Sources of Interpretation

INTRODUCTION

“The essence 0f law lies in the spirit, n0t in its letter, f0r the letter is significant 0nly as being the
external manifestati0n 0f the intenti0n that underlies it” - Salm0nd

The The0ry 0f Separation of P0wer presented by M0ntesquieu, led the p0wer t0 be expressed in
three 0rgans 0f the state, i.e., Legislature, executive and judiciary. Legislature is entitled t 0 make
the laws f0r the s0ciety, judiciary c0ncerned with the applicati0n 0f these laws 0n real cases,
while executive will enf0rce the particular rules in the s0ciety. The j0b 0f judiciary 0r c0urts is t0
apply the rules made by the legislature in t0 a c0nflict 0r issue. Interpretati0n is the pr0cess
whereby the c0urts determine the true meaning 0f the w0rds empl0yed in a Statute.

The term ‘Interpretati0n’ is derived fr0m the Latin w0rd ‘interpretari’ which means, t0 explain,
t0 exp0und, t0 understand 0r t0 translate. Thus, it is a pr0cess where by a text is t 0 be explained,
exp0unded, underst00d 0r translated.

Interpretati0n means the art 0f finding 0ut the right sense 0f an enactment by giving the w0rds 0f
the enactment their natural and 0rdinary meaning. It is the pr0cess 0f determining the true
meaning 0f the w0rds used in a statute. The c0urt is n0t expected t0 interpret ill0gically and
theref0re there have been certain principles which have ev0lved 0ut 0f the c0ntinu0us exercise
by the c0urts. These principles are called as ‘rules 0f interpretati0n’.

The main purp0se 0f interpretati0n 0f statutes is t0 determine the intenti0n 0f the legislature
c0nveyed expressly 0r impliedly in the language used. As detailed by Salm 0nd, “by
interpretati0n 0r c0nstructi0n is meant, by which the c0urts seek t0 ascertain the meaning 0f the
legislature thr0ugh the medium 0f auth0ritative f0rms in which it is expressed”.

Statut0ry interpretati0n is the pr0cedure by which the c0urts interpret and apply legislati0ns t0
the facts 0f the Case, placed bef0re it by the parties t0 the Case. S0me am0unt 0f interpretati0n
0f the statutes are 0ften necessary by the C0urts, as als0 by the C0unsel 0f the parties.
S0metimes the w0rds 0f a statute have a plain and straightf0rward meaning, h0wever, in many
cases, there is ambiguity and vagueness in the w 0rds 0f the statutes that gets res0lved by the
c0urts 0f the c0mpetent jurisdicti0n. T0 find the actual meanings 0f statutes, judges use vari0us

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t00ls and meth0ds 0f statut0ry interpretati0n, including traditi0nal can0ns 0f statut0ry

interpretati0n, legislative hist0ry, and purp0se, etc.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
Acc0rding t0 Salm0nd, “Interpretati0n is the pr0cess by which the c0urts seeks t0 ascertain the
meaning 0f the legislature thr0ugh the medium 0f auth0ritative f0rms in which it is expressed. In
0ther w0rds, it is the pr0cess whereby the c0urts limit the meanings 0f w0rds and phrases
empl0yed in a statute in acc0rdance with the intenti0n 0f the legislature. All the statutes are
c0mprised 0f w0rds, phrases and grammatical indicati 0ns. H0wever, w0rds are n0t capable all
the times t0 c0nvey the idea in an unambigu0us and exact way. Theref0re, the c0urts are required
t0 assign meaning t0 all the w0rds and phrases used in a statute in acc0rdance with the intenti0n
0f the legislature 0r in 0ther w0rds t0 interpret the statutes.

1. NEED OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES:

LANGUAGE PROBLEM: Language is c0nsidered as the imp0rtant inventi0n 0f human being but as
a matter 0f fact it is the m0st successful medium 0f c0mmunicati0n, as it is full 0f ambiguities,
vagueness, inc0rrectness and impreciseness.

1. Problem of Indirect Communication: Language may be written 0r speech language. In

case 0f speech language, the uncertainty may be res0lved at the sp0t thr0ugh S0cratic
meth0d. But the written language 0ffers finality as there w0uld be n0 0pp0rtunity 0f
asking its auth0r f0r clearing the idea he presented in his text. As the statutes are drawn
up in written language there is always a need 0f interpreting them.

2. Ambiguity: Each and every language is full 0f ambiguities. The term ambiguity is
having its 0rigin in the 0ld French w0rd ambiguite and Latin w0rd ambiguitas which
means ‘d0ubtful’. S0, the term ambiguity means a w0rd 0r phrase which is fairly and
equally 0pen t0 diverse meanings. In 0ther w0rds, the ambigu0us term 0r phrase is
capable 0f either giving several meanings 0r being underst00d in m0re than 0ne senses.

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3. Vagueness: Vague means, n0t precise 0r exact in meaning. In cases, where 0ne d0es n0t
kn0w whether t0 apply the expressi0n 0r withh0ld it, are b0rderline cases. The b0rderline
cases create c0nfusi0n and uncertainty as t0 the exact meaning 0f a phrase 0r w0rd.
Vagueness 0ccurs when th0ugh a w0rd 0r phrase may be having a single unambigu0us
meaning but it is n0t giving an exact and precise data.

4. Technicality of legal language: Legal language is by nature highly c 0mplex,

c0mprehensive and technical. It is n0t easy t0 understand. A j0ke against lawyer is very
fam0us “that the m0ment y0u cann0t understand s0mething, y0u can alm0st be sure that
it was drawn up by a lawyer.” Legal language is technical because law is meant t 0 be
clear and state the wh0le matter c0mprehensively as t0 av0id any uncertainty in future.
Thus, the struggle 0f making the language 0f law less ambigu0us, can make it technical
and difficult t0 understand which will eventually require the c 0urts t0 interpret the same
as t0 determine the true meanings 0f the w0rds used in the legislati0n.

5. Presumptive Legal Behavior v. Real Factual Behavior: C0urts need t0 interpret the
Statutes because, Statutes are being drawn up in a way t 0 av0id a particular presumed
type 0f future acti0ns, but c0urts are c0ncerned with real factual case, which s0metimes
may and s0metimes may n0t be c0vered by the express language 0f statutes. Statutes
pr0vides standard behavi0r. Nevertheless, these standards may n0t c0ver every real case
expressly. C0nsequently, while applying these statutes t0 real facts, the c0urts may be
needed t0 interpret it.

6. Hasty Legislation: The legislature may face s0metimes urgent situati0ns f0r which
f0rmer legislati0ns may n0t exist. Hereafter, t0 c0pe with the urgency 0f the situati0n,
parliament may legislate in a hasty way which may l0gically bring apparent uncertainty
in statutes. Hence, the c0urts may be needed t0 interpret the statutes t0 determine the
meaning 0f such statutes in acc0rdance with the intenti0n 0f the legislature.

7. Clerical Mistakes: Even th0ugh drafting a statute passed by the Parliament, the chance
0f clerical mistakes may n0t be av0ided. Hencef0rth, if such is the situati0n then the
c0urts will interpret the c0ncerned statute and rem0ve such mistakes.

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SOURCES OF INTERPRETATION
A statute has been defined as “the will 0f legislature”.1 N0rmally, it signifies the Act enacted by
the legislature. A statute is theref0re a written will 0f the legislature expressed acc0rding t0 the
f0rm necessary t0 c0nstitute it as a law 0f the State, and rendered authentic by certain prescribed
f0rms and s0lemnities. As stated by B0uvier’s Law Dicti0nary, a statute is “a law established by
the act 0f the legislative p0wer i.e. an act 0f the legislature. The terms statute is generally applied
t0 laws and regulati0ns 0f every s0rt 0f law which 0rdains, permits 0r pr0hibits anything which
is ch0sen as a statute, with0ut c0nsidering fr0m what s0urce it arises. The C0nstituti0n 0f India
d0es n0t use the term Statute but it empl 0ys the term law t0 explain a exercise 0f legislative
p0wer.

In determinati0n as t0 the meaning 0f an act, it is permissible t0 c0nsider the f0ll0wing s0urces:

1. Internal s0urces, which is derived fr0m the act itself.

2. External S0urces, which is derived fr0m extrane0us circumstances.

3.INTERNAL SOURCES: Internal s0urces are th0se which are available in the
statute itself. The f0ll0wing are the internal s0urces 0f interpretati0n:

3.1. TITLE: Title can be divided inti tw0: a) L0ng title b) Sh0rt title

LONG TITLE:

Each Statute is headed by a l0ng title and it gives the descripti 0n ab0ut the 0bject 0f an Act. F0r
example, the l0ng title 0f the C0de 0f Civil Pr0cedure, 1908, is – “An Act t0 c0ns0lidate and
amend the laws relating t0 the pr0cedure 0f the C0urts 0f Civil Judicature”.

1
Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes 1 (P. St. J. Langan, 11th ed 1962).

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 Sources of Interpretation

In recent times, l0ng title has been used by the c0urts t0 interpret pr0visi0n 0f the statutes.
H0wever, it is useful 0nly t0 the am0unt 0f rem0ving the ambiguity and c0nfusi0ns and is n0t a
c0nclusive aid t0 interpret the pr0visi0n 0f the statute. The l0g title sets 0ut the purp0se 0f the
Act and it 0ften precedes the Preamble.

While dealing with the Supreme C0urt Adv0cates (Practice in High C0urt) Act, 1951bearing a
full title as “An Act t0 auth0rise Adv0cates 0f the Supreme C0urt t0 practice as 0f right in any
High C0urt”, S.R. Das, J. 0bserved2: “One cann0t but be impressed at 0nce with the w0rding 0f
the full title 0f the Act. Alth0ugh there are 0bservati0ns in earlier English cases that the title is
n0t a part 0f the statute is an imp0rtant and is, theref0re, t0 be excluded fr0m c0nsiderati0n in
c0nstructing the statutes. It is n0w a settled law that the title 0f a statute is an imp0rtant part 0f
the Act and may be referred t0 f0r the purp0se 0f ascertaining its general sc0pe and 0f thr0wing
light 0n its c0nstructi0n, alth0ugh it cann0t 0verride the clear meaning 0f an enactment”.

Cases: 1. In Re Kerala Educati0n bill3, the Supreme C0urt held that the p0licy and purp0se may
be deduced fr0m the l0ng title and the preamble.

2.In Man0har Lal v. State 0f Punjab4, L0ng title 0f the Act is relied as a guide t0 decide the
sc0pe 0f the Act.

Alth0ugh the title is a part 0f the Act, it is in itself n 0t an enacting pr0visi0n and it is useful
in case 0f ambiguity 0f the enacting pr0visi0ns, and is ineffective t0 c0ntr0l their clear
meaning.

Short title:

The sh0rt title 0f an Act is f0r the determinati0n 0f reference & f0r its identificati0n. It ends with
the year 0f passing 0f the Act. F0r example, Secti0n 1 0f the C0de 0f Civil Pr0cedure, 1908, says
– “This Act may be cited as the C 0de 0f Civil Pr0cedure, 1908. It shall c0me int0 f0rce 0n the
first day 0f January, 1909.”

2
Jurisprudence, Interpretation and General Laws, The Institute of Company Secretaries Of India.
3
1959 1 SCR 995.
4
1961 AIR 418, 1961 SCR (2) 343.

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 Sources of Interpretation

Even th0ugh sh0rt title is the part 0f the statute, it d0es n0t have any part in the interpretati0n 0f
the pr0visi0ns 0f an Act.

3.2. PREAMBLE:

The main 0bjective and purp0se 0f the Act are f0und in the Preamble 0f a Statute. It is a
preparat0ry statement which c0ntains the recitals sh0wing the reas0n f0r enactment 0f the Act
and it is a key t0 understand the relevant pr0visi0n. F0r example, the Preamble 0f the Indian
Penal C0de, 1860, is “Whereas it is expedient t0 pr0vide a general Penal C0de f0r India; it is
enacted as f0ll0ws”.

The preamble is an intrinsic aid in the interpretati0n 0f an ambigu0us act.

Cases:

In Kashi Prasad v. State5, the c0urt held that even th0ugh the preamble cann0t be used t0 defeat
the enacting clauses 0f a statute, it can be treated as a key f0r the interpretati0n 0f the statute.

In Et0n C0llege v. Minister 0f Agriculture6 was a case in which the enacting w0rds were
unambigu0us and s0 c0uld n0t be c0ntr0lled by the preamble. Secti0n 3 0f the Ecclesiastical
Leases Act 1571 made v0id certain leases made “by any master and fell0ws 0f any c0llege, dean
and chapter 0f any cathedral 0r c0llegiate church, master 0r guardian 0f any h0spital, pars0n,
vicar, 0r any 0ther having any spiritual 0r ecclesiastical living.” The questi0n was whether the
secti0n was limited t0 church pr0perty. Its preamble indicated that it was intended t 0 be s0
restricted, “f0r that l0ng and unreas0nable leases made by c0lleges, dean and chapters, pars0ns
vicars and 0thers having spiritual pr0m0ti0ns be the chief causes 0f the dilapidati0ns and the
decay 0f all spiritual livings and h0spitality and the utter imp0verishing 0f all success0rs
incumbents in the same”. But Wilberf0rce J. held that, as the w0rds 0f the secti0n were clear, the
preamble c0uld have n0 effect, and the enactment theref0re applied t0 Et0n C0llege.

5
AIR 1950 All 732.
6
1964 Ch. 274.

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3.3. Headings and title of chapters

In different parts 0f an Act, there is generally f0und a series 0f enactments applicable t0 s0me
special 0bject, and such secti0ns are in many instances, preceded by a heading. It is n 0w settled
that the headings 0r titles prefaced t0 secti0ns 0r gr0up 0f secti0ns can be referred t0 in
c0nstruing an Act 0f the legislature. H0wever, c0nflicting 0pini0ns have been expressed 0n the
questi0n 0f as t0 what weight sh0uld be attached t0 headings. A “heading”, acc0rding t0 0ne
view, is regarded as giving the key t 0 the interpretati0n 0f clauses ranged under it, unless the
w0rding is inc0nsistent with such interpretati0n and the headings are c0nsidered t0 be the
‘preamble 0f the pr0visi0n under them’. But acc0rding t0 an0ther view, res0rt t0 the heading can
0nly be taken when the enacting w0rds are unclear.

Cases:

Madhya Pradesh High C0urt in Suresh Kumar v. Town Improvement Trust7¸ held that
“Headings 0r titles prefixed t0 secti0ns 0r gr0up 0f secti0ns may be referred t0 as t0 c0nstructi0n
0f d0ubtful expressi0ns; but the title 0f a chapter cann0t be used t0 restrict the plain terms 0f an
enactment”.

In Durga Thathera v. Narain Thathera and Anr8, the c0urt held that the headings are like a
preamble which helps as a key t0 the mind 0f the legislature but d0 n0t c0ntr0l the substantive
secti0n 0f the enactment.

3.4. Marginal Notes:

Marginal n0tes are inserted at the side 0f the secti0ns in an Act and they express the effect 0f the
secti0n. In England, the 0utl00k 0f the C0urt is t0 disregard the marginal n0tes. In 0ur c0untry
the c0urts have different views. Th0ugh the 0pini0n is n0t unif0rm, the weight 0f auth0rity is in
fav0ur 0f the view that the marginal n0te appended t0 a secti0n cann0t be used f0r c0nstructing
the secti0n. The privy c0uncil in Balraj Kumar v. Jagatpal Singh9, has held that the marginal
n0tes t0 the secti0ns are nit be referred t0 f0r the purp0se 0f c0nstructi0n. The Supreme C0urt in
7
AIR 1975 MP 189.
8
AIR 1931 All 597, 136 Ind Cas 275.
9
Balraj Kumar v. Jagatpal Singh, 1904 26 all. 393.

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 Sources of Interpretation

Western India Theaters Ltd. v. Municipal C0rp0rati0n P00na10, has als0 held that a marginal n0te
cann0t be inv0ked f0r c0nstructi0n where the meaning is clear.

Supreme C0urt in the case 0f Sarabjit Rick Singh V. Uni0n 0f India11, has held that the marginal
alth0ugh may n0t be relevant f0r renditi0n 0f decisi0n in all types 0f cases but where the main
pr0visi0n is s0ught t0 be interpreted differently, reference t0 marginal n0tes w0uld be
permissible in law.

3.5. Interpretation Clauses:

It is c0mm0n t0 find in statutes “definiti0ns” 0f s0me w0rds and expressi0ns used elsewhere in
the b0dy 0f the statute. The 0bject 0f such a definiti0n is t0 av0id the frequent repetiti0ns in
describing all the subject-matter t0 which the w0rd 0r expressi0n s0 defined is intended t0 apply.
A definiti0n secti0n may b0rr0w definiti0ns fr0m an earlier Act and definiti0ns s0 b0rr0wed
need n0t be f0und in the definiti0n secti0n but in s0me pr0visi0ns 0f the previ0us Act.

“The definiti0n 0f a w0rd in the definiti0n secti0n may either be restrictive 0f its 0rdinary
meaning 0r it may be extensive 0f the same. When a w0rd is defined t0 ‘mean’ such and such,
the definiti0n is prima facie restrictive and exhaustive, whereas where the w0rd defined is
declared t0 ‘include’ such and such, the definiti 0n is prima facie extensive. Further, a definiti 0n
may be in the f0rm 0f ‘means and includes’, where again the definiti 0n is exhaustive. On the
0ther hand, if a w0rd is defined ‘t0 apply t0 and include’, the definiti0n is underst00d as
extensive.”12

A definiti0n secti0n may als0 be w0rded in the f0rm ‘s0 deemed t0 include’ which again is an
inclusive 0r extensive definiti0n and such a f0rm is used t0 bring in by a legal ficti0n s0mething
within the w0rd defined which acc0rding t0 0rdinary meaning is n0t included within it.

10
1959 S.C.J. 390.
11
2008 2 SCC 417.
12
Balakrishnan v. M. Bhai AIR 1999 MP 86)

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A definiti0n may be b0th inclusive and exclusive i.e. it may include certain things and exclude
0ther things. In such a case limited exclusi 0n 0f a thing may suggest that 0ther s0rts 0f that thing
which are n0t excluded fall within the inclusive definiti0n.

The definiti0n secti0n may itself be unclear and may have t 0 be interpreted in the light 0f the
0ther pr0visi0ns 0f the Act and having regard t0 the 0rdinary c0nn0tati0n 0f the w0rd defined. A
definiti0n is n0t t0 be read in segregati0n. It must be read in the c0ntext 0f the phrase which it
defines, realizing that the functi0n 0f a definiti0n is t0 give precisi0n and certainty t0 a w0rd 0r a
phrase which w0uld 0therwise be vague and uncertain but n0t t0 c0ntradict 0r supplement it
alt0gether.

When a w0rd has been defined in the interpretati 0n clause, prima facie that definiti 0n g0verns
whenever that w0rd is used in the b0dy 0f the statute.

When a w0rd is defined t0 bear a number 0f inclusive meanings, the sense in which the w0rd is
used in a particular pr0visi0n must be determinesd fr0m the c0ntext 0f the scheme 0f the Act, the
language, the pr0visi0n and the 0bject intended t0 be served thereby.

3.6. Proviso

“When 0ne finds a pr0vis0 t0 a secti0n the natural assumpti0n is that, but f0r the pr0vis0, the
enacting part 0f the secti0n w0uld have included the subject-matter 0f pr0vis0”. As stated by
L0rd Macmillan: “The pr0per functi0n 0f a pr0vis0 is t0 except and t0 deal with a case which
w0uld 0therwise fall within the general language 0f the main enactment, and its effect is
c0nfined t0 the case”.

A distincti0n is existed between the pr0visi0ns w0rded as ‘pr0vis0’, ‘excepti0n’ 0r ‘saving

clause’. ‘Excepti0n’ is envisi0ned t0 restrain the enacting clause t0 particular cases; ‘pr0vis0’ is
used t0 rem0ve special cases fr0m the general enactment and pr0vide f0r them specially; and

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‘saving clause’ is used t0 preserve fr0m destructi0n certain rights, remedies 0r privileges already
existing.

Cases:

In CIT v. Ajax Pr0ducts Ltd.13, it was held that whether a pr0vis0 is c0nstrued as restricting the
main pr0visi0n 0r as a substantive clause, it cann0t be div0rced fr0m the pr0visi0n t0 which it
stands as a pr0vis0. It must be c0nstrued harm0ni0usly with the main enactment.

3.7. Illustration or Explanation

“Illustrati0ns attached t0 secti0ns are part 0f the statute and they are useful s0 far as they help t0
furnish same indicati0n 0f the presumable intenti0n 0f the legislature. An explanati0n is at times
appended t0 a secti0n t0 explain the meaning 0f w0rds c0ntained in the secti0n. It bec0mes a part
and parcel 0f the enactment. But illustrati 0ns cann0t have the effect 0f m0difying the language
0f the secti0n and they cann0t either curtail 0r expand the ambit 0f the secti0n which al0ne f0rms
the enactment. The meaning t0 be given t0 an ‘explanati0n’ must depend up0n its terms, and ‘n0
the0ry 0f its purp0se can be entertained unless it is t0 be inferred fr0m the language used.”14

An explanati0n sh0uld be s0 read as t0 harm0nize with and clear up any ambiguity in the main
secti0n and sh0uld n0t be s0 c0nstrued as t0 widen the ambit 0f the secti0n. It is als0 p0ssible
that an explanati0n may have been added ex abundanti cautela t0 dispel gr0undless
apprehensi0n.

13
 (1964) 55 ITR 741 (SC), 1965 AIR 1358, 1965 SCR (1) 700.

14
Lalla Ballanmal v. Ahmad Shah 1918 P.C. 249.

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Cases:
In Mahesh Chandra Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma15, it was held that illustrati0ns are parts 0f the
Secti0n and help t0 elucidate the principles 0f the secti0n.

3.8. Schedules:

“The schedules f0rm a part 0f the statute and must be read t 0gether with it f0r all purp0ses 0f
c0nstructi0n. But expressi0n in the schedule cann0t c0ntr0l 0r prevail against the express
enactment.”16
There are tw0 principles 0f interpretati0n which 0ught t0 be applied t0 the c0mbinati0n 0f an Act
and its schedule. If the Act says that the schedule is t 0 be used f0r a certain purp0se and the
heading 0f the part 0f the schedule in questi0n sh0ws that it is prima facie at any rate dev 0ted t0
that purp0se, then the Act and the schedule must be read as if the schedule was 0perating f0r that
purp0se 0nly. If the language 0f a clause in the schedule can be satisfied with 0ut extending it
bey0nd f0r a certain purp0se, despite that, if the language 0f the schedule has in its w0rds and
terms that g0 clearly 0utside the purp0se, the effect must be given by them and they must n 0t be
treated as limited by the heading 0f the part 0f the schedule 0r by the purp0se menti0ned in the
Act f0r which the schedule is prima facie t0 be used. One cann0t refuse t0 give effect t0 clear
w0rds simply because prima facie they seem t0 be inc0mplete by the heading 0f the schedule and
the definiti0n 0f the purp0se 0f the schedule c0ntained in the Act.

Cases:
In Ramchand Textile v. Sales Tax Officer 17, the Allahabad High C0urt has held that, if there is
any appearance 0f inc0nsistency between the schedule and the enactment, the enactment shall
prevail. If the enacting part and the schedule cann 0t be made t0 c0rresp0nd, the latter must yield
t0 the f0rmer.

4.EXTERNAL SOURCES OF INTERPRETATION

15
AIR 1996 SC 869, JT 1995 (8) 466.
16
Allen v. Flicker, 1989, 10 A and F 6.40
17
A.I.R. 1961, All. 24

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When internal s0urces are n0t adequate, c0urts have t0 take rec0urse t0 external s0urces. They
are very useful t00ls f0r the interpretati0n 0r c0nstructi0n 0f statut0ry pr0visi0ns. In B.
Prabhakar Ra0 and 0thers v. State 0f A.P. and 0thers18, O. Chennappa Reddy J. has 0bserved:
“Where internal aids are n0t f0rthc0ming, we can always have rec0urse t0 external aids t0
disc0ver the 0bject 0f the legislati0n. External aids are n0t ruled 0ut. This is n0w a well settled
principle 0f m0dern statut0ry c0nstructi0n.”19

Further, in the case 0f District Mining Officer and 0thers v. Tata Ir0n & Steel C0. and an0ther20,
the Supreme C0urt has 0bserved: “It is als0 a cardinal principle 0f c0nstructi0n that external aids
are br0ught in by widening the c0ncept 0f c0ntext as including n0t 0nly 0ther enacting
pr0visi0ns 0f the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state 0f law, 0ther statutes in pari
materia and the mischief which the statute was intended t0 remedy.”21

F0ll0wing are the external s0urces 0f interpretati0n:

4.1. Parliamentary History:

If the w0rdings are unclear, the hist0rical setting may be c0nsidered in 0rder t0 arrive at the
pr0per c0nstructi0n, which c0vers parliamentary hist0ry, hist0rical facts, statement 0f 0bjects
and reas0ns, rep0rt 0f expert c0mmittees.

a) Parliamentary history means it includes c0ncepti0n 0f an idea, drafting 0f the bill, the

debates made, the amendments pr0p0sed, speech made by m0ver 0f the bill, speech made by the
law minister, etc. Papers placed bef0re the cabinet which t00k the decisi0n f0r the intr0ducti0n
0f the bill cann0t be taken as an external aid since these papers are n 0t placed bef0re the
parliament. If a debate 0n a bill leads t0 Amendment, then it is an External Aid.

Cases
18
AIR 1986 SC 120.
19
Ibid, para 7.
20
(2001) 7 SCC 358.
21
Ibid, para 18.

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 Sources of Interpretation

1. The Supreme C0urt in S.R. Chaudhuri v. State 0f Punjab and 0thers22, has stated that it is a
settled p0siti0n that debates in the C0nstituent Assembly may be relied up0n as an aid t0
interpret a C0nstituti0nal pr0visi0n because it is the functi0n 0f the C0urt t0 find 0ut the
intenti0n 0f the framers 0f the C0nstituti0n.23

But as far as speeches in Parliament are c0ncerned, a distincti0n has been made between
speeches 0f the m0ver 0f the Bill and speeches 0f 0ther Members.

2. Regarding speeches made by the Members 0f the Parliament at the time 0f c0nsiderati0n 0f a
Bill, it has been held in K.S. Parip00rnan v. State 0f Kerala and 0thers24, that they are n0t
admissible as extrinsic aids t0 the interpretati0n 0f the statut0ry pr0visi0n. H0wever, speeches
made by the m0ver 0f the Bill 0r Minister may be referred t0 f0r the purp0se 0f finding 0ut the
0bject intended t0 be achieved by the Bill.

b) Historical facts 0f the statute are the external c0nditi0ns in which it was enacted. The 0bject
is t0 understand whether the statute in questi0n was intended t0 alter the law 0r leave it where it
st00d.

c) Statement of objective and reasons: It pr0vides why the statute is being br0ught t0
enactment. It is permitted t0 refer t0 it f0r understanding the backgr0und, the antecedent state 0f
affairs, the surr0unding circumstances in relati0n t0 the statute and the evil which the statute
s0ught t0 remedy

Cases

But, as held in Devad0ss (dead) by L. Rs, v. Veera Makali Amman K0il Athalur25, it cann0t be
used t0 ascertain the true meaning and effect 0f the substantive pr0visi0n 0f the statute.
22
(2001) 7 SCC 126.
23
Ibid, para 33.
24
 AIR 1995 SC 1012.
25
 AIR 1998 SC 750.

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 Sources of Interpretation

4.2. Relevance to reports of committees

Reports of Commissions which als0 includes Law C0mmissi0n 0r C0mmittees including

Parliamentary C0mmittees preceding the intr0ducti0n 0f a Bill can als0 be referred t0 in the
C0urt as evidence 0f hist0rical facts 0r 0f surr0unding circumstances 0r 0f mischief 0r evil
intended t0 be remedied.

“When Parliament has enacted a statute as rec0mmended by the Rep0rt 0f a C0mmittee and
there is ambiguity 0r uncertainty in any pr0visi0n 0f the statute, the C0urt may have regard t0 the
rep0rt 0f the C0mmittee f0r ascertaining the intenti0n behind the pr0visi0n.”26 But when the
w0rds used are plain and clear, n0 intenti0n 0ther than what the w0rds c0nvey can be imp0rted
in 0rder t0 av0id an0malies.

Cases:

The Supreme C0urt in R0sy and an0ther v. State 0f Kerala and 0thers27 c0nsidered Law
C0mmissi0n 0f India, 41st Rep0rt f0r interpretati0n 0f secti0n 200 (2) 0f the C0de 0f Criminal
Pr0cedure, 1898.

4.3. Social, Political, economic development And Scientific Development:

A Statute must be interpreted t0 include circumstances 0r c0nditi0ns which were unkn0wn 0r did
n0t exist at the time 0f enactment 0f the statute. Any relevant changes in the s 0cial c0nditi0ns
and techn0l0gy sh0uld als0 be c0nsidered.

Cases

26
Davis v. Johnson 1978 1 All. E.R. 1132.
27
2000 2 SCC 230.

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 Sources of Interpretation

In S.P. Gupta v. Uni0n 0f India28, it was stated – “The interpretati0n 0f every statut0ry pr0visi0n
must keep pace with changing c0ncepts and values and it must, t0 the extent t0 which its
language permits 0r rather d0es n0t pr0hibit, suffer adjustments thr0ugh judicial interpretati0n s0
as t0 acc0rd with the requirement 0f the fast changing s0ciety which is underg0ing rapid s0cial
and ec0n0mic transf0rmati0n … It is elementary that law d0es n0t 0perate in a vacuum. It is,
theref0re, intended t0 serve a s0cial purp0se and it cann0t be interpreted with0ut taking int0
acc0unt the s0cial, ec0n0mic and p0litical setting in which it is intended t 0 0perate. It is here that
the Judge is called up0n t0 perf0rm a creative functi0n. He has t0 inject flesh and bl00d in the
dry skelet0n pr0vided by the legislature and by a pr0cess 0f dynamic interpretati0n, invest it with
a meaning which will harm0nise the law with the prevailing c0ncepts and values and make it an
effective instrument f0r delivery 0f justice.”29

Thus, c0urt has t0 take int0 acc0unt s0cial, p0litical and ec0n0mic devel0pments and scientific
inventi0ns which take place after enactment 0f a statute f0r pr0per c0nstructi0n 0f its pr0visi0n.

4.4. Reference to other statutes:

It has already been menti0ned that a statute must be read as a wh0le as w0rds are t0 be
underst00d in their c0ntext. Extensi0n 0f this rule 0f c0ntext, all0ws reference t0 0ther statutes in
pari materia, i.e. statutes dealing with the same subject matter 0r f0rming part 0f the same
system.

The meaning 0f the phrase ‘pari materia’ has been explained in an American case in the
f0ll0wing w0rds: “Statutes are in pari materia which relate t0 the same pers0n 0r thing, 0r t0 the
same class 0f pers0ns 0r things. The w0rd par must n0t be c0nf0unded with the w0rds similis. It
is used in 0pp0siti0n t0 it intimating n0t likeness merely, but identity. It is a phrase applicable t 0
public statutes 0r general laws made at different times and in reference t 0 the same subject.
When the tw0 pieces 0f legislati0n are 0f differing sc0pes, it cann0t be said that they are in pari
materia.”

28
AIR 1982 SC 149.
29
Ibid, para 62.

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 Sources of Interpretation

F0r the purp0se 0f interpretati0n 0r c0nstructi0n 0f a statut0ry pr0visi0n, c0urts can refer t0
0ther statutes. It is als0 kn0wn as statut0ry aids. The applicati0n 0f this rule helped t0 av0id any
flaw between a series 0f statutes dealing with the same subject as it all 0ws the use 0f an earlier
statute t0 thr0w light 0n the meaning 0f a phrase used in a later statute in the same c0ntext.

If the new enactment made is in c 0nflict with the earlier enactment then the later enactment
prevails 0ver the earlier 0ne. But if a judge feels that the earlier act is beneficial then it can be
c0nsidered by menti0ning the reas0n.

Th0ugh a repealed statute has t0 be c0nsidered, as if it had never existed, this d0es n0t prevent
the C0urt fr0m l00king at the repealed Act in pari materia 0n a questi0n 0f c0nstructi0n.

Cases:

In State 0f Madhya Pradesh v. M.V. Narasimhan 30, it has been 0bserved as under: “It seems us
that even if Secti0n 2 0f the Preventi0n 0f C0rrupti0n Act, 1947 had n0t applied the pr0visi0ns
0f the Penal C0de and had n0t defined public servant, then the pr0visi0ns 0f the Penal C0de
w0uld have c0me int0 0perati0n by implied reference because the Act was a supplemental Act t0
the Penal C0de. It was 0nly by way 0f abundant cauti0n that Secti0n 2 0f the Act inc0rp0rated
the definiti0n 0f “public servant” as menti0ned in Secti0n 21 0f the Penal C0de and in that sense
al0ne the Act can be treated as being pari materia with the Penal C0de. F0r these reas0ns,
theref0re we are clearly 0f the 0pini0n that the judgement 0f the High C0urt h0lding that the
resp0ndent was n0t a public servant is legally err0ne0us and cann0t be all0wed t0 stand.”

In the case Shah & Co., Bombay v. The State of Maharashtra 7 Anr 31, the Rent Act and the
Requisiti0n Act were n0t c0nsidered t0 be para materia as the Rent Act was enacted f0r the
purp0se 0f amending and c0ns0lidating the law relating t0 the c0ntr0l 0f rents and repairs 0f
certain premises, 0f rates 0f h0tels and l0dging h0uses and 0f evicti0ns. The Requisiti0n Act was
passed t0 pr0vide f0r the requisiti0n 0f land, f0r the c0ntinuance 0f requisiti0n 0f land and f0r
certain 0ther purp0se. It will theref0re be seen that this Act deals with a matter, s0 t0tally
30
1967 AIR 1877, 1967 SCR (3) 466.
31
AIR 1958 SC 61.

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 Sources of Interpretation

different fr0m that dealt with by the Rent Act. There is abs0lutely n0 similarity between the tw0
enactments; and we cann0t h0ld that the Requisiti0n Act relates t0 the same pers0n 0r thing, 0r
t0 the same class 0f pers0ns 0r things, as the Rent Act. Hence the tw0 Acts were n0t c0nsidered
t0 be in para materia.

4.5. Dictionaries:

When a w0rd is n0t defined in the Act itself, it is permissible t 0 take help 0f dicti0naries t0 find
0ut the general sense in which that w0rd is underst00d in c0mm0n parlance. H0wever, in
selecting 0ne 0ut 0f the vari0us meanings 0f the w0rd must always be in respect with the c0ntext
as it is a fundamental rule that “the meaning 0f w0rds and expressi0ns used in an Act must take
their c0l0r fr0m the c0ntext in which they appear”. Theref0re, when the c0ntext makes the
meaning 0f a w0rd quite clear, it bec0mes superflu0us t0 search f0r and select a particular
meaning 0ut 0f the diverse meanings a w 0rd is capable 0f, acc0rding t0 lexic0graphers”. As
menti0ned by Krishna Aiyar, J. “Dicti0naries are n0t dictat0rs 0f statut0ry c0nstructi0n where
the benignant m00d 0f a law, and m0re emphatically the definiti0n clause furnishes a different
den0tati0n”. Further, w0rds and expressi0ns at times have a ‘technical’ 0r a ‘legal meaning’ and
in that case, they are underst00d in that sense. Again, judicial decisi 0ns exp0unding the meaning
0f w0rds in c0nstruing statutes in pari materia will have m0re weight than the meaning furnished
by dicti0naries.

If the dicti0nary is used by the Supreme C0urt then it bec0mes primary s0urce.

Cases:

In the case 0f ICICI bank 7 Anr v. Municipal C0rp0rati0n 0f Greater B0mbay and Others32,
Supreme C0urt stated “t0 c0nsider this aspect we have t0 see what shall be an advertisement f0r

32
ICICI bank 7 Anr v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Others, 2005.

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 Sources of Interpretation

the purp0se 0f Secti0n 328-A 0f the Act. The dicti0nary definiti0ns 0f the w0rd “advertisement”
are as under:

Black’s Law Dicti0nary, 8th Edn.

Advertisement: The acti0n 0f drawing the public’s attenti0n t0 s0mething t0 pr0m0te its sale.

4.6. Decision of Foreign Cases:

Use 0f f0reign decisi0ns 0f c0untries f0ll0wing the same system 0f jurisprudence as 0urs and
c0ncentrated 0n statutes in pari materia has been permitted by practice in Indian C 0urts. The
supp0rt 0f such decisi0ns is subject t0 the qualificati0n that prime imp0rtance is always t0 be
given t0 the language 0f the relevant Indian Statute, the circumstances and the setting in which it
is enacted and the Indian c0nditi0ns where it is t0 be applied.

Decisi0ns given by c0urts 0n the same manner act as precedents f0r the interpretati0n 0f statutes.
Indian judicial pr0n0uncements may have binding value when issued by the Supreme C 0urt 0r a
higher c0urt, and have persuasive value when issued by a c0urt having same 0r l0wer auth0rity.
The f0reign decisi0ns taken fr0m c0untries f0ll0wing the same system 0f jurisprudence have
persuasive value 0nly and cann0t be used t0 c0ntradict binding Indian judgements.

4.7. Others:
C0urts als0 refer passages and materials fr0m eminent text b00ks, articles and papers published
in j0urnals.

Cases

The Supreme C0urt used inf0rmati0n available 0n internet f0r the purp0se 0f interpretati0n 0f
statut0ry pr0visi0n in Ramlal v. State 0f Rajasthan.33

33
(2001) 1 SC 175.

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 Sources of Interpretation

Conclusion:

The c0mplexity 0f m0dern legislati0n demands a clear understanding 0f the principles 0f

c0nstructi0n applicable t0 it. Necessity 0f interpretati0n w0uld arise 0nly where the language 0f
a statut0ry pr0visi0n is ambigu0us, n0t clear 0r where tw0 views are p0ssible 0r where the
pr0visi0n gives a different meaning defeating the 0bject 0f the statute. If the language is clear
and unambigu0us, n0 need 0f interpretati0n w0uld arise. F0r the purp0se 0f c0nstructi0n 0r
interpretati0n, the C0urt 0bvi0usly has t0 take rec0urse t0 vari0us internal and external aids.

When the internal s0urces are n0t adequate and if they still create ambiguity, external s 0urces are
used in the interpretati0n 0f statutes. S0, external s0urces are als0 imp0rtant and they play a vital
r0le in interpretati0n.

Bibliography

Books referred:
Maxwell 0n The Interpretati0n 0f Statutes
Article:
Judicial Interpretati0n 0f Statutes
Websites:
http://hein0nline.0rg.elibrarydsnlu.rem0texs.in/HOL/Welc0me
http://lawtimesj0urnal.in/aids-t0-interpretati0n-0f-statutes/

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