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Amity Law School , Noida

INTERPRETATION OF
STATUTES PROJECT
Topic – Analysis of Case Law –
Dominion of India & Others vs Shrinbai A.
Irani & Ors. 1954 AIR 596, 1955 SCR 206

SUBMITTED TO:
Mr. Ajay Kant Chaturvedi
SUBMITTED BY:
Nandini Sharma- A3256121106
Manasi Shah- A3256121107
Sachin Choudhary-A3256121101
Gladson Rodrigues-A3256121164
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Abstract:
The term ‘Interpretation’ is derived from Latin term ‘interpreter’ which means to
explain or to understand or translate. Interpretation is a process through which
one ascertains the true and correct intention of the law making bodies as is laid in
the form of statutes. As the administration of justice is conducted by the judges in
accordance with the provisions of law, therefore it requires that there are certain
rules of interpretation to ensure that just and uniform decisions are delivered by
them. The most important objective that is achieved by the interpretation of
statutes is that it ensures that the court act according to the intent of the
legislature. Interpretation is the primary function of the judges. There are three
wings of a Government: Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. It is the legislature
which lays down the laws but it is judiciary which puts the law into operation or
in use. There arises need for the judges to ascertain the correct meaning of the
law laid by the legislature. The courts are expected not to act arbitrarily and
consequently they are to follow the rules of interpretation. It is basically finding
out the true sense of any form of words that is the sense the author intended to
convey, and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the
author intended to convey. In case “Dominion of India & others V Shrinbai
A.Irani & others.1954 AIR 596 ,1955 SCR 205 , Court held that The Apex Court
held that the provision was to be interpreted literally and must be given its plain
and grammatical meaning. It must be interpreted in light of the preamble of the
Ordinance. It was held that it does not matter if the requisition Orders were
ending due to the expiry of the Defence of India Act (1939) and its rules or due
to their own inherent weakness. Both such properties were to continue being
under requisition owing to the Ordinance coming into force.

Research Methodology:

The study is based on Doctrinal research. The facts and information have taken
from various websites and have been interpreted accordingly.
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Objective of the Case Study

• To find out the facts of the case

• To find out kind of interpretation used by the court while giving
judgement
• To find out the literal meaning of context

Dominion of India & Others vs Shrinbai A. Irani & Ors. 1954 AIR 596, 1955
SCR 206

Facts:

1. The First Respondent owned three shops which were situated at the

ground floor of the building called ‘Irani Manzil’.

2. The Collector of Bombay requisitioned this property through an Order

issued under Rule 75-A of the Defence of India Rules read with
Notification no. 1336/OR/1/42 of the Government.
3. The premises were used as Government Grain Shop no. 176.

Procedural History:

1. Trial Court: Ruled in favour of the First Respondent holding that the

property would not be under requisition after 30.09.1946 on account of

Clause 3 of the Ordinance of 1946. The Court held that the Order of
requisition was made for a specific purpose and it ceased to be operative
when the purpose was achieved.
2. Court of Appeal: Concurred with the Trial Court with regard to

Clause 3 of the Ordinance of 1946.

Issue:

1. Did Clause 3 of Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Powers) Ordinance,

1946, allow the continuation of requisition of the Government Grain

Shop beyond 30.09.1946?
2. Could the non-obstante clause in Clause 3 of the Ordinance, be
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interpreted to mean that only those requisitioning orders which were

expiring on account of expiration of the Defense of India Act, 1939 and
its rules were to be continued and not those which were expiring due to
an inherent weakness within the orders themselves?

Rule:

1. Clause 3 of Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Powers)

Ordinance, 1946 (the Ordinance).
2. Rule 75A (1) of Defense of India Rules.

3. Rules of Interpretation: Literal Rule of Interpretation

Analysis and Ratio by the Court

1. Due to the expiration of the Defence of India Act, 1939, all requisition

orders made under its Section 75A would have ended on 31.09.1946,
releasing all the immovable properties requisitioned thereunder as well.
2. The Ordinance was enacted to continue these requisitions.

3. The Wrong Argument accepted by lower Courts: The non-obstante

clause supplemented the argument that Clause 3 of the Ordinance will

continue the operation of only those Orders which would have come to an
end owing to the expiration of the Act and Rules. On the other hand,
those Orders which were expiring due to their own inherent weakness
(i.e. Orders containing an expiry date themselves and not just due to the
expiry of the Act), will not be continued.
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4. The above argument treated the non-obstante clause like an exception to

the operative part. Some points regarding non-obstante clause observed in

the judgement:
1. Normally, there should be a close connection between the non-

obstante clause and the operative part of the section, they need not
always be coextensive with one another.
2. If the words of the operative part of the enactment are clear and

can be elucidated in only one given manner, the non-obstante

clause cannot cut its meaning to restrict its scope.
3. In such a case, it has to be assumed that the non-obstante clause

has to be understood as clarifying the whole provision.

Legislature must have put it in the provision with ample caution
and not just for limiting the scope of the enactment.
5. The Court said that Clause 3 read with Clause 2(3) of the Ordinance

(definition of a requisitioned property) gave it a very clear meaning and

chose not to surmise the intention of the legislature behind enacting the
Ordinance.
6. The Apex Court held that the provision was to be interpreted

literally and must be given its plain and grammatical meaning. It

must be interpreted in light of the preamble of the Ordinance. It was
held that it does not matter if the requisition Orders were ending due to
the expiry of the Defence of India Act (1939) and its rules or due to their
own inherent weakness. Both such properties were to continue being
under requisition owing to the Ordinance coming into force.
7. Justice Bhagwati further pronounced that Courts are helpless to go into

the merits of individual cases. Any person who is discontented with the
continuance of the requisition can take their pleas to the proper
Government who may then release the property.
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Analysing the Court’s Reasoning:

1. Literal Rule:

This rule states that a legal provision must be construed in a literal and
grammatical manner. An enactment must be given its natural meaning if its
meaning is clear and unambiguous. Clause 3 of the Ordinance’s language could
only have a single meaning on its plain and grammatical reading and that would
effectuate into continuing all the requisition Orders to continue regardless of
their built-in fragility. The Apex Court had held in Municipal Board V/s. State
Transport Authority, Rajasthan that it is the obligation of the Court to interpret
the law as it exists and to give a provision its plain and grammatical meaning
regardless of harsh conclusions. This rule requires Courts to interpret a
technical word technically and not leniently. The Court stated that it was not
their duty to decipher the intention of the legislature while enacting the
provision. But they were incognizant to the fact that by construing the provision
literally they had surmised the intention of the legislature, which was to keep as
much immovable properties under requisition as possible. The strict
interpretation of the provision led to a harsh conclusion i.e. the First Respondent
not getting the possession of her immovable property.

2. Why was the Golden Rule not applied?

Applying the Golden Rule would have allowed the Court to interpret the
provision somewhat liberally. They could have agreed with the decision of the
lower Courts by giving the non-
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Obstante clause a wider meaning. Golden rule is generally applied where

interpreting the provisions literally would lead to an absurd or unjust conclusion
However, this judgement has to be perused in light of the political background
of 1946 i.e. the end of 2nd World War and the Indian Independence movement
which was about to bear its fruit. It was of paramount exigency for the
Government to keep as much immovable property (such as Government Grain
Shop in this case) to store such essentials. The Court thus construed the
provision literally as this would have allowed them to have maximum amount
of storage space under their requisition.

Conclusion
The Trial Court and Court of Appeal had erred in construing the
provision. The clause was given its legal meaning to hold that all the
properties that were under requisition of the Government will continue
to stay under requisition by virtue of Cause 3 of the Ordinance. By virtue
of the non-obstante clause, a distinction between Orders based on them
expiring due to the end of the Act or expiring due to their own flaw,
cannot be drawn. The non-obstante clause was included just to give the
Ordinance an overriding effect over the operation of the Defense of
India Act, 1939.