Electoral Politics. Vol. 3, No. 1, 2020 • ISSN 2687–0851 (online) • electoralpolitics.

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Assessing the Effectiveness of “Smart Voting” Strategy:

A Discussion of Analytical Approaches

Ivan V. Bolshakov, Vladimir V. Perevalov

The article discusses the approaches for assessing the impact of “Smart Voting” strat-
egy on the 2019 Moscow City Duma election results. The authors use electoral behav-
ior theory to demonstrate how the change of public opinion, protest mobilization and
electoral space transformation ushered a victory for opposition candidates. Electoral
behavior of Moscow citizens has changed significantly compared to the last election:
there is an obvious increase of protest and tactical voting. These voting methods are
different by nature, motives and goals, but this time they found common ground in
candidates, making it possible for analysts to discuss the effectiveness of the opposi-
tion’s new strategy. The authors insist that “Smart Voting” should be regarded as tac-
tical voting, as protest voting has no direct relationship with this strategy. Measuring
the quantitative impact of the two voting methods helps to identify no more than six
constituencies where the strategy was most significant and five constituencies where
it could have been significant had other candidates ended up on the “Smart Voting”
list. However, the strongest impact on election results was created by a decreased com-
petitiveness across constituencies and the change of public opinion that allowed fo-
cusing voters’ attention on the more consequential opposition candidates.

Key words: electoral behavior, tactical voting, protest voting, protest mobilization,
the opposition, electoral competitiveness

Many reporters and analysts called the results of September 2019 election
to Moscow City Duma sensational. For the first time in many years, the oppo-
sition challenged the authorities and nearly stripped them of parliamentary ma-
jority. Representatives from opposition parties took 20 out of the 45 seats, which
only compares to the structure of the first two convocations of the city parlia-
ment. This achievement is attributed to “Smart Voting” strategy initiated by
Alexey Navalny. The essence of this strategy is to vote for the candidate who is
the strongest alternative to the authorities.
In the context of electoral authoritarianism, these election results are indeed
impressive, although the optimistic conclusions regarding the effectiveness of
Navalny’s strategy are unsubstantiated and premature. Our paper on assessing
the impact of “Smart Voting” on election results published in the journal
“Politeia” [Bol’shakov, Perevalov 2020] gave the discussion of the strategy a
new turn. For this reason, we find that we have to clarify our position on the
issue and to elaborate as to why our model provides a better interpretation of
Moscow City Duma election results than its alternatives.
When it comes to Moscow elections, researchers focus on the list of candi-
dates endorsed by “Smart Voting” while paying no heed to the multitude of
factors, voters’ motivations and causal links. The judgement on the strategy’s
success is made intuitively [Rogov 2019; Dollbaum 2019; Racz 2019] while the
quantitative assessment is reduced to pure mathematics [Ovchinnikov 2019a;

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Buzin 2020] and isolated from the context and electoral behavior theory. Ana-
lysts overlook the “Smart Voting” itself and every time view it as something
else instead: a protest, tactical voting, Navalny’s influence or everything at
once.
For example, Kirill Rogov uses protest and tactical voting as synonyms.
For this reason, the gains in electoral indicators of “Smart Voting” candidates
(as compared to electoral indicators of previous election’s runner-ups) are at-
tributed to the strategy itself while the connection with other candidates’ results
in the given constituencies is subsequently ignored.
In his paper, Andrei Buzin measures how the results of party candidates
have changed compared to the 2014 election. The study shows that the results
changed significantly if the candidates were endorsed by “Smart Voting”, and
either dropped or slightly changed if they were not. Although this analysis is
helpful in measuring the dynamics of party preferences, it does not help us un-
derstand the Moscow City Duma election results. The results do not depend on
party preferences as much as they do on voters’ motivations and structural char-
acteristics of electoral space. At the same time, it is clear that both the public
mood and the structure of electoral menu have shifted dramatically compared
to the previous election.
For his part, Boris Ovchinnikov compares the results of the Communist
Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) candidates who were endorsed by
“Smart Voting” and of those who were not to find that the “Smart Voting” can-
didate gained 18-20 pp more votes than their fellow party member not endorsed
by Navalny. That said, the conclusion made from analysing the indicators of
one party is extrapolated to all constituencies. Not only does this method of
qualitative assessment prevent any accurate measurements from being recorded,
but it also generalizes special cases, which naturally leads to data corruption.
Buzin and Ovchinnikov fail to take one major factor into account: a candi-
date’s potential and chances are already built into the “Smart Voting” system as
its basic criteria, meaning they already serve as an explanatory variable to both
candidate’s nomination for “Smart Voting” and election results. By studying the
link between being on “Navalny’s list” and vote returns we combine two de-
pendent variables while breaking the principle of consequential events.
In reality, Buzin and Ovchinnikov compare the results of candidates who,
in many cases, were one of the few, if not the only ones among the opposition
to run a campaign in the constituency, or were the only significant challenger to
the party of power, to the candidates who either did not run a campaign or were
overshadowed by the more powerful and active members of the opposition. In
the end, both Buzin and Ovchinnikov assume that the percent interval between
these two groups of candidates is linked to the “Smart Voting” impact. The find-
ings from this model lose any meaning, as the link between the given variables
is mediated by a third variable, which is removed from the analysis itself. This
approach is justified if tactical voting is employed accidentally and heuristically,
when voters themselves evaluate the chances of a candidate. In our case, how-
ever, such approach proves to be invalid.

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 Moreover, the 2019 election results do not just involve the increased sup-
port for opposition candidates; the point is that they have surpassed their pro-
government competitors, none of whom went over 50%. In the previous elec-
tion, 17 candidates from the party of power gained the absolute majority of votes
(the highest result being 69.28%). In the current election, only 12 administrative
candidates garnered the support of more than 40% of voters (the highest result
being 47.17%). In light of this, we cannot disregard the decreased support for
administrative candidates and confine all changed voter preferences to the op-
position electorate alone. However, interpreting all additional votes gained by
alternative candidates as the effect of “Smart Voting” appears unjustified with-
out at least identifying the strategy’s mechanism for influencing voter motiva-
tion and putting the object of measurement into the collection of variables that
can be empirically tested.

Electoral studies cannot be conducted without mathematical methods just

as much as they cannot be conducted without logic and defining the studied
phenomena in the context of political science and sociology. Interpreting elec-
tion results without any theoretical basis and context consideration leads to what
Giovanni Sartori calls “conceptual stretching” [Sartori 2003]. In other words,
by disregarding object pre-identification and qualitative evaluation of concepts
we engage in false measurement, which does not quite answer the question we
try to address through quantitative analysis. This is why we cannot consider
either Rogov’s (200 thousand or 12.5% of votes) or Ovchinnikov’s (300 thou-
sand or 19% of votes) estimates a valid measure for “Smart Voting” strategy.
We believe that “Smart Voting” has to be identified just as its authors en-
visioned it – a way to consolidate the electorate to prevent the votes of the op-
position supporters from scattering. The following is the quote from the authors
of the strategy: “We need 3% of those voters on the general electoral roll who
never went to the polls before to take part in “Smart Voting” as well as the third
of the voters who always goes to the polls to vote against United Russia. 33%
not from the general electoral roll, but from those who always voted opposition.

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It’s just that this time they have to vote for the same candidate. Then we’ll def-
initely take the majority away from United Russia. What’s important is that they
have to vote smart instead of voting ideologically, for ‘their’ party” [Navalny
2018]. “In a real election, everyone votes on their convictions, not tactically.
But there’s little hope for that after everything that we’ve seen recently. As a
result, they pretend it’s a real election and so do we. But even in a situation like
ours we can try to maximize the damage to the government” [Nanesti... 2019].
These statements indicate a typical tactical voting scenario where the voters
make their vote as useful as possible: they do not waste it by voting for underdog
candidates and instead choose someone with the best chance of defeating the
disliked candidate that is expected to win [Heath, Evans 1994]. The motives
behind this most pragmatic type of electoral behavior have nothing in common
with personal preferences determined by the personality of a candidate, agree-
ing with their political platform (ideological voting) or a desire to demonstrate
dissatisfaction (protest voting). This means that a distinction must be made be-
tween tactical and protest effects of voting, and that their impact on election
results must be measured separately, which we did in our study.
We divided the election participants into three groups: administrative can-
didates endorsed by the mayor’s office, alternative candidates endorsed by the
“Smart Voting” list, and the third group of candidates (all the remaining election
participants who are not part of the main competition). The analysis also ex-
cluded atypical situations (constituencies no. 21 and 37), where administrative
and alternative candidates coincided, meaning they were endorsed both by
“Smart Voting” and mayor’s office.
To solve the main problem, we measured the dynamics of electoral support
for the three groups of candidates and the overflow of votes between them by
comparing it with similar indicators from the 2014 election. (In 2014, the alter-
native candidates were the stronger opposition nominees who gained the most
votes than other opposition candidates).
If the indicators of alternative candidates increased at the expense of the
third group’s indicators decreasing, then a tactical effect was produced (32 con-
stituencies). If they increased at the expense of administrative candidates’ indi-
cators decreasing, this was a protest effect (35 constituencies). Then, by clearing
the results of alternative candidates from one of the effects, we determined
which of the effects was the source of the advantage over the administrative
opponent and helped “Smart Voting” candidates win.
Tactical voting had a decisive impact only in 4 out of the 18 constituencies
won over by the opposition: without it, alternative candidates were losing to
administrative candidates by 3.2 to 13.1 pp. In 10 constituencies, alternative
candidates won by a margin of 3.5 to 23.1 pp without tactical voting; in 6 out of
these 10 constituencies the margin was over 15 pp. In four more constituencies,
the effects were limited (between 0.43 to 0.85 pp for two cases of tactical voting
and between 0.44 and 1 pp for two cases of protest voting). In 30 out of 43
constituencies, the decrease in support for administrative candidates exceeded
the decrease in third group’s indicators. The situation was the opposite only in

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13 constituencies. Eleven cases indicated no tactical voting effect whatsoever –
the third group gained more votes than in the previous election.

An analysis of the overflows revealed a tactical voting share of 5.57%. The

share of protest voting was 11.13%: 9.72% for alternative candidates and a
1.41% overflow to the third group. This estimate corresponds with the scope of
tactical voting in the countries where it is typically observed, namely the United
Kingdom, Germany and Canada, its share amounting to no more than 6-8%
[Johnston, Pattie 1991; Kim, Fording 2001; Gschwend 2017; Kim, Kostadinova
2010].

The correlation analysis confirms our estimates. However, individual com-

parison of the indicators in constituencies with an alternative (18 constituencies)
and administrative (25 constituencies) majority allows for a more reliable con-
clusion. Constituencies with an alternative majority indicate a heavy depend-

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ence of “Smart Voting” candidates’ support on decreased support of pro-gov-
ernment candidates (R = –0.77; R2 = 0.59). A direct link between the results of
alternative and third group candidates (R = 0.24) is revealed here as well. This
is indicative of similar patterns in supporting the “Smart Voting” candidates and
minor opposition candidates, which should not be present under the conditions
of tactical voting and votes overflowing from minor candidates. Constituencies
with an administrative majority indicate a moderate dependence of the increase
in alternative candidates’ indicators on the decrease in third-group candidates’
indicators (R = –0.57; R2 = 0.32). Despite a more significant impact of “Smart
Voting” in this case, it was not enough for the opposition to win.

Electoral space and competition

Another factor that should be considered when assessing the effectiveness

of “Smart Voting” is the configuration of electoral space. Although, according
to Arkadi Lyubarev’s estimates, the effective number of parties decreased only
slightly (3.24 against 3.36 in the previous election) [Lyubarev 2019], comparing
the structure of election participants reveals a link between election outcomes
and party exposure. The index of the effective number of parties demonstrates
the results of the competition, but does not reveal anything about the disposition
of political actors prior to polling day.
In the 2014 election, all major opposition parties competed among them-
selves: candidates from CPRF, Yabloko, A Just Russia and the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party of Russia (LDPR) were running in 42 constituencies out of 45. In
10 constituencies, the competition was intensified by the presence of strong in-
dependent candidates or representatives of the Civic Platform party. One oppo-
sition party or another was not represented only in three constituencies. In four
constituencies, United Russia did not nominate anyone, so the opposition nom-
inees became administrative candidates there.
Within the opposition itself, CPRF and Yabloko became the main compet-
ing parties. The candidates from these parties went toe-to-toe in 19 constituen-
cies at once: CPRF was the strongest opposition party with Yabloko as its run-
ner-up in 16 constituencies while a reversed situation developed in 3 constitu-
encies. 10 constituencies saw CPRF challenging A Just Russia, with 6
consituencies dominated by communists and 4 by A Just Russia. CPRF bested
other opposition candidates in 9 more constituencies while Yabloko did the
same in 3 more. A Just Russia did not top any other constituency and was the
runner-up to the opposition candidate only once more. LDPR candidates be-
came runner-ups only in three constituencies and bested the rest of the opposi-
tion in a single constituency (granted the nominee was the administrative can-
didate, this case should be considered an exception).
Civic Platform gained the upper hand in two constituencies (where it sepa-
rately competed against CPRF and A Just Russia) and became the runner-up to
CPRF in another. In seven constituencies, the race was going on between the

6
opposition party and an alternative independent candidate. Five of these constit-
uencies were dominated by communists, one by Yabloko and one by an inde-
pendent candidate.
The year of 2019 saw a completely different balance of power. Nearly thirty
alternative candidates representing Yabloko, Alexey Navalny, Dmitry Gudkov
and other factions were either denied registration or removed from the election
in a court case, or dropped out of the race for other reasons. United Russia did
not officially nominate its candidates, so all representatives of the party of
power ran as independent candidates (we will further refer to them as United
Russia candidates for clarity nonetheless). At the same time, the number of ad-
ministrative candidates representing the opposition parties increased to six. As
a result, none of the constituencies saw all major parties compete against each
other.
In 35 constituencies, CPRF, LDPR and A Just Russia candidates competed
without anyone from Yabloko (United Russia candidates were not present in 4
of these constituencies either). The competition turned out to be even more lim-
ited in the remaining constituencies. Two of these constituencies had A Just
Russia running against LDPR, but not Yabloko and CPRF. Two more constitu-
encies where Yabloko was running against LDPR did not feature either CPRF
or A Just Russia. In four cases, CPRF and LDPR were featured while A Just
Russia and Yabloko were not. The main opposition parties (three parliamentary
plus Yabloko) were simultaneously represented in two constituencies only, alt-
hough they were only competing among themselves, as one of the opposition
parties served as the administrative actor.
While 30 independent candidates ran in the previous election, this time
there were only 16. In 2014, five independent candidates gained over 10%
(22.99% max). In 2019, there were only two such independents (28.36% max).
Voters supported the independent candidates more commonly even if they were
a minor alternative: without considering the stronger independents, the mean
values were 4.82% and 6.09% respectively.
As a result, the 20 winning “Smart Voting” candidates were not competing
against Yabloko in 16 cases, against United Russia in 6 cases, against CPRF in
3 cases and against A Just Russia in two cases. Speaking of all constituencies,
in 10 cases the election was held without the participants who previously were
alternative candidates and gained an average of 22.5% votes while in 22 cases
there were no participants serving as the second alternative candidate with an
average of 12.6% votes. Considering the nature of electoral geography, the op-
positional capacity of a constituency remained unchanged, but other participants
profited from it this time.
An equally important factor for the 2019 campaign was the spoiler effect,
which was not absent in 2014. CPRF had to compete against Communists of
Russia in 30 constituencies, where it lost between 2.47 and 11.45 pp (6.66 pp
on average) to the second communist party. The opposition lost 22 constituen-
cies with Communists of Russia as a participant, while winning 9 (Communists
of Russia did not run against CPRF in one of these). CPRF could have won 14
more constituencies had the spoilers not participated. It is impossible to make a

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definitive conclusion on alternative outcomes, as voters also relied on personal
qualities of a candidate (for example, spoiler was voted for more often if it was
the only female candidate or the only female opposition candidate). However,
this victory was possible in at least three constituencies where the gap between
the pro-government candidate and CPRF candidate was minimal (constituency
no. 7 – 0.38 pp, constituency no. 32 – 1.32 pp, constituency no. 36 – 0.08 pp).

If the four parliamentary parties and Communists of Russia were simulta-

neously running in one constituency (meaning the major opposition party was
running against both United Russia and no less than three other opposition par-
ties, including the spoiler party), the opposition mostly lost (20 cases) and rarely
won (4 cases). In any case, there were five losing cases in less competitive set-
tings. In three constituencies, CPRF was running against United Russia, LDPR
and A Just Russia, but without Communists of Russia while in two it was run-
ning against United Russia, LDPR and Communists of Russia, but without A
Just Russia (without Yabloko in both cases as well).
The remaining 16 cases are winning cases, four out of which indicated little
competitiveness (out of the main parties, one constituency only saw United Rus-
sia, A Just Russia and LDPR while the rest only saw CPRF, LDPR and A Just
Russia). In three cases, only the four parliamentary parties were competing
among themselves (without Yabloko and United Russia in all seven cases).
Three more constituencies saw three parliamentary parties and Yabloko running
against each other (no United Russia and Communists of Russia in the two and
no CPRF and Communists of Russia in one). Another three had three parlia-
mentary parties and Communists of Russia (no A Just Russia in two cases and
no CPRF in one; no Yabloko in all three either). Finally, the remaining three
constituencies had a relatively high competition, but there was always a party
lacking in every case for full representation (Yabloko in two cases and one for
A Just Russia and United Russia each).

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 Relatively high results achieved by Communists of Russia in several con-
stituencies (higher than the average 7.11% in 14 cases, with 20% as the highest
in a constituency without CPRF) are an indirect indication of protest and ideo-
logical voting. Voters guided by the “Smart Voting” list would not have mis-
taken one communist party for another, especially if it were a matter of a can-
didate’s personality.
Such transformation of electoral space puts considerable strain on trying to
conduct a pure analysis of “Smart Voting” impact. The authorities had already
done what the new strategy was intended to do by decreasing competition levels
among the opposition parties in some cases and releasing them from competi-
tion with party of power in other. A consistent opposition voter did not require
a special tool for transferring their vote from a weaker candidate to a stronger
one – many simply did not have any other choice except voting for the more
prominent alternative candidate. This is equally applicable to protest electorate
for which the party it votes for is not as significant as the act of protest. For
these reasons, comparing party results is meaningless. This is why our analysis
focuses on the indicators of administrative and alternative candidates.

To reduce the impact on the findings of the decreased competition factor,

the effectiveness of “Smart Voting” should be measured where it was truly
meaningful, namely in competitive constituencies where at least two alternative
candidates could compete for the opposition majority. For this purpose, we se-
lected the constituencies that complied with two conditions: a “Smart Voting”
candidate competed against an administrative candidate from the party of power
while also running against the second alternative opposition candidate. The se-
cond condition was defined as nothing more than a twofold gap between the
candidates. We found six eligible constituencies (no. 3, no. 13, no. 26, no. 28,
no. 30 and no. 38), where the first alternative candidate (also known as the
“Smart Voting” candidate) averaged 26.87% and the second averaged 20.95%.

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In the remaining 33 constituencies, the alternative candidate was nearly unchal-
lenged (36.80% against 10.11%). “Smart Voting” effect alone cannot explain
the extremely low result of the runner-up.
Two more cases can be referred to as competitive with certain reservations,
where there may have been a twofold gap between the results of alternative
candidates, but not as wide as in other cases. In constituency no. 16, Mikhail
Timonov, a candidate from A Just Russia, gained 36.40% (winning the election)
while his CPRF contender, Aleksandra Andreyeva, gained 17.34%. At the same
time, not only did she face an ideological spoiler in Communists of Russia
(4.34%), but also an independent candidate of the same name (3.82%). In con-
stituency no. 35, A Just Russia’s Sergei Vasilyev gained the support of 28.36%
voters (losing the election) while his CPRF runner-up Dmitry Agranovsky
gained 11.83% votes (the candidate from Communists of Russia gained 7.97%).

That said, out of the first group of constituencies, only in constituency no.
3 did a “Smart Voting” candidate Aleksandr Solovyov outrun the administrative
candidate and the Communists of Russia candidate, with the latter gaining the
maximum of 20.62% there. Given that Aleksandr S. Solovyov was nominated
by A Just Russia specifically to run against Aleksandr Yu. Solovyov, his inde-
pendent namesake, who ultimately was not registered, and that CPRF’s Timur
Abyshev was removed from the election in a court case, the opposition compe-
tition took place between two spoiler participants. The remaining five constitu-
encies are among those where “Smart Voting” failed by supporting less prom-
ising candidates. These include the extensively covered Roman Yuneman case
as well as the constituencies where “Smart Voting” endorsed A Just Russia
nominees while underestimating the CPRF candidates. That said, Vladimir Ka-
linin, a “Smart Voting” candidate, did not simply lose the election to the admin-
istrative candidate in constituency no. 26 – he also gained 7 pp less than the
alternative candidate in the previous election, whereas the results of the third-
group candidates increased by 21.4 pp.

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Voters’ behavior

We assume that candidate disqualification and protest voting that is often

mistaken for “Smart Voting” became the main success factors for the opposition
in the Moscow City Duma election. Although at a first glance it might seem that
we are referring to a unified group of voters, or one and the same behavioral
pattern where a vote is considered useful by the voter and they strive to bring
down the results of pro-government candidates, we insist that “Smart Voting”
is to be viewed as tactical, and that protest voting took place by itself, without
being triggered by the strategy.
The logic of a protest vote is different from the model of preventing wasted
votes. Tactical voters renounce the preferred candidate because he or she has no
chance of winning the election. Protest voters turn their backs on the preferred
candidate because they want to teach him or her a lesson. The behavior of both
groups is pragmatic. However, the first group is driven by concern that the least
preferred candidate is going to win, but motivated by the chance to avoid the
undesirable outcome. The second group is driven by disaffection, but motivated
by hope that the signal of disaffection will bring change. Tactical voters want
to replace the main actor while protest voters want him or her to adjust his or
her policy.
Since protest voters count on provoking the authorities into reacting to the
lost votes (expecting that they will want to bring back the old supporters), they
strive to make their voice truly heard. Having a viable alternative that will make
the signal visible means protest voting is more likely to take place [Kselman,
Niou 2011: 397]. In this regard, both tactical and protest voters may have the
same candidate of choice.
In its essence, protest electoral behavior is a vote against the main parties
with access to government formation processes and procedures. Since only one
party has this kind of access in Russia, it is a matter of voting for any opposition
party that the voter deems viable (the voting model in the 2011 Russian legisla-
tive election). This is why parties like CPRF, Yabloko and A Just Russia, which
are more familiar to the region, were able to use disaffection to their advantage
in the Moscow election while a party like LDPR, for example, was not, as it has
never had any future in the region.
The examples of Aleksandr Solovyov and Magomed Yandiyev, who won
their seats without any campaigning, often act as arguments in favour of “Smart
Voting” being effective. This impression was further strengthened by Solo-
vyov’s disappearance immediately after the election, which made many people
doubt his actual existence. However, protest support may sometimes be given
to minor and even phantom parties that exist to receive the anti-elite protest vote
[Bergh 2004; Patton 2019]. The second thing to remember is that both Solovyov
and Yandiyev represented A Just Russia – a parliamentary party – and competed
for protest votes against LDPR and Communists of Russia instead of Yabloko
and CPRF, meaning voters perceived them as the main viable opposition candi-
dates.

11
 The outcomes of economic and protest voting are more obvious if there are
just a few viable alternatives with a relatively small number of effective parties
in the election [Anderson 2000: 155-156], but these outcomes are less likely “if
there are no credible actors who can benefit from such behavior” [Bengtsson
2004: 753]. The chances of success may be slim, but such candidates are the
ones to attract the support of dissatisfied voters when there are no viable alter-
natives. Many regional elections in Russia follow this exact scenario. Despite
purging the political field of any viable opposition, Kremlin-endorsed candi-
dates lost the 2018 gubernatorial election to their validated alternates who never
even intended to win [Stanovaya 2018]. In March 2019, an LDPR-endorsed 28-
year-old housewife beat the chairman of the city duma in the mayoral snap elec-
tion in Ust-Ilimsk of Irkutsk Oblast. People voted for ordinary workers and in-
tellectuals in the first alternative legislative election held in 1989 for the same
reasons by setting them off against the Soviet nomenklatura (the elites).
In such context, Khabarovsk Krai legislative assembly election is telling as
well, where LDPR candidates endorsed by “Smart Voting” won 23 out of 24
constituencies. Viktor Fedoreyev (a member of Yabloko running as an inde-
pendent candidate), who was the only alternative winner of plurality-voting part
of the election, did not run an active campaign and was not endorsed by “Smart
Voting”, but still won by a majority due to protest voting and the existing situ-
ation in his constituency. We must bear in mind, however, that Khabarovsk
election was not defined by disaffection alone, but also by the choice between
two administrative parties – United Russia and LDPR – which the latter became
after its candidate won the gubernatorial election the year before. It is therefore
obvious that protest voting often forwards the votes to minor candidates while
tactical voting always does the opposite.
Nevertheless, “Smart Voting” may have resulted in unexpected added ef-
fects, such as an increase in protest mobilization and using the list of candidates
as guidelines for protest voters. This hypothesis has the right to exist, although
it would be impossible to confirm it without conducting a sociological study of
voter motivations. Although it is possible to assume this impact based on indi-
rect data, one should refrain from making any quantitative assessment. Besides,
the focus shifts from the model of “Smart Voting” itself to the impact of having
opinion leaders as political support. In the meantime, Navalny’s list was not the
only recommendation mechanism in this election. Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s
made his own list, as did Dmitry Baranovsky, a municipal deputy – the latter
was quite popular among activists. In certain constituencies, candidates, local
deputies and action groups formed local coalitions as well. This provided extra
support for candidates, although their opinions and actions played a certain role
when it came to garnering support from local coalitions while “Smart Voting”
tried to eliminate these factors.
The bigger point is, however, that “Smart Voting” was intended for the op-
position voters instead of protest voters. The first group are the staunch oppo-
nents of the government who vote opposition every time while the second group
are the resentful and disaffected ex-loyalists who found themselves as tempo-
rary travelling companions to the opposition. As the joint study by Higher

12
School of Economics and Indiana University covering protest mobilization in
2011-2012 indicates that although both loyalist and opposition voters may share
opinions on economic policy and the government’s work, their identities and
understanding of political reality are different, they use different communica-
tion channels and consume information differently [Smyth et al. 2013]. The sit-
uation may have changed over the past years, but we neither have the data that
would confirm it, nor the explanation for such change.
We cannot rule out the fact that a certain number of voters who decided to
protest-vote looked to the chances of candidates in an attempt to assess the via-
bility of the alternative and therefore knew perfectly well which candidates from
their constituency were on the “Smart Voting” list. Still, even in this case, the
main reason (protest) was more of a driving force behind the change of prefer-
ence than the secondary reason (voting for a viable candidate), especially since
the viability of alternative was obvious in most cases.
Denis Volkov and Andrei Kolesnikov write that Russians “do not focus on
what has to be done to bring positive change and how to do it” and mostly men-
tion what “kind of end result they would like to see instead of how to achieve
it” [Volkov, Kolesnikov 2019]. In this context, the greater awareness of a typical
protest voter, his or her ability to understand political scenarios and the nuanced
instrumentality of choice is questionable. Therefore, we assume that protest vot-
ers are a completely different audience and would hardly be able to follow Na-
valny’s recommendations.
We are willing to concede that “Smart Voting” facilitated the mobilization
of opposition voters (especially those who vote sporadically and whose partici-
pation in the election was up in the air after some visible candidates were denied
registration) and helped to channel the protest energy towards active participa-
tion in the election. However, protest mobilization in itself cannot is not limited
by the new strategy. At the very least, we were unable to register any direct
correlation between the increased voter turnout and supporting alternative can-
didates. Quite the contrary: wherever turnout was increasing, “Smart Voting”
candidates received less votes.

13
 General turnout indicators paint the same picture (an average increase of
1.2 pp in constituencies with alternative majority and 0.3 pp in constituencies
with administrative majority). Then again, Ovchinnikov argues that the elec-
torate structure itself changed in the 2019 election. By juxtaposing turnout ge-
ography with party preference geography in the 2016 election, he infers that
pro-opposition voters outnumbered pro-government voters [Ovchinnikov
2019b]. However, his method of assessing voter preferences does not just fail
to describe their behavior this particular time; it also works only if people iden-
tify themselves with the parties they vote for, which is not the case in reality.
Sociologists from the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) did
a curious study that proves that “a large percentage of respondents easily re-
nounce their opinion and change their declared political stance” [Mamonov
2013: 33]. Over several survey ways, 38% of respondents changed the party
they were planning to vote for. At the same time, 70% of this group responded
negatively to the question of whether they changed their choice. Moreover, be-
tween 20% and 32% of respondents changed their retrospective answer over
just 2.5 weeks, meaning that at least twice they mentioned a different party as
the one they voted for in the previous election.
Ovchinnikov’s model demonstrates that the structure of the electorate has
changed by 9 pp compared to 2016, while compared to 2014 the change was
twice as big. Considering the electoral volatility range in Moscow (about 14%
in the 2011-2016 federal elections and about 16% in the 2009 regional election
by the Pedersen index), the acquired data does not indicate any radical change
in the structure of the electorate. Besides, it is difficult to see from this model
how exactly these changes are stimulated by “Smart Voting” and not by the
campaign going political and its protest potential.
When we mention the volatility of Russian voters, we do not mean there is
no ideological voting. On the contrary, the party’s ideological relatability is one
of the more significant factors for many voters. At the same time, consistent
voters become inconsistent for two reasons: if their preferred party does not pay
attention to the issues that concern the voter and if the party disappears from
electoral space. “If a party for one reason or another disappears from the space,
this will affect those voters, whose own position is identical with, or not far
removed from the position of the disappearing party, and the result will be that
the average probability of vote transfers will increase, ceteris paribus” [Peder-
sen 1979:16]. In other words, when the preferred party is not on the ballot, elec-
toral volatility naturally tends to increase.
As for the possibility of discouraged turnout for United Russia, it can be
explained by Morris P. Fiorina’s theory of cross pressures. When strong party
loyalty conflicts with the party’s stance on a relevant issue (in our case, socio-
economic deterioration was the issue), the rule is that an undecided voter is more
likely to stay home. The less loyal voters often choose protest voting as an al-
ternative [Fiorina 1976: 402].

14
Protest mobilization

Finally, the decision to vote and the choice of a specific candidate could be
two unrelated processes. Let us venture a guess that by the time the “Smart Vot-
ing” list was revealed the voters had already decided on voting opposition. Mass
protests triggered by candidate disqualifications and political repressions cre-
ated more stimuli to go and vote than confidence in the “smart” candidate’s
victory. The larger the scale of the protests and the wider their coverage is, the
more citizens are urged to share the displeasure and demands of the protesters
[Tertytchnaya, Lankina 2020]. Weekly unauthorized marches all over the city
made many Moscow citizens aware of the protests as well as making them wit-
nesses and even unwitting participants while police brutality only fueled the
disaffection and urged the citizens to identify with the protesters.
At the same time, it is important to distinguish Navalny’s mobilization ca-
pabilities from “Smart Voting” itself, as these are completely different research
objects. Navalny’s supporters were more active in street protests indeed, but the
latter would not have been as successful without both registered and unregis-
tered candidates. Navalny’s team was represented by five disqualified candi-
dates only while the prosecutor's office was investigating 15 candidates, whom
the authorities considered to be behind the unauthorized rallies. The largest rally
held on August 10 on Sakharov Avenue was organized by municipal deputies
while famous journalists and musicians with extensive online following called
to participate in the rally. Analyzing the online activity of Navalny’s supporters
reveals a correlation with protests, although researchers do not yet have any
proof of it being direct: “We can carefully suppose that online activities of Na-
valny’s supporters increase probabilities of such protests in those regions where
it is already intense” [Myagkov et al. 2020: 2].
Protest cannot be stimulated at a leader’s whim. A leader can only maintain
the protest level for some time, if there are all the necessary economic, psycho-
logical and social conditions for it. According to Ted Gurr, the main reason be-
hind political discontent is people’s frustration with their government figures,
who make them suffer losses, and lost hope is the best incentive for protest and
rioting [Gurr 2005]. In other words, bad policy and government’s mistakes stim-
ulate protest, not actions of the opposition, however effective they are.
Election itself is a powerful incentive for mobilizing dissatisfaction. Like
any emotional reaction, protest can emerge from spontaneous expression of in-
dignation, but “protest [itself] is not really what motivates their choices on Elec-
tion Day”: “protest voting seems to be a direct result of political distrust” [Bergh
2004: 369-376]. Distrust has to emerge before indignation is expressed at the
polls. This is why protest should be studied in a wider context.
Protest mobilization is cyclic and fluctuating [Semyonov, 2018]. More than
4.7 thousand protests of differing scale took place in Russia between 2007 and
2012, averaging 700-800 a year. The number of protests is rising in 2008-2009
(the time of financial crisis) and then gradually dropping and rising again by the
end of 2011 [Lankina, Voznaya 2015: 337]. Protests are peaking in 2012-2013,

15
with over 2000 each year. At the time, the opposition candidates are highly suc-
cessful in the elections. Mikhail Prokhorov scores 8% in the presidential elec-
tion (20% in Moscow and over 15% in Saint Petersburg), Alexey Navalny
scores 27% in the Moscow mayoral election. Yevgeny Roizman, Galina
Shirshina, Yevgeny Urlashov and Anatoly Lokot become mayors of Yekaterin-
burg, Petrozavodsk, Yaroslavl and Novosibirsk respectively while Boris
Nemtsov is elected to Yaroslavl Oblast Duma.
The wave of protest dwindled after Russia’s seizure of Crimea and gave
way to patriotic resurgence instead. Territorial expansion and Western sanctions
boosted the regime’s legitimacy and created a “rally round the flag” effect
[Mueller 1970]. The number of protests in Russia dropped by 40 pp in such
circumstances. The 2014 Moscow election results, along with subsequent leg-
islative and presidential election, reveal a level of rallying around the regime,
decreased support for the opposition, a readiness to endure domestic trouble for
the sake of the “great nation”, but also arouse great expectations from the gov-
ernment.
By summer of 2018, the “Crimean Consensus” had already exhausted its
mobilization potential. The retirement age increase, the fall of real income and
continued economic recession had brought the domestic political agenda back
into public spotlight and shaken the faith in the regime. From this moment on,
the frustration and appetite for change started to grow while the social demands
often started to turn into political more and more often and reflect off election
results. Social frustration fueled the protests: in 2018-2019, their numbers
spiked to over 2000 protests a year once more [Kak protestuyut... 2019]. For the
first time in 10 years, gubernatorial elections in three regions took two rounds,
and the opposition candidate won each round. United Russia shows the worst
results in legislative elections since 2007.

As can be seen from this brief overview, the protest had grown quite strong
before the 2019 campaign. The results of the previous election cycle “created
positive stimuli for the opposition” that, when combined with socioeconomic

16
issues and mistakes of the government, were “able to ignite the desire for polit-
ical engagement in Russian citizens by “accidentally” causing democratization”
[Vaisberg 2019: 44]. However, Moscow protests were not an isolated event, but
part of the bigger wave of political mobilization. This wave can be compared to
the 2011-2012 protests for fair elections and includes anti-landfill protests, cam-
paigns against raising the retirement age and healthcare optimization, blocking
Telegram and the arrest of journalist Ivan Golunov. The wave is made of three
elements: economic, political and local, the latter relating to urban development
and local issues.
At the same time, social and democratic agenda came back to Moscow pol-
itics before they did to federal, owing to the renovation program and municipal
election, which the opposition treated seriously for the first time ever. As a result
of the 2017 campaign, the party of power lost its majority in 25 districts while
the elected deputies rose above the municipal level by becoming visible actors
of city politics, liaisons between local, social and political agendas. Civic activ-
ists distance themselves from politics less and less by appealing to political par-
ties for support and putting forward the claims that the government should be
replaced. In its turn, political opposition becomes more reliant on social popu-
lism and resolving economic issues.
We disagree that economic protest in the Moscow election was irrelevant
[Rogov 2019: 97]. The consequences of the government’s economic decisions
manifest gradually while frustrations continue to grow and burst during major
political mobilizations. Election day is the most opportune time for it. In this
sense, electoral behavior of Russian citizens gets back to normal when they re-
ward or punish the government based on their personal assessment of socioec-
onomic policy and their own wellbeing [Lewis-Beck, Paldam 2000].

Conclusion

In conclusion, we would like to stress that electoral rise of the opposition is

not an accident, but a consequence of change in public attitudes and voter pref-
erences. “Smart Voting” did not lay the foundation for the changed choice and
votes overflow to alternative candidates. This government itself brought the sit-
uation about by introducing unpopular reforms, and disqualification of candi-
dates only reduced the competition among the opposition and, on the contrary,
boosted it among the main alternative and administrative candidates. We recog-
nize the impact the new strategy had on the election results, but insist it was not
as significant as is commonly believed, and that it played a controversial role in
certain constituencies by helping some strong candidates, yet holding back
other. The results in certain constituencies would have been different had
“Smart Voting” not been used there, but the overall outcome of election and the
structure of Moscow parliament would hardly have changed.
Electoral behavior of Moscow citizens changed significantly: the levels of
protest and tactical voting increased compared to previous campaigns. These
voting methods are different by nature, motivations and goals, but they typically
helped the same candidates win, which led to some analysts discussing the great

17
success of “Smart Voting” and attributing all the extra support received by al-
ternative candidates to it. Unlike these analysts, we mark the distinction between
these methods and assume that “Smart Voting” was an example of tactical be-
havior, which should be assessed separately from protest behavior.
At the same time, we do not believe our approach is infallible, nor do we
believe that we have covered all the possible impact the “Smart Voting” strategy
had on the election results. We gave insufficient consideration to how much the
choice of voters with changed preferences depended on the quality of a candi-
date’s campaign, his or her personal characteristics or other expressive reasons.
We did not clock any of tactical or protest voting behavior in a number of con-
stituencies, although circumstantial evidence indicates their presence. For in-
stance, out of the seven constituencies that registered increased support for ad-
ministrative candidates, the biggest surplus of votes went to the journalist Ro-
man Babayan (+14.62 pp) and Ilya Sviridov (+7.67 pp), the ex-mayoral candi-
date from A Just Russia – this surplus was more of a sign of protest than loyalty.
Our model is built on tactical voting for the opposition candidates, although it
is possible that pro-government voters could have also made a tactical choice.
We are also aware that many voters had difficulty distinguishing between the
administrative and alternative candidate, which influences their choice as well.
Although our model has some other limitations, we do hope that it provides a
more detailed explanation of the specifics and principles of the 2019 Moscow
election campaign than other existing models do.

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