INTERPRETAION OF STATUTES

INTRODUCTION

1. A statute as enacted cannot be explained by the individual opinion of the legislatures.

2. After enacting process is over the legislature become functus officio so as that particular statute is
conceived.
3. If it were often to consult the legislature as its intention the answer of the most of the legislature in all
probability will be “search a problem never occurred to us solve it as best as you can consistent with the
words used and the purpose indicated by us in the statute.

INTENTION OF LEGESLATURE

If a statutory provision often to more than one interpretation the correct has to chose that interpretation
which represents the intention of the legislature.
1. Venkatashwaminaidu v. Narasram (AIR 1966 sc. 361).
2. District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron and Steel (AIR 2001 Sc 3134).
3. Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading ( AIR 2002 SC. 1432).

LITERAL CONSTRUCTION
1. The first and primary rule of construction is the intention of the legislature must be found in the words
used by the legislature itself.
“Law to a large extent lives in the language even if it expand with the spirit of the statute.
PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION
2. The words used by the legislature are not bear always a plain meaning.
1. Whether certain words are plain.
2. What the pain meaning is.
1. It is always safe to have an eye on the object and purpose of the statute or reasons and sprit behind it.
2. The statute is best understood if we know reasons for it Utkal Contractoresvs State of Orrissa (AIR 987 SC
1457).
Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 Co. Rep 7(a)
AIR 1957 Sc 907
Raipur Development Authority (2000) 4 SCC 357.

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 Steel Authority v. National Water (AIR 2001 Sc 3527)
Heydon’s Rules Also known as Mirchief Rule
Purposive Constrective
FOUR MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION
1. What was the law before making of the Act?
2. What was the mischief or delete for which the law did not provide?
3. What is the remedy that the act has provided?
4. What is the reason for remedy?
Court must adopt a construction which shall suppressed the mischief and advance the remedy.
 Bengal Immunity AIR 1955 SC 661.
STATUTE MUST BE READ AS A WHOLE IN ITS CONTENTS.

ELEMENTORY RULE

1. The intention of legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole.

2. Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the act to
make a consistent enactment.
3. The court must as certain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clause to
be construe but to the entire statute .it must compare the clause with other party of the law.
 State of West Bengal v. UOI (AIR 1963 SC 1241 (1265).
4. Statute to be construed to make it effective and workable.
1. A statute or any enacting provisions therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative.
2. Ut res MagisValeat quam pereat.
3. Courts’ while pronouncing constitutionality of any statute starts with a presumption in favor of co
constitutionality and prefers a construction which keeps the statute within competence of legislature.
1. Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema AIR 1956 SC. 1107 (1113).

3. The Court will reject the construction which will defeat the plain intention of legislature even though there may
be some in exactitude in languages.

 M. PetiahvsVeeraMallappa AIR 1961 Sc 1107 (1111).

4. A statute is designed to be workable.

5. If meaning plain effect must be given to it irrespective of consequences.

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1. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one
meaning, the Court is bound to believe effect to that meaning irrespective or consequences.

 Nelson Motis v. UOI (AIR 1992 Sc 1981)

 Steel Authority of India v. National Union Worker AIR 2001 Sc 3527 (3539)
2. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits only one meaning, no question of construction
arises.
Act speaks itself.
 State of W.P. v. Vijay Anand AIR 1963 Sc 946.

6. Appraisal of the Rrnevple of plain meaning.

1. It is not possible to decide whether certain words are plain or ambiguous unless they are studied in their context
and construed.

2. The ruled of plain meaning reality means that after court have construed the words and have came to the
conclusion that they can bear only one meaning than only court gives effect to that meaning.

1. D. Saibaba Vs Bar Council of India AIR 2003 Sc 2502 (2507).

Basic Principles of Interpretations.

Intention of legislature

a. Statute must be read as a whole in its context.

b. Statute to be construed to make it effective and workable.
c. If the meaning is plain effect must be given to it irrespective of the consequence.

Appraisal of the principle of Plain meaning.

GUIDING RULES

1. Language of the statute should be read as it is.

2. Rule of literal construction.
3. Regard to subject and object.
4. Regard to consequences.
a. Avoid addition or substitution of words.
b. Casus Omisus
c. Avoiding rejection of words

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 d. Departure from the rule
e. When permissible ------a. Addition words
b. Rejection words.
GUIDING RULES.
1. The intention of the legislature is primary to be gathered from the language used which means that
attention should be paid to:-
1. What has been said and
2. What has not been said
3. J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2001 Sc 3303 (3308)
Addition /Substitution /Rejection----- of words must be avoided.
 Grasim v. Collector of Custom AIR 2002 Sc 727.
1. It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words in to an act unless it is absolutely necessary
to doos .
2. UOI v. Deokinandan Agrawal AIR 1992 SC 96 (101)
2. It is dangerous to substitute some other word of the Statute.
3. Court cannot reframe the legislation as it has no power to legislate
1. Deokinandan Agrawal
2. J.P.Bansal.
CASUS OMISSUS
1. A matter which should have been but not provided for legislation cannot be supplied by the court as to
do so will be legislation and not construction.
2. An omission by the legislature to amend a related provisions present great difficulties of construction
AIR 1987 SC 53
AIR 1990 SC 933
AIR 2001 SC 2699

AVOIDING REJECTION OF WORDS

1. Effort should be made to give eaning to each and every words used by the legislature.
2. Legislature inspired every part in a statute for a purpose and legislature intention is that every part
there of a purpose and that every party of the statute must have effect.
1. Aswini Kumar Gheshvs
2. Arvindo Bose 1952 AIR SC 369 (377)

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EXECEPTION

1. Court can correct drafting error while interpreting a statute by adding, omitting and substituting
words if following features are available:-
a. The intended purpose of the statute or provision in question.
b. By inadvertence the draft man and parliament failed to give effect to provisions that
purpose in the provision in question.
c. The substance of the provision parliament have made although not necessary the precise
word parliament would have used, had the error in Bill been noticed.
ADDITION OF WORD WHEN PERMISSIBLE
1. Ranjit Sing KalaraVs UOI (1991) 2 SCC 87 (19)
2. M.J. Exprot Ltd. Vs Custom Excise AIR 1992 Ac 2014 (2024)
3. SirajHaqvs Central Board AIR 1959 SC 198.
4. Hamemeedea Hardware vs B. Mohan AIR 1988 Sc 1060 (1067).
5. H.C. Suman vs. Rehabilitation Ministry AIR 1991 Sc 216 (1967 -69).
6. Sec. 17 of Consumer Protection Act 1986 constitutes statute commission for each
state but there is no provision in the act limiting territorial jurisdiction.
But the intention of the parliament could not have been that dispute arising in one
state could be taken cognizance of by state commission or other state.
 Union Bank of India vs. M/s. SeppoRalloy AIR 1999 Sc 62 (66)

REJECTION OF WORDS WHEN PERMISSIBLE

1. Some time the ``````intention of parliament is clear but due to some words is
used in the statute due to unskillness of the draftsman, which result in
ineffectiveness of that statute.
2. Since Court is strongly banning a statute to a futility it is permissible in such
cases to reject the surplus orders to make the statute effective and workable.
RULED OF LETERAL CONSTRUCTION
a. Natural and grammatical meanings.
1. Natural

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 2. Ordinarily
3. Popular

I words of a statute is to understand.

Phrases

Sentences

-: are to be constructed according to their grammatical meaning.

Exception

1. Unless leads to some absurdly.

2. Unless there is something in context or in the object of the statute to suggest contrary.
1. In constructing a word in the statute the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is adhered to
unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the
statute.
Olga Tellus v. MC Bombay AIR 1986 SC 180
Pakal Narayan Swami v. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47 (87)
Sirauj Haq v. Ceneral Sunni Waqf.
EXPLAINATION
1. a word is not a crystal transparent and unchanged it is skin of a living though its and may vary
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which used.
KeshvanandBharti (AIR 1973 SC 1461)
2. When it is said that words are to be under statue just in their natural ordinary or popular means it
means that the words should be ascribed that natural sense which they have in relation to the
subject matter with reference to the context in which they have been used in statute.
3. In determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a stature the first question to be asked is:-
1. What is the natural or ordinarily meaning or that word or phrase in the context or the statute?
2. 2. What that meaning of that word leads to some reasonable be supposed to have been the
intention of legislature, that not it is proper to look for some other meaning of the word.

Context in the construction of legislation means

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 I. The statute as a whole
II. The previous state of law
III. Other statute in pari- materia
IV. General scope of the statute
V. The mischief of that it was intended to remedy

Special reference 2003 ( u

AIR 2003 se 87 ( f.138,

Coal for Sales Tax Act included charcoal

Control for colliery control order manual

AIR 1967 SC 1454 (1457)

Commissioner Sales Taxes v. Jaswant Singh

Example-

1. Marble- Akbar Badruddin v. Collector custom AIR 1990 SC 1579 (1595)

2. Vegetable- Whether betel leaves are vegetable
Ramavtar v. Asst. Sales Tax Officer AIR 1961 SC 1325
Ranbax v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1963 SC 351
 Several words have a popular meaning as well as technical or scientific normally in fiscal laws popular
meaning is preferred over technical meaning.
3. Rice and paddy are held to be different commodities for Punjab Sales Tax Act.
 Ganesh Trading Co. v. Haryana
 State of Rajasthan v. Rajasthan Input AIR 1996 SC 2179

(C) Exact meaning preferred to lose meaning.

1. There is a presumption that words are used in an act of parliament correctly and exactly and not loosely or in
exactly

Example-

Meaning of adjoining is conterminous as distinguished from its loose meaning ‘near’ or ‘neighboring’

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  Mayor Counselor v. Taranaki Electricity Power AIR 1933 PC 216

(D) Technical words in technical sense

1. Special meaning in trade or commerce.

(a) Trade

(b) Business

(c) Profession

(d) Art

(e) Science

Words having special meaning in that context are understood in that sense. Such a special meaning is called
technical meaning.

 Union of India v. Garware Nyton AIR 1996 3509 (3512)

(B) Regard to subject and object-

1. The words of statute when there is doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they
best harmonize with the subject of enactment and the object which the legislature has in view

 Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management AIR 1958 SC 353 (356)

 Santa Singh v. Punjab AIR 1976 SC 2386 (2389)

(2) It is recognized rule of interpretation of statute that expression used therein shall ordinarily be understood in a
sense in which they best harmonize with the object of the statute.

 New India Sugar Mills v. Comm of Sales Tax Bihar AIR 1963 SC1207 (1213)

OBJECT ORIENTED APPROACH

1. W.P. Bhoodan Samiti v. Braaj Kishore AIR 1998 SC2239

UP BhoodanYojna Act 1953

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 ‘Landless person’ means landless labour not landless business man in the city.
Sec 2k Industrial Dispute Act 1947
Industrial dispute
Workmen of Dimakuchi v. Management AIR 1958 SC 353 (364)
Sec 235(2) CrPc 1973
Santa Singh v Punjab AIR 1976 SC 2386
(b) Heydon’s Rule- Purposive Construction

Regard to the Consequences

If the language used in capable of bearing more than one construction in seeking true meaning regard must
had to be the consequences resulting from adopting the alternative construction.

1. Hardship
2. Inconvenience
3. Injustice
4. Absurdity
5. Anomoly
Are to be avoided.
(1) In selecting out of different interpretation, court will adopt that which is trust, reasonable and sensible
rather than which is none of those things.
 Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate AIR 1976 SC 331 (338)

(2) It is proper to assume that legislature enact a law which the society considers as honest, fair and
reasonable.
 Budhan Singh v. Bibi be AIR 1970 SC 1880
(B) Inconsistency and Repugnancy to be avoided.

Internal aid to Construction

Part of a statute

1. Long title
2. Preamble
3. Headings
4. Marginal notes

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 5. Punctuations
6. Illustrations
7. Definition/ Interpretation clause
8. Proviso
9. Explanation
10. Schedules
11. Transitional provisions

Long titles of an Act:

1. It is part of the enactment. It is admissible as an aid to its construction.

2. Long title which precedes the preamble must be distinguished with the short title.
3. Short title is only for the purpose of reference to act whereas long title along with the preamble is a god
guide regarding-
a. Object
b. Scope
c. Purpose of Act.
 Kerala Education Bill AIR 1958 SC 956
 Aswini Kumar v. Aurvindo Bose AIR 1956 369 (383)
4. The long title although part of the Act is itself not enacting provision and though useful in case of
ambiguity of enacting provision is ineffective to control their clear meaning.
 ManoharLal v. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 418 (419)

Preamble of the Act:

I. Not enacting part of act

II. Like long title.

It is the cardinal principles of interpretation that where the language of the act is clear. The Preamble must be
disregarded though were the object or meaning of an enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resurted to
explain it.

1. Burakar Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 954 (956-57)

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 2. Arnit Das v. State of Bihar AIR 2000 SC 2264 (2271)

Preamble of the Constitution:

1. The drafting committee of the Constituent Assembly formulated preamble is the light of the objective
resolution but restricted it “to defining the essential feature of the new state and its basic socio political
objective”
2. Draft of Preamble was considered by the Constituent Assembly after considering other part of the
constitution.
3. Constituent Assembly adopted a motion that the preamble stands part of the Constitution.

Headings:

1. Heading or title prefixed to section or grant of sections can be referred to in constructing an act of the
legislative.
Bhikna v. Charan Singh AIR 1959 SC 960 (966)
2. A heading is to be regarded as giving the key to the interpretation of clauses ranged under it, unless the
warding is inconsistent with such interpretation.
3. Headings can only be taken into consideration when the enacting words are ambiguous.
4. Headings prefixed to section or entries cannot control the plain meaning of the word used in any statute
only in case of ambiguity or doubt the heading or sub-heading may be referred to as aid in constructing the
provisions. Even in such case it could not be used for cutting down the wide application or clear words
used in the statute.
 Frick India v Union of India AIR 1990 SC 134 (141)
 Forage Comp. v M.C. Bombay AIR 2000 SC 378 (380)

Marginal Notes:

1. Marginal Notes appended to a section cannot be used for constructing the section.
2. Marginal Notes in an Indian statute cannot be referred to for the purpose of constructing the statute.
 CIT v. AhmedbhaiUmarbhai AIR 1950 SC 134 (141)
 KalawatiBai v. SoeryBai AIR 1991 SC 1581
 Uttam Das v. ShiromaniGurudwaraAIR 1996 SC 2133 (2137)

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Punctuation:

It is error to rely on punctuation in constructing Act of the legislative.

1. Lewis v. AshutoshSenAIR 1929 PC 69(71)

Section 48 of Limitation Act 1908 “For specific movable property lost or acquired by theft or dishonest
misappropriation or conversion or for compensation for wrongfully taking or detaining for same”
PC rejected the contention that the word ‘dishonest’ qualified ot only misappropriation but also
conversion.
2. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Aurvindo
3. Gopalan

Illustration:

1. Illustration appended to a section form part of the statute and although forming no part of the section are of
relevance and value in the construction of the text of the section and they should not be rejected as
repugnant to the section.
 Mahesh Kumar Sharma v. Raj Kumar Sharma AIR 1996 SC 869 (877)
2. Illustrations cannot have the effect of modification (modifying) language of the section and cannot either
curtail or expand the ambit of the section, which alone forms the enactment.
 ShambhuNathMehra v. State of Ajmer AIR 1956 SC 404(406)

Definition Section:

It is a common to find in a statute. ‘Definitions’ of certain words and expressions used elsewhere in the body of the
statute, in order to avoid necessity of frequent repetition in describing the entire subject matter to which word or
expression sub-defined is intended to apply.

1. A definition section may borrowed definitions form an earlier Act.

 LIC v. Crown life Insurance AIR 1965 SC 1985 (1986)
2. A definition borrowed by incorporation or reference.

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  Tata Tea Ltd. v. State of Bombay AIR 1988 SC 1435

[Art. 366(1) of Indian Constitution] Agriculture Income as Income Tax Act.

3. But in absence of incorporation or reference it is hazardous to interpret a word is accordance with its
definition in another statute and more so when such statute is not dealing with any cohant subject.
 MSCO pvt ltd. v. Unoin of India AIR 1985 SC 76
 State of Kerala v. MathaiAIR 1987 SC 33

A. Restrictive and Extensive definitions:

1. The legislature has power to define a word even artificially.

 KishunLal v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1990 SC 2269 (2270)
 CIT Madras v. Sundaram Spinning AIR 2000 SC 490 (491)
 FerozeN. Dotivala v. P.M. Wadhwani, (2003) 1SEC 433(442)
2. The definition of a word in definition clause may either restrictive to its ordinary meaning or it
may be extensive of same.
3. When a word is defined to ‘mean’, such definition is prima facie restrictive and exhaustive.
 Feroze M. Dotiwala
 Vanguard Fire & General Insurance v. Fraser and Ross AIR 1960 SC 971 (975)
4. When a word is defined to ‘include’ it is prima facie extensive.
 Kishunlal v. Rajasthan AIR 1990 SC 2269 (2270)

Extensive Definition:

1. ‘Means and includes’

 Jagir Singh v Bihar AIR 1976 SC 997 (999-1001)
2. ‘To apply and includes’ when by an amending act.
3. The word ‘mean’ ‘includes’ was substituted for the word ‘mean’.
 GollaleswarDev v. Gangavwa.

B. Ambiguous definitions:
1. It is presume that the legislature will be specially precise and careful in its choice of language used in
such a section itself requires interpretation.

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  Banglore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A Rajappa. AIR1978 SC 548 (561)
2. A definition is not to be read in isolation. It must be defined in the context of the phrase.
 Banglore Water Supply and Sewerage v. A. Rajappa
C. Definitions are subject to a Contrary Context:

1. When a word has been defined in the definition clause, prima facie that definition governs whenever
that word is used in the bodyof the statute.
 Indian immigration trust Board v. GovindswamiAIR 1920 PC 114(116)
 Vanguard fire and general Insurance v. Fraser and Ross AIR 1960 971(975)
2. “Unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.
3. Unless the context otherwise requires [such qualification is always implied, Printers (Mysore) Ltd.
v. Asst. Commission Tax officer, 1994(2) sec434]
4. Art 367 of the Constitution: General Clause Act is applies in Interptretation of Constitution Sec.5
(500) of General Clause Act defines ‘state’ includes Union territories. Therefore the word ‘state’
includes Union territory but as the context otherwise requires the word ‘state’ in article 246 does not
include Union territory.
 T.M. Kanniyam v. I.T.O. PondicheriAIR 1968 SC 637

a. ‘Court’ in arbitration Act 1940 defined word court but does not govern sec 14(2)
b. Workman sec 33-C (2) I.D. Act 1947 include dismissed employee only for section 10.

Proviso:

A. Its real nature-

1. The normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something
enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment.
 KedarNath Jute v. Comm. Tax Officer AIR 1966 SC SC 12(14)
 KhushSahgal v. M.C. MitterAIR 2000 SC1390 (1398)
 Calcutta Tramway Co. v. Corporation of Calcutta AIR 1965 SC 1728 (1730)
2. The general rule relating to proviso is that a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an
exception to what is in the enactment and ordinarily a proviso is not interpreted as stating general rule.
 Shah Bhojraj v. Subhash Chandra AIR 1961 SC 1596 (1690)
B. Not constructed as excluding or adding something by implication.

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 When on a fair construction the principal provision is clear a proviso cannot expand or limit it.
 Dwaraka Prasad v. Dwarika Das AIR 1975 SC 1758 (1763)
C. Construed in relation to the section or sections to which it is appended-
The language of a proviso even it’s general normally to be construed in relation to the subject matter
covered by the section to which the proviso is appended.
 Dwarika Prasad v Dwarika Das AIR 1975 SC 1758 (1764)

In other words normally a proviso does not travel beyond the provisions to which it is a proviso.

 Mackinnon v. Audrey D’ CosraAIR 1987 SC 1281

D. Use as guide to Construction of enactment
There is no doubt that where the main provisions are its effect cannot be cut down by the proviso, but
where it is not clear the proviso which cannot be presumed to be surplusage can be properly be looked
into ascertained the meaning and the scope of the main provision.
 Hindustan Ideal Insurance v. LIC AIR 1963 (1087)
E. Proviso as a fresh enactment .
 State of Orissa v Debaki Debi AIR 1964 SC 1413 (1417)

Sometimes it is substantive enactment.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROVISO EXCEPTION AND SAVING CLAUSE

1. Exception- It is intended to restrain the enactment /enacting clause to a particular case.

2. Proviso- It is used to remove special cases from the general enactment and provide for them specially.
3. Savings- It is used to preserve from destruction, certain rights remedies or privilege already existing.

EXPLAINATION:

1. An explanation is appended to a section to explain the meaning of words contained in te section.

 Deepak Chandra v. Chandan Kumar (2003) 7 SEC 66(71)
2. It becomes part and parcel of the enactment.
 Bengal Immuniy v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661
3. When a section contains number of clauses and there is an explaination at the end of the section it should
be seen as to which clause it applies.
 Patel Roadways v. Prasad Travelling AIR 1992 SC 1514 (1518)

WHEN EXPLAINATIONS OPEN WITH-

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 1. “For the purpose of their section”
2. “Nothing in their section”
And placed at the end of the section, it will be prima facie indicate that the explanation applies to all the
clause in the section.
 Commission of Agriculture v. Plantation Corporation of Kerala. AIR 2000 SC 3714
(3717)

SCHEDULES:

1. Schedule appended to statute form part of statute form part of statute.

 Ujagar Prints v. Union of India AIR 1989 sc 516(531)
2. Schedule contains details and forms for working out the policy underlying the section of statute.
3. The division of a statute in section and schedule is mere matter of convenience and a schedule contains
substantive enactment.
 Aphali Pharma Cuetical Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1989 SC 2227 (2237-38)

TRANSITORY PROVISIONS:

One feature of a transitory provision in that it is temporary.

 K.S. Pari Poornam v. State of Kerala AIR 1995 SC 1012 (1035-1036)

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 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY

Tradition View:

1. Intend of Parliament which passed the act is not to be gather from parliamentary history of the statute.
2. No more accurate source of information as to what was the evil or defect which the act now under
construction was intended to remedy could be imagined from the report or the commission
3. Limited but often use should be made of parliamentary history in constructing the statute.

External Aid:

Parliamentary History

1. Bill is original form.

2. Amendment considered during its process is legislative.
3. Speech of the minister
4. Debate is legislature.
5. Report of Commission which may have lead to the introduction of the legislation.
6. Report of law commission.

1. Court sometimes makes distinction between use of a material for finding mischief dealt with by the act and its use
for finding the meaning of the act.
 Shashikant v. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 2114 (2119-20)
2. It was held that speeches made the members of the constituent assembly in the course of debate or the debate on
the draft constitution cannot be admitted as external aid to the construction of the constitution.
 State of Travan v. Bombay Co. Ltd. AIR 1952 SC 366 (368)
3. A statute is expression or the collective intention of the legislation as a whole and any statement made by an
individual, member or minister of the intention and object of the Act, cannot be used to cut down the generality of
the words used in the statute.
 State of West Bengal v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1241 (1247)

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4. Chiaranjit Lal Chowdhary v. Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41 admitted parliamentary history including speech
of minister.
5. Gopalan, AIR 1950 SC 27. Debate can be used to show that the use of a particular word was up for consideration
at all or not.
6. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dadabhoy’s new Chirmiri Pandri Hill. AIR 1972 SC 614 minister’s speech.
7. It is now settled that the debates in the constituent Assembly may be relied upon to interpret a provision in the
constitution.
a. S.R. Chowdhary v. St. of Punjab AIR 2001 SC 2707 (2717)
b. Reference under article 143 2003 AIR 2003 SC 87 (101)
c. T.M. Pai Foundation v. St. of Karnataka AIR 2003 SC255 (415,430)
d. Arna Roy v Union of India AIR 2002 SC 3176 (3199)

Minister’s Speech- Not relied

 Rel. Pepper v. Hari

 P.V. Narsimha Rao v. State AIR 1998 SC 2120

The statement of minister who had moved the bill can be looked at to:-

i. Ascertain the mischief sought to be remedied and

ii. Object and purpose for which the legislation is enacted, but
iii. It is not taken into account for interpreting the provisions of the enactment.

Ammendment Considered during progress of Bill

The amendment considered during the progress of the bill were also ruled for the construction of the act.

a. Ashwini Kumar, AIR 1952 SC 369 (378-79)

b. Express newspapers, AIR 1958 SC 578 (622)
c. Harsaran Verma v. T.N. Singh AIR 1971 SC 1331 (1333)
d. S.P. Anand v. H.D. Dev Gowda AIR 1997 sc272 (276)

Statement of Object and reasons appended to a bill:

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It is well settled that the statement of object and reasons accompanying a bill when introduced in Parliament cannot
be used to determine the time meaning and effect of substantive part of the statute.

They cannot be used except for limited purpose of understanding the background and the antecedent state of affairs
leading up to the legislation

 State of West Bengal v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1241 (1247)

Report of Commission preceding the introduction of a bill:

Report of a committee which preceded the enactment of legislation, report of joint parliamentary committee and
report of commission set up for collecting information leading to legislation are permissible external aid to the
construction.

a. R.S. Naik v A.R. Artulay AIR 1984 SC 684

b. Haldiram Bhujiawala v. Anand Kumar AIR 2000 SC 1287 (1291)
c. Jayalaxmi rice and oil mills, AIR 1971 SC 1015 (1016)

Report of drafting Committee

Report of drafting committee and sub-committees of the Constituent Assembly, the draft constitution and changes
made thereafter in giving the constitution the final shape were referred in interpreting Para 5 (2) of Fifth schedule.

 Samatha v. St. of Andra Pradesh AIR 1997 SC 3297

White papers:

White papers issued by the Government detailing the facts leading to enactment of a statute is also admissible for
understanding the background when the court is called upon to interpret and decide the validity of the statute.

 M. Ismail Faruqqui v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 605

Historical facts and surrounding circumstances:

a. Historical works
b. Pictures
c. Engravings

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 d. Documents
e. Contemporary treaties.

Policy followed in the working of earlier act can be presumed to be known to Parliament while legislating
subsequently on a related subject and will thus admissible in construing the later act.

Social, Political and Economic development Economic invention:

1. Court must apply a statute to the world as it exists today.

2. Statute must be interpreted as it exists today.

A. Reference to the circumstances existing at the time of passing of the statute does not therefore means that
the language used at any rate in a statute should be held in applicable to social , political and economic
development or scientific invention not known at the time of passing of the
1. Telephone: - Technological advances not known at the time when the act was passed. It was held that
the telephone is telegraph within the meaning of that word in the telegraph Act 1863 and 1869.
Although telephone was not invented.
 A.G. v. Edison Telephone Co. of London (1880) 6 QBD 244 referred
a. Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxmimnarain Chopra AIR 1962 SC 159 (162)
b. Vishnu Agencies v. Commercial Tax officer AIR 1978 SC 449(460)
2. Video: - Cinematograph Act 1952 and cinema to Regulation Acts defined “Cinematography”
contained in section 2 (e) of Cinematograph Act 1952 will cover video cassette.
 Laxmi video Theatere v. State of Haryana AIR 1993 SC 2328
 Shankar video v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1993 SC 2111

Handwriting includes typewriter

 State v. S.J. Chowdhary AIR 1996 SC 1491 (1496)

Evidence taken through video confession.

 Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai 2003 AIR SEW 1885

Reference to other statute:

a) Statute in Pari Materia.

b) Assistance of earlier statute.
c) Assistance of earlier statute.

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 d) Incorporation of earlier act into later.
e) Reference of earlier act into later.
f) Codifying and consolidating statute.

Pari Materia

1. Statutes dealing with the same subject matter or forming same systems are known as Pari-materia
statute.
2. A statute must be read as a whole as words are to be understood in their context. Extension of this rule
of context permit references to other statute of Pari materia.
3. Where there are different statute in pari materia though made at different times or even expired and
not referring each other they shall be taken and continue together as one system.
 J.K. Steel Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 1173 (1183)
 Board of Trustees v. Srinesh AIR 1999 SC 2947 (2952)
4. Statutes are pari materia which relates to the same person or things or to the same class of persons or
things.
 Shah and Co. Bombay v. Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 317 (330)
5. When two pieces of legislation are differing scopes it cannot be said that they are pari materia.
Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rate control Act 1947 and Bombay Land Requisition Act
1948 are not pari materia.
6. It is not necessary that the entire subject matter in the two statute should be identical any provision in
one may be held to be Pari material with some provisions in the other statute.

Examples:

a. Section 4 of Prevention of Corruption Act 1994 and “shall presume” in Evidence act are pari
materia.

B. Assistance of earlier Statute:

1. Use of same words in similar connection in a later statute gives rise to a presumption that they are intended to
convey the same meaning as in the earlier statute.
 In re lily Isabel Thomas AIR 1964 SC 855

2. When once certain words in an act of parliament have received a judicial construction in one of the superior
courts and the legislature has repeated them without alteration in a subsequent statute.

21
  Banarasi Devi v. I.T.O. AIR 1964 SC 1742 (1745)
 Diwan Brothers v. Central Bank AIR 1976 SC 1503 (1515)

3. When a particular form of legislative enactment which has received authorities interpretation whether by long
course of practice is adopted in framing of a later statute, it is a sound rule of construction to hold that the words
so adopted were intended by the legislature to bear the meaning which has been put upon them.

4. Article 245 (1) and 246 of Constitution and section 95(1) and 100 of Government of India Act 1935 are pari
material.

“It is well settled rule of construction that when a statute is re- enacted and the words on repealed statute are
reproduced in the new statute, they should be interpreted in the sense which had been judicially put on them under
the repeal Act because the legislature is presumed to be acquainted with the construction which the court have put
upon the word and when they repeat the same words they must be taken to have accepted the interpretation put on
them by the courts as correctly reflecting the legislature mind.”

 Bengal Immunity co. ltd. v. State of Bihar. AIR 1955 SC 661 (749)
 Sakal Deep v. Union of India AIR 1974 SC 338 (341-42)
 Shiv Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1992 SC 1213 (1226)
Meaning of Judicial officer with reference ti Industrial dispute Act 1947 (Statesman pvt. Ltd. v. H.R.
Deb AIR 1968 SC 1495 (1499) cannot be used for constructing that expression in article 217 (2) (a) of the
Constitution for the two are of pari materia.
C. Assistance of later Statute:
1. A later statute is normally not used as an aid to construction of an earlier one.
 ITO v. Maniram AIR 1569 SC 543 (548)
 Vaijath v. Guramma AIR 1999 SC 555 (557)
2. When an earlier act is truly ambiguous a later act may in certain circumstances serve as a parliament
are exposition for the former.
 Ram Krishna v. Janpad Sabha AIR 1962 SC 1073 (1079)
3. It is proper that a subsequent legislation may be looked at in order to see what is the proper
interpretation to be put upon the earlier act, where the earlier act is obscure or ambiguous or readily
capable of more than one interpretation.
 State of Bihar v. S.K. Roy AIR 1960 SC 1995
 Hari Prasad v. A.D. Divaker AIR 1957 SC 121 (130-31)
 Assam Sillimamite v. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 1417 (1422)

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In Corporation of Earlier Act into later reference of earlier Act in to later:

1. Incorporation of an earlier Act in to a later act is a legislative device adopted for the sale of convenience in
order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the earlier Act in to later.
 Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Amik Singh AIR 2002 SC 3499 (3512)
 Mary Roy v. Kerala AIR 1986 SC 1011
2. When an earlier act or certain of its provision are incorporated by reference in to a later Act, the provision
so incorporated become part and pared of the later act as if they had been “bodily transposed in to it”
 Nagpur Improvement Trust
 Ramswaroop v. Munshi AIR 1963 SC 553 (558)

Effect of Incorporation:

1. If the subsequent act brings in to itself by reference some of the clause act, the legal effect is write those
sections into the new act as if they had been actually written in it with pen and printed in it.
 Mahendra & Mahendra v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 798 (810-11)
 Surana steels v. Dy Com. Income Tax AIR 1999 SC 1455 (1459)
2. The result is to constitute the later act along with the incorporated provisions of earlier act an independent
legislation, which is not modified or repealed by a modification or repeal of earlier legislation.
 Narottam Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1964 SC 1667 (1670)
3. The constitutional validity of incorporated provisions and the statute is judged with references to power of
legislature enacting the fresh legislation and not with reference to the power of legislature which enacted
earlier enactment.
 Bhaiyalal Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1962 SC 981 (985)

A statute may instead of referring to a particular previous statute or to any specific provision therein refer to the
law on the subject generally in such a case the reference is construed to mean that the law is as it reads there after
including amendments subsequent to the time of adoption.

 Bajya v. Gopikabai AIR 1978 SC 793

Example:-

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M.P. Land Revenue Code 1954

Section 154 provide that “subject to his personal law, the interest of a tenure holder shall on his death pass by
inheritance survivorship or bequest as the case may be. It was held that a case of legislation by reference of law on
the subject generally and therefore expression personal law will not be limited to the personal law as it stood when
the statute as it stood when the statute was enacted in 1954 but also embrace all subsequent statute like Hindu
succession act 1956 which time to time amended the Personal law.

 Baijya v. Gopika bai

 Heera v. Kasturibai (1996) 6 SCC 82
 Singhai Rakesh Kumar v. Union of India AIR 2001 SC 390

Example:-

M.P. Gram Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam 1973

SADA shall for the purpose or taxation have the power of Municipal Corporation or council has as the case may be
under M.P. Municipal Corporation Act 1956 or M.P. Municipalities Act 1961.

This is held not legislation by incorporation but legislation by reference.

 WCL v. SADA AIR 1982 SC 697

 State of M.P. v. M.V. Narsimha AIR 1975 SC 1835 (1841)

Exception to General Rule that repeal or amendment of an act which is incorporated in a later act has no effect on
the later act or on the provisions incorporated herein subject to the following four exceptions:

a. Where the later and earlier act are supplemental to each other.
Explaination:- whether the amendment of section 21 of Penal code by the criminal law (amend) Act 1958
was also applicable for the purpose of prevention of corruption Act 1947, which by section 2 incorporated
the definition of ‘Public servant’ as contained in section 21 of IPC.
 State of M.P. v. M.V. Narsimhan AIR 1975 SC 1835 (1841)
 State of Kerala v. Attessee AIR 1989 SC 222 (226)
b. Where two acts are pari materia.
c. Where the amendments of the earlier act, if not incorporated in the later act, would render it wholly
unworkable.

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 d. Where the amendment of the earlier acts either expressly or by necessary intendment also applies to the
later act.

Codifying and Consolidating Statute:

1. The purpose of a codifying statute is a present an orderly and authoritative statement of law on a given
subject.
2. Codifying act is presumed not to after the law unless a contrary intention appears.
 Board of trustee v. Sriyanesh AIR 1995 SC 2947 (2952)
3. The essence of a codifying statute is to be exhaustive on the matters in respect of which it declares the law
and it is not the province of judges the disregard or go outside the letters of the enactment according to its

Example:-

A question of res-judicata in relation to a suit is decided solely on the terms of section 11 or C.P.C. and not on
general principles of res-judicata.

 L. Jankirama v. P.P.M. Nilkanta AIR 1962 SC 633 (641)

 Gulab Chandra v. State of Gujrat AIR 1965 SC 1153 (1163)

Consolidating Statute:

1. The purpose of consolidating statute is to present the whole body of statutory law or a subject in complete
form, repealing the former statute.
2. In case of purely consolidating statute the presumption is that such a statue is not intended to alter the law.
3. A consolidating act may be an amending act. This additional purpose is usually indicated in the preamble
or in the law titles. An act to consolidate.

Kind of consolidating enactment:

1. Pure consolidation i.e. re-enactment.

2. Consolidation with correction and minor improvements
3. Consolidation with law commission amendments.

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Effect of Usage and Practice

Contemporanea Expositio:

Usage or Practice developed under a statue is indicative of the meaning ascribed to its words by contemporary
ancient statute is as admissible external aid to construction.

1. Doctrine of stare devises may also be applied when the law is settled in a state for 100 years.

 Ram Adhar Singh v. Bansi AIR 1987 SC 987

Dictionaries

1. When the words are not defined in the act itself it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the
general sense in which that word is understand in common parlance.
 Mahinder Singh v. Narayana AIR 1989 SC 1367 (1368)
2. A statute cannot be construed with the dictionaries in one hand and the statue in the other. Regard must
also be had to scheme, context and to the legislative history.
 Commissioner Income Tax v. M C Budhraja AIR 1993 SC 2529 (2540)
3. A dictionary meaning cannot be adopted if it will make some existing words redundant or will require
reading or some additional words.
 Dental Council of India v. Hari Prakash AIR 2001 SC3303 (3309).

7. Use of Foreign Decisions

On a question of Constitution of Indian statute, use of foreign decisions of countries following the same
system of jurisprudence as ours and rendered on statute in pari materia has been permitted practice in
Indian Court.

 Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 881 (887)

Subsidiary Rule

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 1. Same word same meaning;
a. When the legislature uses same word in different part of the same section or statute, there is a presumption
that the word is used in the same word throughout.
 Bhogilal v. Bombay AIR 1959 SC 356 (377)

Word ‘statement’ in section 157 of Evidence Act 1872 and use of same word in section 17to 21, 32 39 and 1495
carries same meaning.

2. “The guards on which the order has been made” was used in section 3(3) and 7(1) of Preventive Detention
Act 1950 carry different meaning.
 Sham Rao v D.M. Thara AIR 1957 SC 231
3. Even when same word is used at different places in the same clause of same section it may not bear same
meaning at each place having regard to the context of its used.
 Ramnarayan Mor v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1964 SC 949 (953)

Section 117 (1) of U.P. Zamidari:

Abolition and Land Reform laws authorizes the state govt. to declare that ‘hats bazaar and melas’ which had vested
in the state shall vest in Goan Sabha Supreme Court says that vesting in State govt is absolute and vesting in Sabha
is limited to possession and management.

 Maharaja Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1976 SC 2602 (2608)

Example of different meaning of same word used in same clause depending upon context.

2. Use of different word

When in relation to the same subject matter different words are used in same statute, there is presumption that they
are not used in same sense.

 B.R. Enterprise v. State of U.P. AIR 1999 SC 1867 (1902)

“Trade and business” in Art 298 have different meaning from “trade and Commerce” used in art 301 of the
Constitution.

3. Rule of last Amendment

 Aswini Kumar Ghiose v. Aurbindo Bose AIR 1952 SC 369 (76)
4. Non- Obstante Clause

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 a. A clause beginning with “Notwithstanding anything contained in this act or in same particular
provision in the act or in some particular act or in any law for the time being in force.” Is sometime
appended to a section in the beginning with a view to give the enacting provisions of the section in
case of conflict overriding effect over the provisions or act mentioned in non obstante Clause.
 Union of India v. G.M. Kakil AIR 1984 SC 1022
b. The phrase “Notwithstanding anything” is used in contradiction of the phrase “subject to”
 Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service Raspur v. R.T.A. AIR 1966 SC 1318
i. When provision ‘A’ is subject to the provision ‘B’ a case falling under the provision ‘B’ is taken out of
the provision ‘A’.
ii. Comm. Of Wealth Tax v. Trustee H.E.H Nizam AIR 1977 SC 2103
Section 3 of Wealth Tax Act is subject to the other provisions of the act hence a case of a trustee which
falls in section 21 is outside of section 3.

“Notwithstanding anything (contained) in any other law” occurring in a section of an act cannot construe to
take away the effect of any provision of the act in which that section appears.

 P. Virudha Chalam v. Management of Lotus Mills AIR 1998 SC 554 (561-62)

 Any other law will refer to any law other than in which that section occurs.

“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act” may be construed to take away the effect of any provision of
the act in which the section occurs but it cannot take away the effect of any other law.

 Satyanarayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2001 SC 2856 (2860-61)

“Notwithstanding anything contained in this code” in section 482 of CrPc cannot take away the effect of section 19
of P.C. Act which prevent grant of stay.

“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment” cannot take away the effect of any provision in a
law which is not an enactment.

 Sharda Devi v. Bihar AIR 2002 SC 1357 (1360)

Section 54 of Land Acquisition Act 1894 – “Notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment” does not
exclude a letter patent appeal as letter’s patent is not an enactment.

PEK Kalliani Amma v. K. Devi AIR 1964 SC 1963 (1976)

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Section 16 of Hindu Marriage Act 1956 ofens with “Notwithstanding that a marriage is null and void under section
11” but having regard to the language and beneficient purpose of enacting clause it was not restricted to marriages
that were void under section 11 of the act and children born of all void marriages were held to be legitimate.

5. Legal Fiction:
1. The legislature is quite competent to create a legal fiction.
2. Legislature can enact a deeming provision for the purpose of assuming existence of a fact which does not
really exist.
 Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishwa Cooperative AIR 1990 SC 1563 (1575)
 CIT V. Urmila Ramesh AIR 1998 SC 2640 (2645-46)

When act enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and in truth was not done the
court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes between what person the statute fiction is to be resort to.

 State Travancore v. Sammug Vilas AIR 1953 SC 333(343)

6. Mandatory or Directory Provisions:

1. The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intend of legislature and
not upon the language in which intent in clothes.
 State of M.P. v. Pradeep Kumar (2000) 7 SEC 372 (377)
2. If a provision is mandatory an act done in breach thereof will be invalid but if it is directory the act may be
valid although the non compliance may give rise to some other penalty if provided by the statute.
 Drigraj Kaur v. Amar Krishna AIR 1960 SC 444 (449)
 Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel AIR 1985 SC 1416
Breach of a directory provision does not entail any invalidity.

Exception:

The general rule that non-compliance of a mandatory requirement results in nullification of the act is subject to
following two exceptions:-

a. Performance of the requirement is impossible.

29
 b. Waiver: “Quilibet Potest renunia re juri pro se introducto” every man is entitled to renounce a rright
introduced in his favour.
 Lachamma v. Radheshyam AIR 1971 SC

It must be remembered that the principles of waiver applies when the requirements of statute do not involve any
question of Public interest or public policy, than performance of condition cannot be waived.

 Raichand Jain v. Miss Chandra Kanta AIR 1991 SC 744 (754) permission of rent controller to
convert residential building into non-residential.

When consequences provided:

When consequences of nullification on failure to comply with a prescribed requirement is provided by the statute
itself that such requirement must be interpreted as mandatory.

Rajsekhar Gogoi v. Assam AIR 2001 SC 2313 (2315)

Example:

Requirement of registration of certain prescribed documents section 17 of the Registration act or T P Act is
mandatory since the consequences of non-registration is given in section 49 that such document if not registered do
not affect the property comprised therein.

 Secretary of state v. kachwar lime AIR 1935 PC 20 (22)

Use of negative words

1. Negative words are clearly prohibitory and are ordinary used as a legislative device to make a statute
imperative.
 M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa AIR 1961 SC 1107 (1113)

Exceptions:- Direction relating to solemnization of marriage through using negative words, have been construed
directory in case where the enactment in question did not provide for consequences that the marriage in breach of
those direction shall be invalid.

 Lila Gupta v. Laxmi Narayan AIR 1978 SC 1351 (1354-55)

2. Section 25f (c) of I.D. Act 1947 held directory and (a) and (b) are mandatory.

30
 The rule that negative words are usually mandatory is like any other rule subordinate to the context and the
object intended to be achieved by the particular requirement.

Affirmative words may imply negative:

Affirmative words stand at a weaker footing than negative words for reading the provision mandatory but
affirmative words may also be so limiting as to imply negative.

Section 54, 59, 107 and 123 of Transfer of Property Act 1882 and in affirmative language but the requirement are
mandatory.

 Mian PirBux v. Mohd. Taher AIR 1935 PC 235 (237)

Use of ‘Shall’ and ‘May’ and ‘must and ‘should’

1. The use of the word shall raises a presumption that the particular provisions and imperative.
 State of U.P. v. Maharashtra AIR 1957 SC 912 (917)
2. This presumption may be rebutted by other consideration such as object and scope of enactment and the
consequences from the construction.
 Mohan Lal (AIR 1957 SC 912)
3. When a statute uses the word ‘shall’ prima facie it is mandatory but the Court may ascertain the real
intention of legislature by attending to the whole scope of statute.
 State of U.P. v. Babu Ram AIR 1961 SC 751 (765)
4. The word ‘must’ in place of ‘shall’ will itself be sufficient.
5. The use of word ‘should’ instead of ‘must’ may not justify the influence that the provision is directory if
the context in otherwise.
 Bhattacharya v. State of Madhya Pradesh

Consideration of general inconvenience in statutes imposing Public duty-

Where a statute imposes a public duty and lays down the manner in which and time within which the duty shall be
performed injustice or inconvenience may be relevant, in holding such prescription only directory.

Time:

Where a public officer is directed by a statute to perform a duty within a specified time the cases established that
provisions as to time are only directory while construing sec 17(1) of Industrial Dispute Act 1947 that it is

31
obligatory on the govt. to publish an award, but the provision that it should be published within thirty days is not
mandatory and award published beyond thirty days is not invalid.

 Ramington Rand v. Workman AIR 1950 SC 224 (226)

Consultation:

1. Provision in article 320 (3) (e) of Constitution of India requiring that the Public service commission shall
be consulted on all disciplinary matters affecting civil servants has been interpreted as directory.
 State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal AIR 1957 SC 912

Contra:-

 K.K. Shrinivasan v. Union of India AIR 1958 SC 419 (430)

 Jyoti Prakash Mitter v. Chief Justice AIR 1965 SC 961 (966)

Formalities prescribed for making Contract:

1. Formalities and requirement for making contract or transfer have been held imperative.
2. Provisions of Constitution and Municipal Act providing the manner in which contract shall be executed
held mandatory.

Article 299:

 Sohan Lal v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 955 (956)

 B.C. Mahindra v. Municipal AIR 1970 SC 729

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33