanced in a man does not necessarily mean that he is incapable of
sexual intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from tuberculosis can do
the carnal act even in the most crucial stage of health because then they seemed to be
more inclined to sexual intercourse. The fact that the wife had illicit intercourse with a
man other than her husband during the initial period, does not preclude cohabitation
between said husband and wife.
Significantly American courts have made definite pronouncements or rulings on the
issues under consideration. The policy of the law is to confer legitimacy upon children
born in wedlock when access of the husband at the time of conception was not
impossible (N.Y. Milone vs. Milone, 290 N.Y. S. 863, 160 Misc. 830) and there is the
presumption that a child so born is the child of the husband and is legitimate even
though the wife was guilty of infidelity during the possible period of conception (N.Y.
Dieterich vs. Dieterich, 278 N.Y. S. 645, Misc. 714; both cited in 10 C.J.S., pp. 18,19 &
20).
So firm was this presumption originally that it cannot be rebutted unless the husband
was incapable of procreation or was absent beyond the four seas, that is, absent from the
realm, during the whole period of the wife's pregnancy (10 C.J.S. p. 20).
The presumption of legitimacy of children born during wedlock obtains,
notwithstanding the husband and wife voluntarily separate and live apart, unless the
contrary is shown (Ala. Franks vs. State, 161 So. 549, 26 . App. 430) and this includes
children born after the separation [10 C.J.S. pp. 23 & 24; emphasis supplied].
It must be stressed that Article 256 of the Civil Code which provides that the child is
presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress has been adopted for two solid reasons. First,
in a fit of anger, or to arouse jealousy in the husband, the wife may have made this
declaration (Power vs. State, 95 N.E., 660). Second, the article is established as a
guaranty in favor of the children whose condition should not be under the mercy of the
passions of their parents. The husband whose honor if offended, that is, being aware of
his wife's adultery, may obtain from the guilty spouse by means of coercion, a
confession against the legitimacy of the child which may really be only a confession of
her guilt. Or the wife, out of vengeance and spite, may declare the as not her husband's
although the statement be false. But there is another reason which is more powerful,
demanding the exclusion of proof of confession or adultery, and it is, that at the moment
of conception, it cannot be determined when a woman cohabits during the same period
with two men, by whom the child was begotten, it being possible that it be the husband
himself (Manresa, Vol. I, pp. 503-504).
Hence, in general, good morals and public policy require that a mother should not be
permitted to assert the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock in order to obtain some
benefit for herself (N.Y. — Flint vs. Pierce, 136 N.Y. S. 1056, cited in 10 C.J.S. 77).
The law is not willing that the child be declared illegitimate to suit the whims and
purposes of either parent, nor Merely upon evidence that no actual act of sexual
intercourse occurred between husband and wife at or about the time the wife became
pregnant. Thus, where the husband denies having any intercourse with his wife, the
child was still presumed legitimate (Lynn vs. State, 47 Ohio App. 158,191 N.E. 100).
With respect to Article 257 aforequoted, it must be emphasized that adultery on the part
of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her child, because
it is still possible that the child is that of the husband (Tolentino, citing 1 Vera 170; 4
Borja 23-24).
It has, therefore, been held that the admission of the wife's testimony on the point would
be unseemly and scandalous, not only because it reveals immoral conduct on her part,
but also because of the effect it may have on the child, who is in no fault, but who
nevertheless must be the chief sufferer thereby (7 Am. Jur. Sec. 21, pp. 641-642).
In the case of a child born or conceived in wedlock, evidence of the infidelity or
adultery of the wife and mother is not admissible to show illegitimacy, if there is no
proof of the husband's impotency or non-access to his wife (Iowa — Craven vs. Selway,
246 N.W. 821, cited in 10 C.J.S. 36).
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the legitimacy
of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to
conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or economic interest involved
(Tolentino, citing Bevilaqua, Familia, p. 314).
The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock belongs only
to the alleged father, who is the husband of the mother and can be exercised only by
him or his heirs, within a fixed time, and in certain cases, and only in a direct suit
brought for the purpose (La — Ducasse vs. Ducasse, 45 So. 565, 120 La. 731; Saloy's
Succ. 10 So. 872, 44 La. Ann., cited in 10 C.J.S. 77; emphasis supplied).
Thus the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain;
she can only contest the Identity of the child (La — Eloi vs. Mader, 1 Rollo. 581, 38
Am. D. 192).
Formerly, declarations of a wife that her husband was not the father of a child in
wedlock were held to be admissible in evidence; but the general rule now is that they
are inadmissible to bastardize the child, regardless of statutory provisions obviating
incompetency on the ground of interest, or the fact that the conception was antenuptial.
The rule is said to be founded in decency, morality and public policy (Wallace vs.
Wallace 137 Iowa 37,114 N.W. 527,14 L.R.A. [N.S.] 544,126 Am. St. Rep. 253,15
Ann. Cas. 761, Am. Jur. 26).
From the foregoing, particularly the testimony of respondent and her witnesses, this
Court has every reason to believe that Crispin Anahaw was not actually separated from
Elizabeth Mejias; that he was a very potent man, having had four children with his wife;
that even if he and were even separately (which the latter failed to prove anyway) and
assuming, for argument's sake, that they were really separated, there was the possibility
of physical access to each other considering their proximity to each other and
considering further that respondent still visited and recuperated in her mother's house in
Samal where her spouse resided with her children. Moreover, Crispin Anahaw did not
have any serious illness or any illness whatsoever which would have rendered him
incapable of having sexual act with his wife. No substantial evidence whatsoever was
brought out to negate the aforestated facts.
Crispin Anahaw served as a refuge after respondent's reckless and immoral pursuits or a
"buffer" after her flings. And she deliberately did not include nor present her husband in
this case because she could not risk her scheme. She had to be certain that such scheme
to bastardize her own son for her selfish motives would not be thwarted.
This would be the form of wrecking the stability of two families. This would be a
severe assault on morality.
And as between the paternity by the husband and the paternity by the paramour, all the
circumstances being equal, the law is inclined to follow the former; hence, the child is
thus given the benefit of legitimacy.
Finally, Article 220 of the Civil Code reinforces the aforesaid principle when it provides
thus:
Art. 220. In case of doubt, an presumptions favor the solidarity of the
family. Thus, every of law or facts leans toward the validity of
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children the community of property during marriage, the authority of
parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any
member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED JUNE 2,
1978, AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 6, 1978 ARE HEREBY
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

This Court finds no other recourse except to deny respondent's claim to declare her son
SO ORDERED.
Rolando the illegitimate child of petitioner. From all indications, respondent has
paraded herself as a woman of highly questionable character. A married woman who,
on first meeting, rides with a total stranger who is married towards nightfall, sleeps in
his house in the presence of his children, then lives with him after their initial sexual
contact — the atmosphere for which she herself provided — is patently immoral and
hedonistic. Although her husband was a very potent man, she readily indulged in an
instant illicit relationship with a married man she had never known before.

Respondent had shown total lack of or genuine concern for her child (Rolando) for,
even after birth, she left him in the care of a yaya for several months. This is not the
normal instinct and behavior of a mother who has the safety and welfare of her child
foremost in her mind. The filing of this case itself shows how she is capable of
sacrificing the psycho-social future (reputation) of the child in exchange for some
monetary consideration. This is blatant shamelessness.

It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the
responsibility and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband,
her illicit lover and above all — her own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent
to, the bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching
consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who
would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born
during such immoral relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours.
 [ GR No. L-49162, Jul 28, 1987 ]
JANICE MARIE JAO v. CA +
DECISION
236 Phil. 383
PADILLA, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision* of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. no. 51078-
R, dated 29 August 1978, which dismissed petitioner's action for recognition and
support against private respondent, and from the respondent Court's resolution, dated 11
October 1978, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said decision.
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her
mother and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against private respondent Perico V.
Jao. The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was
in due course conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) upon order of
the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test, held 21 January 1969, indicated
that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene S.
Salgado.[1]
The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon
plaintiff's (herein petitioner's) second motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial on
the merits, after which, Janice was declared the child of Jao, thus entitling her to his
monthly support.
Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court's failure to appreciate
the result of the blood grouping tests. As there was no showing whatsoever that there
was any irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao argued that the result of
the tests should have been conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity.
The Court of Appeals upheld Jao's contentions and reversed the trial court's decision. In
its decision, the Court of Appeals held:
"From the evidence of the contending parties, it appears undisputed that JAO was intro-
duced to ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club, by Melvin Yabut. After
this meeting, JAO dated and courted ARLENE. Not long thereafter, they had their first
sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived together as husband and wife. xxx
It further appears undisputed that in April 1968, JAO accompanied ARLENE to the
Marian General Hospital for medical check-up and her confinement was with JAO's
consent. JAO paid the rentals where they lived, the salaries of themaids, and other
household expenses. xxx
The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on August 16, 1968, after
completing 36 weeks of pregnancy, which indicates that ARLENE must have conceived
JANICE on or about the first week of December, 1967. Thus, one issue to be resolved
in this appeal is whether on or about that time, JAO and ARLENE had sexual
intercourse and were already living with one another as husband and wife.
In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met JAO sometime in the third or
fourth week of November, 1967 at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club; that after
several dates, she had carnal knowledge with him at her house at 30 Long-beach,
Merville, Paranaque, Rizal in the evening of November 30, 1967, and that he started to
live with her at her dwelling after December 16, 1967, the date they finished their cruise
to Mindoro Island.
On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met ARLENE at the Saddle and
Sirloin, Bayside Club, however, maintains that this was on December 14, 1967 because
the day following, he and his guests: ARLENE, Melvin Yabut, Didi Crescini and
Charlie Litonjua went to Mindoro by boat. He dated ARLENE four times in January,
1968. He remembered he had carnal knowledge of her for the first time on January 18,
1968, because that was a week after his birthday and it was only in May, 1968 that he
started cohabiting with her at the Excelsior Apartments on Roxas Boulevard.
These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in resolving the paternity of
JANICE, the role of the blood grouping tests conducted by the NBI and which resulted
in the negative finding that in a union with ARLENE, JAO could not be the father of
JANICE.
We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the NBI is not in a position to
determine with mathematical precision the issue of parentage by blood grouping test,
considering the rulings of this Court xxx where the blood grouping tests of the NBI
were admitted; especially where, in the latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo Sunico who
conducted the test and it appears that in the present case, the same Dr. Sunico approved
the findings and report. xxx In Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil 188, the
Supreme Court had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping
test. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood
grouping tests has been recognized as early as the 1950's.
The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be stated as follows:
"Paternity -- Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the
mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man
is not the father of the child. But group blood testing cannot show that a man is the
father of a particular child, but at least can show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in
many states, and courts in others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such
tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-
paternity where the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the
impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the
judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results
avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony
conflicting with the results of the test.
"The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as
they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others with the
same blood type may have been the father of the child. But the Uniform Act recognizes
that the tests may have some probative value to establish paternity where the blood type
and the combination in the child is shown to be rare, in which case the judge is given
discretion to let it in" (I Jones on Evidence, 5th Ed., pp. 193-194).
"In one specific biological trait, viz, blood groups, scientific opinion is now in accord in
accepting the fact that there is a causative relation between the trait of the progenitor
and the trait of the progeny. In other words, the blood composition of a child may be
some evidence as to the child's paternity. But thus far this trait (in the present state of
scientific discovery as generally accepted) can be used only negatively i.e. to evidence
that a particular man F is not the father of a particular child C." (I Wigmore on
Evidence 3rd Ed., pp. 610-611).
In a last ditch effort to bar the admissibility and competency of the blood test, JANICE
claims that probative value was given to blood tests only in cases where they tended to
establish paternity; and that there has been no case where the blood test was invoked to
establish non-paternity, thereby implying that blood tests have probative value only
when the result is a possible affirmative and not when in the negative. This contention
is fallacious and must be rejected. To sustain her contention, in effect, would be
recognizing only the possible affirmative finding but not the blood grouping test itself
for if the result were negative, the test is regarded worthless. Indeed, this is
illogical. xxx As an admitted test, it is admissible in subsequent similar proceedings
whether the result be in the negative or in the affirmative. xxx"
The Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary to petitioner's contention
that Jao's actions before and after JANICE was born were tantamount to recogni-
tion. Said the respondent appellate court:
"On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not recognize her as his own. In
fact, he filed a petition that his name as father of JANICE in the latter's certificate of
live birth be deleted, evidencing his repudiation, rather than recognition. The mere acts
of JAO in cohabiting with ARLENE, the attention given to her during her pregnancy
and the financial assistance extended to her cannot overcome the result of the blood
grouping test. These acts of JAO cannot be evaluated as recognizing the unborn
JANICE as his own as the possession of such status cannot be founded on conjectures
and presumptions, especially so that, We have earlier said, JAO refused to acknowledge
JANICE after the latter's birth.
JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on paragraph 2 of Article 283 in
relation to Article 289 of the New Civil Code which provides: "When the child is in
continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the
latter."
Nor can there be compulsory recognition under paragraphs 3 or 4 of said article which
states:
"(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father."
As aptly appreciated by the court below, JANICE could have been conceived from
November 20, 1967 to December 4, 1967. Indeed, ARLENE claims that her first sexual
intercourse with JAO was on November 30, 1967 while the latter avers it was one week
after January 18, 1968. However, to satisfy paragraph 3 as above-quoted, JANICE
must have been conceived when ARLENE and JAO started to cohabit with one
another. Since ARLENE herself testified that their cohabitation started only after
December 16, 1967, then it cannot be gainsaid that JANICE was not conceived during
this cohabitation. Hence, no recognition will lie. Necessarily, recognition cannot be
had under paragraph 4 as JANICE has no other evidence or proof of her alleged
paternity.
Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical time of conception,
ARLENE had carnal knowledge with two other men: "Oying" Fernandez and Melvin
Yabut, which was not even rebutted; and considering that it was Melvin Yabut, who
introduced ARLENE to JAO at the Bayside Club. Moreover, the testimony of ARLENE
is not wholly reliable. When the trial court said that "the Court is further convinced of
plaintiff's cause by ARLENE's manner of testifying in a most straight-forward and
candid manner", the fact that ARLENE was admittedly a movie actress may have been
overlooked so that not even the trial court could detect, by her acts, whether she was
lying or not.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and a new one entered
dismissing plaintiff-appellee's complaint. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED."
The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of admissibility and
conclusiveness of the result of blood grouping tests to prove non-paternity.
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to affirm
paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,[2] an action for declaration of
filiation, support and damages. In said case, the NBI expert's report of the blood tests
stated that "from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father
of the child." From this statement, the defendant contended that the child must have
been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the NBI expert
cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child; he can only give his
opinion that he is a 'possible father'. This possibility, coupled with the other facts and
circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant Co
Tao is the father of the child Manuel."[3]
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove
paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three
decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an
important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that
blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to
paternity - that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the
mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such
parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood
of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the
child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.[4]
In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood test results to prove
non-paternity has already been passed upon in several cases. In Gilpin v. Gilpin[5]the
positive results of blood tests excluding paternity, in a case in which it was shown that
proper safeguards were drawn around the testing procedures, were recognized as final
on the question of paternity. In Cuneo v. Cuneo[6] evidence of non-paternity consisting
of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that the alleged In view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, as heretofore quoted,
father had cohabited with the mother within the period of gestation. The Court said that which are binding on this Court, we do not find it necessary to further pass upon the
the competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to issue of recognition raised by petitioner.
reject such testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact. Courts, it was
stated, should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby denied. Without
situations presented, since to reject said result was to deny progress.[7] This ruling was pronouncement as to costs.
also echoed in Clark v. Rysedorph[8], a filiation proceeding where an uncontradicted SO ORDERED.
blood grouping test evidence, excluding paternity, was held conclusive.[9] Legislation
expressly recognizing the use of blood tests is also in force in several
states.[10] Tolentino,[11] affirms this rule on blood tests as proof of non-paternity, thus
"Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be
transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two
persons does not indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of
different types will indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus,
when the supposed father and the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they
cannot be father and child by consanguinity. The Courts of Europe today regard a
blood test exclusion as an unanswerable and indisputable proof of non-paternity."[12]
Moreover,
"The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed father cannot be a ground for
compulsory recognition if such cohabitation could not have produced the conception of
the child. This would be the case, for instance, if the cohabitation took place outside of
the period of conception of the child. Likewise, if it can be proved by blood tests that
the child and the supposed father belong to different blood groups, the cohabitation by
itself cannot be a ground for recognition."[13]
Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests in the instant
case by impugning the qualifications of the NBI personnel who performed the tests and
the conduct of the tests themselves. Her allegations, in this regard, appear to be without
merit. The NBI's forensic chemist who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has
had extensive practice in this area for several years. The blood tests were conducted six
(6) times using two (2) scientifically recognized blood grouping systems, the MN Test
and the ABO System,[14] under witness and supervision.[15]
Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a proper
subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the first blood
test, she, represented by her mother, declined to undergo the same blood test to prove or
disprove their allegations, even as Jao was willing to undergo such a test again.[16]
Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that the
result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are admissible and
conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a?vis petitioner Janice. No
evidence has been presented showing any defect in the testing methods employed or
failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of the tests. The result of
such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific fact.
G.R. No. L-83942 December 29, 1988
ROMEO S. AMURAO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMUEL JEROME BUENAVENTURA,
represented by her natural mother and guardian ad litem FE ROSARIO
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
The petitioner was sued for support by the offspring of his illicit relations with a 19-
year old college student. The petitioner denied paternity and refused to give support.
At the commencement of the trial on July 25, 1977, the trial court made a
last-minute effort to simplify the issues by calling the parties and their counsel to a
conference in her chambers. The result was an agreement of the parties, a gist of which
was written down in the minutes of the hearing, duly signed by the parties and their
counsel, attested by the Deputy Clerk of Court, and embodied in the court's order of
September 26, 1977 as follows:
When this case was called for trial this morning, parties jointly moved
for a conference in chambers. The same was granted. After said
conference, parties agreed to submit themselves to a blood-grouping
test to determine the paternity of plaintiff before the National Bureau
of Investigation; and to be bound by the results of the said
government agency in the following manner: a) if the finding is to the
effect that herein plaintiff may be the offspring of defendant, paternity
shall be admitted and this case will proceed for trial only on the issue
of amount of support; and b) if the finding is negative, then this case
shall be dismissed without further trial. The Court finds the same well
taken.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff-minor. his natural mother and defendant are
hereby ordered to submit themselves to a blood-grouping test before
the National Bureau of Investigation on or before October 17, 1977 at
10:00 o'clock in the morning for a determination of plaintiffs
paternity. (Emphasis supplied.) (pp. 29-30, Original Records; p. 20,
Rollo.)
On the basis of the blood grouping tests performed by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the NBI submitted to the Court Report No. 77-100 dated October
17, 1977, finding that:
The said child (Romuel Jerome Buenaventura) is a possible offspring
of the alleged father Romeo Amurao with Fe Rosario Buenaventura
as the natural mother. (p. 20, Rollo.)
Exactly one year later, on September 26, 1978, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order dated September 26, 1977, impugning its validity.
The motion was denied by the trial court. The petitioner sought a review of the order by
the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 51407). The petition was
denied by this Court on May 4, 1980.
A motion to declare the petitioner in contempt of court for failure to pay
support pendente lite was filed by the private respondent minor. At the hearing of the
contempt motion the parties presented evidence on the petitioner's capability to give
support. After the hearing on the contempt motion, the case was set for trial on July 8,
1983, with due notice to both parties, for the presentation of further evidence by the
petitioner (defendant) on the main case. However, neither the petitioner, nor his
counsel, appeared at the hearing. The court declared the case submitted for decision. On
August 8, 1985, it rendered judgment for the private respondent ordering the petitioner
to pay the former support of P500 per month plus attorney's fees of P3,000, and costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV 07645) which rendered
judgment on March 7, 1988, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
the modification that the support fixed in the judgment appealed from
is increased to One Thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) Pesos,
payable within the first five days of each month at the plaintiffs
residence. Defendant-appellant is hereby ordered to pay support
pendente lite of P200.00 in arrears since October 1978 up to the
termination of this appeal. Costs against defendant-appellant. (p. 24,
Rollo.)
Once more, the case is before Us for review upon a petition alleging that the Court of
Appeals erred:
1. in finding that the petitioner had admitted his paternity in relation
to the minor Romuel Jerome Buenaventura and that hence said minor
is entitled to receive support from him;
2. in upholding the trial court's decision based on the evidence
(consisting among others of the petitioner's balance sheets, audit
reports and admissions regarding his income) presented by the parties
at the hearing of the plaintiffs contempt motion;
3. in increasing the amount of support granted by the trial court; and
 4. in applying Article 290 of the Civil Code instead of Articles 296
and 297 of the same Code.

The petition for review is devoid of merit.

The first, second, third, and fourth issues raised by the petition are factual issues which
this Court may not review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Whether or not the petitioner made an admission of paternity under the terms of the trial
court's order dated September 26, 1977, thereby binding himself to give support to his
child, the private respondent herein, is a finding of fact.

So is the Court's determination of the amount of support payable to the private

respondent. It was perfectly proper for the Court to consider the evidence presented by
the parties at the hearing of the plaintiff s contempt motion against the defendant, as
evidence also on the merits of the main case. The parties did not have to repeat the ritual
of presenting the same evidence all over again to the court. The defendant (herein
petitioner), by failing to appear at the hearing of the main case on July 8, 1983 (p. 17,
Rollo), waived his right to adduce additional evidence. Hence, he may not be heard to
complain that he was denied due process.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the minor, who filed his
action for support in 1977 when he was only an infant five (5) months old, is now (as an
11-year old student) entitled to an increase in the amount of support awarded to him by
the trial court, is also a factual issue which We may not re-examine and review.

In any event, We find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
increase in the child's support is proper and is sanctioned by the provisions of Articles
290, 296 and 297 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. This decision is immediately
executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-75377 February 17, 1988
CHUA KENG GIAP, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and CHUA LIAN
KING respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
We are faced once again with still another bid by petitioner for the status of a legitimate
heir. He has failed before, and he will fail again.
In this case, the petitioner insists that he is the son of the deceased Sy Kao and that it
was error for the respondent court to reject his claim. He also says his motion for
reconsideration should not have been denied for tardiness because it was in fact filed on
time under the Habaluyas ruling. 1
This case arose when Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19, 1983, a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in the regional trial court of Quezon City. The
private respondent moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of the petitioner's
capacity to file the petition. The latter, it was claimed, had been declared as not the son
of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in S.P. No. Q-12592, for the settlement of
the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan. The decision in that case had long become final
and executory.2
The motion was denied by Judge Jose P. Castro, who held that the case invoked decided
the paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner. 3 Holding that this was mere
quibbling, the respondent court reversed the trial judge in a petition for certiorari filed
by the private respondent.4 The motion for reconsideration was denied for late
filing.5 The petitioner then came to this Court to challenge these rulings.
The petitioner argues at length that the question to be settled in a motion to dismiss
based on lack of a cause of action is the sufficiency of the allegation itself and not
whether these allegations are true or not, for their truth is hypothetically
admitted. 6 That is correct. He also submits that an order denying a motion to dismiss is
merely interlocutory and therefore reversible not in a petition for certiorari but on
appeal.7 That is also correct Even so, the petition must be and is hereby denied.
The petitioner is beating a dead horse. The issue of his claimed filiation has long been
settled, and with finality, by no less than this Court. That issue cannot be resurrected
now because it has been laid to rest in Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals, 8 decided on
September 28, 1984. In that case, Sy Kao flatly and unequivocally declared that she was
not the petitioner's mother.
The Court observed through Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.
Petitioner Sy Kao denies that respondent Chua Keng Giap is her son
by the deceased Chua Bing Guan. Thus, petitioner's opposition filed
on December 19, 1968, is based principally on the ground that the
respondent was not the son of Sy Kao and the deceased but of a
certain Chua Eng Kun and his wife Tan Kuy.
After hearing on the merits which lasted for ten years, the court
dismissed the respondent's petition on March 2, 1979 on a finding that
he is not a son of petitioner Sy Kao and the deceased, and therefore,
had no lawful interest in the estate of the latter and no right to institute
the intestacy proceedings.
The respondent tried to appeal the court's resolution but his appeal
was denied by the lower court for having been filed out of time. He
then filed a mandamus case with the Court of appeals but the same
was dismissed. Respondent, therefore, sought relief by filing a
petition for certiorari, G.R. No. 54992, before this Court but his
petition was likewise dismissed on January 30, 1982, for lack of
merit. His subsequent motions for reconsideration met a similar fate.
xxx xxx xxx
To allow the parties to go on with the trial on the merits would not
only subject the petitioners to the expense and ordeal of obligation
which might take them another ten years, only to prove a point
already decided in Special Proceeding No. Q-12592, but more
importantly, such would violate the doctrine of res judicata which is
expressly provided for in Section 49, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
There is no point in prolonging these proceedings with an examination of the procedural
objections to the grant of the motion to dismiss. In the end, assuming denial of the
motion, the resolution of the merits would have to be the same anyway as in the
aforesaid case. The petitioner's claim of filiation would still have to be rejected.
Discussion of the seasonableness of the motion for reconsideration is also unnecessary
as the motion would have been validly denied just the same even if filed on time.
Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap was really her son?
More than any one else, it was Sy Kao who could say — as indeed she has said these
many years--that Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.
G.R. No. L-69679 October 18, 1988
VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM, LIM BIAK CHIAO and CALASIAO BIJON
FACTORY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CONSORCIA FRIANEZA GOLEA,
MARIA FRIANEZA VERGARA, BENEDICTA FRIANEZA MAYUGBA
BONIFACIA FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DOMINGO FRIANEZA namely,
DECIDERIA Q. VDA. DE FRIANEZA FRANCISCO, DONA, VILMA and
DECIDERIA, all surnamed FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DANIEL FRIANEZA
namely, ADELA V. VDA. DE FRIANEZA in her behalf and as Guardian ad litem
of Minors, DARLENE, DANIEL JR., DUSSEL and DAISY GLEN, all surnamed
FRIANEZA respondents.
Ethelwoldo R. de Guzman for petitioners.
Tomas B. Tadeo, Sr. for private respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This case involves a contest over the estate of the late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat wherein
the protagonists are her sisters and the children of her deceased brothers on one hand,
and the petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be her only child.
Petitioners Violeta Cabatbat Lim, her husband Liam Biak Chiao, and the Calasiao Bijon
Factory assail the decision dated October 25, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
now Court of Appeals (AC-G.R. No. CV 67055), which affirmed the trial court's
decision finding that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not the off-spring, hence, not a
legal heir of the late Esperanza Cabatbat.
The private respondents, sisters of the late Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No. D-3841), praying
for the partition of the estate of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat, who died without issue on
April 23, 1977. Part of her estate was her interest in the business partnership known as
Calasiao Bijon Factory, now in the possession of Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to
be the child of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat.
Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat was survived by her husband, Proceso Cabatbat, her
sisters, Consorcia Maria, Benedicta, Bonifacia, all surnamed Frianeza and the children
of her deceased brothers Daniel and Domingo. In their complaint, the private
respondents alleged that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza, but was only
a ward (ampon) of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat who sheltered and
supported her from childhood, without benefit of formal adoption proceedings.
Private respondents' evidence on the non-filiation of Violeta to Esperanza Cabatbat
were: 1) the absence of any record that Esperanza Cabatbat was admitted in the hospital
where Violeta was born and that she gave birth to Violeta on the day the latter was
born; 2) the absence of the birth certificate of Violeta Cabatbat in the files of certificates
of live births of the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948, when
Violeta was supposedly born; 3) certification dated March 9, 1977, of the Civil Registry
coordinator Eugenio Venal of the Office of the Civil Registrar General, that his office
has no birth record of Violeta Cabatbat alleged to have been born on May 26, 1948 or
1949 in Calasiao, Pangasinan; 4) certification dated June 16, 1977 of Romeo Gabriana,
Principal II, that when Violeta studied in the Calasiao Pilot Central School, Proceso
Cabatbat and Esperanza Cabatbat were listed as her guardians only, not as her parents;
5) testimony of Amparo Reside that she was in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital on
May 21,1948 to watch a cousin who delivered a child there and that she became
acquianted with a patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth on May 26, 1948 to a
baby girl who grew up to be known as Violeta Cabatbat.
Pitted against the evidence of the plaintiffs are the evidence of herein petitioners
consisting of. 1) Violeta Cabatbat's birth record which was filed on June 15,1948
showing that she was born on May 26, 1948 at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and
that she is a legitimate child of the spouses Proceso and Esperanza Cabatbat; 2)
testimony of Proceso Cabatbat that Violeta is his child with the deceased Esperanza
Frianeza; 3) testimony of Benita Lastimosa denying that she delivered a child in the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is that child; 4) the
marriage contract of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao where Esperanza appeared as the
mother of the bride; 5) Deed of Sale dated May 14, 1960, wherein the vendee Violeta
Cabatbat, then a minor, was represented and assisted by her "mother," Dra. Esperanza
Cabatbat; and 6) another Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 21, 1961, wherein Violeta
Cabatbat was assisted and represented by her "father," Proceso Cabatbat.
Upon the evidence, the trial court held on August 10, 1979 that Violeta Cabatbat is not a
child by nature of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat and that hence, she is
not a legal heir of the deceased Esperanza Cabatbat. The dispositive portion of the trial
court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Finding that defendant VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM is not a child
by nature of the spouses, decedent Esperanza Frianeza and defendant
Proceso Cabatbat, and not a compulsory heir of the said decedent;
(2) Declaring that the heirs of the decedent are her surviving husband,
defendant Proceso Cabatbat and her sisters, plaintiffs Consorcia
MARIA, BENEDICTA alias JOVITA, and BONIFACIA alias
ANASTACIA, all surnamed FRIANEZA her brothers deceased
DANIEL FRIANEZA represented by his surviving spouse, Adela
Vda. de Frianeza, and their children, Darlene, Daniel, Jr., Dussel and
Daisy Glen, all surnamed FRIANEZA and deceased DOMINGO
FRIANEZA represented by his surviving spouse Decideria Q. Vda.
de Frianeza and their children, Francisco, Dona, Vilma and Decideria,
all surnamed FRIANEZA
(3) Finding that the estate left by the decedent are the thirty properties
enumerated and described at pages 13 to 19 supra and an equity in the
Calasiao Bijon Factory in the sum of P37,961.69 of which P13,221.69
remains after advances obtained by the deceased during her lifetime
and lawful deductions made after her death;
(4) That of the real properties adverted to above, three-fourth (3/4)
pro- indiviso is the share of defendant Proceso Cabatbat, as the
surviving spouse, one-half (½) as his share of the conjugal estate and
one-half (½) of the remaining one-half as share as heir from his wife
(decedent's) estate, while the remaining one-half (½) of the other half
is the group share of the heirs of the brothers and sisters of his wife
and of the children of the latter if deceased, whose names are already
enumerated hereinbefore in the following proportions: one-sixth (1/6)
each pro-indiviso to Consorcia Maria, Benedicta alias Jovita, and
Bonifacia alias Anastacia; one-sixth (1/6) to Adela B. Vda. de
Fraineza Darlene, Daniel, Jr., Dussel and Daisy Glen, as a group in
representation of deceased brother DANIEL FRIANEZA and one.
sixth (1/6) to Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza, Francisco, Dona, Vilma
and Decideria as a group in representation of deceased brother
DOMINGO FRIANEZA
(5) That of the balance of the equity of the deceased in the
CALASIAO BIJON FACTORY in the sum of P13,221.69, three-
fourths (3/4) or P9,916.29 is the share of Proceso Cabatbat as
surviving spouse and as heir of his deceased wife, and the remaining
one-fourth (1/4) to the plaintiffs under the sharing already stated in
the preceding paragraph; (a) but because defendant Proceso Cabatbat
has overdrawn his share he is ordered to return to the estate the sum
of P796.34 by depositing the same with the Clark of Court; and (b)
defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, not being an heir, is ordered to
return to the estate the sum of P2,931.13 half of what she and her
codefendant Proceso Cabatbat withdrew from the equity of the
deceased under Exhibit 29, receipt dated April 30, 1977;
(6) Ordering jointly defendant a Proceso Cabatbat and Violeta
Cabatbat Lim to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00, the sum
of P4,000.00 from defendant Proceso Cabatbat and Pl,000.00 from
defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, and litigation expenses in the sum of
Pl,000.00 from defendant Proceso Cabatbat and P200.00 from
defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, to the plaintiffs, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 236-239, Record on Appeal.)
Petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of
the trial court on October 25, 1984.
A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the Intermediate
Appellate Court.
Petitioners have elevated the decision to Us for review on certiorari, alleging that the
Intermediate Appellate Court erred:
1. In finding that petitioner is not the child of Prospers and Esperanza
Cabatbat;
2. In ignoring the provisions of Section 22 of Rule 132, Rules of
Court;
3. In not considering the provision of Article 263 of the New Civil
Code;
4. In disregarding Exhibits 8, 9, 10, and 11 of petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim
Petitioners' first and fourth assignments of error raise factual issues. The finding of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that Violeta Cabatbat was not born of Esperanza
Cabatbat is a factual finding based on the evidence presented at the trial, hence, it is
conclusive upon Us. Well entrenched is the rule that "factual findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect" (Vda. de Roxas vs. IAC, 143
SCRA 77; Republic vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 705). Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court which provides that: "Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is
unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its
execution and authenticity need be given" does not apply to petitioners' Exhibit "5," the
supposed birth registry record of defendant Violeta Cabatbat showing that she was born
on May 26,1948, at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, and that her
father and mother are Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Frianeza, respectively. In
rejecting that document, the trial court pointedly observed:
This is very strange and odd because the Registry Book of admission
of the hospital does not show that Esperanza Frianeza was ever a
patient on May 26, 1948. Indeed, Esperanza Frianeza was never
 admitted in the hospital as an obstetrics case before or after May 26,
1948, that is from December 1, 1947 to June 15, 1948 (Stipulation of
Facts, Pre-Trial Order of May 23, 1977, Record on Appeal, p. 117).

On May 26, 1948, the day defendant Violeta Cabatbat was alleged to
have been delivered by Esperanza Frianeza in the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital, the records of the hospital show that only one
woman by the same of the Benita Lastimosa of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur,
not Esperanza Frianeza, gave birth to an illegitimate child who was
named by her mother Benita Lastimosa as Baby Girl Lastimosa
(Exhibit S. Plaintiffs' Folder of Exhibits, p. 39, Record on Appeal, pp.
117-118). Furthermore, the record of birth certificates of Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948 does not carry the
birth certificate of defendant Violeta Cabatbat and the only birth
certificate in the file of birth certificates of the hospital for May 26,
1948 is that of Baby Girl Lastimosa whose mother's name is Benita
Lastimosa. (pp. 3-4, CA Decision, pp. 13-14, Record on Appeal.)

Furthermore, the absence of a record of the birth of petitioner Violeta Cabatbat in the
Office of the Civil Registrar General, puts a cloud on the genuineness of her Exhibit 5.

Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not well-taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because
this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt.
They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither a legally adopted
child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza
Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The appealed decision is
affirmed, but with modification of paragraphs 2 and 4 of the dispositive portion thereof,
by excluding the widows Adela B. Vda. de Frianeza and Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza,
who are not legal heirs of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat from participating with their
children and the surviving sisters of the deceased in the one-fourth share of the estate
pertaining to the latter under Article 1001 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002.]
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, Petitioner, v.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L.
TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO, Respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 45394 1 which reversed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring
William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and
ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda
Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir
of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all successional rights as such and to pay
the costs of the suit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On November 29, 1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G.
Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an
action for compulsory recognition as "the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late
William Liyao" against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L.
Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. 2 The complaint was later amended to
include the allegation that petitioner "was in continuous possession and enjoyment of
the status of the child of said William Liyao," petitioner having been "recognized and
acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime." 3
The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for
more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon
cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s untimely
demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazon’s two (2)
children from her subsisting marriage, namely: Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed
Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in Quezon City and Manila. This was with the
knowledge of William Liyao’s legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda
Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita
Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which
Corazon and William were then vice president and president, respectively.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the
signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She
failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the
necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land
located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of Far East Realty
Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos
Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited
and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and
hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao.
William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure
a copy of Billy’s birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank
account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company 4 and gave weekly
amounts to be deposited therein. 5 William Liyao would bring Billy to the office,
introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together. 6
During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among
others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billy’s godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz,
William Liyao’s legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio. 7 Corazon also
presented pictures in court to prove that she usually accompanied William Liyao while
attending various social gatherings and other important meetings. 8 During the occasion
of William Liyao’s last birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic
Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence of
Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, "Hey, look I am still young, I can
still make a good looking son." 9 Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession
and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William
Liyao by the latter’s direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for
his food, clothing and other material needs. However, after William Liyao’s death, it
was Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La
Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections, clothing, old
newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where he shared his
last moments with Corazon.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon G.
Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents to her children. She used to visit
Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two children of Corazon from her
marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some
housemaids lived with Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On some occasions
like birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the couple’s residence
and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would usually see William Liyao
in sleeping clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant with her
child Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week in Greenhills and
later on in White Plains where she would often see William Liyao. Being a close friend
of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital during the birth of Billy.
She continuously visited them at White Plains and knew that William Liyao, while
living with her friend Corazon, gave support by way of grocery supplies, money for
household expenses and matriculation fees for the two (2) older children, Bernadette
and Enrique. During William Liyao’s birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the
Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy and told everybody present,
including his two (2) daughters from his legal marriage, "Look, this is my son, very
guapo and healthy." 10 He then talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy before
Christmas. He intended to make it "engrande" and "make the bells of San Sebastian
Church ring." 11 Unfortunately, this did not happen since William Liyao passed away
on December 2, 1975. Maurita attended Mr. Liyao’s funeral and helped Corazon pack
his clothes. She even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue and gray 12 which Mr.
Liyao wore in a photograph 13 as well as another shirt of lime green 14 as belonging to
the deceased. A note was also presented with the following inscriptions: "To Cora, Love
From William. 15 Maurita remembered having invited the couple during her mother’s
birthday where the couple had their pictures taken while exhibiting affectionate poses
with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still married to Ramon Yulo since her
marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally separated from her said husband.
However, during the entire cohabitation of William Liyao with Corazon Garcia,
Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the house when she usually
visited Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she knew that
Billy is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter being
one of her customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazon’s house in Scout Delgado,
Quezon City in the Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to see Mr. Liyao
from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the couple transferred to White Plains,
Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was conceiving, Mr. Liyao was
worried that Corazon might have another miscarriage so he insisted that she just stay in
the house, play mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon how to play mahjong
and together with Atty. Brillantes’ wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong sessions among
themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house, paid the
salary of the maids and food for Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria
knew that Corazon is married but is separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria never
had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao and
Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from
the time that the latter abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was about six
(6) years old when William Liyao started to live with them up to the time of the latter’s
death on December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of Enrique’s half
brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the
house as well as in the office. Enrique’s testimony was corroborated by his sister,
Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying
Billy could not have been superimposed and that the negatives were in the possession of
her mother, Corazon Garcia.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married. 16 Linda grew up and lived with her parents at
San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got married; that her parents were
not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents
would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at their house in
San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even during out of town business trips
or for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father would change his clothes at
home because of his personal hygiene and habits. Her father reportedly had trouble
sleeping in other people’s homes. Linda described him as very conservative and a strict
disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success would compensate for failure of a
home. As a businessman, he was very tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and
did not give up easily. He suffered two strokes before the fatal attack which led to his
death on December 2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May
1974 and was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in the house for two (2) to
three (3) months for his therapy and acupuncture treatment. He could not talk, move,
walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-
Tan, ran the office. She handled the collection of rents while her sister referred legal
matters to their lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had personally changed. He
was not active in business and had dietary restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder
stroke during the latter part of September to October 1974. He stayed home for two (2)
to three (3) days and went back to work. He felt depressed, however, and was easily
bored. He did not put in long hours in the office unlike before and tried to spend more
time with his family.
Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon
was not legally separated from her husband and the records from the Local Civil
Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any annulment 17 of their marriage.
Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the
company garage. Immediately after the death of Linda’s father, Corazon went to
Linda’s office for the return of the former’s alleged investments with the Far East
Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and Company. Linda
added that Corazon, while still a vice-president of the company, was able to take out
documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office.
There was one instance when she was told by the guards, "Mrs. Yulo is leaving and
taking out things again." 18 Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the
office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon Garcia go. Linda did not
recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father after having been shown
three (3) large suit cases full of men’s clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and
pajamas.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never been
separated. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati up to
the time of her father’s death on December 2, 1975. 19 Her father suffered two (2)
minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart attack
sometime between April and May 1974, his speech and hands were affected and he had
to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under strict medication, taking aldomet,
serpacil and cifromet which were prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for high blood
pressure and cholesterol level control. 20 Tita Rose testified that after the death of Mr.
Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita
Rose also stated that her family never received any formal demand that they recognize a
certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. After
assuming the position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come across any
check signed by her late father representing payment to lessors as rentals for the house
occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the laminated photographs presented
by Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which were displayed at
the latter’s office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and
bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who said that he usually reported for
work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 o’clock in the morning.
At past 7:00 o’clock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took
over as night shift driver. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick.
It was only after a month that he was able to report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao
was not able to report to the office regularly. Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao
suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added that as a driver and bodyguard of
Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter among which was buying medicine for him like
capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside the office of
Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on the table. He tried to massage Mr.
Liyao’s breast and decided later to carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao
died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the
first to arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of
the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her
husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr.
Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo
who was also asking about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon. He
freely relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic
Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he went to the
latter’s law office. Being the driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said that
he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao, Atty. Astraquillo, Atty.
Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation together with the
lawyers’ wives. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does not remember
driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like shopping.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad litem of the
minor William Liyao, Jr.;
(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the
deceased William Liyao;
(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L.
Tan and Christian Liyao, to recognize, and acknowledge the minor William Liyao, Jr.
as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao, entitled to all successional rights
as such; and
(d) Costs of suit. 21
In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by preponderance of
evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was
conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial court
observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of the latter such as securing
the birth certificate of petitioner through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia
Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing
sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law
favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child and "the presumption of
legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy
between husband and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257
in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code." The appellate court gave weight to the
testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo
who were still legally married and have not secured legal separation, were seen in each
other’s company during the supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased
William Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and the
baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are not
sufficient to establish proof ,of paternity in the absence of any evidence that the
deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said certificates and
considering that his signature does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals stated that
neither do family pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. With regard to the
passbook which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court observed
that there was nothing in it to prove that the same was opened by William Liyao for
either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since William Liyao’s signature and name do not
appear thereon.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a number
of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to
establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties
have consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn his
own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William
Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate. 22 The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only
flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles
of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in
a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. 23
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the
New Civil Code 24 provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration
of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband’s having access to his wife within the first one hundred and
twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access
was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten
(10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late
William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with
Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner
presented a document entitled, "Contract of Separation," 25 executed and signed by
Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any property that
Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future. 26
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon
Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical
impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds
for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code
may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions
set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. 27 Impugning the legitimacy of the child
is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the
simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which
the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal
that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. 28 It is
only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside
of these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to
an insult to his memory. 29
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad
litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of
petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot
prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate
even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. 30 We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present
petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in
exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a
valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the
husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the
status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s
alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown,
the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the
presumption. 31
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia
with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the
legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the
husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the
records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of
the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at
bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not
through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and
within the period limited by law.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence
presented by both parties on the petitioner’s claim of alleged filiation with the late
William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive evidence
presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his
paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 165166 - August 15, 2012]
CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner, v. DIVINA BULING, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on certiorari, 1 filed by petitioner Charles Gotardo,
to challenge the March 5, 2004 decision2 and the July 27, 2004 resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA GR CV No. 76326. The CA decision ordered the petitioner to
recognize and provide legal support to his minor son, Gliffze 0. Buling. The CA
resolution denied the petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition
and support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child
Gliffze.4ςrνll
In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze.5 For the parties
failure to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial
proceedings.6 Trial on the merits ensued.
The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence
for the respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she
had been hired as a casual employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting
supervisor.7 The petitioner started courting the respondent in the third week of
December 1992 and they became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993.8 The
petitioner gave the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, such as on Valentine
s Day and her birthday; she reciprocated his love and took care of him when he was
ill.9ςrνll
Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the
respondent in the former s rented room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the
respondent s uncle, on Tomas Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte.10 The
petitioner rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994.11 The sexual
encounters occurred twice a month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually,
on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she was pregnant.12 When told of the
pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the respondent.13 They in
fact applied for a marriage license.14 The petitioner even inquired about the costs of a
wedding reception and the bridal gown.15 Subsequently, however, the petitioner backed
out of the wedding plans.16ςrνll
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of
Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to
marry.17 Later, however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the
case.18ςrνll
The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995.19 When the petitioner
did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter
on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child.20 When the
petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite.21ςrνll
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed
paternity,22claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week
of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three
(3) months) when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994.23ςrνll
During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondent s motion,24 granted
a P2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.25ςrνll
THE RTC RULING
In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence proving Gliffze s filiation. It found the respondent s testimony inconsistent on
the question of when she had her first sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e.,
"September 1993" in her direct testimony while "last week of January 1993" during her
cross-testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual contact even after she had
refused the petitioner s initial marriage proposal. It ordered the respondent to return the
amount of support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay P10,000.00 as
attorney s fees.26ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.27ςrνll
chanrobles virtual law library
THE CA RULING
In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the
respondent s testimony, concluding that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her
understanding of the questions of the petitioner s counsel. It noted that the petitioner
and the respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994; that the
respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994;
and that the petitioner s allegation that the respondent had previous relationships with
other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision
and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC
order granting a P2,000.00 monthly child support.28ςrνll
When the CA denied29 the petitioner s motion for reconsideration,30 the petitioner filed
the present Petition for Review on Certiorari .
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTC s
appreciation of the respondent s testimony, and that the evidence on record is
insufficient to prove paternity.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT
The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that the inconsistency in the
respondent s testimony was due to an incorrect appreciation of the questions asked, and
that the record is replete with evidence proving that the petitioner was her lover and that
they had several intimate sexual encounters during their relationship, resulting in her
pregnancy and Gliffze s birth on March 9, 1995.
THE ISSUE
The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it set
aside the RTC s findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal
support to his minor son Gliffze.
OUR RULINGςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
We do not find any reversible error in the CA s ruling.
chanrobles virtual law library
We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the
person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child."31ςrνll
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.32 We have held that
such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family bible in which [his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting
[his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of
proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court."33ςrνll
In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima faciecase, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child.35 We explained that a prima faciecase exists if a woman declares
supported by corroborative proof that she had sexual relations with the putative father;
at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father.36 We explained further
that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of
sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that
the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.37ςrνll
In this case, the respondent established a prima faciecase that the petitioner is the
putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only
with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception.38 Rodulfo corroborated her
testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship.39ςrνll
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the
respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such
that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months
pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the
pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity
and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for
lack of evidentiary support. The petitioner s denial cannot overcome the respondent s
clear and categorical assertions.
The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between the respondent s
direct testimony regarding their first sexual contact as "sometime in September 1993"
and her cross-testimony when she stated that their first sexual contact was "last week of
January 1993," as follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
ATTY. GO CINCO:ςrαlαω
When did the defendant, according to you, start courting
you?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Third week of December 1992.
Q And you accepted him?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Last week of January 1993.
Q And by October you already had your sexual
intercourse?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Last week of January 1993.
COURT: What do you mean by accepting?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A I accepted his offer of love.41ςrνll

chanrobles virtual law library

We find that the contradictions are for the most part more apparent than real, having
resulted from the failure of the respondent to comprehend the question posed, but this
misunderstanding was later corrected and satisfactorily explained. Indeed, when
confronted for her contradictory statements, the respondent explained that that portion
of the transcript of stenographic notes was incorrect and she had brought it to the
attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her former counsel) but the latter took no action
on the matter.42ςrνll

Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must
be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a
testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and to anchor a conclusion based on
these parts. "In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him
on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and
considered."43 Evidently, the totality of the respondent's testimony positively and
convincingly shows that no real inconsistency exists. The respondent has consistently
asserted that she started intimate sexual relations with the petitioner sometime in
September 1993.44ςrνll

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is

obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.45 Support consists of
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family.46 Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment
on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources
or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.47 It may be reduced or
increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the
recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.48ςrνll

In this case, we sustain the award of P2,000.00 monthly child support, without prejudice
to the filing of the proper motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in
arrears, considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during the pendency of this case.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March 5, 2004
decision and the July 27, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No.
76326 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172471 November 12, 2012
ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"An order for x x x support x x x must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence."1
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 is the March 31, 2005 Decision3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79312 which dismissed petitioner
Antonio Perla’s (Antonio) appeal from the February 26, 2003 Decision4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 71 in Civil Case No. 96-3952, ordering him
to give monthly support to respondent Randy Perla (Randy). Likewise assailed is the
CA’s May 5, 2006 Resolution5denying the motion for reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor son, Randy (collectively
respondents), filed before the RTC a Complaint6 for support against Antonio.
They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and Antonio lived together as common-law
spouses for two years. As a result of said cohabitation, Randy was born on November
11, 1983. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he abandoned them and
failed to give any support to his son. Respondents thus prayed that Antonio be ordered
to support Randy.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,7 Antonio, who is now married and has a family of his
own, denied having fathered Randy. Although he admitted to having known Mirasol, he
averred that she never became his common-law wife nor was she treated as such. And
since Mirasol had been intimidating and pestering him as early as 1992 with various
suits by insisting that Randy is his son, Antonio sought moral and exemplary damages
by way of counterclaim from respondents.
During trial, Mirasol testified that from 1981 to 1983, she lived in Upper Bicutan,
Taguig where Antonio was a neighbor.8 In the first week of January 1981, Antonio
courted her9 and eventually became her first boyfriend.10Antonio would then visit her
everyday until 1982.11 Upon clarificatory question by the court whether she and Antonio
eventually lived together as husband and wife, Mirasol answered that they were just
sweethearts.12
When Mirasol became pregnant in 1983, Antonio assured her that he would support
her.13 Eventually, however, Antonio started to evade her.14 Mirasol last saw Antonio in
1983 but could not remember the particular month.15
On November 11, 1983, Mirasol gave birth to Randy.16 She presented Randy’s
Certificate of Live Birth17 and Baptismal Certificate18 indicating her and Antonio as
parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in
the said certificates.19 Antonio supplied his name and birthplace after Erlinda Balmori
(Erlinda), the "hilot" who assisted in Mirasol’s delivery of Randy, went to his house to
solicit the said information.20Mirasol also claimed that it was Erlinda who supplied the
date and place of marriage of the parents so that the latter can file the birth
certificate.21 Mirasol likewise confirmed that she is the same "Mirasol Perla" who
signed as the informant therein.22
Next to take the witness stand was Randy who at that time was just 15 years
old.23 Randy claimed that he knew Antonio to be the husband of her mother and as his
father.24 He recounted having met him for the first time in 1994 in the house of his Aunt
Lelita, Antonio’s sister, where he was vacationing.25 During their encounter, Randy
called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand while the latter hugged him.26 When Randy
asked him for support, Antonio promised that he would support him.27 Randy further
testified that during his one-week stay in his Aunt Lelita’s place, the latter treated him
as member of the family.28
For her part, Aurora Ducay testified that she knew both Mirasol and Antonio as they
were neighbors in Upper Bicutan, Taguig. Presently, Antonio is still her neighbor in the
said place.29 According to her, she knew of Mirasol’s and Antonio’s relationship
because aside from seeing Antonio frequenting the house of Mirasol, she asked Antonio
about it.30 She further narrated that the two have a son named Randy31 and that
Antonio’s mother even tried to get the child from Mirasol.32
Testifying as an adverse witness for the respondents, Antonio admitted having sexual
intercourse with Mirasol in February and August33 of 1981.34 When shown with Randy’s
Certificate of Live Birth and asked whether he had a hand in the preparation of the
same, Antonio answered in the negative.35
Testifying for himself, Antonio denied having courted Mirasol on January 5, 1981
because during that time, he was studying in Iloilo City. He graduated from the Iloilo
Maritime Academy in March of 198136 as shown by his diploma.37It was only in May
1981 or after his graduation that he came to Manila. Further, he denied having any
relationship with Mirasol.38 He claimed that he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol only
once which happened in the month of September or October of 1981.39
Antonio came to know that he was being imputed as the father of Randy only when
Mirasol charged him with abandonment of minor in 1994, which was also the first time
he saw Randy.40 Prior to that, neither Mirasol nor her sister, Norma, whom he met a few
times told him about the child.41
Anent Randy’s Certificate of Live Birth, Antonio testified as to several inaccuracies in
the entries thereon. According to him, his middle initial is "E" and not "A" as appearing
in the said certificate of live birth.42 Also, he is not a protestant and a laborer as
indicated in said certificate.43 Antonio likewise alleged that Mirasol only made up the
entries with respect to their marriage on October 28, 1981.44
Daisy Balmori Rodriguez (Daisy), for her part, testified that she came to know Mirasol
through her mother Erlinda who was the "hilot" when Mirasol gave birth to
Randy.45 She narrated that her mother asked Mirasol the details to be entered in the
child’s Certificate of Live Birth such as the names of the parents, date and place of
marriage, and the intended name of the child.46 Her mother also told her that Mirasol’s
son has no acknowledged father.47 Daisy likewise claimed that Mirasol later left to her
care the then infant Randy until Mirasol took him away without permission when the
child was almost five years old.48
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision49 dated February 26, 2003 ordering Antonio to
support Randy.
The RTC ruled that Mirasol and Randy are entitled to the relief sought since Antonio
himself admitted that he had sex with Mirasol. It also noted that when the 15-year old
Randy testified, he categorically declared Antonio as his father. The RTC opined that
Mirasol would not have gone through the trouble of exposing herself to humiliation,
shame and ridicule of public trial if her allegations were untrue. Antonio’s counterclaim
was denied due to the absence of bad faith or ill-motive on the part of Mirasol and
Randy.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Randy Perla and
against the defendant Antonio Perla, ordering the latter to give a reasonable monthly
support of P5,000.00 to Randy Perla for his sustenance and support to be given to him
from the time of the filing of this Complaint.
Defendant’s counterclaim is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.50
Antonio filed a Notice of Appeal51 which was given due course by the RTC.52
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision53 of March 31, 2005, the CA upheld Randy’s illegitimate filiation based
on the certified true copies of his birth certificate and of his baptismal certificate
identifying Antonio as his father. According to the appellate court, while these
documents do not bear the signature of Antonio, they are proofs that Antonio is the
known, imputed and identified father of Randy. The CA also affirmed the trial court’s
findings on the credibility of the witnesses and its appreciation of facts, as there was
nothing to suggest that the RTC erred in such respects. It highlighted Antonio’s
vacillation in his testimony regarding the number of times he had sex with Mirasol and
concluded that the same is a clear badge of his lack of candor - a good reason to
disregard his denials. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.54
Antonio filed a Motion for Reconsideration55 which was denied by the CA in its
Resolution56 of May 5, 2006.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue
The pivotal issue to be resolved in this case is whether the lower courts correctly
ordered Antonio to support Randy.
Our Ruling
There is merit in the petition.
A re-examination of the factual findings
of the RTC and the CA is proper in this
case.
"Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on
this Court."57 However, this rule admits of certain exceptions such as when the finding
is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures or when the judgment of
the CA is based on misapprehension of facts.58 As this case falls under these exceptions,
the Court is constrained to re-examine the factual findings of the lower courts.
Since respondents’ complaint for support
is anchored on Randy’s alleged
illegitimate filiation to Antonio, the lower
courts should have first made a
determination of the same.
Respondents’ Complaint for support is based on Randy’s alleged illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established
with sufficient certainty. A review of the Decision of the RTC would show that it is
bereft of any discussion regarding Randy’s filiation. Although the appellate court, for its
part, cited the applicable provision on illegitimate filiation, it merely declared the
certified true copies of Randy’s birth certificate and baptismal certificate both
identifying Antonio as the father as good proofs of his filiation with Randy and nothing
more. This is despite the fact that the said documents do not bear Antonio’s signature.
"Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for x x x support may create an unwholesome
situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be
issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence."59
Respondents failed to establish Randy’s
illegitimate filiation to Antonio.
The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code
which provide as follows:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
xxxx
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the
father. However, said certificate has no probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to
Antonio since the latter had not signed the same.60It is settled that "a certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate."61 We also cannot lend credence to Mirasol’s claim that Antonio supplied
certain information through Erlinda. Aside from Antonio’s denial in having any
participation in the preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature
thereon, respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied
certain entries in Randy’s birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained
discrepancies in Antonio’s personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth
certificate are manifestations of Antonio’s non-participation in its preparation. Most
important, it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the
witness stand.
Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate filiation. That during their
first encounter in 1994 Randy called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand while Antonio
hugged him and promised to support him; or that his Aunt Lelita treated him as a
relative and was good to him during his one-week stay in her place, cannot be
considered as indications of Randy’s open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172(1). "[T]o prove open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of
the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child
as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which
cannot be attributed to pure charity.1âwphi1 Such acts must be of such a nature that
they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and
treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously."62 Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and
promised to support him cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the
status of a child. To emphasize, "[t]he father’s conduct towards his son must be
spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist."63 Here, except for that singular
occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his
son.64 Neither can Antonio’s paternity be deduced from how his sister Lelita treated
Randy. To this Court, Lelita’s actuations could have been done due to charity or some
other reasons.
Anent Randy’s baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a
good proof of Antonio’s paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of
participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders
this document incompetent to prove paternity.65 And "while a baptismal certificate may
be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of
the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the
child’s paternity. Thus, x x x baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence
as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to
prove the same."66
This Court cannot likewise agree with the RTC’s conclusion that Antonio fathered
Randy merely on the basis of his admission that he had sexual encounters with Mirasol.
Neither does it agree with the CA that the inconsistencies in Antonio’s testimony with
regard to the number of times he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol are good reasons
to disregard his denials and uphold the respondents’ claims. It is well to stress that as
plaintiff, Mirasol has the burden of proving her affirmative allegation that Antonio is
the father of her son Randy.67 She must rely on the strength of her evidence and not on
the weakness of the defense.68 As Randy was born on November 11, 1983, it was
incumbent upon Mirasol to prove that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio prior to
the usual period of pregnancy or nine months before the birth of Randy. This crucial
period therefore is during the early part of the first quarter of 1983. However, nothing
from Mirasol’s testimony indicates that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio during
that time.

She merely testified that she last met with Antonio in 1983 but could not remember the
particular month.69 Plainly, this hardly means anything not only because it was not
established that the said meeting took place during that crucial period but also because
Mirasol never mentioned that they had sexual contact during their meeting.

Antonio’s admission of sexual intercourse with Mirasol does not likewise by any means
strengthen respondents’ theory that he fathered Randy. When Antonio testified as an
adverse witness for the respondents, he stated that he had sexual intercourse with
Mirasol in February and August of 1981. Later testifying as witness for his own behalf,
he mentioned that he had a one night affair with Mirasol which happened in the month
of September or October of 1981. Assuming that he indeed had sexual contact with
Mirasol on the dates mentioned, still, none of these sexual congresses could have led to
the conception of Randy who was born two years later in 1983.

All told, it is clear that respondents failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. Hence, the order for Antonio to support Randy has no basis.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed

Decision dated March 31, 2005 and Resolution dated May 5, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79312 are REVERSED and SER ASIDE and the Decision
dated February 26, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 71, in
Civil Case No. 96-3952 is VACATED. A new one is entered DISMISSING the
Complaint for Support filed by Mirasol Baring and Randy Perla against Antonio Perla.

SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 202578, September 27, 2017 ]
HEIRS OF GILBERTO ROLDAN, NAMELY: ADELINA ROLDAN, ROLANDO
ROLDAN, GILBERTO ROLDAN, JR., MARIO ROLDAN, DANNY ROLDAN,
LEONARDO ROLDAN, ELSA ROLDAN, ERLINDA ROLDAN-CARAOS,
THELMA ROLDAN-MASINSIN, GILDA ROLDAN-DAWAL AND RHODORA
ROLDAN-ICAMINA, PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF SILVELA ROLDAN,
NAMELY: ANTONIO R. DE GUZMAN, AUGUSTO R. DE GUZMAN, ALICIA R.
VALDORIA-PINEDA, AND SALLY R. VALDORIA, AND HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO
MAGTULIS, NAMELY: CYNTHIA YORAC-MAGTULIS, LEA JOYCE
MAGTULIS-MALABORBOR, DHANCY MAGTULIS, FRANCES DIANE
MAGTULIS, AND JULIERTO MAGTULIS-PLACER, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision[2] and Resolution,[3] which affirmed the Decision[4] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). The RTC ruled that petitioner heirs of Gilberto Roldan, respondent heirs
of Silvela Roldan,[5] and respondent heirs of Leopoldo Magtulis are co-owners of Lot
No. 4696.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Natalia Magtulis[6] owned Lot No. 4696, an agricultural land in Kalibo, Aklan, which
had an area of 21,739 square meters, and was covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. P-7711.[7] Her heirs included Gilberto Roldan and Silvela Roldan, her two children
by her first marriage; and, allegedly, Leopolda Magtulis her child with another man
named Juan Aguirre.[8] After her death in 1961, Natalia left the lot to her children.
However, Gilberta and his heirs took possession of the property to the exclusion of
respondents.
On 19 May 2003, respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Partition and
Damages against petitioners.[9]The latter refused to yield the property on these grounds:
(1) respondent heirs of Silvela had already sold her share to Gilberto; and (2)
respondent heirs of Leopolda had no cause of action, given that he was not a child of
Natalia.
During trial, petitioners failed to show any document evidencing the sale of Silvela's
share to Gilberto. Thus, in its Decision dated 14 December 2007, the RTC ruled that the
heirs of Silvela remained co-owners of the property they had inherited from Natalia. As
regards Leopoldo Magtulis, the trial court concluded that he was a son of Natalia based
on his Certificate of Baptism[10] and Marriage Contract.[11]
Considering that Gilberta, Silvela, and Leopolda were all descendants of Natalia, the
RTC declared each set of their respective heirs entitled to one-third share of the
property. Consequently, it ordered petitioners to account and deliver to respondents
their equal share to the produce of the land.
Petitioners appealed to the CA. They reiterated that Silvela had sold her share of the
property to her brother Gilberta. They asserted that the RTC could not have considered
Leopolda the son of Natalia on the mere basis of his Certificate of Baptism.
Emphasizing that filiation required a high standard of proof, petitioners argued that the
baptismal certificate of Leopoldo served only as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament.
In its Decision dated 20 December 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that
Gilberto, Silvela, and Leopoldo remained co-owners of Lot No. 4696. The appellate
court refused to conclude that Silvela had sold her shares to Gilberto without any
document evidencing a sales transaction. It also held that Leopoldo was the son of
Natalia, since his Certificate of Baptism and Marriage Contract indicated her as his
mother.
Petitioner heirs of Gilberto moved for reconsideration,[12] but to no avail. Before this
Court, they reiterate that Silvela sold her shares to Gilberto, and that Leopoldo was not
the son of Natalia. They emphasize that the certificates of baptism and marriage do not
prove Natalia to be the mother of Leopoldo since these documents were executed
without her participation.
Petitioners additionally contend that respondents lost their rights over the property,
since the action for partition was lodged before the RTC only in 2003, or 42 years since
Gilberto occupied the property in 1961. For the heirs of Gilberto, prescription and
laches already preclude the heirs of Silvela and the heirs of Leopoldo from claiming co-
ownership over Lot No. 4696.
In their Comment,[13] respondents assert that the arguments raised by petitioners involve
questions of fact not cognizable by this Court. As regards the issue of prescription and
laches, they insist that petitioners cannot invoke a new theory for the first time on
appeal.
ISSUES OF THE CASE
The following issues are presented to this Court for resolution:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's finding that Silvela did not sell her
share of the property to Gilberto
2. Whether the courts a quo correctly appreciated Leopoldo to be the son of Natalia
based on his baptismal and marriage certificates
3. Whether prescription and laches bar respondents from claiming coownership over
Lot No. 4696
RULING OF THE COURT

Sale of the Shares of Silvela to Gilberto
Petitioners argue before us that Silvela had a perfected contract of sale with Gilberto
over her shares of Lot No. 4696. That argument is obviously a question of fact,[14] as it
delves into the truth of whether she conveyed her rights in favor of her brother.
The assessment of the existence of the sale requires the calibration of the evidence on
record and the probative weight thereof. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, already
performed its function and found that the heirs of Gilberto had not presented any
document or witness to prove the fact of sale.
The factual determination of courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, is final
and conclusive on this Court except if unsupported by the evidence on record.[15] In this
case, the exception does not apply, as petitioners merely alleged that Silvela "sold,
transferred and conveyed her share in the land in question to Gilberto Roldan for a
valuable consideration" without particularizing the details or referring to any proof of
the transaction.[16] Therefore, we sustain the conclusion that she remains coowner of Lot
No. 4696.
Filiation of Leopoldo to Natalia
In resolving the issue of filiation, the RTC and the CA referred to Articles 172 and 175
of the Family Code, viz.:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The parties concede that there is no record of Leopolda's birth in either the National
Statistics Office[17] or in the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.[18] The
RTC and the CA then referred to other means to prove the status of Leopoldo: his
Certificate of Baptism and his Marriage Contract. Since both documents indicate
Natalia as the mother of Leopoldo, the courts a quo concluded that respondent heirs of
Leopoldo had sufficiently proven the filiation of their ancestor to the original owner of
Lot No. 4696. For this reason, the RTC and the CA maintained that the heirs of
Leopoldo are entitled to an equal share of the property, together with the heirs of
Gilberto and heirs of Silvela.
We disagree.
Jurisprudence has already assessed the probative value of baptismal certificates.
In Fernandez v. Court of Appeals,[19] which referred to our earlier rulings in Berciles v.
Government Service Insurance System[20] and Macadangdang v. Court of
Appeals,[21] the Court explained that because the putative parent has no hand in the
preparation of a baptismal certificate, that document has scant evidentiary value. The
canonical certificate is simply a proof of the act to which the priest may certify, i.e., the
administration of the sacrament. In other words, a baptismal certificate is "no proof of
the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of
prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence."[22]
In cases that followed Fernandez, we reiterated that a baptismal certificate is
insufficient to prove filiation.[23] But in Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. v.
Harper,[24] this Court clarified that a baptismal certificate has evidentiary value to prove
kinship "if considered alongside other evidence of filiation."[25] Therefore, to resolve
one's lineage, courts must peruse other pieces of evidence instead of relying only on a
canonical record. By way of example, we have considered the combination of
testimonial evidence,[26] family pictures,[27] as well as family books or
charts,[28]alongside the baptismal certificates of the claimants, in proving kinship.
In this case, the courts below did not appreciate any other material proof related to the
baptismal certificate of Leopoldo that would establish his filiation with Natalia, whether
as a legitimate or as an illegitimate son.
The only other document considered by the RTC and the CA was the Marriage Contract
of Leopoldo. But, like his baptismal certificate, his Marriage Contract also lacks
probative value as the latter was prepared without the participation of Natalia. In Reyes
v. Court of Appeals,[29] we held that even if the marriage contract therein stated that the
alleged father of the bride was the bride's father, that document could not be taken as
evidence of filiation, because it was not signed by the alleged father of the bride.
The instant case is similar to an issue raised in Paa v. Chan.[30] The claimant in that case
relied upon baptismal and marriage certificates to argue filiation. The Court said:
As regards the baptismal and marriage certificates of Leoncio Chan, the same are not
competent evidence to prove that he was the illegitimate child of Bartola Maglaya by a
Chinese father. While these certificates may be considered public documents, they are
evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specified - which in this case were the baptism and marriage, respectively, of Leoncio
Chan - but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect
to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship.
All told, the Baptismal Certificate and the Marriage Contract of Leopoldo, which a. One-half share to the heirs of Gilberta Roldan; and
merely stated that Natalia is his mother, are inadequate to prove his filiation with the b. One-half share to the heirs of Silvela Roldan.
property owner. Moreover, by virtue of these documents alone, the RTC and the CA 2. Petitioners are ordered to account for and deliver to the heirs of Silvela Roldan their
could not have justly concluded that Leopoldo and his successors-in-interest were one-half share on the produce of the land.
entitled to a one-third share of the property left by Natalia, equal to that of each of her
undisputed legitimate children Gilberto and Silvela. As held in Board of SO ORDERED.
Commissioners v. Dela Rosa,[31] a baptismal certificate is certainly not proof of the
status of legitimacy or illegitimacy of the claimant. Therefore, the CA erred in
presuming the hereditary rights of Leopoldo to be equal to those of the legitimate heirs
of Natalia.

Prescription and Laches

According to petitioners, prescription and laches have clearly set in given their
continued occupation of the property in the last 42 years. Prescription cannot be
appreciated against the co-owners of a property, absent any conclusive act of
repudiation made clearly known to the other coowners.[32]

Here, petitioners merely allege that the purported co-ownership "was already repudiated
by one of the parties" without supporting evidence. Aside from the mere passage of
time, there was failure on the part of petitioners to substantiate their allegation of laches
by proving that respondents slept on their rights.[33] Nevertheless, had they done so, two
grounds deter them from successfully claiming the existence of prescription and laches.

First, as demanded by the repudiation requisite for prescription to be appreciated, there

is a need to determine the veracity of factual matters such as the date when the period to
bring the action commenced to run. In Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag,[34] we considered
that determination as factual in nature. The same is true in relation to finding the
existence of laches. We held in Crisostomo v. Garcia, Jr.[35] that matters like estoppel,
laches, and fraud require the presentation of evidence and the determination of facts.
Since petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as in this
case, entertain questions of law,[36] petitioners claim of prescription and laches fail.

Second, petitioners have alleged prescription and laches only before this Court. Raising
a new ground for the first time on appeal contravenes due process, as that act deprives
the adverse party of the opportunity to contest the assertion of the claimant.[37] Since
respondents were not able to refute the issue of prescription and laches, this Court
denies the newly raised contention of petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner heirs of

Gilberto Roldan is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 02327 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

1. Only the heirs of Gilberta Roldan and Silvela Roldan are declared co-owners of the
land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-7711, which should be partitioned
among them in the following proportions:

[G.R. No. 39537. March 19, 1985.]
IRENE REYES (alias IRENE RAMERO, alias IRENE DELGADO), MOISES
VILLANUEVA and GENOVEVA RAMERO, Petitioners, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, PLACIDA DELGADO, DOMINGO DELGADO, PAULA. DELGADO
and MAXIMINA DELGADO, Respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals Special
Division of Five dated October 7, 1974 in CA-G.R. No. L-44964-R, reversing the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, dated December 26, 1969,
in Civil Case No. 1144 dismissing the action for reconveyance.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
On January 29, 1967, private respondents as plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of
first Instance of Batangas praying that the defendant Irene Reyes, alias Irene Romero or
Irene Delgado, be ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of plaintiffs
Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado, and Paula Delgado over four parcels of land
located in Tayabas, Quezon, and one parcel of land located in Pagbilao, Quezon, and
another deed of reconveyance in favor of plaintiff Maximina Delgado over three parcels
of land located in Alitagtag, Batangas.
It was alleged in the complaint that the defendants thru abuse of confidence, fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation and other falsifications succeeded in registering in the offices
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon and Batangas a document of self-adjudication
(Exhibit "24"), wherein defendant Irene Delgado alleged that she was the sole child of
the deceased Francisco Delgado and entitled to inherit the parcels of lands described in
the complaint; that as a result thereof Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 9913, 10348,
14937, T-11747 and 13489 were cancelled and new Transfer Certificates of Title were
issued in the name of Irene Delgado; that defendant Irene Delgado is not the illegitimate
daughter of Francisco Delgado, who died without issue, but is the legitimate daughter of
Genoveva Romero and Justino Reyes; that plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo
Delgado and Paula Delgado, sisters and brother of the deceased Francisco Delgado are
the heirs entitled to inherit from Francisco Delgado; and that Paula, Placido and
Domingo Delgado defrayed the expenses of the last illness and the funeral expenses of
Francisco Delgado and for the purpose they borrowed the sum of P7,000.00 from their
niece, plaintiff Maximina Delgado, and to pay Maximina Delgado they conveyed to her
the three parcels of land described in subparagraphs (f) to (g) of paragraph 9 of the
complaint. They also alleged that the defendant spouses Irene and Moises Villanueva
borrowed from plaintiffs common fund the sum of P23,000.00 which they used in the
purchase of a parcel of land (pp. 1-14, Record on Appeal; p. 63,
rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On or about March 2, 1967, defendant Irene Delgado, one of the petitioners herein, filed
an answer to the complaint and set up the affirmative defense that she is the illegitimate
daughter of the defendant Genoveva Romero and the deceased Francisco Delgado; that
for several years preceding the birth of Irene Delgado, her mother Genoveva Ramero
had separated from her lawful husband Justino Reyes and never reconciled since then;
and that Irene was born during the cohabitation of Francisco Delgado and Genoveva
Ramero as common-law husband and wife, and since her birth, lived with Francisco
Delgado and Genoveva Ramero, who reared and treated her as their child, maintaining
her and sending her through college. Defendants also denied having contracted a debt of
P23,000.00 from plaintiffs, or that plaintiffs spent for the last illness and funeral of
Francisco Delgado. Irene Delgado likewise set up a counterclaim, alleging that, as the
illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado, she has the right to represent her father to
the inheritance left by her grandmother (pp. 15-43, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On March 16, 1967, the plaintiffs thru counsel filed an answer to the counterclaim
denying that the defendant Irene Delgado was the illegitimate child of Francisco
Delgado, and hence has no right to claim from the estate of Francisco’s mother,
Benigna Castillo, and that the properties claimed by the defendant Irene Delgado no
longer formed part of the estate of Benigna Castillo as she had previously disposed of
them during her lifetime (pp. 43-46, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On August 15, 1967, a pre-trial in Civil Case No. 1144 was conducted.
On March 25, 1969, the plaintiffs filed a motion to admit an amended answer to the
counterclaim posed by defendant, wherein the plaintiffs alleged that the counterclaim of
the defendant, in so far as it would have the effect of being an indirect action for
acknowledgment, has already prescribed (pp. 50-55, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On April 14, 1969, the lower court admitted the amended answer to the counterclaim
over the objections of the defendant (pp. 56-61, Record on Appeal; p. 63,
rec.).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
After trial on the merits, the Court rendered its decision on December 26, 1969
dismissing the action for reconveyance and declaring defendant Irene Delgado the
lawful owner of the eight parcels of land. The counterclaim of Irene Delgado was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (now IAC), the plaintiffs with respect to
their complaint and the defendants with respect to their counterclaim.
The then Court of Appeals sitting as a Special Division of Five rendered its decision on
October 7, 1974, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Wherefore, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed The deed of self-
adjudication executed by Irene Delgado is hereby declared null and void and set aside.
The transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Irene Delgado in lieu of Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489 are hereby canceled,
and T.C.T. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489 are reinstated in the name of
Francisco Delgado. Likewise, the extrajudicial declaration executed by Irene Delgado
adjudicating to herself the 3 parcels of land located in Alitagtag, Batangas, with Tax
Declaration Nos. 8625, 8626 and 8627 are declared null and void. No costs" (pp. 52-53,
rec.).
The then Court of Appeals in arriving at this decision found that, although Irene
Delgado was the spurious daughter of Francisco Delgado, she nevertheless cannot merit
from the estate of the deceased Francisco Delgado because she was not recognized
either voluntarily or by court action (pp. 52-53, rec.).
The titles to the questioned lot however cannot be executed in favor of the plaintiffs;
because in so doing it will be in effect a recognition by the court that the plaintiffs are
the only heirs of Francisco Delgado to the prejudice of other possible heirs or creditors
of the deceased.
As to alleged loan contracted by Irene from the plaintiffs, the then Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court’s decision that it was without merit, because if it were true, the
plaintiffs could have demanded a receipt for such a big amount.
The counterclaim of Irene that she has the share to the inheritance of Benigna Castillo,
Francisco Delgado’s mother, and her alleged share in the expenses for the sickness and
funeral of Francisco Delgado which was advanced by the plaintiffs, need not be ruled
upon because of the findings that Irene is not an heir of Francisco Delgado (pp. 57-58,
rec.).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
On December 2, 1974, Defendants, petitioners herein, filed a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals (pp. 22-37, rec.).
On January 2, 1975, the plaintiffs, respondents herein, submitted their comment on the
petition for review filed by the petitioner (pp. 67-71, rec.).
On January 15, 1975, the petition for review filed by petitioners was denied in a
resolution by the First Division of the Supreme Court for lack of merit (p. 75, rec.).
On February 18, 1975, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 86-113, rec.).
On April 5, 1975, respondents filed their comments on the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners (pp. 130-134, rec.).
On April 23, 1975, petitioners filed their reply to respondents’ comment (pp. 118-125,
rec.).
On May 23, 1975, the Supreme Court reconsidered its resolution denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration (p. 142, rec.).
In their petition, petitioners sought to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
raising the following arguments:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. "There are strong and cogent reasons why this Honorable Court must return to and
even enhance the doctrine in Zuzuarregui v. Zuzuarregui, considering serious flaws in
the reasoning of the currently prevailing doctrine, so that assuming arguendo and pro
hac vice that Irene was not duly recognized or acknowledged as illegitimate child, she is
nevertheless entitled to successional rights as sole heir of the late Francisco Delgado,
considering that her filiation as illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado is
undisputed and beyond question" (p. 12, Petitioner’s Brief; p. 164, rec.).
2. "Upon the other hand, this time assuming arguendo and pro hac vice that under the
Civil Code recognition of an ‘other illegitimate’ is a pre-requisite to enjoyment of
rights, Irene Delgado was legally acknowledged by her father Francisco Delgado,
specially by his consent or advice to her marriage with Moises Villanueva contrary to
the erroneous conclusions of the Court of Appeals" (p. 39, Petitioner’s Brief, p. 164,
rec.).
The petition is without merit.
The doctrine that for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit must be first
recognized voluntarily or by court action is well settled in Our jurisprudence. (Bercilles
v. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Divinagracia v. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307 [1976]; Clemeña
v. Clemeña, 24 SCRA 720 [1968]; Noble v. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104 [1966]; Republic v.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 13 SCRA 272 [1969]; Paulino v. Paulino, 3
SCRA 730 [1961]; Barles v. Ponce Enrile, 109 Phil. 522 [1960]).chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
There is no reason to overturn this doctrine and revert to what was enunciated in the
case of Zuzuarregui v. Zuzuarregui (103 Phil. 346 [1958]); as suggested by herein
petitioners in their first assignment of errors.
It is the contention of the petitioners that the silence of the Civil Code as to the
recognition of illegitimate children other than natural, in contrast to natural children
who are expressly required to be recognized in order to inherit, only meant that
illegitimate children need not be recognized in order to inherit from his or her alleged
parent (p. 13, Petitioner’s Brief; p. 164, rec.). Petitioners also raised the argument that
under Article 287 of the New Civil Code which reads: "Illegitimate children other than
natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction
are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in this code." The
term "other illegitimate children" refers not only to those who are not natural or merely
adulterous or incestuous but also includes natural children who were not acknowledged
or recognized (p. 18, Petitioner’s Brief; p. 164, rec.). In other words, unrecognized
natural children can inherit not the share of a natural child but the share of a spurious
child so long as his filiation shall be duly proved. So, in effect, illegitimate children
need only to prove his filiation to inherit and such does not place him in a more
advantageous position than natural children, as they are placed in the same situation.
WE do not find these arguments persuasive.
Though the Civil Code is silent with respect to spurious children as to their recognition,
this Court, in applying the rules of recognition, applicable to natural children, to said
spurious children, declared in Clemeña v. Clemeña, supra that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The considerations of fairness and justice that underlie the time limit fixed in Article
285 of the Civil Code for actions seeking compulsory acknowledgment of natural
children are fully applicable, if not more, to actions to investigate and declare the
paternity of illegitimate children that are not natural. The motive that led the codifiers to
restrict the period for bringing action for compulsory recognition of natural children
were stated by this Court in Serrano v. Aragon, 22 Phil. 18, to be as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
‘. . . the writers of the code no doubt had in mind that there would arise instances where
certain illegitimate children, on account of the strong temptation due to the large estates
left by deceased persons, would attempt to establish that they were natural children of
such persons in order to get part of the property, and furthermore, they considered that it
is nothing but just and right that alleged parents should have a personal opportunity to
be heard. It was for these reasons and others equally as well founded that Article 137
was enacted’" (p. 724).
There are two (2) general classifications of illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock. They may be either natural (actually or by fiction)
or spurious (the incestuous, adulterous or illicit). Natural children are defined as those
born outside of wedlock of parents, who at the time of conception of the former, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 269, New Civil Code).
On the other hand, spurious children are those born of parents, who at the time of their
conception, are disqualified to marry each other on account of certain impediment.
Because of this basic distinction between these children, it is not legally possible to
classify unrecognized natural children under the class of spurious children. Besides,
commentators construe the phrase "illegitimate children other than natural" as excluding
from the grants of rights under Article 287 of the New Civil Code those children who
are natural child proper by birth and who have not secured voluntary or compulsory
recognition (p. 276, An Outline of Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. 1).
They fall within the scope of the definition of natural children enumerated in Article
269, New Civil Code (p. 142, Civil Law Reviewer, D. Jurado, 1982 ed.). Lastly, to
follow petitioners’ contention will not be in accordance with the consistent
pronouncements of this Court. It is an elementary and basic principle under the old and
new Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural child has no rights whatsoever against his
parent or his estate. His rights spring not from the filiation itself, but from the child’s
acknowledgment by the natural parent (Alabat v. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 [1967]; Mise
v. Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 396 [1954]; Magallanes v. CA, 95 Phil. 797 [1954]; Canales v.
Ugarte, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]; Malonda v. Malonda, 81 Phil. 149 [1948]; Buenaventura v.
Urbano, 5 Phil. 1 [1905]).
As to the second assignment of error raised by petitioners, We find that there was no
sufficient legal recognition of petitioner Irene Delgado by Francisco Delgado.
It can be seen from the record of birth (Exhibit "L-2") that the name of the petitioner
was Irene Ramero, and signed by Genoveva Ramero and of an unknown father. This
was certified to by the treasurer of the municipality of Alitagtag, Batangas (Exhibits "L"
and "L-1"). Another certified copy of another birth certificate issued by the municipal
treasurer and local civil registrar of the municipality of Alitagtag (Exhibit "20") stated
therein that the name of the child is Irene Ramero, and the name of the father is
"Francisco" and the mother "Genoveva Ramero." Any of these records of birth cannot
be sufficient recognition under the law. The birth certificate, to be sufficient
recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if
the father refuses, otherwise she may be penalized (Sec. 5, Act 3753; Madredejo v. De
Leon, 55 Phil. 1 [1930]); and if the alleged father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, or doctor or registrar, is incompetent evidence of
paternity of said child (Bercilles v. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Roces v. Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, 102 Phil. 1050 [1958]). Since any of the certificates of birth
presented were not signed by Francisco Delgado, it cannot be taken as record of birth to
prove recognition of Irene Delgado; nor can this birth certificate be taken as a
recognition in a public instrument (Pareja v. Pareja, 95 Phil. 167 [1954l).
Irene’s certificate of baptism (Exhibit "1") cannot be taken as proof of recognition
(Bercilles v. GSIS, supra, People v. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 [1984]; Cid v. Burnaman,
24 SCRA 434 [19681; Vudaurrazaga v. CA, 91 Phil. 492 [1952]; Capistrano v. Gabino,
8 Phil. 135 [1907]). In the case of Macadangdang v. CA [100 SCRA 73 [1980]), this
Court said that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they
are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with
respect to his kinsfolk.chanrobles law library : red
Irene’s secondary student permanent record (Exhibits "12", "13", "15" and "16") nor the
written consent given by Irene to the operation of her alleged father (Exhibit "4") cannot
be taken as an authentic writing. An authentic writing does not have to be a public
instrument; it is sufficient that it is genuine and not a forgery. It must generally be
signed by the alleged parent (Madredejo v. De Leon, supra) unless the whole instrument
is in the handwriting of the alleged parent and the facts mentioned therein correspond to
actual and real facts (Varela v. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248 [1954]). Thus, Irene’s
secondary student permanent record and her written consent to the operation of her
father, not being signed nor written in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado, cannot be
taken as an authentic writing to prove her recognition by her alleged father.
The marriage contract (Exhibit "17") of Irene Delgado and Moises Villanueva, wherein
it was stated that Francisco Delgado gave his consent or advice for Irene Delgado to
marry, and that he was her father cannot be also taken as recognition in an authentic WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE THEN COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY
document because it was not signed nor in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado. It AFFIRMED IN TOTO, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONERS.
cannot also be taken as recognition in a public instrument as held in the case of Lim v.
CA, (65 SCRA 161, 164 [1975]) wherein the Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"According to Article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889, public documents are those
authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with the formalities required
by law.’ Thus, ‘there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private
individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent
public officials by reason of their office.’ "The public document pointed out in Article
131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class.’

"The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim does not satisfy the requirements of
solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the Civil Code of 1889. Such contract is not a
written act with the intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument executed in due form
before a notary and certified by him. The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the
contracting parties, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two
witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife, signed by
signature or mark by said contracting parties and the said witnesses, and attested by the
person solemnizing the marriage. The marriage contract does not possess the requisites
of a public document of recognition . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

The family pictures (Exhibits "11" to "11-E") presented by Irene, showing Irene posing
with Francisco Delgado, cannot be a sufficient proof of recognition. In the case of
Bercilles v. (GSIS, supra, it was held that pictures do not constitute proof of filiation.

What Irene may have proved is that she had been in continuous possession of a status of
an illegitimate child who is not natural. But such fact alone without a valid recognition
in a record of birth, will, statement before a court of record, or authentic writing does
not make Irene a recognized illegitimate child who is not natural. She nevertheless
possesses the right to compel judicial recognition and the action for this must be
brought within the proper prescriptive period (Clemeña v. Clemeña, supra). Article 285
of the New Civil Code provides "that the action for the recognition of natural children
may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except when the
father or mother dies during the minority of the child, the action shall be brought within
four years from the age of majority, or if after the death of the father or of the mother a
document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both
parents recognize the child, the action shall be brought within four years from the
finding of the document." Since Irene was already of age (35 years old) when her
alleged father died, and she had not presented any discovered document wherein her
presumed father recognized her, the action to compel recognition is already barred
(Canales v. Arrogante, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]).

WE affirm the findings of the then Court of Appeals that Irene Reyes has Irene Delgado
is not an heir of the late Francisco Delgado.chanrobles law library
G.R. No. L-50974-75 May 31, 1989
JUAN CASTRO and FELICIANA CASTRO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CIPRIANO NAVAL and BENITA C.
NAVAL, respondents.
Luis R. Reyes for petitioners.
Marcelino U. Aganon for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 47262 and 47263-R, which affirmed the decision of the then
Court of First Instance of Tarlac in Civil Case Nos. 3762-3763. The dispositive portion
of the trial court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of defendants
and against plaintiffs in the above-entitled cases:
1) Declaring defendant Benita Castro Naval a duly acknowledged and
recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro;
2) Awarding the sum of P2,000.00 to defendants by way of attorney's
fee and expenses of litigation (one-half to be paid by plaintiffs, jointly
and severally, in Civil Case No. 3762 and one-half by plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 3763); and
3) Pending the partition or distribution of the properties involved
herein in appropriate proceedings or by mutual agreement, and so as
to preserve the status quo, the writ of preliminary injunction of
February 10, 1967 shall continue to remain in full force and effect.
With costs against plaintiffs, one-half chargeable to plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 3762 and the other half to plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3763.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 137-138)
Petitioners Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro are the brother and sister of the late
Eustaquio Castro while respondent Benita Castro Naval is the only child of Eustaquio.
Respondent Cipriano Naval is the husband of Benita Castro.
The Court of Appeals correctly summarized the facts of the case as follows:
In Civil Case No. 3762 entitled Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro v.
Benita Castro, the plaintiffs filed an action for partition of properties
against the defendant alleging, among other things that they are the
forced heirs of Pedro Castro who died in Mayantoc, Tarlac on May
27, 1923 (p. 6, Record on Appeal).
In Civil Case No. 3763 plaintiff Marcelina Bautista also filed an
action for partition of properties against defendant Benita Castro
Naval alleging, among other things, that they are also compulsory
heirs of Eustaquio Castro who died in Mayantoc, Tarlac on August
24, 1961 and that they are entitled to the partition of the properties of
said deceased (p. 32, Record on Appeal).
The defendants in their amended answer in both cases allege that
Benita Castro Naval is the only child of the deceased Eustaquio and
that said Eustaquio Castro is the son of Pedro Castro, therefore, the
complaint for partition has no cause of action (p. 25, Record on
Appeal).
With leave of Court, plaintiffs filed their amended complaints
whereby they converted the original action for partition into an action
for quieting of title. Defendant's husband Cipriano Naval was
forthwith impleaded as party-defendant (p. 32, Record on Appeal).
In the meantime, defendant Benita Naval filed a petition for
appointment as receiver and for preliminary injunction in Civil Case
No. 3762. The trial court, however, denied said petition for
appointment of receiver, but granted the petition for writ of
preliminary injunction and also adjudged Marcelina Bautista who is
the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3762 guilty of contempt and ordering
her to pay a fine of P100. 00 (p. 97, Record on Appeal).
Considering that evidence in these incidents of appointing a receiver
and preliminary injunction as well as the motion for contempt were
related to the merits of the case, the parties stipulated that evidence
therein be considered as evidence in the trial on the merits.
During the pre-trial the parties agreed that the main issue to be
resolved in this case is as to whether or not defendant Benita Castro
Naval is the acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio Castro. In view
of this stipulation, defendant Benita Naval was allowed to introduce
evidence to show that she was indeed the acknowledged natural child
of Eustaquio Castro.
The evidence on record shows that Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro,
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3762 and Eustaquio Castro who was
already dead were the children of the deceased spouses Pedro Castro
and Cornelia Santiago. Marcelina Bautista, one of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3763, is the surviving spouse of the deceased
Eustaquio Castro. Eustaquio Castro died on August 23, 1961 and
Pricola Maregmen died on September 11, 1924.
It appears that defendant Benita Castro Naval, a child of Eustaquio
Castro and Pricola Maregmen, was born on March 27, 1919 in San
Bartolome, Tarlac (Exhibit A). Eustaquio Castro, who caused the
registration of said birth gave the date indicated in the civil registry
that he was the father. Benita Castro was later baptized in the Roman
Catholic Church of Camiling, Tarlac, wherein the baptismal
certificate appeared that her parents are deceased Eustaquio Castro
and Pricola Maregmen (Exhibit C). When Eustaquio Castro died,
pictures were taken wherein the immediate members of the family in
mourning were present, among whom was Benita Castro Naval
(Exhibits D and D-1). On this score, the plaintiffs in their complaint
in Civil Case No. 3762 admitted that defendant Benita C. Naval is the
forced heir of Eustaquio Castro and a compulsory heir of Eustaquio
Castro in Civil Case No. 3763.
The evidence further shows that Pricola Maregmen, the natural
mother of Benita C. Naval who was a resident of Mayantoc, Tarlac,
was wedded to Felix de Maya of Anoling Canaling, Tarlac against her
wishes on May 23, 1913. While the celebration of the wedding in
Anong, Camiling, Tarlac was going on, the guests soon found out that
Pricola Maregmen surreptitiously left the party and went to the house
of her first cousin Bernarda Pagarigan at Barrio Malacampa, also in
Anoling Camiling, Tarlac, and there she cried that she did not want to
get married to Felix de Maya. That evening Pricola proceeded to
Barrio San Bartolome, Mayantoc, Tarlac, where she united with her
real sweetheart, Eustaquio Castro, the father of Benita Castro Naval.
Antonio Maregmen, the brother'. of Pricola Maregmen who was then
in the wedding party learned of the disappearance of his sister. He
finally found her living with Eustaquio Castro. A few days later
Eustaquio Castro accompanied by two persons went to the parents of
Pricola Maregmen at Mayantoc, Tarlac and informed them that
Pricola was already living with him as husband and wife. Pricola's
parents merely submitted to their daughter's wishes, so Eustaquio
Castro and Pricola Maregmen lived as husband and wife until the
death of Pricola on September 11, 1924.
There is no dispute that Eustaquio Castro at the time he lived with
Pricola Maregmen, was a widower, and was, therefore, free to marry
Pricola. As a result of their cohabitation Benita Castro Naval, herein
defendant, was born on March 27, 1919. After the death of her
mother, when she was only five years old, she continued to live with
her father Eustaquio Castro until his death on August 22, 1961
(Exhibit 11). Moreover, when Benita Castro Naval got married to
Cipriano Naval, it was Eustaquio Castro who gave her away in
marriage. Even after Benita's marriage, she was taken care of by her
father. (Rollo, pp. 11-13).
The trial court ruled that respondent Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and
recognized child of Eustaquio Castro and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the
partition of the properties left by him. These properties are the subject of the civil cases.
As stated earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
The main issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Benita Castro Naval
is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.
The Court of Appeals justified its pronouncement that the private respondent is an
acknowledged and recognized child of Eustaquio Castro in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The recognition of Benita Castro as a natural child of Eustaquio
Castro appears in the records of birth and partition. Recognition shall
be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or any authentic writing (Art. 278, Civil Code). It was a
voluntary recognition already established which did not need any
judicial pronouncement (Gut, 68 Phil. 385; Root v. Root, (CA), 71
O.G. 3061). In Javelona v. Onteclaro, 74 Phil. 393, the Supreme
Court clarified the distinction between voluntary recognition and
compulsory recognition. In the first place, a voluntary recognition is
made in a public document, whereas in the indubitable writing under
Article 135 is a private document. (Manresa, Vol. 1, p. 579). The
father would ordinarily be more careful about what he said in a public
document than in a private writing, so that even an incidental mention
of the child as his in a public document deserves full faith and credit.
In the second place, in an action on Article 131 (voluntary
recognition) the natural child merely asks for a share in the
inheritance in virtue of his having been acknowledged as such, and is
not trying to compel the father or his heirs to make the
acknowledgment, whereas the action based on Article 135 is to
compel the father or his heirs to recognize the child. In the former
case, acknowledgment has been formally and legally accomplished
 because the public character of the document makes judicial
pronouncement unnecessary, while in the latter case, recognition is
yet to be ordered by the courts because a private writing, lacking the
stronger guaranty and higher authenticity of a public document is not
self- executory. A judgment in favor of the status of a natural child
according to Art. 135 must therefore be based on an express
recognition so found and declared by the court after hearing. At this
juncture, it is to be noted that an action based on voluntary
acknowledgment may be brought after the death of the father, but. not
an action to compel acknowledgment, as a general rule, (Art. 137,
Civil Code) which shows the liberality of the law as to voluntary
recognition, and its strictness toward compulsory acknowledgment.
While it is true that Pricola Maregmen, Benita's mother was married
to Naval (sic), it is the rule, however, that in case the recognition is
made by only one of the parents, it will be presumed that the child is
natural if the parents recognizing it had the legal capacity to contract
marriage at the time of the conception (Art. 277, Civil Code; Borres
and Barza v. Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil. 643; Capistrano v.
Gabino, 8 Phil. 135). The presumption arises from the act of
recognition.
What is more is that plaintiffs in their amended complaint admitted
that Benita Castro was the compulsory heir of Eustaquio Castro. They
cannot now contradict their own allegations (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80
Phil. 232). (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The Court of Appeals has correctly stated the principles but the petitioners contend that
it erred in applying these principles to the facts of this case.
The law which now governs paternity and filiation is Title VI of the Family Code of the
Philippines, Executive Order No. 209, July 6,1987 as amended by Executive Order No.
227, July 17, 1987. We have to examine the earlier provisions, however, because the
Family Code provides in its Article 256 that:
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no question that the private respondent is an illegitimate child of Eustaquio
Castro. Her father Eustaquio was a widower when Pricola Maregmen, her mother, went
to live with him. The two could not validly enter into a marriage because when Pricola
fled from her own wedding party on May 23, 1913, the wedding rites to Felix de Maya
had already been solemnized. In other words, the marriage was celebrated although it
could not be consummated because the bride hurriedly ran away to join the man she
really loved.
Under the Civil Code, whether "new" or "old", illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1)
Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of
parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other. (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil
Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit, were those born of
parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to marry each other on account
of certain legal impediments.
Since Eustaquio Castro was a widower when Benita was conceived, Benita is Ms
natural child. (See Borres and Barza v. Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil. 643,647 [1922]).
However, from the viewpoint of the mother who had a subsisting marriage to Felix de
Maya, Benita was her spurious child.
Under the Civil Code, for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit, she must
first be recognized voluntarily or by court action. (Berciles v. Government Service
Insurance System, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Divinagracia v. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307 [1976];
Vda. de Clemena v. Clemena 24 SCRA 720 [1968]; Noble v. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104
[1966]; Republic v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 13 SCRA 272 [1965];
Paulino v. Paulino 3 SCRA 730 [1961]; Barles, et al. v. Ponce Enrile, 109 Phil. 522
[1960]; and Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]). This arises from the
legal principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights
from her parents or to their estate because her rights spring not from the filiation or
blood relationship but from the child's acknowledgment by the parent. (Alabat v. Vda.
de Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 [1967]; Mise v. Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 396 [1954]; Magallanes,
et al.v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795 [1954]; Canales v. Arrogante, et al., 91
Phil. 6 [1952]; Malonda v. Malonda, 61 Phil. 149 [1948]; Buenaventura v. Urbano, et
al., 5 Phil. 1 [1905]; and Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra). In other words, the rights of
an illegitimate child arose not because she was the true or real child of her parents but
because under the law, she had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child.
This brings us to the question whether or not the private respondent is an acknowledged
and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.
Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of acknowledgment — voluntary and
compulsory. The provisions on acknowledgement are applied to natural as well as
spurious children (Clemena v. Clemena supra; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra).
Article 131 of the old Civil Code provides for voluntary acknowledgment by the father
or mother, while Article 135 and Article 136 of the same Code provide for the
compulsory acknowledgment by the father and mother respectively. Article 131 of the
old Civil Code states that "The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the
record of birth, in a will or in some other public document."
In these cases, the appellate court ruled that the private respondent was voluntarily
recognized by her father, Eustaquio Castro through the record of birth, hence there was
no need for any judicial pronouncement.
The record of birth referred to by the appellate court is actually the birth certificate of
the private respondent. It appears in the certificate that Eustaquio Castro is the
respondent's father.
The petitioners take exception to the respondent court's ruling on voluntary recognition.
Strictly speaking, a birth certificate to be sufficient for purposes of recognizing a child
must be signed by the father and mother jointly and if the father refuses, by the mother
alone otherwise she may be penalized. (Section 5, Article 3753; Madridejo v. de Leon,
55 Phil. 1 [1930]). What is signed is a loose form whose contents are later transferred
by a municipal employee to the local registry book of births which is preserved. An
examination of Exhibition F, Birth Certificate of Benita Castro, Folder of Exhibits, p.
112, shows that this "birth certificate" was in turn copied on October 17, 1961 from
Book page No. 28, and Registry No. 47 of the book bound records where "Eustaquio
Castro" appears under the column "Remarks." This is no question that Eustaquio
himself reported the birth of his daughter but this record is not determinative of whether
or not he also signed the easily lost looseleaf form of the certificate from where the
entry in book bound or logbook record was taken in March, 1919.
The ruling in Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila (102 Phil. 1050 [1958])
and Berciles v. Government Service Insurance System (128 SCRA 53 [1984]) that if the
father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor,
registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity does not apply to this
case because it was Eustaquio himself who went to the municipal building and gave all
the data about his daughter's birth. In Berciles we find no participation whatsoever in
the registration by Judge Pascual Berciles, the alleged father.
We likewise see no application of the statement in Madridejo v. de Leon (supra), that
the father, apart from furnishing the necessary data must also sign the certificate itself
In that case, Pedro Madridejo, the father was still alive when the 1930 case was brought
to court. Pedro himself testified that Melecio Madridejo was conceived and born to him,
a bachelor, and Flaviana Perez, a widow. The two were validly maried when Flaviana
was about to die. If the situation of Benita Castro Naval were similar, there would be no
need to even discuss whether or not the father signed the birth certificate. Under the
present law, the subsequent wedding of a man and woman whose child was conceived
when there were no legal impediments to a valid marriage gives that child the lights of a
legitimate off-spring. The situation is different in the present case.
We apply the more liberal provisions of the new Family Code considering the facts and
equities of this case.
First, Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably the daughter of the late Eustaquio Castro
who was qualified to legally marry when she was conceived and born. From her birth
on March 27, 1919 until the father's death on August 22, 1961 or for 42 years, Benita
lived with her father and enjoyed the love and care that a parent bestows on an only
child. The private respondents, themselves, admitted in their complaint in Civil Case
No. 3762 that Benita is a forced heir of Eustaquio Castro.
Second, the rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family is of no
special relevance here because Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were the only
immediate family of Eustaquio. There are no legitimate children born of a legitimate
wife contesting the inheritance of Benita.
Third, it was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported and registered.
There is no indication in the records that Eustaquio should have known in 1919 that
apart from reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed the certificate and
seen to it that it was preserved for 60 years. Or that he should have taken all legal steps
including judicial action to establish her status as his recognized natural child during the
reglementary period to do so.
Fourth, it was Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano Naval.
The couple continued to live with the father even after the wedding and until the latter's
death.
Fifth, the certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the wake for
Eustaquio may not be sufficient proof of recognition under the Civil Code (Reyes v.
Court of Appeals, supra; People v. Villeza. 127 SCRA 349 [1984]; Cid v. Burnaman,
24 SCRA 434 [1968]; Capistrano, et al. v. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 [1907]) but they add to
the equities of this case favoring the petitioner.
To remove any possible doubts about the correctness of the findings and conclusions of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we, therefore, apply the provision of the Family
Code which states that it shall have retroactive effect since the respondents have no
clear vested rights in their favor.
Under the Code's Title VI on Paternity and Filiation there are only two classes of
children — legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of
illegitimate children have been eliminated.
Article 175 provides that "Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children." (Emphasis
supplied).
Articles 172 and 173 on establishing the filiation of legitimate children provide:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of

the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final

judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a

private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall

be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate

child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
(265a, 266a; 267a)

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should
the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases,
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the
action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive

notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties. (268a)

There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open and continuous possession
of the status of an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro and that the action of Benita in
defending her status in this case is similar to an "action to claim legitimacy" brought
during her lifetime.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-63132 July 30, 1987
ELIAS S. MENDOZA and EUSTIQUIA S. MENDOZA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, BUENAVENTURA GABUYA
and SEVERA FERNANDEZ,respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
Petitioners-spouses Elias and Eustiquia Mendoza seek a review of the decision dated
September 8, 1982 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 58815-58816-17-R
entitled Elias Mendoza, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus Buenaventura Gabuya, et
al., Defendants-Appellees" as well as the resolution of January 3, 1983, denying their
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
Sometime in November and December of 1969, three [3] complaints were filed before
the then Court of First Instance of Cebu; viz: 11 Civil Case No. R-11485 instituted by
herein petitioners-spouses Mendoza against private respondents-spouses Buenaventura
Gabuya and Severa Fernandez for partition of Lot No. 3597 of the Cadastral Survey of
Cebu, located at Pardo, Cebu City, with an area of 2,992 square meters, more or less,
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 43910 issued in the names of
"Buenaventura Gabuya, married to Severa Fernandez ... and Elias S. Mendoza, married
to Eustiquia S. Mendoza ... with one-half [1/2] share each"1 and damages; 2) Civil Case
No. R-11486 commenced by spouses Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima,
likewise against private respondents-spouses Buenaventura Gabuya and Severa
Fernandez for partition of Lot No. 3506 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu, located at
Pardo, Cebu, with an area of 2,799 square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 43909 issued in the names of Buenaventura Gabuya, married to
Severa Fernandez and Modesta Gabuya, married to Dominador Delima, and damages;
and, 3] Civil Case No. R-1152 filed by private respondents-spouses Buenaventura
Gabuya and Severa Fernandez against the spouses Modesta Gabuya and Dominador
Delima and petitioners-spouses Mendoza for the annulment of: a) the extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of the late Evaristo Gabuya, dated March 12, 1969 covering Lot
Nos. 3506 and 3597, Cebu Cadastre; b) the sale of one-half [1/2] portion of Lot No.
3597 dated December 31, 1968 in favor of spouses Mendoza; and, c) Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 43909 and 43910, covering Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597,
respectively; and damages.
Because they involved the same parties and properties, the cases were heard and tried
jointly.
Thereafter, on September 12, 1972, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, based on all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff Buenaventura Gabuya in the third case and
against defendant-spouses Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima and Atty.
Elias S. Mendoza and Eustiquia S. Mendoza:
1] Declaring null and void and without force and effect:
a) The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Evaristo
Gabuya insofar as the shares of defendant Modesta Gabuya in Lot
Nos. 3506 and 3597 are concerned;
b) The Deed of Absolute Sale Modesta Gabuya executed on
December 31, 1968 in favor of her co-defendants-spouses Atty. Elias
S. Mendoza and Eustiquia S. Mendoza, covering Lot No. 3597
without prejudice to the rights of the latter spouses-vendors to
demand from Modesta Gabuya reimbursement of any amounts they
have paid on account of the sale;
c) Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 43909 and 43910 insofar as the
respective recorded one-half [1/2] undivided shares of the spouses
Modesta Gabuya married to Dominador Delima and Atty. Elias S.
Mendoza married to Eustiquia S. Mendoza in each of Lot Nos. 3506
and 3597 with plaintiff Buenaventura Gabuya married to Severa
Fernandez are concerned;
2] Condemning the two defendants-spouses to pay jointly and severally to the
plaintiff the amount of P500.00 as moral damages, P750.00 as attorney's fees;
and,
3] To pay the costs.
The Register of Deeds of Cebu is hereby directed to cancel the recorded one-
half [1/2] share each of the defendants-spouses Modesta Gabuya married to
Dominador Delima and Atty. Elias S. Mendoza married to Eustiquia S.
Mendoza in Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 43909 and 43910, respectively. 2
Dissatisfied with said decision, the spouses Mendoza and the spouses Delima appealed
to the Court of Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Their motion for reconsideration likewise proved unavailing.1awphil
Thus, on February 14, 1983, within the extended period granted, the spouses Mendoza
filed the petition at bar. After private respondents had filed their comment thereon, and
petitioners, their Reply to said comment, the Court, on September 19, 1983, gave due
course to the petition.3 In due time, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.
On July 10, 1985, Atty. Paterno S. Compra entered his appearance as counsel for
spouses Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima, and on July 19, 1985, filed a Notice
of Death, informing this Court that respondent Buenaventura Gabuya died on October
21, 1981 and that Severa Fernandez likewise died on October 14, 1983, allegedly
leaving no legal heirs except Modesta Gabuya.4
Acting on said Notice of Death, the Court resolved on September 18, 1985, "to Direct
[1] the legal representatives of the deceased respondents Buenaventura Gabuya and
Severa Fernandez to appear and to be substituted for the latter, within a period of thirty
[30] days from notice; and [2] the petitioners to amend their petition within ten [10]
days from receipt of the notice of appearance and substitution by the legal
representatives of the aforesaid respondents, so as to conform with the latest
development in the case."5
It appears that sometime between September 18, 1985 and November 27, 1985,
Venerando Gabuya, a sixth degree collateral relative of Buenaventura Gabuya, filed a
motion dated October 31, 1985 to substitute the latter in the case at bar. While the
motion itself does not appear in the rollo, the same was granted by the Court in its
resolution of November 27, 1985.
Meanwhile, on November 20, 1985, the petitioners filed an Amended Petition, naming
the spouses Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima as co-petitioners therein. Said
"petitioners" Modesta Gabuya and Dominador Delima prayed in the Amended Petition
that Modesta Gabuya be declared the sole legal heir of Buenaventura Gabuya. Said
spouses Delima likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
November 27, 1985, which granted Venerando Gabuya's motion for substitution.
However, since the resolution of the motion for reconsideration would entail going into
the merits of the case, its resolution was held in abeyance.
The sole issue presented by the petition is couched by petitioners, thus:
Whether or not under the Civil Code of Spain, a natural child without any
judicial decree or deed of acknowledgment in his favor by his natural parent
may succeed said natural parent under certain circumstances. 6
The factual backdrop of this legal query, as found by the trial court and sustained by the
appellate court, is as follows:
That Buenaventura, Nicolasa and Teresa, all surnamed Gabuya, are the
legitimate children of the spouses Evaristo Gabuya and Susana Sabandija, who
died intestate many years ago, the first in 1926 and the second in 1912; that
both Nicolasa and Teresa died single, the first in 1943 and the second in 1964;
that Modesta Gabuya is the illegitimate daughter of Nicolasa [Exhs. G & 7-B-
Gabuya]; that Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597 of the Cebu Cadastre were some of the
original properties left by the late Evaristo Gabuya both located at Pardo, Cebu
City, formerly covered by Original Certificate [sic] of Title Nos. 6353 and
6597 in the name of Evaristo Gabuya and containing 2,799 square meters and
2,992 square meters, respectively; that sometime in February, 1969, Modesta
Gabuya accompanied by Atty. Elias S. Mendoza went to the house of
Buenaventura Gabuya who wanted to see the titles of these two parcels of land
and Buenaventura was instructed by Modesto to look for them so that they be
reconstituted; that some days later the two, Modesta Gabuya and Elias S.
Mendoza visited him again at his house and Mode took the titles but this time
Buenaventura went with them to the Cebu Capitol Building; that Buenaventura
and Modesto signed a document and acknowledged before Atty. Salvador B.
Mendoza but the latter did not read to the signatories the contents of the
document; that this document dated March 12, 1969 turned out to be an
Extrajudicial settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Gabuya [Exhs. A and 1-B-
Gabuya] whereby Buenaventura and Modesto appear to have divided and
partitioned between themselves pro visio and share and share alike [1/2 each]
Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597; that this Extrajudicial settlement of the Estate of
Evaristo Gabuya was duly published [Exh. B] in the Morning Times and
registered with the Register of Deeds [Exhs. B-1 & B-2] and the document
itself was also similarly registered [Exhs. A-1 and A-2]; that on December 31,
1968, prior to the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement document, a Deed
of Absolute Sale [Exhs. 2-B-Gabuya] was executed by Modesta Gabuya in
favor of the spouses Atty. and Mrs. Elias S. Mendoza covering her alleged
one-half [1/2] undivided share in Lot No. 3597 for a consideration of
P10,000.00; that pursuant to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement [Exhs. A &
1-B-Gabuya], and the Deed of Absolute Sale [Exh. 2-B-Gabuya], Original
Certificates of Title Nos. 6353 and 6597 in the name of the late Evaristo
Gabuya, father of Buenaventura Gabuya, were cancelled and in liue thereof
were issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 43909 and 43910 [Exh. C] The
first in the names of spouses Buenaventura Gabuya married to Severa
Fernandez, and Modesta Gabuya married to Dominador Delima and the
second, in the names of Buenaventura Gabuya married to Severa Fernandez
and Atty. Elias S. Mendoza married to Eustiquia S. Mendoza; that Atty. Elias
S. Mendoza and Modesta Gabuya have respectively asked from Buenaventura
Gabuya the partition of the lots which they are co-owners of the undivided
one-half [1/2] portions; and that Buenaventura refused to do so claiming that
ModestaGabuya is not entitled to inherit from the estate of his late father
Evaristo Gabuya. 7
Under the Civil Code of Spain, the law in force at the time of the death in 1943 of
Nicolasa Gabuya, the mother of Modesta, full successional rights were granted only to
legitimate and legitimated children [Arts. 114 and 122, respectively]. Acknowledged
natural children were given limited successional rights in that they were entitled to
inherit only from the acknowledging parent [Art. 134], while illegitimate children who
did not possess the status of natural children had no successional rights whatsoever [Art.
139]. The latter were only entitled to support. Adopted children become heirs of the
adopting parents only if the adopting parents had agreed to confer the adopted children
such rights in the deed of adoption, or had instituted them as heirs in a will.8
Recognition or acknowledgment of a natural child under said Code must be made in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in some other public
document.9 In the case at bar, the only document presented by Modesta Gabuya to prove
that she was recognized by her mother was the certificate of birth and baptism signed by
Rev. Fr. Filomeno Singson, Assistant Parish Priest of Pardo, Cebu City, stating therein
that Modesta Gabuya is an illegitimate daughter of Nicolasa Gabuya.10 However,
Philippine jurisprudence is consistent and uniform in ruling that the canonical certificate
of baptism is not sufficient to prove recognition.11 The rationale for this ruling,
enunciated in the case of Civ v. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434, is that while the baptismal
certificate in the parish records was a public document before the effectivity of General
Order No. 68 and Act 190, this certificate did not constitute a sufficient act of
acknowledgment, since the latter must be executed by the child's father or mother, and
the parish priest can not acknowledge in their stead.
Neither could the alleged continuous possession by Modesta Gabuya of the status of a
natural child improve her condition. In Alabat v. vda. de Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479, 1481,
it was stressed that:
One last point. During the pendency of this case, the spouses Modesta Gabuya and
Dominador Delima joined the spouses Mendoza as petitioners in this case by submitting
an amended petition, ostensibly in compliance with Our resolution of September 18,
1985. In said Amended Petition, aforementioned spouses Delima prayed that Modesta
Gabuya Delima be declared the sole heir of the deceased private respondent
Buenaventura Gabuya, to the exclusion of substitute Venerando Gabuya. It must be
remembered, however, that the Delima spouses not having joined petitioners-spouses
Mendoza in the instant petition for review. the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. Nos. 58815-58816-17-R has become final and executory as to said spouses
Delima. With the pronouncement of the appellate court that Modesta Gabuya-Delima
was not entitled to inherit from her mother, in conjunction with our affirmance thereof,
it is clear that her prayer in the amended petition cannot be granted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied. The decision of the appellate court
in CA-G.R. Nos. 58815-5881617-R, is affirmed in toto. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

It is an elementary and basic principle in our law of succession that the rights
of a natural child spring not from the filiation itself but from the child's
acknowledgment by the natural parent, made voluntarily or by court decree.
Equally basic and elementary . . . is the fact that possession or enjoyment of
the status of natural child is per se not a sufficient operative acknowledgment
but only a ground to compel the parent to acknowledge the child.

The case of Ramos, et al. v. Ramos, et al., 61 SCRA 284, heavily relied upon by
petitioners, does not apply to the case at bar. Unlike in said case, Modesta Gabuya
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she was in continuous possession
of the status of a natural child.

That this petition must fail is a foregone conclusion. Modesta Gabuya, not having been
acknowledged in the manner provided by law by her mother, Nicolasa, was not entitled
to succeed the latter. The extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Evaristo Gabuya is,
therefore, null and void insofar as Modesta Gabuya is concerned per Article 1105 of the
New Civil Code which states:

A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall
be void only with respect to such person.

Since the ownership of the one-half [1/2] pro indiviso portion of Lot No. 3597 never
passed on to Modesta Gabuya, it follows that the sale thereof to petitioners-spouses
Elias and Eustiquia Mendoza is likewise null and void.12
G.R. No. L-19872 December 3, 1974 Legitimate children: Value

EMILIANO B. RAMOS, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, 1. To Jose Ramos: (a) Hacienda Calaza

vs. with an area of 328 hectares,
GREGORIA T. RAMOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants. (b) a one-hectare town lot, (c) a
23-hectare lot in Sitio Bingig, and
Humberto V. Quisumbing and Maximino M. San Diego for plaintiffs-appellants. (d) some head of cattle P25,291.66

Hilado and Hilado for defendants-appellants. 2. To Granada Ramos: (a) a

parcel of riceland with a capacity
of 16 cavans of seedlings, located
in Barrio Binicuel, Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental and (b) some
AQUINO, J.:p head of cattle 1,891.66

The parties appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros 3. To Agustin Ramos: (a) the
Occidental, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint and holding that the intestate estate of remaining fourteen (14) lots out of
Martin Ramos was settled in Civil Case No. 217, which was terminated on March the eighteen lots described in the
4,1914, and that the judgment therein is res judicata and bars any litigation regarding inventory, which included the Hacienda
the same estate (Civil Case no. 4522). Ylaya with an area of 185 hectares and
(b) some head of cattle 36,291.68
The documentary evidence reveals the following facts:
Natural children:
The spouses Martin Ramos and Candida Tanate died on October 4, 1906 and October
26, 1888, respectively. They were survived by their three legitimate children named 4. To each of the seven (7) natural
Jose, Agustin and Granada. Martin Ramos was also survived by his seven natural children named Atanacia, Modesto,
children named Atanacia, Timoteo, Modesto, Manuel, Emiliano, Maria and Federico. Timoteo, Federico, Manuel, Emiliano
and Maria, were adjudicated personal
On December 10, 1906 a special proceeding was instituted in the Court of First Instance properties valued at P1,785.35 consisting
of Negros Occidental for the settlement of the intestate estate of the said spouses. The of (a) cash amounting to P1,760.35 and
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 217 (its expediente is still existing). Rafael O. (b) P25, representing a one-seventh (1/7)
Ramos, a brother of Martin, was appointed administrator. The estate was administered of a one-sixth (1/6) portion in certain head
for more than six years (Exh. F, G, H, I and J). of cattle allegedly representing one-third
of the free portion of the estate of Martin
A project of partition dated April 25, 1913 was submitted. It was signed by the three Ramos, with an aggregate value of 12,497.51
legitimate children, Jose, Agustin and Granada; by the two natural children, Atanacia Total adjudications P75,972.51
and Timoteo, and by Timoteo Zayco in representation of the other five natural children
who were minors. It was sworn to before the justice of the peace (Exh. 3). It was agreed in the project of partition that Jose Ramos would pay the cash
adjudications to Atanacia, Timoteo and Manuel, while Agustin Ramos would pay the
In the project of partition the conjugal hereditary estate was appraised at P74,984.93. It cash adjudications to Modesto, Federico, Emiliano and Maria. It was further agreed that
consisted of eighteen parcels of land, some head of cattle and the advances to the Jose Ramos and Agustin Ramos would pay their sister, Granada, the sums of P3,302.36
legitimate children(Exh. 3). and P14,273.78, respectively (Exh. 3).

Under that project of partition, the following adjudications were made to the heirs: The record does not show whether assessed or market values were used in appraising
the eighteen parcels of land. By way of explanation, it may be stated that, inasmuch as
the ganancial estate had an appraised value of P74,984.93, one-half thereof or the sum
of P37,492.46 represented the estate of Martin Ramos. One-third thereof was the free
portion or P12,497.48. The shares of the seven natural children were to be taken from
that one-third free portion. Dividing P12,497.48 by seven gives a result of P1,783.35
which represented the one-seventh share of each natural child in the free portion of the
estate of their putative father, Martin Ramos. The partition was made in accordance
with the old Civil Code which provides:
ART. 840. When the testator leaves legitimate children or
descendants, and also natural children, legally acknowledged, each of
the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the portion pertaining to each
of the legitimate children not bettered, provided that it can be
included within the third for free disposal, from which it must
betaken, after deducting the burial and funeral expenses.
The legitimate children may satisfy the portion pertaining to the
natural children in cash, or in other property of the estate, at a fair
valuation.
The sum of P1,785.35, as the legal share of each natural child, was the amount which
was indicated in the project of partition(Exh. 3) and which was to be satisfied in cash.
The second paragraph of article 840 gives the legitimate children the right to satisfy in
cash the hereditary portions of the natural children. (Article 840 was applied in the
project of partition when it stated that each natural child had "una septima partede un
sexto de semovientes" but the statement in the project of partition that each legitimate
child was entitled to "un tercio delos cinco quintos de los semovientes" is erroneous. It
should be "un tercii de los cinco sextos de los semovientes").
Judge Richard Campbell, in his "decision" dated April 28,1913, approved the project of
partition as well as the intervention of Timoteo Zayco as guardian of the five heirs, who
were minors. The court declared that the proceeding would be considered closed and the
record should be archived as soon as proof was submitted that each heir had received
the portion adjudicated to him (Exh. 4).
In an order dated February 3, 1914 Judge V. Nepomuceno asked the administrator to
submit a report, complete with the supporting evidence, showing that the shared of the
heirs had been delivered to them as required in the decision of April 28,1913 (Exh. 5).
In a manifestation dated February 24, 1914, which was signed by Jose, Agustin,
Granada, Atanacia and Timoteo all surnamed Ramos, and by Timoteo Zayco, the
guardian, and which was sworn to before the justice of the peace on March 2 (not 4),
1914 and filed in court on March 5,1914, they acknowledged:
... hemos recibido del Administrador Judicial Rafael O. Ramostodas y
cada una de las participaciones a que respectivamente tenemos
derecho en los bienes relictor de los finados esposos Martin Ramos y
Candida Tanate, completo acuerto y conformidad con elproyecto de
reparticion que nosotros mismo sometemos al Juzgado en 25 de Abril
de 1913 ... . (Exh. 6).
Note that Granada Ramos and the natural children were assumed to have received their
shares from the administrator although according to the object of partition, Jose Ramos
and Agustin Ramos (not the administrator) were supposed to pay the cash adjudications
to each of them. No receipts were attached to the manifestation, Exhibit 6. Apparently,
the manifestation was not in strict conformity with the terms of judge Nepomuceno's
order and with the project of partition itself.
Lots Nos. 1370, 1371, 1372, 1375, 2158, 2159, 2161 and 2163(eight lots) of the
Himamaylan cadastre (page 8 of the Record on Appeal does not mention Lot 1370),
which are involved in this case were registered (as of 1958) in equal shares in the names
of Gregoria Ramos and her daughter, Granada Ramos, as shown below (Exh. 8):
Original
Lot No Registration Present title Date
1370 Aug. 29, 1923 TCT No. RT-2238 Dec. 1,
1933
1371 — do — TCT No. RT-2235 — do —
1372 — do — TCT No. RT-2237 — do —
1375 — do — TCT No. RT-2236 — do —
2158 Sept. 10, 1923 TCT No. RT-2230 — do —
2159 — do — TCT No. RT-2233 — do —
2161 — do — TCT No. RT-2232 — do —
2163 — do — TCT No. RT-2231 — do —
Plaintiffs' version of the case. — A summary of plaintiffs' oral evidence is found in
pages 4 to 13 of their well-written brief. It is reproduced below (omitting the citations of
the transcript):
Martin Ramos, who died in 1906 in the municipality of Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental, left considerable real estate, the most valuable of which were the Hacienda
Calaza and Hacienda Ylaya, both located in Himamaylay, Negros Occidental. Hacienda
Calaza consists of sugar land, palay land and nipa groves with an area of 400 hectares
and with a sugar quota allotment of 10,000 piculs, more or less, and having as its
present actual value P500,000 more or less.
"All the children of martin Ramos, whether legitimate or acknowledged natural, lived
together in Hacienda Ylaya during his lifetime and were under his care. Even defendant
Gregoria Ramos, widow of Jose Ramos, admitted that she dealt with plaintiffs as family
relations, especially seeing them during Sundays in church as they lived with their
father, and maintained close and harmonious relations with them even after the death of
their father. All said children continued to live in said house of their father for years
even after his death.
"Upon their father's death, his properties were left under the administration of Rafael
Ramos, the younger brother of their father and their uncle, Rafael Ramos continued to
administer those properties of their father, giving plaintiffs money as their shares of the
produce of said properties but plaintiffs not receiving any property or piece of land
however, until 1913 when Rafael Ramos gathered all the heirs, including plaintiffs, in
the house of their father, saying he would return the administration of the properties. He
turned over Hacienda Ylaya to Agustin Ramos and Hacienda Calaza to Jose Ramos.
"All said children, defendants and plaintiffs alike, continued to live in the same house of
their father in Hacienda Ylaya, now under the support of Agustin Ramos. Plaintiff
Modesto Ramos who 'could understand Spanish a little', only left said house in 1911;
plaintiff Manuel stayed there for one year and lived later with Jose Ramos for four
years. Plaintiff Maria Ramos, who herself testified that she has 'a very low educational
attainment', lived there until 1916 when she got married. Plaintiff Emiliano lived there
with Agustin, helping him supervise the work in Hacienda Ylaya, until he transferred to
Hacienda Calaza where he helped Jose Ramos supervise the work in said hacienda.
"Agustin Ramos supported plaintiffs, getting the money from the produce of Hacienda
Ylaya, the only source of income of Agustin coming from said hacienda. Plaintiffs
asked money from Agustin pertaining to their share in the produce of Hacienda Ylaya
and received varied amounts, sometimes around P50 at a time, getting more when
needed, and receiving P90 or P100 more or less a year.
"Jose Ramos gave plaintiffs also money as their shares from the products of Hacienda
Calaza. Even Maria Ramos who upon her marriage in 1916 lived in La Cartota with her
husband was given money whenever she went to Himamaylan. Plaintiffs received
varied amounts or sums of money from Jose as their shares in the produce of Hacienda
Ylaya more or less about P100 a year, mostly during the milling season every year
while he was alive up to his death in 1930. Emiliano Ramos, now deceased and
substituted by his widow, Rosario Tragico, moreover, received P300 from Jose Ramos
in 1918 taken from the products of Hacienda Calaza when he went to the United States
to study.
"Upon Jose Ramos death his widow Gregoria Ramos, herself, his first cousin, their
father and mother, respectively being brother and sister, continued to give plaintiffs
money pertaining to their shares in the products of Hacienda Calaza. She however
stopped doing so in 1951, telling them that the lessee Estanislao Lacson was not able to
pay the lease rental.
"There was never any accounting made to plaintiffs by Jose Ramos, plaintiffs reposing
confidence in their elder brother, Nor was any accounting made by his widow,
defendant Gregoria Ramos, upon his death, plaintiff Manuel Ramos moreover having
confidence in her.
"Before the survey of these properties by the Cadastral Court, plaintiff Modesto Ramos
was informed by the Surveying Department that they were going to survey these
properties. Plaintiffs then went to see their elder brother Jose to inform him that there
was a card issued to them regarding the survey and gave him 'a free hand to do
something as an administrator'. They therefore did not intervene in the said cadastral
proceedings because they were promised that they(defendants Jose and Agustin) would
'be the ones responsible to have it registered in the names of the heirs'. Plaintiffs did not
file and cadastral answer because defendants Jose and Agustin told them 'not to worry
about it as they have to answer for all the heirs'. Plaintiffs were 'assured' by defendants
brothers.
"Plaintiffs did not know that intestate proceedings were instituted for the distribution of
the estate of their father. Neither did plaintiffs Modesto, Manuel, Emiliano and Maria
know (that) Timoteo Zayco, their uncle and brother-in-law of defendant widow
Gregoria was appointed their guardian. There was an express admission by defendant
Gregoria Ramos that Timoteo Zayco was her brother-in-law.
"Plaintiffs did not know of any proceedings of Civil Case No. 217. They never received
any sum of money in cash — the alleged insignificant sum of P1,785.35 each — from
said alleged guardian as their supposed share in the estate of their father under any
alleged project of partition.
"Neither did Atanacia Ramos nor her husband, Nestor Olmedo, sign any project of
partition or any receipt of share in(the) inheritance of Martin Ramos in cash. Nestor
Olmedo did not sign any receipt allegedly containing the signatures of Atanacia assisted
by himself as husband, Timoteo Ramos, and Timoteo Zayco as guardian ad-litem of the
minors Modesto, Manual, Federico, Emiliano and Maria. As a matter of fact, plaintiffs
Modesto and Manuel were in 1913 no longer minors at the time of the alleged project of
partition of the estate being approved, both being of age at that time. No guardian could
in law act on their behalf.
"Plaintiffs only discovered later on that the property administered by their elder brother
Jose had a Torrens Title in the name of his widow, Gregoria, and daughter, Candida,
when plaintiff Modesto's children insisted and inquired from the Register of Deeds
sometime in 1956 or 1957. Plaintiffs did not intervene in the intestate proceedings for
(the) settlement of the estate of their brother Jose as they did not know of it.
"Plaintiffs were thus constrained to bring the present suit before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental on September 5, 1957 seeking for the reconveyance in
their favor by defendants Gregoria and daughter Candida and husband Jose Bayot of
their corresponding participations in said parcels of land in accordance with article 840
of the old Civil Code and attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000 plus costs and expenses
of this litigation". (4-13 Brief).
Proceedings in the lower court. — The instant action was filed on September 5, 1957
against defendants Agustin Ramos, Granada Ramos and the heirs of Jose Ramos for the
purpose of securing a reconveyance of the supposed participations of plaintiffs
Atanacia, Emiliano, Manuel, Maria and Modesto, all surnamed Ramos, in the
aforementioned eight (8) lots which apparently form part of Hacienda Calaza. (The
plaintiffs did not specify that the said shares would amount to one-sixth of the said eight
cadastral lots. One-sixth represented the one-third free portion of Martin Ramos' one-
half shares in the said lots. And the said one-sixth portion was the share of his seven
legally acknowledged natural children under article 840 of the old Civil Code).
The action is really directed against the heirs of Jose Ramos, namely, his wife Gregoria
and his daughter Candida in whose names the said eight lots are now registered as
shown in Exhibit 8 and in page 4 hereof. It is predicated on the theory that plaintiffs'
shares were held in trust by the defendants. No deed of trust was alleged and proven.
The defendants denied the existence of a trust. They pleaded the defenses of (a) release
of claim as shown in the project of partition, the decision and the receipt of shares
forming part of the expediente of Civil Case No. 217 (Exh. 3, 4 and 6), (b) lack of cause
of action, (c) res judicata and (d) prescription.
Timoteo Ramos, who was joined as a co-plaintiff, manifested that he had already
received his own share of the inheritance, that he did not authorized anyone to include
him as a plaintiff and that he did not want to be a party in this case. He moved that his
name be stricken out of the complaint (44-45 Rec. or Appeal; Exh. 7).
Emiliano Ramos, who died in 1958, was substituted by his widow and their ten children
(Exh. E, 61-64 Rec. on Appeal).The complaint is silent as to the fate of Federico
Ramos, the seventh natural child of Martin Ramos.
As already noted, after trial, the lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground
of res judicata. The plaintiffs as well as the defendants appealed.
Plaintiffs' appeal. — The plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred (1) in dismissing
their complaint, (2) in denying their right to share in their father's estate and (3) in
holding that the action was barred by res judicata or the prior judgment in the special
proceeding for the settlement of Martin Ramos' intestate estate, Civil Case No. 217 of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Abintesdado de los finados esposos
Martin Ramos y Candida Tanate(Exh. F to J and 1 to 6).
The plaintiffs vigorously press on this Court their theory that the plaintiffs, as
acknowledged natural children, were grievously prejudiced by the partition and that the
doctrine of res judicata should not bar their action.
A preliminary issue, which should first be resolved, is the correctness of the trial court's
"inexorable conclusion" that the plaintiffs were the legally acknowledged natural
children of Martin Ramos. Plaintiffs' action is anchored on that premise.
The defendants failed to impugn that conclusion in their appellants' brief. Not having
done so, it may be regarded as conclusive against them. That is the proposition
advanced by the plaintiffs in their reply-brief.
The defendants in their appellees' brief assail that conclusion. It is true that an appellee
may make an assignment of error in his brief but that rule refers to an appellee who is
not an appellant (Saenz vs. Mitchell, 60 Phil. 69, 80). However, since an appellee is
allowed to point out the errors committed by the trial court against him (Relativo vs.
Castro, 76 Phil. 563; Lucero vs. De Guzman, 45 Phil. 852), defendants' contention that
the plaintiffs were not legally acknowledged natural children may just as well be passed
upon.
The defendants, in contesting the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs were legally
acknowledged children, assume that the legitimate children committed a mistake in
conferring successional rights on the plaintiffs.
We hold that the trial court's conclusion is correct. It is true that the acknowledgment of
the plaintiffs is not evidenced by a record of birth, will or other public document (Art.
131, Old Civil Code). But the record of Civil Case No. 217, which is relied upon by the
defendants to support their defense of res judicata, indubitably shows that the plaintiffs
were treated as acknowledged natural children of Martin Ramos. The reasonable
inference is that they were in the continuous possession of the status of natural children
of Martin Ramos, as evidenced by his direct acts and the acts of his family (Art. 135,
Old Civil Code).
Unacknowledged natural children have no rights whatsoever(Buenaventura vs. Urbano,
5 Phil. 1; Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil. 5, 11; Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil. 738; Crisolo
vs. Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862). The fact that the plaintiffs, as natural children of Martin
Ramos, received shares in his estate implies that they were acknowledged. Obviously,
defendants Agustin Ramos and Granada Ramos and the late Jose Ramos accorded
successional rights to the plaintiffs because martin Ramos and members of his family
had treated them as his children. Presumably, that fact was well-known in the
community. Under the circumstances, Agustin Ramos and Granada Ramos and the heirs
of Jose Ramos are estopped from attacking plaintiffs' status as acknowledged natural
children (See Arts. 283[4] and 2266[3], New Civil Code).
Even the lower court, after treating the plaintiffs in 1913 in the intestate proceeding as
acknowledged natural children, had no choice but to reaffirm that same holding in its
1961 decision in this case.
The crucial issue is prescription. With it the question of res judicata and the existence
of a trust are inextricably interwoven. Inasmuch as trust is the main thrust of plaintiffs'
action, it will be useful to make a brief disgression of the nature of trusts (fideicomisos)
and on the availability of prescription and laches to bar the action for reconveyance of
property allegedly held in trust.
"In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely in equity,
to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another, but
the words 'trust' is frequently employed to indicate duties, relations, and responsibilities
which are not strictly technical trusts." (89 C.J.S. 712).
"A person who establishes a trust is called the trust or; one in whom confidence is
reposed is known as the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the trust has been
created is referred to as the beneficiary" (Art. 1440, Civil Code). There is a fiduciary
relation between the trustee and the cestui que trust as regards certain property, real,
personal, money or choses inaction (Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil. 505).
"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the
trust or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law." (Art. 1144,
Civil Code). "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be
proven by oral evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid, Arts.
1443 and 1457).
"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient
that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid, Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs. Caluag, 96 Phil.
981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546). "Express
trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some
writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention
to create a trust" (89 C.J.S. 722).
"Implied trust are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature
of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are super induced on the transaction
by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the
parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive
trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).
"A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act or
construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of
law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to
which is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed in the deed or
instrument of conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts are found in
article 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, L-31569,
September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168,179).
On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by construction of law, or
arising by operation of law". In a more restricted sense and as contra distinguished from
a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words, either
expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but by the
construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It does not arise by
agreement or intention but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 7260727). "If a person
obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress
upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party." A
constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense(Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the
P.I., 49 Phil. 244; See Art. 1456, Civil Code).
There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership of property
entrusted to him (Palma vs. Cristobal, 77 Phil. 712), or that an action to compel a trustee
to convey property registered in his name in trust for the benefit of the cestui qui
trust does not prescribed (Manalang vs. Canlas, 94 Phil. 776; Cristobal vs. Gomez, 50
Phil. 810), or that the defense of prescription cannot be set up in an action to recover
property held by a person in trust for the benefit of another(Sevilla vs. De los Angeles,
97 Phil. 875), or that property held in trust can be recovered by the beneficiary
regardless of the lapse of time (Marabilles vs. Quito, 100 Phil. 64; Bancairen vs.
Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 126 Juan vs. Zuniga, 62 O.g. 1351; 4 SCRA 1221; Jacinto, L-
17957, May 31, 1962. See Tamayo vs. Callejo, 147 Phil. 31, 37).
That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the possession
of a trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not acquire by prescription the
property held in trust. Thus, section 38 of Act 190 provides that the law of prescription
does not apply "in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust" (Diaz vs. Gorricho and
Aguado, 103 Phil. 261,266; Laguna vs. Levantino, 71 Phil. 566; Sumira vs. Vistan, 74
Phil. 138; Golfeo vs. Court of Appeals, 63 O.G. 4895, 12 SCRA 199; Caladiao vs.
Santos, 63 O.G. 1956, 10 SCRA 691).
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in trust may possibly
apply to resulting trusts as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust (Heirs of
Candelaria vs. Romero, 109 Phil. 500, 502-3; Martinez vs. Grano, 42 Phil. 35;
Buencamino vs. Matias, 63 O. G. 11033, 16 SCRA 849).
The rule of imprescriptibility was misapplied to constructive trusts (Geronimo and
Isidoro vs. Nava and Aquino, 105 Phil. 145, 153. Compare with Cuison vs. Fernandez
and Bengzon, 105 Phil. 135, 139; De Pasion vs. De Pasion, 112 Phil. 403, 407).
Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an
express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui
trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui
trustand(c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive (Laguna vs. Levantino, supra;
Salinas vs. Tuason, 55 Phil. 729. Compare with the rule regarding co-owners found in
the last paragraph of article 494, Civil Code; Casanas vs. Rosello, 50 Phil. 97; Gerona
vs. De Guzman, L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153,157).
With respect to constructive trusts, the rule is different. The prescriptibility of an action
for reconveyance based on constructive trust is now settled (Alzona vs. Capunitan, L-
10228, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 450; Gerona vs. De Guzman, supra; Claridad vs.
Henares, 97 Phil. 973; Gonzales vs. Jimenez, L-19073, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 80;
Bonaga vs. Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason & Co., vs. Magdangal, L-15539, January
30, 1962, 4 SCRA 84). Prescription may supervene in an implied trust (Bueno vs.
Reyes, L-22587, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1179; Fabian vs. Fabian, L-20449, January
29, 1968; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 371).
And whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its enforcement may be barred by
laches (90 C.J.S. 887-889; 54 Am Jur. 449-450; Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, supra.
Compare with Mejia vs. Gampona, 100 Phil. 277).
The plaintiffs did not prove any express trust in this case. The expediente of the intestate
proceeding, Civil Case No. 217, particularly the project of partition, the decision and
the manifestation as to the receipt of shares (Exh. 3, 4 and 6)negatives the existence of
an express trust. Those public documents prove that the estate of Martin Ramos was
settled in that proceeding and that adjudications were made to his seven natural
children. A trust must be proven by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. It
cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite
declarations (De Leon vs. Peckson, 62 O. G. 994). As already noted, an express trust
cannot be proven by parol evidence(Pascual vs. Meneses, L-18838, May 25, 1967, 20
SCRA 219, 228; Cuaycong vs. Cuaycong, L-21616, December 11, 1967, 21 SCRA
1192).
Neither have the plaintiffs specified the kind of implied trust contemplated in their
action. We have stated that whether it is a resulting or constructive trust, its enforcement
may be barred by laches.
In the cadastral proceedings, which supervened after the closure of the intestate
proceeding, the eight lots involved herein were claimed by the spouses Jose Ramos and
Gregoria T. Ramos to the exclusion of the plaintiffs (Exh. 8 to 19). After the death of
Jose Ramos, the said lots were adjudicated to his widow and daughter (Exh. 8). In 1932
Gregoria T. Ramos and Candida Ramos leased the said lots to Felix Yulo (Exh.
20).Yulo in 1934 transferred his lease rights over Hacienda Calazato Juan S. Bonin and
Nestor Olmedo, the husband of plaintiff Atanacia Ramos (Exh. 22). Bonin and Olmedo
in 1935 sold their lease rights over Hacienda Calaza to Jesus S. Consing (Exh. 23).
Those transactions prove that the heirs of Jose Ramos had repudiated any trust which
was supposedly constituted over Hacienda Calaza in favor of the plaintiffs.
Under Act 190, whose statute of limitations applies to this case (Art. 116, Civil Code),
the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten years Diaz vs. Gorricho and
Aguado, supra.).
Atanacia, Modesto and Manuel, all surnamed Ramos, were already of age in 1914 (Exh.
A to D). From that year, they could have brought the action to annul the partition. Maria
Ramos and Emiliano Ramos were both born in 1896. They reached the age of twenty-
one years in 1917. They could have brought the action from that year.
The instant action was filed only in 1957. As to Atanacia, Modesto and Manuel, the
action was filed forty-three years after it accrued and, as to Maria and Emiliano, the
action was filed forty years after it accrued. The delay was inexcusable. The instant
action is unquestionably barred by prescription and res judicata.
This case is similar to Go Chi Gun vs. Co, 96 Phil. 622, where a partition judicially
approved in 1916 was sought to be annulled in 1948 on the ground of fraud. it was
contended that there was fraud because the real properties of the decedent were all
adjudicated to the eldest son, while the two daughters, who were minors, were given
only cash and shares of stocks. This Court, in upholding the petition, said:
"In any case, the partition was given the stamp of judicial approval, and as a matter of
principle and policy we should sustain its regularity, in the absence of such cause or
reason that the law itself fixes as a ground for invalidity" (on page 634). "As the
administration proceedings ended in the year 1916, the guardianship proceedings in
1931, and the action was brought only in the year 1948, more than 32 years from the
time of the distribution and 27 years from the termination of guardianship proceedings",
the action was barred by laches (on page 637). See Lopez vs. Gonzaga, L-18788,
January 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 167; Cuaycong vs. Cuaycong, supra).
The leading case of Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343, repeatedly cited by the
plaintiffs, does not involve any issue of prescription or laches. In that case, the action
for reconveyance was seasonably brought. The alleged trustee was an overseer who
secured title in his name for the land of his brother which was under his administration.
He could not have acquired it by prescription because his possession was not adverse.
On certain occasions, he had admitted that he was merely the administrator of the land
and not its true owner.
More in point is the Cuaycong case, supra, where the action for the reconveyance of
property held in trust accrued in 1936 and it was filed only in 1961 or after the lapse of
twenty-five years. That action was barred.
On its face, the partition agreement was theoretically correct since the seven natural
children were given their full legitime, which under article 942 of the old Civil Code
was their share as legal heirs. But is was possible that the lands were undervalued or
were not properly appraised at their fair market value and, therefore, the natural
children were short-changed in the computation of the value of their shares which the
legitimate children could pay in case as allowed in article 840 of the old Civil Code. It
is of common knowledge that anyone who received lands in the partition of a decedent's
estate would ultimately have an advantage over the one who received cash because
lands increase in value as time goes by while money is easily spent.
As pointed out in the statement if facts, it was anomalous that the manifestation,
evidencing the alleged receipt by the natural children of their shares, should recite that
they received their shares from the administrator, when in the project of partition itself,
as approved by the probate court (Exh. 3 to 6),it was stipulated that Jose Ramos and
Agustin Ramos would be the ones to pay the cash settlement for their shares. No
receipts were submitted to the court to prove that Jose Ramos and Agustin Ramos paid
to the plaintiffs the cash adjudicated to them in the project of partition.
The plaintiffs pinpoint certain alleged irregularities in the intestate proceeding. The aver
that Modesto Ramos and Manuel Ramos were already of age in 1913 and could not
therefore have been represented by Timoteo Zayco as guardian ad litem and that,
consequently, the two were denied due process. The plaintiffs accused Zayco of not
having competently protected the interests of the minors, Maria Ramos and Emiliano
Ramos. The allege that Atanacia Ramos signed the project of partition and the "receipt"
of share (Exh. 3 and 6)without understanding those documents which were in Spanish.
They assert that the lopsided and defective partition was not implemented.
In short, the plaintiffs contend that the partition was not binding on them (Note that
their brother, Timoteo, considered himself bound by that partition). They ask that the
case be remanded to the lower court for the determination and adjudication of their
rightful shares.
All those contentions would have a semblance of cogency and would deserve serious
consideration if the plaintiffs had not slept on their rights. They allowed more than forty
years to elapse before they woke up and complained that they were much aggrieved by
the partition. Under the circumstances, their claims can hardly evoke judicial
compassion. Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt. "If eternal vigilance is
the price of safety, one cannot sleep on one's right for more than a tenth of a century and
except it to be preserved in its pristine purity" (Ozaeta, J. in Association Cooperativa de
Credito Agricola de Miagao vs. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 281, 283).
The plaintiffs have only themselves to blame if the courts at this late hour can no longer
afford them relief against the inequities allegedly vitiating the partition of their father's
estate.
In connection with the res judicata aspect of the case, it maybe clarified that in the
settlement of a decedent's estate it is not de rigueur for the heirs to sign a partition
agreement. "It is the judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the
distributees" (Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu, L-17818, January 25,1967, 19 SCRA 85, 91)
which in this case was Judge Campbell's decision (Exh. 4).
A judgment in an intestate proceeding may be considered asa judgment in rem (Varela
vs. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248, 267. See Sec. 49[a], Rule 39, Rules of Court). There is a
ruling that "if that decree of distribution was erroneous or not in conformity with law or
the testament, the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had
become final; its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless
properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud". A partition approved by the court in
1939 could no longer be contested in 1956 on the ground of fraud. The action had
already prescribed. "The fact that one of the distributees was a minor at the time the
court issued the decree of distribution does not imply that the court had no jurisdiction
to enter the decree of distribution." (Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu, supra, citing Ramos vs.
Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 742). "A final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person
vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributes" (Syllabus, Santos vs. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895, 900).
Parenthetically, it may be noted that the filing of the instant case long after the death of
Jose Ramos and other persons involved in the intestate proceeding renders it difficult to
determine with certitude whether the plaintiffs had really been defrauded. What Justice
Street said in Sinco vs. Longa, 51 Phil. 507, 518-9 is relevant to this case.
In passing upon controversies of this character experience teaches the
danger of accepting lightly charged of fraud made many years after
the transaction in question was accomplished, when death may have
sealed the lips of the principal actors and changes effected by time
may have given a totally different color to the cause of controversy.
In the case before us the guardia, Emilio Tevez, is dead. The same is
true of Trinidad Diago, mother of the defendant Agueda Longa; while
Agapito Longa is now living in Spain. It will be borne in mind also
that, insofar as oral proof is concerned, the charge of fraud rests
principally on the testimony of a single witness who, if fraud was
committed, was a participant therein and who naturally would now be
anxious, so far as practicable, to put the blame on others. In this
connection it is well to bear in mind the following impressive
language of Mr. Justice Story:
... But length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence; and as
it thus removed from the parties all the immediate means to verify the
nature of the original transactions, it operates by way of presumption,
in favor of innocence, and against imputation of fraud. It would be
unreasonable, after a great length of time, to require exact proof of all
the minute circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a
satisfactory explanation of every difficulty, real or apparent with
which it may be incumbered. The most that can fairly be expected, in
such cases, if the parties are living, from the frailty of memory, and
 human infirmity, is, that the material facts can be given with certainty
to a common intent; and, if the parties are dead, and the cases rest in
confidence, and in parol agreements, the most that we can hope is to
arrive at probable conjectures, and to substitute general presumption
of law, for exact knowledge. Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not
lightly to be imputed to the living, for, the legal presumption is the
other way; as to the dead, are not here to answer for themselves, it
would be the height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and
violate the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear,
beyond a reasonable doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.],481,
498).
Defendants' appeal. — Defendants Granada Ramos, Gregoria T. Ramos, Candida
Ramos, Jose Bayor and Agustin Ramos appealed from the lower court's decision insofar
as it ignored their counterclaim for P50,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as attorney's
fees. In their brief the claim for attorney's fees was increased to P20,000. They prayed
for exemplary damages.
The defendants argue that plaintiffs' action was baseless and was filed in gross and
evident bad faith. It is alleged that the action caused defendants mental anguish,
wounded feelings, moral shock and serious anxiety and compelled them to hire the
service of counsel and incur litigation expenses.
Articles 2219 and 2220 (also 1764 and 2206) of the Civil Code indicate the cases where
morel damages may be recovered. The instant litigation does not fall within any of the
enumerated cases. Nor can it be regarded as analogous to any of the cases mentioned in
those articles. Hence, defendants' claim for moral damages cannot be sustained
(Ventanilla vs. Centeno, 110 Phil. 811, 814). The worries and anxiety of a defendant in
a litigation that was not maliciously instituted are not the moral damages contemplated
in the law (Solis & Yarisantos vs. Salvador, L-17022, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 887).
"The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the
actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may not be
charged on those who may exercise it erroneously." (Barretto vs. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771,
779).
On the other hand, the award of reasonable attorney's fees is governed by article 2208
of the Civil Code which lays down the general rule that, in the absence of stipulation,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses cannot be recovered. Article 2208 specifies
eleven instances where attorney's fees may be recovered. The defendants did not point
out the specific provision of article 2208 on which their counterclaim may be
predicated.
What may possibly apply to defendants' counterclaim are paragraphs four and eleven
which respectively provide that attorney's fees may be recovered "in case of a clearly
unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff"(defendant is a plaintiff in his
counterclaim) or "in any other cases where the court deems it just and equitable" that
attorney's fees should be awarded.
We hold that, notwithstanding the dismissal of the action, no attorney's fees should be
granted to the defendants. Under the facts of the case, it cannot be asseverated with
dogmatic finality that plaintiffs' action was manifestly unfounded or was maliciously
filed to harass and embarrass the defendants. All indications point to the fact that the
plaintiffs honestly thought that they had a good cause of action. They acted in evident
good faith. (See Herrera vs. Luy Kim Guan, 110 Phil. 1020, 1028; Rizal Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, L-23729, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 61).
Inasmuch as some of the plaintiffs were minors when the partition of their father's
landed estate was made, and considering that they were not allotted even a few square
meters out of the hundreds of hectares of lands, which belonged to him, they had reason
to feel aggrieved and to seek redress for their grievances. Those circumstances as well
as the marked contrast between their indigence and the affluence of the heirs of their
half-brother, Jose Ramos, might have impelled them to ask the courts to reexamine the
partition of their father's estate.
It is not sound public policy to set a premium on the right to litigate. An adverse
decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party
(Herrera vs. Luy Kim, supra; Heirs of Justiva vs. Gustilo, 61 O. G. 6959. Cf. Lazatin
vs. Twano and Castro, 112 Phil. 733, 741).
Since no compensatory and moral damages have been awarded in this case, defendants'
claim for exemplary damages, which was ventilated for the first time in their appellants'
brief, may be as an afterthought, cannot be granted(Art. 2229, Civil Code).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the clarification that
defendants' counterclaim is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-39381 July 18, 1975
FELISA LIM, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GUADALUPE ENRIQUEZ UY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-39033 July 18, 1975
GUADALUPE ENRIQUEZ UY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA LIM, respondents.
Juanito R. Sagun for Felisa Lim.
Pedro G. Uy and Francisco D. Bacabac for Guadalupe Enriquez Uy.
CASTRO, J.:
These two petitions for certiorari were separately filed by Felisa Lim and Guadalupe
Enriquez Uy to review the decision dated June 6, 1974 of the Court of Appeals, and the
resolutions dated September 12, 1974 and July 18, 1974 of the same court denying their
respective motions for reconsideration. We affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
In 1962 Felisa Lim brought suit against Francisco Miguel Romualdez Uy Chen Hong in
the Court of First Instance of Manila for (1) declaration of nullity of the affidavit Uy
executed in which he adjudicated to himself, as the only son and heir of Susana Lim, a
lot (120 square meters) with the house thereon located at Tayabas St., Sta. Cruz,
Manila; (2) cancellation of the certificate of title issued in the name of Uy; and (3)
issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in her favor.
Both Uy and Felisa Lim claimed they inherited, to the exclusion of each other, the
property in question from Susana Lim. Felisa Lim claims to be the natural daughter of
Susana Lim. To support her claim, she presented (1) her certificate of baptism, which
certificate states that Felisa Lim is the natural daughter of Susana Lim; and (2) her
marriage contract, which contract states that Susana Lim gave consent to Felisa Lim's
mother. Felisa Lim also alleges continuous possession of the status of a natural child.
On the other hand, Uy claimed to be the only son and heir of Susana Lim. To support
his claim, he presented, among others, (1) his application for alien registration in the
Bureau of Immigration, which application names Susana Lim as Uy's mother; (2) the
order of the Bureau of Immigration cancelling his alien registration, which order
describes Uy as a Filipino citizen by derivation from his mother Susana Lim; and (3) his
identification certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration, which certificate likewise
describes Uy as a citizen of the Philippines by derivation from his mother Susana Lim.
On November 22, 1967 the court a quo, after finding Felisa Lim as "the daughter and
only heir" of Susana Lim, rendered judgment declaring the affidavit executed by Uy
null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila (1) to cancel the
registration of the said affidavit, (2) to cancel the certificate of title in the name of Uy,
and (3) to issue a new transfer certificate of title in favor of Felisa Lim.
Uy then moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision and asked for new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence. This motion for reconsideration and new trial
the court a quo denied.
Uy appealed to the Court of Appeals.1 On June 6, 1974 the appellate court reversed the
judgment dated November 22, 1967 of the court a quo and dismissed the complaint.
The appellate court ruled that neither Felisa Lim nor Uy "is entitled to the inheritance
because neither of them had been recognized by Susana Lim as her child by any of the
means provided for by law; and neither had either of them been declared in a judicial
proceeding to be a child of Susana Lim." Both parties' subsequent respective motions
for reconsideration were denied.
Hence the present recourse by both parties against the judgement dated June 6, 1974 of
the appellate court as well its resolutions dated September 12,1974 and July 18, 1974
denying their respective motions for reconsideration.
In L-39381, Felisa Lim assails the finding of the appellate court that she "has no right to
inherit from Susana Lim, even on the assumption that she is her natural daughter, as she
had not been recognized by any of the means provided for by the New Civil Code."
Felisa Lim alleges that Susana Lim's consent to her marriage, given pursuant to Act
3613 (The Marriage Law), amounted to an admission and recognition on the part of
Susana Lim that she (Felisa) is her natural daughter. Felisa Lim adds that the records in
the office of the Local Civil Registrar pertaining to her marriage license, "together with
the supporting papers which included the consent given by Susana Lim, were destroyed
during the liberation of the City of Manila." However, that Susana Lim gave consent to
her marriage, Felisa Lim asserts, the marriage contract evinces. Felisa Lim states that
the marriage contract partakes of a public document and thus fulfills the provisions of
the old Civil Code (re recognition "in some other public document") and the new Civil
Code (re recognition "in any authentic writing").
In L-39033, Guadalupe Enriquez Uy takes exception to the appellate court's non-
adjudication of the property in question in favor of her husband. The finding of the
appellate court that her husband "is not likewise entitled to inherit from Susana Lim"
makes no difference, she states, for her husband purchased the property in question
"with his own money prior to his mother's death and took conveyance and title thereof"
in his mother's name in deference to her since "she gave him a little amount to complete
the purchase price."
L-39381
At the outset, it should be noted that Felisa Lim claims that her recognition by Susana
Lim as her (the latter's) natural child took place in 1943. Since the recognition allegedly
took place during the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1889, such recognition should be
reckoned in accordance with the requisites established by the said Civil Code. For, the
law in force at the time of the recognition governs the act of recognition.
Section 131 of the Civil Code of 1889 requires that the recognition of a natural child
"be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document." Felisa Lim
argues that her marriage contract partakes of a public document.
According to article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889, public documents "are those
authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with the formalities required
by law." Thus, "there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private
individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent
public officials by reason of their office."2 "The public document pointed out in Article
131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."3
The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim does not satisfy the requirements of
solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the Civil Code of 1889. Such contract is not a
written act with the intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument executed in due form
before a notary and certified by him. The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the
contracting parties, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two
witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife, signed by
signature or mark by the said contracting parties and the said witnesses, and attested by
the person solemnizing the marriage. The marriage contract does not possess the
requisites of a public document of recognition. Be it remembered that recognition,
under the Civil Code of 1889, "must be precise, express and solemn."4
resulting trust in favor of the one furnishing the consideration for the transfer, unless a
different intention or understanding appears. The trust which results under such
circumstances does not arise from contract or agreement of the parties, but from the
facts and circumstances, that is to say, it results because of equity and arises by
implication or operation of law."5
To support her allegation regarding the existence of an implied trust, Uy presented
excerpts from the respective testimonies of her deceased husband, her husband's half-
brother, and the former owner of the property in question. These testimonies, as
excerpted, tend to prove (1) that the deceased Uy received a P10,000 legacy from his
father; (2) that he purchased the property in question; and (3) that the name of Susana
Lim appeared on the deed of sale.
It is thus asserted that the deceased Uy furnished the consideration, although he asked
Susana Lim for a little amount to complete the purchases price of the property in
question, and that having supplied the greater portion of the purchase money, he
intended the purchase for his own benefit.
It is our view that two countervailing circumstances militate against Uy's theory of an
implied trust in favor of her husband. (1) Uy raised the theory of implied trust for the
first time in her motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate court; (2) the
evidence regarding the alleged purchase by her late husband is altogether unconvincing.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

L-39033

Uy claims that her husband purchased the property in question with his own money
prior to Susana Lim's death but took conveyance thereof in her name. In the
circumstances, she alleges, an implied trust exists in favor of her husband. She
questions the statement made by the appellate court in its resolution dated July 18, 1974
denying her motion for reconsideration, which statement reads: "The title is in the name
of Susana Lim, and oral testimony cannot overcome the fact that the sale was made to
Susana Lim and title issued in her favor."

An implied trust arises "where a person purchases land with his own money and takes
conveyance thereof in the name of another. In such a case, the property is held on a
 [G.R. No. 86302. September 24, 1991.]
CASIMIRO MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
TEOPISTA TORING TUÑACAO, Respondents.
Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr. for Petitioner.
Domingo Antigua & Associates for Private Respondent.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza,
but the latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day. The trial court believed
him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. The appellate court did
not and reversed the judgment of the court below. Now the issue is before us
on certiorari.
The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City.
Teopista Toring Tuñacao, the herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on
August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro
Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza
recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according her the
rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.cralawnad
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiff’s
allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees.
Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that
her father was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother because
Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. When she married Valentin
Tuñacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to drive it so he could
have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the sale to her
and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tuñacao, to build a house
on his lot and later he gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente
Toring. On February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a
co-depositor at the Mandaue City branch of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank. Two years later, Margarita Bate, Casimiro’s adopted daughter, took the passbook
from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned to her after admonishing Margarita. 1
Lolito Tuñacao corroborated his mother and said he considered Casimiro his
grandfather because Teopista said so. He would kiss his hand whenever they saw each
other and Casimiro would give him money. Casimiro used to invite him to his house
and give him jack fruits. When his grandfather learned that he was living on a rented
lot, the old man allowed him to build a house on the former’s land. 2
Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac
Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro.
Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring because she used
to work with him in a saltbed in Opao. Casimiro himself told him she was his
sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which eventually
resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant in 1930 and giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro
handed him P20.00 to be given to Brigida at Teopista’s baptism. Casimiro also gave
him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida. 3
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father
Hipolito, Casimiro’s brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him.
He worked on Casimiro’s boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would
also give him various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00 to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac
also declared that Casimiro intended to give certain properties to Teopista. 4
Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age, but Vicente Toring took
the stand to resist Teopista’s claim.
Vicente, who professed to be Casimiro’s only illegitimate child by Brigida Toring,
declared that Teopista’s father was not Casimiro but a carpenter named Ondoy, who
later abandoned her. Vicente said that it was he who sold a lot to Teopista, and for a low
price because she was his half-sister. It was also he who permitted Lolito to build a
house on Casimiro’s lot. This witness stressed that when Casimiro was hospitalized,
Teopista never once visited her alleged father. 5
The last statement was shared by the other defense witness, Julieta Ouano, Casimiro’s
niece, who also affirmed that Vicente Toring used to work as a cook in Casimiro’s boat.
She flatly declared she had never met Teopista but she knew her husband, who was a
mechanic. 6
The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in Article 283 of the Civil Code,
which has been held to be applicable not only to natural children but also to spurious
children. 7 The said article provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his
natural child:chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father
by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father.
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.
This article has been substantially reproduced in the Family Code as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
In his remarkably well-written decision, Judge Leoncio P. Abarquez rejected the
plaintiff’s claim that she was in continuous possession of the status of a child of the
alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family. His Honor
declared:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In this particular case the established evidence is that plaintiff continuously lived with
her mother, together with her sister Paulina. Neither the plaintiff nor her husband had
come to live with the defendant. At most, only their son, Lolito Tuñacao was allowed to
construct a small house in the land of the defendant, either by the defendant himself, as
claimed by the plaintiff, or by Vicente Toring, as claimed by the witnesses of the
defendant. The defendant never spent for the support and education of the plaintiff. He
did not allow the plaintiff to carry his surname. The instances when the defendant gave
money to the plaintiff were, more or less, off-and-on or rather isolatedly periodic. They
were made at considerable intervals and were not given directly to the plaintiff but
through a third person. Thus, while it may be conceded that: a) the defendant’s parents,
as well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza that
Teopista is the daughter of the defendant; b) that Teopista calls the defendant as "Papa
Miroy" ; c) that Teopista would kiss defendant’s hand when she met him; d) that the
defendant gave to her and her husband the income of the passenger truck as well as the
proceeds of the sale thereof, all these acts, taken altogether, are not sufficient to show
that the plaintiff had possessed continuously the status of a recognized illegitimate
child.
On appeal, however, the respondent court 8 disagreed and arrived at its own conclusion
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Contrary to the conclusion of the court a quo, We find that appellant has sufficiently
proven her continuous possession of such status. Although the court a quo did not pass
on the credibility of the various witnesses presented, We consider the witnesses for the
plaintiff as credible and unbiased. No proof was shown to render them otherwise. There
is no showing that Isaac and Gaudencio testified falsely. They were disinterested parties
with no ax to grind against the appellee or the people actively acting in his behalf. In
fact even the court a quo conceded to the truthfulness of some of their testimonies.
By contrast, it continued, Vicente Toring was an interested party who was claiming to
be the sole recognized natural child of Casimiro and stood to lose much inheritance if
Teopista’s claim were recognized. He had earlier filed theft charges against his own
sister and libel charges against her husband. As for Julieta Ouano, the respondent court
found it difficult to believe that she had never met Teopista although both of them have
been living in the same barangay since birth.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on August 11, 1988. A motion
for reconsideration was filed, and it was only from the opposition thereto of the private
respondent that Casimiro’s counsel learned that his client had died on May 31, 1986. He
immediately informed the respondent court but the motion for reconsideration was
denied without any substitution of parties having been effected. The said counsel, now
acting for Vicente Toring, then asked this Court to substitute the latter for the deceased
Casimiro Mendoza in the present petition.
The applicable provisions of the Rules of Court are Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3,
reading as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity or incompetency of party. —
Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall
be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or
incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor, guardian or other
legal representative.
Sec. 17. Death of party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to
appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or
within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within
said time the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to
be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
In the early case of Masecampo v. Masecampo, 9 it was settled that:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
The subsequent death of the father is not a bar to the action commenced during his
lifetime by one who pretended to be his natural son. It may survive against the executor,
administrator, or any other legal representative of the testate or intestate succession.
Pursuant to the above rules and jurisprudence, we hereby allow the substitution of
Casimiro Mendoza pro haec vice and nunc pro tunc by Vicente Toring, who appears to
be the former’s illegitimate son. This disposes of the private respondent’s contention
that the lawyer-client relationship terminated with Casimiro’s death and that Vicente
has no personality now to substitute him.
Now to the merits.
We note that both the trial court and the respondent court, in arriving at their respective
conclusions, focused on the question of whether or not Teopista was in continuous
possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza. This was
understandable because Teopista herself had apparently based her claim on this
particular ground as proof of filiation allowed under Article 283 of the Civil Code.
To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,"
it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does
not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be
of an intermittent character while it continues. 10 The possession of such status means
that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through others,
spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is
illegitimate). 11 There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed
father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of
paternal affection and care. 12
With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has not been
in continuous possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro
Mendoza, under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family
Code.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they were both
residents of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the respondent court observed, that
this could have been because defendant had a legitimate wife. However, it is not
unusual for a father to take his illegitimate child into his house to live with him and his
legitimate wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in this case. In fact, Vicente
Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived with the latter
and his wife, apparently without objection from the latter. We also note that Teopista
did not use the surname of Casimiro although this is, of course, not decisive of one’s
status. No less significantly, the regularity of defendant’s act of giving money to the
plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not been sufficiently
established. The trial court correctly concluded that such instances were "off-and-on,"
not continuous and intermittent. Indeed, the plaintiffs testimony on this point is tenuous
as in one breath she said that her mother solely spent for her education and in another
that Casimiro helped in supporting her. 13
But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has
nevertheless established that status by another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an
illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by
evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family
Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 14
The trial court conceded that "the defendant’s parents, as well as the plaintiff himself,
told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the
defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light of Rule 130, Section 39, of
the Rules of Court, providing as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him
by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration. The word pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
The statement of the trial court regarding Teopista’s parentage is not entirely accurate.
To set the record straight, we will stress that it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on
this question of pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro’s father. His testimony was that
he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was Casimiro’s brother, and Brigida
Mendoza, Casimiro’s own mother, that Teopista was Casimiro’s illegitimate daughter.
15

Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule because it is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are
apprehended from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. 16" Nevertheless,
precisely because of its nature as hearsay evidence, there are certain safeguards against
its abuse. Commenting on this provision, Francisco enumerates the following requisites
that have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be
admitted in evidence:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
so holding, we give effect to the policy of the Civil code and the Family Code to
liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity of illegitimate children, without
prejudice to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed status with his own
defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the facilities of modern medicine
and technology.cralawnad
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING
Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the illegitimate child of the late Casimiro Mendoza and
entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.

4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.

5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must be shown by evidence other than such declaration. 17

All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the
declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida
Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac’s testimony.
The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro,
which were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition. The
declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the
controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the
declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than such declaration,
consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which
Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs. 18

The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro could have done this by
deposition if he was too old and weak to testify at the trial of the case.

If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private respondent
and her witnesses, such as the financial doles made by Casimiro to Brigida Toring, the
hiring of Teopista’s husband to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro, who later sold
the vehicle and gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista and her husband, the
permission he gave Lolito Tuñacao to build a house on his land after he found that the
latter was living on a rented lot, and, no less remarkably, the joint savings account
Casimiro opened with Teopista, we can reasonably conclude that Teopista was the
illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.

We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the other
circumstances of this case, Teopista Toring Tuñacao has proved that she is the
illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such. In
G.R. No. L-29759 May 18, 1989
NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO, in her individual capacity
and as judicial guardian of the minors ANTONIO ALBERTO, JR. and LOURDES
ALBERTO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO J. ALBERTO, JR., assisted by
his mother as his natural guardian, ANDREA JONGCO, respondents.
Tañada, Carreon & Tañada for petitioners.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 31, 1968 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34750-R'* entitled "Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., thru his mother
as his natural guardian, Andrea Jongco, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Natividad del Rosario
Vda. de Alberto, in her individual capacity and as judicial guardian of the minors,
Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr., defendants-appellees", reversing the August
10, 1964. Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila.
The case originated from a complaint for acknowledgment and partition filed on
September 8, 1960 with the then Court of First Instance of Manila by the herein private
respondent, a minor, 18 years of age, assisted by his mother, Andrea Jongco, as his
natural guardian, against the herein petitioners (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-8). In the said
Complaint, private respondent alleged, in substance, that in 1941 his alleged father,
Antonio C. Alberto, and his mother, Andrea Jongco, lived together as husband and wife
and as a result of which, he was born on September 10, 1942; that during the time that
his alleged father and mother lived together as husband and wife and up to the time of
his birth, both were single and had no legal impediment to marry each other; that after
his birth, his father and mother continued living together as husband and wife, his father
supporting them and introducing him to the public as his natural child; that even the
family of his father recognized him as such; that on or about the year 1944, his father
and mother separated, and subsequently, his father married herein petitioner Natividad
del Rosario; that as a result of the marriage, two (2) children were born herein
petitioners Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.; that although his father was
separated from his mother, he continued to support him and recognized him as his own
child; that on July 3, 1949, his father died, and without notice to him, petitioner
Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on July 17, 1949, instituted before the then
Court of First Instance of Manila an intestate proceedings for the estate of his deceased
father, docketed therein as Special Proceedings No. 9092; that in the said intestate
proceedings, petitioners deliberately omitted him as one of the heirs and for this reason
they succeeded in having the properties of his deceased father adjudicated and
partitioned among themselves; that the said intestate proceedings were terminated on
November 9, 1953; that his father left properties valued at P74,963.81, and accordingly,
as a natural child of his father, he is entitles to at least P18,000.00; and that he had
absolutely no previous knowledge of the intestate proceedings and came to know about
it only recently and thereupon made a demand from the petitioners who refused to give
him his share. Accordingly, he prays that the petitioners be ordered to acknowledge him
as the natural child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his one-fourth share be turned over to
him; and that petitioners be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fee
and the cost of suit (Record on Appeals, pp. 2-9).
On September 21, 1960, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1)
the cause of action is barred by prior judgment; and (2) that the cause of action is also
barred by the statute of limitation (Ibid, pp. 9-19). To this motion, private respondents
filed an opposition on October 22, 1960 (Ibid, pp. 20-58).
On November 11, 1960, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss
(Ibid, pp. 97-98).
On November 18, 1964, petitioners filed their Answer to the Complaint (Ibid, pp. 98-
102).
On November 23, 1964, private respondent filed his Answer to Defendants'
counterclaim (Ibid, pp. 102-104). On August 10, 1964, the trial court rendered a
decision in favor of the petitioners (Ibid, pp. 104- 123). The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
Considering all the foregoing, the Court orders the dismissal of the
complaint without pronouncement as to the costs. The counterclaim is
also dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondent, not satisfied with the decision, appealed to respondent Court, and in
a Decision promulgated on August 31, 1968 (Ibid, pp. 61-75), respondent Court
reversed the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the said Decision,
reads:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set
aside and another rendered declaring plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr.,
an acknowledged Natural Child of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto;
declaring said plaintiff the owner pro indiviso of one-fifth (1/5) of the
hereditary estate of Antonio C. Alberto; and ordering the defendants
to deliver to plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., his one-fifth (1/5) share
in said estate, subject to the usufructuary rights of defendants
Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto pursuant to Articles 834 of the
Old Civil Code, and to pay the costs of suit.
 SO ORDERED.
On September 24, 1968, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same
was denied in a Resolution dated October 14, 1968 (Rollo, p. 77). Hence, the instant
petition.
This Court, in a resolution dated November 27,1968, resolved to give due course to the
petition (Rollo, p. 91).
Petitioners assigned the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (TRIAL COURT) HAD NO
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE.
II
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE
OF ACTION WAS NOT BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.
III
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE
OF ACTION HAD NOT YET PRESCRIBED.
IV
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., IN
NOT BRINGING THE INSTANT ACTION FOR AN UNREASONABLE LENGTH
OF TIME, WAS GUILTY OF LACHES.
V cannot be raised on appeal (Dalman vs. City Court of Dipolog City, Branch II, 134
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT BY BASING ITS JUDGMENT ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS,
GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF ANDREA JONGCO AND
OTHER WITNESSES OF RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., DESPITE THE SERIOUS
CONTRADICTIONS, INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES IN THEIR
TESTIMONIES AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT AND CATEGORICALLY
STATED IN ITS DECISION.
VI
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A GROSS ERROR OF LAW AND A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY DISREGARDED
PETITIONERS' EVIDENCE.
VII
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., WAS AN
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF THE DECEASED ALBERTO AND IN
DECLARING HIM OWNER PRO-INDIVISO OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE
HEREDITARY ESTATE OF THE DECEASED.
I.
It is the contention of petitioners that inasmuch as the instant case was filed on
September 8, 1960, almost five (5) years after the enactment of R.A. No. 1401 —
creating the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the questions of paternity and
acknowledgment fall beyond the jurisdictional pale of the Court of First Instance of
Manila and instead comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court. While petitioners admitted that this objection to lack of
jurisdiction by the Court of First Instance of Manila over the subject matter of the
present action had not been raised either in the said court or in the Court of Appeals and
is brought to this Court for resolution for the first time on appeal, they contend that a
party may object to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action at
any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal since lack of jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter cannot be waived. Such contention is untenable.
This Court has already ruled that the question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court
SCRA 243 [1985]). Besides, a party who had voluntarily participated in the trial, like
the herein petitioners, cannot later on raise the issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction
(Philippine National Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 299 [1986];
Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 470 [1984]; Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968]). Moreover, there are no more Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts today. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the functions of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court have been transferred to the Regional Trial
Courts (Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo, 143 SCRA 356 [1986]).
II.
Petitioners alleged that the intestate proceedings for the settlement of estate of the
deceased Antonio C. Alberto (Special Proceedings No. 9092) had already been
terminated on November 9, 1953 by the order of distribution directing the delivery of
the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto and that in said proceedings the
court also declared who are the heirs of the deceased. Consequently, the instant case
which seeks to secure the recognition of Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. as an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased in order to establish his rights to the inheritance is already
barred by prior judgment (Petitioners' Brief, p. 47) despite private respondent's
insistence that he had no knowledge or notice of the intestate proceedings of his alleged
natural father (Record on Appeal, p. 21).
Petitioners' submission is impressed with merit.
This Court has invariably ruled that insolvency proceedings and settlement of a
decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding against the whole
world. All persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were
notified or not, are equally bound (Philippine Savings Bank vs. Lantin, 124 SCRA 483
[1983]). The court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the
publication of the notice prescribed ... and any order that may be entered therein is
binding against all of them (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 741 [1951] citing in re Estate
of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). It was ruled further that a final order of distribution of the
estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees; and
that the only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control
or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the
reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of which, if successful,
would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or
order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and
disposed of (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, supra; Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva
Caceres 45 Phil. 895).
III.
As to the issue of prescription, the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly provides:
Art. 1100. The action for rescission on account of lesion shall
prescribe after four years from the time the partition was made.
Intestate proceedings were terminated as alleged in the complaint itself on November 9,
1953 so that said four years prescriptive period expired on November 9,1957. Hence,
the present action filed on September 8, 1960 and which has for one of its objects the
rescission of the agreement of partition among the petitioners, as approved by the
intestate court, is already barred by prescription.
That an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an alleged preterition of
a compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith or fraud of the other persons interested,
which is what the complaint in this case alleges in substance, is indicated in Article
1104 of the Civil Code as follows:
Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory
heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad
faith or fraud on the part of the other persons interested; ...
It has also been ruled by this Court that the four years period provided in Article 1100
of the Civil Code (formerly Art. 1076 of the old Civil Code) should commence to run
from the approval of the agreement of partition by the Court (Samson vs. Araneta, 60
Phil. 27, 36). Thus, in the case at bar, it is evident that the action to rescind the
Agreement of Partition which was approved by the Court on November 9, 1953, had
already prescribed when respondent filed the complaint in the case at bar on September
8, 1960.
While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so
long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code),
petitioners herein had never recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either
expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for
partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to the case at bar.
Moreover, private respondent cannot claim exemption from the effects of prescription
on the plea of minority under the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:
(1) Minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents,
guardians or other legal representatives:
xxxxxxxxx
Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living parent, his mother, Andrea Jongco, who in fact
filed the complaint in the case at bar for him, falls squarely under the above-cited
provision.
Granting arguendo that respondent is a natural child of the deceased Antonio Alberto,
Sr., the action for recognition of natural child may be brought only during the lifetime
of the presumed parent. And if the presumed father or mother died during the minority
of the child, the latter may file the action within four (4) years from the attainment of
majority (Art. 285 [1]). However, if the minor has a guardian as in this case,
prescription runs against him even during minority (Wenzel etc., et al. vs. Surigao
Consolidated Mining, Inc., 108 Phil. 530 [1960]). In such case, the action for
recognition must be instituted within four (4) years after the death of the natural father
(Magallanes, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795 [1954]). Antonio C.
Alberto, Sr., the alleged father, died on July 3, 1949. The complaint for
acknowledgment and partition was filed eleven (11) years later, on September 8, 1960.
Hence, prescription had set in.
Neither can it be claimed that the present action is in substance one for recovery of
property in order to avoid the consequences of prescription, for as correctly stated by
the petitioners, to be entitled to the recovery of the property from the estate, Alberto, Jr.
must first rescind the partition and distribution approved by the intestate proceedings,
otherwise, the recovery of any property from the petitioners is not possible. Be that as it
may, such partition can no longer be rescinded having been already barred by the
Statute of Limitations.
Furthermore, even granting that Article 1104 of the Civil Code does not apply and there
is an injury to the rights of plaintiff, tills action would still not prosper under Articles
1146 and 1149 of the same Code which provide that the action must be brought within
four and five years, respectively, from the time the right of action accrues.
IV
Petitioners' claim of laches is likewise tenable. The trial court in its findings clearly and
unmistakably declared that respondent Alberto, Jr. is guilty of laches as follows:
About 1944, Andrea Jongco said she learned of Antonio Alberto's
marriage to Natividad del Rosario. Yet, she took no steps to protect
the interests of her child, Antonio, although she was already
confronted with the incontrovertible proof of Antonio's infidelity and
the hallowness of his promises.
It might be that Andrea Jongco was then relying on Antonio Alberto's
not denying that Alberto, Jr. was his child, if such was the case. If this
was so, however, how can we explain her inaction even after the
death of Antonio Alberto in 1949, or until September 8, 1960, when
she filed this action, Andrea kept silent, took no action to have her
child recognized as the son of the alleged father. Her laches, as well
as the inherent improbabilities in her testimony rendered it unworthy
of belief.
... It is evident that the plaintiff's case is adversely affected by his long
delay in bringing this action. 'Undue delay in the separate
enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of lack of merit in this
claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights most
strongly when they are threatened or invaded. (Buenaventura vs.
David, 37 Phil. 435-440). (Record on Appeal, pp. 108-109).
This Court has consistently declared that laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541
[1985]; Tendo vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78 [1985]; De Castro vs. Tan, 129 SCRA 85
[1984]; Medija vs. Patcho, 132 SCRA 540 [1984]; Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff,
Armed Forces of the Phil., 133 SCRA 800 [1984]; Gumonpin vs. CA, 120 SCRA 687
[1983]).
As pointed out by the trial court, there appears to be no explanation for the surprising
delay in the filing of the complaint in the case at bar except perhaps, the fact that during
the lifetime of the deceased Antonio Alberto, private respondents were receiving
support until the latter died in 1949; but thereafter, they allowed more than ten years to
elapse or until September 8, 1960 before they filed the present action to assert their
rights despite Andrea Jongco's allegation that they stopped receiving support after
Alberto, Sr.'s death.
On the other hand, there is merit in petitioners' allegations that such delay is prejudicial
to them. Private respondents could have filed the action in 1944 when Andrea Jongco
learned of the marriage of the deceased with petitioner Natividad del Rosario instead of
waiting for 16 years when the supposed father's lips had been sealed by death and
possible witnesses like Antonio Alberto, Sr.'s mother had become too old to give
coherent testimony.
On this point, the Supreme Court ruled:
The assertion of doubtful claims, after long delay, cannot be favored
by the courts. Time inevitably tends to obliterate occurrences from the
memory of witnesses, and even where the recollection appears to be
entirely clear, the true clue to the solution of a case may be hopelessly
lost. These considerations constitute one of the pillars of the doctrine
long familiar in equity jurisprudence to the effect that laches or
unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a
right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to
the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Vigilantibus non
dormientibus equites subvenit (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435,
reiterated in Edralin vs. Edralin, 1 SCRA 227 [1961]).
The other explanation might have been the minority of Antonio Alberto, Jr. at the time
of his supposed father's death. But such explanation as discussed earlier is unavailing
even in case of prescription under Article 1108 of the Civil Code where minority does
not stop the running of the prescriptive period for minors who have parents, guardians
or legal representatives.
Thus, it is well established that "The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and
not those who sleep when the law requires them to act (Cui and Joven vs. Henson, 51
Phil. 606, 610; Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. vs. Villaluz, Sept. 29, 1951, 90 Phil. 154)."
The law does not encourage laches, indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the
contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he... must show that he
is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings (Samson vs. Yateo, August 28,1958; 104
PMI. 378).
V.
Finally on the merits of this case, petitioners would have this Court review and reverse
the conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals. As a general rule, this is a function this
Court does not undertake. The established principle is that the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court; except: (1)
when the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2)
when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) where there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the Court in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case, and
the same are contrary to the admissions of both the apellant and the appellee; (6) when
the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) when the
findings are without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Manlapaz vs.
C.A., 147 SCRA 238-239 [1987]; Guita vs. C.A., 139 SCRA 576 [1985]; Sacay vs.
Sandiganbayan, 147 SCRA 593 [1986]).
It is readily evident that this case falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the
rule, specifically that the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the
trial court.
At the trial, the lower court in evaluating the evidence presented by the complainants is
of the view that the testimony alone of Andrea Jongco is sufficient to totally discredit
not only her testimony but also her entire case. Aside from being inherently improbable
and the merit of her claim being adversely affected by her testimony and her long delay
in bringing action, her testimony is contradicted by the testimonies of Jose, Zoilo and
Pilar who are brothers and sister of the deceased Antonio Alberto and who have no
pecuniary interest whatsoever in the outcome of the controversy. They testified that
during the period Andrea Jongco claimed that Antonio Alberto, Sr. lived with her, the
deceased in fact lived with his mother and brothers at the family residence except for
his brief stint with the army (Decision, Civil Case No. 44164; Record on appeal, pp.
111-112).
More than that, the trial court found among others, that Andrea Jongco has had five
children (aside from her son Antonio) with four different men. The assumption,
therefore, is that she lived with at least four different men without being married to any
of them. Thus, the trial court aptly ruled that his propensity to promiscuous relationship
with different men, render it unjust to state with definiteness that any particular person
is the father of any one of her children." (Ibid, p. 121).
Other witnesses are Eufracia Cailan who allegedly took care of Antonio, the father,
since the latter was a child and then of Antonio, the alleged son, and Encarnacion
Peralta, an alleged former lessor of Andrea Jongco and Antonio Alberto. Their
testimonies were, however, found by the trial court to be inherently improbable,
inconsistent with human experience and deliberately invented to conform with the
testimony of Andrea Jongco (Ibid, pp. 109-117).
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in its decision gave more credence to the
testimonies of Eufracia Cailan and Encarnacion Peralta and declared that their
testimonies have sufficiently established the fact that Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. is the son
of the late Antonio C. Alberto and Andrea Jongco which finds further proof in the birth
certificate and the baptismal certificate of Alberto, Jr. (Rollo, pp. 6-11).
In this connection, it must be stated that in the case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135
SCRA 439 (1985), this Court, citing the cases of Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA
53; People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349; Cid vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA
434; Vudaurrazaga vs. C.A., 91 Phil. 492; and Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135, ruled
that a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the
instant case, is not competent evidence of paternity.
In casting doubt upon the credibility of petitioner Natividad's testimony, the Court of
Appeals pointed out her serious inconsistency on material points such as her claim that
she was married to the deceased in 1941 and her later admission in the answer that they
were married in 1944.
The record shows, however, that both admissions were correct, the first marriage was a
secret civil marriage celebrated in Pililla, Rizal while the second was a religious
ratification of the former. The lack of marriage certificate as evidence was also
considered by the Court of Appeals as an impairment of credibility despite a
certification to the effect that all pre-war records in the Municipality of Pililla, Rizal
were destroyed during the last war. Said Appellate Court is of the view that if they did
plan to marry secretly at that time, they could have chosen a city or municipality near
Manila and that Pililla must have been chosen as the place of the supposed marriage so
that petitioners could have an apparent good reason for the non-presentation of the
marriage certificate.
As aptly argued by the petitioners, such conclusion is purely conjectural. Besides
petitioners' reasons for the choice of that place, the celebration of the marriage was
positively confirmed by Damaso Herrera, one of the sponsors thereof.

In any event, it is a fundamental rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial
court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong
and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real
evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the
case (People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 29, 30 [19871; People vs. Grefiel, 125 SCRA 108
[1983]; Chase vs. Buencamino, 136 SCRA 381 [1985]; People vs. Fernandez, 124
SCRA 248 (1983]; Olangco vs. C.F.I. of Misamis Oriental, 121 SCRA 338 [1983];
Minuchechi vs. C.A., 129 SCRA 479 [1984]).

After a careful review of the records and the evidence presented by the contending
parties, no cogent reasons could be found to justify the reversal of the findings of the
trial court.

In view of the foregoing, there appears to be no need to discuss the last two assignments
of errors.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby Reversed and
the decision of the trial court is Reinstated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33659 June 14, 1990
VICTORIA U. BALUYUT, MA. THERESA U. BALUYUT and MA.
FLORDELIZA U. BALUYUT, all minors, represented by their mother and
guardian ad litem, NORMA URBANO, petitioners,
vs.
FELICEDAD S. BALUYUT and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Note: The family name Baluyut appears as Baluyot is some pleadings.
Donald E. Asis for the Administratrix
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Victoria and Ma. Flordeliza, all surnamed
Baluyot, then minors, represented by their mother and guardian ad litem, Norma
Urbana which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 38069-R entitled "Felicidad S. Baluyut, Administratrix-Appellant v.
Victoria U. Baluyut, et al., Intervenors-Appellees." The decision brought to this
court for review reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
(now Regional Trial Court) and dismissed the petition for intervention filed by
petitioners in the trial court.
In Special Proceedings No. 1835, entitled "Intestate Estate of Deceased Enrique
Baluyut,' filed before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, herein petitioners
filed on April 29, 1965 a petition for intervention. The petition alleged that
petitioners have a legal interest in the estate of the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut;
that petitioners-minors are the illegitimate children of the deceased, begotten out
of wedlock by said deceased and petitioners' mother and guardian ad litem Norma
Urbano; that petitioners were conceived and born at the time when Norma
Urbano cohabited with the deceased while the latter was already married to
Felicidad S. Baluyut; that they were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status of children of the deceased during his lifetime by direct overt acts of said
deceased having supported and maintained them. The petitioners also alleged that
they were deliberately excluded from the estate of Enrique M. Baluyut (pp. 10-18,
Record on Appeal).
Felicidad S. Baluyut, widow of Enrique and appointed administratrix of his estate,
opposed the petition for intervention (p. 20, Record on Appeal). On May 8, 1965
(pp. 18-19, Record on Appeal), the trial court issued an order allowing the
petitioners to intervene.
After trial, a decision (pp. 24-31, Record on Appeal) was rendered declaring the
intervenors Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza the forced heirs of deceased
Enrique Baluyut and ordering administratrix Felicidad Vda. de Baluyut to pay
P150.00 monthly support to Norma Urbano, guardian ad litem for the three minor
children. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders:
1) FELICIDAD VDA. DE BALUYUT, the administratrix to pay
P150.00 as monthly support out of the Estate of Enrique Baluyut
to Norma Urbano guardian ad litem for the three minor children,
Victoria, Theresa and Flordeliza Baluyut.
2) That under Art. 887, (5) New Civil Code said children are
forced heirs of the late Enrique Baluyut.
3) That they are entitled to their hereditary rights in said Estate
of Enrique Baluyut under the provisions of the New Civil Code
(pp. 29-30, Record on Appeal).
On February 15, 1966, the administratrix filed a Notice of Appeal from the trial
court's decision. On February 22, 1966, the intervenors filed their Objection to
Appeal and Motion for Execution. The latter motion was based on the
pronouncement in Salazar v. Salazar, L-5823, April 29, 1953, that an order
granting support pendente lite is final and executory.
On May 4,1986, the trial court issued an order (p. 37, Record on Appeal) declaring
that it considers intervenors' motion for execution as a motion for reconsideration
and amended the decision to the effect that it granted the minors Victoria, Theresa
and Flordeliza monthly support pendente lite in the amount of P150.00 payable
every first day of the month to their guardian ad litem Norma Urbano.
On April 22, 1971, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment (pp. 19-41, Rollo)
reversing the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby reversed and
the intervenors' petition in intervention is hereby declared
dismissed, without costs. The order granting alimony pendente
lite to the intervenors is hereby set aside. (p. 41, Rollo)
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of respondent Court of Appeals' decision
was denied on May 24, 1971 (p. 53, Rollo). Hence, the instant petition for review
on certiorari filed on June 19, 1971.
On June 23, 1971, We gave due course to the petition (p. 57, Rollo). On July 1,
1971, We required the petitioners to file their brief (p. 58, Rollo). Respondents, on
the other hand, filed their brief on October 28, 1971 (p. 85, Rollo). On December
17, 1971, the petition was considered submitted for decision (p. 87, Rollo).
On June 3, 1975, petitioners filed a "Motion and Manifestation" praying for the
reinstatement of the order of the trial court to grant the petitioners monthly
support during the pendency of the case. The said order for monthly support
granted by the trial court in its decision of May 4, 1966 was terminated in the early
part of 1971 (p. 90, Rollo). When asked to comment on the manifestation and
motion of petitioners, respondents opposed said motion in view of respondent
Court of appeals' finding that petitioners were not the recognized spurious
children of deceased Baluyut (p. 113, Rollo).
On November 25, 1976, We granted petitioner's motion for continuation of their
monthly support pendente lite effective June 1975 until further orders (p.
141, Rollo). After an exchange of pleadings by the parties regarding the order of
this court on the matter of the continuation of petitioners' support pendente lite,
and after a motion filed by petitioners to cite administratrix for contempt, private
respondents filed a manifestation on January 6,1978, informing this Court that: 1)
the former administratrix Felicidad S. Baluyut was substituted by one of her
daughters, Milagros B. Villar, as Special Administratrix; and that 2) they have
complied with the September 13, 1977 resolution of the court requiring them to
show cause why they should not be dealt with as in contempt for failing to obey the
order to pay petitioners a monthly support pendente lite. Private respondents also
manifested their compliance by depositing with the then Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch 1, a Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank check in the
amount of P4,350.00 representing the required support until October, 1977.
Another PCIB check in the amount of P300.00 representing support pendente
lite for November and December, 1977 was also deposited with the trial court (p.
335, Rollo).
On February 19, 1980, petitioners, assisted by their guardian ad litem and private
respondent Administratrix Milagros B. Villar, both parties assisted by their
respective counsel, filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss the petition in view of
petitioners 'filing of a "Petition for Withdrawal of Intervention" with the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga taking cognizance of the Intestate Estate of Enrique
Baluyut. The petition for withdrawal was based on a waiver by petitioners of any
right or interest they may have on the estate of the deceased in consideration of the
financial assistance granted them by the administratrix of the estate (p. 371, Rollo).
The petition for withdrawal of intervention was approved by the intestate court on
February 14, 1980 (p. 369, Rollo), while the Joint Motion to Dismiss the instant
petition was noted by this court on April 3, 1981 (p. 372, Rollo).
The withdrawal of intervention in consideration of the financial assistance
extended to petitioners by the administratrix of the estate of the deceased Enrique
M. Baluyut (p. 37, Rollo) is in the nature of a compromise settlement of the instant
petition (p. 371, Rollo). Considering, however, that the issue involved in this case is
whether or not petitioners, Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza, all
surnamed Baluyut are the acknowledged, spurious children of the deceased,
Enrique M. Baluyut, the Joint Motion to Dismiss the instant petition cannot be
granted, acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of persons and of
future support cannot be the subject of a compromise (pars. 1 and 4, Article 2035
of the Civil Code). (See Advincula v. Advincula, L-19065, January 31, 1964).
The trial court found that petitioners are the illegitimate children of the deceased
Enrique M. Baluyut. This finding was shared by respondent Court of Appeals:
... the testimony of Norma Urbana supported by that of Liberata
Vasquez on the one hand as against that of the administratrix
who declared that she and her late husband were always together
and that of Cecilia Waters who testified that Norma had a suitor
named Lieut. Alex on the other, leads us to give credence to the
proof of the intervenors specifically the testimony of Norma that
the intervenors are in fact her illegitimate children with the late
Enrique M. Baluyut (p. 35, Rollo).
However, proof of filiation of the petitioners to the late Enrique M. Baluyut is not
sufficient to confer upon them any hereditary right in the estate of the deceased.
What is necessary to be established by an illegitimate not natural child in order
that he may be entitled to successional rights under Article 887 of the New Civil
Code, is not the fact of his bare filiation but a filiation acknowledged by the
putative parent. This has been the consistent pronouncement of this Court since
the reversal of the pronouncement in Reyes, et al. v. Zuzuarregui, et al., 102 Phil.
346 by the pronouncement in the case of Paulino v. Paulino, 113 Phil. 697, 700, 701,
702. In the Paulino case, it was held:
An illegitimate (spurious) child to be entitled to support and
successional rights from his putative or presumed parents must
prove his filiation to them. Filiation may be established by the
voluntary or compulsory recognition of the illegitimate (spurious)
child. Recognition is voluntary when "made in the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing." It is compulsory when by court action the
child brings about his recognition. ...
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that by their motion to dismiss the appellees are deemed
to have admitted that the appellant is the illegitimate spurious,
not natural child of the deceased Marcos Paulino. Such an
 admission, however, does not entitle her to inherit from her
alleged putative father. It is necessary to allege that her putative
father had acknowledged and recognized her as such. Such
acknowledgment is essential and is the basis other right to
inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment the
action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be
brought after the death of the putative father.
This was reiterated in the case of Republic v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, 121 Phil. 261, where this Court held that:
... the illegitimate (spurious) child, to be entitled to support and
successional rights from his parents, must prove his filiation and
this may be done by means of voluntary or compulsory
recognition of the relationship. For this purpose, the provisions
concerning natural children are held applicable. ...
There are two modes of acknowledgment provided in the New Civil Code; one, by
the voluntary recognition by the putative parent made in the record of birth, a
statement before the court of record, or in any authentic writing (Art. 278, New
Civil Code) and two, by compulsory recognition under Article 283 of the same law.
Were the petitioners voluntarily recognized by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as his
illegitimate spurious children?
There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that the petitioners
were recognized by the deceased during his lifetime as his spurious children. The
petitioners' records of birth, although in the name of Enrique Baluyut, were not
signed by the latter. There was no authentic writing presented nor any statement
in a court of record which would prove that the petitioners were recognized by the
deceased.
With regard to compulsory recognition, Article 283 enumerates the cases where
the father is obliged to recognize the child as his, namely: a) in cases of rape,
abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with
that of the conception; b) when the child is in continuous possession of the status of
a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family; c) when
the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father; d) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father.
The grounds relied upon by petitioners for compelling the heirs of Baluyut to
recognize them as the heirs of the deceased were the alleged possession by the
petitioners of the status of recognized illegitimate spurious children and that they
were conceived at the time when their mother cohabited with the deceased. Since
the petitioners were still minors at the time of the death of Enrique M. Baluyut, the
action for compulsory recognition was correctly filed by petitioners' guardian ad
litem and mother, Norma Urbano. However, as correctly pointed out by
respondent appellate court, since the recognition sought in the case is compulsory,
strictness in the application of the rules applies. We agree with respondent
appellate court that the evidence presented by petitioners failed to satisfy the high
standard of proof required for the success of their action for compulsory
recognition. Respondent court held:
The combined testimony of Norma Urbano and her witness
Liberata Vasquez insofar as the issue of recognition is concerned
tends to show that Norma was kept by the late Enrique M.
Baluyut as his mistress first in the house of Liberata and then in a
house supposedly rented from one Lacuna. But this Lacuna was
not even presented to testify in support of the claim of Norma and
Liberate that Baluyut rented his house for Norma. And,
according to Norma and Liberata, Baluyut visited Norma some
twice a week in the house where she kept her as his mistress; that
Baluyut paid the hospital bills for the delivery of the two younger
children of Norma. But, according to Liberata herself, it was not
Baluyut who personally paid the hospital bills but he gave the
money for the payment of the hospital bills to Liberato and he
requested her to pay the money to the hospital. This only shows
that Baluyut was hiding his Identity as the father of the children
of Norma, an act which is inconsistent with recognizing such
children as his own.
If Enrique did not want to hide being the father of the intervenors
who were born at the Ortanez hospital, there was no need for him
to ask Liberata to pay the hospital bill of Norma for the delivery
of her youngest child as Baluyut could have easily done this
himself. There is not even evidence showing that he visited Norma
at the hospital when she delivered there. Coupled with the
circumstance that Enrique tried to hide his being the father of the
intervenors, there is absence of positive and convincing proof that
Enrique treated the intervenors as his children in all relations in
society and in life. Far from treating them in society as his
children, he was hiding Norma and the intervenors from society
and visited them only once in a while evidently only to satisfy his
sexual urge with Norma but with no genuine desire to have and
treat the intervenors so as to confer on them the continuous
possession of the status of recognized illegitimate (not natural)
children. There is not even any proof that he had brought out
these intervenors to show them publicly as his children. With the
single exception of Liberata Vasquez, not a single neighbor of
Norma in the rather populous area of Project 4, Quezon City, was
produced to testify on any act of Enrique to show his genuine
desire to treat the intervenors as his very own in his actual
relations. The foregoing deficiencies in the intervenors' proof is
fatal to their case.
In order to prove the continuous possession of
the status of a natural child, the acts must be of
such a nature that they reveal, not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent
desire to have and treat the child as such in all
relations in society and in life, not accidentally,
but continuously' (Igar, et al. vs. Vda. de
Balingkit, CA, 60 O.G. 7792; Onos, et al. vs. Vda.
de Onos, CA-G.R. No. 24646-R, July 22, 1964).
The birth certificates Exhibits 'A,' 'B' and 'C' of the intervenors
do not help their case for these are not evidence of recognized
filiation by the deceased Enrique Baluyut because, firstly, they
were admitted in evidence by the lower court merely as part of
the of the witnesses who referred to them in the course of said
witnesses' testimony and hence, they are not evidence of the facts
stated in them. Secondly, they are merely evidence of the fact that
gave rise to their execution, that is, the fact of birth and nothing
else, much leas of recognition as they are not signed by Enrique
Baluyut.
In an action for compulsory acknowledgment
under paragraph 4, Article 283 of the Civil
Code, a birth certificate which, on its face, was
not signed by the supposed natural father is
incompetent evidence on paternity, being in
violation of oration 5 of Act 3753 and Article 280
of the Civil Code' (Roces vs. Local Civil
Registrar, 54 O.G. 4950; Crisolo va. Macadaong,
No. L-7017, April 19, 1964; Bernabe, etc. vs.
Lacodin, CA, 59 O.G. 3178).
If birth certificates, which are unsigned by the
presumed father as required by section 5 of Act
No. 3752 and Article 280 of the Civil Code, are
incompetent evidence even to prove paternity
alone, with more reason are birth certificates
incompetent evidence to prove recognized
filiation. (pp. 36-39, Rollo)
Petitioners would have Us relax Our rule on strictness of the application of law
regarding compulsory recognition as first laid down in the Javellana v. Monteclaro,
74 Phil. 393. They opined that the said case was in fact the forerunner of the
liberal view that has found its way into the present provisions of the New Civil
Code governing paternity and recognition.
Petitioners failed to grasp the import of this Court's ruling in the Javellana case.
That the case was the forerunner of the liberal view that has found its way into our
statute books, is true. But, the rule of liberality enunciated therein applied only to
case involving voluntary recognition specifically in a public document and not to
cases of compulsory recognition. Thus,
Upon the second point, whether a voluntary acknowledgment
may be done incidentally in a public document, a distinction must
be made between the two kinds of acknowledgment: (1)
voluntary, and (2) compulsory. In the former, recognition may be
incidental, but in the latter, it must be direct and express.
In actions to compel the alleged father to acknowledge his natural
child, based upon recognition in an indubitable writing, article
135, par. 1, of the Civil Code, requires that the father must
expressly recognize his paternity. This provision has been strictly
construed by Spanish and Philippine jurisprudence against the
alleged natural child. Thus, in the Sentence of July 5,1906, the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain held in an action to compel
acknowledgment under article 135, that a mere allusion, more or
leas clear, by the alleged father to his supposed child, if there is no
express recognition of his paternity, is not sufficient. In the
Sentence of April 8,1915, that same Tribunal declared that there
should be an indubitable documentary proof or uninterrupted on
of the status of a natural child, excluding deductions and
conjectures. As to Philippine cases, the same rule has been
adhered to in several decisions by this court. Thus, in Benedicto
vs. De la Rama, 4 Phil., 746, an action was filed to compel
recognition of a natural child, based in part on a letter of
defendant telling the mother of his affection toward her and
asking her to take care of the child. This court held that the letter
did not expressly recognize the child, under article 135. In
Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1, the alleged father wrote the
child a letter advising him how to conduct himself. This court
held that the letter did not contain an-express recognition under
article 135.
But while in actions to compel recognition the foregoing principle
is true with respect to indubitable writings according to article
135, par. 1 of the Civil Code, however, in cases of voluntary
 acknowledgment in a public document under article 131, the law
is more liberal and permits an incidental recognition. ...
(Javellana, et al. v. Monteclaro, et al., 74 Phils. 393)

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 63680 March 23, 1990
JACOBA T. PATERNO, TOMAS T. PATERNO, and MARIA LUCIA
PATERNO, petitioners,
vs.
BEATRIZ PATERNO, BERNARDO PATERNO and the INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
Cruz, Cases, Cabaltera & Associates for petitioners. Bausa, Ampil, Suarez, Paredes &
Bausa for respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
In the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, now defunct, there was filed
by Feliza Orihuela, as guardian ad litem of her children, Beatriz Paterno and Bernardo
Paterno, a complaint 1 praying that the latter be declared illegitimate (adulterous)
children of, and consequently entitled to inherit from, the deceased Jose P. Paterno.
According to Feliza, Beatriz and Bernardo had been begotten of her illicit liaison with
Jose P. Paterno, a married man, and should thus be counted among the latter's
compulsory heirs in accordance with Article 887 2 of the Civil Code. Feliza prayed in
her complaint for: (1) the invalidation of the extrajudicial partition of Jose Paterno's
estate executed by his Widow, Jacoba T. Paterno, and his legitimate children, Luis T.
Paterno, Vicente T. Paterno, Tomas T. Paterno, Susana T. Paterno and Maria Lucia T.
Paterno, said partition having deprived the minor plaintiffs of their legitimes; (2) the
extension to Beatriz and Bernardo of support; and (3) the payment to them of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. 3
The answer with counterclaim filed for the widow and her children aforenamed inter
alia asserted as affirmative defense that the "plaintiffs are guilty of laches as they
should have exercised their right of action, if any, against the deceased Dr. Jose P.
Paterno during his lifetime in order to give the latter an opportunity to admit or deny the
same, death having sealed his lips." 4
It appears that "upon defendants" filing their answer, the Honorable N. Almeda-Lopez
started reception of plaintiffs 'evidence. However, on January 11, 1964, prior to a
scheduled continuation of the hearing, the Honorable Judge C. Juliano Agrava who x x
(succeeded Judge Almeda-Lopez) required the parties to show cause why the case
should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On April 4, 1964, and after both parties
had submitted their respective memoranda, the court finally ordered the dismissal of the
case, for the reason that where an illegitimate child seeks to participate in the estate of
the deceased putative father, the action becomes essentially one for recovery of
plaintiffs' supposed share in the estate and the question of paternity becomes merely an
incident thereto. As the main issue falls within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts,
the incidental question of paternity should also be resolved therein, if the splitting of
causes of action is to be avoided. ...." 5
The plaintiffs perfected an appeal to this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-
23060. The appeal resulted in the reversal of the challenged order. In a decision
rendered on June 30, 1967, this Court set aside "the order of dismissal appealed from,
insofar as it affects the issue of paternity," and returned the case "to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court for determination of that particular issue." Said the Court: 6
... The issue to be determined ... is which of plaintiffs' claim (filiation
or participation [in the decedent's estate]) constitutes the main cause
and which is merely an incident thereto.
xx
... Clearly before the claim to participate in the estate may be
prosecuted, plaintiffs' right to succeed must first be established.
Differently stated, plaintiffs' main action is that for recognition of
their status as illegitimate children of the deceased, upon which the
right to share in the hereditary estate of the putative father would rest.
(This matter is without doubt within the jurisdiction of the JDRC.) ...
In granting to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court 'such
incidental powers generally possessed by the court of first instance,'
the law x x (however) could not have intended to confer on this
special tribunal jurisdiction over all subject matter cognizable by the
ordinary court of first instance. The term 'incidental powers' must
refer to the authority to issue such orders or writs and take such
measures as might be necessary to carry out the functions of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. (Hence, the matter of the
participation in the estate of the decedent is not within its
competence; it is within the jurisdiction of the court of first instance.)
The above conclusion will not constitute a violation of the rule against splitting of cause
of action. The prohibition provided in the Rules of Court is against the institution of
more than one suit for a single cause of action, (Sec. 3, Rule 2 ...). But, as alleged in the
complaint, the bases for plaintiffs' various claims would not be the same. By the
creation of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, with its exclusive jurisdiction
over cases involving paternity and acknowledgment, recognition of children and
recovery of hereditary shares can no longer be properly joined as cause of action, since
each lies within the jurisdiction of a different tribunal.
The case having been thereafter remanded to and tried by the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court (JDRC), that Court rendered judgment on April 14, 1970 dismissing the
complaint on the ground of prescription, its view being that the action for compulsory
recognition should have been commenced within the lifetime of the alleged father, and
on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to present "clear, strong and convincing"
evidence of their filiation. 7Dismissed as well was the defendants' counterclaim. The
plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, 8where basically, they imputed to
the JDRC two (2) errors, 9 to wit:
1) holding that they (plaintiffs) had lost whatever right of action they
might otherwise have had, when they failed to file the corresponding
action during the lifetime of their putative parent, Jose P. Paterno; and
2) ruling that plaintiffs' evidence was in part incompetent and in any
event did not constitute "clear, strong and convincing proof' of
plaintiffs' filiation.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the JDRC. In a decision promulgated on
August 16, 1982, 10 said Court, after an extensive review of the evidence adduced by the
parties before the JDRC — observing in this connection that as against the
plaintiffs'(illegitimate children's) "witnesses and documentary evidence, Mrs. Jacoba
Paterno, widow of the decedent, stood alone to deny the claim of the plaintiffs-
appellants" — reached the following conclusions:
It is true there appear to be certain inconsistencies in plaintiffs'
evidence as pointed out by the trial court, but in the final analysis,
these inconsistencies are only minor matters winch, to Our mind,
instead strengthened the entire plaintiffs' evidence. Had these
witnesses been very elaborate, thorough and precise, We would have
entertain(ed) some doubts. In fact, the evidence is so convincing,
clear, positive that We noted that, after trial and assessment of the
evidence, the trial court was constrained, perhaps, in consonance with
its conscience, to admit that 'in evaluating plaintiffs' evidence ... the
court cannot definitely state that their (plaintiffs') claim is false. 'The
trial court was convinced that plaintiffs-appellants Beatriz and
Bernardo and Virginia are the children of Dr. Jose P. Paterno, but
being of the opinion that spurious children's right of action to compel
recognition as such is lost forever upon the demise of the putative
father, found against the plaintiffs.
We hold, after going over the records, that there are sufficient
evidence, clear and convincing, establishing the filiation of plaintiffs
appellants Beatriz and Bernardo Paterno as spurious children of
Dr.Jose P. Paterno; that Jose P. Paterno died when they were still
minors and the present action for the establishment of their filiation to
Dr. Jose P. Paterno was filed before they reach(ed) the age of majority
and within the period of limitation, within which cases of this nature
should be instituted to establish paternity and filiation. 11
WHEREFORE, finding the Court a quo in error, the decision
appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another one entered,
declaring plaintiffs-appellants Beatriz and Bernardo Paterno
illegitimate(spurious) children of Dr. Jose P. Paterno, deceased,
begotten out of wedlock with Felisa Orihuela (who is herein
appointed guardian ad litem) conceived and born when the deceased
was cohabiting with the latter, (and) having enjoyed and continued
possessing the status as children of the deceased Dr. Jose P. Paterno.
We are not in a position to pass on, much less, grant the other prayers
of the appellants contained in their brief except as to costs, inasmuch
as the directive of Our Supreme Court in the case of Paterno,et al. vs.
Paterno, et al., L-32060, June 30, 1964, 20 SCRA 585, returning this
case to the court of origin, specifically states:
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from, insofar as it
affects the issue of paternity is hereby set aside, and the case returned
to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for determination of
that particular issue.
Mrs. Jacoba T. Paterno, the widow, and her legitimate children have appealed to this
Court on certiorari. In these proceedings, they claim that the Court of Appeals erred in
—
1) holding the evidence of the enjoyment by Beatriz and Bernardo
Paterno of the status of children of the deceased Jose Paterno, to be
strong, clear and convincing;
2) failing to take account of —
a) the suspicious nature of the alleged letter of the decedent to Feliza,
mother of Beatriz and Bernardo (Exh. G), it being in English although
Felisa was "not adequately conversant in English;"
b) the suspect character of Beatriz's alleged baptismal certificate in
that it "does not even state the given name" (Exh. B);
c) he lack of specific evidence of cohabitation between the decedent
and Feliza during the periods of conception of their alleged children;
d) the "contradictory and conflicting evidence on direct acts by
petitioner vis-a-vis the status of private respondents;"
 3) failing to apply the doctrine in Clemena v. Clemena, 24 SCRA
(1968), 720, to the effect that doubts in paternity suits are resolved
against the claimant.
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value
or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or
the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are
without doubt questions of fact. 12 Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a
party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse
party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents
presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as
to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body
of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight
— all these are issues of fact. Questions like these are not reviewable by this Court
which, as a rule, confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to
questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth. 13 But it is
questions of this type which the petitioners have precisely submitted for resolution to
this Court. Therefore, in accordance with established rule and practice, those issues will
not be considered by this Court, the resolutions thereon by the Court of Appeals being
final. 14
It may however be noted in passing that, as recapitulated in painstaking detail in the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, 15 the dovetailing and mutually corroborative
testimony of the private respondents, their mother Felisa Orihuela, and Teresa Miranda
and Anselmo Macapinlac, the late Dr. Jose P. Pateno's retainers to whose care and
company he entrusted his illegitimate family, does indeed compel acceptance of the fact
that from their birth until Dr. Pateno's death, said respondents were treated as, and
enjoyed the status of, his children by blood.
The gist of that testimony is to the effect that Dr. Paterno had borne the expenses of the
birth and baptism of said children, who were born in the same year (1938) within eleven
months of each other; that in that year, after the birth of the first child, Beatriz, mother
and daughter had moved from A. Luna in San Juan, Rizal, to Rubi Street in San Andres
Bukid, Manila, where the second child, Bernardo, and a third, Virginia, who died at
four, were born; that in 1940, the family moved to a house in A. Lake Street in San
Juan, Rizal purchased by Dr. Paterno; that in both places, they had lived with and been
maintained by Dr. Paterno in the company of the Miranda and Macapinlac families; that
shortly before the outbreak of the war in December 1941, Dr. Paterno left for Hongkong
where he stayed until war's end; that in his absence, mother and children received
monthly support from Don Vicente Madrigal at the instance of Dr. Paterno who was
Madrigal's brother-in-law; that for sometime after Liberation, they lived in the Madrigal
compound in Gen. Luna, Paco, Manila; that when Dr. Paterno thereafter returned to the
Philippines and until he again left for Hongkong, he lived with mother and children,
first in Antipolo, Rizal and later in Marilao, Bulacan; that when Felisa decided to get
married — this while Dr. Paterno was in Hongkong on his second sojourn there — she
sought and received the forgiveness of his wife, Dona Jacoba, who even consented to
act as sponsor at her wedding; that when Dr. Paterno returned once more from
Hongkong, to be assigned to the Madrigal cement plant in Binangonan, Rizal, he made
it a point to see that Beatriz and Bernardo went or were brought to visit him, especially
during weekends, and on these occasions, he and the children slept in his room in the
same bed, he would tell them to come or send word to him for anything they might
need, and would give them money when they left; that Beatriz, then about thirteen or
fourteen, was being sent to school in Sta. Isabel College by Dr. Paterno, who did the
same for Bernardo, who was enrolled at the University of Santo Tomas; that these
reunions continued until he fell ill and had to keep to his house in Mendoza St., Quiapo,
Manila, and Doña Jacoba forbade the children to see him on the excuse that he might
suffer a relapse; that on the some five occasions that they tried to see Dr. Paterno in his
residence while he lay sick, the children were given money by Doña Jacoba upon
leaving; and that after his death and burial, Doña Jacoba gave them money for their
tuition.
Hence, even if, against all applicable law and precedent, this Court were minded to
substitute its own assessment of such testimony, as supported by the documents also
presented by the private respondents, for that of the Court of Appeals, it would reach no
different conclusion. True, certain inconsistencies may be noted in the testimony given
by the witnesses for the private respondents, but it is on the whole unanimous and
consistent as to the really crucial fact that Dr. Paterno treated and acted towards said
respondents, from their birth onward, in a manner only a real father would and leaving
little doubt that he recognized and considered them as in truth his children. The simple
denials of the widow, petitioner Jacoba T. Paterno, do not suffice to refute such proof.
The action for recognition (or to establish filiation) having been timely filed-having
been instituted after the demise of the putative parent and before the attainment of the
age of majority of the children concerned-and the ground invoked therefor having been
satisfactorily proven, 16 the Court of Appeals committed no error in declaring and
confirming the status of the private respondents as illegitimate children of the late
Dr.Jose P. Paterno.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with
costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 187273, Feb 15, 2017 ]
ROMEO F. ARA v. DRA. FELY S. PIZARRO +
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
For a claim of filiation to succeed, it must be made within the period allowed, and
supported by the evidence required under the Family Code.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asking
that the Court of Appeals Decision[1] dated August 1, 2008 and Resolution[2] dated
March 16, 2009, in CA-G.R. CV No. 00729 entitled "Romeo F. Ara, Ramon A. Garcia,
William A. Garcia, and Henry A. Rossi v. Dra. Fely S. Pizarro,” which modified the
Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Action No. 337-03 entitled
"Romeo F. Ara, Ramon A. Garcia, William A. Garcia and Henry A. Rossi vs. Dra. Fely
S. Pizarro" for Judicial Partition, be set aside.
Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia (petitioners), and Dra. Fely S. Pizarro and Henry
A. Rossi (respondents) all claimed to be children of the late Josefa A. Ara (Josefa), who
died on November 18, 2002.[4]
Petitioners assert that Fely S. Pizarro (Pizarro) was born to Josefa and her then husband,
Vicente Salgado (Salgado), who died during World War II.[5] At some point toward the
end of the war, Josefa met and lived with an American soldier by the name of Darwin
Gray (Gray).[6] Romeo F. Ara (Ara) was born from this relationship. Josefa later met a
certain Alfredo Garcia (Alfredo), and, from this relationship, gave birth to sons Ramon
Garcia (Ramon) and William A. Garcia (Garcia).[7] Josefa and Alfredo married on
January 24, 1952.[8] After Alfredo passed away, Josefa met an Italian missionary named
Frank Rossi, who allegedly fathered Henry Rossi (Rossi).[9]
Respondent Pizarro claims that, to her knowledge, she is the only child of
Josefa.[10]Further, petitioner Garcia is recorded as a son of a certain Carmen Bucarin and
Pedro Garcia, as evidenced by a Certificate of Live Birth dated July 19, 1950;[11] and
petitioner Ara is recorded as a son of spouses Jose Ara and Maria Flores, evidenced by
his Certificate of Live Birth.[12]
Petitioners, together with Ramon and herein respondent Rossi (collectively, plaintiffs a
quo), verbally sought partition of the properties left by the deceased Josefa, which were
in the possession of respondent Pizarro.[13] The properties are enumerated as follows:
1. Lot and other improvements located at Poblacion, Valencia City, Bukidnon
with an area of One Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Eight (1,268) sq. m. in the
name of Josefa Salgado covered by Katibayan ng Original na Titulo No. T-
30333;
2. Tamaraw FX; and
3. RCBC Bank Passbook in the amount of One Hundred Eight Thousand Pesos
(Php 108,000.00) bank deposit.[14]
Respondent Pizarro refused to partition these properties. Thus, plaintiffs a quoreferred
the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation and amicable settlement.[15]
The parties were unable to reach an amicable settlement.[16] Thus, the Office of the
Barangay Captain issued a Certification to File Action dated April 3, 2003.[17]
Plaintiffs a quo filed a Complaint dated April 9, 2003[18] for judicial partition of
properties left by the deceased Josefa, before the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay
City, Branch 9 (Trial Court). In her Answer, respondent Pizarro averred that, to her
knowledge, she was the only legitimate and only child of Josefa.[19] She denied that any
of the plaintiffs a quo were her siblings, for lack of knowledge or information to form a
belief on that matter.[20] Further, the late Josefa left other properties mostly in the
possession of plaintiffs a quo, which were omitted in the properties to be partitioned by
the trial court in Special Civil Action No. 337-03, enumerated in her counterclaim
(Additional Properties).[21]
Respondent Pizarro filed her Pre-Trial Brief dated July 28, 2003, which contained a
proposed stipulation that the Additional Properties also form part of the estate of
Josefa.[22] Amenable to this proposal, plaintiffs a quo moved that the Additional
Properties be included in the partition, in a Motion to Include in the Partition the
Proposed Stipulation dated August 31, 2003.[23]
At the pre-trial, Ara, Garcia, and Ramon claimed a property of respondent Rossi as part
of the estate of Josefa. This property was not alleged nor claimed in the original
complaint. This compelled respondent Rossi to engage the services of separate counsel,
as the claim of his property constituted a conflict of interest among the plaintiffs a
quo.[24]
In a Pre-trial Order issued by the Trial Court on October 1, 2003, the following facts
were admitted:
4. All the above mentioned fathers of the children in this case, Mr. Vicente
Salgado, Mr. Darwin Grey [sic] and Henry Rosi (sic), are all deceased. Josefa
Ara Salgado is also deceased having died on November 18, 2002.
5. The properties mentioned in Paragraph 9 of the counter-claim mentioned in the
Answer filed by the defendant thru counsel are also admitted by both counsels
to be part of the properties subject of this partition case.
6. The Katibayan Ng Orihinal na Titulo attached thereto as ANNEXES "C"-"C-
1", are all admitted as the subject properties.
7. Some properties involved maybe covered by the land reform program of the
government and the parties have agreed that only the remainder thereof or the
 proceeds of compensation shall be partitioned among them. All these
properties shall be properly determined during the inventory to be finally
submitted to the Court for approval.
8. All the foregoing properties were acquired after the death of Vicente Salgado
and presumably all the exclusive properties of Josefa Ara Salgado.[25]
After trial, on February 20, 2006, the Trial Court, issued a Decision. The decretal
portion states:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders a DECISION as follows:
1. Awarding the Baguio property to Henry Rossi, to be deducted from his share;
2. Awarding the Valencia property covered by OCT No. T- 30333; Tamaraw FX and
the RCBC Bank Deposit Passbook to defendant Fely S. Pizarro, to be deducted from her
share; and
3. With respect to the other properties that may not be covered by the foregoing, the
same are declared under the co-ownership of all the plaintiffs and defendant and in
equal shares.
SO ORDERED.[26]
Respondent Pizarro appealed the Trial Court Decision, claiming it erred in finding
petitioners Ara and Garcia to be children of Josefa, and including them in the partition
of properties.[27]
Petitioners Ara and Garcia, as well as respondent Rossi, also filed their own respective
appeals to the Trial Court Decision. Respondent Rossi questioned the inclusion of his
property in the inventory of properties of the late Josefa.[28] Petitioners questioned the
awarding of particular properties to, and deductions from the respective shares of,
respondents Pizarro and Rossi.[29]
The Court of Appeals,[30] on August 1, 2008, promulgated its Decision[31] and held that
only respondents Pizarro and Rossi, as well as plaintiff a quo Ramon, were the children
of the late Josefa, entitled to shares in Josefa's estate:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeals are PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 20 February 2006, of the court a quo, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The legitimate children of Josefa Ara,
namely, Fely Pizarro and Ramon A. Garcia, are each entitled to one (1) share, while
Henry Rossi, the illegitimate child of Josefa Ara, is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the
share of a legitimate child, of the total properties of the late Josefa Ara sought to be
partitioned [.]
....
SO ORDERED.[32]
In omitting petitioners from the enumeration of Josefa's descendants, the Court of
Appeals reversed the finding of the Trial Court. The Court of Appeals found that the
Trial Court erred in allowing petitioners to prove their status as illegitimate sons of
Josefa after her death:
In holding that appellants William A. Garcia and Romeo F. Ara are the illegitimate sons
of Josefa Ara, the court a quo ratiocinated:
Without anymore discussing the validity of their respective birth and baptismal
certificates, there is sufficient evidence to hold that all the plaintiffs are indeed the
children of the said deceased Josefa Ara for having possessed and enjoyed the status of
recognized illegitimate children pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 175 of the
Family Code which provides:
"Illegitimate children may establish their filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children"
in relation to the second paragraph No. (1) of Article 172 of the same code (sic), which
provides:
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, legitimate filiation shall be proven by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child."
All the plaintiffs and defendant were taken care of and supported by their mother Josefa
Ara, including their education, since their respective birth and were all united and lived
as one family even up to the death and burial of their said mother, Josefa Ara. Their
mother had acknowledged all of them as her children throughout all her life directly,
continuously, spontaneously and without concealment.[33] (Emphasis omitted.)
Petitioners, together with Garcia, and respondent Rossi filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration, which were both denied by the Court of Appeals on March 16,
2009.[34]
Petitioners bring this Petition for Review on Certiorari.[35]
Respondents Pizarro and Rossi filed their respective Comments on the
Petition.[36]Petitioners filed a Reply to respondents' Comments, as well as a Motion to
Submit Parties to DNA Testing,[37] which this Court denied. Memoranda were
submitted by all the parties.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erroneously applied Article 285 of the Civil
Code, which requires that an action for the recognition of natural children be brought
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, subject to certain exceptions.[38] Petitioners
assert that during Josefa's lifetime, Josefa acknowledged all of them as her children
directly, continuously, spontaneously, and without concealment.[39]
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not apply the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Family Code, which states that filiation may be established even
without the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or an admission of filiation in
a public or handwritten document.[40]
Further, petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals erred in its asymmetric application of
the rule on establishing filiation. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
respondent Pizarro was a daughter of Josefa Ara and Vicente Salgado, asserting there
was no basis for the same. Petitioners claim that, in her Formal Offer of Exhibits dated
May 26, 2005, respondent Pizarro offered as evidence only a Certificate of Marriage of
Salgado and Josefa to support her filiation to Josefa.[41]
On respondent Rossi, petitioners claim that there is no direct evidence to prove his
filiation to Josefa, except for his Baptismal Certificate, which was testified to only by
respondent Rossi.[42]
The primordial issue for this Court to resolve is whether petitioners may prove their
filiation to Josefa through their open and continuous possession of the status of
illegitimate children, found in the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code.
This Petition is denied.
I
On establishing the filiation of illegitimate children, the Family Code provides:
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Articles 172 and 173 of the Family Code provide:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
(2)
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
Article 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or
her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or
in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within
which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of
either or both of the parties. (268a)
Thus, a person who seeks to establish illegitimate filiation after the death of a putative
parent must do so via a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment,
or an admission of legitimate filiation. In Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals:[43]
The following provision is therefore also available to the private respondent in proving
his illegitimate filiation:
Article. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
....
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents mentioned
in the first paragraph (which are practically the same documents mentioned in Article
278 of the Civil Code except for the "private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent himself), he insists that he has nevertheless been "in open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child," which is now also admissible as
evidence of filiation.
Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, receiving support
from him during that time; that he has been using the surname Uyguangco without
objection from his father and the petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a
special power of attorney executed in his favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one
by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he has shared in the profits of the copra business of the
Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business; that he was a director, together with
the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons Development Corporation, a family corporation;
and that in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the
petitioners he was given a share in his deceased father's estate.
It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," like his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to prove his
filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is
now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975. The second paragraph of this
Article 175 reads as follows:
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce
evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or
prove his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or
special laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can
no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation.[44]
Petitioners did not present evidence that would prove their illegitimate filiation to their
putative parent, Josefa, after her death as provided under Articles 172 and 175 of the
Family Code.
To recall, petitioners submitted the following to establish their filiation:
Garcia's Baptismal Certificate listing Josefa as his mother, showing that the baptism
(1)
was conducted on June 1, 1958, and that Garcia was born on June 23, 1951;[45]
(2) Garcia's Certificate of Marriage, listing Josefa as his mother;[46]
(3) A picture of Garcia's wedding, with Josefa and other relatives;[47]
Certificate of Marriage showing that Alfredo and Josefa were married on January
(4)
24, 1952;[48]
Garcia's Certificate of Live Birth from Paniqui, Tarlac, issued on October 23,
(5) 2003,[49] under Registry No. 2003-1447, which is a late registration of his birth,
showing he was born on June 23, 1951 to Alfredo and Josefa;[50]
(6) A group picture of all the parties in the instant case.[51]
(7) In the Comment of Rossi to the Formal Offer of Exhibits of Pizarro, Rossi stated:
1. That William Garcia and Romeo Flores Ara are half brothers of Dr. Henry Rossi
their mother being Josefa Ara, who did not register them as her children for fear of
losing her pension from the U.S. Veterans Office;[52]
Ara testified that he was a son of the late Josefa and Gray, and that his record of
(8)
birth was registered at camp Murphy, Quezon City;[53] and
Nelly Alipio, first degree cousin of Josefa, testified that Ara was a son of Josefa and
(9)
Gray.[54]
None of the foregoing constitutes evidence under the first paragraph of Article 172 of
the Family Code.
Although not raised by petitioners, it may be argued that petitioner Garcia's Certificate
of Live Birth obtained in 2003 through a late registration of his birth is a record of birth
appearing in the civil register under Article 172 of the Family Code.
True, birth certificates offer prima facie evidence of filiation. To overthrow the
presumption of truth contained in a birth certificate, a high degree of proof is
needed.[55] However, the circumstances surrounding the delayed registration prevent us
from according it the same weight as any other birth certificate.
There is a reason why birth certificates are accorded such high evidentiary value. Act
No. 3753, or An Act to Establish a Civil Register, provides:
Section 5. Registration and Certification of Births. — The declaration of the physician
or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either
parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax and shall be
sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician,
or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born child.
In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a)
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; (f) and such other data may be
required in the regulation to be issued.
In the case of an exposed child, the person who found the same shall report to the local
civil registrar the place, date and hour of finding and other attendant circumstances.
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly
by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it
shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who
refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such
father could be identified.
Any foetus having human features which dies after twenty four hours of existence
completely disengaged from the maternal womb shall be entered in the proper registers
as having been born and having died.
Further, Rule 21 of National Statistics Office Administrative Order No. 1-93, or the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Act No. 3753, provides that a person's birth be
registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar-General by one of the following
individuals:
Rule 21. Persons Responsible to Report the Event. — (1) When the birth occurred in a
hospital or clinic or in a similar institution, the administrator thereof shall be responsible
in causing the registration of such birth. However, it shall be the attendant at birth who
shall certify the facts of birth.
(2) When the birth did not occur in a hospital or clinic or in a similar institution, the
physician, nurse, midwife, "hilot", or anybody who attended to the delivery of the child
shall be responsible both in certifying the facts of birth and causing the registration of
such birth.
(3) In default of the hospital/clinic administrator or attendant at birth, either or both
parents of the child shall cause the registration of the birth.
(4) When the birth occurs aboard a vehicle, vessel or airplane while in transit,
registration of said birth shall be a joint responsibility of the driver, captain or pilot and
the parents, as the case may be.
Further, the birth must be registered within 30 days from the time of birth.[56] Thus,
generally, the rules require that facts of the report be certified by an attendant at birth,
within 30 days from birth. The attendant is not only an eyewitness to the event, but also
presumably would have no reason to lie on the matter. The immediacy of the reporting,
combined with the participation of disinterested attendants at birth, or of both parents,
tend to ensure that the report is a factual reporting of birth. In other words, the
circumstances in which registration is made obviate the possibility that registration is
caused by ulterior motives. The law provides in the case of illegitimate children that the
birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only
by the mother if the father refuses. This ensures that individuals are not falsely named
as parents.
National Statistics Office Administrative Order No. 1-93 also contemplates that reports
of birth may be made beyond the 30-day period:
Rule 25. Delayed Registration of Birth. — (1) The requirements are:
a) if the person is less than eighteen (18) years old, the following shall be required:
four (4) copies of the Certificate of Live Birth duly accomplished and signed by
i)
the proper parties;
accomplished Affidavit for Delayed Registration at the back of the Certificate of
ii) Live Birth by the father, mother or guardian, declaring therein, among other
things, the following:
> name of child;
> date and place of birth;
> name of the father if the child is illegitimate and has been acknowledged by
him;
> if legitimate, the date and place of marriage of parents; and
> reason for not registering the birth within thirty (30) days after the date of birth.
In case the party seeking late registration of the birth of an illegitimate child is not
the mother, the party shall, in addition to the foregoing facts, declare in a sworn
statement the present whereabouts of the mother.
any two of the following documentary evidences which may show the name of
iii)the child, date and place of birth, and name of mother (and name of father, if the
child has been acknowledged);
> baptismal certificate;
> school records (nursery, kindergarten, or preparatory);
> income tax return of parent/s;
> insurance policy;
> medical records; and
> others, such as barangay captain's certification.
affidavit of two disinterested persons who might have witnessed or known the
iv)
birth of the child. (46:1aa)
If the person is eighteen (18) years old or above, he shall apply for late registration
b)
of his birth and the requirements shall be:
i) all the requirements for a child who is less than eighteen (18) years old; and
ii) Certificate of Marriage, if married. (46:1ba)
Delayed registration of birth, like ordinary registration made at the time of birth,
(2) shall be filed at the Office of the Civil Registrar of the place where the birth
occurred. (46:3)
Upon receipt of the application for delayed registration of birth, the civil registrar
(3) shall examine the Certificate of Live Birth presented whether it has been completely
and correctly filled up and all requirements complied with. (47a)
In the delayed registration of the birth of an alien, travel documents showing the
(4) origin and nationality of the parents shall be presented in addition to the
requirements mentioned in Rule 25 (1). (49:2a)
Thus, petitioners submitted in evidence a delayed registration of birth of Garcia,
pursuant to this rule. Petitioners point out that a hearing on the delayed registration was
held at the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac. No one appeared
to oppose the delayed registration, despite a notice of hearing posted at the Office of the
Civil Registrar.[57]
It is analogous to cases where a putative father's name is written on a certificate of live
birth of an illegitimate child, without any showing that the putative father participated in
preparing the certificate. In Fernandez v. Court of Appeals:[58]
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the petitioners identifying
private respondent as their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of their
paternity. Again, the records do not show that private respondent had a hand in the
preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of the
respondent court is in accord with our pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil
Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958),viz:
". . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
explicitly prohibited, not only the naming of the father or the child born outside
wedlock, when the birth certificates, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him,
but, also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he could be
identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record
the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the
certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter,
is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child.
We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a birth certificate not
signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of
paternity."[59] (Emphasis in the original).
In Berciles v. Government Service Insurance System:[60]
The evidence considered by the Committee on Claims Settlement as basis of its finding
that Pascual Voltaire Berciles is an acknowledged natural child of the late Judge
Pascual Berciles is the birth certificate of said Pascual Voltaire Berciles marked Exh.
"6". We have examined carefully this birth certificate and We find that the same is not
signed by either the father or the mother; We find no participation or intervention
whatsoever therein by the alleged father, Judge Pascual Berciles. Under our
jurisprudence, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, the putting
of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void. Such registration
would not be evidence of paternity. (Joaquin P. Roces et al. vs. Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, 102 Phil. 1050). The mere certificate by the registrar without the signature of
the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on his part (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92
Phil. 729). A birth certificate does not constitute recognition in a public instrument.
(Pareja vs. Pareja, et al., 95 Phil. 167). A birth certificate, to evidence acknowledgment,
must, under Section 5 of Act 3753, bear the signature under oath of the acknowledging
parent or parents. (Vidaurrazaga vs. Court of Appeals and Francisco Ruiz, 91 Phil. 492).
....
In the case of Mendoza, et al. vs. Mella, 17 SCRA 788, the Supreme Court speaking
through Justice Makalintal who later became chief Justice, said:
It should be noted, however, that a Civil Registry Law was passed in 1930 (Act No.
3753) containing provisions for the registration of births, including those of illegitimate
parentage; and the record of birth under such law, if sufficient in contents for the
purpose, would meet the requisites for voluntary recognition even under Article 131.
Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here
really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy
of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been
voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it.
While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the
original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753
(Vidaurrazaga vs. Court of Appeals, 91 Phil. 493; In re Adoption of Lydia Duran, 92
Phil. 729). For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who
furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the
birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a
natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in
such a case there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes
the child as his or her own (Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1); and in Exhibit 1 no such
statement appears. The claim of voluntary recognition is without basis."[61]
Further, in People v. Villar,[62] this Court sustained the Trial Court's rejection of a
delayed registration of birth as conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein:
In the resolution of the sole assignment of error we find as well-taken and accordingly
adopt as our own the lower court's ratiocination, thus:
After going over the evidence in support of the alleged minority of the accused
Francisco Villar when he committed the crime on or about August 24, 1977, the Court
finds that Exhibit 1 and the testimonies of the defense witnesses can not have more
probative value than the written statement of Francisco Villar, Exhibit E. It is to be
noted that Exhibit 1 is a delayed registration of a supposed birth accomplished and
submitted only on January 12, 1979 to the Local Civil Registrar of Caloocan City by the
witness Leonor Villar, long after the offense was committed and after the prosecution
finally rested its case on November 21, 1978, thus exposing the basis of Exhibit 1 to be
resting on a slender and shaky foundation, and more so, in the absence of explanation
from the defense of the reason for said late registration. Hence, the Court rejects Exhibit
1....
The appellant invokes Art. 410 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall
be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts herein
contained.
Suffice it to say that the above-quoted provision makes the information given in Exhibit
1 only prima facie but not conclusive evidence. This must be so because the Local Civil
Registrar merely receives the information submitted to him; he does not inquire into its
veracity. Moreover, to regard as conclusive the content of a certificate of live birth can
lead to absurd results. Supposing that Leonor had given John F. Kennedy as the father
of Francisco, are we to accept that as an incontestable fact? In the light of the
circumstances already narrated concerning the preparation and submission of Exhibit 1,
the lower court committed no error in disregarding it.[63]
A delayed registration of birth, made after the death of the putative parent, is tenuous
proof of filiation.
Thus, we are unable to accord petitioner Garcia's delayed registration of birth the same
evidentiary weight as regular birth certificates.
Even without a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment,
filiation may still be established after the death of a putative parent through an
admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, signed
by the parent concerned.[64] However, petitioners did not present in evidence any
admissions of filiation.
An admission is an act, declaration, or omission of a party on a relevant fact, which may
be used in evidence against him.[65]
The evidence presented by petitioners such as group pictures with Josefa and
petitioners' relatives, and testimonies do not show that Josefa is their mother. They do
not contain any acts, declarations, or omissions attributable directly to Josefa, much less
ones pertaining to her filiation with petitioners. Although petitioner Garcia's Baptismal
Certificate, Certificate of Marriage, and Certificate of Live Birth obtained via late
registration all state that Josefa is his mother, they do not show any act, declaration, or
omission on the part of Josefa. Josefa did not participate in making any of them. The
same may be said of the testimonies presented. Although Josefa may have been in the
photographs, the photographs do not show any filiation. By definition, none of the
evidence presented constitutes an admission of filiation under Article 172 of the Family
Code.
II
The Trial Court bypassed the issue of the birth certificates and did not consider the first
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code. Instead, it ruled only on the open and
continuous possession of status of filiation:
Without anymore discussing the validity of their respective birth and baptismal
certificates, there is sufficient evidence to hold that all the plaintiffs are indeed the
children of the said deceased Josefa Ara for having possessed and enjoyed the status of
recognized illegitimate children pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 175 of the
Family Code[.]
....
All the plaintiffs and defendant were taken care of and supported by their mother Josefa
Ara, including their education, since their respective birth and were all united and lived
as one family even up to the death and burial of their said mother, Josefa Ara. Their
mother had acknowledged all of them as her children throughout all her life directly,
continuously, spontaneously and without concealment.[66]
Thus, the Court of Appeals found that the Trial Court had erred in allowing petitioners
to prove their illegitimate filiation through the open and continuous possession of the
status of illegitimate children after the death of the putative parent:
However, the trial court's finding cannot be sustained. Even granting for the sake of
argument that appellants Romeo F. Ara and William Garcia did enjoy open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, still, they should have
proven this during the lifetime of the putative parent. Article 285 of the Civil
Code provides the period for filing and (sic) action for recognition as follows:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter
(1) may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his
majority;
If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which
(2)
nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the
document.
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted
by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which We quote:
… Pizarro:
The law is very clear. If filiation is sought to be proved under the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Family Code, the action must be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent. It is evident that appellants Romeo F. Ara and William Garcia can no
longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of their open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove their alleged filiation through
any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple reason is
that Josefa Ara is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of her alleged
sons' illegitimate filiation.[67]
The Court of Appeals did not adopt the Trial Court's appreciation of evidence. It ruled
that, because petitioners' putative parent Josefa had already passed away, petitioners
were proscribed from proving their filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172
of the Family Code.
The Court of Appeals properly did not give credence to the evidence submitted by
petitioners regarding their status.
Josefa passed away in 2002.[68] After her death, petitioners could no longer be allowed
to introduce evidence of open and continuous illegitimate filiation to Josefa. The only
evidence allowed under the law would be a record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private signed, handwritten instruction by Josefa.
An alleged parent is the best person to affirm or deny a putative descendant's filiation.
Absent a record of birth appearing in a civil register or a final judgment, an express
admission of filiation in a public document, or a handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned, a deceased person will have no opportunity to contest a claim of
filiation.
In truth, it is the mother and in some cases, the father, who witnesses the actual birth of
their children. Descendants normally only come to know of their parents through
nurture and family lore. When they are born, they do not have the consciousness
required to be able to claim personal knowledge of their parents. It thus makes sense for
the parents to be present when evidence under the second paragraph of Article 172 is
presented.
The limitation that an action to prove filiation as an illegitimate child be brought within
the lifetime of an alleged parent acknowledges that there may be other persons whose
rights should be protected from spurious claims. This includes other children, legitimate
and illegitimate, whose statuses are supported by strong evidence of a categorical
nature.
Respondent Pizarro has submitted petitioners' certificates of live birth to further
disprove petitioners' filiation with Josefa. A Certificate of Live Birth issued in Paniqui,
Tarlac on July 19, 1950 shows that Garcia's parents are Pedro Garcia and Carmen
Bugarin[69] while another Certificate of Live Birth issued in petitioner Ara's birthplace,
Bauang, La Union, shows that he is the son of spouses Jose Ara and Maria Flores.[70]
The Court of Appeals gave credence to these birth certificates submitted by respondent
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein
could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement
made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and
disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes
more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.
Therefore, this Court upholds the birth certificates of William Garcia and Romeo F.
Ara, as issued by the Civil Registry, in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, where the
High Court ruled that the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in
the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.
Consequently, appellants Romeo F. Ara and William Garcia are deemed not to be the
illegitimate sons of the late Josefa Ara.[71]
Thus, the Court of Appeals made a determination on the evidence and found that the
birth certificates submitted by respondent Pizarro belong to petitioners Garcia and Ara.
These birth certificates name Carmen Bugarin[72] and Maria Flores,[73] as the respective
mothers of petitioners Garcia and Ara. Considering that these birth certificates do not
name Josefa as a parent of either petitioner, petitioners are properly determined not to
be Josefa's children.
Petitioners point out that the Certificate of Birth does not contain petitioner Garcia's
correct birth date. They claim that the birth date of petitioner Garcia as recorded in his
baptismal certificate is June 23, 1951. This birth date is also reflected on his Certificate
of Live Birth issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as in
the Notice of Hearing of the delayed registration of birth certificate of petitioner Garcia.
Thus, petitioners speculate that the birth certificate submitted by respondent Pizarro is
of a different "William Garcia":
Perhaps, defendant-appellant Fely Pizarro obtained a Certificate of Live Birth and
Cedula de Baotismo of a wrong person bearing the same name William Garcia which
always happened (sic) in our country considering that the family name Garcia is very
much common because in the said documents the birthdate of a certain William Garcia
was June 23, 1950 not June 23, 1951, the actual birth of William Garcia.[74]
On this point, respondent Pizarro argues:
It may be noted that William Garcia obtained said Certificate more than six (6) months
after he, with his co-plaintiffs, had filed the case of judicial partition on 9 April 2003.
Obviously, he found the need to apply for the late registration of his birth when he
learned from respondent's Answer that from her knowledge she is the only child of
Josefa Ara. Very likely, William Garcia already knew that he already has a record of
birth in the municipality of Paniqui, Tarlac, showing that her mother was not Josefa
Ara.[75]
These are matters of appreciation of evidence, however, which cannot be subject of
inquiry in a petition for review under Rule 45. Nonetheless, considering that there were
two reports of birth for William Garcia, and considering further that one of the reports
was made only after initiating a case which would directly use said report, we cannot
find error in the Court of Appeals' decision to disregard the delayed registration.
Finally, petitioners' claim that there was no basis for the Court of Appeals to find that
respondents are the children of Josefa is untenable. Respondents' filiation with Josefa
was not put in question before the Trial Court. Even petitioners admitted in their
Complaint that respondents were Josefa's children.[76] Further, on appeal, no party
questioned the Trial Court's determination that respondents Pizarro and Rossi were the
children of Josefa. Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining these
findings without requiring further proof.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The August 1, 2008
Decision and the March 16, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 00729 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46746 March 15, 1990
LIGAYA GAPUSAN-CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PROSPERO PARCON, respondents.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for petitioner.
Gil B. Parreno for respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate and without legitimate issue on April 6, 1966 in
Bacolod City. Neither her surviving spouse, Prospero Parcon, nor her other known
relatives — three (3) sisters and a nephew — made any move to settle her estate
judicially.
It was Ligaya Gapusan-Chua, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of
Felisa Gapusan Parcon, who instituted judicial proceedings for the settlement of the
latter's estate. About a year and eight months after Felisa's demise, or on January 15,
1968, Ligaya filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for
the settlement of the estate and for issuance of letters of administration in her
favor. 1 She also sought her designation as Special Administratrix pending her
appointment as regular administratrix. 2
By Order dated January 16, 1968, the Court appointed Ligaya Special Administratrix of
Felisa Parcon's estate.
On April 22, 1968, Prospero Parcon, Felisa Parcon's surviving husband, filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Order of January 16, 1968. 3 He denied that Ligaya was an
acknowledged natural child of his deceased wife, and applied for his own appointment
as administrator of his wife's estate. 4
Hearings were had on the issue of Ligaya claimed affiliation. Ligaya presented, among
other proofs, 5 the following documents:
a) Felisa Parcon's sworn statement of assets and liabilities wherein
Ligaya is named and described as the daughter of Felisa (Exh. 4);
b) Felisa Parcon's application for GSIS life insurance in which Ligaya
is set out as her (Felisa's) daughter (Exh. 3);
c) Check No. 44046 of the Government Service Insurance System in
the sum of P505.50 paid to her (Ligaya) as her share in the death
benefits due the heirs of Felisa Parcon (Exh. 2); and
d) a family photograph, showing Ligaya beside the deceased (Exh. 1).
Prospero Parcon, on the other hand, sought to demonstrate that Ligaya's exhibits did not
constitute conclusive proof of her claimed status of acknowledged natural child, for the
reason that:
a) another document, Felisa's application for membership in Negros
Occidental Teachers' Federation (NOTF), merely named Ligaya as
her "adopted daughter;"
b) in the distribution of death benefits pursuant to the decedent's GSIS
insurance policy, supra, Ligaya was allocated only P500.00 whereas
Prospero received P1,000.00; and
c) Mrs. Leticia Papasin (Felisa's sister) and Vice-Mayor Solomon
Mendoza travelled from afar to affirm before the Probate Court on the
witness stand that Ligaya was not the daughter of Felisa, 6 Mrs.
Papasin's testimony being that in 1942 an unknown "drifter" had sold
Ligaya, then an infant, to Felisa.
The Probate Court found for Ligaya. Its Order dated April 16, 1969 disposed as
follows: 7
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that petitioner is the
acknowledged natural child of the late Felisa Gapusan, and for being
the next of kin of the deceased (Rule 78, Rules of Court), she is
hereby appointed regular administratrix of the properties of the
above-mentioned deceased with the same bond given by her as
special administratrix, with costs against the oppositors.
On appeal seasonably perfected, the Court of Appeals (Fourth Division), in a Decision
dated April 13, 1977, (1) set aside the Probate Court's Order of January 16, 1968
(appointing Ligaya Special Administratrix) and of April 16, 1969 (declaring her the
decedent's acknowledged natural child and appointing her regular administratrix), and
(2) appointed Prospero Parcon regular administrator of his wife's estate. In that Court's
view, the evidence at best showed merely that Ligaya had been treated as a daughter by
Felisa, but that this did "not constitute acknowledgment" but "only a ground to compel
recognition;" and that Ligaya had failed to establish that she had been acknowledged by
Felisa in accordance with Article 278 of the Civil Code (Article 131 of the Civil Code
of 1889). Appeal has in turn been taken from this judgment to this Court by Ligaya
Gapusan-Chua.
Here, Ligaya insists that the evidence submitted by her does indeed sufficiently
establish her status as the acknowledged natural child of Felisa Parcon, and that her
appointment as regular administratrix is justified by law and jurisprudence.
More particularly, she contends that the sworn statement of assets and liabilities, a
public document submitted by the decedent pursuant to a legal requirement therefor,
and the latter's application for life insurance were in law indubitable recognition by her
mother of her status as an acknowledged natural child, voluntarily made, and were
adequate foundation for a judicial declaration of her status as heir. These statements,
she alleges, were "authentic writings" in contemplation of Article 278 of the Civil Code:
Art. 278. Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing.
These, she contends, together with her treatment as a daughter by Felisa — a fact found
to have been established by the evidence by both the Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals — eliminate all doubt about the juridical verity of her recognition as a natural
child.
Prospero Parcon disagrees. He argues that, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, the
statements designating Ligaya as Felisa's daughter merely furnished ground for Ligaya
to compel recognition by action which, however, should have been brought during the
lifetime of the putative parent in accordance with Article 285 of the Civil Code, reading
as follows:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in
the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should
appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both
parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the
finding of the document.
Since, Parcon continues, no such action was instituted prior to the death of Felisa, proof
of the "authentic document" (sworn statement of assets and liabilities) in the
proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate was inefficacious as basis for a
declaration of filiation or heirship.
The issue thus presented is whether or not Felisa's sworn statement of assets and
liabilities and her application for insurance are "authentic writings" which effectively
operated as a recognition of Ligaya Gapusan-Chua as her natural child, even if no
action was brought by the latter to compel the former, during her lifetime, to recognize
her as such.
Recognition of natural children may be voluntary or compulsory. 8
Voluntary recognition, it has been said, "is an admission of the fact of paternity or
maternity by the presumed parent, expressed in the form prescribed by the Civil Code.
Its essence lies in the avowal of the parent that the child is his; the formality is added to
make the admission incontestable, in view of its consequences." 9 The form is
prescribed by Article 278 of the Civil Code, earlier adverted to; it provides that a
voluntary recognition "shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing." 10
Compulsory recognition is sometimes also called judicial recognition, to distinguish it
from that which is a purely voluntary act of the parent. 11 It is recognition decreed by
final judgment of a competent court. It is governed by Articles 283 and 284, setting
forth the cases in which the father or mother, respectively, is obliged to recognize a
natural child, and Article 285 providing that generally, the action for recognition of
natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents. 12
The matter of whether or not judicial approval is needful for the efficacy of voluntary
recognition is dealt with in Article 281 of the Civil Code. 13
Art. 281. A child who is of age cannot be recognized without his
consent.
When the recognition of a minor does not take place in a record of
birth or in a will, judicial approval shall be necessary.
A minor can in any case impugn the recognition within four years
following the attainment of his majority.
In other words, judicial approval is not needed if a recognition is voluntarily made —
1) of a person who is of age, only his consent being necessary; or
2) of a minor whose acknowledgment is effected in a record of birth
or in a will.
On the other hand, judicial approval is needful if the recognition of the minor is
effected, not through a record of birth or in a will but through a statement in a court of
record or an authentic document. In any case the individual recognized can impugn the
recognition within four years following the attainment of his majority. 14
Now, there are no less than three (3) writings submitted in evidence in this case in
which Felisa Gapusan Parcon describes Ligaya Gapusan-Chua as her daughter, viz.:
a) Felisa's sworn statement of assets and liabilities, in which she
names and describes Ligaya as her daughter (Exh. 4);
b) her application for GSIS life insurance in which she again
describes Ligaya as her daughter (Exh. 3); and
c) her application for membership in the Negros Occidental Teachers'
Federation, where she names Ligaya as her "adopted daughter" (Exh.
1).
Each of these writings is undoubtedly an "authentic writing" within the contemplation
of Article 278. "An 'authentic writing' for purposes of voluntary recognition . . . (is)
understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the father" (or mother), including "a
public instrument" (one acknowledged before a notary public or other competent
official with the formalities required by law), 15 and, of course, a public or official
document in accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The sworn
statement of assets and liabilities filed by Felisa Parcon is a public document, having
been executed and submitted pursuant to a requirement of the law. So it has been held
by this Court. 16 The other two writings above mentioned are, to be sure, not public
documents, but this is of no moment; neither of them has to be a public document in
order to be categorized as an "authentic writing." It is enough that they are the genuine
or indubitable writings of Felisa Gapusan Parcon. That in one of the writings, Felisa's
application for membership in the Negros Occidental Teachers' Federation, Felisa
describes Ligaya as her "adopted" daughter is also inconsequential. It may be explained
by her reluctance to confess publicly to her colleagues in the teaching profession that
she had borne a child out of wedlock. It is in any case a categorical avowal by Felisa
that Ligaya is indeed her daughter, an admission entirely consistent with the two other
authentic writings executed by her in which she acknowledges Ligaya to be her
daughter without qualification. Moreover, if these three (3) writings are considered in
conjunction with the undisputed fact that Ligaya had been continuously treated by
Felisa as her daughter, the proposition that Ligaya was indeed Felisa's daughter
becomes well nigh conclusive.
It is admitted on all sides that no judicial action or proceeding was ever brought during
the lifetime of Felisa to compel her to recognize Ligaya as her daughter. It is also
evident that Ligaya's recognition as Felisa's daughter was not made in a record of birth
or a will, a circumstance which would have made judicial approval unnecessary, only
her own consent to the recognition being required. The acknowledgment was made
in authentic writings, and hence, conformably with the legal provisions above cited,
judicial approval thereof was needed if the writings had been executed during Ligaya's
minority. 17 In other words, the question of whether or not the absence of judicial
approval negated the effect of the writings as a mode of recognition of Ligaya is
dependent upon the latter's age at the time the writings were made.
The point need not be belabored, however. For whether Ligaya were still a minor or
already of age at the time of her recognition in the authentic writings mentioned, that
circumstance would be immaterial in the light of the attendant facts.
In the first place, the consent required by Article 281 of a person of age who has been
voluntarily recognized may be given expressly or tacitly. 18 Assuming then that Ligaya
was of age at the time of her voluntary recognition, the evidence shows that she has in
fact consented thereto. Her consent to her recognition is not only implicit from her
failure to impugn it at any time before her mother's death, but is made clearly manifest
and conclusive by her assertion of that recognition in the judicial proceeding for the
settlement of her mother's estate as basis for her rights thereto. Assuming on the other
hand, that she was a minor at the time of her recognition, and therefore judicial approval
of the recognition was necessary, the absence thereof was cured by her ratification of
that recognition, after having reached the age of majority, by her initiation of the
proceedings for the settlement of her deceased mother's estate on the claim precisely
that she was the decedent's acknowledged natural daughter. 19 The requirement of
judicial approval imposed by Article 281 is clearly intended for the benefit of the minor.
"The lack of judicial approval can not impede the effectivity of the acknowledgment
made. The judicial approval is for the protection of the minor against any
acknowledgment made to his prejudice." 20 "Therefore, the lack, or insufficiency of
such approval is NOT a defect available to the recognizing parent but one which the
minor may raise or waive. If after reaching majority the minor consents to the
acknowledgment, the lack of judicial approval should make no difference. Implied
consent to the acknowledgment may be shown (e.g.,) by such acts as keeping, even after
reaching the age of majority, the acknowledgment papers and the use of the parent's
surname. 21
Upon the foregoing facts and considerations, Ligaya Gapusan Chua must be held to be a
voluntarily acknowledged natural child of Felisa Gapusan Parcon. She is therefore
entitled, in accordance with Article 282 of the Civil Code, to bear her mother's surname,
and to receive the hereditary portion accorded to her by the Code.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals (Fourth Division) dated
April 13, 1977 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the Orders of the Probate
Court dated January 16, 1968 — appointing Ligaya Gapusan-Chua Special
Administratrix — and of April 16, 1969 — declaring said Ligaya Gapusan-Chua the
decedent's acknowledged natural child and appointing her regular administratrix — are
REINSTATED AND HEREBY AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 54135, Nov 21, 1991 ]
PEOPLE v. POLICARPIO RAFANAN +
DECISION
G.R. No. 54135
FELICIANO, J.:
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan convicting him of the crime of rape and sentencing him
to reclusionperpetua to indemnify complainant Estelita Ronaya in the amount of
P10,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following manner:
"The prosecution's evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita
Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the mother
of the accused, Ines Rafanan alias 'Baket Ines' with a salary of P30.00 a month.
The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house
at Barangay San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two
children.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the
mother of the accused to help in their store which was located in front of their house
about six (6) meters away. Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00
o'clock in the evening, the accused called the complainant to help him close the door of
the store and as the latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the
complainant inside the store and said, 'Come, let us have sexual intercourse,' to which
Estelita replied, 'I do not like,' and struggled to free herself and cried. The accused held
a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet including the handle which he pointed to the throat of the
complainant threatening her with said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced her to lie
down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own
pants, went on top of the complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her
inspite of her resistance and struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused
cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or to anybody in the
house, otherwise he would kill her.
Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not
leave the house of the accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the house of the
accused that evening and the following morning she scrubbed the floor and did her daily
routine work in the house. She only left the house in the evening of March 17, 1976.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what
happened the night before in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel
ensued among them prompting Estelita Ronaya to go back to her house. When Estelita's
mother confronted her and asked her why she went home that evening, the complainant
could not answer but cried and cried. It was only the following morning on March 18,
1976 that the complainant told her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon
knowing what happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately
accompanied her to the house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis Police
Force who lives in Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is a
cousin of the father of the complainant. He advised them to proceed to the municipal
building while he went to fetch the accused. The accused was later brought to the police
headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit 'E', which the accused allegedly used in threatening
the complainant."[1]
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial
and in due course of time, the trial court, as already noted, convicted the appellant.
The instant appeal is anchored on the following
"Assignment of Errors
1. The lower court erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant solely on the
testimony of the complainant and her mother.
2. The lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the prosecution,
'Exhibits B and C'.
3. The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert witnesses, as to the
mental condition of the accused-appellant at the time of the alleged commission of the
crime of rape.
4. The lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was
suffering from insanity."[2]
Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of her mother whose
testimonies he contends are contradictory. It is claimed by appellant that the testimony
of complainant on direct examination that she immediately went home after the rape
incident, is at variance with her testimony on cross examination to the effect that she
had stayed in the house of appellant until the following day. Complainant, in saying that
she left the house of appellant by herself, is also alleged to have contradicted her mother
who stated that she (the mother) went to the store in the evening of 17 March 1979 and
brought Estelita home.
The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were clarified by her on
cross examination. In any case, the inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential
details which do not touch upon the manner in which the crime had been committed and
therefore did not in any way impair the credibility of the complainant.[3]
The commission of the crime was not seriously disputed by appellant. The testimony of
complainant in this respect is clear and convincing:
"Fiscal Guillermo:
Q: Now, we go back to that time when according to you the accused pulled you from
the door and brought you inside the store after you helped him closed the store. Now,
after the accused pulled you from the door and brought you inside the store what
happened then?
A: 'You come and we will have sexual intercourse,' he said.
Q: And what did you say?
A: 'I do not like,' I said.
Q: And what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to have sexual COURT:
intercourse with him? Alright, what do you mean by he was able to succeed in getting what he wanted to get?
A: I struggled and cried. Fiscal Guillermo:
Q: What did the accused do after that? Considering the condition of the witness, your honor, with tears, may we just be
A: He got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened and he could do what allowed to ask a leading question which is a follow-up question?
he wanted to do. He was able to do what he wanted to do. Witness:
Q: This 'kutsilyo' you were referring to or knife, how big is that knife? Will you please A: He inserted his private part inside my vagina.
demonstrate, if any? Fiscal Guillermo:
A: This length, sir. (Which parties agreed to be about one and one-half [1-1/2] feet Q: Now, when he inserted his private parts inside your vagina what did you feel,
long.) if any?
xxx xxx xxx A: I felt something that came out from his inside.
Fiscal Guillermo: Q: Now, how long, if you remember, did the accused have his penis inside your
Q: Now, you said that the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with you after vagina?
he placed the bolo or that knife [at] your throat. Now, will you please tell the court what A: Around five (5) minutes maybe, sir.
did the accused do immediately after placing that bolo at your throat and before having Q: After that what happened then?
sexual intercourse with you? A: He removed it.
A: He had sexual intercourse with me. Q: After the accused has removed his penis from your vagina what else happened?
Q: What was your wearing apparel that evening? A: No more, sir, he sat down.
A: I was wearing pants, sir. Q: What, if any, did he tell you?
Q: Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear? A: There was, sir. He told me not to report the matter to my mother and to anybody in
A Yes, sir, I have a panty. their house.
Q: Now, before the accused have sexual intercourse with you what, if any, did he do Q: What else did he tell you?
with respect to your pants and your panty? A: He told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me.
A: He removed them, sir. Q: After that where did you go?
Q: Now, while he was removing your pants and your panty what, if any, did you do? A: I went home already, sir."[4]
A: I continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants but he was stronger The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a mental aberration
that's why he succeeded. characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. At
Q: Now, after he had removed your panty and your pants or pantsuit what else the urging of his counsel, the trial court suspended the trial and ordered appellant
happened? confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and
A: He went on top of me, sir. treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the
Q: At the time what was the accused wearing by way of apparel? hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978.
A: He was wearing pants.
Q: When you said he went on top of you after he has removed your pantsuit and your During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental and
panty, was he still wearing his pants? physical condition of the appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip
A: He unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his pants. and Dr.Arturo E. Nerit, physician-in-charge and chief, Forensic Psychiatry Service,
Q: And after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did you see which he respectively.
opened? In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following observations concerning
A: I saw his penis. appellant's mental condition were set forth:
Q: Now, you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants and brought out his
penis which you saw, he went on top of you. When he was already on top of you what "On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to interview, would just look
did you do, if any? up whenever questioned but refused to answer.
A: I struggled. On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly attired, with
Q: Now, you said that you struggled. What happened then when you struggled against dishevelled hair, would stare vacuously through the window, or look at people around
the accused when he was on top of you? him. He was indifferent and when questioned, he would just smile inappropriately. He
A: Since he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to get. refused to verbalize, even when persuaded, and was emotionally dull and mentally
xxx xxx xxx inaccessible. He is generally seclusive, at times would pace the floor, seemingly in deep
thought. Later on when questioned his frequent answers are 'Aywan ko, hindi ko alam.'
His affect is dull, he claimed to hear strange voices 'parang ibon, tinig ng ibon,' but
cannot elaborate. He is disoriented to 3 spheres and has no idea why he was brought
here."
The report then concluded:
"In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y
Gambawa is found suffering from a mental disorder called schizophrenia, manifested by
carelessness in grooming, sluggishness in movements, staring vacuously, indifferen[ce],
smiling inappropriately, refusal to verbalize, emotional dullness, mental inaccessibility,
seclusiveness, preoccupation, disorientation, and perceptual aberrations of hearing
strange sounds. He is psychotic or insane, hence cannot stand court trial. He needs
further hospitalization and treatment."[5]
The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following description of
appellant's mental condition:
"At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded in his responses. There is
dullness of his affect and he appeared preoccupied. He is observed to mumble alone by
himself and would show periods of being irritable saying - 'oki naman' with nobody in
particular. He claim he does not know whether or not he was placed in jail and does not
know if he has a case in court. Said he does not remember having committed any wrong
act"
and the following conclusions:
"In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y
Gambawa is at present time still psychotic or insane, manifested by periods of
irritability - cursing nobody in particular, seclusive, underactive, undertalkative,
retarded in his responses, dullness of his affect, mumbles alone by himself, preoccupied
and lack of insight.
He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and
treatment."[6]
In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was described as having become
"better behaved, responsive" and "neat in person," and "adequate in his emotional tone,
in touch with his surroundings and x x x free from hallucinatory experiences." During
the preceding period, appellant had been allowed to leave the hospital temporarily; he
stayed with a relative in Manila while coming periodically to the hospital for check-ups.
During this period, he was said to have been helpful in the doing of household chores,
conversed and associated freely with other members of the household and slept well,
although, occasionally, appellant smiled while alone. Appellant complained that at
times he heard voices of small children, talking in alanguage he could not understand.
The report concluded by saying that while appellant had improved in his mental
condition, he was not yet in a position to stand trial since he needed further treatment,
medication and check-ups.[7]
In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in
household chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed"
and "oriented" and as denying having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was
in a "much improved condition" and "in a mental condition to stand court trial."[8]
Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who
suggested that appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the
hospital, in effect implying that appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia
when he raped complainant.[9] The defense next presented Dr. Raquel Jovellano, a
psychiatrist engaged in private practice, who testified that he had examined and treated
the appellant.
Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:
"Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. -- The following are
exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a
felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without
first obtaining the permission of the same court.
xxx xxx x x x."
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only
in People vs. Formigones[10] that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal
insanity, quoting extensively from the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on
the Revised Penal Code, thus:
"The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may
be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence
in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no
responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; (Decision of
the Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim. 413.) that there be a
complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
April 29, 1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the
will. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For
this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of
the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because
mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of April 20, 1911; 86 Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be [equated with]
imbecility or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive
evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few
moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he
was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary,
and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him
from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of
will are proved." (Underscoring supplied.)
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases.[11] A
linguistic or grammatical analysis of those standards suggests
that Formigonesestablished two (2) distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition --
"complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act," and (b) the test
of volition -- "or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will." But our
caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition rather than on a test relating to
"freedom of the will;" examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up any case where
this Court has exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of
"freedom of the will," i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of
intelligence." This is perhaps to be expected since a person's volition naturally reaches
out only towards that which is presented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that
intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the accused failed to show
complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court has recognized at most a
mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with Article 13(9) of the Revised
Penal Code: "Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-
power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his
acts."[12]
Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is
said to be the most common form of psychosis and usually develops between the ages
15 and 30.[13] A standard textbook in psychiatry describes some of the symptoms of
schizophrenia in the following manner:
"Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizophrenia: a
disturbance of association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity. Bleuler
also stressed the dereistic attitude of the schizophrenic -- that is, his detachment from
reality and his consequent autism and the ambivalence that expresses itself in his
uncertain effectivity and initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of schizophrenia is often
referred to as the four A's: association, affect, autism, and ambivalence.
xxx xxx xxx
Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that he
considered in no way specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value in making a
diagnosis. Schneider's first-rank symptoms include the hearing of one's thoughts spoken
aloud, auditory hallucinations that comment on the patient's behavior, somatic
hallucinations, the experience of having one's thoughts controlled, the spreading of
one's thoughts to others, delusions, and the experience of having one's actions
controlled or influenced from the outside.
Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on the basis of
second-rank symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical appearances. Second-
rank symptoms include other forms of hallucination, perplexity, depressive and
euphoric disorders of affect, and emotional blunting.
Perceptual Disorders
Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia x x x.
Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external
stimuli are common symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are auditory
hallucinations, or the hearing of voices. Most characteristically, two or more
voices talk about the patient, discussing him in the third person. Frequently, the voices
address the patient, comment on what he is doing and what is going on around him, or
are threatening or obscene and very disturbing to the patient. Many schizophrenic
patients experience the hearing of their own thoughts. When they are reading silently,
for example, they may be quite disturbed by hearing every word they are reading clearly
spoken to them.
Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in schizophrenic
patients, but they are not rare. Patients suffering from organic or affective psychoses
experience visual hallucinations primarily at night or during limited periods of the day,
but schizophrenic patients hallucinate as much during the day as they do during the
night, sometimes almost continuously. They get relief only in sleep. When visual
hallucinations occur in schizophrenia, they are usually seen nearby, clearly defined, in
color, life size, in three dimensions, and moving. Visual hallucinations almost never
occur by themselves but always in combination with hallucinations in one of the other
sensory modalities.
xxx xxx xxx
Cognitive Disorders
Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by
reasoning, and that are idiosyncratic for the patient -- that is, not part of his cultural
environment. They are among the common symptoms of schizophrenia.
Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in the paranoid
type of schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by some unseen mysterious
power that exercises its influence from a distance is almost pathognomonic for
schizophrenia. It occurs in most, if not all, schizophrenics at one time or another, and
for many it is a daily experience. The modern schizophrenic whose delusions have kept
up with the scientific times may be preoccupied with atomic power, X-rays, or
spaceships that take control over his mind and body. Also typical for many
schizophrenics are delusional fantasies about the destruction of the world."[14]
In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting
circumstance,[15] it has mostly been rejected by the Court. In each of these cases, the
evidence presented tended to show that if there was impairment of the mental faculties,
such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the
consciousness of his acts.
The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same situation. Dr. Jovellano declared as
follows:
"(Fiscal Guillermo:)
Q: Now, this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found him, would you say
doctor that he was completely devoid of any consciousness of whatever he did in
connection with the incident in this case?
A: He is not completely devoid of consciousness.
Q: Would you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of threatening the victim at
the time of the commission of the alleged rape?
A: Yes, he was conscious.
Q: And he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down?
A: Yes.
Q: And he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim at the time?
A: Yes.
Q: And he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a vagina upon which he The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of
will place his penis? proving his affirmative allegation of insanity.[17] Here, appellant failed to present clear
A: Yeah. and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the
Q: And he was conscious enough to be competent and have an erection? sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the
A: Yes. accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is
Q: Would you say that those acts of a person no matter whether he is schizophrenic committed.[18] Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of the two (2) physicians
which you said, it deals (sic) some kind of intelligence and consciousness of some acts (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental
that is committed? condition during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to
A: Yes, it involves the consciousness because the consciousness there in relation to circumstances occurring on or immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies
the act is what we call primitive acts of any individual. The difference only in the act of consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted
an insane and a normal individual, a normal individual will use the power of reasoning with schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and
and consciousness within the standard of society while an insane causes (sic) already examined appellant during his confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the defense
devoid of the fact that he could no longer withstand himself in the ordinary chose to present Dr. Nerit.
environment, yet his acts are within the bound of insanity or psychosis.
Q: Now, Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which you said the Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.
accused here is suffering is capable of planning the commission of a rape? In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not
A: Yes, they are also capable. exempting because it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of
Q: He is capable of laying in wait in order to assault? his acts, may be considered as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the
A: Yes. Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an illness which diminishes the exercise of the offender's
Q: And would you say that condition that ability of a person to plan a rape and to will-power without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. Appellant
perform all the acts preparatory to the actual intercourse could be done by an insane should have been credited with this mitigating circumstance, although it would not have
person? affected the penalty imposable upon him under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code:
A: Yes, it could be done. "in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty
Q: Now, you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not? (reclusion perpetua in this case), it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
A: Yes, sir. mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
Q: Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is deed."
wrong?
A: Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the
wrong but yet there is no inhibition on the individual. amount of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.
Q: Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are
going to commit is wrong?
A: Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the
inhibition. The reasoning is weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not] there,
the drive is [not] there."[16] (Underscoring supplied)
The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at the
time of commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is
critical if the defense of insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan
threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she had been sexually
assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the
reprehensible moral quality of that assault. The defense sought to suggest, through Dr.
Jovellano's last two (2) answers above, that a person suffering from schizophrenia
sustains not only impairment of the mental faculties but also deprivation of the power of
self-control. We do not believe that Dr. Jovellano's testimony, by itself, sufficiently
demonstrated the truth of that proposition. In any case, as already pointed out, it
is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of
insanity is to be found.
 [G.R. No. 121930. June 14, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOREDO REAL y
RIZO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
What is before us is an appeal from a decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Romblon,
Branch 81, convicting accused-appellant Loredo Real y Rizo of murder and sentencing
him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all accessory penalties of the law and to
pay the heirs of the deceased P36,000.00,as actual damages, P300,000.00, by way of
moral damages, P49,381.19, for loss of earning capacity, P30,000.00, for attorney's
fees, P50,000.00, as death indemnity and costs.
The victim was Noe Tarrosa, the mayor of Cajidiocan, Romblon, who died on the spot,
after accused-appellant admittedly shot him with an armalite rifle in front of the
municipal hall, municipality of Cajidiocan, Romblon, on the night of April 28, 1988.
On April 19, 1990, 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alexander Mortel of Romblon
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Romblon, Branch 81, an information charging
accused-appellant Loredo Real y Razo with murder, alleging:
"That on or about the 28th day of April 1988, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening,
inthe poblacion, municipality of Cajidiocan, province of Romblon, Philippines, and
within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, did
then and there, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with an armalite rifle, one MAYOR
NOE TARROSA, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds in different parts
of his body which were the direct and immediate cause of his death."2
At his arraignment on July 4, 1990, accused-appellant, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged.3 Trial ensued, with the prosecution presenting nine (9)
witnesses and the defense calling on the accused-appellant as its lone witness.
The State's version of the mayor's killing, based on the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Pfc. Rodolfo Rio,4Milo Fetalino,5 Pfc. Elmo dela Cruz,6Rosario Burgos7 and
Eduardo Rivero8 is as follows:
At around 7:00 p.m. of April 28, 1988, Milo Fetalino, municipal assessor Isidro
Machado and Patrolman Inso Rabino were in front of the Cajidiocan municipal building
engaged in a drinking spree hosted by the mayor. Later on, the mayor excused himself
as he was going to Bgy. Cambajao.
A few minutes later, accused-appellant arrived at the municipal building. The mayor
requested accused-appellant to get his motorcycle as the mayor wanted to visit
Barangay Cambajao to monitor illegal gambling activities reportedly proliferating inthat
locality. Heeding the mayor's request, accused-appellant went home and soon returned
to the municipal building with his motorcycle. Pfc. Rodolfo Rio rode at the back of
accused-appellant's motorcycle and the tandem drove towards Bgy. Cambajao, with the
mayor on board another motorcycle driven by one Ernesto "Bong" Calsado, Jr. tailing
them.
At Bgy. Cambajao, Pfc. Rio scoured the area for gambling operations, but his search
yielded nothing. He proceeded to where accused-appellant's motorcycle was parked and
there he saw the mayor and accused-appellant shaking hands. Pfc. Rio and accused-
appellant thereafter boarded the motorcycle and headed back for Cajidiocan. Along the
way, Pfc. Rio heard accused-appellant utter in disgust "Puno na ako." (I'm fed up).
Upon reaching the Cajidiocan town hall at past ten o'clock of that same evening, Pfc.
Rio alighted from accused-appellant's motorcycle and immediately went inside the
police station to investigate one Onyong Rabino who was apprehended by Pat. Male.
Accused-appellant passed by the group of men drinking. Accused-appellant, who Milo
Fetalino observed to be very tense and on the verge of tears, then took the armalite rifle
placed beside Fetalino and Pat. Rabino and ordered those drinking (Fetalino, Machado
and Rabino) to go home. Ten minutes later, a burst of gunfire ripped through the
stillness of the night. Pfc. Rio rushed outside the building to check what happened.
There, he saw the mayor's bloodied body sprawled on the asphalted street in front of the
municipal building. Pfc. Rabino, Pat. Elmo de la Cruz and accused-appellant were near
the fallen mayor, with Pat. dela Cruz rebuking the accused "Edu, putang ina akin na
iyong armalite" and grappling with the latter for the possession of the M-16 armalite
rifle apparently used in the mayor's shooting. After accused-appellant was disarmed,
Pfc. Rio asked him why he shot the mayor. Accused-appellant answered "Patas na" (it's
now even), because his younger brother was killed by the mayor's brother a few years
back. Rosario Burgos, who also arrived at the crime scene, asked him the same
question. Accused-appellant replied: "Paano hinahabol niya ang buhay ko. Ako pobre
paano na lang ang pamilya ko kung ako ang mamatay maayo kuno siya kay
mangaranon." (He was after my life. I am poor and what would happen to my family if I
would be killed. He is fortunate to be rich). Pat. Rabino arrived at the scene and took the
dead mayor's .38 caliber pistol from its holster, leaving the casing still tucked in the
right side of the mayor's waist. Thereafter, Pat. dela Cruz brought the armalite rifle to
the police station for safekeeping, while accused-appellant was led to the detention cell.
Upon examination of the handgun, Pfc. Rio observed that it was locked or "on safety"
mode, although there was a bullet inside its chamber. When asked whether the pistol
found beside the mayor (considering that the gun's holster remained tucked in the waist
of mayor) could have slid out from the holster when the mayor fell on the ground after
being gunned down, Pfc. Rio confirmed the possibility of such happening.
The mayor sustained eight (8) gunshot wounds in different parts of his body. One (1)
bullet hit the victim's face. One (1) bullet found its mark on his chest; four (4) in the
abdomen; and two (2) at the back. Each of these wounds was enough to kill the mayor.
These findings are reflected in the Autopsy Report dated April 30,
1988.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellant admitted killing the mayor. He claimed self-defense. He
testified10 that at about 11:00 in the evening of April 28, 1988, he was in front of the
Cajidiocan Municipal building beside the flagpole doing his tour of duty. Moments
later, he heard the sound of a motorcycle approaching from the south. It stopped about
seven (7) meters away from where he was posted. Accused-appellant then heard
somebody shout "Where is Real?" He focused his attention onthe motorcycle and saw
the mayor alight therefrom. The mayor then slowly approached accused-appellant and,
with a Super .38 pistol pointed at him, uttered loudly: "I do, I will kill you!" Fearing for
his life, accused-appellant fired his service armalite rifle, which was in full-automatic
mode, at the mayor, causing the latter to fall on his back. Accused-appellant observed
the fallen mayor for a few seconds before going to the municipal building. He met
Patrolmen Rabino and dela Cruz along the way and handed his armalite rifle to Pat. de
la Cruz. Accused-appellant was thereafter brought to the detention cell. From his cell,
he saw Pat. Rio inspecting the mayor's Super .38 pistol. Pat. Rio told Pat. Male that he
would "lock" the pistol.
Accused-appellant denied that he hosted a drinking spree in Bgy. Cambalo a week prior
to the mayor's killing. He presented a police blotter to prove that he was assigned in
Cajidiocan from April 21 to April 28, 1988.
Accused-appellant also denied that onApril 28, 1988, he went to Bgy. Cambajao with
the mayor and grabbed the armalite rifle during the drinking session held in front of the
Cajidiocan municipal building. Accused-appellant claimed that he came directly from
his house to the Cajidiocan municipal building to assume his tour of duty from 11:00
p.m. of April 28, 1988 until 7:00 a.m. of the following day. He got hold of the armalite
rifle when the outgoing guard on duty, Pat. Rabino, turned it over to him. The rifle was
on full-automatic mode when it was handed to him, since it was the usual practice to put
it on that mode on the nightshift.
On the death of his brother in the hands of "Jing" Tarrosa (the mayor's brother),
accused-appellant confirmed that Judge Job B. Madayag dismissed the criminal case
filed against "Jing." He disagrees, however, that "Jing" acted in self-defense since it was
"Jing"who went to his brother's house to kill him.
The trial court accepted the prosecution's version in its findings of fact, and appreciated
against accused-appellant the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. He was credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Now before this Court, accused-appellant pleads for his acquittal, claiming that:
1) he was denied due process of law when he was not allowed to complete his evidence.
2) he acted in self-defense.
Accused-appellant's first pose has no merit. As the Solicitor General points out,11 after
the prosecution finished presenting its evidence on May 7, 1992, the defense asked for
postponements of the hearing which earned repeated warnings from the trial court. In
fact, the continuation of the cross-examination of accused-appellant (which began on
July 7, 1994) scheduled on August 15, 1994, was reset many times at the instance of the
defense until the trial court, in an Order dated September 21, 1994, warned the defense
counsel that the case would be deemed submitted for decision if he failed to proceed
with the continuation of the cross-examination of the accused-appellant or the
presentation of additional evidence.
Also, accused-appellant and counsel failed to appear at the hearing set on January 31,
1995, claiming viatelegram that accused-appellant had been hospitalized. This
prompted the trial court to issue an order directing accused-appellant to submit a
verified medical certificate, with warning that failure on his part to submit such medical
certificate would compel the trial court to declare the case submitted for decision.
Accused-appellant still failed to comply with the January 31, 1995 order. The court thus
declared the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence at hand.12 Clearly,
accused-appellant has only himself to blame for the failure to complete his evidence.
As to his claim of self-defense, we hold that the trial court correctly rejected it.
The settled rule is that where an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-
defense to escape criminal liability, he assumes the burden to establish his plea by
credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his
admission that he killed the victim.13The accused must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. For even if the prosecution
evidence were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted
the killing.14 For self-defense to prosper, the accused must positively show that there
was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed his life in danger and forced
him to inflict more or less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing therefor
reasonable means to resist the attack.15 This defense, in the main, is perched on proof of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.16 "Unlawful aggression presupposes an
actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for
the justifying circumstance of self defense. In other words, there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed anunlawful
aggression against the person defending himself. Simply put, unlawful aggression is
indispensable, it being the main ingredient of self-defense."17cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellant has failed to establish the element of unlawful aggression with
convincing evidence. His account of the mayor's dreadful approach on his person finds
no corroboration at all. The fact that the mayor's Super .38 pistol was retrieved beside
his fallen body may give semblance of verity to accused-appellant's tale of unlawful
aggression. Such view loses its persuasive effect against (1) the possibility that the gun
was thrown out from the holster as the mayor fell to the ground and (2) the fact that the
mayor's pistol was "locked" or on "safety mode" when it was recovered at the crime
scene.18cräläwvirtualibräry
If accused-appellant's claim were true that he and the mayor were face to face when he
fired at the mayor, there was no justification at all for him to further inflict two (2)
gunshot wounds at the back of the mayor.19 Any one of the six (6) bullets that found
their mark on the frontal portion of the mayor's body was enough to immobilize or repel
the purported unlawful aggression supposedly undertaken by the mayor. From the
moment those six (6) wounds were inflicted on the mayor, the supposed aggression had
certainly ceased. Accused-appellant no longer faced any danger to his life and limb. His
continued offensive stance made him the aggressor.20 When an unlawful aggression
which has begun no longer exists, the one making a defense has no right to kill or even
injure the former aggressor.21cräläwvirtualibräry
It is worth reiterating at this juncture that the nature and number of wounds inflicted by
an assailant are constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia which
disprove a plea of self-defense.22 The eight (8) gunshot wounds sustained by the mayor,
each of which was fatal, belie the accused-appellant's exculpatory pretension and
confirm the prosecution's theory that accused-appellant purposely and vigorously
attacked the deceased in order to kill the latter.23cräläwvirtualibräry
On these considerations, it becomes clear why the accused-appellant's plea of self-
defense can not succeed as against the collective testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, which are credible. It is the trial Judge who is best situated to assess and
evaluate the probity and trustworthiness of witnesses, for he is able to observe directly
their behavior and manner of testifying and is thus in a much better situation to
determine whether they were telling the truth or not.24cräläwvirtualibräry
There may have been inconsistencies in the narration of the prosecution witnesses on
minor details which do not affect the weight of their testimonies. Testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses cannot be expected to be uniform to the last details.25 We
certainly do not expect the testimony of witnesses to a crime to be consistent all
throughout because different persons have different impressions and recollections of the
same incident.26Even the most truthful witnesses can make mistakes or innocent lapses
that do not necessarily affect their credibility.27 Thus, findings of trial courts on the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal, and the rule is not
changed simply because of some inconsequential inconsistencies that are discovered
upon a faultfinding scrutiny of the records.28cräläwvirtualibräry
However, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the trial court erred in finding
that evident premeditation attended the mayor's killing. This aggravating circumstance
was based on witness Eduardo Rivero's testimony that a week prior to the crime,
accused-appellant told him and three (3) other persons during a drinking session that he
would take revenge against the mayor for the killing of his brother by a brother of the
mayor. The Solicitor General pointed out that witness Rivero's story deserved scant
consideration. His testimony was not corroborated by any of the three (3) persons
present in that drinking session. His narration was full of improbabilities.
Furthermore, to establish evident premeditation, it must be shown that there was a
period sufficient to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection and a time
adequate to allow the conscience of the actor to overcome the resolution of his
will.29 Stated differently, the essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of
the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to
carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.30 In this case, less than an hour lapsed from the time accused-appellant
uttered "Puno na ako" (enroute to Cajidiocan coming from Bgy. Cambajao) up to the
moment he shot the mayor at the municipal building. It is definitely not a sufficient
lapse of time to give the accused-appellant an opportunity to coolly and serenely
deliberate on the meaning and consequences of what he planned to
do.31cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court also erred in appreciating treachery against accused-appellant. None of
the prosecution witnesses saw the actual shooting. There is thus no conclusive evidence
to show that the attack came without warning and that the mayor had absolutely no
opportunity to defend himself or to escape. Where no particulars are shown as to the
manner by which the aggression was commenced or how the act which resulted in the
death of the victim began and developed, treachery can not be established from mere
suppositions drawn solely from circumstances prior to the killing.32 The same degree of
proof to dispel reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion may be reached
respecting the attendance of alevosia.33 It must be proven as clearly and as cogently as
the crime itself.34 "Where treachery is not adequately proved, the appellant can only be
convicted of homicide."35cräläwvirtualibräry
We agree with the trial court that voluntary surrender was present. Voluntary surrender
must be spontaneous in such a manner that it showed the intent of the accused to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or
because he wished to save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his
search and capture.36 Here, accused-appellant surrendered to his fellow policemen the
very moment he shot the mayor and calmly agreed to be detained.
Accordingly, absent any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed by accused-
appellant is homicide,37 not murder. The accused-appellant may be credited with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance
to offset it. The penalty prescribed for homicide is reclusion temporal, to be imposed in
its minimum period pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, subject to the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby MODIFIES the appealed decision. The Court finds
the accused Loredo Real y Rizo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, defined
and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, for the killing of Mayor
Noe Tarrosa, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender attendant, without
any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P50,000.00, plus P50,000.00, as moral damages and costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 77737-38 August 15, 1988
CHRISTINA MARIE DEMPSEY, a minor and represented by her mother,
Janalita Rapada, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LXXV, Third Judicial Region, Olongapo
City, and JOEL DEMPSEY, respondents.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for petitioners.
Miguel F. Famularcano, Jr. for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The facts of the case are summarized by the Trial Court as follows:
This is a petition denominated as one for review on certiorari and/or a special civil
action for certiorari from the decision rendered by the respondent court on November
28, 1986 in Criminal Cases Nos. 460-86 and 461-86, entitled "The People of the
Philippines v. Joel Dempsey."
On January 30, 1986, two separate informations were filed against respondent Joel
Dempsey before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch II, Olongapo City charging him
with violation of Article 59 (par. 2) of P.D. 603 and Article 46, par. 8 of P.D. 603.
The Informations read:
Criminal Case No. 68-86
That on or about and during the period from December 1985 to the
present, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously leave their
conjugal dwelling at No. 15 Ohio Street, Upper Kalaklan, Olongapo
City and abandon his child Christina R. Dempsey and deprive him
(sic) of his love, care and protection she from the accused (sic) since
then, by continuously failing and refusing to give adequate support to
the said minor child and despite pleas, the accused without lawful
justification, failed, disregarded and still continues to fail and
disregard to perform his obligations to his said minor child Christina
R. Dempsey,
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 69-86
That on or about and during the period from December 1985 to the
present, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail and refuse to
provide his child Christina R. Dempsey with adequate support, as
defined in Article 290 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that he is
capable of supporting his child, and despite pleas, the accused without
lawful justification, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to
provide his child with adequate support, to the damage and prejudice
of the said child.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, pp. 18-19)
xxx xxx xxx
The testimony of complainant Janalita Rapada purports to show that
in her cohabitation with the accused, without the benefit of marriage,
Christina Marie was born on October 01, 1984, at the St. Jude's
Family Clinic, Olongapo City where she delivered the child. Her birth
certificate, Exhibit "A" bears an entry of the name of the accused as
the father and Exhibit "A-1 " the Affidavit of the Acknowledgment
duly signed by him.
At the present, the child receives a monthly support from the accused
in the sum of $150.00 thru the child's mother, Janalita Rapada. Aside
from this monthly support, Janalita Rapada obtained a promise from
the accused to declare Christina Marie as his dependent and also a
commitment to declare the child after his citizenship. This will entitle
the child for all the benefits and privileges extended to dependents of
American US Navy servicemen like free medical check-up. Efforts
were made with the Naval Legal Service Office, US Naval Facilities,
Subic Bay, Philippines to compel the accused to fulfill these
commitments but to no avail. To seek redress thru the Court, she
engaged the services of Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr., offering
P5,000.00 as Attorney's fee payable after the cases are decided.
xxx xxx xxx
At the Naval Legal Service Office, someone entertained her demand
for the accused to declare Christina Marie as his dependent and after
his American citizenship. She was of the belief that these could be
 done not knowing that the American who entertained her demands
had no authority to effect the same. (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
Upon arraignment, the private respondent freely, voluntarily, and spontaneously entered
a plea of guilty to the offense charged in the Information.
On August 26, 1986, the Trial Court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the charges against him, considering the mitigating circumstances
of his voluntary plea of guilty, this Court sentences him to a prison
term of Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) days to Four (4) months of
Arresto Mayor, medium period and fine of Three hundred (P300.00)
Pesos for each of the cases and to pay the costs.
For the civil liability, judgment is rendered against accused Joel
Dempsey confirming the payment of US $150.00 monthly support to
Christina Marie and to continue payment thru Janalita Rapada, to be
used solely for the needs of the child until she reaches the age of
majority; to recognize the child Christina Marie as his natural child;
to pay Christina Marie thru Janalita Rapada the sum of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damage; and to pay the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fee
to Atty. Manuel Rosapapan as Chairman of the Committee on Legal
Aid of the IBP Chapter of Zambales Olongapo City and the same to
form part of the legal aid fund.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 23-24)
The private respondent appealed the municipal trial court's decision to the regional trial
court and prayed that the award on civil liability be set aside and the penalty of
imprisonment be reduced to a penalty of fine only.
In a decision rendered on November 28, 1986, the respondent regional trial court
reversed the municipal trial court's decision on the following grounds:
1. Parental authority to which certain parental obligations are attached pertains only to
legitimate and adopted children unlike petitioner who is an acknowledged illegitimate
minor child of private respondent; that in cases of abandonment of minors, the proper
forum is the Department of Social Welfare where the person to whom the minor has
been left must report immediately (Art. 161, P.D. 603).
2. A person cannot he held criminally liable for failure to support a minor child.
3. The Municipal Trial Court had determined a matter not within its competence and
authority.
Hence, the present petition on pure questions of law.
The petitioner maintains that the penalty of imprisonment and fine in both cases is
sanctioned by the law and jurisprudence and that the award of civil liability is justified.
We find merit in the instant petition.
The respondent court committed reversible error when it failed to take into account that
the decision of the municipal trial court was based on the private respondent's plea of
guilty. Respondent Joel Dempsey did not and does not challenge the validity of
Presidential Decree No. 603, Articles 46 and 59 on certain obligations of parents to their
children and Articles 60 and 210 penalizing violations of mandatory provisions. As a
matter of fact, respondent Dempsey's appeal impliedly recognizes the validity of the
judgment of conviction because he asked that the penalty of imprisonment be changed
to fine, not that the trial court's decision was void or that he be acquitted.
There can be no question about the trial court's jurisdiction over the criminal
prosecutions. Article 69 of P.D. 603 penalizes abandonment of a minor child by its
parent, as provided in Article 59, with imprisonment from two to six months or a fine
not exceeding five hundred pesos or both. Article 210 penalizes a violation of the
obligation to give adequate support found in Article 46 with imprisonment not
exceeding one month or a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or both, unless a higher
penalty is provided for in the Revised Penal Code or special laws.
The respondent court erred in its ruling that the trial court determined a matter not
within its competence and authority. There is likewise no basis for its gratuitous finding
that a parent cannot be held criminally liable under P.D. 603 for withholding support
from his minor child. There is absolutely no discussion on this ruling. The records
show, however, that Joel Dempsey's plea of guilt to the charge of withholding support
from his minor daughter was made without a full understanding of that particular
charge. Janalita Rapada herself testified that she is receiving $150.00 a month for the
support of the minor Christina Marie Dempsey. The amount of P3,000.00 monthly
appears to fulfill the requirement of "adequate support" found in Par. 8, Art. 46 of P.D.
No. 603. What Rapada wants is a judicial declaration for this support to continue. This
cannot be the basis of a criminal conviction.
As to the information charging abandonment, the private respondent entered his plea of
guilt with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act and with the
assistance of his counsel. The reversal of conviction based on a plea of guilty is an act
which is not at all explained by the respondent court and, therefore, in excess of its
jurisdiction. It is well-settled as a general rule that a plea of guilt is sufficient to sustain
conviction without introduction of further evidence (People v. Formentera, 130 SCRA
114; People v. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 119; People v. Gravino, et al., 122 SCRA 123;
People v. Pajarillo, 94 SCRA 828). Only in such exceptional cases as capital offenses is
evidence still required.
The respondent court further ruled that Christina Dempsey is not entitled to the rights
arising from the parental responsibility of her father, she being an illegitimate child.
Reliance was made on Art. 17 of P.D. 603 which defines the joint parental authority of
parents over their legitimate or adopted children. The respondent court's observations
are wrong because the law itself protects even illegitimate children. Illegitimate children
have rights of the same nature as legitimate and adopted children. This is enunciated in
Art. 3, P.D. 603 which provides that "all children shall be entitled to the rights herein
set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion,
political antecedents, and other factors." Rights must be enforced or protected to the
extent that it is possible to do so.
The Solicitor General points out that the new Family Code promulgated as Executive
Order No. 209, July 17, 1978 erases any distinction between legitimate or adopted
children on one hand and acknowledged illegitimate children on the other, insofar as
joint parental authority is concerned. Article 211 of the Family Code, whose date of
effectivity is approaching, merely formalizes into statute the practice on parental
authority.
irresponsibility, the law does not allow us to affirm the grant of exemplary damages
only on the basis of the facts herein presented. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded
inasmuch as there is not one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil
Code).
As to the penalties, we agree with the Solicitor General that these should be modified
accordingly. And finally, it should be noted that the Regional Trial Court after declaring
that the Municipal Trial Court acted outside of its competence merely set aside the
appealed decision. Instead of acquitting the accused, it suggested the filing of necessary
pleadings before the proper court.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City,
Branch 75 of the Third Judicial Region is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of Branch II of the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City is REINSTATED
with the modification that in Criminal Case No. 6886, Joel Dempsey is sentenced to
imprisonment of One (1) month and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00)
while in Criminal Case No. 69-86 he is ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.

The respondent court would shift jurisdiction over the case from the municipal trial
court to the Department of Social Services and Development. It is readily apparent that
the DSSD cannot take cognizance of and enforce the criminal sanctions of P.D. 603.
Besides, Christina Marie Dempsey is not an abandoned child in the strict sense of the
word as she is still in the custody and care of her mother. Art. 141 of P.D. 603 defines
an abandoned child as follows: "... Am abandoned child is one who has no parental care
or guardianship or whose parents or guardians have deserted him for a period of at least
six continuous months ... ." Article 161 cannot, therefore, be applied to the case at bar.
Thus, it is not the Department of Social Services and Development which has
jurisdiction but the Municipal Trial Court.

There is one other point which has to be corrected. As part of the civil liability in its
judgment, the trial court required the accused to recognize Christina Marie as his natural
child. This should not have been done. The recognition of a child by her father is
provided for in the Civil Code and now in the new Family Code. In this criminal
prosecution, where the accused pleaded guilty to criminal charges and the issue of
recognition was not specifically and fully heard and tried, the trial court committed
reversible error when it ordered recognition of a natural child as part of the civil liability
in the criminal case.

We also agree with the respondent regional trial court that the penalty imposed is
erroneous. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees is improper. Although
fathers like Joel Dempsey should be deterred from committing similar acts of
G.R. No. 58847 August 31,1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee,
vs.
BARTOLOME BARRANCO, accused-appellant.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Ang isang karaniwang kasabihan ay "ang karangalan ng isang tao ay katumbas ng
kanyang buhay," lalo na at kung ang pag-uusapan ay ang karangalan, dangal o puri ng
isang babae. Kaya nga sa batas, ang pagsira ng puri ng isang babae ay mabigat na
kasalanan at kung ito ay ginawa ng sapilitan ang parusang katumbas ay mabilanggo
habang buhay. Ano pa at kung ang pag-gahasa ay ginamitan ng sandatang
nakamamatay o ginawa ng dalawa o higit pang kalalakihan, o ang pinagsamantalahan
ay namatay o nasiraan ng bait, ang pataw na parusa sa batas ay bitay. 1 Ganoon pa man
sa ating saligang batas ay ipinagbabawal na ilapat ang parusang ito. 2
Ito ang paksa ng paghahabol na ito. Si Rosalia Barranco ay isang dalagang labing-siyam
na taong gulang lamang. Siya ang panganay sa pitong anak ng magasawang Jaime at
Aurora Barranco. Tuwing araw ng Sabado, ang magkakapatid maliban kay Rosalia ay
tumutulong sa kanilang mga magulang sa pagsasaka sa kanilang bukid sa Abanay, may
layong tatlong kilometro sa kanilang tirahan sa Madong, Janiuay, Iloilo. Naiiwang mag-
isa si Rosalia sa bahay upang siya ay tumingin sa alagang baboy at magsilbing bantay
ng kanilang tahanan.
Si Bartolome Barranco ay may-asawa at limang anak. Siya ay pinsang makalawa ng
ama ni Rosalia at pinakamalapit na kapitbahay ng pamilyang Barranco sa Baranggay
Madong. Ang pagitan ng dalawang tirahan ay humigit kumulang lamang sa isang daang
(100) metro. Si Rosalia ay kumare ng asawa ni Bartolome. Nang katanghalian ng ika-10
ng Pebrero, 1980, habang si Rosalia ay mag-isang natutulog sa kanilang bahay, bigla na
lamang niyang naramdaman na may taong nakadagan sa kanya. Nang imulat ni Rosalia
ang kanyang mga mata, nakita niya si Bartolome na hubot hubad sa kanyang ibabaw.
Kung sa papaanong paraan nakapasok sa kanilang bahay ang nasabing tao ay hindi niya
mawari. Nang makita niya ang mukha ni Bartolome akala niya na ang mga pangyayari
ay isang masamang panaginip lamang subalit siya ay nagitla nang itinutok ni Bartolome
ang isang patalim (butcher's knife) sa kanyang leeg. Binalaan siya nito na kung siya ay
magtatangkang gumalaw o sumigaw ay papatayin siya nito. Hindi makagalaw sa sindak
si Rosalia. Itinaas ni Bartolome ang kanyang palda at biglang binatak ang kanyang
panti.
Sapagkat magkadikit ang mga hita ni Rosalia, iniutos ni Bartolome na ibuka niya ang
mga ito. Hindi siya sumunod kaya siya ay binantaang muli na papatayin ni Bartolome
kapag hindi niya ibinuka ang kanyang mga hita. Lalong nanigas sa takot si Rosalia.
Hinawi ni Bartolome ang mga hita ni Rosalia, at tinangka nitong ipasok ang kanyang ari
sa ari ng dalaga. Matapos ang dalawang ulit na sapilitang pagtatangka ay nagtagumpay
si Bartolome na maipasok ang kanyang ari at tuluyang hinalay si Rosalia. Naramdaman
ni Rosalia ang matinding hapdi sa bungad ng kanyang ari. Pagkatapos nito, nagpahinga
si Bartolome ng mga limang minuto habang ang kanyang ari ay nakababad sa ari ni
Rosalia. Ipinagpatuloy niya ang kanyang makamundong pagnanasa. At habang
ginagahasa ni Bartolome si Rosalia hawak niya ang patalim na nakatutok sa leeg ni
Rosalia.
Bago tuluyang umalis si Bartolome, binalaan niya ang dalaga na huwag magsusumbong
sa kanyang mga magulang kung ayaw niyang mamatay. Sumusulak ang kalooban ni
Rosalia sa tindi ng galit bunga ng pagkalugso ng kaniyang puri, subalit hindi siya
makakibo dahil sa malaking takot na baka siya ay patayin ni Bartolome oras na isiwalat
niya ang nangyari. Kaya't minabuti na lamang niya na itikom ang kanyang bibig at tiisin
ang masaklap na kapalaran.
Noon ika-19 ng Marso, 1980, ika-siyam ng umaga noon, habang si Rosalia ay abalang
naghahanda ng pagkain ng alagang baboy, bigla na lamang siyang sinakmal ng buhat sa
likod ni Bartolome upang pagsamantalahang muli. Ang kanyang ina ay nagkataon na
wala sa bahay noon sapagkat dumalo sa pagtatapos ng isa sa kanyang mga kapatid na
babae. Sa kanyang pagkabigla, dinampot ni Rosalia ang isang pirasong kahoy at ipinalo
niya ito sa ulo ni Bartolome. Binitiwan siya ni Bartolome. Agad siyang lumabas ng
bahay at sinabing sisigaw ng saklolo kung hindi titigil si Bartolome. Dahil dito, agad-
agad umalis si Bartolome.
Pagdating ng kanyang ina, nuong mga ikalabing-isa ng umaga, nakita nito si Rosalia na
umiiyak. Itinanong nito ang dahilan. Hindi na nakatiis si Rosalia at napilitang ipagtapat
sa kanyang ina ang naganap noong ika-10 ng Pebrero. Kinabukasan, si Rosalia kasama
ang kanyang ina ay nagsumbong sa puno ng pulisya sa Janiuay, Iloilo. Pinayuhan sila
na ipasuri muna ang dalaga sa manggagamot ng NBI sa Iloilo City. Sa nasabing
tanggapan, sinuri siya ni Dr. Ricardo H. Jaboneta. Tiningnan pa kung siya ay buntis
(pregnancy test) at napagalaman na siya nga ay nagdadalang tao.
Noong ika-16 ng Abril, 1980, nagharap ng habla si Rosalia sa salang panggagahasa
laban kay Bartolome sa mababang hukuman (municipal circuit court) ng Janiuay-
Badiangan, Iloilo. Matapos madakip si Bartolome at ang paunang pagsisiyasat, ang
nauukol na habla ay isinampa ng punong taga-usig ng lalawigan sa hukuman. Nang
itanong kay Bartolome kung inaamin niya ang paratang laban sa kaniya sa hukuman,
tinanggihan niya ito kayat pinasimulan ang paglilitis hanggang sa ito ay matapos.
Noong ika-3 ng Abril, 1981 naglabas ng hatol ang hukuman. Napatunayan na si
Bartolome ay nagkasala ng panggagahasa sa pamamagitan ng sandatang nakamamatay.
Ipinataw sa kanya ang parusang pagkabilanggo ng habang-buhay kasama ang iba pang
mga parusa ayon sa batas at ipinagbabayad pa siya ng halaga ng usapin. Iniutos din ng
hukuman na kilalanin niyang anak ang bunga ng kanyang kasalanan. At sa dahilang siya
ay nakapiit mula pa ng ika-3 ng Hulyo,1980, iniutos din na ang kanyang
pansamantalang pagkabilanggo ay bibilangin na kasama sa parusang ipinataw sapagkat
siya ay lumagda sa isang kasunduan na tutupad sa lahat ng pinag-uutos sa mga
naparusahang nakapiit.
Naghahabol ngayon ang nasasakdal sa Hukumang ito at sinasabing: (1) hindi dapat
pinaniwalaan ang pahayag ng nagreklamo sa dahilang walang ibang nagpatotoo dito;
(2) na hindi siya dapat parusahan sa salang panggagahasa; at (3) hindi siya dapat utusan
na kilalaning anak niya ang naging supling ni Rosalia.
Matapos na suriin ang mga katibayang iniharap, walang makitang sapat na dahilan ang
Hukumang ito upang baguhin ang pasiya ng mababang hukuman.
Ang kasalanang panggagahasa ay totoong mahirap patunayan sapagkat ang karaniwang
nakakaalam lamang nito ay ang pinagsamantalahan at ang nagsamantala. Samakatuwid,
hindi maaasahan na mayroon pang ibang makapagpapahayag ng pangyayari. Hindi
pangkaraniwan na ang salang ito ay nagaganap na may saksi. Sa ganitong dahilan ang
hukuman ay umaasa sa katapatan ng pahayag ng nagsusumbong at tinitimbang ito laban
sa pagtanggi o pagpapasinungaling ng inuusig.
Sinasabi ng nasasakdal na hindi dapat paniwalaan ang mga pahayag ng nagsasakdal
dahil sa hindi pagkakatugma nito.
Una, di-umano ay nagpahayag ang nagsasakdal na siya ay natakot kaya siya ay
sumunod sa utos ng nasasakdal na ibuka ang kanyang mga hita. Subalit nang tanungin
siyang muli ng manananggol ng nasasakdal ang naging kasagutan niya ay ang
nasasakdal ang siyang humawi ng kanyang mga hita. Walang saliwa sa mga pahayag na
ito. Malinaw na dahil sa tindi ng takot ni Rosalia, ibinuka niya ang kanyang mga hita at
hinayaang mahawi ng nasasakdal ang kanyang mga hita.
Ikalawa, sinabi raw ng naghahabla na binunot ng nahahabla ang kanyang ari pagkatapos
siyang gamitin nito at ipinasok lamang ito nang muli siyang inabuso. Noong siya ay
tanungin ng manananggol ng nasasakdal ukol sa bagay na ito, ng sabi niya ay
nagpahinga ang nahahabla na ang kanyang ari ay nakababad sa loob ng kanyang ari.
Dapat alalahanin na ang naghahabla ay isang dalaga na noon lamang nakaranas ng
bagay na ito. Nakaramdam siya ng matinding sakit sa kanyang ari at bukod pa rito ay
ang malaking takot na sumagila sa kanya. Hindi maaasahan na malaman pa niya kung
binunot nga o hindi ng nasasakdal ang kanyang ari. Maaaring sinabi niyang nakababad
pa rin ang ari ng inuusig sa kanya kung pagkatapos ng paggalaw nito ang nasasakdal ay
hindi umalis sa pagkakadagan sa kanya habang ito ay sandaling nagpahinga.
Ikatlo, di-umano, tiwali ang pahayag ng naghahabla na noong ika-19 ng Marso nang
tinangkang halayin siyang muli ng nasasakdal ay pinalo niya ito ng kahoy sa ulo, at
sinabi rin niya na kung ang nahahabla ay lalapit, siya ay lalabas at hihingi ng saklolo.
Walang lisya dito. Maliwanag na sinabi ng nagsasakdal na pinalo niya sa ulo ang
nasasakdal kaya nabitawan siya nito. At malinaw rin na ang nagsasakdal ay lumabas at
sinabing hihiyaw siya kapag nagpatuloy sa masamang tangka ang nasasakdal.
Ganoon pa man, kung mayroon mang hindi pagkakatugma ang pahayag ng naghahabla,
ito ay sa mga maliliit na bahagi lamang at ito ay hindi sapat na dahilan upang hindi
paniwalaan ng hukuman ang kabuuan ng kanyang ipinahayag. Ang totoo nito, dahil sa
napakasaklap na naranasan ng nagsasakdal hindi maaasahan na matatandaan pa niya
ang pinakamaliliit na bahagi ng pangyayari. Ang isang saksi na ang pahayag ay
mayroong kaunting pagkakamali ang karaniwang nagsasabi ng katotohanan.
Sa kabilang dako, hindi kapani-paniwala ang pahayag ng nasasakdal na hindi niya
pinilit ang nagsasakdal noong ika-10 ng Pebrero. Kusang-loob daw ang kanilang
pagtatalik at may isang taon nang may pagkakaugnayan sila bago pa man dumating ang
nasabing araw. Ito ay napasinungalingan ng kinalabasan ng pagsusuri ng manggagamot
ng NBI sa ari ni Rosalia, gaya ng sumusunod:
labia majora and minora coaptated. Fourchette tense vestibular
moncoss vilacious. Hymen fleshy, presence of superficial laceration
at 9 o'clock position according to face of a watch. Edges fairly
coaptable and congested. Hymenal orifice originally angular and
adnidts glass tube three cms. diameter with moderate resistance.
Ito ang karaniwang kalagayan ng ari ng babaeng donselya matapos ang kanyang unang
karanasan. Samakatuwid, walang katotohanan ang salaysay ng nahahabla na may isang
taon na silang nagtatabi ng nagsasakdal bago pa noong ika-10 ng Pebrero.
Sinabi rin ng nasasakdal na ang nagsasakdal ang tumukso sa kanya kaya sila nagkaroon
ng kaugnayan. Pinangalawahan ito ng kaniyang asawa na si Salvacion Sarno na
nagpahayag na ang nagsasakdal ang hayagang umakit sa kanyang asawa at sa harap
niya ay ikinaskas pa ang suso nito sa asawa niya. Nang sinaway niya ito, ang sagot di-
umano sa kanya ay "wala kang pakialam sapagkat ako ay puta!.
Hindi kapanipaniwala! Walang anumang katibayan na iniharap ang nasasakdal na ang
nagsasakdal ay malandi at malaswang babae. Kahit na ang isang masamang babae ay
hindi ipagsisiksikan ang kanyang katawan sa isang lalaki laluna't kung nakaharap ang
asawa nito. At lalo nang mahirap paniwalaan kung magkumare sila. At kung totoo man
na ginawa ito ng nagsasakdal sa harapan ng asawa ng nasasakdal, bakit hindi man
lamang nagalit ito?
Na ang nasasakdal ay naglulubid lamang ng buhangin ay napansin din ng mababang
hukuman samantalang siya ay nagpapahayag dito. Nang sinasabi niyang sila ng
nagsasakdal ay mayroong kaugnayan, napansin ng hukom na matagal at atubili siya sa
pagsagot sa mga tanong. Nang usisain ng hukom kung bakit hindi siya agad
makapagsalita ang sagot niya ay siya ay natatakot, subalit hindi niya masabi kung ano
ang kaniyang kinatatakutan. 3 Maliwanag na ang kinatatakutan niya ay ang malaking DAHIL DITO, ang paghahabol ni Bartolome Barranco ay pinawawalang bisa at ang
kasinungalingan na hinahabi niya upang makaligtas siya sa kaniyang mabigat na sala. hatol ng mababang hukuman ay pinagtitibay ng walang anumang pagbabago maliban na
siya ay inuutusan na sustentohan ang naging bunga ng kanyang kasalanan sa halaga at
Ipinagdidiinan ng nasasakdal na ang sumbong laban sa kanya ay pagbabangong-puri panahon na papasiyahan ng mababang hukuman sa pagbasa ng hatol na ito at babayaran
lamang ng nagsasakdal sa dahilang ito ay nagdadalang-tao. Bakit kinakailangan pang niya ang nagsasakdal ng P 30,000.00.
ipaghayagan ang kapalaran ng nagsasakdal sa hukuman kung hindi ito ang
katotohanan? Kung sila man ay nagkaroon ng pinagdaanan hindi kaya higit na IPINAG-UUTOS.
mamarapatin pa ng nagsasakdal ang tiisin na lamang ang kanyang sinapit na kalagayan
sa halip na magdala ng malaking kahihiyan sa kanyang angkan? Ang nakikitang dahilan
ng Hukuman ay sapagkat nais ng nagsasakdal na maibangon ang kanyang nilugsong
puri at maipataw ang kaukulang parusa sa nasasakdal.

Ipinagtatalo ng nahahabla kung bakit hindi agad nagsumbong ang naghahabla sa

kanyang mga magulang; na hindi agad siya nagpasuri sa manggagamot; na hindi siya
humingi ng saklolo nang siya ay ginagahasa; na walang anumang sugat o gasgas sa
kaniyang katawan; na hindi napunit ang kanyang panti o damit; at bakit inireklamo sa
ina ang tangka noong ika-19 ng Marso subalit hindi naman inireklamo ang pagkagahasa
noong ika-10 ng Pebrero.

Ang sagot ay simple lamang. Malaki ang naging takot ng naghahabla. Tiniis niya ang
mapait na karanasan at ito ang dahilan kaya hindi siya agad nagsumbong sa kaniyang
mga magulang, hindi siya kaagad nagpunta sa manggagamot, at hindi siya nakasigaw
ng saklolo. Dahil sa kanyang takot, nahubaran siya ng malaya at napagsamantalahan ng
nasasakdal. Kaya wala siyang gasgas sa katawan. Wala siyang napunit na damit o panti.
Subalit matapos ang higit sa isang buwang pagtitiis, at dahil sa muling pagtatangka sa
kanyang purl, nagputok na ang kalooban ng nagsasakdal. Labis na ito. Sobra na. Dapat
ng kalusin. Dinampot niya ang isang putol ng kahoy at ipinukpok sa ulo ang nasasakdal.
At nang tangkaing ituloy ang masamang hangarin, sinabi ng nagsasakdal na lalabas siya
at hihiyaw ng saklolo. Ang kanyang matinding galit ay nangibabaw sa kanyang takot.
Saka lamang natigil ang maitim na hangarin ng nasasakdal.

Sapat na ito. Ang salang ginawa ng nahahabla ay malinaw. Hinalay niya ang karangalan
ng isang dalaga na naiwang nagusa sa kanilang bahay. Naturingan pa namang kamag-
anak ang nahahabla ng nag- uusig at pinakamalapit na kapitbahay na dapat asahan na
magmamalasakit ngunit siya pa ang nagsamantala dito. Dapat siyang managot sa
kanyang nakaririmarim na ginawa. Ang purl ng isang dilag ay kanyang buhay. Wasto
ang parusa na mabilanggo ng panghabang-buhay ang nasasakdal.

Subalit mayroong pagkakamali ang mababang hukuman ng ipag- utos nito na kilalanin
ng nahahabla bilang anak ang bunga ng kanyang kasalanan. Ang nahahabla ay may-
asawa. Hindi maaari na kilalanin ang batang bunga ng kasalanan na anak ng isang may-
asawa. 4 Subalit may katungkulan siyang sustentuhan ang bata ayon sa batas. 5Bukod pa
dito dapat pagbayarin ang nahahabla ang malaking pinsala na ginawa niya kay Rosalia
Barranco ng halagang P 30,000. 00. 6
G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30, 1979
RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE LEON,
BERNARDO DE LEON, ARLENE DE LEON and IRMA L.
VELOSO, respondents.
Ernesto T. Zshornack, Jr. for petitioner.
Jose W. Diokno Law Office private respondents the Leons.
Arturo E. Balbastro for privates respondent Veloso.
TEEHANKEE, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
The Court dismisses the petition which seeks to overrule respondent judge's orders
declaring that petitioner has failed to establish by competent evidence his alleged status
as an adopted child of the deceased Lazatin spouses and prays for judgment of this
Court "declaring as established the fact of (his) adoption as a son of the deceased
spouses entitling him to succeed in their estates as such." Respondent judge correctly
ruled that he could not allow petitioner (who had filed a motion to intervene in the
proceedings to probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin and to
settle her estate as her adopted son, after having earlier filed a motion to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of her pre-deceased husband as his admitted illegitimate [not
natural] son), over the opposition of private respondents, to introduce evidence that he
had "enjoyed ... the status of an adopted child of the without his first producing
competent and documentary that there had been judicial proceedings for his by the said
spouses which resulted in the final judgment of a competent court decreeing his
adoption.
On January 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin diamond intestate in Pasay City, survived
by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters, respondent Nora L. de
Leon, married to respondent Bernardo de Leon, and respondent Irma Lazatin, married
to Francisco Veloso.
One month after Mariano's death, his widow, Margarita de Asis, commenced an
intestate proceeding before the Court of First Instance of Pasay, docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 2326-P. Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne, claiming to be admitted illegitimate
(not natural) children of Dr. Lazatin with one Helen Munoz, intervened. Subsequently,
one Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another admitted illegitimate (not
natural) child.
Two months after or on April 11, 1974, the widow, Margarita de Asis, also died,
leaving a & holographic will executed on May 29, 1970, providing, among others, for a
legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a
legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education
to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.
During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the People's Bank
and Trust Company, Roxas Boulevard branch, which either she or respondent Nora L.
de Leon could open. Five days after Margarita's death, respondent Nora L. de Leon,
accompanied by her husband, respondent Bernardo de Leon, opened the safety deposit
box and removed its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of
her sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to her
mother. Respondent Nora L. de Leon claims that she opened the safety deposit box in
good faith, believing that it was held jointly by her and her deceased mother. Her sole
reason for opening the box was to get her stock certificates and other small items
deposited therein. When she was to close the deposit box, the bank personnel informed
her that she needed an authority from the court to do so, in view of her mother's death
and so, she removed everything from the box.
On June 3, 1974, private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of the late
Margarita de Asis, before docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P of respondent Court, Days
after having learned that respondent Nora L. de Leon had opened this safety deposit
box, petitioner's son, Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a motion in the probate court, claiming
that the deceased had executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate and
demanding its production. He likewise prayed for the opening of the safety deposit box.
Respondent Nora L. de Leon admitted that she opened the box but there was no will or
any document resembling a will therein.
Upon the order of the probate court, presided over by Judge Arsenio B. Alcantara, the
safety deposit box was opened on November 6, 1974, at which time it was found to be
empty, because prior thereto respondent Nora L. de Leon had already removed its
contents.
On November 22, 1974, or seven months after, the death of Margarita de Asis,
petitioner intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of the late
Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326- P), as an admitted illegitimate (not
natural) child.
Under the same date of November 22, 1974, petitioner's son, Ramon, filed a petition in
the estate proceedings of Margarita de Asis to examine private respondents on the
contents of the safety deposit box, Whereupon, on January 31, 1975, the probate court
ordered respondent Nora L. de Leon to deliver the properties taken from the safety
deposit box to the Clerk of Court. Subsequently, however, the two cases (Sp. Proc. No.
2326-P, Mariano Lazatin, and 2341-P, Margarita de Asis) were transferred to the sala of
respondent Judge Jose C. Campos, Jr.
On May 29, 1975, Judge Campos issued an order requiring counsel for respondents
Nora L. de Leon and Bernardo de Leon to produce all those papers and items removed
from the safety deposit box and to deliver the same to the custody of the court within
one week. Within the period ordered, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with the
Clerk of Court, not the items themselves, but two keys to a new safety deposit box
which could only be opened upon order of the court.
On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion
to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, as an adopted
child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased
Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, the petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was
later adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified on August 19, 1975 to state that
petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis.
On September 29, 1975, Judge Campos found respondent' Nora L. de Leon guilty of
contempt of court for not complying with the orders of January 31, 1975 and May 29,
1975, requiring her to produce and deliver to the court an the papers and items removed
from the safety deposit box. Her former counsel was also found guilty of contempt,
sentenced to pay a fine of P00.00 and suspended from appearing in the two cases (Sp.
Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano M. Lazatin, and Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, Margarita de Asis),
on her testimony that she, Nora L. de Leon, acted upon his advice.
Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate
of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, at which hearings petitioner presented no
decree of adoption in his, favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over private
respondents' objections, that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; he
had been supported by them until their death; formerly he was known as "Renato
Lazatin" but was compelled to change his surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased
spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife; that at first, he and
his wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis, father of Margarita, but a few
months later, they transferred to the Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by
the deceased spouses, where they continuously resided up to the present. Photographs
were also intended to be presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph of Irma Veloso where
she addressed herself as sister of petitioner; photograph of deceased Margarita de Asis
and petitioner when he was a boy; document showing that petitioners real name is
"Renato Lazatin." 1
Respondent court first reserved its ruling on private respondents' objections to the
admission of petitioner's evidence, but on November 14, 1975, when petitioner could
not present evidence on the issue of his alleged legal adoption, respondent court
discontinued the hearing and gave the parties time to file memoranda on the question of
the admissibility of the evidence sought to be introduced by petitioner.
On March 4, 1976, respondent court barred the introduction of petitioner's evidence
because: têñ.£îhqwâ£
All the evidence submitted by Renato and Ramon Sta. Clara through
their counsel do not prove or have no tendency to prove the existence
of any judicial proceeding where the adoption of the parties above
named were taken up by any court. Neither do the evidence tend to
establish the presence of any record of a proceeding in court where
the adoption of the above named persons was held. The evidence,
however, tends to prove a status of a recognized natural child which,
however, is not the legal basis for which Renato and Ramon seek to
intervene in this proceedings. In view thereof, and taking into
consideration the evidence heretofore presented by the petitioners,
any further introduction of similar evidence, documentary or oral,
would not prove or tend to prove the fact of their adoption but rather
of a recognized natural child.
Petitioner then filed on March 16, 1976, in both cases, a motion to declare as
established the fact of adoption in view of respondent Nora L. de Leon's refusal to
comply with the orders of respondent court to deposit the items she had removed from
the safety deposit box of Margarita de Asis. As authority therefor, petitioner invokes the
sanction of Rule 29, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, since according to him, the order
of the court for the production of the items in the safety deposit box can be considered
as an order for production and inspection of documents under Rule 27.
Private respondents opposed the motion, and on March 26, 1976, respondent court
denied petitioner's motion. On April 26, 1976, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited
with respondent court the items she had removed from the safety deposit box. An
inventory was conducted by respondent court, with notice to the parties, and the items
surrendered consisted only of pieces of jewelry and stock certificates.
On June 3,1976, respondent court, ruling on petitioners motion for definite resolution
on his previous n declare as established the fact of adoption, issued the f
order: têñ.£îhqwâ£
As far as the case of Renato Sta. Clara is his Petition to establish his
status as an adopted child, The Court has ruled that he has failed to
establish such status. The any motion for reconsideration unless based
on some documentary proof.
Hence, the petition at bar.
We find the ruling of the respondent court to be in conformity with law and
jurisprudence.
1. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem 2 which creates between two persons
a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 3 Only
an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down
under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. 4 It is not of natural law
at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. 5 To establish the relation, the statutory
requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute
nullity. 6 The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by
the person claiming its existence. The destruction by fire of a public building in which
the adoption papers would have been filed if existent does not give rise to a
presumption of adoption nor is the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding
to be presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to
evolve a presumption of its non-existence. 7 Where, under the provisions of the statute,
an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court constitute the
evidence by which such adoption may be established. 8
2. Petitioner's flow of evidence in the case below does not lead us to any proof of
judicial adoption. We can not pluck from his chain of evidence any link to the real
existence of a court decree of adoption in his favor. Petitioner's proofs do not show or
tend to show that at one time or another a specific court of competent jurisdiction
rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the late spouses an order approving his
adoption as a child of the latter. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof
are presented or attempted to be presented. Petitioner merely proceeds from a nebulous
assumption that he was judicially adopted between the years 1928 and 1932. By what
particular court was the adoption decreed or by whom was the petition heard, petitioner
does not even manifest, much less show. There are no witnesses cited to that adoption
proceeding or to the adoption decree. Apparently on the assumption that the adoption
was commenced in Manila, petitioner's counsel secured a certification from the Court of
first Instance of Manila which, however, negatively reported "(T)hat among the
salvaged records now available in this Office, there has not been found, after a diligent
search, any record regarding the adoption of Mr. Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara
allegedly filed sometime in the years 1928 to 1931 by the spouses Dr. Mariano M.
Lazatin and Margarita de Asis Lazatin." The certification of the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila "(T)hat our pre-war records relative to decisions of the Court of First Instance
were either destroyed or burned during the Liberation of the City of Manila," does not
furnish any legal basis for a presumption of adoption in favor of petitioner. This is
because there was no proof that petitioner was really adopted in Manila or that an
adoption petition was filed in the Court of first Instance of Manila by the deceased
spouses, where, after hearing, a judgment of approval was rendered by said court.
Moreover, if there was really such adoption, petitioner could have conveniently secured
a copy of the newpaper publication of the adoption as required under Section 4, Rule 99
of the Rules of Court (formerly Section 4, Rule 100) or a certification of the publishing
house to that effect. Petitioner's failure on this point is anotherer strong indication of the
non-existence of the one who gave the written consent of the non-existence of the
adoption paper. We also observed to the adoption (Section 3, Rule 99, Rules of Court),
whether the parents or orphanage, does not appear on this point is not so difficult and
such proof must be presented if only to prove the real existence of the adoption. And of
course, if the war, the clear right and duty of petitioner was to duly reconstitute the
records as provided by law.
3. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the
statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not
his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption. 9 Even evidence of
declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his
heir, and that he had adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the
deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not
sufficient to establish the fact of adoption.10 Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses
fed, clothed, educated, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted
child, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily
establish adoption of the child. 11 Withal, the attempts of petitioner to prove his
adoption by acts and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory
presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of petitioner's evidence is
rather to establish his status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an adopted child
which status of an admitted illegitimate child was — the very basis of his petitioner for
intervention in the estate proceedings of the late Dr. Lazatin, as above stated. (Supra, at
page 3 hereof)
We do not discount though that declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are
admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of persons who must know
the truth. 12 Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the
case admits and because greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof than
from its admission. 13 But, in proving an adoption, there is a better proof available and it
should be produced. The whereabouts of the child's family and circulation of the
jurisdiction in which they resided and investigation in those courts where adoption are
usually granted would surely produce an adoption order, if indeed there was an
order. 14 Besides, since the point in favor of receiving hearsay evidence upon matters of
family history or pedigree is its reliability, it has been set forth as a condition upon
which such evidence is received that it emanate from a source within the family.
Pursuant to this view, before a declaration of a deceased person can be admitted to
prove pedigree, or ancestry, the relationship of the declarant, by either of blood or
affinity to the family in question, or a branch thereof, must ordinarily be established by
competent evidence. 15 Section 33 of Rule 130 states: "The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or outside of the Philippines, or unable to testify, in respect to the
pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such actor declaration ..."
4. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption
proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such
secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the
instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss;
contents; although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the
court. 16 The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an
alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the
circumstances of the particular case.17 As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to
establish the former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss or
destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first beer. established that
such adoption paper really existed and was lost. This is indispensable. 18 Petitioner's
supposed adoption was only testified to by him and is allegedly to be testified to a
brother of the deceased Mariano M. Lazatin or others who have witnessed that the
deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child. If adoption was really made, the
records thereof should have existed and the same presented at the hearing or subsequent
thereto or a reasonable explanation of loss or destruction thereof, if that be the case,
adduced. 19
Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child does
not justify the conclusion that petitioner had been in fact judicially adopted by the
spouses nor does it constitute admissible proof of adoption.
We cannot entertain the plea of petitioner that the sanction of Rule 29 should be applied
to consider as established the fact of his adoption due to the refusal of respondent Nora
L. de Leon to produce the document of adoption, because first, the fact or real existence
of petitioner's adoption had not been established; second, there is no proof that such
document of adoption is in the possession of respondent Nora L. de
Leon; third, the motu proprio order of the court for Nora de Leon to produce the items
retrieved from the safety deposit box cannot be treated as a mode of discovery of
production and inspection of documents under Rule 27; and fourth, the items deposited
in the safety deposit box have already been surrendered by respondent Nora L. de Leon
on April 26; 1976 and no document of adoption in favor of petitioner was listed as
found in the safety deposit box.
5. As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot
properly intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No.
2341-P as an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an
estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate, either as one who
would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a
creditor. 20 A child by adoption cannot inherit from the parent creditor. by adoption
unless the act of adoption has been done in strict accord with the statue. Until this is
done, no rights are acquired by the child and neither the supposed adopting parent or
adopted child could be bound thereby. 21 The burden of proof in establishing adoption is
upon the person claiming such relationship. He must prove compliance with the statutes
relating to adoption in the jurisdiction where the adoption occurred. 22 A fortiori if no
hereditary interest in the estate can be gained by a claimant who failed to submit proof
thereof, whether the will is probated or not, intervention should be denied as it would
merely result in unnecessary complication. 23 To succeed, a child must be ligitimate,
legitimated, adopted, acknowledged illegitimate natural child or natural child by legal
fiction or recognized spurious child. 24
In the face of the verified pleadings of record (constituting judicial admissions) which
show that petitioner sought to intervene on November 22, 1974 in the estate
proceedings of his alleged adoptive father Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-
P) as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child, 25 while his intervention on August 20,
1975 in the estate of Margarita de Asis, widow of the deceased Dr. Lazatin (Sp. Proc.
No. 2341-P) was as her adopted child on the basis of the affidavit of a brother of the
deceased Dr. Lazatin, Benjamin Lazatin, executed August 19, 1975 (which affidavit
modified a first affidavit executed on May 31, 1975, which failed to estate by
"oversight" petitioner, but stated that affiant knew petitioner to be "an illegitimate son"
of Dr. Lazatin who later "legally adopted (him) as a son before the Court of First
Instance of Manila sometime between the years 1928 and 1921") and prescinding from
the question of whether a natural or spurious child may be legally adopted by the
putative father, we hold that no grave abuse of discretion nor error of law as committed
by respondent judge in issuing the questioned orders of March 4, 1976, March 26, 1976
and June 3, 1976 denying petitioner's petition "to declare as established in this
proceeding the fact of adoption" and denying "any motion for reconsideration unless
based on some documentary proof." The Court finds no basis to grant the affirmative
relief sought in this proceeding by petitioner for a rendition of judgment "declaring as
established the fact of your petitioner's adoption as a son of the deceased spouses
entitling him to succeed in their estates as such in accordance with the applicable law on
succession as to his inheritance."
Upon the filing of the petition, the Court issued on June 16, 1976 a temporary
restraining order; which as amended on July 21, 1976, restrained respondent judge
"from proceeding with the hearing scheduled on June 17, 1976 at 8:30 a.m., requiring
the submission of evidence to establish heirship in Special Proceedings No. 2326-P
entitled 'Intestate Estate of the Late Mariano M. Lazatin' and Special Proceedings No.
2341-P, entitled 'Testate Estate of the late Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin,' and from
proceeding with the probate of the alleged holographic will of the deceased Doñ;a
Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin scheduled on June 29, 1976, August 10 and 12, 1976
and on any other dates." With the Court's determination of the issues as herein set forth,
there is no longer any need for restraining the proceedings below and the said
restraining order shall be immediately lifted.
On January 24, 1977, the Court upon petitioner's motion resolved to conditionally allow
respondent judge "to take the deposition of petitioner's witnesses to perpetuate their
testimonies pursuant to Rule 134, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, subject to the Court's
ruling in due course on the admissibility of such testimonies." The Court thereby
permitted in effect the advance testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, principally among
them Rafael Lazatin and Esteban L. Lazatin, both brothers of the deceased Dr. Mariano
L. Lazatin and as stated in petitioner's motion of January 11, 1977: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Substantially, the testimony of the above-named witnesses will be on
the fact that they had been informed by the deceased spouses,
Mariano and Margarita Lazatin that your petitioner was their
[Mariano's and Margarita's] judicially adopted son and to elicit further
from them the fact that your petitioner enjoys the reputation of being
their judicially adopted son in the Lazatin family.
The Court's resolution allowing the advance testimonies of petitioner's witnesses was
but in application of the Court's long standing admonition to trial courts is reaffirmed
in Lamagan vs. De la Cruz, 26, "to be liberal in accepting proferred evidence since even
if they were to refuse to accept the evidence, the affected party will nevertheless be
allowed to spread the excluded evidence on the record, for review on appeal." The
Court therein once again stressed the established rule that "it is beyond question that
rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence
during the course of the trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of
separate appeal or review on certiorari, but are to be assigned as errors and reviewed in
the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of
the case," 27 and that a party's recourse when proferred evidence is rejected by the trial
court is to make a offer stating on the record what a party or witness would have
testified to were his testimony not excluded, as well as to attach to the record any
rejected exhibits.

At the continuation of the proceedings below for declaration of heirship and for probate
of the alleged holographic the deceased Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin, pet who has
failed to establish his status as an alleged ;m child of Margarita de Asis (unless, as
reserved to him by the court below, he can show some documentary proof),and whose
intervention in the estate of the deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin is as an admitted
illegitimate child, win have to decide whether he will pursue his first theory of having
the of such admitted illegitimate child of said deceased. Whatever be his theory and his
course of action and whether or not he may be duly snowed to intervene in the
proceedings below as such alleged admitted illegitimate child, his recourse in the event
of an adverse ruling against him is to make a formal offer of proof and of his excluded
evidence, oral and documentary, and seek a reversal on an appeal in due course.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed and the questioned orders denying

petitioner's petition below "to declare as established in this proceeding the fact of [his]
adoption" are hereby affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued on June 16, 1976
and amended on July 21, 1976 is ordered lifted, effective immediately. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 79955. January 27, 1989.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES
AND ZENAIDA CARREON CERVANTES, Petitioners, v. GINA CARREON
FAJARDO AND CONRADO FAJARDO, Respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the person of the
minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. In a resolution, dated 5 October 1987, the Court
resolved to issue the writ returnable to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Pasig at the hearing of 12 October 1987 at 8:30 a.m. Said Judge was directed to hear the
case and submit his report and recommendation to the Court.
On 3 December 1987, said Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig submitted to
the Court his report and recommendation, also dated 3 December 1987.
It appears that the minor was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo
and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the
child for adoption to Gina Carreon’s sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners
Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody
of the child when she was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the
adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina
Carreon on 29 April 1987. 1
The appropriate petition for adoption (Sp. Proc. No. 057-B) was filed by herein
petitioners over the child before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Fourth Judicial
District, Branch 67 which, on 20 August 1987, rendered a decision 2 granting the
petition. The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo. The court ordered that the
child be "freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal
obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents
and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and
capable of inheriting their estate." 3
Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents, herein petitioners Nelson and
Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the
amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused
to accede to the demand.
As a result, on 11 September 1987, while petitioners were out at work, the respondent
Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners’ residence in Angono,
Rizal, on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Respondent Gina
Carreon brought the child to her house in Parañaque. Petitioners thereupon demanded
the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give
up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had
executed was not fully explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners that she will,
however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of
P150,000.00.chanrobles law library : red
Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case study on the adoption
and submitted a report thereon to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal in the adoption case,
testified on 27 October 1987 before the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig
in connection with the present petition. She declared that she had interviewed
respondent Gina Carreon on 24 June 1987 in connection with the contemplated
adoption of the child. During the interview, said respondent manifested to the social
worker her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners. 4
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter’s
welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child
under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to
rule otherwise. 5 In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost
consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking
into account the resources and moral as we]l as social standing of the contending
parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion. 6
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other
than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law
husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon
will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop
into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had
previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for
almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like
Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true
father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other
hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially,
and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the
natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only jobless but also
maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and
consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving
the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting
parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. 7 The adopting
parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child 8 and exercise
parental authority and responsibility over him. 9
ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Hon. Eutropio Migrino, the Petition is GRANTED. The custody and care of
the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to whom they
properly belong, and respondents are ordered (if they still have not) to deliver said
minor to the petitioners immediately upon notice hereof. This resolution is immediately
executory.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 103695. March 15, 1996.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
JAIME B. CARRANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 24453 which affirmed in toto the decision of Branch XVI of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, granting private respondents’ petition for the
adoption of Midael C. Mazon with prayer for the correction of the minor’s first name
"Midael" to "Michael."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petition below was filed on September 2, 1988 by private respondents spouses
Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then
fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since
he was seven years old. When private respondents were married on January 19, 1986,
the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody. Private
respondents prayed that judgment be rendered:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) Declaring the child Midael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and
purposes;
b) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally change to that of the petitioners and that the
first name which was mistakenly registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to
"MICHAEL."cralaw virtua1aw library
The RTC set the case for hearing on September 21, 1988, giving notice thereof by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Cavite and by
service of the order upon the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the
Office of the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the
name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction
sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because
the petition was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Thereafter the case was heard during which private respondent Zenaida Caranto,
Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the minor testified. Also presented
was Carlina Perez, social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, who endorsed the adoption of the minor, being of the opinion that the
same was in the best interest of the child.
On May 30, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision. The RTC dismissed the opposition of
the Solicitor General on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) applies only to the correction of entries
concerning the civil status of persons. It cited Rule 108, S1, which provide that "any
person interested in an act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of the
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto." It held that the correction of
names in the civil registry is not one of the matters enumerated in Rule 108, S2 as
"entries subject to cancellation or correction." According to the trial court, the error
could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of action
and inconvenience to the petitioners.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the herein petition and declaring
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Michael C.Mazon is, for all legal intents and purposes, the son by adoption of
petitioners Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto;
2. Henceforth, the minor’s name shall be Michael Caranto, in lieu of his original name
of Michael Mazon, or Midael Mazon, as appearing in his record of birth;
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Cavite City, the birthplace of said minor, is hereby
directed to accordingly amend (and) correct the birth certificate of said minor; and
4. This judgment shall retroact to September 2, 1988, the date of filing of the herein
petition.
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that
the correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As
additional ground for his appeal, he argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case for adoption because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name
given was "Michael," instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his
certificate of Live Birth.
On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic, 2 invoked by the
petitioner in support of its plea that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case, was inapplicable because that case involved a substantial error. Like the trial
court, it held that to require the petitioners to file a separate petition for correction of
name would entail "additional time and expenses for them as well as for the
Government and the Courts" .
Hence this petition for review. Private respondents were required to comment. Despite
opportunity given to them, however, they did not file any comment.
The first issue is whether on the facts stated, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the
private respondents’ petition for adoption. Petitioner’s contention is that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption because the notice by
publication did not state the true name of the minor child. Petitioner invokes the ruling
in Cruz v. Republic. 3 There the petition for adoption and the notice published in the
newspaper gave the baptismal name of the child ("Rosanna E. Cruz") instead of her
name in the record of birth ("Rosanna E. Bucoy"). it was held that this was a
"substantial defect in the petition and the published order of hearing." Indeed there was
a question of identity involved in that case. Rosanna E. Bucoy, as common experience
would indicate.
The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the
child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves merely the substitution
of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name
would read "Michael." Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly
clerical one. Changing the name of the child from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C
Mazon" cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names "can be read and
pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." The purpose
of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who gave any objection to
the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by
publication of notice in this case.
For this reason we hold that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the
minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial
court, correctly did so.
With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the
Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents’ prayer for the
correction of the name of the child in the civil registry.
Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this
case and because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial court,
insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and without force
or effect.
The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the
correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons. Rule 108, S2 plainly
states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
§2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss
or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation;
(n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
This case falls under letter" (o)," referring to "changes of name." Indeed, it has been the
uniform ruling of this court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code — to implement which Rule
108 was inserted in the rules of Court in 1964 — covers "those harmless and innocuous
changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly misspelled." 4 Thus in Yu v.
Republic 5 it was held that "to change ‘Sincio’ to ‘Sencio’ which merely involves the
substitution of the first vowel ‘i’ in the first name in to the vowel ‘e’ amounts merely to
the righting of a clerical error. "In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic 6 it was held that "the
change of petitioner’s name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo
is a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is appropriate."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding. Now §3 of this provides:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
§3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an
indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be had. 7 As
he was not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision
of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The
absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings
subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment. 8
Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required by Rule 108,
§4 which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
§4. Notice and publication. — Upon filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof
to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to
be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for
adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, S4. In that notice only the prayer for
adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in addition the correction
of his name in the civil registry was also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus
deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an
indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction of
entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was
concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject
matter. 9

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

MODIFIED by deleting from the decision of the Regional Trial Court the order to the
local civil registrar to change the name "MIDAEL" to "MICHAEL" in the birth
certificate of the child. In other respects relating to the adoption of Midael C. Mazon,
the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992 Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which
is the surname of the petitioner.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the Department of
COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents. Social Welfare and Development, Regional Office, Region V,
Legaspi City, and the Local Civil Registrar of Tiwi, Albay, with
The Solicitor General for petitioner. copies of this decision. 6

Mariano B. Miranda for private respondent. Herein petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as earlier stated, affirmed the
aforesaid decision of the court below. Hence, this present petition with the following
assignment of errors:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Family

REGALADO, J.:
Code cannot be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed
by Zenaida C. Bobiles; and
Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on February
20, 1990 1 which affirmed in toto the decision of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court
2 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's
of Legaspi City 2 granting the petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor
decision which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of
Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review
spouses Dioscoro Bobiles and Zenaida C. Bobiles. 7
on certiorari.

The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat,
February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child
then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4)
and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by
months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, docketed therein as
either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its
Special Proceeding No. 1386. 3
decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive
Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new
The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
order dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. 4 The
order was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served on the Solicitor
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should
General; Assistant Provincial Fiscal Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of
be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her
the child; and the social worker assigned to the court. A copy of said order was posted
husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption
on the bulletin board of the court and in the other places it had required for that purpose.
by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the
Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. 5
petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason
Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption. We are not persuaded.
Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the hearing, the
testimonies of herein private respondent, together with that of her husband, Dioscoro
Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-inclusion of
Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and
Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect, hence its prayer for an
Development were taken and admitted in the proceedings.
outright dismissal on that score. It could not be taking exception only on the ground of
non-joinder since petitioner must be aware that non-joinder is not a ground for the
On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows: dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. 8 We further apprehend that this
objection has been raised for the first time on appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless,
ACCORDINGLY, it is declared that henceforth, the minor child, we shall clarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in its aforestated assignment of
JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience errors.
and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all
intents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant
provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application
will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon
events foreign to the will of the holder. 9 The term expresses the concept of present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against
arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free
society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. 10 Vested
rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also
an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. 11
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a
petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs.
Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under
said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the
same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was
already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial
court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction
being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court
is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action.12 We do not find in the present case such facts as would constitute it as an
exception to the rule.
The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local and foreign
jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise that Article 185 of the Family
Code is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective
construction in the sense that they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings,
as well as to future actions. However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural
steps completed before their enactment. 13
Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and procedural
statutes are generally retroactive in that they apply to pending proceedings and are not
confined to those begun after their enactment although, with respect to such pending
proceedings, they affect only procedural steps taken after their enactment. 14
The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending actions and
proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so
extensive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes
into effect, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the
question of procedure arises.15
The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a case is
substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A petition cannot be
dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and
effect at the time. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and
substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court
acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. 16 To repeat, the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil
cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although
of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance. 17
On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code should
not apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have modified the trial court's
decision by granting the adoption in favor of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles
only, her husband not being a petitioner. We do not consider this as a tenable position
and, accordingly, reject the same.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for
adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B"
and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his
wife in adopting the child. The pertinent parts of his written consent read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually
desire to adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still a
minor being six (6) years old, likewise residing at 18 C. Imperial
Street, Legaspi City, Albay, also in the Philippines;
3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of said
minor child, JASON CONDAT, before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations court, now the Regional Trial Court in Legaspi City, Albay
in the Philippines;
4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father, am giving
my lawful consent to this adoption of said minor child, JASON
CONDAT;
5. That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES, and I
have continuously reared and cared for this minor child, JASON
CONDAT since birth;
 6. That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a kind of
maternal and paternal love for the boy as our very own, exercising
therein the care, concern and diligence of a good father toward him;
7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF
CONSENT for whatever it is worth in the premises as to the matter of
adoption of this minor child, JASON CONDAT, by my wife
ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and by me, DIOSCORO C.
BOBILES, in any court of justice; (Emphasis supplied.) 18
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court,
are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then obtaining, and
by reason of his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an
affidavit of consent on his part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is
evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the
formal requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations of
substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be compromised by
arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply to this
case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that adoption
statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect
the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the
adoption. 19 The modern tendency of the courts is to hold that there need not be more
than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of the
proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and technical construction of
the statute as to defeat its intention and beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings
where every material requirement of the statute was complied with.
In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring the judicial
microscope to bear upon the case in order that every slight defect may be enlarged and
magnified so that a reason may be found for declaring invalid an act consummated
years before, but rather to approach the case with the inclination to uphold such acts if it
is found that there was a substantial compliance with the statute. 20 The technical rules
of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed
more important that the petition should contain facts relating to the child and its parents,
which may give information to those interested, than that it should be formally correct
as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if
it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give
the court jurisdiction. 21
In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and
welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration. 22 The welfare of a
child is of paramount consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the
propriety of its adoption by another, and the courts to which the application for adoption
is made is charged with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and, to bring
those interests fully before it, it has authority to make rules to accomplish that
end. 23 Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound discretion of the court.
This discretion should be exercised in accordance with the best interests of the child, as
long as the natural rights of the parents over the child are not disregarded. In the
absence of a showing of grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving
official will not be disturbed. 24
In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will
be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural
parents. 25 The representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition for adoption 26 and the trial
court dispensed with the trial custody for several commendatory reasons, especially
since the child had been living with the adopting parents since infancy. 27 Further, the
said petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.
The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption
and we find no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly stated by respondent
court: "Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the
foregoing doctrine, 28 We are of the opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption
issued by the court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the
child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life." 29
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child
to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care
and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection
of society and family in the person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples
or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the
person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law. 30
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to
set aside the Decision1 dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General
Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which
dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim
and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23
June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose
parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban).
Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to
make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children2 were named
Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely
eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March
1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His
date of birth is 1 August 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records
and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December
2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty5 given
under Republic Act No. 85526(RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of
a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258
and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle
was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months
old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent.8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of
Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her
natural parents were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification for
Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The
trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the
petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and
Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied
in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that
petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA
8552. Petitioner’s argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was
untenable because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency
and certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a
party in this case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is
merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint
adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an
emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain
obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not
petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
 The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty
of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to
adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case
since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore
necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had
already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her
husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision
denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7,
Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and
legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring
for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a
position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of
the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of
the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological
parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at
least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that
he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any
appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in
his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her
country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her
Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly
with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the
other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
(Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted
is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for
adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the
trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And
third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being
an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552
such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of
the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain
such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in
his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the
latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the
trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness
and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and
well-being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall
not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains
the age of majority or 18 years of age16 — emancipation terminates parental authority
over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible
for all acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of
legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse
of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be
severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of
the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and
obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and
support in keeping with the means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee
shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.
However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on
testamentary succession shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter
and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the
child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and
compulsory heirs of each other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental
authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the
rights19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the
mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime
and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the
adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled20 such as
support21 and successional rights.22
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed
to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned
children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless
couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in
the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion
of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a
manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied
with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended
to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the
Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the
case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the
proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the
matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption.
(Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have
jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit
petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of
his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.

We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until
and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint
adoption is mandatory.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15

September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL.
PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23828 February 28, 1966
PAULINA SANTOS and AURORA SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
GREGORIA ARANZANSO and DEMETRIA VENTURA, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for the petitioners.
Eulogio Rafael for the respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was filed by Simplicio
Santos and Juliana Reyes in the Court of First Instance of Manila on June 4,
1949.1 Paulina Santos was then 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old. The
petition, which was under oath, alleged inter alia, that the whereabouts of the minors'
nearest of kin, particularly their parents, were unknown; that since the outbreak of the
war said minors have been abandoned by their respective parents; and that for years,
since their infancy, said children have continuously been in petitioners' care and
custody. A guardian ad litem Crisanto de Mesa, was thereafter appointed for the minors.
Said guardian ad litem forthwith gave his written consent to the adoption. Paulina
Santos, being over fourteen years of age, likewise gave her written consent thereto.2
After due publication and hearing, the adoption court (CFI) rendered on August 25,
1949 a decision, hereunder quoted in full:
This is a petition for the adoption of the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and
Aurora Santos Reyes by the spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana R. Santos.
After due publication in the "National Weekly", a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Manila, once a week for three consecutive weeks, the
case was then set for trial. The office of the Solicitor General was duly notified
of the petition and at the hearing did not offer any objection.1äwphï1.ñët
From the evidence presented at the hearing, it appears that the petitioners have
been married for the past twenty-seven years and have no children of their
own. They desire to adopt the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos
Reyes, both of whom are and for years have been living under their care and
custody; that the former, since she was barely three months old has already
been taken care of by them up to the present time, and the latter has been cared
for since she was only fifteen days old. Paulina Santos Reyes is now seventeen
years old and has given her consent to the adoption as shown by her signature
at the foot of the petition. She ratified the same in open Court. Both parents of
the minors have long been unheard from and in spite of diligent efforts of the
petitioners to locate them, they could not be found. The consent to the adoption
has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. The
petitioners are both proprietors and have substantial income, more than enough
to support and educate the minors. The Court is of the opinion that this
adoption will be for the best interest and welfare of the minors.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the petition of the spouses Simplicio
Santos and Juliana R. Santos to adopt the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and
Aurora Santos Reyes and in accordance with Rule 100 of the Rules of Court in
the Philippines, hence forth, the minors are freed from all legal obligations to
their natural parents and are, to all legal intents and purposes the children of
the petitioners.
NOW, ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, August 25, 1949.
No appeal was taken from the aforesaid decision.
Subsequently — eight years later — on October 21, 1957, Juliana Reyes died, in
Manila, without testament. On November 25, 1957 Simplicio Santos filed in the Court
of First Instance of Manila a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana
Reyes.3 In said petition he stated among other things that the surviving heirs of the
deceased are: he, as surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17
years of age, respectively. In the same petition, he asked that he be appointed
administrator of the estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the deceased, filed on January 2,
1958 an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator. For her grounds she
asserted that Simplicio Santos" marriage to the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and
thus void: and that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was likewise
void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living and
had not abandoned them. An answer to the opposition was filed by Simplicio Santos on
March 7, 1958 and oppositor Aranzanso filed a reply thereto on March 17, 1958.
Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise that she is the first cousin of the deceased Juliana
Reyes and adding that she is the mother of the child Paulina Santos, filed on March 19,
1959 an opposition to the petition of Simplicio Santos to be named administrator, and,
moreover, thereunder adopted, as her own, the pleadings filed by Gregoria Aranzanso.
By order of April 6, 1959, the Court of First Instance decided the point in dispute,
ruling that the validity of the adoption in question could not be assailed collaterally in
the intestate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 34354). From the order Gregoria Aranzanso
and Demetria Ventura appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In its decision, promulgated on September 14, 1964, the Court of Appeals reversed the
appealed order, finding instead that the adoption was null and void ab initio due to the
absence of consent thereto by the natural parents of the minor children, which it deemed
a jurisdictional defect still open to collateral attack.
After denial of their motion for reconsideration by the Court of Appeals, Paulina Santos
and Aurora Santos appealed to this Court by way of petition for review, filed on
November 18, 1964, to which due course was given. Five months after submission of
this case for decision — or on October 14, 1965 — petitioners herein filed a petition for
preliminary injunction, and later, on October 26, 1965, a supplemental petition therefor,
to stop the trial court from allowing Gregorio Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura, as well
as of two other persons, namely, Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, to intervene in the
settlement proceedings or to withdraw cash advances from the estate.
It was alleged in the petition and supplemental petition for preliminary injunction that
on September 22, 1965 the probate court issued an order allowing Gregoria Aranzanso
and Demetria Ventura to intervene in the settlement proceedings of Juliana Reyes'
estate (Sp. Proc. No. 34354); that on October 2, 1965 said court issued an order
allowing, on previous motions therefor, withdrawal of the sum of P7,000 each, under
bond, to all the parties,including Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura; that on
October 7, 1965 two strangers to the proceedings — the aforesaid sisters Consuelo and
Pacita Pasion — filed a motion, stating that they are also first cousins of the decedent
and praying that an order be issued allowing them to withdraw the sum of P7,000 each
under bond; that on October 13, 1965 the same Pasion sisters filed a supplemental
motion in the same proceedings praying that their motion of October 7 be treated as a
motion to intervene; that on October 18, 1965 the probate court issued an order
allowing the Pasion sisters to intervene in the settlement proceedings and allowing them
to withdraw under bond the sum of P7,000 each from the funds of the estate.
On November 4, 1965 respondents, together with Consuelo and Pacita Pasion — who
thereby submitted themselves to this Court's jurisdiction and stated that they, "for
purposes of expediency, are also denominated respondents" — filed their "Comment",
as required by this Court, opposing the aforesaid petition for preliminary injunction. On
November 15, 1965 this Court granted the prayer for preliminary injunction and the writ
was issued upon posting of a bond of P5,000 on November 20, 1965. Respondents
however moved for reconsideration or modification thereof on November 23, 1965,
stating inter alia that they would now be precluded from taking part in the scheduled
hearing for settlement of the accounts of the special administratrix (Araceli A. Pilapil).
On November 26, 1965 we ordered modification of the preliminary injunction, so that
on November 29, the writ was modified so as to enjoin the probate court, until further
orders: (1) from hearing and/or approving the settlement of special administratrix's
accounts; (2) from allowing any sale, disposition or disbursement of the estate except
when essential for strictly maintenance purposes; and (3) from allowing respondents,
Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura, or Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, or any of
them, to receive any advance, cash or otherwise, from the funds of the intestate estate.
The principal issue on the merits in this appeal is whether respondents-oppositors
Aranzanso and Ventura, could assail in the settlement proceedings the adoption decree
in favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos. In sustaining their right to make such a collateral
attack, the respondent Court of Appeals rested as abovementioned on the premise that
failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering
the adoption void ab initio. In its view, said consent was not properly dispensed with,
not only because the evidence adduced in the adoption proceedings was insufficient to
support a finding that the parents had abandoned the children, but also since the
adoption court fatally omitted to expressly and specifically find that such abandonment
in fact occurred.
In this regard it should be stated that the Court of Appeals completely relied on
American jurisprudence and authorities to the effect that parental consent to the
adoption is a jurisdictional requisite (E.g., 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children, Section 45[a]
p. 435; Whetmore vs. Fratello, 282 P2d 667, 670). The point to remember, however, is
that under our law on the matter, consent by the parents to the adoption is not an
absolute requisite:
SEC. 3. Consent to adoption.—There shall be filed with the petition a written
consent to the adoption signed by the child if over fourteen years of age and
not incompetent, and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or
hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child, or if there are no such
parents by the general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child
is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society
or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or
by such person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the
consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required. (Rule 100, Old Rules
of Court.)4
Stated otherwise, if the natural parents have abandoned their children, consent to the
adoption by the guardian ad litem suffices. This brings as to the question whether in the
proceedings at bar the Court of Appeals can still review the evidence in the adoption
case and conclude that it was not sufficiently established therein that the parents of
Paulina and Aurora Santos had abandoned them.
First of all, it is not quite accurate to say that the adoption court made no determination
of the fact of abandonment. As quoted earlier, it is stated in the decision of the adoption
court, that:
From the evidence presented at the hearing it appears that the petitioners have
been married for the past twenty-seven years and have no children of their
own. They desire to adopt the minors Paulina Santos [y] Reyes and Aurora
Santos [y] Reyes, both of whom are and for years have been living under their
care and custody; that the former, since she was barely three months old has
already been taken care of by them up to the present time, and the latter has
been cared for since she was only fifteen days old. Paulina Santos [y] Reyes
is now seventeen years old. . . . Both parents of the minors have long been
 unheard from and in spite of diligent efforts of the petitioners to locate them,
they could not be found. The consent to the adoption has been given by the
guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Abandonment — under persuasive American rulings — imports "any conduct on the
part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child". It means "neglect or refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children."
(2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, Sec. 32, pp. 886-887.) It can thus readily be seen that altho
the CFI judgment approving the adoption does not use the word "abandoned", its
findings sufficiently contain a set of facts and circumstances which truly constitutes a
finding of abandonment.
Coming now to the power of the Court of Appeals to review in this case the finding of
abandonment made by the adoption court, we find that even under American
jurisprudence — relied upon, as stated, by said Court — the settled rule is that even
when the jurisdiction of an inferior or special tribunal depends upon the existence of a
fact to be established before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be
questioned in a collateral attack upon its order (In re McKaeg's Estate, 141 Cal. 403, 74
Pac. 1039, 1040; In re Camp's Estate, 131 Cal. 469, 63 Pac. 736).
Anent this point the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series,
Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of
proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because
the fact needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial
determination of some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of
kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the
order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity
of the decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily
in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the
determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be
collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children
would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all
investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by different
tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have been valid,
while another court would hold it to have been of no avail.
Freeman on Judgments says the same thing:
In general, therefore, where the right of the court to assume jurisdiction of a
cause and proceed to judgment depends upon the ascertainment of facts in
pais and the court retains jurisdiction it thereby impliedly adjudges that the
requisite jurisdictional facts exist and having found such facts in favor of
jurisdiction, its decision in this respect, whether erroneous or not, cannot be
questioned in a collateral proceedings, for a presumption arises in such cases,
when the validity of the judgment is attacked, that the necessary jurisdictional
facts were proven. . . . . (Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720.)
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, construing a statute akin to our law in this regard,
said in Parsons vs. Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N.W. 147, 148:
The statute to be considered is section 4022, Rev. St. 1878, which reads as
follows: "No such adoption shall be made without the written consent of the
living parents of such child unless the court shall find that one of the parents
has abandoned the child or gone to parts unknown." Thus it will be seen that
upon the fact being established that the living parent has abandoned his child,
he is deemed by the statute to have thereby relinquished all parental right to be
consulted in respect to the child's welfare, and his consent to the adoption is
therefore dispensed with. The term "abandon" obviously means no more than
neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and
support which parents owe to their children. The fact of abandonment,
judicially determined, was essential to the jurisdiction; not essential that it
should be determined on proper evidence, necessarily, or in accordance with
the truth, because mere error in that regard does not affect jurisdicition. If
jurisdiction be obtained to determine a fact, its determination wrong or on
insufficient or improper evidence is immaterial oh the question of legal right to
proceed judicially to the next step. That is deemed to be elementary... A
judicial determination may be contrary to conclusive evidence, or legal
evidence, or without any evidence, yet cannot be impeached for want of
jurisdiction. Van Fleet, Coll. Attack, Secs. 663, 665. That rule applies to all
judicial proceedings. . . . .
It follows, therefore, that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing, under a collateral
attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of Paulina and Aurora
Santos had abandoned them. This is so even if such fact of abandonment is deemed
jurisdictional, a point which we need not — and do not — rule upon in this case.
For the same reason, it is not in point to argue here that Simplicio Santos in fact
concealed the adoption proceedings from the natural parents, thereby rendering the
judgment obtained therein null and void or being secured by extrinsic fraud. The rule is
well recognized that a judgment can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud only in
a separate action brought for that purpose; not by way of collateral attack (Gomez vs.
Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717; Ramos vs. Mañalac, 89 Phil. 270).
Anent the alleged lack of notice of the adoption proceedings on the natural parents,
suffice it to mark that adoption is a proceeding in rem5 and that constructive notice,
such as the publication duly made as aforesaid, is enough where the residence of the
parents is unknown (2 Am. Jur., 2d, Adoption, Sec. 56, p. 906). Notice, moreover, is not
required in adoption cases in regard to the abandoning parent (Parsons vs. estate of Juliana Reyes. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is dissolved,
Parsons, supra). except insofar as it enjoins the intervention or allowance of withdrawals of properly
from the estate by Gregoria Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo and Pacita Pasion,
Assuming that Simplicio Santos was not validly married to Juliana Reyes, it will not in the concept of heirs, as to which it is hereby made permanent. No costs. So ordered.
make any difference as far as the right of respondents to intervene in the intestate
proceedings is concerned. Juliana Reyes should then be deemed to have filed the
petition for adoption as a person whose status is single, not married. The defect would
then lie only as to Simplicio Santos, who, as allegedly married to another person (a
point that we do not decide in this case), could not adopt without joining his wife in the
petition.6 It being the estate of Juliana Reyes that is the subject matter of the settlement
proceedings, the flaw, if any, would not affect the consideration of the right of Paulina
and Aurora Santos to succeed as adopted children of Juliana Reyes, to the exclusion of
respondents.

It must not be forgotten that the philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote the
welfare of the child. Accordingly, the modern trend is to encourage adoption (Prasnik
vs. Republic, 5 O.G. 1942) and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote that objective.

From 2 Corpus Juris Secundum 375-376 we quote:

Accordingly, as the main purpose of adoption statutes is the promotion of the

welfare of children, bereft of the benefits of the home and care of their real
parents, wherever possible without doing violence to the terms of the statute,
such a construction should be given adoption laws as will sustain, rather than
defeat, this purpose.

Although, as against the interests of the child, the proceedings must be strictly
in accordance with the statute, there is a tendency on the part of the courts,
however, where the adoption has been fully consummated, to construe the
statute with a reasonable degree of liberality, to the end that the assumed
relationship and the intention of the parties be upheld, particularly as against
strangers to the proceedings collaterally attacking them . . . .

From all the foregoing it follows that respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and Ventura
and those who, like them (Pasion sisters), claim an interest in the estate of Juliana Reyes
as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view
of the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first cousins
(Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption
must be — as in the instant case — considered valid.

Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the order of the
probate court a quosustaining the adoption, dated April 6, 1959, is affirmed.
Respondents Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura as well as Consuelo and Pacita
Pasion are declared without right to intervene as heirs in the settlement of the intestate
G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988
RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father,
ROMEO DAOANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO
AGONOY and AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered
by the respondent judge * in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson
Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners", the dispositive part of
which reads, as follows:
Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth Quirino
Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and purposes,
the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and
Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal obedience
and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel Bonilla and
Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and
Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names
'Bonilla' and 'Marcos' be changed with "Agonoy", which is the family
name of the petitioners.
Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting parents
shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code.
Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records of
the Local Civil Registry of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, for its legal
effects at the expense of the petitioners. 1
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition
with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the
minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In re Adoption of the
Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-
Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No. 37. 2
The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be
served upon the office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the ILOCOS
TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with
editorial offices in Laoag City. 3
On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father
and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned
petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a
legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March
1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil
Code. 4
After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was
presented. Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendred its
decision, granting the petition for adoption. 5
Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).
The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent
spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under
paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:
Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children, or children by legal fiction;
xxx xxx xxx
In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondents judge held that "to
add grandchildren in this article where no grandchil is included would violate to (sic)
the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not
included".
But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of
Millendez,6 that the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not only
introduce a foreign element into the family unit, but would result in the reduction of
their legititimes. It would also produce an indirect, permanent and irrevocable
disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent reconciliation
between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to
disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.
We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children
mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the
respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and
unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only
statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory
construction. 7

Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines,
obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are
disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the
Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its
Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from
adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been
disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But,
when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was
changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.

Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons
who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal
fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood
relationship. 8 The present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of
the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy
life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective.9 Under the law now in
force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by
legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt. 10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement as
to costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-62465 May 24, 1985
SPOUSES ERNESTO S. NIETO and MATILDE NILO NIETO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROMEO D. MAGAT JUDGE DESIGNATE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH
XIII, respondents.
Floro Abelon for petitioners.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the defunct Court of First instance of
Pangasinan in Special Proceedings No. A540 for adoption of a minor child.
The spouses Ernesto S. Nieto and Matilde Nilo Nieto filed a petition to adopt Roy Nieto
Sumintac, their nephew. The spouses are childless and they reared Roy from his birth in
1971 until 1975 and they continue to support him. Roy had to be left in the Philippines
when the spouses went to Guam wherefore husband is employed.
The Ministry of Social Services and Development favorably recommended the adoption
to the court. It said that the petitioners are in a better position to provide for the minor
child considering that his natural parents are impoverished Despite the favorable
recommendation, the court denied the petition. It said:
Under the facts and evidence adduced, the petition should be
DENIED. Firstly, the adopting parents are non-residents of the
Philippines. The report of the Ministry of Social Services and
Development, through its Social Worker, is explicit in this regard.
Secondly, the trial custody as required by PD 603 cannot be effected
as the petitioners are non-residents. Presumably, they are already
aliens. In this situation, technicalities may later be encountered should
the petition be granted. (Rollo, p. 10.)
In the resolution of February 21, 1983, the respondent judge as well as the Minister of
Social Services and Development were required to comment on the petition. Because of
bureaucracy the latter's comment was filed only on April 23, 1985. It prays that the
judgment of the trial court be reversed and another rendered granting the petition for
adoption of the minor Roy Nieto Sumintac. We agree.
That the adopting parents are non-residents of the Philippines (albeit presumably
temporarily only) is an uncontested fact. That "they are already aliens" is an unjustified
conclusion it has no basis.
Does the fact that the petitioner reside temporarily in Guam disqualify them from
adopting the minor child? A reading of Articles 27 and 28 of P.D. No. 603 gives a
negative answer. They provide as follows:
Art. 27. Who May Adopt. — Any person of age and in full possession
in his civil rights may adopt: Provided, That he is in a position to
support and care for his legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children, or natural children by legal fiction, or other illegitimate
children, in keeping with the means, both material and otherwise, of
the family.
In all cases of adoption, the adopter must be at least fifteen years
older than the person to be adopted.
Art. 28. Who May Not Adopt. — The following persons may not
adopt:
(1) A married person without the written consent of the spouse;
(2) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to final approval of his
accounts;
(3) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
(4) An alien who is disqualified to adopt according to the laws of his
own country or one with whose government the Republic of the
Philippines has broken diplomatic relations. (Rollo, pp. 46-47.)
The trial court also said that adoption had to be denied because "the trial custody as
required by PD 603 cannot be effected as the petitioners are non-residents." But Art. 35
of P.D. No. 603 specifically authorizes the court, either upon its own or on petitioner's
motion, to dispense with the trial custody if it finds that it is to the best interest of the
child. The Minister of Social Services and Development suggests that the trial custody
is unnecessary because:
We submit that the six months trial custody is only observed to insure
the emotional adjustment of the child to his adoptive family, which is
now at this point unnecessary, considering that both parties are ready
for their legal union. It was indicated that the minor is comfortable
 with the adopters. Moreover, the petitioners can obviously discipline
the child without being doubtful if the child can accept them as his
own true parents. The adoption of minor-nephew would even
strengthen the family solidarity of petitioners and the child with all
the rights and duties appertaining thereto. (Rollo, pp. 49-50.)

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the decision of the court a quo is reversed the
petition for adoption is granted. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-30576 February 10, 1976
ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN and MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (Branch X) PRESIDED OVER BY
HON. JUDGE HERMINIO C. MARIANO, respondent.
Susano A. Velasquez for petitioners.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule
and Trial Attorney Herminio Z. Florendo for respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent court, dated June 27,
1968, dismissing petitioners' petition to adopt the minor, Colin Berry Christensen
Duncan. It seeks to have the findings and conclusions of law contained in -the decision
annulled and revoked and to declare the petition for adoption meritorious and the child
sought to be adopted, the minor Colin Berry Christensen Duncan, declared the child by
adoption and heir of herein petitioners-Appellants. Robin Francis Radley Duncan and
Maria Lucy Christensen. 1
Petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen are husband and
wife, the former a British national residing in the Philippines for the last 17 years and
the latter an American citizen born in and a resident of the Philippines. Having no
children of their own but having previously adopted another child, said spouses filed a
petition with respondent court (Sp. Proc. No. 5457) for the adoption of a child
previously baptized and named by them as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan. The
petition is filed and denominated as Sp. Proc. No. 5457.
In the decision rendered by respondent Court dated June 27, 1968, the petition for
adoption was dismissed. 2
The principal reason given for the dismissed al of the petition was that ... the consent
given in this petition Exhibit "J" is improper and falls short of the express requirement
of the law. 3
Rationalizing its action respondent Judge said:
Art. 340 (of the Civil Code) provides that the written consent of the
following to the adoption shall be necessary:
2. The guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted.
"Under the law aforementioned, it will be noted that the law is couched in mandatory
terms by the word SHALL be necessary, and it enumerates the persons who will give the
consent to the adoption in the order as follows: parents, guardian, or the person in
charge of the person to be adopted.
It is admitted by witness Velasquez that she knew the identity of the
mother who gave her the child. This being the case, the proper person
who is supposed to give the parental consent to the adoption should
first be, in the order of preference, the parent or the mother herself. 4
On the allegation of petitioners that their principal witness, Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez, under whose care the newly-born child was entrusted by the unwedded
mother, could not reveal the identity of the mother because it would violate the
privileged communications between the attorney and client, respondent Judge
explained: "The contention that for her (Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the witness
for the petitioners who gave the written consent to the adoption of the child in her
capacity as loco parentis to said child) to reveal the identity of the mother would be
violative of the client-attorney relationship existing between her and the mother cannot
hold water, because in the first place, there was no such relationship existing between
them in so far as this case is concerned and secondly, it is not only a question of
revealing the identity of the mother but rather, of giving consent to adoption by that
alleged unwed mother."5
Taking exception to respondent Judge's decision and the ratio decidendi thereof,
appellants-petitioners alleged the following as errors committed by the trial court: 6
1) The inviolability of privileged communication between attorney
and client is only binding upon the attorney in the same case where
such relationship of attorney and client arose when the client imparted
the privileged communication and that elsewhere or in another case
the attorney is not bound to the secrecy;
2) The infant that was given away by the natural mother, even without
the latter providing for the child's maintenance and support, could not
be considered as abandoned;
3) The stranger who received the baby or child, in this case, Atty.
Corazon de Leon Velasquez, could not be considered as the guardian
de facto and in loco parentis of the child, and therefore, is not
empowered by law to give written consent to the adoption;
 4) That whenever and as long as the natural mother is known to
anybody, only said natural mother can give the written consent to the
adoption;
5) That the term "person in charge of the person to be adopted", one
of those who can give consent to the adoption under Article 340 of
the Civil Code, means or refers to institutions or orphanages
established for the purpose of rearing orphans, foundlings and
destitute children.
The facts of this case are few and simple.
a) Sometime in May, 1967, a child, less than a week old (only 3 days
old) 7 was given to petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and his
wife Maria Lucy Christensen, for them to adopt, by Atty. Corazon de
Leon Velasquez. The child was later on baptized as Colin Berry
Christensen Duncan with the aforementioned espouses appearing in
the records of said baptism as the parents of said child; 8
b) Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez on the other hand, received the
infant from the child's unwed mother who told the former never to
reveal her (the mother's) identity because she wanted to get married
and did not want to destroy her future. The mother instructed Atty.
Corazon de Leon Velasquez to look for a suitable couple who will
adopt the child. The mother did not provide for the maintenance and
support of her child; 9
c) In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners in September, 1967,
Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, as the de facto guardian or loco
parentis of the child subject of the adoption petition, gave the written
consent required by law; 10
d) Learning, from the testimony of witness Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez that the natural mother of the child sought to be adopted
was still alive, the court then pressed upon the witness to reveal the
identity of said mother. The witness refused to divulge the same on
the ground that there existed an attorney and client relationship
between them. She had been instructed by her client not to reveal the
latter's identity. She could not now violate such privilege
communication. 11
After examining the facts and the arguments presented, it appears to this Court that
there is only one principal issue involved, i.e., whether or not the person who gave the
consent for adoption, which in this case is Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is the
proper person required by law to give such consent.
The law applicable is. Art. 340 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 340. The written consent of the following to adoption shall be
necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2) The parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be
adopted.
On the other hand, the Rules of Court (Rule 99) has this to say on those who are
required to give consent in adoption:
Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. — There shall be filed with the petition a
written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen
years of age or over and not incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if
any, and by each of its known living parents who is not an insane or
hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child, or if there
are no such parents by the general guardian, or guardian ad litem of
the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum,
children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer
or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such person; but if
the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its
father to the adoption shall not be required.
Going by the set of facts in this case, only one of two persons particularly described by
law may be considered here as legally capable of giving the required written consent.
They are:
Under Art. 340 of the Civil 'Code, the "parent, guardian or person in charge of the
person to be adopted" while the other one is that mentioned in Section 3, Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court, describing it as each of the known living parents "who has not
abandoned such child." The father's consent here is out of the question as the child is
illegitimate and unrecognized.
Since the person whose written consent to the adoption (Atty: Corazon de Leon
Velasquez) is assailed by the trial court as being unauthorized and had consequently
caused the rejection of the petition, this Tribunal will now look into her alleged
authority or lack thereof to give the controverted consent.
Sometime in May of 1967, the child subject of this adoption petition, undisputedly
declared as only three days old then, was turned over by its mother to witness Atty.
Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The natural and unwedded mother, from that date on to the
time of the adoption proceedings in court which started in mid- year of said 1967, and
up to the present, has not bothered to inquire into the condition of the child, much less
to contribute to the livelihood, maintenance and care of the same. In short, this parent is
the antithesis of that described in the law as "known living parent who is not insane Or
hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child." We are convinced that in fact
said mother had completely and absolutely abandoned her child. This Court has
previously declared that abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent
which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental claims to the child. 12 Applying
this legal yardstick, the unidentified mother of the child in this case can be declared, as
she is hereby declared, as having abandoned her child with all legal consequences
attached thereto.
Having declared that the child was an abandoned one by an unknown parent, there
appears to be no more legal need to require the written consent of such parent of the
child to the adoption. As had been said by this Court in the aforecited case of Santos vs.
Aranzanso, the parental consent required by the law in adoption proceedings refers to
parents who have not abandoned their child. 13 The question now is whether or not
Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the undisputed custodian of the abandoned waif may
be considered as the guardian under Art. 340 or the person standing in loco parentis of
said infant contemplated in Art. 349 of the Civil Code.
It seems to Us that when the 3-day old baby was left to and placed in the hands of Atty.
Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the helpless infant was in dire need of someone who could
give it protection and sustain its delicate and fragile life. Atty. Velasquez was under no
legal compulsion to accept the child and to extend to it the protection and care it badly
needed. Since there had been no showing that the identity of the natural mother was
made known to the trial court or to the herein petitioners, nor had said mother seen fit to
present herself before the court despite the public notice given to the proceedings as
required by law, there clearly appears only one person who could be considered as the
guardian exercising patria potestas over such abandoned child. Since there was no
guardian ad litem appointed by the court and the child not being in the custody of an
orphan asylum, children's home or any benevolent society, there could not have been
anyone other than Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could, with reason, be called
the guardian of said infant. It was she who had actual. physical custody of the infant and
who, out of compassion and motherly instinct, extended the mantle of protection over
the hapless and helpless infant which otherwise could have suffered a tragic fate, like
being thrown into some garbage heap as had often happened to some unwanted
illegitimate babies. The least this Court could do to recognize and acknowledge her
good Samaritan deed is to extend, as it hereby extends, to her the recognition that she
was a de facto guardian exercising patria potestas over the abandoned child.
The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the ancient Roman legal
maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh decision it
rendered. While this old adage generally finds apt application in many other legal cases,
in adoption of children, however, this should be softened so as to apply the law with
less severity and with compassion and humane understanding, for adoption is more for
the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock, than for
those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to provide
homes, love, care and education for unfortunate children, who otherwise may grow
from cynical street urchins to hardened criminal offenders and become serious social
problems, should be given the widest attitude of sympathy, encouragement and
assistance. The law is not, and should not be made, an instrument to impede the
achievement of a salutary humane policy. As often as is legally and lawfully possible,
their texts and intendments should be construed so as to give all the chances for human
life to exist — with a modicum promise of a useful and constructive existence.
The herein petitioners, the spouses Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy
Christensen, appear to be qualified to adopt the child. There is no showing that they
suffer from any of the disqualifications under the law. Above all, they have the means
to provide the child with the proper support, care, education and love that a growing
child needs, even if they have previously adopted another child as theirs. The fact that
even before they have applied for legal custody and adoption of the infant they have
already showered it with love and care and had it baptized, with them appearing in the
records of the baptism as the parents of the child, speaks well of the genuine desire of
petitioners to have the child as their very own. The child was born in May, 1967, and he
will be at this time, 1976, about 9 years of age. In all the years, from the time he was
turned over to the herein petitioners when he was only about a week old (there is no
showing that the said child was ever placed at any' time in the care and custody of some
other persons) he had been cared for and loved by the spouses Robin Francis RadLey
Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen. He must have known no other parents than these
persons. If we are now to sustain the decision of the court below, this Tribunal will be
doing a graver injustice to all concerned particularly to said spouses, and worse, it will
be imposing a cruel sanction on this innocent child and on all other children who might
be similarly situated. We consider it to be justifiable and more humane to formalize a
factual relation, that of parents and son, existing between the herein petitioning spouses
and the minor child baptized by them as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan, than to
sustain the hard, harsh and cruel interpretation of the law that was done by the
respondent court and Judge. It is Our view that it is in consonance with the true spirit
and purpose of the law, and with the policy of the State, to uphold, encourage and give
life and meaning to the existence of family relations.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision of the respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in Sp. Proc. No. 5457, dated June 27, 1968,
is hereby annulled, and We declare that the minor Colin Berry Christensen Duncan is
the adopted child and the heir of petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria
Lucy Christensen.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
HERBERT CANG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA
CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on
the ground that the latter has abandoned them? The answer to this interesting query,
certainly not one of first impression, would have to be reached, not solely on the basis
of law and jurisprudence, but also the hard reality presented by the facts of the case.
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree of adoption issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14,2 in Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB,
"In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph
Anthony, all surnamed Cang, Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago
Clavano, petitioners."
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27,
1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on
January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was
undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged
extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for
legal separation with alimonypendente lite 3 with the then Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Cebu 4 which rendered a decision5 approving the joint manifestation
of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed
and board." They further agreed:
(c) That the children of the parties shall be entitled
to a monthly support of ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00) effective from the date of the filing of
the complaint. This shall constitute a first lien on
the net proceeds of the house and lot jointly owned
by the parties situated at Cinco Village, Mandaue
City;
(d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into
any contract or agreement with any person or
persons, natural or juridical without the written
consent of the husband; or any undertaking or acts
that ordinarily requires husband's consent as the
parties are by this agreement legally separated; 6
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie
before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the
divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie,
reserving "rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places" to petitioner. 7
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American
citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning
P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month8a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines
for his children's expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his
children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria
Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed
Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-
year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an
affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to
support" his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had
been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the
United States to attend to a family business, "leaving the children would be a problem
and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad;" and that her husband
had "long forfeited his parental rights" over the children for the following reasons:
1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter into
any contract without the written consent of her husband;
2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the
United States and had been transferring from one place to another to
avoid detection by Immigration authorities, and
3. Her husband had divorced her.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children
while his finances were "too meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience,
allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children."
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody
over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby
leaving custody of their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie
had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody
should be transferred to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver
custody over the minors to petitioner.
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree
of adoption with a dispositive portion reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of the
minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by
the petitioner-spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago
Clavano is hereby granted and approved. These children shall
henceforth be known and called as Keith D. Clavano, Charmaine D.
Clavano and Joseph Anthony D. Clavano respectively. Moreover, this
Decree of Adoption shall:
(1) Confer upon the adopted children the same
rights and duties as though they were in fact the
legitimate children of the petitioners;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by
nature, of the children; and,
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a
copy of this Decree of Adoption for registration purposes.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the lower court was "impelled" by these reasons:
(1) The Cang children had, since birth, developed
"close filial ties with the Clavano family, especially
their maternal uncle," petitioner Ronald Clavano.
(2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless
and, with their printing press, real estate business,
export business and gasoline station and mini-mart
in Rosemead, California, U.S.A., had substantial
assets and income.
(3) The natural mother of the children, Anna Marie,
nicknamed "Menchu," approved of the adoption
because of her heart ailment, near-fatal accident in
1981, and the fact that she could not provide them a
secure and happy future as she "travels a lot."
(4) The Clavanos could provide the children moral
and spiritual direction as they would go to church
together and had sent the children to Catholic
schools.
(5) The children themselves manifested their desire
to be adopted by the Clavanos — Keith had testified
and expressed the wish to be adopted by the
Clavanos while the two younger ones were
observed by the court to have "snuggled" close to
Ronald even though their natural mother was
around.
On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner to rest on "a
very shaky foundation" because of its findings that:
(1) Petitioner was "morally unfit to be the father of
his children" on account of his being "an
improvident father of his family" and an
"undisguised Lothario." This conclusion is based on
the testimony of his alleged paramour, mother of his
two sons and close friend of Anna Marie, Wilma
Soco, who said that she and petitioner lived as
husband and wife in the very house of the Cangs in
Opao, Mandaue City.
(2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that
were of "comparatively recent dates" were
"attempts at verisimilitude" as these were joint
deposits the authenticity of which could not be
verified.
(3) Contrary to petitioner's claim, the possibility of
his reconciliation with Anna Marie was "dim if not
nil" because it was petitioner who "devised,
 engineered and executed the divorce proceedings at neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations which
the Nevada Washoe County court." parents owe their children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the
withholding of the parent's presence, his care and the opportunity to
(4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, petitioner display voluntary affection. The issue of abandonment is amply
"is now an alien from the standpoint of Philippine covered by the discussion of the first error.
laws" and therefore, how his "new attachments and
loyalties would sit with his (Filipino) children is an Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the
open question." children and has in fact even maintained bank accounts in their
names. His duty to provide support comes from two judicial
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social Worker pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-707 CEB, supra,
in her Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as follows: obliges him to pay the children P1,000.00 a month. The second is
mandated by the divorce decree of the Nevada, U.S.A. Federal Court
which orders him to pay monthly support of US$50.00 for each child.
Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children.
Oppositor has not submitted any evidence to show compliance with
And abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified
the decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has submitted 22 cancelled dollar
by statute as a ground for dispensing with his consent to its (sic)
checks (Exhs. 24 to 45) drawn in the children's names totalling
adoption (Re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 P. 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]).
$2,126.98. The last remittance was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45). His
Indeed, in such case, adoption will be allowed not only without the
obligation to provide support commenced under the divorce decree on
consent of the parent, but even against his opposition (Re McKeag,
May 5, 1982 so that as of October 6, 1987, oppositor should have
141 Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039, 99 Am. St. Rep. 80; Re Camp. 131 Gal.
made 53 remittances of $150.00, or a total of $7,950.00. No other
469,63 P. 736, 82 Am. St. Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis, 83 Colo. 346,
remittances were shown to have been made after October 6, 1987, so
265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170 Iowa, 561, 153 N.W. 160,
citing R.C.L.; Steams v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349; 97 Am. that as of this date, oppositor was woefully in arrears under the terms
of the divorce decree. And since he was totally in default of the
St. Rep. 441; Wilson v. Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439, 93 Am. St. Rep.
judgment in JD-707 CEB, the inevitable conclusion is oppositor had
564; Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo, 173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am.
not really been performing his duties as a father, contrary to his
St. Rep. 17.) 9
protestations.
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding
True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three accounts in
that it would be in the best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption different banks, as follows —
was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did
not have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Acct. No. Date Opened Balance Name of Bank
Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and (d) the petitioners
for adoption did not present as witness the representative of the Department of Social ———— —————— ———— ——————
Welfare and Development who made the case study report required by law.
1) 118-606437-4 July 23, 1985 $5,018.50 Great Western Savings,
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:
Oct. 29, 1987 Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.
Art. 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the
natural parents of the child to be adopted. It has been held however 2) 73-166-8 March 5, 1986 3,129.00 Matewan National Bank
that the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not
necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729; Santos vs. Ananzanso, 16
Oct. 26, 1987 of Williamson, West
SCRA 344). The question therefore is whether or not oppositor may
be considered as having abandoned the children. In adoption cases,
abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to forego Virginia, U.S.A.
parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, or the
 3) 564-146883 December 31, 1986 2,622.19 Security Pacific National consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603,
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
Oct. 29, 1987 Bank, Daly City, Cal.,
Art. 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides —
U.S.A.
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The written consent of the
The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositor's name following to the adoption shall be necessary:
as trustee for Charmaine Cang and Joseph Anthony Cang,
respectively. In other words, the accounts are operated and the (1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of
amounts withdrawable by oppositor himself and it cannot be said that age or, over;
they belong to the minors. The second is an "or" account, in the
names of Herbert Cang or Keith Cang. Since Keith is a minor and in (2) The natural parents of the child or his legal
the Philippines, said account is operable only by oppositor and the guardian of the Department of Social Welfare or
funds withdrawable by him alone. any duly licensed child placement agency under
whose care the child may be;
The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed in his
offer of evidence "the aim and purpose of providing for a better future (3) The natural children, fourteen years and above,
and security of his family."10 of the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He emphasized On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No.
that the decree of legal separation was not based on the merits of the case as it was 91 amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
based on a manifestation amounting to a compromise agreement between him and Anna As thus amended, Article 31 read:
Marie. That he and his wife agreed upon the plan for him to leave for the United States
was borne out by the fact that prior to his departure to the United States, the family
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The written consent of the
lived with petitioner's parents. Moreover, he alone did not instigate the divorce
following to the adoption shall be necessary:
proceedings as he and his wife initiated the "joint complaint" for divorce.
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of
Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his children was
age or over;
belied by the award to him of custody over the children in Civil Case No. JD-707. He
took exception to the appellate court's findings that as an American citizen he could no
longer lay claim to custody over his children because his citizenship would not take (2) The natural parents of the child or his legal
away the fact that he "is still a father to his children." As regards his alleged illicit guardian after receiving counselling and appropriate
relationship with another woman, he had always denied the same both in Civil Case No. social services from the Ministry of Social Services
JD-707 and the instant adoption case. Neither was it true that Wilma Soco was a and Development or from a duly licensed child-
neighbor and family friend of the Clavanos as she was residing in Mandaue City seven placement agency;
(7) kilometers away from the Clavanos who were residents of Cebu City. Petitioner
insisted that the testimony of Wilma Soco should not have been given weight for it was (3) The Ministry of Social Services and
only during the hearing of the petition for adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother of Development or any duly licensed child-placement
Ronald, came to know her and went to her residence in Iligan City to convince her to be agency under whose care and legal custody the
a witness for monetary considerations. Lastly, petitioner averred that it would be child may be;
hypocritical of the Clavanos to claim that they could love the children much more than
he could. 11 (4) The natural children, fourteen years and above,
of the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this Court,
alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court. 12 As such, when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on September
25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by
Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code
which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the
Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As amended
by the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads:
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be
necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or
over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal
guardian, or the proper government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years
of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or
over, of the adopting parents, if living with said
parent and the latter's spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to
be adopted. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the
law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite
for its validity. Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court as follows:
Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. — There shall be filed with the petition
a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years
of age or over and not incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if any,
and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or
hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child, or if the child
is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent
society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum,
home, or society, or by such persons; but if the child is illegitimate
and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption
shall not be required. (Emphasis supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the
natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless,
the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned
the child 13 or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may
acquire jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of the parents or one
of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant
exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with
which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption. Thus, the Court declared:
. . . . The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied
to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the
petition should contain facts relating to the child and its parents,
which may give information to those interested, than that it should be
formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a
petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the
adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court
jurisdiction. 14
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to
the petition for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is lacking.
Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for
adoption by the natural father as follows:
3. That the children's mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V.
CLAVANO, has given her express consent to this adoption, as shown
by Affidavit of Consent, Annex "A". Likewise, the written consent of
Keith Cang, now 14 years of age appears on page 2 of this petition;
However, the father of the children, Herbert Cang, had already left his
wife and children and had already divorced the former, as evidenced
by the xerox copy of the DECREE OF DIVORCE issued by the
County of Washoe, State of Nevada, U.S.A. (Annex "B") which was
filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long after he abandoned his
family to live in the United States as an illegal immigrant. 15
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written
consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since
abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which
our statutes and jurisprudence 16 dispense with the requirement of written consent to the
adoption of their minor children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a
proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural
parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon,
failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did
not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this
Court. 17 This Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 18 However, although this Court is not a
trier of facts, it has the authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower
courts if it that these do not conform to the evidence on record. 19
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court has held that the exceptions to the rule that
factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal are the following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate
facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion 21 on the issue
of whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the
adoption unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to forsake or
renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a
ban." The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus
put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent
never to resume or claim one's rights or interests. 22 In reference to abandonment of a
child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which
evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims
to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of
care and support which parents owe their children." 23
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children
as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. 24 While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural
and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to
send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Petitioner's testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of
the following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children:
1. Exh. 1 — a 4-page updated letter of Menchu (Anna Marie)
addressed to "Dear Bert" on a C. Westates Carbon Phil. Corp.
stationery. Menchu stated therein that it had been "a long time since
the last time you've heard from me excluding that of the phone
conversation we've had." She discussed petitioner's intention to buy a
motorbike for Keith, expressing apprehension over risks that could be
engendered by Keith's use of it. She said that in the "last phone
conversation" she had with petitioner on the birthday of "Ma," she
forgot to tell petitioner that Keith's voice had changed; he had become
a "bagito" or a teen-ager with many "fans" who sent him Valentine's
cards. She told him how Charmaine had become quite a talkative
"almost dalaga" who could carry on a conversation with
her angkong and how pretty she was in white dress when she won
among the candidates in the Flores de Mayo after she had prayed so
hard for it. She informed him, however, that she was worried because
Charmaine was vain and wont to extravagance as she loved clothes.
About Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she told petitioner that the boy was
smart for his age and "quite spoiled" being the youngest of the
children in Lahug. Joeton was mischievous but Keith was his idol
with whom he would sleep anytime. She admitted having said so
much about the children-because they might not have informed
petitioner of "some happenings and spices of life" about themselves.
She said that it was "just very exciting to know how they've grown up
and very pleasant, too, that each of them have (sic) different
characters." She ended the letter with the hope that petitioner was "at
the best of health." After extending her regards "to all," she signed her
name after the word "Love." This letter was mailed on July 9, 1986
from Cebu to petitioner whose address was P.O. Box 2445,
Williamson, West Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).
2. Exh. 2 — letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery with golden
print of "a note from Menchu" on the left upper corner. Anna Marie
stated that "we" wrote to petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984 and that Keith and
Joeton were very excited when petitioner "called up last time." She
told him how Joeton would grab the phone from Keith just so
petitioner would know what he wanted to order. Charmaine, who was
asleep, was so disappointed that she missed petitioner's call because
she also wanted something that petitioner should buy. Menchu told
petitioner that Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener, light-colored T-
shirts for her walking shorts and a (k)nap sack. Anna Marie informed
petitioner that the kids were growing up and so were their needs. She
told petitioner to be "very fatherly" about the children's needs because
those were expensive here. For herself, Anna Marie asked for a
subscription of Glamour and Vogue magazines and that whatever
expenses he would incur, she would "replace" these. As a postscript,
she told petitioner that Keith wanted a size 6 khaki-colored "Sperry
topsider shoes."
3. Exh. 3 — an undated note on a yellow small piece of paper that
reads:
Dear Herbert,
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful
one.
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. It's nice to be
thought of at X'mas. Thanks again.
4. Exh. 4 — a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of Jose
Clavano, Inc. addressed to "Dear Dad." Keith told his father that they
tried to tell their mother "to stay for a little while, just a few weeks
after classes start(s)" on June 16. He informed petitioner that Joeton
would be in Kinder I and that, about the motorbike, he had told his
mother to write petitioner about it and "we'll see what you're (sic)
decision will be." He asked for chocolates, nuts, basketball shirt and
shorts, rubber shoes, socks, headband, some clothes for outing and
perfume. He told petitioner that they had been going to Labug with
their mother picking them up after Angkong or Ama had prepared
lunch or dinner. From her aerobics, his mother would go for them in
Lahug at about 9:30 or 10:00 o'clock in the evening. He wished his
father "luck and the best of health" and that they prayed for him and
their other relatives. The letter was ended with "Love Keith."
5. Exh. 5 — another undated long letter of Keith. He thanked his
father for the Christmas card "with $40.00, $30.00 and $30.00" and
the "card of Joeton with $5.00 inside." He told petitioner the amounts
following his father's instructions and promise to send money through
the mail. He asked his father to address his letter directly to him
because he wanted to open his own letters. He informed petitioner of
activities during the Christmas season — that they enjoyed eating,
playing and giving surprises to their mother. He apprised him of his
daily schedule and that their mother had been closely supervising
them, instructing them to fold their blankets and pile up their pillows.
He informed petitioner that Joeton had become very smart while
Charmaine, who was also smart, was very demanding of their mother.
Because their mother was leaving for the United States on February 5,
S
they would be missing her like they were missing petitioner. He asked
i $200.00. He told petitioner more anecdotes about
for his "things" and
n
Joeton like he would make the sign of the cross even when they
would pass by the c Iglesia ni Cristo church and his insistence that
Aquino was not edead because he had seen him on the betamax
r Charmaine had become "very maldita" who was
machine. For Keith,
e with her dolls and things but Joeton was full of
not always satisfied
l the letter with "Love your son, Keith." The letter
surprises. He ended
y
was mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).
,
6. Exh. 6 — an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked petitioner for
Mpencil box, socks, half shirt, pencil
the bathing suit, key chain,
sharpener and $50.00. Shee reminded him of her birthday on January
23 when she would turn 9nyears old. She informed him that she wore
size 10 and the size of herc feet was IM. They had fun at Christmas in
h on January 9 although Keith's classes
Lahug but classes would start
had started on January 6. uThey would feel sad again because Mommy
would be leaving soon. She hoped petitioner would keep writing
them. She signed, "Love, Charmaine."
7. Exh . 7 — an undated letter of Keith. He explained to petitioner
that they had not been remiss in writing letters to him. He informed
him of their trip to Manila — they went to Malacañang, Tito Doy
Laurel's house, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the executive house,
Tagaytay for three days and Baguio for one week. He informed him
that he got "honors," Charmaine was 7th in her class and Joeton had
excellent grades. Joeton would be enrolled in Sacred Heart soon and
he was glad they would be together in that school. He asked for his
"reward" from petitioner and so with Charmaine and Joeton. He asked
for a motorbike and dollars that he could save. He told petitioner that
he was saving the money he had been sending them. He said he
missed petitioner and wished him the best. He added that petitioner
should call them on Sundays.
8. Exh. 8 — a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but apparently
written by the latter. She asked for money from petitioner to buy
something for the school and "something else." She, promised not to
spend so much and to save some. She said she loved petitioner and
missed him. Joeton said "hi!" to petitioner. After ending the letter
with "Love, Joeton and Charmaine," she asked for her prize for her
grades as she got seventh place.
9. Exh. 9 — undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner that he had
been writing him; that he would like to have some money but he
would save them; that he learned that petitioner had called them up
but he was not around; that he would be going to Manila but would be
back home May 3; that his Mommy had just arrived Thursday
afternoon, and that he would be the "official altar boy." He asked
petitioner to write them soon.
10. Exh. 10 — Keith thanked petitioner for the money he sent. He told
petitioner that he was saving some in the bank and he was proud
because he was the only one in his group who saved in the bank. He
told him that Joeton had become naughty and would claim as his own
the shirts sent to Keith by petitioner. He advised petitioner to send
pants and shirts to Joeton, too, and asked for a pair of topsider shoes
and candies. He informed petitioner that he was a member of the
basketball team and that his mom would drive for his group. He asked
him to call them often like the father of Ana Christie and to write
them when he would call so that they could wait for it. He informed
petitioner that they had all grown bigger and heavier. He hoped
petitioner would be happy with the letter that had taken him so long to
write because he did not want to commit any mistakes. He asked
petitioner to buy him perfume (Drakkar) and, after thanking
petitioner, added that the latter should buy something for Mommy.
11. Exh. 11 — a Christmas card "For My Wonderful Father" dated
October 8, 1984 from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
12. Exh. 12 — another Christmas card, "Our Wish For You" with the
year '83 written on the upper right hand corner of the inside page,
from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
13. Exh. 13 — a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had written
him even when their Mom "was there" where she bought them clothes
and shoes. Keith asked petitioner for $300.00. Because his mother
would not agree to buy him a motorbike, he wanted a Karaoke unit
that would cost P12,000.00. He informed petitioner that he would go
to an afternoon disco with friends but their grades were all good with
Joeton receiving "stars" for excellence. Keith wanted a bow and arrow
Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He expressed his desire that petitioner
would come and visit them someday.
14. Exh. 14 — a letter of Keith with one of the four pages bearing the
date January 1986. Keith told his father that they had received the
package that the latter sent them. The clothes he sent, however, fitted
only Keith but not Charmaine and Joeton who had both grown bigger.
Keith asked for grocery items, toys and more clothes. He asked, in
behalf of his mother, for low-heeled shoes and a dress to match,
jogging pants, tights and leotards that would make her look sexy. He
intimated to petitioner that he had grown taller and that he was
already ashamed to be asking for things to buy in the grocery even
though his mother had told him not to be shy about it.
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A.
showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited
amounts for the benefit of his children. 25 Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by
petitioner to the children from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the
courts below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial support
but also the emotional exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family.
Instead, the courts below emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his
children and the fact that, as regards the bank deposits, these were "withdrawable by
him alone." Simply put, the courts below attached a high premium to the prospective
adopters' financial status but totally brushed aside the possible repercussion of the
adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt. However, his
seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his testimony is contradicted by his
feelings towards his father as revealed in his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to
conclude that Keith's testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for
adoption that would certainly have engendered confusion in his young mind as to the
capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
The courts below emphasized respondents' emotional attachment to the children. This is
hardly surprising for, from the very start of their young lives, the children were used to
their presence. Such attachment had persisted and certainly, the young ones' act of
snuggling close to private respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their
emotional detachment from their father. Private respondents, being the uncle and aunt
of the children, could not but come to their succor when they needed help as when
Keith got sick and private respondent Ronald spent for his hospital bills.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a
person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than
his natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, 26 the Court awarded custody of a
minor illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor
instead of to his affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child
opted to go with his mother. The Court said:
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that
private respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough,
however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to
support her children according to her means.
In Celis v. Cafuir 27 where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether to award
custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster mother, this Court said:
This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having
deprived mother and son of the beautiful associations and tender,
imperishable memories engendered by the relationship of parent and
child. We should not take away from a mother the opportunity of
bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to
poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look
back with pride and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her
efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come
true. We should not forget that the relationship between a foster
mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to
be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for him,
said parents might yet count and appraise (sic) all that they have done
and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and
even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into
their hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who
never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of
her associations with her child, however unpleasant and
disappointing. Flesh and blood count. . . . .
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court stated that "(I)n ascertaining the welfare
and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into
account all relevant considerations." Thus, in awarding custody of the child to the
father, the Court said:
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at
least, her counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and
agony" of a mother separated from her children and the humiliation
she suffered as a, result of her character being made a key issue in
court rather than the feelings and future, the best interests and welfare
of her children. While the bonds between a mother and her small
child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is
bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say
that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is
not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent
but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.
(Emphasis supplied) 29
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority
over his children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account
the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the
child. 30 The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs
more evidentiary support other than his inability to provide them the material comfort
that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had
so emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and
counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he received from his children
prove that petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie between him and his
children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to their whims but
also because he was a person they could share with their daily activities, problems and
triumphs.
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond petitioner's
"meager" financial support to ferret out other indications on whether petitioner had in
fact abandoned his family. The omission of said courts has led us to examine why the
children were subjected to the process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that
bound them to their father. To our consternation, the record of the case bears out the
fact that the welfare of the children was not exactly the "paramount consideration" that
impelled Anna Marie to consent to their adoption.
In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the children in the
country, as she was wont to travel abroad often, was a problem that would naturally
hamper her job-seeking abroad. In other words, the adoption appears to be a matter of
convenience for her because Anna Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her
children. 31 In his testimony, private respondent Ronald swore that Anna Marie had
been out of the country for two years and came home twice or three times, 32 thereby
manifesting the fact that it was she who actually left her children to the care of her
relatives. It was bad enough that their father left their children when he went abroad, but
when their mother followed suit for her own reasons, the situation worsened. The
Clavano family must have realized this. Hence, when the family first discussed the
adoption of the children, they decided that the prospective adopter should be Anna
Marie's brother Jose. However, because he had children of his own, the family decided
to devolve the task upon private respondents. 33
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children. A
businessman, private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between Cebu and Manila
while his wife, private respondent Maria Clara, is an international flight
stewardess. 34 Moreover, private respondent Ronald claimed that he could "take care of
the children while their parents are away," 35 thereby indicating the evanescence of his
intention. He wanted to have the children's surname changed to Clavano for the reason
that he wanted to take them to the United States as it would be difficult for them to get a
visa if their surname were different from his. 36 To be sure, he also testified that he
wanted to spare the children the stigma of being products of a broken home.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald, his sister
Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the inescapable conclusion that they just
wanted to keep the children away from their father. One of the overriding
considerations for the adoption was allegedly the state of Anna Marie's health — she
was a victim of an almost fatal accident and suffers from a heart ailment. However, she
herself admitted that her health condition was not that serious as she could still take care
of the children. 37 An eloquent evidence of her ability to physically care for them was
her employment at the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles 38 — she could not have
been employed if her health were endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos' attempt
at depriving petitioner of parental authority apparently stemmed from their notion that
he was an inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed fear that her children
would "never be at ease with the wife of their father." 39
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a womanizer and
father to the sons of Wilma Soco. 40 As to whether he was telling the truth is beside the
point. Philippine society, being comparatively conservative and traditional, aside from
being Catholic in orientation, it does not countenance womanizing on the part of a
family man, considering the baneful effects such irresponsible act visits on his family.
Neither may the Court place a premium on the inability of a man to distinguish between
siring children and parenting them. Nonetheless, the actuality that petitioner carried on
an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that
petitioner was necessarily an unfit father. 41 Conventional wisdom and common human
experience show that a "bad" husband does not necessarily make a "bad" father. That a
husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to
deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the
children. 42 Petitioner has demonstrated his love and concern for his children when he
took the trouble of sending a telegram 43 to the lower court expressing his intention to
oppose the adoption immediately after learning about it. He traveled back to this
country to attend to the case and to testify about his love for his children and his desire
to unite his family once more in the United States. 44
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide by the
agreement with his wife on the support of the children. Petitioner was an illegal alien in
the United States. As such, he could not have procured gainful employment. Private
respondents failed to refute petitioner's testimony that he did not receive his share from
the sale of the conjugal home, 45 pursuant to their manifestation/compromise agreement
in the legal separation case. Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of
the sale redounded to the benefit of his family, particularly his children. The proceeds
may not have lasted long but there is ample evidence to show that thereafter, petitioner
tried to abide by his agreement with his wife and sent his family money, no matter how
"meager."
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it
carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the
adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the
overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper
context and perspective. The Court's position, should not be misconstrued or
misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and
jurisprudence. 46 The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored
solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of
the parents over the child. 47
In this regard, this Court notes private respondents' reliance on the
manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie which
became the basis of the decree of legal separation. According to private respondents'
counsel, 48 the authority given to Anna Marie by that decree to enter into contracts as a
result of the legal separation was "all embracing" 49 and, therefore, included giving her
sole consent to the adoption. This conclusion is however, anchored on the wrong
premise that the authority given to the innocent spouse to enter into contracts that
obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall include entering into agreements
leading to the adoption of the children. Such conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis as
private respondents' apparent reliance on the decree of legal separation for doing away
with petitioner's consent to the adoption.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal
separation did not, of necessity; deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose
of placing the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: ". . . in
case of legal separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the court." In awarding custody, the court shall take into account "all
relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit."
If should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse the
"exercise" of parental authority. Having custody of the child, the innocent spouse shall
implement the sum of parental rights with respect to his rearing and care. The innocent
spouse shall have the right to the child's services and earnings, and the right to direct his
activities and make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health and
religion. 50
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the joint exercise of
which is vested by the law upon the parents, 51 as
. . . a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents
for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and
development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the
education of their hearts and senses. As regards parental authority,
"there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of
duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship
and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a
parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated
children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody
and company. 52 (Emphasis supplied)
As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely
deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in
the legal separation case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on
the basis of the agreement of the spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a
compromise, 53 there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner
was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody of his children
or that there are grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In
fact, in the legal separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody
over the children from Anna Marie back to petitioner. The order was not implemented
because of Anna Marie's motion for reconsideration thereon. The Clavano family also
vehemently objected to the transfer of custody to the petitioner, such that the latter was
forced to file a contempt charge against them. 54
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a
valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. In the instant
case for adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to
warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority
is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. 55 But there cannot be a valid decree of
adoption in this case precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the
finding of the courts below on the issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was
based on a misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled in Tenchavez
v. Escaño 56 that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil
Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy. While
petitioner is now an American citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently
remained a Filipino citizen, the divorce has no legal effect.
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of established
customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of Appeals, 57 a case
involving the visitorial rights of an illegitimate parent over his child, the Court
expressed the opinion that:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to
care for their children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best
interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be
unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even
when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is
lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain
unchanged. Neither the law not the courts allow this affinity to suffer
absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well
being of the child.
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code, there has been
a pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so much on the need
of childless couples for a child, as on the paramount interest, of a child who needs the
love and care of parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and
the Family Code, the discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act No.
8043 on Intercountry,
Adoption 58 and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the domestic adoption
of Filipino children. 59
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as the
following policies in the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998":
(a) To ensure that every child remains under the
care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be
provided with love, care, understanding and
security towards the full and harmonious
development of his/her personality. 60
 (b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and
adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the
paramount consideration in accordance with the
tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN)
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 61
(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary
separation from his/her biological parent(s). 62
without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case
at bar, has not abandoned them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for
adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.

Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the SO ORDERED.
Rights of the Child, the government and its officials are duty bound to comply with its
mandates. Of particular relevance to instant case are the following provisions:

States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of

parents . . . to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving
capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the
exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present
Convention. 63

States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from
one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact
with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the
child's best interests. 64

A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to
maintain on a regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances
personal relations and direct contacts with both parents . . . 65

States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to
provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a
manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child. 66

Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic
statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be
in the best interests of the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in derogation
of the primary right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The
rights of parents vis-à-vis that of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in
fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible.

Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are
now of legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority.
For sure, they shall be endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their
parents. This is not to state that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their
welfare and best interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the time
that the petition for adoption was filed. 67 Said petition must be denied as it was filed
G.R. No. 71370 January 3l, 1987
SLOBODAN BOBANOVIC AND DIANNE ELIZABETH CONNUNGHAM
BOBANOVIC, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SYLVIA P. MONTES (in her capacity as Minister of Social
Services and Development), respondent.
RESOLUTION
ALAMPAY, J.:
In our decision in this case promulgated on July 7, 1986 and which is now the subject of
the motion for reconsideration filed by the Ministry of Social Services and
Development, this Court emphasized that in adoption cases, the interest and welfare of
the child is of paramount consideration and that "every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law
(Malkinson vs. Agrava, 54 SCRA 66, and other cited cases) and the law should not be
made, as instrument to impede the achievement of a salutary policy." (Duncan vs. CFI
of Rizal, L-30576,69 SCRA 298).
Applying the aforecited judicial guidelines, this Court directed the present Ministry of
Social Services and Development "to forthwith issue without undue delay, the requisite
travel clearance certificate in favor of herein petitioners' adopted child, Adam
Christopher Bobanovic." In our decision, we stated that "all that MSSD had to do was
to use a little of its time to verify the correctness of the case study report, prepared and
submitted by the Social Worker who acted upon instruction of the court below."
Respondent's motion for reconsideration of the decision in this case, dated August 5,
1986, although filed late, in the interest of justice, was nevertheless admitted under our
resolution of September 5, 1986. In said motion, public respondent stressed the
existence of the 1981 Memorandum of Agreement between the State and Territory
Adoption Authorities of Australia and the Ministry of Social Services and Development
of the Philippines. Respondent Minister therein pointed out that under the stated
Memorandum of Agreement, it has been agreed among others, the following.
xxx xxx xxx
1.4. The adoption authorities in both countries will jointly approve of
prospective adopting parents and the selection of particular adoptive
parents for a particular child. ... (Rollo, p. 140)
Respondent Minister further averred that certain significant procedures have been
accepted and agreed to be observed, such as:
xxx xxx xxx
4.1. Any person or persons having their ordinary place of residence
in an Australian State or Territory, who wish to adopt a child from
the Philippines will apply to the Director of the appropriate
Australian State or Territory investigated, where he is satisfied that
the applicants are fit and proper persons to adopt a child from the
Philippines, he will cause the preparation of a detailed Family Study
and will act as intermediary and forward the Family Study to the
Philippines for consideration Only family studies presented by an
appropriate Australian State or Territory Adoption Authority to the
Philippine Ministry of Social Services and Development win be
considered.
4.2. In an yapplication for approval as persons fit and proper to
adopt a child from the Philippines, the following will be conditions
precedent to the approval of the application by the Australian State or
Territory Adoption Authorities.
(a) Applicants must have attained the ages specified in the
appropriate laws of both countries and be in a position to support and
care for their family.
(b) The State or Territory Adoption Authority investigating an
application will confirm that applicants have no criminal record or
else make appropriate comment on that record. (Rollo, pp. 141-142)
The Court is constrained to consider the aforestated matters. We note the assertions of
the respondent Minister which appear uncontroverted in petitioners' reply, that "the
preparation of the Family Study report from the home country on the prospective
adopters is a requirement in this Memorandum of Agreement with Australia. ... "(Rollo,
p. 142).
The Court does not say nor do We entertain a belief that the herein petitioners are in any
way disqualified to be adopting parents in their home State or ordinary place of
residence. What the Court simply wishes to express is that it would be more prudent and
desirable to require that the petitioners herein submit themselves to a Family Study
Report in their home country so that if a favorable report is thereafter submitted to the
Ministry of Social Services and Development, then the corresponding travel
certification should then forthwith issue, in implementation of the judgment of adoption
already rendered. This step, if taken by petitioners win lead to the removal Of the basic
reason for the reluctance and apprehension of the public respondent Minister who,
understandably, is concerned that the welfare of the adopted child might later be WHEREFORE, and in the light of the facts and circumstances hereinabove discussed,
prejudiced — a possibility that may arise in the event that the latter's adoption is not the dispositive portion of our judgment in the instant case directing the issuance of the
sanctioned or recognized by Australia where petitioners are citizens and residents of. requisite travel clearance certificate in favor of the child, Adam Christopher Bobanovic,
is hereby SUSPENDED and DEFERRED until after petitioners shall have submitted
It may not be amiss to state that the petitioners, in their Comment to the motion for themselves to a Family Case Study in their home State of Victoria, Australia where they
reconsideration principally expound on the finality of the decision in the adoption case are said to be residing. Upon furnishing herein respondent Minister of Social Services
and that the working arrangement between the adoption authorities of Australia and the and Development with the corresponding official report on said Family Case Study and
Philippines does not have the effect of law. But even as petitioners deplore the delay in if such is favorable to the petitioners herein, then the requisite travel clearance
the issuance of the certificate of clearance to travel, they, however, fail to tender an certificate for the adopted child, Adam Christopher Bobanovic, should thus be issued by
explanation or state any reason whatsoever for their apparent reluctance to submit the office of the public respondent Minister as previously decreed.
themselves to a Family Case Study in their home State.
SO ORDERED.
While the Court takes the view that the decision in the adoption case should not be
disturbed and that all the technicalities that were raised against the adoption should
yield to the ultimate end of promoting the best interest of the adopted child, the same
guiding principle should be applied in the matter of the issuance of the travel clearance
certificate. This subsequent aspect of the adoption which was raised by respondent
Minister was brought only lately to the Courts attention. Thus, it becomes relevant and
important to extend consideration to the aforementioned Memorandum Agreement
entered into in 1981 by our country and Australia.

It is well worth considering that the welfare of the adopted child can be truly protected
if there is at least an assurance that the home State of the petitioners has undertaken a
family case study concerning them. As it would be but a simple thing for petitioners to
submit to a family case study report, the Court finds it difficult to perceive the reason
for petitioners' apparent adamant attitude in declining to do so. As petitioners profess
their desire to extend to their adopted child the warmth of a parent's love, the comforts
of a caring home and the material provision he needs, their sincerity in this regard can
best be manifested by laying aside any possible inconvenience on their part or searching
for legal technicalities. Whether or not the referred Memorandum Agreement has the
force and effect of law should be of least consideration to the petitioners if they are truly
disposed to do their part to expedite the travel for their adopted child to their country.
The best solution would be for them to accept and submit themselves to a family case
study which should not be at all a difficult thing for them to do.

In the same way that this Court took to task the Ministry of Social Services and
Development for being, paradoxically, 'overly concerned over its claimed exclusive
prerogative to conduct the case study work instead of placing more importance on the
possible prejudicial effects of its refusal on the welfare of the child," a similar rebuke
may be fastened on the petitioners for their seemingly adamant attitude and reluctance
to submit themselves to a family case study report, which if favorable to them would
quickly remove the last reasonable obstacle for the issuance of the subject travel
clearance certificate. It will banish the apprehension and any misgiving on the part of
the local authorities concerned that the adopted child might be confronted with
unexpected problems seriously prejudicial to his welfare, should the latter's adoption be
not sanctioned or recognized by the State where petitioners reside and are citizens of.
G.R. No. 76290 November 23, 1988
MINISTER MAMITA PARDO DE TAVERA of the Ministry of Social Services
and Development (MSSD) and LOURDES BALANON, Officer-in-Charge, SCWU,
MSSD, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE BONIFACIO A. CACDAC, JR., of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Region, Branch XLVIII Manila, GEORGE BAXTER BROWN
GORDON, and GAIL JUDITH MILBOURN GORDON, respondents.
Rosa Maria Juan Bautista for petitioners.
J. V. Natividad & Associates for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The Resolution of respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch XLVIII, Manila, of 1
October 1986 ordering the Chief of the Special Child and Welfare Unit of the Ministry
of Social Services and Development (MSSD) to issue a travel clearance in favor of the
adopted minor, Anthony Gandhi Gordon, within five (5) days from notice, under pain of
contempt, is directly challenged in this certiorari Petition for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. At the same time the
Petition seeks to annul the Decision dated 5 August 1986 of the same Court declaring
the minor, Anthony Gandhi O. Custodio the truly and lawfully adopted child of George
Baxter Gordon and Gail Judith Milbourn Gordon (the Gordons, for brevity.)
On 6 November 1986, we issued a temporary Restraining Order enjoining Respondent
Judge from enforcing the assailed Decision and Resolution.
Because of the official request of the MSSD addressed to this Court to require all
Regional Trial Court Judges handling adoption cases to adhere strictly to the provisions
of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. No. 603), the Petition was given due course.
The antecedental facts disclose that, on 19 June 1986, in a verified Petition before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XLVIII, Manila, the Gordons sought to adopt the minor,
Anthony Gandhi O. Custodio, a natural son of Adoracion Custodia. The Petition was set
for hearing on 31 July 1986, with notice published in a newspaper of general circulation
in the City of Manila for three (3) consecutive weeks.
On the date of hearing, nobody appeared to oppose the Petition. The Office of the
Solicitor General, which was notified of the Petition and the hearing, failed to send any
representative for the State. Thus, the Trial Court appointed the Branch Clerk of Court
as Commissioner to receive the additional evidence, the deposition of some witnesses
having been taken previously.
The principal evidence disclosed that the Gordons, as British citizens, are allowed by
their home country to adopt foreign babies specifically from the Republic of the
Philippines; that the husband is employed at the Dubai Hilton International Hotel as
Building Superintendent; that they are financially secure and can amply provide for the
education and support of the child; that Anthony's mother, Adoracion Custodia had
given her consent to the adoption realizing that her child would face a brighter future;
that the Case Study Report submitted by the Social Worker of the Trial Court gave a
favorable recommendation after observing that there existed a parent-child relationship
between the Gordons and Anthony and that although the natural mother was having
second thoughts and experiencing lonesome feelings, her aspirations for the future
betterment of her one-year-two-month old child prevailed so she agreed to the adoption.
After assessment of the evidence the Trial Court concluded, in its decision of 5 August
1986, that the Gordons possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
for adoption and declared Anthony the truly and lawfully adopted child of the Gordons,
the Decree of Adoption to take effect from the filing of the petition on 19 June 1986.
On 11 August 1986, the Gordons wrote MSSD for a travel clearance for Anthony. The
next day, 12 August, they also filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion before the Trial Court
stating that the Chief of the Passport Division of the then Ministry of Foreign Affairs
refused to issue a passport to Anthony without a Case Study of the MSSD and praying
that it be required to issue such passport.
Subpoenaed, the MSSD opposed the grant of a travel clearance on the principal grounds
that the Report of the Court Social Worker and that of the Pastor of the International
Christian Church of Dubai cannot take the place of a report of the MSSD or a duly
licensed child placement agency; that the required six-month trial custody had not been
met nor the reasons therefor given as required by Article 35 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code (P.D. No. 603); that the Gordons had given P10,000.00 to the natural
mother, which is reflective of the undesirable attitude of the Gordons to shop for
children as if they were shopping for commodities; that under Muslim law, which is the
law in Dubai, Anthony cannot inherit from the adopting parents; that the Gordons had
filed another petition for adoption of a baby girl before the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 94, on 24 June 1986 but because she died a month later they tried
to pass off another child to whom they gave the same name and represented that she
was the very same girl they were adopting; and that there being no Memorandum of
Agreement between Dubai and the Philippines there is no guarantee that the adopted
child will not be sold, exchanged, neglected or abused.
Over the MSSD Opposition, the Trial Court, in its Resolution of 1 October 1986
ordered the MSSD to issue the travel clearance under pain of contempt and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to issue the corresponding passport. It reasoned out that the Court
Social Worker Report could take the place of a report from a duly licensed placement
agency or of the MSSD; that the Court had impliedly dispensed with the six-month trial
custody considering that the Gordons were foreigners whose livelihood was earned
abroad; that the Decision had become final and executory and to entertain the MSSD
objections at that point would put the MSSD above the Courts and its refusal to issue a
travel clearance a defiance of a lawful Order of the Court.
In so resolving, the Trial Court relied on: (1) the Resolution of this Court in
Administrative Matter No. 85-2-7136-RTC denying the request of the MSSD for a
Supreme Court Circular to all Regional Trial Court Judges to the effect that, with the
abolition of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, only the MSSD can make the
required case study and submit its report and recommendation to the Courts. That denial
was predicated on the following finding:
... The law expressly provides that in a petition for adoption a case
study of a child to be adopted, his natural parents and the prospective
adopting parents may be conducted by the Department of Social
Welfare ... or the Social Work and Counselling Division, in case of
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the functions of which are
now exercised by the Regional Trial Courts Staff Assistant V (Social
Worker), Regional Trial Court. (Emphasis supplied)
and 2) this Court's ruling in Bobanovic vs. Hon. Montes (G.R. No. L-71370, July 7,
1986, 142 SCRA 485), reading in part:
By refusing to issue the travel clearance, respondent Minister would
in effect frustrate said judgment of adoption for the adopting parents
who reside in a foreign country would consequently remain separated
from their adopted child. The respondent Minister would in effect
take away from the petitioners what already belongs to them as a
vested legal right. The unfairness of such a situation created by the
action of the public respondent is patently a wanton abuse of her
discretion and a neglect of her plain duty to assist in the reasonable
implementation of the final order of a proper court.
In refusing to grant the travel clearance certificate, respondent MSSD
discounts and negates the effects of a valid and final judgment of the
Court regarding which no appeal had even been taken from
(Bobanovic vs. Hon. Montes, G.R. L-71370, July 7, 1986).
It is true that in resolving a Motion for Reconsideration in that case on 31 January 1987,
this Court deferred the implementation of its judgment directing the issuance of the
requisite travel clearance certificate because of a Memorandum of Agreement between
Australia and the Philippines belatedly brought to its attention which requires that a
prospective adopter of a Filipino child should first undergo a Family Study to be
conducted by the adopter's home state. In the case at bar, however, attention has not
been called to any such agreement between Great Britain and the Philippines.
On the strength of the foregoing Circular and Decision, the challenged Decision and
Resolution of respondent Court have to be upheld. Unequivocally, prior to Executive
Order No. 91, issued on 17 December 1986, the Social Workers in Regional Trial
Courts had the authority to conduct a case study of a child to be adopted. While
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts have been abolished by B.P. Blg. 129, their
functions have been merged with Regional Trial Courts, which were then provided with
Social Workers to assist the Court in handling juvenile and domestic relations cases.
It may be that respondent Trial Court had not complied strictly with the provisions of
P.D. No. 603 on adoption. As it had reasoned out, however, it was satisfied with the
Case Study Report submitted by the Court Social Worker. Prior to Executive Order No.
91, amending the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the MSSD did not have the exclusive
authority to make a case study in adoption cases. The Court evaluated the Report of its
social Worker and found that it was based on "very honest insight and opinion based on
personal interviews and home study painstakingly made ..." The objections which the
MSSD have (sic) against the petitioners Gordon are all reflected in "... the case study
report and such have been passed upon by the Court in its decision granting the
adoption" (P. 30, Rollo). The MSSD did not allege that the Social Worker Report was
faulty or incorrect. It thus appears that the objective of trial custody had been
substantially achieved, which is, "to assess the adjustment and emotional readiness of
the adopting parents for the legal union" (Article 35, P.D. No. 603). And as far as the
delegation of the reception of evidence to a Commissioner is concerned, that is
permissible in the absence of any opposition.
The MSSD objection that the Gordons were making of the adoption case a commercial
venture does not necessarily follow from the fact that they had given the natural mother
the sum of P10,000.00. As the latter had explained, the amount was handed to her as a
gesture of assistance. By receiving the same, the latter had not thereby made a "hurried
decision caused by strain or anxiety to give up the child," which is sought to be avoided
by Article 32, P.D. No. 603. As to the "changeling" referred to by the MSSD, it appears
that the Gordons also wanted to adopt a baby girl in proceedings before the Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, but that was aborted as the first baby they selected was a
"mongoloid" so they decided to surrender her to the International Alliance for Children
where she eventually died. At. any rate, as the Trial Court had stated, the questionable
attitude of the Gordons was belatedly raised and had yet to be proven and should not be
made to prejudice Anthony. Moreover, the Gordons are British citizens and Muslim
law, which is the law in Dubai, has no applicability to them. In the last analysis, it is not
bureaucratic technicalities but the best interests of the child that should be the principal
criterion in adoption cases.
More significantly, as the Trial Court had opined, its judgment had become final and
executory and, therefore, commands obeisance. The MSSD could have appealed
through the Solicitor General when it learned of the Decision, but it did not. Its
opposition to the issuance of a travel clearance cannot be equated with a motion for
reconsideration the request for a clearance being directed towards the implementation of
the Trial Court judgment. Its present Petition for certiorari cannot be a substitute for a
lost appeal. And even assuming that the Trial Court judgment was erroneous, the same
would not be correctible by Certiorari. Much less can such an extraordinary Writ be
availed of for the annulment of a final judgment, exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
which appertains to the Court of Appeals (Section 9[3], B.P. Blg. 129).
Constitutional mandate that the protection of minors is a paramount duty of the State
(Section 3[2], Article XV, 1987 Constitution).<äre||anº•1àw>
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of 5 August 1986 and Resolution dated 1 October
1986, both of respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch XLVIII Manila, are hereby
AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby lifted. No
costs.

Since the filing of this case, this Court had issued Circular No. 12 to all Judges of the SO ORDERED.
Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases, dated 2 October 1986, directing them:

(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development ,

thru its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency
thereof with respect to those cases already filed;

(2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Art. 33 of the

aforesaid decree that—

No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of

Social Welfare (now the Ministry of Social Services and
Development), or the Social Work and Counselling Division, in the
case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts (now defunct), has
made a case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as
well as the prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its report
and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition.
The Department of Social Welfare (now the Ministry of Social
Services and Development) shall intervene on behalf of the child if it
finds, after such case study, that the petition should be denied.

The Staff Assistant V (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if

any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and
Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such
case study.

(3) To personally HEAR all adoption cases and desist from the
practice of delegating the reception of evidence of the petitioner to the
Clerk of Court.

With the foregoing directive, a happy solution has been arrived at. The understandable
concern of the MSSD for Filipino children up for adoption by foreigners is recognized
and appreciated; the prerogative of the Courts to render judgments based upon their
assessment of the evidence inclusive of Case Study Reports that may be submitted is
fully upheld; the guidelines for a modus vivendi in adoption cases between the executive
and judicial departments of government, even with the advent of Executive Order No.
91 dated 17 December 1986, have been adequately laid down-all in proper fealty to the
G.R. No. L-22523 September 29, 1967
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLA Y
MENDOZA. LUIS E. SANTOS, JR. and EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
A. E. Dacanay for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee.
ANGELES, J.:
An appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, in Special
Proceeding No. 0001, dismissing the petition instituted by the spouses Luis R. Santos,
Jr. and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza.
The issue before Us is, whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger brother.
The trial court dismissed the petition reasoning thus:
A critical consideration in this case is the fact that the parents of the minor to
be adopted are also the parents of the petitioner-wife. The minor, therefore, is
the latter's legitimate brother.
In this proceeding, the adoption will result in an incongruous situation where
the minor Edwin Villa, a legitimate brother of the petitioner-wife, will also be
her son. In the opinion of the court, that incongruity not neutralized by other
circumstances absent herein, should prevent the adoption.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision but the same was denied. Hence, this
appeal.
The facts are not disputed.
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on January 8, 1963,
praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their
(petitioner's) son by adoption. Evidence was presented that the order setting the case for
hearing has been duly published, Exhibit A. There having been no opposition registered
to the petition, the petitioners were permitted to adduce their evidence.
It was established that the petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the
City of Manila. They were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of
their own. They do not have a child of their own blood. Neither spouse has any
legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, or natural child by
legal fiction, nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and
Florencia Mendoza who are the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa
Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with business interests in a textile
development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the general manager of Medry
Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His income is approximately
P600.00 a month. His co-petitioner-wife, is a nurse by profession, with an average
monthly earning of about P300.00.
It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza was born on May 22, 1958, Exhibit C.
He was a sickly child since birth. Due to the child's impairing health his parents
entrusted him to the petitioners who reared and brought him up for the years thereafter,
and as a result, there developed between the petitioners and the child, a deep and
profound love for each other. The natural parents of the minor testified that they have
voluntarily given their consent to the adoption of their son by the petitioners, and
submitted their written consent and conformity to the adoption, and that they fully
understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their child by the petitioners.
We are not aware of any provision in the law, and none has been pointed to Us by the
Office of the Solicitor General who argues for the State in this case, that relatives, by
blood or by affinity, are prohibited from adopting one another. The only objection
raised is the alleged "incongruity" that will result in the relation of the petitioner-wife
and the adopted, in the circumstance that the adopted who is the legitimate brother of
the adopter, will also be her son by adoption. The theory is, therefore, advanced that
adoption among people who are related by nature should not be allowed, in order that
dual relationship should not result, reliance being made upon the views expressed by
this Court in McGee vs. Republic. L-5387, April 29, 1954, 94 Phil. 820.1awphîl.nèt
In that case, an American citizen, Clyde E. McGee married to a Filipina by whom he
had one child, instituted a proceeding for the adoption of two minor children of the wife
had by her first husband. The lower court granted the petition of McGee to adopt his
two minor step-children. On appeal by the State. We reversed the decision. We said:
The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation
where none existed before. Where therefore the relationship of parent and child
already exists whether by blood or by affinity as in the case of illegitimate and
step-children, it would be unnecessary and superfluous to establish and super
impose another relationship of parent and child through adoption.
Consequently, an express authorization of law like article 338 is necessary, if
not to render it proper and legal, at least, to remove any and all doubt on the
subject matter. Under this view, article 338 may not be regarded as a
surplusage. That may have been the reason why in the old Code of Civil
 Procedure, particularly its provisions regarding adoption, authority to adopt a
step-child by a step-father was provided in section 766 notwithstanding the
general authorization in section 765 extended to any inhabitant of the
Philippines to adopt a minor child. The same argument of surplusage could
plausibly have been advanced as regards section 766, that is to say, section 766
was unnecessary and superfluous because without it a step-father could adopt a
minor step-child anyway. However, the inserting of section 766 was not
entirely without reason. It seems to be an established principle in American
jurisprudence that a person may not adopt his own relative, the reason being
that it is unnecessary to establish a relationship where such already exists (the
same philosophy underlying our codal provisions on adoption). So some states
have special laws authorizing the adoption of relatives such as a grandfather
adopting a grandchild and a father adopting his illegitimate or natural-child.
Notwithstanding the views thus expressed, a study of American precedents would
reveal that there is a variance in the decisions of the courts in different jurisdictions
regarding, the matter of adoption of relatives. It cannot be stated as a general
proposition that the adoption of a blood relative is contrary to the policy of the law, for
in many states of the Union, no restriction of that sort is contained in the statutes
authorizing adoption, although laws of other jurisdiction expressly provide that
adoption may not take place within persons within a certain degree of relationship (1
Am. Jur. 628-629). Courts in some states hold that in the absence of express statutory
restriction, a blood relationship between the parties is not a legal impediment to the
adoption of one by the other, and there may be a valid adoption where the relation of
parent and child already exists by nature (2 Am. Jur. 2d 869). Principles vary according
to the particular adoption statute of a state under which any given case is considered. It
would seem that in those states originally influenced by the civil law countries where
adoption originated, the rules are liberally construed, while in other states where
common law principles predominate, adoption laws are more strictly applied because
they are regarded to be in derogation of the common law.
should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person who can
properly rear and educate them (In re Havsgord's Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378).
With respect to the objection that the adoption in this particular case will result in a dual
relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the
adopting elder sister, that fact alone should not prevent the adoption. One is by nature,
while the other is by fiction of law. The relationship established by the adoption is
limited to the adopting parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as
expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of
the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children
which they may have after the adoption except that the law imposes certain
impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted
considered as descendants of the adopter (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. I, 1960 Ed., p.
652, citing 1 Oyuelos 284; Perez, Gonzales and Castan; 4-11 Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff
177; Muñoz P. 104). So even considered in relation to the rules on succession which are
in pari materia, the adoption under consideration would not be objectionable on the
ground alone of the resulting relationship between the adopter and the adopted. Similar
dual relationships also result under our law on marriage when persons who are already
related, by blood or by affinity, marry each other. But as long as the relationship is not
within the degrees prohibited by law, such marriages are allowed notwithstanding the
resulting dual relationship. And as We do not find any provision in the law that
expressly prohibits adoption among relatives, they ought not to be prevented.
For all the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the
petition for the adoption of the subject minor, granted. No pronouncement as to costs.

Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has
been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not among those prohibited from
adopting. Article 339 of the same code names those who cannot be adopted, and the
minor child whose adoption is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the
law. Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural
father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-
child by the step-father or stepmother. This last article is, of course, necessary to
remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in these cases where there
already exist a relationship of parent and child between them by nature. To say that
adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each
other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption among
relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be,
which in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child to
be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children,
G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES and
ZENAIDA CARREON CERVANTES, petitioners,
vs.
GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO, respondents.
Yolanda F. Lim for petitioners.
Voltaire C. Campomanes for respondents.
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the person of
the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. In a resolution, dated 5 October 1987, the Court
resolved to issue the writ returnable to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Pasig at the hearing of 12 October 1987 at 8:30 a.m. Said Judge was directed to hear the
case and submit his report and recommendation to the Court.
On 3 December 1987, said Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig submitted to
the Court his report and recommendation, also dated 3 December 1987.
It appears that the minor was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo
and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the
child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners
Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody
of the child when she was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the
adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina
Carreon on 29 April 1987. 1
The appropriate petition for adoption (Sp. Proc. No. 057-B) was filed by herein
petitioners over the child before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Fourth Judicial
District, Branch 67 which, on 20 August 1987, rendered a decision 2granting the
petition. The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo. The court ordered that the
child be "freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal
obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents
and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and
capable of inheriting their estate ." 3
Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents, herein petitioners Nelson and
Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the
amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused
to accede to the demand.
As a result, on 11 September 1987, while petitioners were out at work, the respondent
Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners' residence in Angono,
Rizal, on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Respondent Gina
Carreon brought the child to her house in Parañaque. Petitioners thereupon demanded
the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give
up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had
executed was not fully explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners that she will,
however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of P150,000.00.
Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case study on the adoption
and submitted a report thereon to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal in the adoption case,
testified on 27 October 1987 before the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig
in connection with the present petition. She declared that she had interviewed
respondent Gina Carreon on 24 June 1987 in connection with the contemplated
adoption of the child. During the interview, said respondent manifested to the social
worker her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners. 4
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's
welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child
under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to
rule otherwise. 5 In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost
consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking
into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending
parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion. 6
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other
than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law
husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon
will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop
into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had
previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for
almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like
Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true
father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other
hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially,
and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the
natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only jobless but also
maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and
consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving
the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting
parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. 7 The adopting
parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child 8 and exercise
parental authority and responsibility over him.9

ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court

of Pasig, Hon. Eutropio Migrino, the Petition is GRANTED. The custody and care of
the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to whom they
properly belong, and respondents are ordered (if they still have not) to deliver said
minor to the petitioners immediately upon notice hereof This resolution is immediately
executory.

SO ORDERED.
 ARTURO PELAYO v. MARCELO LAURON ET AL. +
DECISION
12 Phil. 453
TORRES, J.:
On the 23d of November, 1900, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a
complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about the
13th of October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the
defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was requested by them to
render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a
child; that therefore, and after consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escaño, it
was found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to remove the foetus by means of
forceps which operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the
after-birth, in which service he was occupied until the following morning, and that
afterwards, on the same day, he visited the patient several times; that the just and
equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the defendants refuse
to pay without alleging any good reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed that
judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants, or any of them, for the sum
of P500 and costs, together with any other relief that might be deemed proper.
In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegations
therein contained and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in
consequence of the said childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with her
husband independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with
them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants,
her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances; therefore, he prayed
that the defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff demurred to the above answer, and the court below sustained the demurrer,
directing the defendants, on the 23d of January, 1907, to amend their answer.
In compliance with this order the defendants presented, on the same date, their amended
answer, denying each and every one of the allegations contained in the complaint, and
requesting that the same be dismissed with costs.
As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties, judgment was entered by the court
below on the 5th of April, 1907, whereby the defendants were absolved from the former
complaint, on account of the lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of action
against the defendants, with costs against the plaintiff, who excepted to the said
judgment and in addition moved for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was
contrary to law; the motion was overruled and the plaintiff excepted and in due course
presented the corresponding bill of exceptions. The motion of the defendants
requesting that the declaration contained in the judgment that the defendants had
demanded the professional services of the plaintiff be eliminated therefrom, for the
reason that, according to the evidence, no such request had been made, was also denied,
and to the decision the defendants excepted.
Assuming that it is a real fact acknowledged by the defendants, that the plaintiff, by
virtue of having been sent for by the former, attended as physician and rendered
professional services to a daughter-in-law of the said defendants during a difficult and
laborious childbirth, in order to decide the claim of the said physician regarding the
recovery of his fees, it becomes necessary to decide who is bound to pay the bill,
whether the father and mother-in-law of the patient, or the husband of the latter.
According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any
kind of fault or negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code
or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from
contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in
accordance with their stipulations. (Arts, 1090 and 1091.)
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.)
If every obligation consists in giving, doing, or not doing something (art. 1088), and
spouses are mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that,
when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the
other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a
physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the
sickness by which life is jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such support is
therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his
professional services. This liability originates from the above-cited mutual obligation
which the law lias expressly established between the married couple.
In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay
the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the
daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth is the husband of the patient and
not her father and mother-in-law, the defendants herein. The fact that it was not the
husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife is no bar to the
fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger to
which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that medical
assistance was urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife
with the indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is specially
established by the law, as has been seen, and compliance therewith is unavoidable;
therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is entitled to recover his fees, must direct
his action against the husband who is under obligation to furnish medical assistance to
his lawful wife in such an emergency.
From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was improper to have brought
an action against the defendants simply because they were the parties who called the
plaintiff and requested him to assist the patient during her difficult confinement, and
also, possibly, because they were her father and mother-in-law and the sickness
occurred in their house. The defendants were not, nor are they now, under any
obligation by virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence
of any contract entered into between them and the plaintiff from which such obligation
might have arisen.

In applying the provisions of the Civil Code in an action for support, the supreme court
of Spain, while recognizing the validity and efficiency of a contract to furnish support
wherein a person bound himself to support another who was not his relative, established
the rule that the law does impose the obligation to pay for the support of a stranger, but
as the liability arose out of a contract, the stipulations of the agreement must be
upheld. (Decision of May 11, 1897.)

Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect
to the obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the
furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the
other hand, it does not appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the
plaintiff physician, for which reason it is obvious that the former can not be compelled
to pay fees which they are under no liability to pay because it does not appear that they
consented to bind themselves.

The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors assigned to the
judgment below are unfounded, because, if the plaintiff has no right of action against
the defendants, it is needless to declare whether or not the use of forceps is a surgical
operation.

Therefore, in view of the considerations hereinbefore set forth, it is our opinion that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
 [ GR No. 45616, May 16, 1939 ] way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be
entered.
FELICIANO SANCHEZ v. FRANCISCO ZULUETA + Although mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application,
nevertheless, the failure to accompany the opposition therewith did not justify the court
DECISION in ignoring said opposition, just because of this omission, inasmuch as an opportunity to
68 Phil. 110 present evidence has been asked. It may be that the defendant could not get hold of
affidavits in support of his opposition, but he may have on hand other evidence of
greater weight.
AVANCENA, C.J.:
If the defendant has a valid defense which calls for proof, and he asks for an
In civil case No. 3199 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, wherein Josefa Diego opportunity to present evidence, it is error to deny him this opportunity.
and Mario Sanchez are plaintiffs and Feliciano Sanchez is defendant, the plaintiffs ask
that the; defendant be sentenced to pay them a monthly allowance for support. The decision rendered by the Court of Appeals is reversed, and it is ordered that the
The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs are the wife and child, respectively, of the petitioner be given an opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense against
defendant; that the latter, since 1932, refused and still refuses to support the plaintiffs; the application for support pendente lite, to the extent which the court may determine,
that the latter have no means of subsistence, while the defendant receives from the without special pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.
United States Army a monthly pension of P174.20; that the defendant abandoned the
plaintiffs without any justifiable cause and now refuses to allow them to live with him.
The defendant alleges, as special defense, that the plaintiff Josefa Diego abandoned the
conjugal home on October 27, 1930, without his knowledge or consent, because she
committed adultery with Macario Sanchez, with whom she had, as a result of the illicit
relations, a child which is the other plaintiff Mario Sanchez.
The month following the filing of the complaint, the plaintiffs asked the court to compel
the defendant to give them, by way of allowance pendente lite, the sum of P50 a
month. In opposition to his petition, the defendant alleged that Mario Sanchez is not his
legitimate child but is the adulterous child of the plaintiff with Macario Sanchez, and he
asked for an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of this defense. The court,
without acceding to this petition of the defendant to adduce evidence, favorably acted
upon the application of the plaintiffs and ordered the defendant to pay a monthly
allowance pendente lite of P50 to the plaintiffs, from July 1, 1936. In view of these
facts, the defendant filed a petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals against
the judge of the Court of First Instance and the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals denied
the petition, and from this resolution, the defendant comes to this court on certiorari.
We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to
present his evidence for the purpose of determining whether it is sufficient prima
facie to overcome the application. Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense
against an action for support (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil, 285). Consequently, as to the
child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations, for in that case,
it would not be the child of the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support as
such. But as this defense should be established, and not merely alleged, it would be
unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not of course necessary to go fully into
the merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of
evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one
G.R. No. L-48219 February 28, 1979
MANUEL J. C. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court, Quezon City, COURT OF APPEALS and CELIA ILUSTRE-
REYES, respondents.
Eriberto D. Ignacio for petitioner.
Gonzalo D. David for private respondent.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 06928-SP entitled "Manuel J. C. Reyes, petitioner, versus, The Hon. Leonor
Ines-Luciano as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (Quezon City) and
Celia Ilustre-Reyes, Respondents", dismissing the petition to annul the order of the
respondent Judge directing the petitioner to give support pendente lite to his wife, Celia
Ilustre-Reyes, private respondent herein, in the amount of P40,000.00 a month.1
The private petitioner, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Quezon City a complaint dated June 3, 1976 against her husband, Manuel J. C.
Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that the defendant had attempted to kill
plaintiff. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are:
6.8 On March 10, 1976, defendant went to V. Ilustre and attacked
plaintiff. He pummeled her with fist blows that floored her, then held
her head and, with intent to kill, bumped it several times against the
cement floor. When she ran upstairs to her father for protection, he
pushed her at the stairway of 13 flights and she fell sliding to the
ground floor. Determined to finish her off, he again gave her a strong
swing at her abdomen which floored her half unconscious. Were it not
for plaintiff's father, he would have succeeded killing her;
6.9. On May 26, 1976, although on May 11 previous she ceased
holding office with defendant at Bel-Air Apartments elsewhere
adverted to, she went thereto to get her overnight bag. Upon seeing
her, defendant yelled at her to get out of the office. When he did not
mind him, he suddenly doused her with a glass of grape juice, kicked
her several times that landed at her back and nape, and was going to
hit her with a steel tray as her driver, Ricardo Mancera, came due to
her screams for help. For fear of further injury and for life, she rushed
to Precinct 5 at united Nations Avenue, Manila Metropolitan Police,
for assistance and protection;2
The plaintiff asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children. The
defendant, petitioner herein, opposed the application for support pendente lite on the
ground that his wife had committed adultery with her physician.
The application for support pendente lite was set for hearing and submitted for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings and the documents attached thereto by the
parties.
The respondent Judge issued an order dated March 15, 1977 granting plaintiff's prayer
for alimony pendente lite in the amount of P5,000.00 a month commencing from June
1976.3
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled
to support during the pendency of the case, and, alleging that even if she entitled, the
amount awarded was excessive. The respondent Judge reduced the amount from
P5,000.00 to P44,00.00 a month in an order dated June 17, 1977.4
Manuel J. C. Reyes filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals dated July 25,
1977 asking that the order granting support pendente lite to private respondent. Celia
Ilustre-Reyes, be annulled on the ground that the respondent Judge, Leonor Ines-
Luciano, had committed a grave abuse of discretion or that said order be modified
inasmuch as the amount awarded as support pendente lite is excessive.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because:
Considering the plight of the wife during the pendency of the case for
legal separation and that the husband appears to be financially capable
of giving the support, We believe that the petitioner has not presented
a clear case of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
in issuing the questioned orders. We see no compelling reason to give
it due course.5
The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeal committed the following error:
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN A
MANNER AMOUNTING IT CAN ERROR OF LAW AND A
DEPARTURE FROM THE ACCEPTED NORMS LAID DOWN BY
THIS HON. COURT IN THE CASES WE SHALL LATER ON
DISCUSS, IN REFUSING TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE
ORIGINAL PETITION FOR certiorari HEREIN AGAINST
RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES, AND IN AFFIRMING THE
ORDERS FOR SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE ANNEXES "F" AND
 "H" OF THIS PETITION WHEN HELD THAT RESPONDENT-
APPELLEE JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT ANY ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ISSUING SAID ORDERS, FOR THE REASONS
THAT:
A. IN ACTIONS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION THE WIFE IS
ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM THE HUSBAND DESPITE THE
FACT THAT A CASE FOR ADULTERY HAD BEEN FILED BY
THE HUSBAND AGAINST HER; AND
B. IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT PENDENTE
LITE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE COURT ASCERTAIN THE
KIND AND AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE EVEN BY AFFIDAVITS
ONLY OR OTHER DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE APPEARING
IN THE RECORDS.6
It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support however, the
alleged adultery of wife must be established by competent evidence. The allegation that
the wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right receive support pendente
lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained wig defeat the
action.7
In the instant case, at the hearing of the application for support pendente lite before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court presided by the respondent Judge, Hon. Leonor
Ines-Luciano the petitioner did not present any evidence to prove the allegation that his
wife, private respondent Celia Ilustre-Reyes, had committed adultery with any person.
The petitioner has still the opportunity to adduce evidence on the alleged adultery of his
wife when the action for legal separation is heard on the merits before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City. It is to be noted however, that as pointed out
by the respondents in their comment, the "private respondent was not asking support to
be taken from petitioner's personal funds or wherewithal, but from the conjugal
property—which, was her documentary evidence ...". 8 It is, therefore, doubtful whether
adultery will affect her right to alimony pendente lite. In Quintana vs. Lerma,9 the
action for support was based on the obligation of the husband to support his wife.
The contention of the petitioner that the order of the respondent Judge granting the
private respondent support pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month is not
supported by the allegations of the complaint for legal separation and by competent
evidence has no merit.
The complaint or legal separation contains allegations showing that on at least two
occasions the defendant, petitioner herein, had made attempts to kill the private
respondent. Thus it is alleged that on March 10, 1976, the defendant attacked plaintiff,
pummeled her with fist blows that floored her, held her head and with intent to kill,
bumped it several times against the cement floor and when she ran upstairs to her father
for protection, the petitioner pushed her at the stairway of thirteen (13) flights and she
fell sliding to the ground floor and defendant gave her a strong swing at her abdomen
which floored her half unconscious and were it not for plaintiff's father, defendant
would have succeeded in killing her. 10 It is also alleged that on May 26, 1976, the
defendant doused Celia Ilustre-Reyes with a glass of grape juice, kicked her several
times at her back and nape and was going to hit her with a steel tray if it were not for
her driver who came due to her creams for help." 11
In fixing the amount of monthly support pendente lite of P4,000,00, the respondent
judge did not act capriciously and whimsically. When she originally fixed the amount of
P5,000.00 a month, the respondent Judge considered the following:
On record for plaintiff's cause are the following: that she and
defendant were married on January 18, 1958; that she is presently
unemployed and without funds, thus, she is being supported by her
father with whom she resides: that defendant had been maltreating her
and Cried to kill her; that all their conjugal properties are in the
possession of defendant who is also president, Manager and Treasurer
of their corporation namely:
1. Standard Mineral Products, which was incorporated on February 9,
1959: presently with paid-in capital of P295,670.00; assets and
liabilities of P757,108.52; Retained Earnings of P85,654.61: and
majority stockholder is defendant;
2. Development and Technology Consultant Inc. incorporated on July
12, 1971, with paid-in capital of P200,000.00; Assets and liabilities of
P831,669.34; defendant owns 99% of the stocks; and last Retained
Earnings is P98,879.84.
3. The Contra-Prop Marine Philippines, Inc. which was incorporated
on October 3, 1975, with paid-in capital of P100,000 defendant owns
99% of the stocks.
To secure some of the of said Agreement of Counter-Guaranty
Mortgage with Real Estate, and Real Estate Mortgage were
undertaken by plaintiff of their properties outside of other
accommodations; and that she needs of P5,000.00 a month for her
support in accordance with their station in life. 12
The amount of support pendente lite was reduced to P4,000.00 inasmuch as the children
are in the custody of the petitioner and are being supported by him.
It is thus seen that the respondent judge acted with due deliberation before fixing the SO ORDERED.
amount of support pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month.

In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is not necessary to

go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind
and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the
application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the
resolution to be entered. Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the
application for support pendente lite. 13 It is enough the the facts be established by
affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. 14

The private respondent has submitted documents showing that the corporations
controlled by the petitioner have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of the
Ministry of Public Highways.

Considering the high cost of living due to inflation and the financial ability of the
petitioner as shown by the documents of record, We find that the amount of P4,000.00 a
month granted by the respondent Judge as alimonypendente lite to the private
respondent is not excessive. There is no showing that the respondent Judge has
committed a grave abuse of discretion in granting said support.

In a resolution dated July 31, 1978, this Court issued a temporary restraining order
effective immediately against the enforcement of the lower court's order giving support
pendente lite to private respondent in the sum of P4,000.00 monthly commencing June
1976 and in lieu thereof to allow such support only to the extent of P1,000.00 a
month. 15

Later the petitioner was required to pay the support at the rate of P1,000.00 a month
which had accumulated since June 1976 within ten (10) days from notice of the
resolution:16

The private respondent acknowledged on November 20, 1978 having received from the
petitioner, through his counsel a check in the amount of P30,000.00 as payment of
support for the period from June 1976 to November 1978 or thirty (30) months at
P1,000.00 a month in compliance with the resolution of this Court dated October 9,
1978.

In view of the foregoing, the support of P4,000.00 should be made to commence or,
March 1, 1979.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby denied and the decision of the
Council of Appeals sought to be reviewed is affirmed with the modification that the
support pendente lite at the rate of Four Thousand Pesos (P4.000.00) a month should
commence from March 1, 1979 without pronouncement as to costs.
 [ G.R. No. 206647, August 09, 2017 ]
RICHELLE P. ABELLA, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR DAUGHTER,
MARL JHORYLLE ABELLA, PETITIONER, V. POLICARPIO CABAÑERO,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Filiation must be established for a child to claim support from a putative father. When
"filiation is beyond question, support follows as [a] matter of obligation."[1] To establish
filiation, an action for compulsory recognition may be filed against the putative father
ahead of an action for support. In the alternative, an action for support may be directly
filed, where the matter of filiation shall be integrated and resolved.[2]
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari[3] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure praying that the assailed August 25, 2011 Decision[4] and January 15,
2013 Resolution[5] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02687 be reversed and
set aside.
The assailed Court of Appeals August 25, 2011 Decision sustained the March 19, 2007
Decision[6] of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Antique in Civil Case No.
2005-4-3496. The Regional Trial Court Decision dismissed petitioner Richelle P.
Abella's (Richelle) action for support of her minor daughter, Marl Jhorylle Abella
(Jhorylle) against respondent Policarpio Cabañero (Cabañero). The assailed Court of
Appeals January 15, 2013 Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.[7]
In a Complaint[8] for Support (Complaint) filed on April 22, 2005, petitioner Richelle
alleged that while she was still a minor in the years 2000 to 2002, she was repeatedly
sexually abused by respondent Cabañero inside his rest house at Barangay Masayo,
Tobias Fornier, Antique.[9] As a result, she allegedly gave birth to a child on August 21,
2002.[10]
Richelle added that on February 27, 2002, she initiated a criminal case for rape against
Cabañero. This, however, was dismissed. Later, she initiated another criminal case, this
time for child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. This, too, was dismissed.[11]
Richelle prayed for the child's monthly allowance in the amount of P3,000.00.[12]
In his Answer, Cabañero denied sexually abusing Richelle, or otherwise having any
sexual relations with her. Thus, he asserted that he could not have been the father of
Richelle’s child.[13]
After two (2) re-settings, pre-trial was held on February 21, 2007. Only Richelle's
counsel appeared. Richelle's motion to present her evidence ex parte was granted.[14]
In her testimony, Richelle noted that Cabañero was related to her mother and that she
treated him as her uncle. She narrated how she was sexually abused by Cabañero on
July 25, 2000, September 10, 2000, and February 8, 2002 and how Cabañero threatened
her to keep her silent. She added that during this period, Cabañero sent her three (3)
letters. She testified that she bore her and Cabañero's child, whom she named Marl
Jhorylle Abella, on August 21, 2002. She insisted on her certainty that Cabañero was
the father of the child as she supposedly had no sexual relations with any other man.[15]
In its March 19, 2007 Decision,[16] the Regional Trial Court dismissed Richelle's
Complaint without prejudice, on account of her failure to implead her minor child,
Jhorylle, as plaintiff.
Richelle filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals.[17]
In its assailed August 25, 2011 Decision,[18] the Court of Appeals sustained the
dismissal of the Complaint.
However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the Regional Trial Court's basis for
dismissing the Complaint. It emphasized that non-joinder of indispensable parties is not
a ground for the dismissal of an action and added that it would have sufficed for the
Regional Trial Court to have "ordered the amendment of the caption of the [C]omplaint
to implead the minor child."[19] The Court of Appeals still ruled that the dismissal of the
Complaint was proper as the filiation and paternity of the child had not been previously
established. As the child's birth certificate did not indicate that Cabañero was the father
and as Cabañero had not done anything to voluntarily recognize the child as his own,
the Court of Appeals asserted that Richelle "should have first instituted filiation
proceedings to adjudicate the minor child's paternity."[20]
Following the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, Richelle filed this Petition.
For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
filiation proceedings should have first been separately instituted to ascertain the minor
child's paternity and that without these proceedings having first been resolved in favor
of the child's paternity claim, petitioner Richelle P. Abella's action for support could not
prosper.
This Court reverses the Court of Appeals Decision.
While it is true that the grant of support was contingent on ascertaining paternal
relations between respondent and petitioner's daughter, Jhorylle, it was unnecessary for
petitioner's action for support to have been dismissed and terminated by the Court of
Appeals in the manner that it did. Instead of dismissing the case, the Court of Appeals
should have remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court. There, petitioner and her
daughter should have been enabled to present evidence to establish their cause of
action—inclusive of their underlying claim of paternal relations—against respondent.
I
Article 194 of the Family Code delineates the extent of support among family members,
while Article 195 identifies family members who "are obliged to support each other":
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation,
even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and
from school, or to and from place of work.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are
obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of
the hitter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children
of the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. (Emphasis
supplied)
Lim-Lua v. Lua[21] echoed Article 201 of the Family Code[22] and stated that the "amount
of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged
to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to
the needs of the recipient."[23] Article 202 of the Family Code adds, however, that
support may be adjusted and that it "shall be reduced or increased proportionately,
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same."[24]
II
The obligation to give support shall only be demandable from the time the person
entitled to it needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of
judicial or extrajudicial demand.[25] Support pendente lite may also be claimed, in
conformity with the manner stipulated by the Rules of Court.[26]
An illegitimate child, "conceived and born outside a valid marriage," as is the admitted
case with petitioner's daughter, is entitled to support.[27] To claim it, however, a child
should have first been acknowledged by the putative parent or must have otherwise
previously established his or her filiation with the putative parent."[28] When "filiation is
beyond question, support [shall then follow] as [a] matter of obligation."[29]
The judicial remedy to enable this is an action for compulsory recognition.[30] Filiation
proceedings do not merely resolve the matter of relationship with a parent but also
secure the legal rights associated with that relationship: citizenship, support, and
inheritance, among others.[31]
The paramount consideration in the resolution of questions affecting a child is the
child's welfare,[32] and it is "[t]he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate
children.”[33] Nevertheless, in keeping with basic judicial principles, the burden of proof
in proceedings seeking to establish paternity is upon the "person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child."[34] Likewise, a liberal application of
rules should not be "without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or
her own defenses."[35]
III
Illegitimate children establish their filiation "in the same way and on the same evidence
as legitimate children,"[36]that is, by:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.[37]
In the absence of these, illegitimate filiation, as with legitimate filiation, may be
established by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[38]
In keeping with these, the recognition of an illegitimate child through a birth certificate,
a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing, has been held to
be "in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court
action is required."[39]
IV
Having thus far only presented her child's birth certificate, which made no reference to
respondent as the child's father, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that the necessary
condition of filiation had yet to be established. The Court of Appeals later affirmed the
dismissal of petitioner's Complaint, insisting that separate filiation proceedings and their
termination in petitioner's daughter's favor were imperative.
While ably noting that filiation had yet to be established, the Court of Appeals'
discussion and final disposition are not in keeping with jurisprudence.
Dolina v. Vallecera[40] clarified that since an action for compulsory recognition may be
filed ahead of an action for support, the direct filing of an action for support, "where the
issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved,"[41] is an equally valid
alternative:
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the
filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina's
demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera's illegitimate
child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until
Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The child's remedy is to file through her
mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If filiation is
beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children
are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.
Dolina's remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for
compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand
support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of
compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.[42] (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Agustin v. Court of Appeals[43] extensively discussed the deep jurisprudential roots that
buttress the validity of this alternative.
Agustin concerned an action for support and support pendente lite filed by a child,
represented by his mother. The putative father, Arnel Agustin, vehemently denied
paternal relations with the child. He disavowed his apparent signature on the child's
birth certificate, which indicated him as the father. Agustin "moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth
certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to
support if not recognized by the putative father."[44] The Regional Trial Court denied
Agustin's motion to dismiss; it was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In sustaining the lower courts' decisions, this Court noted that enabling the mother and
her child to establish paternity and filiation in the course of an action for support was
merely a permission "to prove their cause of action against [Agustin,] who had been
denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement."[45]
This Court added that an action to compel recognition could very well be integrated
with an action for support. This Court drew analogies with extant jurisprudence that
sustained the integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim
inheritance and emphasized that "the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the
same,"[46]This Court explained:
[Petitioner] claims that the order and resolution . . . effectively converted the complaint
for support to a petition for recognition, which is supposedly proscribed by law.
According to petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child, has no right to ask for
support and must first establish his filiation in a separate suit. . .
The petitioner's contentions are without merit.
The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for
recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against
petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of
acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an
action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in
accordance with jurisprudence. InTayag v. Court of Appeals, we allowed the integration
of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim one's inheritance:
... In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and
successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the
latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father
had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such acknowledgment
is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such
acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be
brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore,
is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of
acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that
the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad
Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance,
from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition.
Further, that, the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim
inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. . . . wherein we
said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event
maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time
to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court
must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the
joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other
words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion
prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of
heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as
to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in
other cases . . .
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court,
is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in
numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child
having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally
acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance
against his coheirs . . .; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the
distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother ... In neither of these
situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree
compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and
distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the
court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the
basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent
Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A
separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related
the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is
entirely appropriate to these proceedings.[47] (Citations omitted)
Indeed, an integrated determination of filiation is "entirely appropriate"[48] to the action
for support filed by petitioner Richelle for her child. An action for support may very
well resolve that ineluctable issue of paternity if it involves the same parties, is brought
before a court with the proper jurisdiction, prays to impel recognition of paternal
relations, and invokes judicial intervention to do so. This does not run afoul of any rule.
To the contrary, and consistent with Briz v. Briz,[49] this is in keeping with the rules on
proper joinder of causes of action.[50] This also serves the interest of judicial economy—
avoiding multiplicity of suits and cushioning litigants from the vexation and costs of a
protracted pleading of their cause.
Thus, it was improper to rule here, as the Court of Appeals did, that it was impossible to
entertain petitioner's child's plea for support without her and petitioner first surmounting
the encumbrance of an entirely different judicial proceeding. Without meaning to lend
credence to the minutiae of petitioner's claims, it is quite apparent that the rigors of
judicial proceedings have been taxing enough for a mother and her daughter whose
claim for support amounts to a modest P3,000.00 every month. When petitioner
initiated her action, her daughter was a toddler; she is, by now, well into her
adolescence. The primordial interest of justice and the basic dictum that procedural
rules are to be "liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding"[51] impel us to grant
the present Petition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed
August 25, 2011 Decision and January 15, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 02687 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Antique for it to settle in
Civil Case No. 2005-4-3496 the matter of Marl Jhorylle Abella's purported paternal
relation with respondent Policarpio Cabañero and, in the event of a favorable
determination on this, to later rule on the matter of support.
SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 223477, February 14, 2018 ]
CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated
August 28, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated February 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02211, which affirmed the Judgment[4] dated September
10, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6 (RTC) in Crim. Case No.
CBU-87386 finding petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar (Melgar) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9262,[5] otherwise known as
the "Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004."
The Facts
An Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation Section 5 of
RA 9262, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the month of August, 2001 and subsequent thereto, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
having the means and capacity to give financial support, with deliberate intent, did then
and there commit acts of economic abuse against one [AAA,[6]] and her minor son,
[BBB] (12 years old), by depriving them of financial support, which caused mental or
emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, to AAA and her son.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
After arraignment wherein Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, he and
AAA entered into a compromise agreement[8] on the civil aspect of the case. After the
RTC's approval of the compromise agreement on June 24, 2010, the criminal aspect of
the case was provisionally dismissed with Melgar's conformity. However, one (1) year
later, or on June 24, 2011, the prosecution moved to set aside the compromise
agreement and to revive the criminal action, on the ground that Melgar sold the
property, which was supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his
son, BBB, from 2001 to 2010 pursuant to their compromise agreement. Consequently,
the RTC revived the criminal aspect of the case and allowed the prosecution to present
its evidence.[9]
The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar,
which resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged
the paternity of BBB as evidenced by the latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as
numerous photographs showing Melgar with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with
Melgar turned sour as the latter had an affair with a younger woman. When BBB was
just about one (1) year old, Melgar stopped giving support, prompting AAA to file a
case for support, which was eventually granted. This notwithstanding, Melgar still
refused to give support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was constrained to file the
instant criminal case against Melgar.[10]
To substantiate her claims, AAA averred that Melgar could afford to provide support of
P8,000.00 per month because he has a lavish lifestyle with his family. He owns a
Toyota Avanza and his children are enrolled in. On the other hand, her son, BBB, is a
scholar at and she spends the amount of P20,000.00 a month for his needs, of which she
asked Melgar for P8,000.00 as support.[11]
For his part, Melgar was deemed to have waived his right to adduce evidence due to his
repeated failure to appear during trial.[12]
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment[13] dated September 10, 2012, the RTC found Melgar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 and, accordingly, sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.[14]
The RTC found Melgar to have committed economic abuse against AAA and their son,
BBB, when he stopped supporting them. Worse, he sold the property which was
supposed to answer for his support-in-arrears from 2001 to 2010.[15]
Melgar moved for reconsideration,[16] which was, however, denied in an Order[17] dated
May 9, 2013 of the RTC. Aggrieved, Melgar appealed[18] to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[19] dated August 28, 2015, the CA affirmed Melgar's conviction. It held
that Melgar is legally obliged to support BBB.[20] As such, when he deliberately and
with evident bad faith deprived BBB of support, he committed economic abuse under
Section 5 (e) of RA 9262. In this regard, the CA observed that the reinstatement of the
criminal case was prompted by Melgar's evident refusal to comply with the judgment
based on compromise agreement, particularly, in providing support to his son; and
worse, in conveying to another person the parcel of land which was supposed to, among
others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his son from 2001 to 2010.[21] Lastly, the CA
ruled that Melgar's acts "has clearly caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule
or humiliation to [AAA] and her child[, BBB]."[22]
Undaunted, Melgar moved for reconsideration,[23] which was, however, denied in a
Resolution[24] dated February 10, 2016; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Melgar's
conviction for violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.
 The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Enacted in 2004, RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of
violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners, i.e., husband, former husband, or any person who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or
is likely to result in, inter alia, economic abuse.[25] The said law defines economic abuse
as follows:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - x x x.
xxxx
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of
the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.
xxxx
As may be gathered from the foregoing, "economic abuse" may include the deprivation
of support of a common child of the man-accused and the woman-victim, whether such
common child is legitimate or not.[26] This specific act is penalized by Section 5 (e) of
RA 9262, pertinent portions of which read:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or
restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other hann, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not
limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial
support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
xxxx
Under this provision, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered an act of violence against women and children.[27] Notably, case law
instructs that the act of denying support to a child is a continuing offense.[28]
In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section
5 (e) of RA 9262 are present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a
romantic relationship, resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his
paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter
was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent
when he sold to a third party his property which was supposed to answer for, among
others, his support-in-arrears to BBB. Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate from
the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication
that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was in the best position to assess and
detennine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties and, hence, due
deference should be accorded to the same.[29]
In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Melgar argues, inter alia, that
he was charged of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 as the Information alleged that
the acts complained of "caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to [AAA] and her son[, BBB]." As such, he contends that he cannot be
convicted of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.[30]
Melgar's contention is untenable.
Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence,[31] punishes the act of
"causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman
or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the
woman's child/children." Notably, "[p]sychological violence is an element of violation
of Section 5 (i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim.
Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or
emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party.
To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show
proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar acts. And
to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the
victim as such experiences are personal to this party."[32] Thus, in cases of support, it
must be first shown that the accused's denial thereof - which is, by itself, already a form
of economic abuse - further caused mental or emotional anguish to the woman-victim
and/or to their common child.
In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA
and BBB of support, no evidence was presented to show that such deprivation caused
either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be
convicted of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262. This notwithstanding - and taking
into consideration the variance doctrine which allows the conviction of an accused for a
crime proved which is different from but necessarily included in the crime charged[33] -
the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as
the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even without the additional element of
psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein.
penalty of imprisonment for an indetenninate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. In addition, Melgar is also ordered to pay a fine in the amount of
P300,000.00, to undergo a mandatory psycholo ical counselling or psychiatric
treatment, and report compliance to the court.[38]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated August 28,
2015 and the Resolution dated February 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-CR No. 02211 finding petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known
as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing petitioner Celso M.F.L.
Melgar: (a) to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum; (b) to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00; and (c) to
undergo a mandatory psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment and report
compliance to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6.
SO ORDERED.

As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Melgar, Section 6 of RA 9262 provides that

violations of Section 5 (e) shall be punished by, inter alia, prision correccional.
Notably, while such crime is punishable by a special penal law, the penalty provided
therein is taken from the technical nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
In Quimvel v. People,[34] the Court succinctly discussed the proper treatment of
prescribed penalties found in special penal laws vis-a-vis Act No. 4103,[35] otherwise
known as the Indetenninate Sentence Law, viz.:
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (ISL), provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the
minimum and maximum prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond
what the special law prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the
landmark mling of People v. Simon [(G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 239 SCRA 555)]
that the situation is different where although the offense is defined in a special law, the
penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Under such
circumstance, the legal effects under the system of penalties native to the Code would
also necessarily apply to the speciallaw.[36]
Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under
the RPC, the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules
applied for those crimes punishable under the RPC.[37]

Applying the foregoing to this case, the courts a quo correctly imposed on Melgar the
G.R. No. 72746 May 7, 1987
BERNARDA S. CANONIZADO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ BENITEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XLVII, MANILA and ATTY . CESAR R.
CANONIZADO, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Somewhere along the way in the marriage of the private respondent and the petitioner,
the sweetness soured. The spouses separated, and soon enough they were involved in a
bitter wrangling that would reach the courts, including this one, and fester for more than
three and a half decades.
It all began in an action for support filed by the petitioner against her estranged
husband, the private respondent on March 13, 1956 in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila. The trial court granted the claim for their minor child
Christina in the amount of P100.00 monthly but denied similar support for the petitioner
on the ground that she was gainfully employed. 1
The petitioner questioned this decision in a petition for certiorari with this Court, which
on September 30, 1960, considered the appealed decision a mere order resolving the
petitioner's motion for alimony pendente lite and modified it by granting support both
for the minor child and the petitioner in the monthly amount of P100.00 each. 2
When the corresponding writ of execution was issued, the respondent filed an action in
the Court of First Instance to restrain the sale by public auction of certain properties
over which he claimed to have lost ownership. However, on February 23, 1963, the trial
court declared the supposed conveyance of such properties to be simulated and ordered
the sheriff to proceed with the auction sale. 3 The decision became final when the appeal
filed by the private respondent was later withdrawn. 4
An alias writ of execution was issued on March 1, 1963, but was not satisfied because
of an order of the court dated May 20, 1963, which, while directing payment of support
from January to May 1963, exempted from levy the books and office equipment used
by the respondent in the practice of his law profession. 5
On September 9, 1964, a decision on the merits was promulgated by the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court awarding arrearages in support pendente lite to both the
petitioner and her daughter plus current monthly support for the latter at the rate of
P150.00 beginning October 1964. 6 This decision was affirmed on appeal, with the
modification that a P100.00 monthly support was also to be given to petitioner
beginning October 1964. 7 This became final and executory on January 21, 1969.8
A writ of execution was accordingly issued on July 22, 1976, for the collection of the
amounts of P16,150.00 and P17,200.00, respectively, representing the private
respondent's liabilities for the support of daughter Christina up to the time she finished
her studies in April 1969 and the total arrearages in support due the petitioner as of
December 1972. 9
However, these amounts were not collected, and remain unliquidated to date because of
a series of compromise agreements reached by the parties for deferment and
moratorium. 10
As the commitments provided in these agreements were not fulfilled, the petitioner filed
on April 4, 1977, a motion for an alias writ of execution based on the original writ of
July 22, 1976. The respondent judge, however, denied the motion and the subsequent
motion for reconsideration, holding that the decision could no longer be enforced by
mere motion in view of the lapse of more than five years. 11
On November 21, 1978, the petitioner filed with this Court a petition for mandamus
with pre injunction, docketed as G.R. No. L-49315, for the payment by the respondent
of his support in arreas. 12 On July 5, 1982, another petition, docketed as G.R. No.
60966, asked that the respondent judge be ordered to act on the petitioner's motion for
current support. 13
We discussed G.R. No. 60966 because of the respondent's motion to terminate support
which had not yet been resolved and directed the respondent judge to receive evidence
on this matter. 14 But in G.R. No. L-49315, this Court granted the petition and ordered
the issuance of the alias writ of execution to enforce collection of the support in arrears
from 1956 to 1972. 15
The records show that our decision in the latter case has not been enforced, possibly
because of the fact that the motion to terminate support filed by the private respondent
has not yet been resolved. 16
The writ of execution we have ordered is not affected by that motion. The motion
affects only support from 1973 and does not at all involve the support adjudged against
him before that date, specifically, from 1956 to 1972. Such support has already become
due and has acquired the character of vested rights accruing to the petitioner and the
daughter Christina.
The other possible reason for the respondent judge's delay in implementing the writ of
execution is a second pending motion this time to restrain levy on the ground that the
properties sought to be taken are the same properties declared exempt in the order of
May 20, 1963. 17 We note, though, that as worded the alias writ of execution issued by
the respondent judge covers other properties of the private respondent that can answer 1956 to April 1969 in the sum of P16,150.00. For contempt of this Court, the private
for the payment of the support in arrears. respondent is also punished as above indicated.

While mandamus is not available to control discretion, it may nevertheless issue to SO ORDERED.
compel the performance of a ministerial act, as in this case. 18 The writ of execution
having been authorized and directed by this Court, the only task of the respondent judge
is to issue and enforce it. As the properties exempt from execution have already been
determined, the respondent judge should now order the enforcement of the writ against
the other properties of the private respondent not exempt from execution. That is a
ministerial act that can be, as it is hereby, compelled.

Regarding the motion to declare the private respondent in contempt, its resolution will
depend on the evidence received by the respondent judge. Such resolution can be made
by her in the exercise of her discretion, which, to repeat, we cannot dictate. We can,
however, order her to exercise that discretion whichever way she sees fit, not to decide
the way we order but simply to decide according to her own lights. In other words, what
we are directing is general action only, not any specific action sustaining a particular
position. 19 Later, we may review such action if it is challenged as a grave abuse of
discretion, but that question is not before us now.

With respect to the third prayer, i.e., for legal interest on the amount due from 1956, the
same cannot be granted. Suffice it to say that such a claim is groundless since the
decision and orders sought to be enforced do not direct the payment of interest and have
long become final. The issue of interest was never raised before and cannot now be
raised here for the first time.

We note from the record that after the hearing of July 30, 1986, the parties were
required to submit simultaneous memoranda within fifteen days. 20 The petitioner
complied but not the private respondent. The private respondent did so only after he
was asked to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, and at that his
explanation was perfunctory and unsatisfactory, 21 on top of the fact that the
memorandum was eighty days late. 22For such contumacy, the private respondent is
hereby penalized with a fine of P500.00, to be paid within ten days from notice, or ten
days in prison.

There has been too much temporizing in this case that should not be permitted to
continue even longer in defiance of the constitutional mandate for speedy justice. The
respondent judge is directed to act with an possible dispatch on the pending incidents
and to finally decide this protracted controversy once and for all.

WHEREFORE, the respondent judge is hereby directed to order the immediate

enforcement of the alias writ of execution of August 14, 1984, and the collection from
the private respondent of arrearages in support due to the petitioner from March 1956 to
December 1972 in the sum of P17,200.00 and to the daughter Christina from March
G.R. No. L-64982 October 23, 1984
ALEJANDRO B. HONTIVEROS, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, Third Special Cases Division,
HON. WILFREDO G. CAINGLET in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
CLVIII, RTC and BRENDA M. HERNANDO, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This petition for certiorari seeks to review the decision of the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Court) dated August 5, 1983,
which affirmed the order of respodent Judge Cainglet (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent Judge) dated May 30, 1983. The dispositive portion of the respondent
court's decision reads as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is denied and the petition
dismissed for lack of merit. Accordingly, the restraining order issued
by this Court earlier is hereby lifted, without pronouncement as to
costs (p. 97, rec.).
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. and private respondent Brenda M. Hernando are the
father and mother of an acknowledged natural child born on November 27, 1981 and
given the name Margaux H. Hontiveros.
For the period from November 1981 to June 1982, the child had been under the care and
custody of the mother. The father, petitioner herein, used to take the child out during
Saturdays and return the child to private respondent's residence on Saturday evenings
(p. 29, rec.).
On June 21, 1982, Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. passed by the house of Brenda Hernando to
take the child to their house for a visit, with the agreement that she will be returned by
nightfall (p. 29, rec.). However, the child was never returned to the mother.
To recover the custody of her child, private respondent filed on August 24, 1982 a
petition for habeas corpus in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Metro Manila,
entitled "In the Matter of the Custody of the Minor Child Margaux H. Hontiveros,
Brenda M. Hernando, Petitioner, versus Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. and Alejandro
Hontiveros, Sr., respondents", which petition was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
9784 of said court and assigned to Branch XIX thereof (p. 8, rec.).
On August 26, 1982, the petitioner filed a petition for custody of minor Margaux H.
Hontiveros with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 9788 with Branch XXIII of the said court. Private respondent filed a
motion to dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 9788 on the ground of litis
pendency, citing the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 9784. The motion to dismiss
was denied. Subsequently, however, petitioner Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. abandoned the
prosecution of Special Proceedings No. 9788, for which reason the Hon. Judge Rizalina
Bonifacio Vera dismissed said petition on October 26, 1983.
On September 9, 1982, a hearing was conducted by the Hon. Judge Santiago Rañada in
connection with Special Proceedings No. 9784. The parties agreed that the minor child
Margaux shall be under the custody of the petitioner for seven (7) days every other
week (p. 171, rec.). Accordingly, Judge Rafiada issued the following order: têñ.£îhqwâ£
As preliminarily agreed upon by petitioner and respondent Alejandro
Hontiveros, Jr., the Court hereby orders the minor child Margaux H.
Hontiveros to be put under the custody of the petitioner, with the
understanding that respondent Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. will be
allowed to take said minor child into his custody every other week for
a period of seven (7) days with the obligation of taking said minor
child from the residence of petitioner every other Friday, at 9:00
A.M., and return said child on or before the next Friday morning at
9:00 A.M. This arrangement is effective immediately, with the
condition that the custody of said child is now immediately given to
petitioner and respondent Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. will be allowed to
pick up said child on Friday, 17 September 1982, at about 9:00 A. M.
(P. 37, rec.).
On May 24, 1983, the petitioner filed an urgent ex parte petition for issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Regions Branch CLVIII, to which the Court the aforesaid case was reassigned
following the reorganization of the inferior courts under BP 129 (p. 38, rec.). The object
of the petition for preliminary injunction is to prevent the private respondent from
bringing the minor child outside the country, specifically the United States of American
where she was allegedly bound for.
The petition was set for hearing on May 30, 1983. On said date, the counsel for private
respondent moved for the withdrawal of the petition for habeas corpus on the ground
that said petition has become moot and academic upon the production of the body of
Margaux Hontiveros before Judge Rafiada and in view of the order of September 9,
1982. Respondent Judge Wilfredo Cainglet (presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch CLVIII) granted the motion for the
withdrawal of the petition for habeas corpus. Since the petition for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction is but an ancillary action, the same was denied by the
respondent Judge in his order dated May 30, 1983. Said order states: têñ.£îhqwâ£
xxx xxx xxx
As preliminarily agreed upon by petitioner and respondent Alejandro
Hontiveros, Jr., the Court hereby orders the minor child Margaux H.
Hontiveros to be put under the custody of the petitioner, with the
understanding that respondents Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. will be
allowed to take said minor child into his custody every other week for
a period of seven (7) days with the obligation of taking said minor
child from the residence of petitioner every other Friday, at 9:00
A.M., and return said child on or before the next Friday morning at
9:00 A.M. This arrangement is effective immediately, with the
condition that the custody of said child is now immediately given to
petitioner and respondent Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. will be allowed to
pick up said child on Friday, 17 September 1982, at about 9:00 A.M.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
When this petition was called for hearing today, petitioner's counsel,
Atty. Wilfredo Chato moved for the withdrawal this petition on the
ground that the same has now become moot and academic in view of
the Order of this Court aforecited, to which motion for withdrawal
residents' counsel, Atty. Yolanda Q. Javellana interposed her
objection. The said counsel for the respondents in open Court
today, admitted that the respondents have not filed a counterclaim
anent the herein petition and further admitted that there is a present
case involving the same parties and same subject matter filed with the
Pasig Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) and pending
before Branch 162, presided by the Executive Judge, the Hon.
Rizalina Bonifacio Vera since August 26, 1982.
The Court believes that the matter of withdrawing a case is a
prerogative of plaintiff or petitioner and ordinarily could not be
validly objected to by the defendant or respondent as in the present
case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court, finding the petitioner's
motion to withdraw the herein petition to be justified grants the same
and hereby orders the WITHDRAWAL of the present petition for
Habeas Corpus, subject to the mandate of this Court in its Order dated
September 9, 1982, predicated upon the agreement of the herein
petitioner and respondents.
Anent the respondents' motion/petition for the issuance of a Writ of
preliminary injunction praying for the immediate issuance of a
restraining Order against the herein petitioner, the same being merely
ancillar action and now moot and academic there being no principal
or main action or petition upon which respondents' motion/petition
may be predicated upon for the issuance of the said restraining
Order, upon motion by petitioner's counsel with objection of
respondents' counsel the same is hereby DENIED for lack of factual
and legal justification.
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 48-49, rec.,emphasis supplied).
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was likewise denied for lack of factual and
legal justification (p. 50, rec.)
On June 3, 1983, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for
preliminary injunction with the Intermediate Appellate Court questioning the order of
respondent Judge dated May 30, 1983 and the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
The respondent Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit in its decision dated
August 5, 1983. The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the adverse ruling but the
same was affirmed by respondent Court in its resolution dated August 17, 1983.
Hence, this petition.
The following issues are presented:
1. Whether or not the order of respondent Judge dated May 30,1983 was issued with
grave abuse of discretion, and
2. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the custody of his minor child Margaux H.
Hontiveros.
I
The records reveal that the original action instituted by private respondent in the then
Court of First Instance was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to recover custody of
her acknowledged natural child Margaux without depriving the father of his visitorial
rights. The petition was filed against the father who allegedly took the child from her
mother's home and kept her indefinitely without the mother's consent.
At the hearing conducted on September 9, 1982, the minor child was "produced before
the Court and a settlement was reached upon agreement of the parties. Thus, the order
of Judge Rañada was issued. Even if the order was termed "preliminary ", WE take note
of the fact that the private respondent's prayer in her pleading had been satisfied for her
evident purpose in filing the petition for habeas corpus was to get back the custody of
her child.
Because of such settlement and considering that as noted in the questioned order of May
30, 1983, the petitioner's counsel admitted that there was a pending case (Special
Proceedings No. 9788) involving the same parties and same subject matter filed with
another branch of the same court and the petitioner herein did not file a counterclaim,
the respondent Judge allowed the withdrawal of the case for habeas corpus pending
before him (pp. 48-49, rec.).
Section 2, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the dismissal of an action
by order of the court at plaintiff's instance (private respondent herein) upon such terms
and conditions as the court deems proper. WE agree with the respondent Court that
considering the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, as earlier noted, and
considering further that no real injury would result if the urgent ex parte petition could
not be acted upon since it could be threshed out in the coordinate branch of the Pasig
Regional Trial Court, the dismissed of the petition forhabeas corpus is warranted. In the
case of Duque vs. Vinarao (63 SCRA 206), WE held that a petition for habeas
corpus can be dismissed upon voluntary withdrawal of the petitioner and certification of
the Judge Advocate General.
WE agree with the respondent Judge that the petition for habeas corpus has been
rendered moot and academic with the issuance of the order dated September 9, 1982,
which was predicated upon the agreement of the parties. In Pestrano vs. Corvista (81
Phil. 53), WE held that where the subject person had already been released from the
custody complained of, the petition for habeas corpus then still pending was considered
already moot and academic and should be dismissed. In the case at bar, the minor child
Margaux H. Hontiveros was in fact produced in court. By virtue of the order of Judge
Ranada, she was released to the custody of her mother with the father having the right
to take her in his custody every other week.
WE believe that the respondent Judge merely exercised his sound discretion in allowing
the withdrawal of the case in his branch. "Grave abuse of discretion" means such
capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment as is equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to
lack of jurisdiction (Vda. de Bacaling vs. Laguda 54 SCRA 243). In the case at bar,
there was no abuse of discretion by the respondent Judge. He acted within the ambit of
judicial discretion allotted to Judges of inferior courts, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The court may, subject to the requirement of due process, give all
such directions and orders as it may deem necessary or expedient in
the determination of the dispute before it. It may refrain from hearing
the dispute or part thereof, or dismiss any matter or part of any
matter, where further proceedings are not necessary or desirable.
Certainly, it may also defer the hearing of any motion or hear one
motion in preference to others, when its judgment such is necessary ...
The discretion granted by law is not interfered with unless it is
gravely abused (Maritime Company of the Philippines, et al. vs.
Paredes, et al., 19 SCRA 569, 580).
Petitioner is of the theory that he was deprived of due process because the respondent
Judge dismissed his urgent ex parte petition for preliminary injunction without hearing.
WE cannot sustain the stand of the petitioner.
It should be borne in mind that petitioner Med a petition for custody of minor Margaux
H. Hontiveros with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 9788. The respondent Judge knew of the existence of Special
Proceedings No. 9788 because this fact was admitted by the counsel of the petitioner
himself. All that the petitioner must do then is to file the petition for preliminary
injunction in Branch XXIII of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal where Special
Proceedings No. 9788 is assigned. The issue as to whether he can be granted a
preliminary injunction could have properly been ventilated below. Unfortunately,
petitioner chose to appeal by way of certiorari, a remedy which WE cannot grant
because the respondent Judge acted within the parameters of judicial discretion.
What is more, petitioner himself did not pursue his action for custody of the minor
Margaux H. Hontiveros. Worse, he abandoned the case and Special Proceedings No.
9788 was dismissed by Judge Vera on October 26, 1983 for lack of interest on the part
of the petitioner to prosecute (p. 208, rec.). If at all petitioner can only blame himself if
he feels that he was deprived of due process.
II
The second issue is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the custody of the minor child
Margaux H. Hontiveros. Once more, WE are asked to arbitrate between the rights and
duties of parents and children.
Article 363 of the Civil Code provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount. No matter shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court
finds compelling reasons for such measure.
The Code Commission observed that the rule in Article 363 of the Civil Code is
necessary "in order to avoid many a tragedy when a mother has seen her baby torn away
from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child
of tender age (Report of the Code Commission, p. 12).
Finding the above rationale beyond question, Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and
Youth Welfare Code) provides the following:

Article 17 — ...

In case of separation of his parents, no child under five years of age shall be separated
from his mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to do so (P.D. 603, dated
December 10, 1974, 70 O.G. 10774).

While the petitioner would have US believe in his reply that the private respondent is
unfit to take care of his child, it is too late in the day to do so because under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in this Tribunal What the
petitioner should have done is to bring out the questions of fact in Special Proceedings
Nos. 9788. It is just too bad that the case for custody was dismissed for lack of interest
on the part of the petitioner.

Clearly, the private respondent has a clear legal right under Article 17 of P.D. 603 to the
custody of her minor child, there being no compelling reason to the contrary.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY DENIED. WITH COSTS AGAINST

PETITIONER.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
 G.R. No. L-52242 November 17, 1980
MIGUEL R. UNSON III, Petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO AND
EDITA N. ARANETA, Respondents.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for certiorari to have the order of respondent judge of December 28, 1979
ordering petitioner to produce the child, Maria Teresa Unson, his daughter barely eight
years of age, with private respondent Edita N. Araneta and return her to the custody of
the later, further obliging petitioner to "continue his support of said daughter by
providing for her education and medical needs," allegedly issued without a "hearing"
and the reception of testimony in violation of Section 6 of Rule
99.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner and private respondent were married on April 19, 1971 1 and out of that
marriage the child in question, Teresa, was born on December 1, 1971. However, as
stated in a decision rendered on August 23, 1974 in Civil Case No. 7716 of respondent
judge himself, on July 13, 1974 they executed an agreement for the separation of their
properties and to live separately, as they have in fact been living separately since June
1972. The agreement was approved by the Court. The parties are agreed that no specific
provision was contained in said agreement about the custody of the child because the
husband and wife would have their own private arrangement in that respect. Thus,
according to the affidavit of petitioner attached to his supplement to petition, submitted
in compliance with the directive of this Court during the hearing of this case, he affirms
that:chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(8) That when Maria Teresa started pre-school in 1976 at the Early Learning Center in
San Lorenzo, very near petitioner's residence, and later, when she started school at
Assumption College, Maria Teresa would stay with petitioner during school days and
spend weekends with her mother, but there were times when her mother would not even
bother to pick her up during non-school days; chanrobles virtual law library
(9) That during the early part of 1978 petitioner personally acquired knowledge that his
wife Edita Araneta has been living with her brother-in-law Agustin F. Reyes, in an
apartment at C. Palma St., Makati, Metro Mla. and so petitioner tightened his custody
over his daughter, especially after:
a. he found out that Agustin F. Reyes was confined at the Makati Medical Center from
October 13 up to December 3, 1977 for "Manic Depressive" disorder, under the care of
Dr. Baltazar Reyes; chanrobles virtual law library
b. he found out that his wife Edita Araneta delivered a child fathered by Agustin F.
Reyes on September 24, 1978, (Please see Birth Certificate attached hereto as Annex
"A-1");chanrobles virtual law library
c. he found out that Agustin F. Reyes had been confined again for the same ailment at
the Makati Medical Center from June 27 up to August 29, 1978 under the care of the
same doctor .
(10) That on May 21, 1980 Edita Araneta delivered another child fathered by Agustin F.
Reyes. (Please see Birth Certificate attached hereto as Annex "A-2");chanrobles virtual
law library
(11) That aside from the foregoing circumstances, the following militate against custody
of Maria Teresa in favor of Edita Araneta:
a. Agustin F. Reyes is the child's godfather/baptismal sponsor;chanrobles virtual law
library
b. Agustin F. Reyes and Edita Araneta have left the Roman Catholic Church and have
embraced a protestant sect (Please see Annex "A-2" hereof, which lists the occupation
of Agustin F. Reyes as a seminarian);
(12) That Maria Teresa is almost nine (9) years old, born and reared under the Roman
Catholic faith, impressionable, and should not be exposed to an environment alien to the
Catholic way of life, which is the upbringing and training petitioner, as her father is
committed to;chanrobles virtual law library
(13) That petitioner is executing this affidavit for all legal purposes. (Pp. 81-82 of
Record)
Upon the other hand, private respondent affirms in her affidavit Annex "A"
aforementioned that:chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
6. Since the birth of Maria Teresa, she has always lived with affiant, her mother, who
has reared and brought up the child to the best of her ability. Affiant has not in any way
spoken ill of nor turned the child against her father, herein petitioner; chanrobles virtual
law library
7. In fact, it was affiant who was always insistent that petitioner have custody of Maria
Teresa every week end and half of summer and Christmas vacation so that the child
could establish a healthy and viable relationship with her father, herein
petitioner; chanrobles virtual law library
8. This was especially so when affiant noticed that petitioner's parents showed more
interest in the child than petitioner; since it was petitioner's parents who would more
often pick up Maria Teresa and bring her back to and from affiant's home; chanrobles
virtual law library
9. This fact was even noticed by the child; thus affiant immediately requested petitioner
to spend more time with Maria Teresa; chanrobles virtual law library
10. From 1972 to 1978, affiant had always exercised full custody of Maria Teresa. It
was affiant who voluntarily gave custody of the child to petitioner on weekends and half
of the summer and Christmas vacations. In view of this amicable arrangement, no
specific terms were agreed and stipulated upon by affiant and petitioner regarding
custody of the child in their petition for separation of property before the lower
court; chanrobles virtual law library
11. From 1972 to September, 1979, affiant and petitioner have always had a cordial and
amicable relationship. Even from 1973 when affiant started living with her brother-in-
law, Agustin F. Reyes at San Lorenzo, Makati, affiant and petitioner retained a cordial
relationship. Petitioner, since 1973, always knew about affiant's relationship with
Agustin F. Reyes. In fact, petitioner would visit Maria Teresa at affiant's home.
Petitioner was always welcome to pick up Maria Teresa at any
time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
12. When petitioner left for Australia in 1974 for a period of one year, petitioner left
Maria Teresa to stay with affiant at San Lorenzo. During this time, Maria Teresa was
always allowed to visit with and to be picked up at any time by petitioner's
parents; chanrobles virtual law library
13. Petitioner, his family, affiants family (Mr. and Mrs. Teodoro Araneta), affiant's
relatives and friends, since 1973, have long known of and accepted the circumstances
involving private respondent and Agustin F. Reyes;chanrobles virtual law library
14. Affiant admits that her present circumstances at first impression might seem socially
if not morally unacceptable; but in reality this is not so. Maria Teresa has been reared
and brought up in an atmosphere of Christian love, affection and honesty to the import
of the situation. Further, the quality and capacity of affiant of being a good mother has
always remained; (Pars. 6 to 14 of Annex "A" of Record)
It is axiomatic in Our jurisprudence that in controversies regarding the custody of
minors the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and moral
welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social
and moral situations of the contending parents. Never has this Court diverted from that
criterion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
With this premise in view, the Court finds no difficulty in this case in seeing that it is in
the best interest of the child Teresa to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to
say immoral influence, that the situation in which private respondent has placed herself,
as admitted by her, might create in the moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now in
her formative and most impressionable stage in her life. The fact, that petitioner might
have been tolerant about her stay with her mother in the past when she was still too
young to distinguish between right and wrong and have her own correct impressions or
notions about the unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother with her own uncle-
in-law, the husband of her sister's mother, is hardly of any consequence now that she
has reached a perilous stage in her life. No respectable father, properly concerned with
the moral well-being of his child, specially a girl, can be expected to have a different
attitude than petitioner's in this case. Under the circumstances thus shown in the record,
the Court finds no alternative than to grant private respondent no more than visitorial
rights over the child in question. Anyway, decisions even of this Supreme Court on the
custody of minor children are always open to adjustment as the circumstances relevant
to the matter may demand in the light of the inflexible criterion We have mentioned
above. We deem it a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge to have
acted precipitably in issuing his order of December 28, 1979 here in
question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As to the issue of jurisdiction, that is, whether or not, after the decision on separation of
properties had become final, the matter of the custody of the child should be the subject
of a separate proceeding under Rule 99. We are inclined to agree with respondents that,
considering that in the decision on the separation of properties mention is made of
support for the child, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, and since under Sec- tion 6
of Rule 99, the matter of the custody of children of separated spouses may be brought
before the Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding,
the respondent court had jurisdiction to decide the question of custody here. And as
regards the petitioner's claim of denial of hearing and due process before the issuance
by respondent judge of his order of December 28, 1979, We find that-petitioner was
given sufficient time and opportunity to be heard, as, in fact, he filed his written
opposition. With the facts in this case practically uncontroverted, We do not see the
need for the calling of witnesses and the hearing of testimony in open
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge is hereby set aside, the restraining order
heretofore issued is made permanent and the parties are ordered to submit to this Court
within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof their own agreement as to the visitorial
rights of private respondent, otherwise, the Court will take it upon itself to fix the terms
and conditions thereof. No costs.
[G.R. No. L-10134. June 29, 1957.]
SABINA EXCONDE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE
CAPUNO, Defendants-Appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperiña and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in
the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No. 15001). During the trial,
Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperiña, reserved her right to bring
a separate civil action for damages against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno was
found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision. Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old when he committed the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin
Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of
P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña. Defendants set up the defense that
if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperiña, he is Dante Capuno
and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former was not under
the control, supervision and custody of the latter. This defense was sustained by the
lower court and, as a consequence, it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages
claimed in the complaint. From this decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals
but the case was certified to us on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of
law.
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a
student of the Balintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San
Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said
city upon instruction of the city school’s supervisor. From the school Dante, with other
students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel
and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep
turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña, died as a
consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his
son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a
parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he
attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.
The only issue involved in this appeal is whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held
civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the
death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.
The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
x x x
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody."cralaw virtua1aw library
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question
jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the
negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then
living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of
the father is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the
father from liability.
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or
directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision only applies to an
institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla,
Civil Law, 1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557). Here Dante
Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his
extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon
instruction of the city school’s supervisor. And it was in connection with that parade
that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the accident
occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the
city school’s supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he
was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who
live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority
they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them,
keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to
their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them
in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which
they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903, last
paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to prove.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin
Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of
P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action.
 the presumption of Art. 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show
Bengzon, Montemayor, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur. actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable.

Paras, C.J., concurs in the result. Padilla and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

After mature consideration I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving the father
of liability. I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code to
teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is
there between them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their
pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the
duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons,
so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. In
my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used
in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify
"teachers" but only "heads of establishments." The phrase is only an updated version of
the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil
Codes.

If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art.
1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have
incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear that where the parent
places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the
parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody,
for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the
school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under
instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.

In the case before us, there is no question that the pupil, Dante Capuno, was instructed
by the City School Supervisor to attend the Rizal parade. His father could not properly
refuse to allow the child to attend, in defiance of the school authorities. The father had
every reason to assume that in ordering a minor to attend a parade with other children,
the school authorities would provide adequate supervision over them. If a teacher or
scout master was present, then he should be the one responsible for allowing the minor
to drive the jeep without being qualified to do so. On the other hand, if no teacher or
master was at hand to watch over the pupils, the school authorities are the ones
answerable for that negligence, and not the father.

At any rate, I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no
way able to prevent, and which he had every right to assume the school authorities
would avoid. Having proved that he entrusted his child to the custody of school
authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him, the father has rebutted
G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971
Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and
President, respectively, of a school of arts and trades, known under the name and
style of "Manila Technical Institute" (M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and
SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.
Leovillo C. Agustin for plaintiffs-appellants. .
Honorato S. Reyes for appellee Brillantes, et al. .
Villareal, Almacen Navarra & Amores for appellee Daffon. .
TEEHANKEE, J.:
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila. .
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a
student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute, Quezon Boulevard,
Manila, had filed on May 19, 1966, the action below for damages arising from the death
on March 10, 1966 of their son at the hands of a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L.
Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said Institute. .
Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "(T)he defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at
the time when the incident which gave rise to his action occurred was a member of the
Board of Directors of the institute;1 the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president
thereof; the defendant Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the
deceased belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of the
deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship,
but lately on August 2, 1962, it was duly incorporated."
The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs' son were thus narrated by the trial
court: "(T)he deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were
classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock,
they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room
located on the ground floor. At that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and
Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely
looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a
foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in
retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist
blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon
followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block
which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was
administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital.
He never regained consciousness; finally he died. The foregoing is the substance of the
testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the incident."
The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the incident, as testified to by
the lone eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a classmate of the protagonists, as that of a
disinterested witness who "has no motive or reason to testify one way or another in
favor of any party" and rejected the self-exculpatory version of defendant Daffon
denying that he had inflicted any fist blows on the deceased. .
With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian of the Manila Police Department
who performed the autopsy re "Cause of death: shock due to traumatic fracture of
theribs (6th and 7th, left, contusion of the pancreas and stomach with intra-gastric
hemorrhage and slight subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain," and his testimony that
these internal injuries of the deceased were caused "probably by strong fist blows," the
trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code.3 It held that "(T)he act, therefore, of the accused Daffon in giving the
deceased strong fistblows in the stomach which ruptured his internal organs and caused
his death falls within the purview of this article of the Code."4
The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of
the Manila Technical Institute, in this wise:
... Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 2180. ... .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
In the opinion of the Court, this article of the Code is not applicable to
the case at bar, since this contemplates the situation where the control
or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over
the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents.
CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180. NEW CIVIL
CODE CONSTRUED: — The clause "so long as
they remain in their custody" contained in Article
 2180 of the new civil code contemplated a situation
where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher,
such that the control or influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents. In those
circumstances the control or influence over the
conduct and actions of the pupil as well as the
responsibilities for their sort would pass from the
father and mother to the teachers. (Ciriaco L.
Mercado, Petitioner vs. the Court of Appeals,
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., et al., respondents, G.R.
No. L-14862, May 30, 1960).5
There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with
his teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. These
defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the
defendant Daffon.
Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial court as follows:
1. Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the plaintiffs as
heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P6,000.00 for the death
of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory
expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of
earning power, considering that the deceased was only between
sixteen and seventeen years, and in good health when he died, and (e)
P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action. .
2. Absolving the other defendants. .
3. Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit.
Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal question that under the factual findings of the
trial court, which are now beyond review, the trial court erred in absolving the
defendants-school officials instead of holding them jointly and severally liable as
tortfeasors, with defendant Daffon, for the damages awarded them as a result of their
son's death. The Court finds the appeal, in the main, to be meritorious. .
1. The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the ground that the
provisions of Article 2180, Civil Code, which expressly hold "teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades ... liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody," are not applicable to
to the case at bar, since "there is no evidence that the accused Daffon [who inflicted the
fatal fistblows]6 lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants-officials of
the school. These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the
defendant Daffon."
The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado
vs. Court of Appeals,7 that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in
their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of
the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions
of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the
responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at
bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes
with their parents after school is over." This dictum had been made in rejecting therein
petitioner father's contention that his minor son's school, Lourdes Catholic School at
Kanlaon, Quezon City [which was not a party to the case] should be held responsible,
rather than him as father, for the moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged against him for
the physical injury inflicted by his son on a classmate. [A cut on the right cheek with a
piece of razor which costs only P50.00 by way of medical expenses to treat and cure,
since the wound left no scar.] The moral damages award was after all set aside by the
Court on the ground that none of the specific cases provided in Article 2219, Civil
Code, for awarding moral damages had been established, petitioner's son being only
nine years old and not having been shown to have "acted with discernment" in inflicting
the injuries on his classmate. .
The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another dictum in the earlier case
of Exconde vs. Capuno,8 where the only issue involved as expressly stated in the
decision, was whether the therein defendant-father could be civilly liable for damages
resulting from a death caused in a motor vehicle accident driven unauthorizedly and
negligently by his minor son, (which issue was resolved adversely against the father).
Nevertheless, the dictum in such earlier case that "It is true that under the law
abovequoted, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused
by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only
applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational
institution" was expressly cited and quoted in Mercado. .
2. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and squarely raises
the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under Article 2180, Civil Code,
for damages caused by their pupils and students against fellow students on the school
premises. Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved,
since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident. There is no question,
either, that the school involved is a non-academic school,9 the Manila Technical
Institute being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. .
The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and teacher of the
Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) are liable
jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's
minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No liability
attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors.
The school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly
impleaded as party defendant. While plaintiffs sought to so implead it, by impleading
improperly defendant Brillantes, its former single proprietor, the lower court found that
it had been incorporated since August 2, 1962, and therefore the school itself, as thus
incorporated, should have been brought in as party defendant. Plaintiffs failed to do so,
notwithstanding that Brillantes and his co-defendants in their reply to plaintiffs' request
for admission had expressly manifested and made of record that "defendant Antonio C.
Brillantes is not the registered owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute" which is
now a corporation and is not owned by any individual person."10
3. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of
their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a
certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to
"exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child."11 This is expressly
provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code.12 In the law of torts, the
governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as
well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities
during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as
well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from
dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some
student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. .
4. As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion
in Exconde, "the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is
some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in
the exercise of their authority" 13 and "where the parent places the child under the
effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one
answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the
parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the
authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction." The school
itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers
under the same cited article.14
5. The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the
ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student
who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used
in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise
over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the
pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as
erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde)
on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. .
6. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school
must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of their co-
defendant Daffon in the latter's having caused the death of his classmate, the deceased
Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the
protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with
their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the
school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow
students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve
themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil
Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said
defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. .
7. Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award of P6,000.00 as indemnity for the death
of their son should be increased to P12,000.00 as set by the Court in People vs.
Pantoja,15 and observed in all death indemnity cases thereafter is well taken. The Court,
in Pantoja, after noting the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, had
expressed its "considered opinion that the amount of award of compensatory damages
for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be P12,000.00." The Court
thereby adjusted the minimum amount of "compensatory damages for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict" as per Article 2206, Civil Code, from the old stated minimum of
P3,000.00 to P12,000.00, which amount is to be awarded "even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances" pursuant to the express provisions of said codal article. .
8. Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal that the lower court should have awarded
exemplary damages and imposed legal interest on the total damages awarded, besides
increasing the award of attorney's fees all concern matters that are left by law to the
discretion of the trial court and the Court has not been shown any error or abuse in the
exercise of such discretion on the part of the trial court.16 Decisive here is the
touchstone provision of Article 2231, Civil Code, that "In quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence." No gross
negligence on the part of defendants was found by the trial court to warrant the
imposition of exemplary damages, as well as of interest and increased attorney's fees,
and the Court has not been shown in this appeal any compelling reason to disturb such
finding. .
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows:
.
1. Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L. Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton and Santiago M.
Quibulue jointly and severallyto pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador
Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and
compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of
earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action in both
instances; 2. absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3.
dismissing defendants' counterclaims. .

In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes' dissent in the
Exconde Case but added that "since the school involved at bar is a non-academic
school, the question as to the applicability of the cited codal provision to academic
institutions will have to await another case wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly
impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is
not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. The parties herein
have also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even
establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the
offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion
that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-
academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge
of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the
case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall
be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general
shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the
canon of reddendo singula singulis"teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and
students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
Exconde where he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code
to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What
substantial difference is there between them insofar as concerns the
proper supervision and vice over their pupils? It cannot be seriously
contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of
watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third
Persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and
Supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the
old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers"
but only "heads of establishments." The phrase is only an updated
version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the
Italian and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of
negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their
authority, it would seem clear that where the parent places the child
under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the
parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while
under his custody, for the very reason/that the parent is not supposed
to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and
supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. And if
there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic
schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance
is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde
and Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even the head of the
school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if
that same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability would attach to the
teacher or the school head. All other circumstances being the same, the teacher or the
head of the academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the
non-academic school would be held liable, and simply because the latter is a school of
arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the
school authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective schools. There does
not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the
school is academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school is non-
academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the
school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury
contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school where he is
registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply
showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head
would be held liable if the school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be
held answerable for the torts committed by his students, why is it the head of the school
only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in
the case of the academic or non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the
head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the
school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the
academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of
artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the
technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such a
master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually
even boarded with him and so came under his constant control, supervision and
influence. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his
students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the
persons directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then (as
now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not
be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades,
because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion
of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the
corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the
students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision
must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the
legislature, taking into account the charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees
fit to enact the necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-
extensive with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during the
school term, as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners
themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while the custody
requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be
boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the
control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of
the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the
semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and
excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of registration, and in
the case of graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises. In the
view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the
semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school only
upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before that day he has already registered
and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed ended
upon the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites to
be satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of reports, term papers,
clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to the
disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether
from observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.
Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in
the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere
of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school
authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for
his students' torts, in practically the same way that the parents are responsible for the
child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the
dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils
in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at
the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it.
Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the
influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such
influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent
shag be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at
any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to
fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the
school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts
of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat
superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the
diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the
defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180,
which also states that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
Persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only
when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student
be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor,
the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless
of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the teacher and the
head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense,
Article 2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice Makalintal in his
dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may be unduly exposed to liability under
this article in view of the increasing activism among the students that is likely to cause
violence and resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure.
Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the present ruling, it is not the school that
will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available to it in
case it is sought to be held answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its head or
the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its
teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the
pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among
them. In almost all cases now, in fact, these measures are effected through the
assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher physically enforce those
rules upon the students. Ms should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken
adequate steps to prevent any injury that may be committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be unfair
to hold him directly answerable for the damage caused by his students as long as they
are in the school premises and presumably under his influence. In this respect, the Court
is disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed
on the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. Obviously, the
parent can expect more obedience from the child because the latter's dependence on him
is greater than on the teacher. It need not be stressed that such dependence includes the
child's support and sustenance whereas submission to the teacher's influence, besides
being coterminous with the period of custody is usually enforced only because of the
students' desire to pass the course. The parent can instill more las discipline on the child
than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher for the
tort committed by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or the head of
the school of arts and trades is responsible for the damage caused by the student or
apprentice even if he is already of age — and therefore less tractable than the minor —
then there should all the more be justification to require from the school authorities less
accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in preventing the injury.
After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for the student's acts because he has
reached majority age and so is no longer under the former's control, there is then all the
more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility for the acts of the
student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following
conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the
authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year
classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to
finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is
important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even the
mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate
purpose that would have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them
was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct control
and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections
and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not
disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that
Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did
not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-
charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that
Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived
observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance.
His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he
was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it is true that
the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter
was physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not been established that it
was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the
private respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through the
enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be
held liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated
an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him without
taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was
clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does
not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he
confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held
directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice.
Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private
respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of
the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection
with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the
principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted
by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the
auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply
sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances
here related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as
a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so

ordered.
G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988
BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, EDUARDO B. CASTRO,
DIOMEDES B. CASTRO, VIRGINIA B. CASTRO and RODOLFO B.
CASTRO., respondents.
Edilberto B. Tenefrancia for petitioners.
Leonardo L. Cocjin Jr. for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the
decision 1 of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, dated 7 December 1984, in AC-
G.R. No. CV 69876, in so far as it affirmed the decision 2 of the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac (hereinafter referred to as the Trial Court), which held, among others,
petitioners solidarily hable with Jimmy B. Abon, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
The relevant facts, as found by the Trial Court and adopted by reference by the
respondent Court, are:
... Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an academic institution ...
[However], it is also an institution of arts and trade. It has so advertised itself, as its own
evidence shows. Its brochure (Exh. 2) shows that BCF has a full-fledged technical-
vocational department offer Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician
courses as well as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses... these
courses divest BCF of the nature or character of being purely or exclusively an
academic institution. 3
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges Foundation
Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Unit, which is under the fifth control of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. 4 The ROTC Unit, by way of accommodation to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), pursuant to Department Order No. 14, Series of
1975 of the Department of Education and Culture, 5 is provided by the BCF an office
and an armory located at the basement of its main building. 6
The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed
armorer. 7 As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment
from the AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the
AFP, 8 as well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the
Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units
in Baguio and an employee (officer) of the AFP. 9 Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce
student of the BCF. 10
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon
shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm
which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. 11 As a result,
Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the
crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP. 12
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B.
Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and
Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF),
Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF)
and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. as party defendants. After hearing, the Trial
Court rendered a decision, (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin
Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally, to pay private
respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro: a) P12,000.00 for the death of Napoleon
Castro, (b) P316,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased,
(c) P5,000.00 as moral damages, (d) P6,000.00 as actual damages, and (e) P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees, plus costs; (2) absolving the other defendants; and (3) dismissing the
defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit. 13 On appeal by petitioners, the respondent
Court affirmed with modification the decision of the Trial Court. The modification
consisted in reducing the award for loss of earning capacity of the deceased from
P316,000.00 to P30,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and increasing the indemnity
for the death of Napoleon Castro from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
The central issue in this case is whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity hable
with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a
consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such
liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter
"stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]." 14 Likewise, "the
phrase used in [Art. 2180 — 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise
over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time." 15
In the case at bar, in holding that Jimmy B. Abon was stin in the protective and SO ORDERED.
supervisory custody of the Baguio Colleges Foundation when he shot Napoleon Castro,
the respondent Court ruled that:

it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at
the time of the shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the
evening; but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and
property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been
attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just
about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The time interval is
safely within the "recess time" that the trial court spoke of and
envisioned by the Palisoc case, supra. 16 (Emphasis supplied)

In line with the case of Palisoc, 17 a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be
in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance
in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities
where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the
school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its
nature does not include dismissal. 18 Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being
in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being
in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.

Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered
to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot
Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident, Roberto B. Ungos ROTC
Unit Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B. Abon "not to leave the office and [to
keep the armory] well guarded." 19 Apart from negating a finding that Jimmy B. Abon
was under the custody of the school when he committed the act for which the
petitioners are sought to be held liable, this circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon
was supposed to be working in the armorywith definite instructions from his superior,
the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.

Petitioners also raise the issue that, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, a school which
offers both academic and technical/vocational courses cannot be held liable for a tort
committed by a student enrolled only in its academic program; however, considering
that Jimmy B. Abon was not in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro, the
Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon such other issue. 20

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED in so far as it holds

petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for his tortious act in the killing of
Napoleon Castro. No costs.
G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002 c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorney’s fees;

ST. MARY'S ACADEMY, petitioner, d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral damages; and to
vs. pay costs.
WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL,
JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO 2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel
VILLANUEVA, respondents. are hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated in the
event of insolvency of principal obligor St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City;
DECISION
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort
PARDO, J.: and who was under special parental authority of defendant St. Mary’s Academy, is
ABSOLVED from paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged against
The Case defendants St. Mary’s Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents;

The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals as well 4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His
as the resolution denying reconsideration, holding petitioner liable for damages arising counterclaim not being in order as earlier discussed in this decision, is hereby
from an accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to DISMISSED.
visit the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
IT IS SO ORDERED."’ (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206)."
The Facts
"From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year
1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from
"Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy,
Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day,
William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James
Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned
Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner,
by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School,
Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the Regional Trial Court of
Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a
Dipolog City.
student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and
as a result the jeep turned turtle.
"On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered
its decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident."2
"‘WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the
In due time, petitioner St. Mary’s academy appealed the decision to the Court of
following manner:
Appeals.3
1. Defendant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual
William Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following sums of money:
damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto.4
a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Mary’s Academy filed a motion for
S. Carpitanos;
reconsideration of the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion.5
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages incurred by plaintiffs for
burial and related expenses;
Hence, this appeal.6
The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral
damages against the petitioner.
The Court’s Ruling
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Mary’s Academy liable for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 2187 and 2198 of the Family Code, pointing out that
petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher
accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental
authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1)
the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all
authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and
other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized
by the school or its teachers.9
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those
exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their
supervision, instruction, or custody.10
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.11
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the
‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in
what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the
injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’"12
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II,
but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted
the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the
recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio
Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased
Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator
who stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide
that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless
driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents’ reliance on Article 219 of the
Family Code that "those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding
Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor" was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II
to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson
of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was
driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time
of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver
or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the
minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened
the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep.
"The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred."13
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which
petitioner St. Mary’s Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of
the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such
accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages
in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they

are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.14 In this case, the
proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner.

For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of the
Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos
must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorney’s fees as part of damages is the
exception rather than the rule.15 The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification.16 Thus,
the grant of attorney’s fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.

Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was
respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact.1âwphi1 We have
held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter
while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets."17 Hence, with the
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that
the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible
for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals18 and that of the trial court.19 The Court remands the case to the trial court for
determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Mary’s Academy,
Dipolog City.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26953 March 28, 1969
ZENAIDA MEDINA, assisted by her husband, FELICIANO CASERO, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
DRA. VENANCIA L. MAKABALI, respondent-appellee.
Fausto D. Laquian for petitioner-appellant.
Maximino Q. Canlas for respondent-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Once more Courts are asked to arbitrate between rights and duties of parents and
children, and between parent and foster parent.
Appellant's claim for custody of a minor boy, Joseph Casero, was sought to be
enforced by habeas corpus proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, in
its Special Proceeding No. 1947. After hearing, the writ was denied by the Court, and
the case was appealed directly to this Supreme Court exclusively on points of law.
Uncontested facts found by the Court below are that on February 4, 1961, petitioner
Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph Casero in the Makabali Clinic
in San Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by respondent Dra. Venancia
Makabali, single, who assisted at the delivery. The boy was Zenaida's third, had with a
married man, Feliciano Casero.
The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth. The latter took care and
reared Joseph as her own son; had him treated at her expense for poliomyelitis by Dra.
Fe del Mundo, in Manila, until he recovered his health; and sent him to school. From
birth until August 1966, the real mother never visited her child, and never paid for his
expenses.
The trial disclosed that petitioner Zenaida Medina lived with Feliciano Casero with her
two other children apparently with the tolerance, if not the acquiescence, of Caseros
lawful wife who resides elsewhere, albeit the offspring of both women are in good
terms with each other; that Casero makes about P400.00 a month as a mechanic, and
Zenaida herself earns from 4 to 5 pesos a day.
The Court, upon calling Joseph on the witness stand, observed that the boy is
fairly intelligent as a witness. He never knew his mother, Zenaida. He was
calling the respondent his "Mammy". The Court informed him that his real
mother is Zenaida. He was asked with whom to stay with his real mother or the
respondent. The boy pointed to the respondent and said "Mammy!" The Court
asked him, "Why do you choose to stay with your "Mammy?" He answered,
"She is the one rearing me." This confrontation was made in the presence of
the two women, Zenaida, the petitioner, and the respondent, Dra. Makabali, in
open court. (C.F.I. Rollo, p. 39).
After extracting from Dra. Makabali a promise to allow the minor a free choice with
whom to live when he reaches the age of 14, the Court held that it was for the child's
best interest to be left with his foster mother and denied the writ prayed for. The real
mother appealed, as already stated.
We see no reason to disturb the order appealed from. While our law recognizes the
right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic
principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children,
the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and
that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from
the mother (Do.) This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal
institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right
of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of
his parents, into a radically different institution, due to the influence of Christian faith
and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Peña,
now "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of
duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor." 1
As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but
ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate
support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development (Civil Code,
Art. 356). As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in
these sacred duties; she not only failed to provide the child with love and care but
actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his tenderest years, when he needed his
mother the most. It may well be doubted what advantage the child could derive from
being coerced to abandon respondent's care and love to be compelled to stay with his
mother and witness her irregular menage a trois with Casero and the latter's legitimate
wife.lawphi1.ñet
It is hinted that respondent's motivation in refusing to surrender the boy is to coerce
petitioner to pay for the rearing of the child. This is not acceptable, for Dra. Makabali
knew (at least at the trial) that any expectation on her part is illusory, given Zenaida's
meager resources, yet expressed willingness to care and educate him.
No abuse of discretion being shown, but on the contrary, the appealed order being
justified in fact and law, we hold that said order should be, and hereby is, affirmed.
Costs against appellant.
G.R. No. L-68374 June 18, 1985
HORACIO LUNA and LIBERTY HIZON-LUNA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON ROQUE A. TAMAYO, as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR Branch CXXXI1 Makati, Metro
Manila, MARIA LOURDES SANTOS, and SIXTO SALUMBIDES, respondents.
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
Review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent appellate court in case CA-G. R.
No. SP-01869, entitled: " Horacio Luna, et al., petitioners, versus Hon. Roque A.
Tamayo, etc., et al., respondents, " which affirmed an order denying a motion to restrain
the execution of a final judgment rendered in a habeas corpus case.
The records of the case show that the herein private respondent Maria Lourdes Santos is
an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna who is married to his co-petitioner
Liberty Hizon-Luna. Maria Lourdes Santos is married to her correspondent Sixto
Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides, also known as Shirley
Luna Salumbides, who is the subject of this child custody case.
It appears that two or four months after the birth of the said Shirley Salumbides on April
7, 1975, her parents gave her to the petitioners, a childless couple with considerable
means, who thereafter showered her with love and affection and brought her up as their
very own. The couple doted upon Shirley who called them "Mama" and "Papa". She
calls her natural parents "Mommy" and "Daddy." When Shirley reached the age of four
(4) years in 1979, she was enrolled at the Maryknoll College in Quezon City, where she
is now in Grade I I I.
A few months before September, 1980, her "Mama" and "Papa" decided to take Shirley
abroad and show her Disneyland and other places of interest in America. Shirley looked
forward to this trip and was excited about it. However, when the petitioners asked for
the respondents' written consent to the child's application for a U.S. visa, the
respondents refused to give it, to the petitioners' surprise and chagrin Shirley was utterly
disappointed. As a result, the petitioners had to leave without Shirley whom they left
with the private respondents, upon the latter's request. The petitioners, however, left
instructions with their chauffeur to take and fetch Shirley from Maryknoll College every
school day.
When the petitioners returned on October 29, 1980, they learned that the respondents
had transferred Shirley to the St. Scholastica College. The private respondents also
refused to return Shirley to them. Neither did the said respondents allow Shirley to visit
the petitioners. In view thereof, the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, against the private respondents to produce
the person of Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody. The case was docketed
in court as Spec. Proc. No. 9417, and after the filing of an answer and due hearing, a
decision was rendered on March 9, 1981, declaring the petitioners entitled to the child's
custody and forthwith granted the writ prayed for.
The private respondents appealed to the then Court of Appeals where the case was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-12212, and in a decision dated April 7, 1982, the appealed
decision was reversed and set aside and another entered, ordering the petitioners, among
other things, to turn over Shirley to the private respondents. The herein petitioners filed
a motion for the reconsideration of the decision but their motion was denied.
Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for review of the decision of the appellate
court. The case was docketed herein as G.R. No. 60860 and on November 10, 1982, this
Court, in a minute resolution, denied the petition for lack of merit.
Upon finality of the judgment, the case was remanded to the court of origin and
assigned to Regional Trial Court, NCJR Branch CXXXII Makati, Metro Manila,
presided over by respondent Judge Roque A. Tamayo who, thereafter, issued an order
directing the issuance of a writ of execution to satisfy and enforce the resolution of the
Supreme Court which affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The execution of the judgment was vigorously opposed by the petitioners who filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the order and to set aside the writ of execution on the
ground of supervening events and circumstances, more particularly, the subsequent
emotional, psychological, and physiological condition of the child Shirley which make
the enforcement of the judgment sought to be executed unduly prejudicial, unjust and
unfair, and cause irreparable damage to the welfare and interests of the child. By reason
thereof, the respondent judge called a conference among the parties and their counsels,
and conducted hearings on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and to set aside
the writ of execution. Shirley made manifest during the hearing that she would kill
herself or run away from home if she should ever be separated from her Mama and
Papa, the petitioners herein, and forced to stay with the respondents. A portion of her
testimony is quoted hereunder:
ATTY. CASTRO:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Would you want to have with your daddy and
mommy, referring to Sixto Salumbides and Maria
Lourdes Salumbides
A No, sir.
 Q Why not?
A Because they are cruel to me. They always spank
me and they do not love me. Whenever I am eating,
they are not attending to me. It is up to me whether
I like the food or not.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, if you will be taken from your papa and
mama (Luna spouses) and given to your daddy and
mommy (Salumbides spouses), what would you do
if you will do anything?
A I will either kill myself or I will escape. Even now
they said they love me. I don't believe them. I know
they are not sincere. They are only saying that to
me. And I know those words were not coming from
their hearts. If they will get me from my papa and
mama, they will be hurt because they know that my
papa and mama love me very much. 1
Dra. Cynthia Dulay Bruce, a child psychologist, affirmed her findings that —
... She (Shirley) has only grown more embittered, cautions, distrusting
of her biological parents. She threatens to kill herself or run away if
given to her biological parents. She claims she would be very
unhappy with her biological parents since they do not understand her
needs are selfish to her, and don't know how to care for her. Presently,
she is very difficult to encourage in seeing her biological parents in a
different light. 2
and that —
... I reviewed with them (Salumbides spouse) that at the present time,
to get Shirley back in this emotionally charged transaction, would
hinder Shirley seeing them as truly loving and concerned parents. She
would more deeply distrust them if they uproot her from the home of
the choice of Mr. and Mrs. Luna. The biological parents wish to do
what is also helpful to Shirley. I discussed with both parties the
recommendations of placement and follow up. 3
But, the respondent judge denied the petitioners' motion to set aside the writ of
execution The petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order and when it
was denied, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction and restraining order with the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court,
which was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. SP-01869, to stop altogether the execution
of the decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in CA-G.R. No. SP-12212. The
petition was duly heard, after which a decision was rendered on May 25, 1984,
dismissing the petition, Hence, the present recourse.
The issue is whether or not procedural rules more particularly the duty of lower courts
to enforce a final decision of appellate courts in child custody cases, should prevail over
and above the desire and preference of the child, to stay with her grandparents instead
of her biological parents and who had signified her intention Up kill herself or run away
from home if she should be separated from her grandparents and forced to live with her
biological parents.
It is a well-known doctrine that when a judgment of a higher court is returned to the
lower court, the only function of the latter court is the ministerial one of issuing the
order of execution. The lower court cannot vary the mandate of the superior court, or
examine it, for any other purpose than execution; nor review it upon any matter decided
on appeal or error apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than to settle so much as has
been demanded. However, it is also equally well-known that a stay of execution of a
final judgment may be authorized whenever it is necessary to accomplish the ends of
justice as when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such
execution inequitable; or when it appears that the controversy had never been submitted
to the judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ of execution has been
improvidently issued; or that it is defective in substance; or is issued against the wrong
party; or that the judgement debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ
has been issued without authority.
In the instant case, the petitioners claim that the child's manifestation to the trial court
that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should be forced to live with
the private respondents is a supervening event that would justify the cancellation of the
execution of the final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-
12212. The respondents, upon the other hand, maintain that there are no supervening
developments and circumstances since these events are not new as the Court of Appeals
had taken into account the physiological and emotional consideration of the transfer of
custody of Shirley when it reversed the decision of the trial court and gave to the private
respondents the custody of the child Shirley; and besides, the wishes and desires of the
child is no hindrance to the parents' right to her custody since the right of the parents to
the custody of their children paramount.
We find merit in the petitioner. The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would
kill herself or run away from home if she should be taken away from the herein
petitioners and forced to live with the private respondents, made during the hearings on
the petitioners' motion to set aside the writ of execution and reiterated in her letters to
the members of the Court dated September 19, 1984 4 and January 2, 1985, 5 and during
the hearing of the case before this Court, is a circumstance that would make the
execution of the judgment rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 9417 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not illegal. Article 363 of the Civil
Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property
of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the
minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of
their children. Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and
the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no
less than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her
right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual
development. 6 The threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to a wholesome
family life that will provide her with love, care and understanding, guidance and
counseling. and moral and material security. 7 But what if the threat is for real.?

Besides, in her letters to the members of the Court, Shirley depicted her biological
parents as selfish and cruel and who beat her often; and that they do not love her. And,
as pointed out by the child psychologist, Shirley has grown more embitered cautious
and dismissing of her biological parents. To return her to the custody of the private
respondents to face the same emotional environment which she is now complaining of
would be indeed traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the child. As requested by
her, let us not destroy her future.

WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby GRANTED and the writ prayed
for issued, setting aside the judgment of the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in
CA-G.R. No. SP-01869, and restraining the respondent judge and/or his successors
from enforcing the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-
12212. entitled: "Horacio Luna and Liberty Hizon-Luna, petitioners-appellees, versus
Maria Lourdes Santos and Sixto Salumbides, respondents-appellants." The decision
rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 9417 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal granting the
herein petitioners custody of the child Shirley Salumbides should be maintained.
Without costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 95305 August 20, 1992
ELENA, OSCAR, CELIA, TERESITA and VIRGILIO, all surnamed
LINDAIN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES APOLINIA VALIENTE and
FEDERICO ILA, respondents.
Maria Rosario B. Ragasa and Oscar L. Lindain for petitioners.
Jose C. Felimon for private respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August 8, 1990 of the
Court of Appeals which dismissed the complaint for annulment of a sale of registered
land, thereby reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City.
The facts of the case in a nutshell are as follows:
When the plaintiffs were still minors, they were already the registered
owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
NT-63540 (Exh. D-1). On November 7, 1966, their mother, Dolores
Luluquisin, then already a widow and acting as guardian of her minor
children, sold the land for P2,000 under a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Registered Land (Exh. 2) to the defendants spouses Apolonia Valiente
and Federico Ila. The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered in the
office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija. TCT
No. NT-66311 was issued to the vendees, Apolonia Valiente and
Federico Ila.
The defendants admitted that the property in question was sold to
them by the mother of the minors as evidenced by a Deed of Sale
(Exh. B for the plaintiffs and Exh. 2 for the defendants) and although
at first they were reluctant to buy the property as the sale would not
be legal, the registered owners thereof being all minors, upon advice
of their counsel, the late Atty. Arturo B. Pascual, and the counsel of
Dolores Luluquisin, Atty. Eustaquio Ramos, who notarized the
documents, that the property could be sold without the written
authority of the court, considering that its value was less than P2,000,
they bought the property and had it registered in their names under
Certificate of Title No. 66311 (Exhibit C for the plaintiffs).
Plaintiffs contend, however, that the sale of the lot by their mother to
the defendants is null and void because it was made without judicial
authority and/or court approval.
The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the sale was valid, as
the value of the property was less than P2,000, and, considering the
ages of plaintiffs now, the youngest being 31 years old at the time of
the filing of the complaint, their right to rescind the contract which
should have been exercised four (4) years after reaching the age of
majority, has already prescribed.
On May 25, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City rendered a decision for the
plaintiffs (now petitioners), the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the following:
(1) Declaring the Deed of Sale executed by the guardian Dolores
Luluquisin in favor of the defendants spouses Apolonia Valiente and
Federico Ila over the property of the minors covered by the TCT No.
NT-66311 to be null and void;
(2) Ordering defendants Spouses Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila
to surrender to the Register of Deeds of San Jose City Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 66311;
(3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of San Jose City to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 66311 in the names of Spouses Apolonia
Valiente and Federico Ila;
(4) Ordering the Register of Deeds to issue a new Transfer Certificate
of Title in lieu of what was ordered cancelled in the names of
plaintiffs, namely: Elena, Oscar, Celia, Teresita and Virgilio, all
surnamed Lindain;
(5) Ordering the defendants to vacate the lot covered by TCT No. NT-
66311 and deliver the possession of the same to the plaintiffs subject
however to the rights of the defendants as buyers, possessors and
builders in good faith;
(6) Without cost. (pp. 41,42, Rollo.)
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed and another one was
entered dismissing the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. The Court of
Appeals applied the ruling of this Court in Ortañez vs. Dela Cruz, O.G., Vol. 60, No.
24, pp. 3434, 3438-3439, that:
A father or mother acting as legal administrator of the property of the
child under parental authority cannot, therefore, dispose of the child's
property without judicial authority if it is worth more than P2,000.00,
notwithstanding the bond that he has filed for the protection of the
child's property. But when the value of such property is less than
P2,000.00, the permission of the court for its alienation or disposition
may be dispensed with. The father or mother, as the case may be, is
allowed by law to alienate or dispose of the same freely, subject only
to the restrictions imposed by the scruples of conscience. (p.
64, Rollo.)
It upheld the sale and dismissed the complaint of the heirs who thereupon filed this
petition for review alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of
the Regional Trial Court and in ordering the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in
total disregard of the findings of facts of the trial court and contrary to the provisions of
law on contracts and guardianship.
The principal issue before us is whether judicial approval was necessary for the sale of
the minors' property by their mother.
We find merit in the petition for review.
Art. 320 of the New Civil Code, which was already in force when the assailed
transaction occurred, provides:
Art. 320.— The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court
of First Instance.
Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished from judicial)
administrator of the property of his/her minor children, does not have the power to
dispose of, or alienate, the property of said children without judicial approval. The
powers and duties of the widow as legal administrator of her minor children's property
as provided in Rule 84 by the Rules of Court entitled, "General Powers and Duties of
Executors and Administrators" are only powers of possession and management. Her
power to sell, mortgage, encumber or otherwise dispose of the property of her minor
children must proceed from the court, as provided in Rule 89 which requires court
authority and approval.
In the case of Visaya, et al. vs. Suguitan, et al., G.R. No. L-8300, November 18, 1955,
we held that:
It is true that under Art. 320 of the new Civil Code the mother, Juana
Visaya, was the legal administrator of the property of her minor
children. But as such legal administrator she had no power
to compromise their claims, for compromise has always been deemed
equivalent to an alienation (transigere est alienare), and is an act of
strict ownership that goes beyond mere administration. Hence, Art.
2032 of the new Civil Code provides:
The Court's approval is necessary in compromises
entered into by guardians, parents, absentee's
representatives and administrators or executors of
decedent's estates. (Emphasis supplied.)
This restriction on the power of parents to compromise claims
affecting their children is in contrast to the terms of Art. 1810 of the
old Civil Code that empowered parents to enter into such
compromises, without requiring court approval unless the amount
involved was in excess of 2000 pesetas. At present, the Court['s]
approval is indispensable regardless of the amount involved.
(Emphasis ours.)
In the recent case of Badillo vs. Ferrer, 152 SCRA 407, 409, this Court stated.
Surviving widow has no authority or has acted beyond her powers in
conveying to the vendees the undivided share of her minor children in
the property, as her powers as the natural guardian covers only
matters of administration and cannot include the power of disposition,
and she should have first secured court approval before alienation of
the property.
The above ruling was a reiteration of Inton vs. Quintana, 81 Phil. 97.
The private respondents' allegation that they are purchasers in good faith is not credible
for they knew from the very beginning that their vendor, the petitioners' mother, without
court approval could not validly convey to them the property of her minor children.
Knowing her lack of judicial authority to enter into the transaction, the private
respondents acted in bad faith when they went ahead and bought the land from her
anyway.
One who acquires or purchases real property with knowledge of a defect in the title of
his vendor cannot claim that he acquired title thereto in good faith as against the owner
of the property or for an interest therein (Gatioan vs. Gaffud, 27 SCRA 706).
The minors' action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed for "real actions over
immovables prescribe after thirty years" (Art. 1141, Civil Code). Since the sale took
place in 1966, the action to recover the property had not yet prescribed when the
petitioners sued in 1987.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is set
aside and that of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City dated May 25, 1989, being
correct, is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23253 March 28, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR BETTY CHUA SY ALIAS
"GRACE CABANGBANG" FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS. PACITA CHUA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MR. & MRS. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG ET AL., respondents-appellees.
Francisco R. Sotto and Associates for petitioner-appellant.
Teofilo F. Manalo for respondents-appellees Mr. & Mrs. Cabangbang.
Enrico R. Castro for respondent-appellee Victor T. Villareal.
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal direct to this Court from the decision of May 21, 1964 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal dismissing Pacita Chua's petition for habeas corpus directed
against Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife Flora Cabangbang.
Pacita Chua, when still in the prime of youth, supported herself by working in
nightclubs as a hostess. And sexual liaison she had with man after man without benefit
of marriage. She first lived with a certain Chua Ben in 1950 by whom she had a child
who died in infancy. She afterwards cohabited with Sy Sia Lay by whom she had two
children named Robert and Betty Chua Sy. The latter child was born on December 15,
1957. Shortly after the birth of Betty, Pacita Chua and Sy Sia Lay separated. Finding no
one to fall back on after their separation, Pacita Chua lingered in and around nightclubs
and gambling joints, until she met Victor Tan Villareal. In due time she became the
latter's mistress. In 1960 another child, a girl, was born to her. In 1961 when this last
child was still an infant, she and Villareal separated. Without means to support the said
child, Pacita Chua gave her away to a comadre in Cebu.
Sometime in May 1958 Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife, a childless couple,
acquired the custody of the child Betty who was then barely four months old. They have
since brought her up as their own. They had her christened as Grace Cabangbang on
September 12, 1958. 1
There is some testimonial conflict on how the Cabangbang spouses acquired custody
of the girl Betty (or Grace), Pacita Chua avers that in October 1958, while she and
Villareal were still living together, the latter surreptitiously took the child away and
gave her to the Cabangbangs, allegedly in recompense for favors received. She
supposedly came to know of the whereabouts of her daughter, only in 1960 when the
girl, who was then about three years old, was brought to her by Villareal, who shortly
thereafter returned the child to the Cabangbangs allegedly thru threats intimidation,
fraud and deceit. The Cabangbang spouses assert in rebuttal that Mrs. Cabangbang
found the child, wrapped in a bundle, at the gate of their residence; that she reared her
as her own and grew very fond of her; and that nobody ever molested them until the
child was 5-½ years of age.lâwphi1.ñet
At all events, it is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbang
spouses by Villareal with the knowledge and consent of Pacita Chua.
By letter dated June 6, 1963 addressed to the Cabangbang spouses, with copy
furnished to Villareal, Pacita Chua thru counsel demanded the surrender to her of the
custody of the child. Failing to secure such custody, Pacita Chua (hereinafter referred to
as the petitioner) filed on June 14, 1963 a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, praying that the court grant her custody of and recognize her
parental authority over the girl. Named respondents in the petition were Villareal and
the spouses Cabangbang.
On June 15, 1963 a writ was issued commanding the provincial sheriff of Rizal or any
of his deputies to produce the body of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang before the
court a quo on June 17, 1963, at 8:30 a.m. However, for reasons not stated in the record,
the child was not produced before the lower court as ordered.
On June 21, 1963 Villareal filed his answer to the petition. The Cabangbangs filed
their answer the next day.
After due trial, the lower court on May 21, 1964 promulgated its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court has come to the conclusion that
it will be for the welfare of the child Betty Chua Sy also known as Grace
Cabangbang to be under the custody of respondents Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome
Cabangbang. Petition dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
In this appeal now before us, the petitioner tenders for resolution two issues of law
which, by her own formulation, read as follows: "The lower court erred when it
awarded the custody of petitioner's daughter Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang, who
is less than seven (7) years old, in favor of respondents Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome
Cabangbang, and [2] illegally deprived petitioner of parental authority over her
daughter."
We resolve both issues against the petitioner.
I.
Stated succinctly, the petitioner's thesis is that pursuant to the mandate contained in
article 363 of the Civil Code she cannot be separated from her child who was less,
seven years of age, and that she cannot be deprived of her parental authority over the
child because not one of the grounds for the termination, loss, suspension or deprivation
of parental authority provided in article 332 of the same Code obtains in this case.
Whether the petitioner can be legally separated from her child, Betty Chua Sy or Grace
Cabangbang, is an issue that is now moot and academic. Having been born on
December 15, 1957, the child is now 11 years of age. Consequently, the second
paragraph of art. 363 of the Civil Code, which prohibits the separation of a child under
seven years of age from her mother, "unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure," has no immediate relevance. The petitioner correctly argues, however, that
the reasons relied upon by the lower court — i.e., "petitioner is not exactly an upright
woman" and "it will be for the welfare of the child" — are not strictly speaking, proper
grounds in law to deprive a mother of her inherent right to parental authority over her
child. It must be conceded that minor children — be they legitimate, recognized natural,
adopted, natural by legal fiction or illegitimate, other than natural as specified in art.
269 of the Civil Code — are by law under the parental authority of both the father and
the mother, or either the father or the mother, as the case may be. But we take the view
that on the basis of the aforecited seemingly unpersuasive factual premises, the
petitioner can be deprived of her parental authority. For while in one breath art. 313 of
the Civil Code lays down the rule that "Parental authority cannot be renounced or
transferred, except in cases of guardianship or adoption approved by the courts, or
emancipation by concession," it indicates in the next that "The courts may, in cases
specified by law deprive parents of their [parental] authority." And there are indeed
valid reasons, as will presently be expounded, for depriving the petitioner of parental
authority over the minor Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang.
It is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbangs by Villareal
with the knowledge and consent of the petitioner. In support of this finding, it cited the
facts that the petitioner did not at all — not ever — report to the authorities the alleged
disappearance of her daughter, and had not taken any step to see the child when she
allegedly discovered that she was in the custody of the Cabangbangs. It discounted the
petitioner's claim that she did not make any move to recover the child because the
Cabangbangs are powerful and influential. The petitioner is bound by the foregoing
findings of fact. Having taken her appeal directly to this Court, she is deemed to have
waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by the trial court. 2
Art. 332 of the Civil Code provides, inter alia:
The courts may deprive the parents of their authority or suspend the exercise
of the same if they should treat their children with excessive harshness or
should give them corrupting orders, counsels, or examples, or should make
them beg or abandon them. (emphasis supplied)
Abandonment is therefore one of the grounds for depriving parents of parental
authority over their children.
Was the petitioner's acquiescence to the giving by Villareal of her child to the
Cabangbangs tantamount to abandonment of the child? To our mind, mere acquiescence
— without more — is not sufficient to constitute abandonment. But the record yields a
host of circumstances which, in their totality, unmistakably betray the petitioner's
settled purpose and intention to completely forego all parental response possibilities and
forever relinquish all parental claim in respect to the child.
She surrendered the custody of her child to the Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until
1963, or after the lapse of a period of five long years, before she brought action to
recover custody. Her claim that she did not take any step to recover her child because
the Cabangbangs were powerful and influential, does not deserve any modicum of
credence. A mother who really loves her child would go to any extent to be reunited
with her. The natural and normal reaction of the petitioner — once informed, as she
alleged, and her child was in the custody of the Cabangbangs — should have been to
move heaven and earth, to use a worn-out but still respectable cliche, in order to recover
her. Yet she lifted not a finger.
It is a matter of record — being the gist of her own unadulterated testimony under oath
— that she wants the child back so that Sy Sia Lay, the alleged father, would resume
providing the petitioner the support which he peremptorily withheld and ceased to give
when she gave the child away. A woman scorned, she desires to recover the child as a
means of embarrassing Villareal who retrieved the jeep he gave her and altogether
stopped living with and supporting her. But the record likewise reveals that at the pre-
trial conducted by the court a quo, she expressed her willingness that the child remain
with the Cabangbangs provided the latter would in exchange give her a jeep and some
money.
The petitioner's inconsistent demands in the course of the proceedings below, reveal
that her motives do not flow from the wellsprings of a loving mother's heart. Upon the
contrary, they are unmistakably selfish — nay, mercenary. She needs the child as a
leverage to obtain concessions — financial and otherwise — either from the alleged
father or the Cabangbangs. If she gets the child back, support for her would be
forthcoming so she thinks — from the alleged father, Sy Sia Lay. On the other hand, if
the Cabangbangs would keep the child, she would agree provided they gave her a jeep
and some money.
Indeed, the petitioner's attitude, to our mind, does nothing but confirm her intention to
abandon the child — from the very outset when she allowed Villareal to give her away
to the Cabangbangs. It must be noted that the abandonment took place when the child,
barely four months old, was at the most fragile stage of life and needed the utmost care
and solicitude of her mother. And for five long years thereafter she did not once move
to recover the child. She continuously shunned the natural and legal obligations which
she owed to the child; completely withheld her presence, her love, her care, and the
opportunity to display maternal affection; and totally denied her support and
maintenance. Her silence and inaction have been prolonged to such a point that her
abandonment of the child and her total relinquishment of parental claim over her, can
and should be inferred as a matter of law. 3
Note that this was not the only instance when she gave away a child of her own flesh
and blood. She gave up her youngest child, named Betty Tan Villareal, to
her comadre in Cebu because she could not support it.
Of incalculable significance is the fact that nowhere in the course of the petitioner's
lengthy testimony did she ever express a genuine desire to recover her child Betty Chua
Sy or Grace Cabangbang — or, for that matter, her other child Betty Tan Villareal —
because she loves her, cares for her, and wants to smother her with motherly affection.
Far from it. She wants Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang back so that the alleged
father would resume giving her (the petitioner) support. She wants her back to humiliate
and embarrass the respondent Villareal who, with her knowledge and consent, gave the
child to the Cabangbangs. But — "most unkindest cut of all"! — she nevertheless
signified her readiness to give up the child, in exchange for a jeep and some money.
We therefore affirm the lower court's decision, not on the grounds cited by it, but upon
a ground which the court overlooked — i.e., abandonment by the petitioner of her
child. 4
Contrast the petitioner's attitude with that of the respondents Cabangbang — especially
the respondent Flora Cabangbang who, from the moment the child was given to them,
took care of her as if she were her own flesh and blood, had her baptized, and when she
reached school age enrolled her in a reputable exclusive school, for girls.
Ironically enough, the real heart-rending tragedy in this case would consist not in
taking the child away from the Cabangbangs but in returning her to the custody of the
petitioner.
For, by her own admission, the petitioner has no regular source of income, and it is
doubtful, to say the very least, that she can provide the child with the barest necessities
of life, let alone send her to school. There is no insurance at all that the alleged father,
Sy Sia Lay — an unknown quantity, as far as the record goes — would resume giving
the petitioner support once she and the child are reunited. What would then prevent the
petitioner from again doing that which she did before, i.e., give her away? These are of
course conjectures, but when the welfare of a helpless child is at stake, it is the bounden
duty of courts — which they cannot shirk — to respect, enforce, and give meaning and
substance to a child's natural and legal right to live and grow in the proper physical,
moral and intellectual environment. 5
This is not to say that with the Cabangbang spouses, a bright and secure future is
guaranteed for her. For life is beset at every turn with snares and pitfalls. But the record
indubitably pictures the Cabangbang spouses as a childless couple of consequence in
the community, who have given her their name and are rearing her as their very own
child, and with whom there is every reason to hope she will have a fair chance of
normal growth and development into respectable womanhood.
Verily, to surrender the girl to the petitioner would be to assume — quite incorrectly
— that only mothers are capable of parental love and affection. Upon the contrary, this
case precisely underscores the homiletic admonition that parental love is not universal
and immutable like a law of natural science.
II.
The petitioner assails as illegal and without basis the award of the custody of Grace
Cabangbang or Betty Chua Sy to the Cabangbang spouses upon the grounds, first, that
the couple are not related by consanguinity or affinity to the child, and second, because
the answer of the spouses contains no prayer for the custody of the child.
The absence of any kinship between the child and the Cabangbangs alone cannot serve
to bar the lower court from awarding her custody to them. Indeed, the law provides that
in certain cases the custody of a child may be awarded even to strangers, as against
either the father or the mother or against both. Thus, in proceedings involving a child
whose parents are separated — either legally or de facto — and where it appears that
both parents are improper persons to whom to entrust the care, custody and control of
the child, "the court may either designate the paternal or maternal grandparent of the
child, or his oldest brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet person to take
charge of such child, or commit it to and suitable asylum, children's home, or
benevolent society." 6
Parenthetically, sections 6 and 7 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court belie the petitioner's
contention that the first sentence of art. 363 of the Civil Code, which states that
In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the
latter's welfare shall be paramount.....
applies only when the litigation involving a child is between the father and the mother.
That the policy enunciated, in the abovequoted legal provision is of general application,
is evident from the use of the, adjective all — meaning, the whole extent or quantity of,
the entire number of, every one of. 7 It is, therefore, error to argue that if the suit
involving a child's custody is between a parent and a stranger, the law must necessarily
award such custody to the parent. Sec 7, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, precisely
contemplates, among others, a suit between a parent and a stranger who, in the words of
the provision, is "some reputable resident of the province." And under the authority of
the said rule, the court — if it is for the best interest of the child — may take the child
away from its parents and commit it to, inter alia, a benevolent person.
The petitioner's contention that the answer of the spouses Cabangbang contains no
prayer for the retention by them of the custody of the child, is equally devoid of merit.
The several moves taken by them are clear and definitive enough. First, they asked for
her custody pendente lite. Second, they sought the dismissal of the petition below for
lack of merit. Finally, they added a general prayer for other reliefs just and equitable in
the premises. Surely the above reliefs prayed for are clearly indicative of the
Cabangbangs' genuine desire to retain the custody of Betty Chua Sy or Grace
Cabangbang.

III.

Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The
petitioner has not proven that she is entitled to the rightful custody of Betty Chua Sy or
Grace Cabangbang. Upon the contrary, by wantonly and completely shunting aside her
legal and moral obligations toward her child, she must be deemed as having forfeited all
legitimate legal and moral claim to her custody. The lower court acted correctly in
dismissing her petition.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-18284 April 30, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, ANA ISABEL
HENRIETTE ANTONIA CONCEPCION GEORGIANA, ISABEL VALDES
JOHNSTON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
Domingo T. Zavalla for oppositor-appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal taken by petitioner-appellant Isabel Valdes Johnston from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal dated September 19, 1960 and its order of October 31,
1960, Hon. Andres Reyes, presiding, prescribing the use of the surname Valdes by the
adopted child instead of Valdes Johnston petitioner's married name at the time of the
filing of the petition.
On June 24, 1960, petitioner-appellant Isabel Valdes Johnston, filed a petition for the
adoption of one Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana, 2 years and 10
months old, then under the custody of the Hospicio de San Jose, an orphanage situated
in the city of Manila. The petition shows that petitioner-appellant is 48 years old,
married to Raymond Arthur Johnston, Filipino, residing at 12 San Lorenzo Drive,
Makati, Rizal; that the couple are childless; that the consent of the Mother Superior of
the orphanage and the husband of petitioner-appellant was obtained.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Notice of the hearing of the petition was issued and duly published as required by law,
and after hearing, the lower court rendered a decision granting the petition, with the
following dispositive part:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted declaring the child
Ana Isabel Henriette Antonia Concepcion Georgiana freed from all legal
obligations and obedience and maintenance with respect to its natural parents
and is, to all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioner, with the
corresponding change of surname VALDES, which is the surname of
petitioner.
The petitioner-appellant filed a motion on October 24, 1960, praying that the surname
given to the minor be "Valdes Johnston", instead of "Valdes" only, but this motion was
denied by the lower court in its order of October 31, 1960. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner-appellant argues that since she is now using the surname of her husband by
virtue of Article 370, par. 1 of the new Civil Code, and because that is the surname
(Valdes Johnston) she used in filing the petition in the present case, under which she
testified at the time of the trial, and under which she is now known to all her relatives,
friends and acquaintances, she had to be known by her maiden surname, and the lower
court should have decreed that the minor whom she adopted should be allowed to bear
the surname she is now using. She also argues that the use of the surname "Valdes" by
the adopted child, as prescribed by the lower court, will create the impression that she is
the illegitimate child of petitioner-appellant begotten before her marriage, a situation
which is humiliating to both adopter and adopted.
The Solicitor General in reply argues that while it is true that a married woman is
permitted to add to her surname her husband's surname, the fact remains that appellant's
surname is Valdes and not Johnston; that a married woman has a surname of her own to
which may be added her husband's surname if she so chooses; that if the minor be
permitted to use the surname Valdes Johnston, much confusion would result because
the public would be misled into believing that she was adopted by appellant's husband
also, which is not true in this case.
We agree with the decision of the lower court authorizing or prescribing the use of the
surname Valdes by the adopted child. The provision of law (Art. 341, par. 4, Civil
Code) which entitles the adopted minor to the use of the adopter's surname, refers to the
adopter's own surname and not to her surname acquired by virtue of marriage.
Petitioner-appellant's real surname is Valdes and not Johnston, and as she made the
adoption singly without the concurrence of her husband, and not as a married woman,
her name as adopter was her maiden name. The adoption created a personal relationship
between the adopter and the adopted, and the consent of Raymond Johnston, Isabel
Valdes' husband, to the adoption by her individually, did not have the effect of making
him an adopting father, so as to entitle the child to the use of Johnston's own surname.
Since adoption gives the person adopted the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter (Art. 341, par. 1, Civil Code), much confusion would
indeed result, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, if the minor child herein
were allowed to use the surname of the spouse who did not join in the adoption.
For one thing, to allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter,
would mislead the public into believing that he had also been adopted by the husband,
which is not the case. And when later, questions of successional rights arise, the
husband's consent to the adoption might be presented to prove that he had actually
joined in the adoption.
It is to forestall befuddling situations pointed out above and other possible confusing
situations that may arise in the future, that this Court is inclined to apply strictly the
provision of the Civil Code to the effect that an adopted child use the surname of the
adopter himself or herself, and not that which is acquired by marriage.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the court below prescribing the use of the
surname "Valdes" by the adopted minor Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion
Georgiana, is hereby affirmed. Without costs.
G.R. No. L-32054 May 15, 1974
TERESITA LLANETA (known also as TERESITA LLANETA FERRER and
TERESITA FERRER), petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, as Presiding Judge of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, respondent.
Pascual G. Mier for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General
Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. and Trial Attorney Quirino B. Maglente, Jr. for respondent.
CASTRO, J.:p
From the denial by the respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in
its special proceeding H-00237, of her petition for change of name, Teresita Llaneta has
come to this Court on appeal by certiorari.
Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom
she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about
four years later Atanacia had relations with another man out of which Teresita was
born. Shortly after Teresita's birth, Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila
where all of them lived with Atanacia's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita
was raised in the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all her
dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years old, she
applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Irosin, Sorsogon, where she was born, as
she was required to present it in connection with a scholarship granted to her by the
Catholic Charities. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta
— not Ferrer — and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown
father.
On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which
she had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and
confusion, Teresita petitioned the court below on March 18, 1969 for change of her
name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. After trial duly had, the
respondent judge denied her petition; hence the present recourse.
The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as
she can remember; that all her records, in school and elsewhere, put her name down as
Teresita Ferrer; that her friends and associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and
that even the late Serafin Ferrer's nearest of kin (who apparently have kept Teresita's
illegitimacy a secret from her) have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname
Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta
(in order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate) would result in confusion
among the persons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious
explanations of the circumstances of her new surname.1 In her official dealings, this
would likewise mean a lifelong fending with the necessary affidavits. Moreover, it is a
salutary law that would allow Teresita, inspite of her illegitimate birth, to carry on in
society without her unfortunate status being bandied about at every turn.2
The respondent court places reliance on the doctrine, expounded in three decisions of
this Court,3 that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of
family relationship. The principle remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed
change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the
family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In the case
at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two
remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the
petition. Adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition
from the relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. Clearances from various
Government agencies show that Teresita has a spotless record. And the State
(represented by the Solicitor General's Office), which has an interest in the name borne
by every citizen within its realm for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition
at the trial after a searching cross-examination, of Teresita and her witnesses. Whether
the late Serafin Ferrer, who died some five years before Teresita was born, would have
consented or objected to her use of his surname is open to speculation. One thing,
however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of action to prevent the
surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with her.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and the petition of Teresita Llaneta
for change of her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer is hereby granted. Let a copy of this
decision be forwarded to the civil registrar of Irosin, Sorsogon, for this information and
proper action. No costs.
G.R. No. L-41427 June 10, 1988
CONSTANCIA C. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONSUELO DAVID, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether or not a woman who has
been legally divorced from her husband may be enjoined by the latter's present wife
from using the surname of her former husband.
A complaint was filed by petitioner Constancia C. Tolentino with the then Court of First
Instance of Quezon City against Consuelo David for the purpose of stopping and
enjoining her by injunction from using the surname Tolentino. The complaint also
contained a claim for damages which the petitioner, however, waived. An application
for a writ of preliminary injunction was filed as well.
On January 13, 1972 respondent Consuelo David filed her answer admitting she has
been using and continues to use the surname Tolentino.
The application for the writ was heard with both parties presenting evidence in support
of their respective claims.
On January 18, 1972, the trial court issued an order granting the petitioner's action for a
writ of preliminary injunction with the actual writ being issued on January 20, 1972.
The order granting said writ reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered by the undersigned Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City,
that, until further orders, you CONSUELO DAVID, your agents
and/or representatives and/or persons acting under your control,
direction, instruction and/or supervision, ARE ENJOINED from
using, employing and/or applying, in any manner, form or means
whatsoever, the surname TOLENTINO. (p. 17, Original Record On
Appeal)
On February 2, 1972, respondent Consuelo filed a motion for leave to file a third party
complaint against her former husband. The motion was granted on March 18,1972.
Thereafter, third party defendant Arturo Tolentino filed his answer on April 19,1972.
After the hearings, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
confirming the preliminary injunction and making the same
permanent and perpetual-restraining and enjoining defendant, her
agents and/or representatives and/or persons acting under her control,
direction, instruction and/or supervision, from using, employing
and/or applying, in any manner, form or means whatsoever, the
surname" TOLENTINO."
No pronouncement as to costs, the same having been waived by the
plaintiff.
The third-party complaint is hereby dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs. (p. 93, Original Record on Appeal)
The private respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals raising several
issues, among them, the prescription of the plaintiff's cause of action and the absence of
a monopolistic proprietary right of the plaintiff over the use of the surname Tolentino.
On June 25, 1975, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, sustaining Error 1, this Court is constrained to
reverse, as it now reverses, judgment appealed from, complaint is
dismissed, with costs. (p. 76, Petitioner's Brief)
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution
dated August 29,1975.
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
The uncontroverted facts of the case are:
The petitioner is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino, their marriage having been
celebrated on April 21, 1945 in Manila. The union produced three children.
Respondent Consuelo David was legally married to Arturo Tolentino on February 8,
1931. Their marriage likewise produced children. The marriage was dissolved and
terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation on September 15, 1943
by a decree of absolute divorce granted by the Court of First Instance of Manila in
Divorce Case No. R-619 entitled "Arturo Tolentino v. Consuelo David" on the ground
of desertion and abandonment by the wife. The trial court granted the divorce on its
finding that Arturo Tolentino was abandoned by Consuelo David for at least three (3)
continuous years.
Thereafter, Arturo Tolentino married a certain Pilar Adorable, who however, died soon
after their marriage. Tolentino subsequently married Constancia on April 21, 1945.
Consuelo David, on the other hand, continued using the surname Tolentino after the
divorce and up to the time of the filing of this complaint.
The third party defendant, in his answer, admitted that the use of the surname Tolentino
by the private respondent was with his and his family's (brothers and sisters) consent.
The petition mainly revolves around two issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioner's cause of action has already prescribed, and
2. Whether or not the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using
the surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced.
The petitioner's contention that her cause of action is imprescriptible is without merit. In
fact, it is contradictory to her own claim. The petitioner insists that the use by
respondent Consuelo David of the surname Tolentino is a continuing actionable wrong
and states that every use of the surname constitutes a new crime. The contention cannot
be countenanced because the use of a surname by a divorced wife for a purpose not
criminal in nature is certainly not a crime. The rule on prescription in civil cases such as
the case at bar is different. Art. 1150 of the Civil Code provides: "The time for
prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains
otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought."
All actions, unless an exception is provided, have a prescriptive period. Unless the law
makes an action imprescriptible, it is subject to bar by prescription and the period of
prescription is five (5) years from the time the right of action accrues when no other
period is prescribed by law (Civil Code, Art. 1149). The Civil Code provides for some
rights which are not extinguished by prescription but an action as in the case before us
is not among them. Neither is there a special law providing for imprescriptibility.
Moreover, the mere fact that the supposed violation of the petitioner's right may be a
continuous one does not change the principle that the moment the breach of right or
duty occurs, the right of action accrues and the action from that moment can be legally
instituted (Soriano v. Sternberg, 41 Phil. 210).
The respondent Court of Appeals, on the other hand, is of the opinion that the period of
prescription should be four (4) years, since it appears to be an action based on quasi-
delict. — hatever the period, it cannot be denied that the action has long prescribed
whether the cause accrued on April 21, 1945 when the petitioner and Arturo Tolentino
got married, or on August 30, 1950, when the present Civil Code took effect, or in 1951
when Constancia Tolentino came to know of the fact that Consuelo David was still
using the surname Tolentino. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which
detemines the starting point for the computation of the period of prescription (Espanol
v. Phil. Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314).
The petitioner should have brought legal action immediately against the private
respondent after she gained knowledge of the use by the private respondent of the
surname of her former husband. As it is, action was brought only on November 23,
1971 with only verbal demands in between and an action to reconstitute the divorce
case. The petitioner should have filed her complaint at once when it became evident that
the private respondent would not accede to her demands instead of waiting for twenty
(20) years.
As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, "where the plaintiff fails to go to the Court
within the prescriptive period, he loses his cause, but not because the defendant had
acquired ownership by adverse possession over his name but because the plaintiffs
cause of action had lapsed thru the statute of limitations." (p. 37, Rollo)
On the principal issue of whether or not a divorced woman may continue using the
surname of her former husband, Philippine law is understandably silent. We have no
provisions for divorce in our laws and consequently, the use of surnames by a divorced
wife is not provided for.
There is no merit in the petitioner's claim that to sustain the private respondent's stand is
to contradict Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code.
It is significant to note that Senator Tolentino himself in his commentary on Art. 370 of
the Civil Code states that "the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband's
surname. She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others from
using it." (Tolentino, Civil Code, 1974 ed., P. 681).
Art. 371 is not applicable to the case at bar because Art. 371 speaks of annulment while
the case before us refers to absolute divorce where there is a severance of valid
marriage ties. The effect of divorce is more akin to the death of the spouse where the
deceased woman continues to be referred to as the Mrs. of her husband even if the latter
has remarried rather than to annulment since in the latter case, it is as if there had been
no marriage at all.
The private respondent has established that to grant the injunction to the petitioner
would be an act of serious dislocation to her. She has given proof that she entered into
contracts with third persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal relations
using the surname Tolentino. The petitioner, on the other hand, has failed to show that
she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of legal rights inasmuch as she can use
her husband's surname and be fully protected in case the respondent uses the surname
Tolentino for illegal purposes.

There is no usurpation of the petitioner's name and surname in this case so that the mere
use of the surname Tolentino by the Private respondent cannot be said to have injured
the petitioner's rights. "The usurpation of name implies some injury to the interests of
the owner of the name. It consists in the possibility of confusion of Identity ... between
the owner and the usurper. It exists when a person designates himself by another name
... The following are the elements of usurpation of a name: 1) there is an actual use of
another's name by the defendant; 2) the use is unauthorized; and 3) the use of another's
name is to designate personality or Identify a person" (Tolentino, supra, p. 685). None
of these elements exists in the case at bar and neither is there a claim by the petitioner
that the private respondent impersonated her. In fact, it is of public knowledge that
Constancia Tolentino is the legal wife of Arturo Tolentino so that all invitations for
Senator and Mrs. Tolentino are sent to Constancia. Consuelo never represented herself
after the divorce as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino but simply as Mrs. Consuelo David-
Tolentino. The private respondent has legitimate children who have every right to use
the surname Tolentino. She could not possibly be compelled to use the prefix "Miss" or
use the name Mrs. David, different from the surnames of her children. The records do
not show that she has legally remarried.

In Silva, et al. v. Peralta (110 Phil. 57) cited by the petitioner, it was not the mere use of
the surname that was enjoined but the defendant's representation that she was the wife
of Saturnino Silva. There was, therefore, a usurpation of the wife's status which is
absent in the case at bar.

We rule that the use of the surname Tolentino does not impinge on the rights of the
petitioner.

Considering the circumstances of this petition, the age of the respondent who may be
seriously prejudiced at this stage of her life, having to resort to further legal procedures
in reconstituting documents and altering legal transactions where she used the surname
Tolentino, and the effects on the private respondent who, while still not remarried, will
have to use a surname different from the surnames of her own children, we find it just
and equitable to leave things as they are, there being no actual legal injury to the
petitioner save a deep hurt to her feelings which is not a basis for injunctive relief.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The writs of preliminary and mandatory
injunction issued by the trial court are SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-63817 August 28, 1984
CORAZON LEGAMIA y RIVERA, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Felipe O. Pascual for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent Appellate Court.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari to review and reverse a decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court.
In the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila, Corazon Legamia was accused of using
an alias in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended. The information
against her reads:
That on or about November 4th, 1974, and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully use the substitute
or alias name CORAZON L. REYES, which is different from
Corazon Legamia y Rivera with which she was christened or by
which she has been known since childhood, nor as a pseudonym for
literary purpose and without having been previously authorized by a
competent Court to do so; that it was discovered only on or about
November 4th, 1974. (Rollo, pp. 11-12.)
She was convicted by the trial court which sentenced her to an indeterminate prison
term of only (1) year, as minimum, to two (2) years, as maximum; to pay a fine a fine
of
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment; and to pay the costs. The trial court
recommended, however, that she be extended executive clemency. On appeal to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the sentence was affirmed in toto. Hence the instant
petition.
The facts:
Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years from November 8, 1955 to
September 26, 1974, when Emilio died. During their live-in arrangement they produced
a boy who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. He was born on October 18,
1971.
From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon was
known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced
her to friends as Mrs. Reyes.
Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural Credit
Administration when he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio's death,
Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration
for death benefits. The letter was signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The voucher evidencing
payment of Michael's claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was also signed "Corazon L.
Reyes."
For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio, Felicisima Reyes
who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon's prosecution.
Parenthetically, the amount paid to Michael is "equivalent to 2/5 of that which is due to
each legitimate child in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code" per advice
given by Atty. Diomedes A. Bragado of the Agricultural Credit Administration to
Felicisima. (Rollo, pp. 14-15.)
The law:
Commonwealth Act No. 142 provides in Section 1:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema,
television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events
where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no
person shall use any name different from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with
which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with
which he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration upon entry; or
such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent
court: Provided, That persons, whose births have not been registered
in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized have one
year from the approval of this act within which to register their names
in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the
patronymic name and one or two surnames. (As amended by R.A. No.
6085.)
The issue:
Did the petitioner violate the law in the light of the facts abovestated?
The resolution:
It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife
and use the name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to
another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly
frowned upon. A number of women can be Identified who are living with men
prominent in political, business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself out
as the man's wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her
husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142
because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light
of our cultural environment that the law must be construed.

In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He
introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name without
any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his
death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her
guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon
had done especially because some of them probably had their own Corazons.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby set aside; the petitioner is acquitted
of the charge. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-32026 January 16, 1986
RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF ABSENCE OF ROBERTO L.
REYES. ERLINDA REYNOSO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON, JOSE P. ALEJANDRO, in his capacity as Judge, Court of First Instance of
Cavite, Branch II, Cavite City, respondents.
PATAJO, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite dismissing the
petition filed by petitioner-appellant Erlinda Reynoso Reyes to have her husband
Roberto Reyes declared an absentee.
In a petition filed on October 25, 1969 Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the declaration of
the absence of her husband Roberto L. Reyes alleging that her husband had been absent
from their conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and since then had not been heard from
and his whereabouts unknown. The petition further alleged that her husband left no will
nor any property in his name nor any debts.
The evidence presented by petitioner in support of her petition established that she and
Roberto L. Reyes were married on March 20, 1960; that sometime in April 1962 her
husband left the conjugal home due to some misunderstanding over personal matters;
that since then petitioner has not received any news about the whereabouts of her
husband; that they have not acquired any properties during their marriage and that they
have no outstanding obligation in favor of anyone; that her only purpose in filing the
petition is to establish the absence of her husband, invoking the provisions of Rule 107
of the New Rules of Court and Article 384 of the Civil Code.
After hearing the Court a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that since Roberto L.
Reyes left no properties there was no necessity to declare him judicially an absentee. It
said:
A perusal of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court on absentees reveals that
it is based on the provisions of Title XIV of the New Civil Code on
absence. And the reason and purpose of the provisions of the New
Civil Code on absence (Arts. 381 to 396) are: (1) The interest of the
person himself who has disappeared; (2) The rights of third parties
against the absentee, especially those who have rights which would
depend upon the death of the absentee; and (3) The general interest of
society which may require that property does not remain abandoned
without someone representing it and without an owner (Civil Code by
Francisco, Vol. 2, pp. 930- 931, 1953 Ed.).
It will thus be noted that said provisions of the New Civil Code are
concerned with absence only with reference to its effects on property
(2 Manresa, 101-102, Civil Code by Francisco, Vol. 2, p. 932. 1953
Ed.). Article 384, New Civil Code, which is reproduced from Article
184 of the old Code, and relied upon by herein petitioner, refers to the
second period or stage of absence, and specifically indicates the
precise moment when the same may begin. Thus, this article provides
that after the lapse of two (2) years without any news about the
absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and five (5) years in
case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of
his property, his absence may be declared by the Court. The
primordial purpose of this declaration is to provide for an
administrator of the property of the absentee. It cannot be said that
because of the comma (,) between the words 'news' and 'and', the two-
year period mentioned in the first part of the law has no reference to
or bearing on the property of the absentee. Manresa states that the
only reason for the different periods is because in one case (2 years)
the absentee has not left a person in charge of the administration of
his property, and in the other case (5 years) the absentee has provided
for his absence by appointing an administrator of his property
dispensing in a way the giving of news about himself (2 Manresa,
127-128). It is worth to note, in this connection, that the first period or
stage of absence as covered by Article 381 of the New Civil Code
provides for provisional measures-the appointment by the Court of a
person to represent the absentee' in all that may be necessary'-when a
mere presumption of his absence arises. It should be noted that the
appointment of a 'representative' of the absentee is for the protection
of the interest of the latter. This is clear from the provisions of Article
382 which enjoins the judge to 'take the necessary measures to
safeguard the rights and interests of the absentee. ... Moreover, it is
not enough that a person is declared an absentee. The law (see
Articles 381, 382 and 383) requires the judge to appoint a
representative for the absentee precisely to safeguard the property or
interest of the latter. It is thus imperative that the declaration of
absence be for a specific purpose, and that purpose can be no other
than the protection of the interest or property of the absentee. Castan,
in his commentary, emphatically states that there must be an
immediate necessity for the representation of the absentee in some
specific urgent matters (Vol. 1, pp. 182-183).
The same observation and commentary can be said of the
corresponding complimenting provisions of Rule 107 of the Rules of
Court, particularly Sections 6 and 7 thereof which make it mandatory
 upon the Court to appoint a representative, trustee or administrator
who shall safeguard the rights and interest of the absentee.

Considering that neither the petition alleges, nor the evidence shows,
that Roberto L. Reyes has any rights, interest or property in the
Philippines, there is no point in judicially declaring him an absentee.

We affirm the order of the lower Court dismissing the petition. As this Court said
in Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 197:

... For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to
have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does
not know his or her former spouse to he living, that such former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III,
paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68). (On page 183).

The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has properties
which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the
Court (Article 384, Civil Code); the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of
property (Article 191, Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court that the administration
of an classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her (Article 196, Civil Code).
The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the
management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife may be combined and
adjudicated in the same proceedings, Peyer vs. Martinez, 88 Phil. 72, 80).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the order

of the lower Court dismissing the petition to declare Roberto L. Reyes an absentee.
With costs against petitioner-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-60101 August 31, 1983 Urgent Eastship Manila

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, REGRET TO INFORM YOU ENCOUNTERED BOISTEROUS
vs. WEATHER WITH STRONG NORTHEASTERLY WINDS WITH
JOSEPHINE LUCERO, respondents. GAIL FORCE CAUSING THE VESSEL ROLLING AND
PITCHING VIOLENTLY VESSEL NOW INCLINING 15 TO 20
Valera, Cainglet & Dala Law Office for petitioner. DEGREES PORT FEARING MIGHT JETTISON CARGO ON
DECK IF EVERYTHING COME TO WORSE SITUATION
HOWEVER TRYING UTMOST BEST TO FACILITATE
Jose R. Millares for private respondent.
EVERYTHING IN ORDER STOP NO FIX POSITIONS FROM
NOON 15th UP TO 0600 HRS TO DATE NEED ASSISTANCE
APPROXIMATE DR POSITIONS AT 0600 HRS 10TH WITHIN
THE VICINITY LATITUDE 20-02, ON LONGTITUDE 110-02, OE
ESCOLIN, J.: COURSE 120 DEGREES REGARDS ...

Petition for review filed by the Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. to set aside the decision of LUCERO
the National Labor Relations Commission, which affirmed the judgment rendered by
the National Seamen Board, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: Second Message: 2

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby ordered to pay complainant her February l6/80 1530 GMT VIA INTERCOM
monthly allotments from March, 1980 up to the amount of
P54,562.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.
Respondent is likewise further ordered to pay complainant her future EMICON
monthly allotment up to the arrival of the M/V EASTERN MINICON
in the port of Manila or after four (4) years when the presumptive EAST SHIP MANILA
death established by law takes effect.
RYC NOTED ACCORDINGLY SINCE WASTE PAPER CARGO
The material facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows: On October 31, 1979, ON PORT SIDE AND HAD BEEN WASH OUT VESSEL AGAIN
Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., LISTING ON STARBOARD SIDE REGRET WE HAVE TO
Company for short, as master/captain to its vessel M/V Eastern Minicon plying the JETTISON STARBOARD SIDE WASTE PAPER CARGO IN
HongkongManila route, with the salary of P5,560.00 exclusive of ship board allowances ORDER TO BALANCE THE VESSEL NOW ALMOST BACK TO
and other benefits. Under the contract, his employment was good for one (1) round trip NORMAL POSITION HOWEVER VESSEL STILL LABORING
only, i.e., the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the VIOLENTLY REGARDS
Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the captain's salary,
while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila. LUCERO

On February 16, 1980, while the vessel was enroute from Hongkong to Manila where it Third Message: 3
was expected to arrive on February 18, 1980, Capt. Lucero sent three (3) messages to
the Company's Manila office: FEBRUARY 16/80 2150 HRS

First Message: 1 PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD

February l6,1980 0700 GMT Via Intercom NEED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE POSITION 19-35 N 116-40 E
SEAWATER ENTERING INSIDE HATCH VESSEL INCLINING
EMINICON 15 TO 20 DEGREES PORT IF POSSIBLE SEND IMMEDIATE
 ASSISTANCE VESSEL IN DANGER PREPARING TO
ABANDON ANYTIME
MASTER
Acting on these radio messages, the Company, respondent below, took the following
steps:
RESPONDENT informed of the grave situation, immediately
reported the matter to the Philippine Coast Guard for search and
rescue operation and the same was coordinated with the U.S. Air
Force based at Clark Air Base. Respondent also released radio
messages to all vessels passing the Hongkong/Manila route requesting
them to be very cautious and vigilant for possible survivors and to
scan the area whether there are signs of debris from the ill-fated
vessel "EASTERN MINICON" which has foundered In the
meantime, two (2) vessels of the respondent were also dispatched to
the area last reported by the Master for search and rescue operation,
but the collective efforts of all parties concerned yielded negative
results, (p. 79, Rollo)
Subsequently, the Lloyds of London, insurer of the M/V Eastern Minicon through its
surveyors, confirmed the loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the Company paid the
corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew members, except respondent
Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept the same.
On July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucerofiled a complaint with -the National Seamen Board,
Board for short, for payment of her accrued monthly allotment of P3,183.00, which the
Company had stopped since March 1980 and for continued payment of said allotments
until the M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila. She contended that the
contract of employment entered into by her husband with the Company was on a
voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the same was to terminate only upon the vessel's
arrival in Manila.
Upon the other hand, the Company maintained that Mrs. Lucero was no longer entitled
to such allotments because: [a] the Lloyds of London had already confirmed the total
loss of the vessel and had in fact settled the company's insurance claim and [b] the
Company, with the approval of the Board, had likewise paid the corresponding death
benefits to the heirs of the other seamen The Company further invoked the provisions of
Article 643 of the Code of Commerce, to wit:
Art. 643. If the vessel and her cargo should be totally lost, by reason
of capture or wreck, all rights shall be extinguished, both as regards
the crew to demand any wages whatsoever, and as regards the ship
agent to recover the advances made.
xxx xxx xxx
On May 19, 1981, the Board rendered the aforecited judgment in favor of Mrs.
Josephine Lucero and against petitioner Company. The Board held that the presumption
of death could not be applied because the four-year period provided for by Article
391(l) of the Civil Code had not yet expired; and that the payment of death benefits to
the heirs of the other crew 'members was based upon a voluntary agreement entered into
by and between the heirs and the Company, and did not bind respondent Mrs. Lucero
who was not a party thereto.
On appeal, the respondent National Labor Relations Conunission affirmed the said
decision. It held that:
Within the context of the foregoing circumstances, the only recourse
is to presume the vessel totally lost and its crew members dead. But in
this connection, the question that comes to the fore is: When will the
presumption arise? Article 391 of the Civil Code provides the answer,
to wit:
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on
board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the
vessel or aeroplane;...
By the aforequoted law, it is quite clear that the person to be
presumed dead should first "not been heard of for four years since the
loss of the vessel" before he can be presumed dead for all purposes.
Applied to Capt. LUCERO, it is evidently premature to presume him
dead as four years has not yet expired. Thus, even in Judge Advocate
General vs. Gonzales, et al., (CA) 48 O.G. 5329, the very case cited
by the respondent herein, the court Id. in the case of the missing
soldier that although nothing was heard of him since 7 May 1942, the
fact of his death is not presumed until seven years after 1942.
Since Capt. LUCERO cannot yet be presumed dead as demonstrated
hereinabove, it logically follows that as of now, he is presumed have
It is of no moment to Us that the vessel was conceded by the Lloyds
of London to have been totally lost which, in the first place, was
admittedly merely based on presumption as even the whereabouts of
the vessel remains unknown. Similarly, even the agreement, which
formed the basis of the Decision of the NSB ordering payment of
death benefits to the heirs of some of the crew must have been
predicated upon a presumption of death of the crew members
 concerned. Such circumstances do not suffice to establish the actual
death of Capt. LUCERO.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, by the terms of the appointment of Capt. LUCERO, his
engagement terminates upon the return of the vessel at the Port of
Manila. He is considered to be still working entitling his spouse to
allotment until the vessel returns or until it is officially declared
totally lost, or until the presumption of his death becomes effective in
which case the burden of proving that he is alive is shifted to his wife
for purposes of continuing her allotment.
We are unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the respondent NLRC.
It is undisputed that on February 16, 1980, the Company received three (3) radio
messages from Capt. Lucero on board the M/V Eastern Minicon the last of which,
received at 9:50 p.m. of that day, was a call for immediate assistance in view of the
existing "danger": "sea water was entering the hatch"; the vessel "was listing 50 to 60
degrees port," and they were "preparing to abandon the ship any time.' After this
message, nothing more has been heard from the vessel or its crew until the present time.
There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and
disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite
logically. are sufficient to lead Us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that
the persons aboard had perished with it. upon this premise, the rule on presumption of
death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of
evidence. As this Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro 4 "Where there are facts, known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step
in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls."
Of similar import is the following pronouncement from American Jurisprudence:5
Loss of Vessel.— Where a vessel sets out on a voyage and neither the
vessel nor those who went in her are afterward heard of, the
presumption arises, after the utmost limit of time for her to have
completed the voyage and for news of her arrival at any commercial
port of the world to have been received, that the vessel has been lost
and that all on board have perished. The presumption of death in such
cases does not rest on the fact alone that the person in question has
been absent and unheard from for a specific length of time, but also
on the fact that the vessel has not been heard front The question,
moreover, is not whether it is impossible that the person may be alive,
but whether the circumstances do not present so strong a probability
of his death that a court should act thereon. The presumption of death
from absence of tidings of the vessel on which the absentee sailed is
strengthened by proof of a storm to which the vessel probably was
exposed. The presumption is even stronger where it appears
affirmatively that the vessel was lost at sea, that nothing has been
heard of a particular person who sailed thereon, and that a sufficient
time has elapsed to permit the receipt of news of any possible
survivors of the disaster.
In People vs. Ansang 6 where, in open sea, the appellant aboard a vinta ignited three
home-made bombs and threw them at the boat occupied by the victims, and the said
boat was later washed ashore and the passengers thereof were never heard or seen again
by anybody, this Court convicted the appellant of multiple murder, holding that the
victims were dead.
Similarly, in People vs. Sasota, 7 the claim of the appellants therein that there was no
conclusive evidence of death of the victim because his body was never found was
overruled by this Court in this wise:
In a case of murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover the
body or to show where it can be found. 'Mere are cases like death at
sea, where the finding or recovery of the body is impossible. It is
enough that the death and the criminal agency be proven. There are
even cases where said death and the intervention of the criminal
agency that caused it may be presumed or established by
circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, it may be remembered that in several treason cages
decided by this Court, where besides the act of treason the accused is
held responsible for the death of persons he had or tortured and later
taken away, where the victims were never later seen or heard from, it
has been presumed that they were lulled or otherwise criminally
disposed of or liquidated by the accused this, for the purpose of fixing
the penalty.
If in the foregoing criminal cases, where the proof required for conviction must be
beyond reasonable doubt, the rule of presumption was not applied and the fact of death
was deemed established, with more reason is this Court justified in entering a finding of
death. Indeed, We cannot permit Article 391 to override, or be substituted for, the facts
established in this case which logically indicate to a moral certainty that Capt. Lucero
died shortly after he had sent his last radio message at 9:50 p.m. on February 16, 1980.
In view of the conclusion arrived at above, We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other
issued raised in this case, they being mere adjuncts to the principa issue already
disposed of.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC subject of this petition is hereby set aside,
and the complaint of respondent Josephine Lucero dismissed. However, Mrs. Lucero is
entitled to death benefits. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84250 July 20, 1992
DAYA MARIA TOL-NOQUERA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, Presiding Judge, Branch XVI, Regional Trial
Court, 8th Judicial Region, Naval, Leyte, and DIOSDADO TOL, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Questioned in this action is the dismissal of a petition filed by Daya Maria Tol-Noquera
for appointment as administratrix of the property of the absentee Remigio Tol.
In Special Proceedings No. P-056, which was filed in December 1986, Daya Maria Tol
alleged that she was the acknowledged natural child of Remigio Tol, who had been
missing since 1984. She claimed that a certain Diosdado Tol had fraudulently secured a
free patent over Remigio's property and had obtained title thereto in his name. She was
seeking the administration of the absentee's estate in order that she could recover the
said property.
The petition was opposed by Diosdado Tol, who argued that Daya Maria Tol was not an
acknowledged natural child of the absentee and that the property sought to be
administered was covered by an original certificate of title issued in his name.
On March 31, 1987, the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it was a
collateral attack on a Torrens title. The court also declared in effect that it was useless to
appoint an administrator in view of the claim of a third person that he was the owner of
the absentee's property.
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, she filed a notice of
appeal with this Court on June 4, 1984. However, inasmuch as only questions of law
were involved, we resolved to require the petitioner to seek review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court within 15 days from notice.
In the petition now before us, it is argued that the original petition in the trial court was
not intended as a collateral attack on a Torrens title; hence, Art. 389 of the Civil
Code 1 was not applicable.
The private respondent, on the other hand, contends that since the petitioner claims she
is an illegitimate child of Remigio Tol, she is prohibited under Art. 992 of the Civil
Code 2 from inheriting ab intestato from the relatives of her father.
The private respondent likewise questions the necessity of her appointment for the
purpose only of having the title annulled. He adds that in view of her allegations of
fraud, she should have sued for the annulment of the title within a period of one year,
which had already expired. Lastly, the decision of the trial court had already become
final and executory because 76 days had already elapsed from the date of receipt of the
said decision on May 21, 1987, to the date the petition was filed before this Court on
August 5, 1987.
A study of the record reveals that the lower court was rather hasty in dismissing the
petition.
As we see it, the petition was not a collateral attack on a Torrens title. The petitioner did
say there was a need to appoint an administrator to prevent the property from being
usurped, but this did not amount to a collateral attack on the title. The alleged fraudulent
issuance of title was mentioned as a justification for her appointment as administrator.
But there was nothing in the petition to indicate that the petitioner would attack the title
issued to Diosdado in the same proceeding. In fact, the petitioner declared that whatever
remedy she might choose would be pursued in another venue, in a proceeding entirely
distinct and separate from her petition for appointment as administratrix.
Regarding the Torrens certificate of title to the disputed property which was presented
to defeat the petitioner's appointment, we feel that the position of trial court was rather
ambivalent. For while relying on such title to justify the dismissal of the petition, it
suggested at the same time that it could be attacked as long as this was not done in the
proceeding before it.
The private respondent's arguments that the petitioner cannot inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate parents of the absentee is immaterial to this case. Her disqualification as
an heir to her supposed grandparents does not inhibit her from petitioning for a
declaration of absence or to be appointed as an administratrix of the absentee's estate.
The relevant laws on the matter are found in the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 381. When a person disappears from his domicile his
whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to
administer his property the judge, at the instance of an interested
party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in
all that may be necessary.
This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances
the power conferred by the absentee has expired.
Art. 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article having
been made, the judge shall take the necessary measures to safeguard
the rights and interest of the absentee and shall specify the powers,
 obligations and remuneration of his representatives, regulating them
according to the circumstances, by the rules concerning guardians.
Art. 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse present
shall be preferred when there is no legal separation.
If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor, any
competent person may be appointed by the court.
Art. 384. Two years having elapsed without any news about the
absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and five years in case
the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his
property, his absence may be declared.
Art. 385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence:
(1) The spouse present;
(2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy
of the same;
(3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy;
The issue of whether or not the property titled to Diosdado Tol is really owned by him
should be resolved in another proceeding. The right of Daya Maria Tol to be appointed
administratrix cannot be denied outright by reason alone of such issue.
Even if it be assumed that the title obtained by Diosdado Tol is already indefeasible
because of the lapse of the one-year period for attacking it on the ground of fraud, there
are still other remedies available to one who is unjustly deprived on his property. One of
these is a claim for reconveyance, another a complaint for damages. 5 The petitioner can
avail herself of such remedies if she is appointed administratrix of the estate of the
absentee.
Finally, we find that the appeal was perfected seasonably. Notice of appeal was filed on
June 4, 1987, within the 15-day extension of the period to appeal as granted by this
Court in its resolution dated July 8, 1987.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. This case is hereby REMANDED to the
court of origin for determination of the legal personality of Daya Maria Tol to petition
the declaration of Remigio Tol's absence and of her competence to be appointed as
administratrix of his estate.
SO ORDERED.

(4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right
subordinated to the condition of his death.

Art. 386. The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until
six months after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a proceeding separate from

and prior to a petition for administration. This was the ruling in Reyes
v. Alejandro, 3 reiterating Pejer v. Martinez. 4 In the latter case, the court declared that
the petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the management
of the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife could be combined and adjudicated in
the same proceeding.

The purpose of the cited rules is the protection of the interests and property of the
absentee, not of the administrator. Thus, the question of whether the administrator may
inherit the property to be administered is not controlling. What is material is whether
she is one of those allowed by law to seek the declaration of absence of Remigio Tol
and whether she is competent to be appointed as administratrix of his estate.
G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Judge, Br. I, C I, Nueva Vizcaya, HEIRS OF
CASIANO SANDOVAL, HEIRS OF LIBERATO BAYAUA, JOSE C. REYES,
and PHILIPPINE CACAO AND FARM PRODUCTS, INC., respondents.
Celso D. Gangan respondent Heirs of Liberato Bayaua.
Acosta & Associates fox Phil. Cacao and Farm Products, Inc.
Jose Reyes & Associates for Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, et al.
NARVASA, J.:
Sought to be annulled and set aside in this special civil action of certiorari is the
decision of respondent Judge Sofronio G. Sayo rendered on March 5, 1981 in Land
Registration Case No. N-109, LRC Record No. 20850, confirming, by virtue of a
compromise agreement, the title of the private respondents over a tract of land.
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original application for
registration of a tract of land identified as Lot No. 7454 of the Cadastral Survey of
Santiago, BL Cad. 211 (July 17, 1961) and having an area of 33,950 hectares. The land
was formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela, but had been
transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act No. 236.
Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director of Lands and the
Director of Forestry, and some others, including the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua.1 In due
course, an order of general default was thereafter entered on December 11, 1961 against
the whole world except the oppositors.
The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3, 1981 when a
compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the parties, assisted by their
respective counsel, namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had since died), the
Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and
the Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the
Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded —
1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;
2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341 hectares;
3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and
4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000 hectares.
The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement,
adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out
of this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C.
Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. In consideration of the areas respectively
allocated to them, all the parties also mutually waived and renounced all their prior
claims to and over Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre.
In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge approved the
compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in
accordance with its terms.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, has taken the present
recourse in a bid to have that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void
and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor
General contends that —
1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for
registration;
2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development had legal
authority to enter into the compromise agreement;
3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not given notice of the
compromise agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part therein;
4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision approving the compromise; it
was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the
"patently erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate remedial measures
to bring about its annulment.
The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor General's arguments are
premised on the proposition that Lot 7454 is public land, but it is not. According to
them, as pointed out in the application for registration, the private character of the land
is demonstrated by the following circumstances, to wit:
1) the possessory information title of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest;
2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by the Director of Lands
in the proper cadastral proceedings;
3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 to the effect
that the (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896 and appearing in the
Bureau of Archives, the property in question was registered under the 'Spanish system
of land registration as private property owned by Don Liberato Bayaua, applicants'
predecessors-in-interest;
4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496 (the Torrens Act) presupposes
that there is already a title to be confirmed by the court, distinguishing it from
proceedings under the Public Land Act where the presumption is always that the land
involved belongs to the State.
Under the Regalian Doctrine 2 all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that all applicants in
land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 3 Unless the applicant
succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was
acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper
acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain
. 4 The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim;
he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual
evidence of possession and title. 5
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document relied upon and
presented by the applicants for registration, to prove the private character of the large
tract of land subject of their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the
National Library dated August 16, 1932 (already above mentioned) to the effect that
according to the Government's (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896,
the property in question was registered under the Spanish system of land registration as
private property of Don Liberato Bayaua. But, as this Court has already had occasion to
rule, that Spanish document, the (Estadistica de Propiedades,) cannot be considered a
title to property, it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime, and
obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. 6 It is an inefficacious
document on which to base any finding of the private character of the land in question.
And, of course, to argue that the initiation of an application for registration of land
under the Torrens Act is proof that the land is of private ownership, not pertaining to the
public domain, is to beg the question. It is precisely the character of the land as private
which the applicant has the obligation of establishing. For there can be no doubt of the
intendment of the Land Registration Act, Act 496, that every applicant show a proper
title for registration; indeed, even in the absence of any adverse claim, the applicant is
not assured of a favorable decree by the Land Registration Court, if he fails to establish
a proper title for official recognition.
It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the
compromise agreement of the parties. But that compromise agreement included private
persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land
subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned
to persons or entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of
any part of the land. What was done was to consider the compromise agreement as
proof of title of the parties taking part therein, a totally unacceptable proposition. The
result has been the adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not
submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership, founded on
nothing but the agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over the
land.
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise
agreement did not and could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the
private respondents.
As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private respondents, it should be
pointed out that under the Spanish Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode of
acquiring title to public lands, subject to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription thereof
in the Registry of Property, and second, actual, public, adverse, and uninterrupted
possession of the land for twenty (20) years (later reduced to ten [10] years); but where,
as here, proof of fulfillment of these conditions is absent, the informacion
posesoria cannot be considered as anything more than prima facie evidence of
possession. 7
Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the
compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for approval. It is, after all, the
Solicitor General, who is the principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason for
our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the
Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not binding until they are actually
received by the Solicitor General." 8
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be,
as they are hereby, declared null and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness
however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private
parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their
respective claims to the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge complained of is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. Land Registration Case No. N-109 subject of the petition is
REMANDED to the court of origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings
therein, receiving the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering judgment as such
evidence and the law may warrant. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-32181 March 5, 1986
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LEONOR VALENCIA, as Natural mother and guardian of her minor children,
BERNARDO GO and JESSICA GO; and THE HON. AGAPITO HONTANOSAS,
Judge of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Branch XI.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Judge Agapito Hontanosas of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI who ordered the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu to make the necessary cancellation and/or correction in the entries of birth of
Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu.
Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and
Jessica Go filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation
and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry
of the City of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3043-R.
The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for
correction of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code
of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a
summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and
innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled,
occupation of parents, etc., and not changes or corrections involving civil status,
nationality, or citizenship which are substantial and controversial.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order
directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the Cebu
Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu, once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and notice thereof, duly served on the Solicitor
General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and Go Eng.
Respondent Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the opposition wherein she admitted that
the present petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil status and nationality
or citizenship of respondents, but alleged that substantial changes in the civil registry
records involving the civil status of parents, their nationality or citizenship may be
allowed if- (1) the proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to support
the allegations of the petition or to disprove the same; that respondents have complied
with these requirements by filing the present special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court and that they have caused reasonable notice to be given to the persons named in
the petition and have also caused the order for the hearings of their petition to be
published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that since the petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo
Go and Jessica Go from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status from "Legitimate" to
Illegitimate", and changing also the status of the mother from "married" to "single" the
corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do the
citizenship and status of the petitioning minors and the status of their mother.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss.
After trial on the merits during which the parties were given all the opportunity to
present their evidence and refute the evidence and arguments of the other side, the
lower court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered granting the instant
petition and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of the City of Cebu to
make the necessary cancellation and/or correction on the following
entries:
A. In the Record of Birth of BERNARDO GO, to register said
Bernardo Go as 'FILIPINO' instead of 'CHINESE'; as
'ILLEGITIMATE instead of LEGITIMATE', and his father's (GO
ENG) and mother's (LEONOR VALENCIA) civil status as 'SINGLE
instead of MARRIED';
B. In the Record of Birth of JESSICA GO to register said Jessica Go
as 'FILIPINO' instead of 'CHINESE'; as 'ILLEGITIMATE' instead of
'LEGITIMATE' and father's (GO ENG) and mother's (LEONOR
VALENCIA) civil status as 'SINGLE instead of MARRIED': and
C. In both Records of Birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go to change
the entry on Petitioner's Citizenship from 'CHINESE to FILIPINO'.
Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, the Clerk of
Court is hereby directed to furnish a copy of this decision to the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, who shall forthwith
enter the cancellation and/'or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo
Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry as adverted to above.
From the foregoing decision, oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines appealed
to us by way of this petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner Republic of the Philippines raises a lone error for the grant of this
petition, stating that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
CORRECTION OF THE PETITIONER'S CITIZENSHIP AND
CIVIL STATUS AND THE CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL STATUS
OF HER MINOR CHILDREN BERNARDO GO AND JESSICA
GO.
The petitioner premises its case on precedents from the 1954 case of Ty Kong Tin v.
Republic (94 Phil. 321) to the 1981 case of Republic v. Caparosso (107 SCRA 67), that
entries which can be corrected under Article 412 of the New Civil Code as implemented
by Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court refer to those mistakes that are clerical in
nature or changes that are harmless and innocuous (Wong v. Republic, 115 SCRA 496).
In Republic v. Medina(119 SCRA 270) citing the case of Chua Wee, et al, v.
Republic (38 SCRA 409), there was this dicta:
From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950
until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court on January 1,
1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to
secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous
rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article 412
of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revise Rules of Court now
provides for such a procedure which should be limited solely to the
implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of
correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108, lie all the other
provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its rule- making authority under Sec. 13 of Art. VIII
of the Constitution, which directs that such rules of court 'shall not
diminish or increase or modify substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to
be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of
errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so
as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning
citizenship, legitimacy or paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it
would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes
are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code.
xxx xxx xxx
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of
clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or
citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief
cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a
right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate
remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of
fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning
the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an
appropriate proceeding.
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black's Law Dictionary defines
"adversary proceeding as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex
parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding." (Platt v. Magagnini, 187
p. 716, 718, 110 Was. 39).
The private respondent distinguishes between summary proceedings contemplated
under Article 412 of the Civil Code and fullblown adversary proceedings which are
conducted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
She states:
It will please be considered that the nature of the matters that may be
changed or corrected are of two kinds. It may either be mistakes that
are clerical in nature or substantial ones. Under the first category are
those 'harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name
that is clearly misspelled, occupation of the parents, etc.,' (Ansaldo v.
Republic, No. L-10276, Feb. 14, 1958, 54 O.G. 5886) or 'one' that is
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding'. (Black v.
Republic, No. L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958, 104 Phil. 848).
To the second category falls those which affect the civil status or
citizenship or nationality of a party (Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, No. L-
5609, Feb. 5, 1954, 94 Phil. 321: Tan Su v. Republic, No. L-12140,
April 29, 1959, 105 Phil. 578: Black v. Republic, No. L-10869, Nov.
28, 1958, 104 Phil. 848; Bantoco Coo v. Republic, No. L-14978, May
23,1961, 2 SCRA 42: Barillo v. Republic, No. L-14823, Dec. 28,
1961, 3 SCRA 725).
Changes or corrections in the entries in the civil registry were
governed, at first, by Act No. 3753 (Civil Registry Law) which placed
these matters exclusively upon the sound judgment and discretion of
the civil registrars. With the effectivity of the New Civil Code on
August 30, 1950, these matters were governed by Article 412 thereof
which prescribes judicial order before an entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected. This requirement was deemed necessary to
forestall the commission of fraud or other mischief in these matters.
But even then, it is not any correction that can be considered under
Article 412 of he Civil Code. The nature of the corrections sought has
to be considered and if found to refer only to clerical errors the same
may be allowed under said article which was construed to
contemplate only a summary proceeding.
And so in the Ty Kong Tin case, this Honorable Court took occasion
to draw a distinction between what entries in the civil register could
be corrected under Article 412 of the New Civil Code and what could
not. In the process, to our mind, this Honorable Court set down
propositions which hold true not only in that case but also in the
subsequent cases for the latter merely reiterated the Ty Kong Tin
decision. These are:
First, that proceedings under Article 412 of the New Civil Code are
summary:
Second, that corrections in the entires in the civil register may refer to
either mere mistakes that are clerical in nature or substantial ones
which affects the civil status or -the nationality or citizenship of the
persons involved; and
Third, that if the change or correction sought refers to mere correction
of mistakes that are clerical in nature the same may be done, under
Article 412 of the Civil Code; otherwise, if it refers to a substantial
change which affects the civil status or citizenship of a party. the
matter should be threshed out in a proper action.
To our humble estimation, these propositions do not altogether bar or
preclude substantial changes or corrections involving such details as
the civil status or nationality of a party. As a matter of fact, just three
years after the Ty Kong Tin decision, this Honorable Court allowed a
party to correct mistakes involving such substantial matters as his
birthplace and citizenship in the birth certificates of his two sons.
(Lim v. Republic, No. L-8932, May 31, 1957, 101 Phil. 1235)
Only that where the correction pertains to matters which are important
and controversial certain conditions sine que non have to be complied
with. Thus it was held:
If it refers to a substantial change which affects the status or
citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper
action ... .' (Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, supra)
. . . . for changes involving the civil status of the parents, their
nationality or citizenship, those are grave and important matters
which may have a bearing and effect on the citizenship and
nationality not only of said parents, but of the offsprings, and to seek
said changes, it is not only the State, but also all parties concerned
and affected should be made parties defendants or respondents, and
evidence should be submitted, either to support the allegations of the
petition or complaint, or also to disprove the same so that any order
or decision in the case may be made in the entry in a civil register
that will affect or even determine conclusively the citizenship or
nationality of a person therein involved. (Ansaldo v. Republic, 54
O.G. 5886; Emphasis supplied; Reiterated in the cases of: Tan Su v.
Republic, supra; Bantoto Coo v. Republic, supra; Barillo v. Republic,
supra; San Luis de Castro v. Republic, L-17431, April 30, 1963; Ilu
Lin v. Republic, L- 18213, Dec. 24, 1963; Reyes v. Republic, No.
L-17642, Nov. 27, 1964; Calicdan Baybayan v. Republic, L-20707,
March 18, 1966; Tan v. Republic, L-19847, April 29, 1966).
If at all what is forbidden is, in the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
'only the entering of material corrections or amendments in the record
of birth by virtue of a judgment in a summary action against the Civil
Registrar. (Matias v. Republic, No.
L-26982, May 8, 1969.
It will thus be gleaned from the foregoing that corrections involving
such matters as the civil status of the parents, their nationality or
citizenship may be allowed provided the proper suit is filed.
The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to
ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein. Under our system of administering
justice, truth is best ascertained or approximated by trial conducted under the adversary
system,
Excerpts from the Report on Professional Responsibility issued jointly by the
Association of American Law Schools and the American Bar Association explain why:
An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for
combatting this natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms
of the familiar that which is not yet fully known. The arguments of
counsel hold the case, as it were, in suspension between two opposing
interpretations of it. While the proper classification of the case is thus
kept unresolved, there is time to explore all of its peculiarities and
nuances.
These are the contributions made by partisan advocacy during the
public hearing of the cause. When we take into account the
preparation that must precede the hearing, the essential quality of the
advocate's contribution becomes even more apparent. Preceding the
hearing inquiries must be instituted to determine what facts can be
proved or seem sufficiently established to warrant a formal test of
their truth during the hearing. There must also be a preliminary
analysis of the issues, so that the hearing may have form and
direction. These preparatory measures are indispensable whether or
not the parties involved in the controversy are represented by
advocates.
Where that representation is present there is an obvious advantage in
the fact that the area of dispute may be greatly reduced by an
exchange of written pleadings or by stipulations of counsel. Without
the participation of someone who can act responsibly for each of the
parties, this essential narrowing of the issues becomes impossible. But
here again the true significance of partisan advocacy lies deeper,
touching once more the integrity of the adjudicative process itself. It
is only through the advocate's participation that the hearing may
remain in fact what it purports to be in theory; a public trial of the
facts and issues. Each advocate comes to the hearing prepared to
present his proofs and arguments, knowing at the same time that his
arguments may fail to persuade and that his proofs may be rejected as
inadequate. It is a part of his role to absorb these possible
disappointments. The deciding tribunal, on the other hand, comes to
the hearing uncommitted. It has not represented to the public that any
fact can be proved, that any argument is sound, or that any particular
way of stating a litigant's case is the most effective expression of its
merits.
xxx xxx xxx
These, then, are the reasons for believing that partisan advocacy plays
a vital and essential role in one of the most fundamental procedures of
a democratic society. But if we were to put all of these detailed
considerations to one side, we should still be confronted by the fact
that, in whatever form adjudication may appear, the experienced
judge or arbitrator desires and actively seeks to obtain an adversary
presentation of the issues. Only when he has had the benefit of
intelligent and vigorous advocacy on both sides can he feel fully
confident of his decision.
Viewed in this light, the role of the lawyer as a partisan advocate
appears, not as a regrettable necessity, but as an indispensable part of
a larger ordering of affairs. The institution of advocacy is not a
concession to the frailties of human nature, but an expression of
human insight in the design of a social framework within which man's
capacity for impartial judgment can attain its fullest realization. (44
American Bar Association Journal (1160-1161, 1958)
Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been
fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is appropriate.
The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.— Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an orde, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC, 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction
is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation
or correction of an entry in the civil register are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the
filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order fixing the
time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition:
(I) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108
of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be
no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or
any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or
corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings.
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of
Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu was filed by
respondent Leonor Valencia on January 27, 1970, and pursuant to the order of the trial
court dated February 4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in the, Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the City
of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on the Solicitor General. the Local Civil
Registrar and Go Eng. The order likewise set the case for hearing and directed the local
civil registrar and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest under the
entries whose corrections were sought, to file their opposition to the said petition. An
opposition to the petition was consequently filed by the Republic on February 26, 1970.
Thereafter a full blown trial followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying and
presenting her documentary evidence in support of her petition. The Republic on the
other hand cross-examined respondent Leonor Valencia.
We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way
of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register
with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took
place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.
In Matias v. Republic (28 SCRA 31), we held that:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In the case of petitioner herein, however, the proceedings were not
summary, considering the publication of the petition made by order of
the court in order to give notice to any person that might be interested,
including direct service on the Solicitor General himself. Considering
the peculiar circumstances of this particular case, the fact that no
doubt is cast on the truth of petitioner's allegations, or upon her
evidence in support thereof, the absence of any showing that
prejudice would be caused to any party interested (since petitioner's
own father testified in her favor), and the publicity given to the
petition, we are of the opinion that the Ty Kong Tin doctrine is not
controlling this case. "
Only last year, we had occasion to clarify the Ty Kong Tin doctrine, further.
In Republic v. Macli-ing (135 SCRA 367, 370-371), this Court ruled:
The principal ground relied upon in this appeal is that Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court upon which private respondents anchor their Petition
is applicable only to changes contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil
Code, which are clerical or innocuous errors, or to corrections that are
not controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence. (Tiong v.
Republic, 15 SCRA 262 [1965]).
It is true that the change from Esteban Sy to Sy Piao would
necessarily affect the Identity of the father. (Barillo v. Republic, 3
SCRA 725 [1961]) In that sense, it can be said to be substantial.
However, we find indubitable evidence to support the correction
prayed for. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, 94 Phil. 321 (1954), as well
as subsequent cases predicated thereon, we forbade only the entering
of material corrections in the record of birth by virtue of a judgment
in a summary action. the proceedings below, although filed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, were not summary. The Petition was
published by order of the lower Court once a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
accordance with law. The Solicitor General was served with copy of
the Petition as well as with notices of hearings. He filed his
Opposition to the Petition. The Local Civil Registrar of the City of
Baguio was likewise duly served with copy of the Petition. A Fiscal
was always in attendance at the hearings in representation of the
Solicitor General. He participated actively in the proceedings,
particularly, in the cross-examination of witnesses. And,
notwithstanding that all interested persons were cited to appear to
show cause why the petition should not be granted, no one appeared
to oppose except the State through the Solicitor General. But neither
did the State present evidence in support of its Opposition.
To follow the petitioner's argument that Rule 108 is not an appropriate proceeding
without in any way intimating what is the correct proceeding or if such a proceeding
exists at all, would result in manifest injustice.
Apart from Bernardo Go and Jessica Go, there are four (4) other sisters and one (1)
other brother born of the same father and mother. Not only are all five registered as
Filipino citizens but they have pursued careers which require Philippine citizenship as a
mandatory pre-requisite. To emphasize the strict policy of the government regarding
professional examinations, it was the law until recently that to take the board exams for
pharmacist, the applicant should possess natural born citizenship. (See. 18, Republic
Act 5921 and Sec. 1, P.D. 1350)
The sisters and brother are: It would be a denial of substantive justice if two children proved by the facts to be
Philippine citizens, and whose five sisters and brother born of the same mother and
1. Sally Go, born on April 29, 1934 was licensed as a Pharmacist after passing the father enjoy all the rights of citizens, are denied the same rights on the simple argument
government board examinations in 1956. that the "correct procedure" not specified or even intimated has not been followed.

2. Fanny Go, born on July 12, 1936 is a Registered Nurse who passed the government We are, therefore, constrained to deny the petition.
board examinations in 1960.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
3. Corazon Go, born on June 20, 1939, during the trial of this case in 1970 was a fourth
year medical student, qualified to take the government board examinations after The decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED.
successfully completing the requirements for a career in medicine, and presumably is a
licensed physician now. SO ORDERED.

4. Antonio Go, born February 14, 1942 was an engineering student during the 1970 trial
of the case and qualified by citizenship to take government board examinations.

5. Remedios Go, born October 4, 1945 was a licensed Optometrist after passing the
government board examinations in 1967.

The above facts were developed and proved during trial. The petitioner failed to refute
the citizenship of the minors Bernardo and Jessica Go.

In this petition, it limits itself to a procedural reason to overcome substantive findings

by arguing that the proper procedure was not followed.

There are other facts on the record. Leonor Valencia is a registered voter and had
always exercised her right of suffrage from the time she reached voting age until the
national elections immediately preceding the filing of her petition. The five other sisters
and brother are also registered voters and likewise exercised the right of suffrage.

An uncle of the mother's side had held positions in the government having been elected
twice as councilor and twice as vice-mayor of Victorias, Negros Occidental.
Respondent Leonor Valencia has purchased and registered two (2) parcels of land as per
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-46104 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-37275.
These allegations are well documented and were never contradicted by the Republic. As
correctly observed by the lower court.

The right of suffrage is one of the important rights of a citizen. This is

also true with respect to the acquisition of a real property. The
evidence further shows that her children had been allowed to take the
Board Examinations given by the Government for Filipino citizens
only.
G.R. No. L-31065 February 15, 1990
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and
Benguet and PANG CHA QUEN representing the minor, MAY SIA alias
MANMAN HUANG, respondents.
Sinforoso Fangonil for private respondent.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the order dated February 12, 1969 of respondent Judge
Pio R. Marcos of the then Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court of Baguio
and Benguet, granting the petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court and authorizing "the name of the minor child May Sia alias Manman Huang, also
known as Mary Pang [to] be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz" (p. 12, Rollo).
On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by private respondent Pang Cha Quen
alleging that she is a citizen of Nationalist China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a
Filipino citizen; that she had resided in Baguio City since her birth on January 29, 1930;
that by a previous marriage to Sia Bian alias Huang Tzeh Lik, a citizen of Nationalist
China, she gave birth to a daughter, May Sia alias Manman Huang on January 28, 1958
in the City of Manila; that on January 12, 1959, she caused her daughter to be registered
as an alien under the name of Mary Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the
child's father had abandoned them; that her daughter has always used the name Mary
Pang at home and in the Baguio Chinese Patriotic School where she studies; that on
August 16, 1966, petitioner Pang Cha Quen married Alfredo De la Cruz; that as her
daughter has grown to love and recognize her stepfather, Alfredo De la Cruz, as her
own father, she desires to adopt and use his surname "De la Cruz" in addition to her
name "Mary Pang" so that her full name shall be Mary Pang De la Cruz; that Alfredo
De la Cruz gave his conformity to the petition by signing at the bottom of the pleading;
that the petition was not made for the purpose of concealing a crime as her ten-year old
daughter has not committed any, nor to evade the execution of a judgment as she has
never been sued in court, and the petition is not intended to cause damage or prejudice
to any third person. She prayed that her daughter be allowed to change her name from
May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to Mary Pang De la Cruz.
On April 4, 1968, respondent Judge issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on
September 16, 1968 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning and inviting all interested persons to
appear and show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The order also
directed that it be published at the expense of the petitioner in the Baguio and Midland
Courier, a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City and Mountain Province,
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, the first publication to be made as soon as
possible. The order also commanded that the Solicitor General and the City Attorney of
Baguio be furnished copies of the order and petition.
On September 16, 1968, when the petition was called for hearing, nobody opposed it.
Upon motion of petitioner's counsel, respondent Judge authorized the Clerk of Court or
his deputy to receive the evidence of the petitioner, Pang Cha Quen.
Finding the petition meritorious, respondent Judge issued an order on February 12, 1969
authorizing the name of the minor, May Sia alias Manman Huang, also known as Mary
Pang, to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz.
The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the Supreme Court on the
ground that the court's order is contrary to law.
In its petition f r review, the Government raised two (2) issues namely: (1) whether or
not respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction over the case; and (2) whether
respondent Judge erred in granting the petition although private respondent Pang Cha
Quen failed to adduce proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of the minor
"May Sia" alias Manman Huang."
On the first issue, the Government pointed out that the captions of the petition and of
the published order of the court did not include the name "Mary Pang" as one of the
names that the minor has allegedly been using, hence, the petition and the published
order contain a fatal jurisdictional defect.
The Government's contention is well-taken. Thus did we rule in the case of Jesus Ng
Yao Siong vs. Republic, 16 SCRA 483, 487-88:
Petitioner himself admits that he is known by all these names. This
gives rise to the necessity of including his aliases in the title of the
petition not only in the body thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
We accordingly hold that for a publication of a petition for a change
of name to be valid, the title thereof should include, first, his real
name, and second, his aliases, if any
In Republic vs. Zosa, G.R. No. 48762, September 12, 1988, this Court explained the
reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted and the
other names or aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition, or in the caption of the
published order. It is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the caption of
the published order or the title of the petition in a special proceeding for a change of
name. Only if the caption or the title strikes him because one or all of the names
mentioned are familiar to him, does he proceed to read the contents of the order. The
probability is great that he will not notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if
they are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition.
In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified petition dated March 30,1968, and the
published order of the trial court dated April 4, 1968 read, thus:
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR
MAY SIA ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA
CRUZ, PANG CHA QUEN, Petitioner. (P. 15, Rollo.)
The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions of the court's order and
of the petition defeats the purpose of the publication. In view of that defect, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings, i.e., the various
names and aliases of the petitioner which she wished to change to "Mary Pang De la
Cruz."
In Go Chin Beng vs. Republic, L-29574, August 18, 1972, we held that all aliases of the
applicant must be set forth in the title of the published petition, for the omission of any
of such aliases, would be fatal to the petition even if such other aliases are mentioned in
the body of the petition.
The second ground for the Government's appeal is the failure of the petitioner below,
Pang Cha Quen, to state a proper and reasonable cause for changing the name/names of
her daughter.
The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of name:
(1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(3) when the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs. Republic, L-21194, April
29,1966; Chill Hap Chin vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30, 1966; Republic vs. Tanada, et
al., L-31563, November 29, 1971; Alfon vs. Republic, I,51201, May 29, 1980);
(4) having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
unaware of his alien parentage (Josefina Ang Chay vs. Republic, L-28507, July 31,
1980); or
(5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage all in
good faith and not to prejudice anybody (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, November 29,
1965).
As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the reasons offered for
changing the name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with, and
learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father" (p. 23, Rollo); (2)
to afford her daughter a feeling of security (pp. 23-24, Rollo); and (3) that "Alfredo de
la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity at the foot of this
pleading" (p. 24, Rollo).
Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule is that a
change of name should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family
relationship to another where none actually exists (Laperal vs. Republic, L-18008,
October 30, 1962; Johnson vs. Republic, L-18284, April 30, 1963; Moore vs. Republic,
L-18407, June 26, 1963). In Padilla vs. Republic, 113 SCRA 789, we specifically held
that our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person not
their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who is
not their father, can result in confusion of their paternity.
Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name is that it was not filed by
the proper party. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, provide:
SECTION 1. Venue. — A person desiring to change his name shall
present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in
which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition.- A petition for change of name shall be
signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some
other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date
of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for
Clearly, the petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change
his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other person in his behalf.
In this case, however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia.
Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall
have reached the age of majority, may file the petition to change her name. The decision
to change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of a new name and
surname shall be hers alone to make. It must be her personal decision. No one else may
make it for her. The reason is obvious. When she grows up to adulthood, she may not
want to use her stepfather's surname, nor any of the aliases chosen for her by her
mother. In Moore vs. Republic, 8 SCRA 282, 284, we held:

Another factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child concerned
is still a minor who for the present cannot fathom what would be his
feeling when he comes to a mature age. Any way, if the time comes,
he may decide the matter for himself and take such action as our law
may permit. For the present we deem the action taken by petitioner
premature.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the State has an interest in the name borne by
each individual for purposes of identification and the same should not be changed for
trivial reasons like the instant case (Ty vs. Republic L-18669, November 29, 1965). A
change of name is a mere privilege and not a matter of right (Ong Peng Oan vs.
Republic, L-8035, November 29, 1957; Yu vs. Republic, L- 22040, November 29,
1965) and because the petition to change the name of the minor May Sia is not
supported by weighty reasons, the trial court erred in granting it.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the order appealed from is
hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-53417 December 8, 1988
EMPERATRIZ LABAYO-ROWE, petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Avelino L. Liangco for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
At issue in this petition is the nature of the proceedings required in order to effect
correction of entries in the civil registry involving the correct spelling of the surname as
well as the civil status of the mother at the time of the birth of her child.
On November 18, 1970, Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe, petitioner below, filed through
counsel 1 a petition for the correction of entries in the civil registry with the then Court
of First Instance of Pampanga. 2 She asked the court to order the Local Civil Registrar
of San Fernando, Pampanga to correct the entries in the birth certificates of her children
Vicente L. Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat especially with regard to petitioner's name
which appears in both certificates as "Beatriz Labayo-Labayu and as regards her civil
status and date of marriage which appears in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat as
"married" with the year appearing "1953 Bulan." 3
In the order dated December 3, 1970, Judge Malcolm Sarmiento, finding the petition to
be sufficient in form and substance, granted the petition and set the case for hearing on
January 20, 1971. 4 As directed by the court, the said order was published in Voice, a
local newspaper of general circulation in Pampanga for three (3) consecutive weeks,
particularly in its issues of December 6, 13, and 20, 1970. 5 The Republic was
represented by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose R. Paras who appeared for the Solicitor
General.
At the hearing, petitioner testified that her nickname is Beatriz and Emperatriz J.
Labayo is her real name; that the entry in Victoria Miclat's birth certificate stating her
civil status as "married" is not correct because she was never married to Vicente Miclat,
the father of her child; that the date and place of marriage appearing in the said birth
certificate as 1953-Bulan is not true as they were never married; that the questioned
entries were reported by Vicente Miclat; and that she is at present married to an
American by the name of William Rowe.
Finding merit in the petition, the presiding judge issued an order dated January 25, 1971
directing the local civil registrar of San Fernando, Pampanga to correct the entries under
Register No. 2083, Series of 1961, and to change the name of the mother appearing as
Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo. The court also directed the civil registrar to
correct the name of the mother appearing as Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz to Emperatriz
Labayo, her civil status from "married" to "single" and the date and place of marriage
from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage."
On February 19, 1971, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed a notice of
appeal together with the record on appeal, praying that the same be approved and
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. There being no objection interposed and since the
record on appeal was filed within the reglementary period, the same was approved and
directed to be forwarded to the Court of Appeals in an Order dated March 22, 1971.6
In its appeal, the Republic questions the propriety of the lower court's order to correct
the civil status and the date and place of marriage of the petitioner below as appearing
in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat. Anchoring its argument in the ruling of this
Court in Chua Wee vs. Republic,7 and Go vs. Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Malabon,8 the Republic prays for the reversal of the order of the lower court dated
January 25, 1971. It likewise prayed that the appeal be elevated to this Court as it
involves a pure question of law. 9
The Court of Appeals was of the view that the question on appeal pertains only to the
propriety of the lower court's order dated January 25, 1971 directing the changes in the
entries of the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat. In its Resolution dated December 28,
1979, 10 the appellate court ordered the certification and elevation of the case to this
Court inasmuch as the appeal involves a pure question of law.
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that "(n)o entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without judicial order." It has been held that the corrections
contemplated in Article 412 include only corrections of mistakes that are clerical in
nature. In Go vs. Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Malabon, 11 this Court ruled that
the clerical errors which might be corrected through judicial sanction under the said
article should be those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of names
clearly misspelled, 12 occupation of parents, errors that are visible to the eye or obvious
to the understanding, errors made by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in copying or
writing.13
If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to
the eye or obvious to the understanding, 14 the court may, under a summary procedure,
issue an order for the correction of the mistake.15However, as repeatedly construed,
changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex,
are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate
adversary proceedings 16 depending upon the nature of the issues involved.17 This
opinion is predicated upon the theory that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is
summary in nature which does not cover cases involving controversial
issues.18 Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in
character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the
issues in controversy, 19 and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries
are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the
complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted. 20 The philosophy behind this
requirement lies in the fact that the books making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. 21 If the
entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary
proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected
by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be
set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. 22 For these
reasons, the law has placed the necessary safeguards to forestall such an eventuality so
that even on matters which call for a correction of clerical mistakes, the intervention of
the courts was found necessary.
As earlier noted, the petition for correction of entries in the civil registry which is now
before Us on appeal by the Republic does not only involve the correction of petitioner
Labayo's name and surname registered as "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayo in the birth
certificates of her children. The petition also seeks the change of her status from
"married" to "not married" at the time of her daughter's birth, thereby changing the
status of her child Victoria Miclat from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." The change of
petitioner's name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo is a mere
innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is appropriate. The Republic,
however, is appealing the part of the questioned Order which directed as well the
change of the petitioner's status from "married" to "not married" and Victoria Miclat's
filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate."
should be notified or represented. 26 The truth is best ascertained under an adversary
system of justice. 27
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially
impaired if her status would be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover,
she would be exposed to humiliation and embarassment resulting from the stigma of an
illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of
the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was
served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108,
like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution 28 which directs that such rules "shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights." If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless
changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without
observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become
an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify substantive rights.
This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order appealed from is hereby MODIFIED by
nullifying the portion which directs the change of petitioner's civil status as well as the
filiation of the child Victoria Miclat. Let a copy of this decision be served upon the
Local Civil Registrar of San Fernando, Pampanga for proper implementation. No costs.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

In David vs. Republic, 23 this Court held' that where the petition for correction of entries
in the civil registry, if granted, will have the effect of changing not only the civil status
of the petitioner but as well as her child's filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate,"
the same cannot be granted except in an adversary proceeding. The matter should be
threshed out in an appropriate action as the corrections involve substantial alterations,
and not mere clerical errors. 24 An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the
indispensable parties should be made parties to the case as required under Section 3,
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified
through the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines
as the only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary in nature, is short of
what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office
of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made
respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well,
together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be
adversely affected thereby 25 All other persons who may be affected by the change