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❖ ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

❖ REG. NO: L13-1111-0063-18

❖ NAME OF THE EXAMINATION : 3-YEARS BACHELOR OF

LAWS (LL.B.), 2020 - 2021

❖ SEMESTER : 6 TH SEMESTER, EXTERNAL ASSESSMENT

❖ NAME OF THE SUBJECT : INTERPRETATION OF

STATUTES AND PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION.

❖ NAME OF THE PAPER : 3rd PAPER

❖ DATE OF EXAMINATION : 11/08/2021

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Q.1) What is Interpretation of Statute? Distinguish between

Interpretation and Construction of Statutes.
Ans. 1)

1. Meaning of interpretation and construction.

The term has been derived from the Latin term ‘interpretari’, which means to
explain, expound, understand, or to translate. Interpretation is the process of
explaining, expounding and translating any text or anything in written form. This
basically involves an act of discovering the true meaning of the language which
has been used in the statute. Various sources used are only limited to explore
the written text and clarify what exactly has been indicated by the words used in
the written text or the statutes.

Interpretation of statutes is the correct understanding of the law. This process

is commonly adopted by the courts for determining the exact intention of the
legislature. Because the objective of the court is not only merely to read the law
but is also to apply it in a meaningful manner to suit from case to case. It is also
used for ascertaining the actual connotation of any Act or document with the
actual intention of the legislature.

There can be mischief in the statute which is required to be cured, and this can
be done by applying various norms and theories of interpretation which might go
against the literal meaning at times. The purpose behind interpretation is to
clarify the meaning of the words used in the statutes which might not be that
clear.

According to Salmond, “Interpretation” is the process by which the court seeks

to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative
forms in which it is expressed.
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Construction meaning

In simple words, construction is the process of drawing conclusions of the

subjects which are beyond the direct expression of the text. The courts draw
findings after analysing the meaning of the words used in the text or the statutes.
This process is known as legal exposition. There are a certain set of facts
pending before the court and construction is the application of the conclusion of
these facts.

The objective is to assist the judicial body in determining the real intention of the
legislature. Its aim is also to ascertain the legal effect of the legal text.

Difference between Interpretation and Construction

Interpretation Construction

1. Construction, on the other hand,

1. In law, interpretation refers to
refers to drawing conclusions from
exposing the true sense of the
the written texts which are beyond
provisions of the statutes and to
the outright expression of the legal
understand the exact meaning of the
text.
words used in any text.
2. The purpose of construction is to
2. Interpretation refers to the linguistic
determine the legal effect of words
meaning of the legal text.
and the written text of the statute.
3. In the case where the simple
3. In the case where the literal
meaning of the text is to be adopted
meaning of the legal text results in
then the concept of interpretation is
ambiguity then the concept of
being referred to.
construction is adopted.
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Classification of Statutes

Codified statutory law can be categorized as follows-

Codifying statutes

The purpose of this kind of statute is to give an authoritative statement of the rules of
the law on a particular subject, which is customary laws. For example- The Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 and The Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Consolidating statutes

This kind of statute covers and combines all law on a particular subject at one place
which was scattered and lying at different places. Here, the entire law is constituted in
one place. For example- Indian Penal Code or Code of Criminal Procedure.

Declaratory statutes

This kind of statute does an act of removing doubts, clarifying and improving the law
based on the interpretation given by the court, which might not be suitable from the
point of view of the parliament. For example- the definition of house property has been
amended under the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1985 through the judgement of the
supreme court.

Remedial statutes

Granting of new remedies for enforcing one’s rights can be done through the remedial
statutes. The purpose of these kinds of statutes is to promote the general welfare for
bringing social reforms through the system. These statutes have liberal interpretation
and thus, are not interpreted through strict means. For example- The Maternity
Benefits Act, 1961, The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 etc.
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Enabling statutes

The purpose of this statute is to enlarge a particular common law. For example- Land
Acquisition Act enables the government to acquire the public property for the purpose of
the public, which is otherwise not permissible.

Disabling statutes

It is the opposite of what is provided under the enabling statute. Here the rights
conferred by common law are being cut down and are being restrained.

Penal statutes

The offences for various types of offences are provided through these statutes, and
these provisions have to be imposed strictly. For example- Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Taxing statutes

Tax is a form of revenue which is to be paid to the government. It can either be on

income that an individual earns or on any other transaction. A taxing statute thus, levies
taxes on all such transactions. There can be income tax, wealth tax, sales tax, gift tax,
etc. Therefore, a tax can be levied only when it has been specifically expressed and
provided by any statute.

Explanatory statutes

The term explanatory itself indicates that this type of statute explains the law and
rectifies any omission left earlier in the enactment of the statutes. Further, ambiguities in
the text are also clarified and checked upon the previous statutes.
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Amending statutes

The statutes which operate to make changes in the provisions of the enactment to
change the original law for making an improvement therein and for carrying out the
provisions effectively for which the original law was passed are referred to as amending
statutes. For example- Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 amended the code of 1898.

Repealing statutes

A repealing statute is one which terminates an earlier statute and may be done in the
express or explicit language of the statute. For example- Competition Act, 2002
repealed the MRTP Act.

Curative or repealing statutes

Through these statutes, certain acts which would otherwise be illegal are validated by
curing the illegality and enables a particular line of action.

Conclusion

“By interpretation or construction is meant”, says SALMOND: “the process by which the courts
seek to ascertain the meaning of the Legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in
which it is expressed” It has been said that there is a distinction between the two expressions .
As explained by Cooley: “ Interpretation differs from construction in sense that the former is the
art of finding out the true sense of any form of words; that is, the sense which their author is
intended to convoy; and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the author
intended to convey. Construction, on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting
subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the text from elements known from and given in
the text; conclusions which are in spirit though not within the letter of the law.” This distinction,
however, “has been largely relegated to the realm of academic discussion” , and has been
criticised as ‘ erroneous’ . Even conceding that there may be some abstract distinction between
the two it cannot be doubted, as was observed by WHITE, J. That “in common usage
interpretation and construction are usually understood as having the same significance”. It may
be added that the present work has followed this common usage and the two expressions
hereinafter, have been used as synonymous.
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Q. 2) Discuss the general principles of interpretation. Write a

note on Literal Rule of Interpretation.

Ans.2

Meaning of Interpretation or Construction

While interpretation of a legal provision is always dependent of the fact of any
given case, the application of a statutory provision would always depend on
the exact facts of a given case. As per SALMOND, ‘By interpretation or
construction is meant, the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the
meaning of the Legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which
it is expressed.
Interpretation differs from Construction, however. The former is the art of
finding out the true sense of any form of words, which also means the sense
that the author intends to convey. It may also be understood as the process
by which the courts determine the meaning of a statutory provision for the
purpose of applying it to the situation before them. Construction on the other
hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respects subjects that lie beyond the
direct expression of the text from elements known from and given in the text.
Intention of the Legislature
A statute is an edict of the Legislature and the conventional way of interpreting
or construing a statute is to seek the ‘intention’ of its maker. It is to be
understood according to the intent of its maker, with the guidance furnished by
the accepted principles of interpretation. “The object of interpreting a statute is
to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it”, South Asia Industries
(Pvt.) Ltd. S. Sarup Singh, AIR 1966 SC 346.
Words in any language are not scientific symbols having any precise or
definite meaning, and language is but an imperfect medium to convey one’s
thought, to an audience consisting of persons of various shades of opinion.
The function of courts too, is only to expound, and not to legislate.
The problem of interpretation, is a problem of meaning of words and their
effectiveness as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought.
Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate references to referents. But
words of any language are capable of referring to different referents in
different contexts or times.However, there always lies the difficulty of
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borderline cases , within or outside the connotation of a word. Language,

therefore, has high chances of misunderstanding.
The law is a pragmatic instrument of social order and an interpretative effort
must be imbued with the statutory purpose. A construction that would promote
the purpose or object of an Act, even if not expressed, is to be preferred.
“There is no possibility of mistaking midnight for noon; but at what precise
moment twilight becomes darkness is hard to determine.” (Jane Straford
Boyse v. John T. Rassborough, (1857) 6 HLC p. 45:10 ER 1192 (HL). Thus,
the courts, although conscious of such a dividing line,, do not attempt to draw
it for reasons of practical impossibility; however, sometimes, attempts it after
laying down a working line; howsoever pragmatic, it may or may not be. There
is a marginal area in which the courts mould or creatively interpret legislation
and thus finish or refine legislation which comes to them in a state requiring
varying degrees of refinement. Since, interpretation always implies a degree
of discretion and choice, creativity, a degree which is especially high in certain
areas such as constitutional adjudication.
Some judges proclaim that they perform creative functions even in
interpretation, however, this may sometimes lead to conclusions which have a
strong legislative flavor. Interpretation should not be regarded as a search for
the purpose of the Legislature or even for the purpose of the statute, but as
one of ‘attribution of purpose’, in venturing to do justice.
The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature
must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The question is not
what may be supposed to have been intended but what has been said. The
key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law. Each word,
phrase or sentence, is to be construed in the light of the general purpose of
the Act itself. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context, as they
are the bases of interpretation. If the text is the texture, context gives the
colour. Neither can be ignored. A particular clause or expression is construed
by construing the whole instrument and any dominant purposes that it may
express. The Legislative function cannot be usurped under the disguise of
interpretation, and the danger of an priori determination of the meaning of a
provision based on the preconceived notions of ideological structure or
scheme should be avoided. Caution is all the more necessary.
The correct interpretation is one that best harmonizes the words with the
object of the statute. A right construction of the Act can only be attained if its
whole scope and object together with an analysis of its wording and the
circumstances in which it is enacted are taken into consideration. It s all about
interpretation and not about interpolation.
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The rules of interpretation are not rules of law; they are guides and such of
them which serve no useful purpose, can be rejected and new rules can be
evolved in their place. They are aids to construction, presumptions or pointers.
The shift towards use of plain language has attached with it, a lot of
controversy. The language of our legislation cannot be reduced to baby talk
for consumption of the masses, and the attainment of precision, and accuracy.
A good draft contains a clear expression of intent, uses a consistent
terminology throughout, avoids passive voice and aspirational statements The
terms defined are either authoritatively defined in the draft or by judicial
interpretation.Sentences are short. Simple words commonly used in ordinary
speech are preferred. Convoluted sub-division is avoided and so is repetition.
Difference between purposive and literal construction: The difference is in
truth of one degree only. The real distinction lies in the balance to be struck in
the particular case between literal meaning of the words on the one hand and
the context and purpose of the measure in which they appear on the other.
Statute must be read as a whole in its context
The statute as a whole, the previous state of the law, other statutes in pari
materia, the general scope of the statute, and the mischief it is to remedy, is
the basic context of any statute. The elementary rule states that the intention
of the Legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. Every
clause needs to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses
of the Act, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of
statutes relating to the subject-matter. It is the most natural and genuine
exposition of a statute.
The conclusion that the language is plain or ambiguous can only be truly
arrived at by studying the statute as a whole. How far and to what extent each
component influences the meaning of the other , would be different in each
given case. Each word, must however, be allowed to play its role, however
significant or insignificant it may be. in achieving the legislative intent. Each
section must be construed as a whole, whether or not one of the parts is a
saving clause or a proviso. They may be interdependent, each portion
throwing light, if need be on the rest.
A question of construction only arises when one side submits that a particular
provision of an Act covers the facts of the case and the other submits that it
does not or it may be agreed it applies, but the difference arises to its
application.
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Statute to be construed to make it effective and workable: However plain

the meaning be
The interpretation should be construed to make the statute workable, which
secures the object, unless crucial omissions or clear direction makes that end
unattainable. The doctrine of purposive reconstruction may be taken recourse
to for the purpose of giving it full effect to the statutory provisions. The
meaning of the statute must be considered rather then the rendering the
statute a nullity.
Appraisal of the principle of plain meaning
Plain words require no construction. This starts with the premise that the
words are plain and that the conclusion can be arrived at after construing the
words. This also means that once the conclusion has been arrived at, that the
words/ sentence can bear only one meaning, the effect to that meaning is to
be given.
Language which on its construction results in absurdity, inconsistency,
hardship or strange consequence is not readily accepted as unambiguous.
Here unambiguous means ‘unambiguous in its context. So ambiguity need not
necessarily be a grammatical ambiguity, but one of appropriateness of the
meaning in a particular context. Also, difference of judicial opinion as to the
true meaning of certain words need not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
those words are ambiguous.
“Statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to its plain
meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly
necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd,
unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the test of the
statute.” [Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P.) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC
111 : AIR 2003]

Literal Rule of Interpretation:

Here, we shall study the rules of literal (grammatical) Interpretation. A

literal interpretation has the following major rules—
The simple meaning of words
(a) Words should be given their ordinary meaning, and
(b) Such meaning should be simple and natural.
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Illustration—if definitions of words have been mentioned at the start of any

statute then such words should be given the same meaning in respect to
the complete statute by which they have been defined.
Universal Meaning—
During interpretation, words should be given their popular and common
meaning. It should avoid technical meaning.
Illustration—the word ‘residence’ in Divorce Act, 1869 has been used in a
very literal sense, hence it should be interpreted also in accordance to the
act (Paster JS. Singh v/s Smt. Jyotsna Singh, A.l R. 1982 Madhya
Pradesh 122)
Meaning of Undefined Words—
As we have seen above, if any word has been defined at the start of the
Act then it’s meaning in respect to Complete Act should be taken in
accordance with such definition.
But if any word is undefined then its interpretation can be done with the aid
of the dictionary S. Samuel v/s Union of India (A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 218)—it
was said that while doing so, it should be considered that—
• Ordinary words do have ordinary meaning, and
• Words with more than one meaning should have such meaning which
is proper in accordance with it.
• It does not mean otherwise, and
• it is not opposed to the intention of the legislature
While interpreting the language and words of the statute, the object and
subject matter of statutes should be kept in mind. The intention legislature
cannot be ignored while interpreting.
Words should be interpreted in such a way so that the object of legislature
and statute is fulfilled.
Sramjivi Stores, Calcutta v/s Union of India (A.l R 198 Delhi 76)-—Delhi
High Court said that the object of the statute cannot be ignored
interpretation words should be so interpreted that the object of stature is
fulfilled, literal interpretation should not be such the object of the statute
fails.
Similarly, Devdas v/s Makali Amma (AIR 1998 S.C. 750) Supreme Court
decided that the objects of Statute could be considered to know the
background of the Statute.”
Context
Ram Manohar v/s State of Bihar (1996 S.C R. 709)—It decided that “The
words used in the statute obtain their meaning and expression from its
context.
Gender
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Sec. 13 of General Clauses Act. 1897 provides that until there is no specific
provision regarding any Gender, till then the word Gender shall include
both male and female. Similarly, the ‘person’ shall include both male and
female,
Similar Meaning of Similar Words
Where similar has been used more than once a statute’ There they should
be given one meaning at all places. It shall not correct to give one a certain
meaning in one place and different meaning at another place. If different
circumstances arise at different places in a Statute, then the subject matter
and context should be used.
Different Meaning of Different Words
When differences are used in Statutes, then it should be presumed that the
legislature intended to give them different meanings.
Mr. D.L.F. Qutub Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v/s
State of Haryana (A,I R. 2003 S.C. 1648)——Supreme Court decided that
giving a different meaning to different words seems to be in accordance
with the intention of the legislature.
Equivalent Words
Words used in Statutes should be given equivalent meanings at all places.
It is an important rule of literal interpretation.
Casher v/s Holmes (I L.J. I.S.K.B. 280)—it was said that any words should
not be given an inferior meaning at one place and a superior meaning at
another place.
Addition or Removal of Words
It is an important rule of literal interpretation that no word should be added
nor removed from the statute while interpreting. All those words used in a
statute or prevailing in it should be interpreted only.
Federation Bank of India v/s Hanumatlar (A.I.R 195 1 Calcutta 382)—
Calcutta High Court said that it is the duty of Courts to neither add a word
from their side nor ignore any words while interpreting a statute. All those
words which have been used in the statute should be made the subject-
matter of their Interpretation.
‘And’ and ‘Or’ Words
The words ‘and’ and Or’ are used in various places in a statute. Both of
these words are not similar and give different meanings. Hence, it should
be kept in mind while interpreting.
Dr. B. N. Gupta Charitable Trust v/s Delhi Development
Authority (A.I.R. 1997 Delhi 50)—Delhi High Court said that the words
and’ and Or’ should be used at their place only.
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Words having more than one meaning

Sometimes, such words are used in statutes that have more than one
meaning. If anyone of those meanings is accepted, it creates problems and
the possibility of problems. Hence, in such situation, such meaning shall be
accepted from more than are meaning which-
• Fulfills the intention of the legislature. and
• is in accordance with the provisions of a statute
It is also the view of the Supreme Court that where any words have
more than one meaning or two opinions can be formed, there that one
meaning should be accepted which protects the constitutionality of
Provision. (Taj Kumar Balakrishna v/s A.K. Menon, A.l R SC 442)
Almost a Similar view has been expressed by Patna High Court
in Priyavrath Mehta vs Amerendu Banerjee (A.l R 1997 Patna and
Calcutta High Court in ‘Shanti Swaroop Sarkar v/s Pradeep Kumar
Sarkar (A.l R 1997 Calcutta 197). It decided in them that- where any word
has two meanings or expressions and one of them is in accordance with
the intention of provision and the second one is opposed to it, there that
would be accepted which is in accordance with the intention.
Meaning of Trade Words
Statutes and Laws regarding trade-business or commercial matters
generally use words in the trading world. In such a situation, such words
should be given that meaning which is followed in the trading world.
Illustration—if word Tariff’ is used in any Act then the trade or dictionary
meaning should be considered interpreting it. (Collector, Central Excise,
Madras v/s Ms. I.T.C. Ltd., A.I R 2003 S.C. 1484).
Meaning of Legal Words
Legal words are somehow different from common worlds. Their meaning
and intention are also a district. Hence, whenever the legal words are
interpreted, they should be given only one legal meaning.
Illustration—‘sale’ and ‘Agreement to Sell’ are both legal words. Their
meaning and intention are both different. Therefore, while interpreting
them, their legal importance should be taken into consideration.
Meaning of Technical Words
Words related to Technical Subjects are many times of technical nature
and their meaning is different from the literal meaning. Hence, such should
be interpreted in Technical sense.
Rukma Bai vs Lal Bhai Motichand (5 M.I.A. 234)—It was decided that
where the legislature has intentionally used a technical word in any statute,
there it should be accepted in the technical meaning only, even though it
may be different from the literal meaning.
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Meaning of Artistic Words

Many times, Artistic words are used in the statute. In such situations, they
should be understood in an artistic sense only.
Ordinary and Natural Meaning
It is the golden rule of interpretation of statutes that the words used should
be accepted in their Ordinary and natural meaning only unless it does not
mean otherwise.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v/s Shindu Kaur (A.I.R. 1998 Punjab and
Haryana 184)—Punjab and Haryana High Court decided that ‘when the
language is clear and plain, then the plain meaning of words has to be
followed.
Much before, ‘Sheikh Gulfan v/s Sanat Kumar Banerjee‘
(A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1839)—
Supreme Court said the same that—
“It is an important rule of interpretation of statutes that when parties
executing any document or record intentionally use certain words then such
words should be given their ordinary and natural meaning.”

O.3) Explain the Golden and Mischief Rule of Interpretation

with the help of Landmark case laws.

Ans.3

The Golden rule of Interpretation

The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning.
It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and
unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the
consequences. The paper is a critique of the golden rule of interpretation along with relevant
case laws.
INTRODUCTION
Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the word is
understood. The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of law.
The proper construction of a statute is a question of law. The purpose of the interpretation of the
statute is to unlock the locks put by the legislature. For such unlocking, keys are to be found out.
These keys may be termed as aids for interpretation and principles of interpretation.
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According to Gray, the process by which a judge (or indeed any person, lawyer or layman, who
has occasion to search for the meaning of a statute) constructs from words of a statute book, a
meaning which he either believes to be that of the legislature, or which he proposes to attribute
to it, is called ‘interpretation’.
The conventional way of interpreting a statute is to seek the intention of its makers, and apply
that to the facts of the case at hand. An interpretation of the statutory provision which defeats
the intent and purpose for which the statute was enacted should be avoided. Justice Chakravarti
made two observations on his behalf in Badsha Mia v. Rajjab Ali:
The primary object in interpreting a statute is always to discover the intention of the legislature
and in England, the rules of interpretation, developed there, can be relied on to aid the
discovery because those whose task is to put the intention of the legislature into language,
fashion their language with those very rules in view.

Since framers of statutes couch the enactments in accordance with the same rules as the
judicial interpreter applies, application of those rules in the analysis of a statute naturally brings
up the intended meaning to the surface. It is at least doubtful whether, in a case of framers of
Indian statutes of the present times, especially of the provincial legislature, the same
assumption can always be made.

Interpretation is of two kinds – grammatical and logical. Grammatical interpretation is arrived at

by reference to the laws of speech to the words used in the statute; in other words, it regards
only the verbal expression of the legislature. Logical interpretation gives effect to the intention of
the legislature by taking into account other circumstances permissible according to the rules
settled in this behalf. ‘Proper construction’ is not satisfied by taking the words as if they were
self-contained phrases. So considered, the words do not yield the meaning of a statute.
According to Gray, grammatical interpretation is the application to a statute of the laws of
speech; logical interpretation calls for the comparison of the statute with other statutes and with
the whole system of law, and for the consideration of the time and circumstances in which the
statute was passed. It is the duty of the judicature to ascertain the true legal meaning of the
words used by the legislature.

A statute is the will of the legislature and the fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all
others are subordinate, and that a statute is to be expounded, according to the intent of them
that made it. The object of interpretation is to find out the intention of the legislature.
The primary and foremost task of a court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of
the legislature, actual or imputed. The words of the statute are to be construed so as to
ascertain the mind of the legislature from the natural and grammatical meaning of the words
which it has used. ‘The essence of the Law’, according to Salmond:
Lies in its spirit, nor in its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the external
manifestation of the intention that underlies it. Nevertheless, in all ordinary cases, the courts
must be content to accept the litera legis as the exclusive and conclusive evidence of
the sententia legis. They must, in general, take it absolutely for granted that the legislature has
said what it meant, and meant what it has said.
Ita scriptumest is the first principal of interpretation. Judges are not at liberty to add to or take
from or modify the letter of the law simply because they have reason to believe that the
true sententia legis is not completely or correctly expressed by it. It is to say, in all ordinary case
grammatical interpretation is the sole form allowable.
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Parke B in Becke v. Smith formulated the following well-known rule for the interpretation of
statutes:
If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment, we are bound to
construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead, in our view of the case, to an
absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful
or obscure, but we assume the function of legislators when we depart from, the ordinary
meaning of the precise words used merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or
manifest injustice from adherence to their literal meaning.

Burton J in Warburton v. Loveland,observed:

I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes, that, in the first instance, the grammatical
sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with any expressed
intention, or declared purpose of the statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or
inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged so far as to
avoid such inconvenience, but no further.

LORD WENSLEYDALE’S GOLDEN RULE

Lord Wensleydale called it the ‘golden rule’ and adopted it in Grey v Pearson and thereafter it
is usually known as Lord Wensleydale’s Golden Rule. This is another version of the golden rule.
His Lordship expressed himself thus:
I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now I believe universally
adopted at least in the courts of law in Westminster Hall that in construing wills, and indeed
statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be
adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with
the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may
be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.

It is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the
words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of
the legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or
repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such
inconvenience, but no further.

Jervis CJ, also described it as the ‘golden rule’ in Matteson v. Hart.

We must, therefore, in this case have recourse to what is called the golden rule of construction,
as applied to Acts of parliament, viz to give to the words used by the Legislature their plain and
natural meaning, unless it is manifest, from the general scope and intention of the statute,
injustice, and absurdity would result from so construing them.

Thus, if the meaning of the words is at variance with the intention of the legislature to be
collected from the statute itself and leads to some absurdity or repugnance, then the language
may be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, absurdity or repugnance and no
further. The modern positive approach is to have a purposeful construction, which is to
effectuate the object and purpose of the Act.
17 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

In other words ambiguity, inconsistency, incompleteness in literal interpretation leads

modification of language so as to avoid such inconvenience. When in construing a word literally,
there exist variance with the intention of the legislature to be gathered from the subject or
context of the statute, the language may be varied or modified in such a case, but no further.
Ambiguity here means double meaning, a word’s expression capable of more than one
meaning. A word is inconsistent when it is incompatible with other words or gives separate
meaning when read with other parts of the statute.

The word ‘absurdity’ also means ‘repugnance’: Repugnancy appears when there is a direct
conflict or inconsistencies like one provision says, “do” and other says, “don’t.” A situation may
be reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other. In all such
cases, the statute becomes equivocal i.e., double meaning or questionable, suspicious or
uncertain in nature. Whenever the meaning of the word, phrase, expression or sentence is
uncertain, it may be a case of departing from the plain grammatical meaning, and there may be
a need for application of the golden rule.
It is however reiterated in every concerned case, that the province of the judge is a very
different one of construing the language in which the legislature has finally expressed. If they
undertake the other province, which belongs to the legislature who, have to endeavour to
interpret the desire of the country, the courts are in danger of going astray in a labyrinth to the
character of which they have no sufficient guide.
And in this order again, the only safe course is to read the language of the statute in what
seems to be its natural sense. When we say that the ordinary and grammatical sense of the
words must be adhered to in the first instance, it means that most words have primary meaning
in which they are generally used, and such a meaning should be applied first. Words have a
secondary meaning

LITERAL GOLDEN RULE

There are three fundamental rules suggested in the English Cases:
Firstly, the literal rule that, if the meaning of the section is plain, it is to be applied whatever the
result. The Second is “golden rule” that the words should be given their ordinary sense unless
that would lead to some absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument; and the
“mischief rule” which emphasizes the general policy of the enactment and the evil at which it
was directed.”
For the application of the literal rule, a clear and unequivocal meaning is essential. In
Jugal Kishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.The Supreme Court held that the cardinal rule of
construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is by giving to the words their
ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and
the words are susceptible of another meaning, the court may adopt the same. But when no such
alternative construction is possible, the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal
interpretation.
In New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, the Apex Court had
held: “It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that expressions used therein should
ordinary be understood in a sense in which they best harmonies with the object of the statute
and which effectuate the object of the legislature. Therefore, when two constructions are
feasible, the court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppress the mischief as the
legislature envisioned. The Court should adopt a project oriented approach keeping in mind the
principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits.”
In Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, the Supreme Court said: “in order to get the
true import of the statute, it is necessary to view the enactment in retrospect, the reasons for
enacting it, the evils it was to end and the object it was to sub-serve. The Act has therefore to be
18 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

viewed as a whole and its intention determined by construing all the construing parts of the Act
together and not by taking detached section as to take one word here and another there.”
Interpretative Process
Crawford has discussed the various ways by which the meaning of statutes is to be
ascertained. He writes:
“The first source from which the legislative intent is to be sought is the words of the statute.
Then an examination should be made of the context, and the subject matter and purpose of the
enactment. After the exhaustion of all intrinsic aids, if the legislative intent is still obscure, it is
proper for the court to consult the several extrinsic matters for further assistance. And during the
consideration of the- various sources of assistance, further help may, of course, be found on the
use of the numerous rules of construction.”
Austin divided the interpretative process into three sub-processes:

•finding the rule;

•finding the intention of the legislature; and
•extending or restricting the statute so discovered to cover cases which should be
covered.
De Sloovere recommended the following steps:

• finding or choosing the proper statutory provisions;

• interpreting the statute law in its technical sense; and
• applying the meaning so found, to the case in hand.
According to Odgers there are three methods of judicial approach to the construction of a
statute, namely, (a) the literal; (b) by employing the Golden Rule; and (c) by considering the
mischief that the statute was designed to obviate or prevent. Vacher v. London Society of
Compositors is an example of the employment of all three methods approached. The question
there was whether under Section 4(1), Trade Disputes Act 1906, any tortuous act by trade
unions was protected or only such tortuous acts as were committed in contemplation or
furtherance of a trade dispute.
The House of Lords took the former view and, in delivering their opinions, Lord Macnaughten
adopted the Golden Rule from Grey v. Pearson Lord Atkinson followed the literal approach in
the case of Cooke v. Charles A Vageler,[while Lord Moulton discussed the history of the
statute and applied the mischief method.
It is one of the well-established rules of construction that if the words of a statute are in
themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in
their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such a case best declaring the
intention of the legislature. It is equally a well-settled principle of construction that where
alternative constructions are equally open that alternative is to be chosen which will be
consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating;
and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, fiction or confusion into the
working of the system.
APPLICATION OF GOLDEN RULE
If the choice is between two interpretations, said Viscount Simon, L.C. in Nokes v. Doncaster
Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. “We should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation
to futility or the narrower one which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation.
We should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would
legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. Thus, if the language is
capable of more than one interpretation, one ought to discard the literal or natural meaning if it
19 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

leads to an unreasonable result, and adopt that interpretation which leads to reasonably
practical results.”
In this case Section 154 of the Companies Act, 1929, was in question. This provision provided
machinery for the transfer of the undertaking (an old company) to a new company. Under the
section, “transfer” includes all property, rights, liabilities and duties of the former company vest
with the latter. An issue therefore was whether a contract of service previously existing between
an individual and transferor company automatically becomes a contract between the individual
and the latter company.
Hence, an action was taken against him; however, no notice was given to him about the
proposed amalgamation either by the transferor or the transferee company. It was contended
that the contract of service could fall under the term “property”. Rejecting the contention, the
House of Lords held that the benefits of a contract entered into between the former company
and the employee cannot be transferred (by X company to Y company) without the consent of
the employee.

Notice of amalgamation by transferor or Transferee Company to the individual servant was

essential. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary-
meaning. If the legislature really desired that workmen should be transferred to a new company
without their consent being obtained, plain words could be derived to express this intention.

As in the present case, neither the provision of law provides such a primary meaning as
applicable to the transfer of personal service, and nor there is any overt act on the part of the
transferor or the transferee company informing the worker as regards the amalgamation The
contract did not exist between the appellant and the respondent and therefore the latter
company cannot take any action against the employee regarding service.

In R. v. Sweden Lord Parker construed Section 1(1) of the poor Prisoners’ Defense Act,
1930: “Any person committed for trial for an indictable offence shall be entitled to free legal aid
in the preparation and conduct of his defense at the trial and to have solicitor and counsel
assigned to him for that purpose.” The Court of Criminal appeal held that this section gave the
right to an accused person once the certificate is granted to have a solicitor assigned for the
purposes mentioned, but not a right that that solicitor or another should defend him at the trial.
The court observed: “if the section properly construed, gave an accused person a right to have
a solicitor at the trial, it would mean that he could repeatedly refuse to have the solicitor
assigned when he got advice which he did not like and go to others, and there would be no
means whatever to prevent that, with the result that there might be added expense to the
country, delays and abuse of the whole procedure.” Such an unreasonable intention of
Parliament cannot be imputed.

In Nyadar Singh v. Union of India,a restricted construction was given to rule 11 (VI) of the
Central Services (Classification, Appeal and Control) Rules, 1965. This Rule empowers
imposition of “penalty of reduction to a lower time-scale pay, grade post or service.” The
Supreme Court held that a person initially appointed to a higher post and grade of pay scale
cannot be reduced to a lower grade or post. A wider construction if given to the provision, it may
affect the recruitment policy itself for a person directly recruited to a higher post may not have
the requisite qualification for the lower post.
Maxwell says that the application of Golden Rule of Construction, and its limits, can be seen in
the area devoted to construction with reference to the consequences, and construction to avoid
inconvenience and injustice, and to prevent evasion He illustrated the application of the rule in
20 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

various cases relating to criminal, civil, labour, revenue taxation and administration branches of
law.
In Free Lanka Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ranasinghe (1964) AC 541 a Statute made it felony ‘to
break from prison”. Held it would not apply to a prisoner who escaped while the prison was on
fire. Since his act was, not to recover liberty, but to save his life. Similarly, a statute which made
‘an act’ criminal in unqualified terms was understood as not applying where the act done was
excusable or justifiable on grounds generally recognized by law.
In Luke v. R.R.C , Lord Reid said: “An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be
imputed a statute if there is some other construction available. Where to apply words literally
would defeat the “obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result”
we must do some violence to the words and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a
rational construction. Though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges, but a
problem may arise where more than one meaning arc available through the words of the
statute, that meaning should be chosen which is reasonable and rational.”
In R. v. London Justices, Section 105 of the Highways Act, 1835, gave an appeal to ‘any
person’ who though himself aggrieved by any order, conviction, judgment or determination of a
justice under the Act. This was held not to apply to ‘an informant who complained of an
acquittal’ on a charge of obstructing of the highway, for if it did, the person acquitted would be
liable to be twice vexed for the same offence.
In Day v. Simpson, it was held that the Theatres Act, 1843, which prohibited under a penalty
the performance of plays without license, would extend to a performance where the players did
not come on the stage, but acted m a chamber below it, their fingers being reflected by mirrors
so as to appear to the spectators to be on the stage. To carryout effectually the object of a
statute, it must be so construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing, in an indirect or
circuitous manner that which it has prohibited or enjoined.
This manner of construction has two aspects; one is that the courts, mindful of the Mischief Rule
will not be astute to narrow the language of a statute so as to allow persons within its purview to
escape its net. The other is that the statute may be applied to the substance rather than the
mere form of transactions, thus defeating any shifts and contrivances, which parties may have
devised in the hope of thereby falling outside the Act. When the courts find an attempt at
concealment, they will, “brush away the cobweb varnish, and shrew the transactions in their true
light.

Thus, in the name of justice or beneficial construction, the language of a statute cannot be
narrowed down so as to permit one to escape from the purview of law. However, where the
language itself is evasive and ambiguous, modification of it is permissible.
In Inland Revenue Commissioner v. J.B. Hodge & Co. (Glasgow) Ltd., (1961) 1 WLR 92
held; “Where possible, a construction should be adopted which will facilitate the smooth working
of the scheme of legislation established by the Act, which will avoid producing or prolonging
artificiality in the law and which will not produce anomalous results. Where two possible
constructions present, the more reasonable one is to be chosen.
In Gill v. Donald Humberstone & Co. Ltd., (1963) 1 WLR 929 per Lord Reid: ‘Beneficial laws
are addressed to practical people, and ought to be construed in the light of practical
consideration, rather than a meticulous comparison of the language of their various provisions.
If the language is capable of more than one interpretation, we ought to discard the more natural
meaning if it leads to an unreasonable result, and adopt that interpretation which leads to a
reasonably practical result.”
INDIAN CASES
In India, there are several good examples where the Supreme Court or High Courts have
applied the Golden Construction of Statutes. Certain confusion one may face when it appears
21 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

that even for the literal rule, this rule is named. As golden rule initially starts with the search of
the literal meaning of the provision, and if there is unequivocal meaning, plain and natural and
no repugnancy, an uncertainty of absurdity appears, apply the meaning.

But when there is a possibility of more than one meaning, we have to go further to avoid the
inconvenience by even modifying the language by addition, rejection or substitution of words so
as to make meaning accurate expounding of intention of the legislature.
In Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore, the Supreme Court held that the
expression “landless person” used in Section 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953, which
made provision for grant of land to landless persons, was limited to “landless laborers”. A
landless labour is he who is engaged in agriculture but having no agricultural land.
The Court further said that “any landless person” did not include a landless businessman
residing in a city. The object of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan movement, which aimed
at distribution of land to landless labourers who were verged in agriculture. A businessman,
though landless cannot claim the benefit of the Act.

In Lee v. Knapp, Section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960, provided that “a driver causing
accident shall stop after the accident”, the interpretation of the word “stop” was in question. In
this case, the driver of the motor vehicle stopped for a moment after causing an accident and
then ran away. Applying the golden rule the court held that the driver had not fulfilled the
requirement of the section, as he had not stopped for a reasonable period so as to enable
interested persons to make necessary inquiries from him about the accident at the spot of the
accident.
In Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar in construing Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act,
1958, the Supreme Court laid down that the crucial date on which the age of the offender had to
be determined is not the date of offence, but the date on which the sentence is pronounced by
the trial court An accused who on the date of offence was below 21 years of age but on the date
on which the judgment pronounced, if he was above 21 years, he is not entitled to the benefit of
the statute.
This conclusion reached having regard to the object of the Act. The object of the Statute is to
prevent the turning of the youthful offenders into criminals by their association with the hardened
criminals of mature age within the walls of the prison. An accused below 21 years is entitled to
the benefit of the Act by sending him under the supervision of the probation officer instead of
jail.

In Narendra Kiadivalapa v. Manikrao Patil Section 23 of the Representation of People Act,

1951, which permitted inclusion of the name in the electoral roll “till the last date for nomination”
for an election in the concerned constituency, has been construed. Section 33(1) of the R.P.
Act, 1951 specifies that the nomination papers shall be presented between the hours of 11’O
clock in the fore noon and 3’0 clock in the after noon. Reading these provisions together in the
light of the object behind them, the Supreme Court construed the words “last date” in section 23
as “last hour of the last date” of nomination under Section 33(1) of the Act.
In Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U P., Sales Tax
was fixed at two per cent, of the turnover in the case of “cooked food” under Section 3A of the
U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The appellant firm engaged in the business of biscuit manufacture
and sale. Whether biscuits though intended for human consumption, can be construed as
“cooked food” and liable to be taxed as per the notification issued under the said provision.
Held that if an expression is capable of a wider meaning, the question whether the wider or
narrower meaning should be accepted depends on the context of the statute. Here biscuit was
22 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

not covered within the words ‘cooked food’. However, where the precise words used are plain
and unambiguous the court is bound to construe them in their ordinary sense and not to limit
plain words in an Act of Parliament by consideration of policy which has to decided not by the
court but by Parliament itself.

In Tirath Singh v. Bachitter Singh the appellant argued that it was obligatory under Section
99 (1) (a) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 for the tribunal to record names of
all persons who had been guilty of corrupt practices including parties and non-parties to the
petition and that under the proviso, notice should be given to all persons named under Section
99(1)(a)(ii). He being a party to the petition was, therefore, entitled to a fresh notice. Supreme
Court said that such an interpretation will lead to an absurdity and held that the proviso along
with clause (b) thereto and the setting of the section pointed out that notice is contemplated only
against non- parties to the petition.
DIFFICULTIES IN THE APPLICATION OF GOLDEN RULE
Lord Moulten in Vacher & Sons v. London Society of Compositor had explained the
reasons for adopting caution before application of the golden rule of construction in these
words: “There is a danger that it may generate into a mere judicial criticism of the propriety of
the Acts of the legislature. We have to interpret statutes according to the language used therein,
and though occasionally the respective consequences of two rival interpretations may guide us
in our choice in between them, it can only be where, taking the Act as a whole and viewing it in
connection with the existing state of law at the time of the passing of the Act, we can satisfy
ourselves that the words cannot have been used in the sense the argument points.
“It may sometimes happen that laws made for the benefit of the public at large may come in the
conflict of some individual interest or take away his legal right and cause injustice to him. That is
to say, like public policy, absurdity, uncertainty or repugnance, are very unruly horses.

In State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money the Supreme Court said that “it is the duty of
all courts of justice, to take care for the general good of the community, that hard cases do not
make bad law. Referring earlier cases the court observed that absurdity should be understood
in the same sense as repugnance that is to say something which would be as absurd with
reference to the other words of the statute as to amount to repugnance
In Grundi v. Great Boulder Proprietary Cold Mines Ltd., Lord Greene M.R. said,
“Although absurdity or non-absurdity of one conclusion as capered with another may be and
very often is, of assistance to the court in choosing between two possible meanings of
ambiguous words. The Golden Rule of Construction is a doctrine, which must be applied with
great care, remembering that judges may be fallible in this question of absurdity and in any
event it must not be applied so as to result in twisting language into a meaning, which it cannot
bear. It is a doctrine which must not be used to re-write the language in a way different from that
in which it was originally framed.”
Criticism Of Golden Rule
The Golden Approach can be criticized:

The United Kingdom Law Commissions commented in their report that:

“There is a tendency in our systems, less evident in some recent decisions of the courts but still
perceptible, to over emphasise the literal meaning of a provision (i.e. the meaning in the light of
its immediate and obvious context) at the expense of the meaning to be derived from other
possible contexts; the latter include the ‘mischief’ or general legislative purpose, as well as any
international obligation of the United Kingdom, which underlie the provision”.
23 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

They also stated that to place undue emphasis on the literal meaning of words is to “assume an
unattainable perfection in draftsmanship” This was written in 1969 and in the light of more
recent judicial developments, it seems that the courts have shifted somewhat from the literal
approach. Zander contends that: “The main principles of statutory interpretation-the literal rule,
the golden rule and the mischief rule-are all called rules, but this is plainly a misnomer (A
misnomer is a term that suggests an interpretation known to be untrue).
They are not rules in any ordinary sense of the word since they all point to different solutions to
the same problem. Nor is there any indication, either in the so-called rules or elsewhere, as to
which to apply in any given situation. Each of them may be applied but need not be” Zander, in
his more recent book, criticized the golden rule for being silent as to how the court should
proceed if it does find an unacceptable absurdity
1. It suffers from the same difficulties as the literal approach vis a lack of wider contextual
understandings of “meanings.”
2. The idea of “absurdity” covers only a very few cases. Most cases involve situations
where difficult choices have to be made between several fairly plausible arguments, not
situations where the words lead to obvious absurdities.
3. The use of the “absurdity” safety valve can be very erratic as pointed out by Professor
Willis in his famous article, “Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell” (l938) l6 C.B. Rev.l.
Willis at l3-l4:
What is an ‘absurdity’? When is the result of a particular interpretation so ‘absurd’ that a court
will feel justified in departing from a ‘plain meaning’? There is the difficulty. ‘Absurdity’ is a
concept no less vague and indefinite than plain meaning’: you cannot reconcile the cases upon
it. It is infinitely more susceptible to the influence of personal prejudice.
The result is that in ultimate analysis the ‘golden rule’ does allow a court to make quite openly
exceptions which are based not on the social policy behind the Act, not even on the total effect
of the words used by the legislature, but purely on the social and political views of the men who
happen to be sitting on the case …

What use do the courts make of the ‘golden rule’ today? Again the answer is the same – they
use it as a device to achieve a desired result, in this case as a very last resort and only after all
less blatant methods have failed. In those rare cases where the words in question are (a)
narrow and precise, and (b) too ‘plain’ to be judicially held not plain, and yet to hold them
applicable would shock the court’s sense of justice, the court will if it wishes to depart from their
plain meaning, declare that to apply them literally to the facts of this case would result in an
‘absurdity’ of which the legislature could not be held guilty, and, invoking the ‘golden rule,’ will
work out an implied exception. It was defined in Grey v. Pearson “the ordinary sense of the
words is to be adhered to, unless it would lead to absurdity, when the ordinary sense may be
modified to avoid the absurdity”
CONCLUSION
The ‘Golden rule’ could, thus, be explained as follows:—
1. It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the meaning of an Act when the meaning can
be fairly gathered from the words used, that is to say, if one construction would lead to
an absurdity while another will give effect to what common sense would show, as
obviously intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be
rejected even if the same words used in the same section, and even the same sentence,
have to be construed differently. Indeed, the law goes so far as to require the courts
sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words, if by doing
so absurdity and inconsistency can be avoided.
2. The Court should not be astute to defeat the provision of the Act whose meaning is, on
the face of it, reasonably plain. Of course, this does not mean that an Act or any part of it
24 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

can be recast. It must be possible to spell the meaning contended for, out of the words
actually used.
3. Unless the words are without meaning or absurd, it would be safe to give words their
natural meaning because the framer is presumed to use the language which conveys
the intention and it would not be in accord with any sound principle of construction to
refuse to give effect to the provisions of a statute on the very elusive ground that to give
them their ordinary meaning leads to consequences which are not in accord with the
notions of propriety or justice entertained by the Court.

Mischief Rule of Interpretation

Maxwell also says the same that—it is the duty of Courts regarding the interpretation of
statutes that they should do construction in such a way that mischief get no place in it.
(Interpretation of Statutes: Maxwell).
Pandurang Dagddu Pastey v/s Ramchandra Baburao Heirey, (A I R 1997 Munibai 397)—
Mumbai High Court decided that the literal and grammatical interpretation is the only
interpretation which will further the aim and object of the enactment and will prevent the
mischief.
Mischief means—Voluntarily Cause injury or loss to someone.
The Mischief Rule in the content of interpretation means-to prevents the misuse of provisions of
the statute. Mischief should not have a place in the statute. If an attempt is made to add
Mischief in any statute, then it must be prevented by the Mischief Rule.
The Rule of Mischief says that the statute should be construed in such a way to suppress the
Mischief.
‘Smith v/s Huge’ is a good example in this context. It is based on the ‘Street Offence Act’. It
provides for prohibition of inducement by prostitutes over roads to the passing public. This act
was interpreted in such a way to misuse it by not including the inducement by prostitutes from
the windows and balconies of their houses. But Court said while rejecting this agreement that
the inducement by prostitutes from the windows and balconies of their houses is also prohibited
under this act, because the purpose of this act is to prevent prostitution, that is, protect the on
goes from the effect of a prostitute’.
A similar important case is Heydon’s Case. Heydon [76 E.R. 637: (1854) 3 CR 7]—lays down
those four points which are required to be considered interpreting—
• What was the common law prevailing before passing this act?
• Which is the mischief or defect for that there was no provision in common law?
• What remedy was decided or promised by the parliament to remove the defect of the
commonwealth?
• What is the actual reason for the remedy?
Two important formulas related to mischief are—
• Pro-private commando: and
• Pro-bona public
Both these formula means that the Courts should construe the statute in such a manner as to
suppress the mischief and encourage the remedy. Simultaneously, further mischief could be
prevented from finding out the intention of the legislature. It should be encouraged in such a
way that the intention of the legislature is achieved
Two examples in this respect are—‘Alamgir v/s State of Bihar’ (A.IR 1959 S C 436) is the first
example. Appellant changed under sec 498 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. A married woman was
living with the appellant on her own will. The Appellant argued that he does not fall within the
25 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

limits of sec 498. But Supreme Court said while rejecting this argument, that sec 498 contains
words ‘taking’ or ‘enticing’ or ‘concealment’ or ‘detained. The Appellants case falls within the last
word ‘detained’ because the intention of the legislature is to avoid the mischief of preventing the
husband from having intercourse with his wife.
Sewantilal v/s Income Tax Commissioner (A.I.R 1968 S C 697)——The Supreme Court said
that—It is an established rule of interpretation that the words used in the statute should be
construed in such a way to prevent mischief or consequences from it and achieve the intention
behind the statute.
Pyarelal v/s Ramchandra Mahadev (AIR 1974 S.C. 223)— an exciting question arose in this
matter. Accused was charged with sweetening the supari with artificial sweetener. He argued
that supari was not a food under the food adulteration act. 1954. Supreme Court rejected this
argument and held that supari is an article of food. The definition of food should be interpreted
in the context of the mischief which the provision of the act was intended to suppress and
advance the remedy
This view was followed in Glaxo Laboratories v/s Presiding Officer (A.I.R. 1984 S.C.
505). Supreme Court said that the purpose of interpretation is to give effect to the intention
underlying the statute, and therefore, unless the literal or grammatical construction leads to
absurdity, it has to be given effect to. If two construction is possible, that construction which
advances the intention of legislation and remedies the mischief should be accepted.
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Vis Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing
Company (A.l R. 1962 S.C. 1536) – The respondent factory which consisted of four separate
units for manufacturing brass and copper sheets and utensils therefrom for milling paddy, a flour
mill and a sawmill was asked to comply with the provisions of the Employee’s Provident Fund
Act: 1952. But the respondent refused the Act because in each of the four units less than fifty
numbers were employed and therefore the provisions of the Act did not apply to him. But the
Supreme Court rejected the argument and said that the expression in which qualifier the word
factory and not the word industry. If it is not considered a factory then the purpose of the act
would fail. Therefore, the mischief is to be suppressed
Private Mehta v/s Amrender Banerjee (A.l R. 1997 Patna 114) and Tej Kumar Balkrishna
Ruiyya v/s A.K. Menon (A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 442)-—In all, it was decided that where there are two
constructions of a word, their such interpretation would be adopted which fulfils the purpose of
the statute and suppresses the mischief.

• The statute should be construed in accordance with the intention of legislature; and
• Suppress the Mischief.
If certain words are added to the Act by way of Amendment by the Parliament for suppressing
the remedy, then it should be given consideration (Ms. National Insurance Co. Ltd. v/s Baljeet
Kaur, AIR. 2004 S.C. 1340).

Q.4) Discuss the rules relating to interpretation of Penal

Statute with the help of case laws.

Ans.4)

There are certain well-established principles of Penal Law which guide courts from time to time.
The major principle is—benefit of the doubt to the accused, the burden of proof over prosecution
26 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

for proving the charge beyond doubt, a person should be considered innocent until proved
guilty, etc. Those principles play an important part in the interpretation of words.

These principles also clarify that the statutes in Criminal Cases should be construed in favour of
the Accused.

Periswami v/s Emperor (A.I.R. 1931 Madras 177) Madras High Court said that where two
reasonable constructions are possible, there that construction should be adopted which is in the
interest of the accused.
Tularam Relumal v/s State (I.C.R. 1953 Bombay 1007) – It was held that where two
constructions are possible of a provision, there that construction should be adopted which
protects the as possible, interests of the accused. Penal Statutes should be construed by as
possible, clear, ordinary and grammatical meaning.
Sajjan Sing v/s State of Punjab (A I R 1964 S C 464) – The Supreme Court decided that
where construction of a provision are possible, their such construction should be adopted which
is In the interest of the accused. While interpreting such provisions, the Court should not try to
add new words on its own, because this Increases the possibility of reducing the chance to
materialise the intention of the legislature.
Motibai v/s R. Prasad (1970 S.C.J 559) – It was stated that Court should not try to add new
words on its own, while interpreting a Penal Statute. Courts are required to do Grammatical
Interpretation of Penal Statutes.
Seth Balakishan VIS Emperor (A.I.R 1928 Nagpur 219)— Nagpur High Court determined that
where doubt arises during the interpretation of Penal Statutes, the construction should be In
favour of accused. This case involved the interpretation of provisions of Arms Act.
Strict Interpretation
Penal Statutes are required to be strictly interpreted. Smith v/s Wood [(1889) 24 Q B D.
23]. Kamal Prasad v/s King-Emperor [(1947) 230 I. C. 160 Patna]‘, etc. also state that Penal
Statute should be strictly construed.
Another similar case is Ranjit Odessey v/s State of Maharashtra (A.I.R 1965 S.C
881). Appellant convicted for the Sale of an obscene book ‘Lady Chatterley’s Lovers’. Appellant
argued that he had neither the knowledge of the book being obscene nor his intention was to
sell such a book. He also stated that ‘it is not possible for a shopkeeper to read all books before
sale’. But, the Supreme Court applied a strict interpretation of Penal Statutes to state that
question of men rea or Intention for the conviction of the accused in such matter is irrelevant
Radhyshyam v/s Mewalal (A.I.R. 1929 Allahabad 210) Allahabad High Court held that the
excise act should be interpreted strictly and should be construed liberally in the public interest.
Retrospective Effect
It is well established that Penal Statutes do not have Retrospective Effect. (Nag PO Nature v/s
Emperor, J.C.R. 7 Rangoon 355).
In other words, it could be said, that an accused can neither be convicted nor be penalised by
applying any law retrospectively.

But, Supreme Court did say in a case that if the retrospective effect of an act is in favour of the
accused, then it can be done so. State of Bombay v/s Vishnu Ramchandra, A.I.R. 1961 S.C
307). Kedarnath v/s State of West Bengal (A.I.R. 1953 S C. 404) included a similar question.
In this case, the accused was charged with such an offence for which he can be sentenced or
penalised. Later, the amount of fine was increased by an amendment, Supreme Court held that
the amended amount of fine can be applied with retrospective effect because it shall be violative
of Article 20 (l) of the Constitution.
27 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

The benefit of Subsequent Law

Ratanlal v/s State of Punjab (A.I.R 1965 S.C. 881) a good example in this respect. A 16-year
boy found guilty of house trespass and breach of modesty of a 7-year girl. The trial court
sentenced him for 6-month rigorous imprisonment and with a fine. Later. In 1958 the ‘Probation
of Offenders’ Act, 1958 came into force which provided the benefit of Probation to accused
below the age of 21 years. The Supreme Court favoured providing the benefit of probation.
Interpretation of Words
In Penal Statutes, words should be construed in their simple and natural sense. The Intention of
Legislature should be considered while interpreting.

State of Kerala v/s Mathai Verghese (A.I.R. 1987 SC. 33). The Supreme Court held that the
word Currency Notes used in sec 489 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 includes not only Indian
Currency Notes but also the Currency Notes of all Countries. If only Indian Currency Notes were
considered to have included then, it would have meant that forgery of Currency Notes of other
countries is not an offence, which would never be the intention of the legislature.
A similar case is Maharaja Book Depot v/s State of Gujarat (A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 180). It involved
the question of interpretation of the word -Paper and Exercise Book’ used in sec 2 (a) (vii) of
Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Supreme Court held including Exercise Book within the paper
that the Exercise Book is a group of papers which has been stitched by a thread and bound by a
pin. This is simple and natural meaning of paper.
In all, it means that words of Penal Statute should be adopted their simple and natural meaning.

Above analysis, following certain Principles of Interpretation Of penal Statutes are

propounded—
• Penal Statute should be construed strictly.
• Penal Statute should be construed liberally in favour of public interest.
• Where two constructions are possible or ambiguity arises, their construction should be
adopted which is for the benefit of accused
• Penal Statutes should not be given Retrospective Effect if it leads to adverse effect over
the interest of the accused.
• Any subsequent law can be applied retrospectively to give benefit to the accused.
• The court shall not add new on its own while interpreting a Penal Statute.
• Words should be adopted in their simple and natural meaning.
• Criminal men’s rea is required for conviction in every matter. These are certain important
principles of Interpretation of Penal Statutes. Maxwell says that—Interpretation of Penal
Statutes is done more in accordance with the intention of the legislature, than in
comparison to earlier. The modern decision shows the behaviour of strict and beneficial
interpretation to reduce the difference between constructions (Maxwell Interpretation of
Statutes).

Q.7) Explain the Rules of Interpretation of Taxing Statute.

Ans.7)
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Interpretation of Taxation Statute

Introduction

Government of India is divided into three branches i.e. Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. It is

the function of the legislature to make the laws and that of the executive, to enforce those laws.

Legislature derives its power of imposing taxes from Article 265 of the Constitution which states

that “No tax can be levied or collected unless it has the authority of law”. It is through this article

that the legislature acquires the right to impose tax and prescribe various conditions under

which such tax is applicable.

Interpretation means to give meaning to some words which are ambiguous or unclear by looking

into the intention of the legislature, purpose which the law fulfils or the mischief it eliminates

which existed prior to enactment of that law. It is a common rule that words are to be given their

direct and grammatical meaning. But in case there are any ambiguities then the help of

interpretation is taken by understanding the context in which such words are used. Such

meaning is given which solves the purpose of the law and which seems to be intention of the

legislature. Practical applicability of laws is different from drafting & enforcing the law. It is the

role of judiciary to interpret the laws made by the legislature. It is the function of Judiciary to

apply the law made by the legislature on case to case basis.

The Legislature also has power to delegate its law-making power to the Executive for proper

implementation of the laws. Such delegation of power is exercised in form of rules, regulations,

circular, clarifications and notifications. In India, such power to issue above subordinate

legislation is with Central Board of Indirect Tax and Customs (CBEC) in case of indirect tax and

Central Board of Direct Tax (CBDT) in case of direct tax. But all these subordinate legislations

are limited to powers given to the subordinate authorities through the principal statute and these
29 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

subordinate legislations has the same legal and binding authority as if they are part of the

parent statute.

Need & Importance of Interpretation

As the social, economic and political conditions of the society keeps on changing,

interpretations of the laws also require change. Legislature is not equipped to meet such

changing conditions and legislature cannot anticipate every situation which might occurred in

real life. Thus, it is Courts which play the role and interpret the laws to adapt as per needs of the

society.

Rule of Strict Interpretation

Strict rule of interpretation is one of the principles used to interpret fiscal and penal statutes.

According to this rule, plain, clear and direct meaning is given to words which are used in

common parlance by the general public to which such law is applicable. There can be no

presumption by court with respect to particular meaning. Court cannot give particular meaning

to a word which is not clear by making a presumption that particular meaning is the intention of

the legislature. Court cannot under the guise of possible or likely intention of the legislature, give

meaning to the words which are not clear and where contextual meaning cannot be made out.

Reasons for Applicability of Strict Rule on Taxation Statute

Tax is a forceful extraction of money from the assessee (taxpayer) by the sovereign authority in

which the taxpayer is not entitled to any assured benefit. So, taxes place a monetary burden on

the taxpayer and thus to some extent it is considered as penalty on the taxpayer which is
30 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

imposed under the authority of law. Thus, unless the imposition of tax is clearly backed by law,

no tax can be imposed.

Taxation statute is a fiscal statute which is enacted on the basis of trial and error method or on

experimentation basis. It is not practicable for legislature to anticipate all the possible situations

or conditions which may arose after the law is enacted. It is possible that the assessee might

use some shortcomings in the law as a loophole and take advantage of it. As tax results in

pecuniary burden so the benefit of doubt is given to assessee in case of any contradictions.

Strict rule is applicable to taxation statutes, so courts are bound to give clear and plain meaning

to the words without delving into the consequences it can result in. There is no presumption of

tax or intendment of the legislature to impose tax unless clearly and specifically provided. Thus,

it is the legislature or subordinate authority to come forward and bring amendments and

clarifications to rectify the loopholes.

Thus, direct meaning is given to words used in the statute and in case of two interpretations

coming out than in that case that such interpretation is given, which is in favour of the taxpayer.

Until and unless, clear words are used in the statute which imposes the liability on the taxpayer,

there can be no burden to pay tax.

Rule of Interpretation applicable to Taxation Statute

Taxation statute is a fiscal statute which imposes the pecuniary burden on the taxpayer. So

such statutes are construed strictly. Plain, clear and direct grammatical meaning is given.

Where there are two possible outcomes then that interpretation is given which is in favour of

assessee.
31 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

Any taxation statute involves three stages firstly, the subject on which tax is levied or

imposed, secondly, the assessment of the liability of assessee and lastly, the recovery once the

assessment is made. The first stage is where charging provisions of the act are involved. These

charging provisions must be clearly provided in the statute. These charging provisions provide

the extent and coverage of the subjects as to whom the tax is applicable. It also provides the

outline in form of subjects which the legislature wants to cover under the law. Charging

provisions are to be interpreted strictly as it results in financial burden. There cannot be any

ambiguity and meaning which is clear, obvious, direct is given. Nothing can be inferred to

substantiate the intention of the legislature or purpose for which the law was made. Once the

revenue shows that particular subject is covered by law then tax is applicable for all those

subjects. But if it fails to proof then no tax can be imposed by extending the meaning.

Principal of equity has no role to play in case of taxation law. It is because there is lot of

deeming legal fiction involved in tax laws. Thus, whatever is written must be strictly followed

without considering its justness. If the words are clear, then court has to give that meaning

irrespective of consequences it resulted into or in other words even if such construction is

unequitable, then also Court is bound due to legal fiction. Court cannot meet the deficiency by

extending the provisions of the statute. It is duty of the legislature to rectify it through

amendments.

In a Taxation statute, if a word has a clear meaning, then in that case, the court is bound to

follow the clear meaning even if such meaning results in absurd results. It is in legislature’s

domain to rectify such absurdity. In case of taxation statutes, Courts cannot extend the scope of

law by giving meanings to word which are unclear or uncertain. This is based on the reason that

if legislature had thought of such situation then it would have covered it by using appropriate

description and words under the principal act or taxation authority would have issued some

notification clarifying the same.

32 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

The case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kores India Ltd. (AIR 1977 SC 132) is relevant. In this

case, the issue was pertaining to inclusion of carbon paper in the definition of word “paper”. It

was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that in common parlance word paper is one which is

used for writing, packaging and printing whereas carbon paper is used entirely for different

purpose. Moreover, manufacturing process of carbon paper is entirely different and complicated

from that of normal paper. So, Court held carbon paper will not be included in normal paper so

as to make it subject to taxation. It was held that meaning of paper is quiet clear and there is no

need to interpret it so as to extend its meaning to include carbon paper. Thus, Courts are not

required to extend the meaning to cover the subjects which on the face cannot be included in

common parlance. It is only when specifically provided by statute then only it becomes subject

to tax.

The words used in the taxation law should be given meaning which is understood by general

public in daily routine and one which is popular. Such meaning should be given to words which

people to whom law is applicable are familiar with.

The second and third stage involved in any tax laws are assessment of the liability and recovery

of dues respectively. These provisions are machinery provisions which provides for

technicalities and procedure to be followed under the act to make it functional. These provisions

are to be interpreted fairly and liberally to promote the intention of the legislature. In case of

contradiction whereby two meaning are coming out then one which is reasonable, which will

assist in fulfilling the intention of the legislature and solving the purpose for which law was

enacted is preferred. They are to be interpreted in such a way so as to enforce and apply

charging provisions smoothly.

In case of exemptions, strict rule does not apply rather liberal rule is applied. All the conditions

under which exemptions are given must be clearly specified. Once the assessee has shown that

all the conditions precedent required to claim exemptions are fulfilled then he is entitled to claim

exemptions. Once the assessee falls within the category of exemptions, then such exemption
33 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

should be allowed. It cannot be denied on the basis of assumed or likely intention of the

authority making the law.

The doctrine of Substantial Compliance is based on the principle of equity which is also

applicable to taxation laws. According to this doctrine, if the conditions for claiming exemptions

are met substantially or only a few minor procedural requirements are not fulfilled which does

not hamper the purpose for which such law was made then in that case substantial compliance

can also entitles one to claim exemptions. Applicability of such doctrine is based on case to

case basis as it results are different depending on facts of each case, extent of compliance,

whether partial compliance fulfils the essence, object and purpose of the law.

Conclusion

As the tax laws are interpreted strictly, legislature must ensure that words used in the statute

are clear and wide enough to cover all subjects which it intend to be taxed. Words and

descriptions should be used with proper care and sophistication so as to avoid any ambiguity.

While making the laws assistance of such experts should be taken who deal with such laws on

daily basis as they are the ones who understand the intricacies and could help in drafting the

law involving the intricacies and complexities. Experienced Chartered Accountants, Litigators

and officers of tax department should be consulted and their experience should be considered

while enacting the laws. If the tax laws are drafted with loopholes, then the purpose of that law

is not fulfilled and the whole law collapses.

Imposition of tax is burden on the assessee so it should be interpreted strictly and no such

construction should be made on the basis of presumptions and assumptions as to intention of

the legislature. No addition or subtraction should be allowed in case of charging provisions in

furtherance of fulfilling the purpose of the act or to meet intention of the legislature. Tax laws
34 ROLL NO : L13/LLB/183031

should be interpreted in manner so to maintain a balance between interest of both revenue

department and the assessee.

Also, the role of Courts is not to apply the tax laws blindly and strictly but it should check

whether the transactions of assessee amounts to evasion of tax, avoidance of tax or its just tax

planning. If assessee deliberately makes the complex transactions so as to avoid taxes and

thereby intends to game the system, then the Courts should adopt for reasonable and equitable

construction in favour of revenue and to set examples for future jurisprudence of interpretation

of taxation laws.