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INTERPRETAION OF STATUTES

Made By:1. Sukhamrit Singh

Roll Number -A3256118031

2.Ritwik Jaiswal

Roll Number- A32561180

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INTRODUCTION

1. A statute as enacted cannot be explained by the individual opinion of the


legislatures.
2. After enacting process is over the legislature become functus officio so as that
particular statute is conceived.
3. If it were often to consult the legislature as its intention the answer of the most
of the legislature in all probability will be “search a problem never occurred to
us solve it as best as you can consistent with the words used and the purpose
indicated by us in the statute.

INTENTION OF LEGESLATURE

If a statutory provision often to more than one interpretation the correct has to
chose that interpretation which represents the intention of the legislature.
1. Venkatashwaminaidu v. Narasram (AIR 1966 sc. 361).
2. District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron and Steel (AIR 2001 Sc 3134).
3. Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading ( AIR 2002 SC. 1432).

LITERAL CONSTRUCTION
1. The first and primary rule of construction is the intention of the legislature
must be found in the words used by the legislature itself.
“Law to a large extent lives in the language even if it expand with the spirit
of the statute.

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PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION
2. The words used by the legislature are not bear always a plain meaning.
1. Whether certain words are plain.
2. What the pain meaning is.
1. It is always safe to have an eye on the object and purpose of the statute or
reasons and sprit behind it.
2. The statute is best understood if we know reasons for it Utkal Contractoresvs
State of Orrissa (AIR 987 SC 1457).
Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 Co. Rep 7(a)
AIR 1957 Sc 907
Raipur Development Authority (2000) 4 SCC 357.
Steel Authority v. National Water (AIR 2001 Sc 3527)
Heydon’s Rules Also known as Mirchief Rule
Purposive Constrective
FOUR MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION
1. What was the law before making of the Act?
2. What was the mischief or delete for which the law did not provide?
3. What is the remedy that the act has provided?
4. What is the reason for remedy?
Court must adopt a construction which shall suppressed the mischief and
advance the remedy.
 Bengal Immunity AIR 1955 SC 661.
STATUTE MUST BE READ AS A WHOLE IN ITS CONTENTS.

ELEMENTORY RULE

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1. The intention of legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole.
2. Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and
other clauses of the act to make a consistent enactment.
3. The court must as certain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention
not merely to the clause to be construe but to the entire statute .it must compare
the clause with other party of the law.
 State of West Bengal v. UOI (AIR 1963 SC 1241 (1265).
4. Statute to be construed to make it effective and workable.
1. A statute or any enacting provisions therein must be so construed as to make
it effective and operative.
2. Ut res MagisValeat quam pereat.
3. Courts’ while pronouncing constitutionality of any statute starts with a
presumption in favor of co constitutionality and prefers a construction which
keeps the statute within competence of legislature.
1. Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema AIR 1956 SC. 1107 (1113).

3. The Court will reject the construction which will defeat the plain intention of
legislature even though there may be some in exactitude in languages.

 M. PetiahvsVeeraMallappa AIR 1961 Sc 1107 (1111).

4. A statute is designed to be workable.

5. If meaning plain effect must be given to it irrespective of consequences.

1. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e. they are
reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Court is bound to believe effect to
that meaning irrespective or consequences.

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 Nelson Motis v. UOI (AIR 1992 Sc 1981)
 Steel Authority of India v. National Union Worker AIR 2001 Sc
3527 (3539)
2. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits only one meaning,
no question of construction arises.
Act speaks itself.
 State of W.P. v. Vijay Anand AIR 1963 Sc 946.

6. Appraisal of the Rrnevple of plain meaning.

1. It is not possible to decide whether certain words are plain or ambiguous unless
they are studied in their context and construed.

2. The ruled of plain meaning reality means that after court have construed the
words and have came to the conclusion that they can bear only one meaning than
only court gives effect to that meaning.

1. D. Saibaba Vs Bar Council of India AIR 2003 Sc 2502 (2507).

Basic Principles of Interpretations.

Intention of legislature

a. Statute must be read as a whole in its context.


b. Statute to be construed to make it effective and workable.
c. If the meaning is plain effect must be given to it irrespective of the
consequence.

Appraisal of the principle of Plain meaning.

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GUIDING RULES

1. Language of the statute should be read as it is.


2. Rule of literal construction.
3. Regard to subject and object.
4. Regard to consequences.
a. Avoid addition or substitution of words.
b. Casus Omisus
c. Avoiding rejection of words
d. Departure from the rule
e. When permissible ------a. Addition words
b. Rejection words.
GUIDING RULES.
1. The intention of the legislature is primary to be gathered from the language
used which means that attention should be paid to:-
1. What has been said and
2. What has not been said
3. J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2001 Sc 3303 (3308)
Addition /Substitution /Rejection----- of words must be avoided.
 Grasim v. Collector of Custom AIR 2002 Sc 727.
1. It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words in to an act unless
it is absolutely necessary to doos .
2. UOI v. Deokinandan Agrawal AIR 1992 SC 96 (101)
2. It is dangerous to substitute some other word of the Statute.
3. Court cannot reframe the legislation as it has no power to legislate

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1. Deokinandan Agrawal
2. J.P.Bansal.
CASUS OMISSUS
1. A matter which should have been but not provided for legislation cannot be
supplied by the court as to do so will be legislation and not construction.
2. An omission by the legislature to amend a related provisions present great
difficulties of construction
AIR 1987 SC 53
AIR 1990 SC 933
AIR 2001 SC 2699

AVOIDING REJECTION OF WORDS

1. Effort should be made to give eaning to each and every words used by
the legislature.
2. Legislature inspired every part in a statute for a purpose and legislature
intention is that every part there of a purpose and that every party of the
statute must have effect.
1. Aswini Kumar Gheshvs
2. Arvindo Bose 1952 AIR SC 369 (377)

EXECEPTION

1. Court can correct drafting error while interpreting a statute by adding,


omitting and substituting words if following features are available:-
a. The intended purpose of the statute or provision in question.

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b. By inadvertence the draft man and parliament failed to give effect
to provisions that purpose in the provision in question.
c. The substance of the provision parliament have made although
not necessary the precise word parliament would have used, had
the error in Bill been noticed.
ADDITION OF WORD WHEN PERMISSIBLE
1. Ranjit Sing KalaraVs UOI (1991) 2 SCC 87 (19)
2. M.J. Exprot Ltd. Vs Custom Excise AIR 1992 Ac 2014
(2024)
3. SirajHaqvs Central Board AIR 1959 SC 198.
4. Hamemeedea Hardware vs B. Mohan AIR 1988 Sc 1060
(1067).
5. H.C. Suman vs. Rehabilitation Ministry AIR 1991 Sc 216
(1967 -69).
6. Sec. 17 of Consumer Protection Act 1986 constitutes statute
commission for each state but there is no provision in the act
limiting territorial jurisdiction.
But the intention of the parliament could not have been that
dispute arising in one state could be taken cognizance of by
state commission or other state.
 Union Bank of India vs. M/s. SeppoRalloy AIR 1999 Sc 62 (66)

REJECTION OF WORDS WHEN PERMISSIBLE


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1. Some time the ``````intention of parliament is clear but due
to some words is used in the statute due to unskillness of
the draftsman, which result in ineffectiveness of that
statute.
2. Since Court is strongly banning a statute to a futility it is
permissible in such cases to reject the surplus orders to
make the statute effective and workable.
RULED OF LETERAL CONSTRUCTION
a. Natural and grammatical meanings.
1. Natural
2. Ordinarily
3. Popular

I words of a statute is to understand.

Phrases

Sentences

-: are to be constructed according to their grammatical meaning.

Exception

1. Unless leads to some absurdly.

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2. Unless there is something in context or in the object of the statute to suggest
contrary.
1. In constructing a word in the statute the grammatical and ordinary sense of
the words is adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some
repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the statute.
Olga Tellus v. MC Bombay AIR 1986 SC 180
Pakal Narayan Swami v. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47 (87)
Sirauj Haq v. Ceneral Sunni Waqf.
EXPLAINATION
1. a word is not a crystal transparent and unchanged it is skin of a living
though its and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which used.
KeshvanandBharti (AIR 1973 SC 1461)
2. When it is said that words are to be under statue just in their natural
ordinary or popular means it means that the words should be ascribed
that natural sense which they have in relation to the subject matter with
reference to the context in which they have been used in statute.
3. In determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a stature the first
question to be asked is:-
1. What is the natural or ordinarily meaning or that word or phrase in
the context or the statute?
2. 2. What that meaning of that word leads to some reasonable be
supposed to have been the intention of legislature, that not it is
proper to look for some other meaning of the word.

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Context in the construction of legislation means

I. The statute as a whole


II. The previous state of law
III. Other statute in pari- materia
IV. General scope of the statute
V. The mischief of that it was intended to remedy

Special reference 2003 ( u

AIR 2003 se 87 ( f.138,

Coal for Sales Tax Act included charcoal

Control for colliery control order manual

AIR 1967 SC 1454 (1457)

Commissioner Sales Taxes v. Jaswant Singh

Example-

1. Marble- Akbar Badruddin v. Collector custom AIR 1990 SC 1579 (1595)


2. Vegetable- Whether betel leaves are vegetable
Ramavtar v. Asst. Sales Tax Officer AIR 1961 SC 1325
Ranbax v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1963 SC 351

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 Several words have a popular meaning as well as technical or scientific
normally in fiscal laws popular meaning is preferred over technical
meaning.
3. Rice and paddy are held to be different commodities for Punjab Sales
Tax Act.
 Ganesh Trading Co. v. Haryana
 State of Rajasthan v. Rajasthan Input AIR 1996 SC 2179

(C) Exact meaning preferred to lose meaning.

1. There is a presumption that words are used in an act of parliament correctly


and exactly and not loosely or in exactly

Example-

Meaning of adjoining is conterminous as distinguished from its loose meaning


‘near’ or ‘neighboring’

 Mayor Counselor v. Taranaki Electricity Power AIR 1933 PC 216

(D) Technical words in technical sense

1. Special meaning in trade or commerce.

(a) Trade

(b) Business

(c) Profession

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(d) Art

(e) Science

Words having special meaning in that context are understood in that sense.
Such a special meaning is called technical meaning.

 Union of India v. Garware Nyton AIR 1996 3509 (3512)

(B) Regard to subject and object-

1. The words of statute when there is doubt about their meaning are to be
understood in the sense in which they best harmonize with the subject of
enactment and the object which the legislature has in view

 Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management AIR 1958 SC 353


(356)
 Santa Singh v. Punjab AIR 1976 SC 2386 (2389)

(2) It is recognized rule of interpretation of statute that expression used therein


shall ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonize with the
object of the statute.

 New India Sugar Mills v. Comm of Sales Tax Bihar AIR 1963
SC1207 (1213)

OBJECT ORIENTED APPROACH

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1. W.P. Bhoodan Samiti v. Braaj Kishore AIR 1998 SC2239
UP BhoodanYojna Act 1953
‘Landless person’ means landless labour not landless business man in the
city.
Sec 2k Industrial Dispute Act 1947
Industrial dispute
Workmen of Dimakuchi v. Management AIR 1958 SC 353 (364)
Sec 235(2) CrPc 1973
Santa Singh v Punjab AIR 1976 SC 2386
(b) Heydon’s Rule- Purposive Construction

Regard to the Consequences


If the language used in capable of bearing more than one construction in
seeking true meaning regard must had to be the consequences resulting
from adopting the alternative construction.

1. Hardship
2. Inconvenience
3. Injustice
4. Absurdity
5. Anomoly
Are to be avoided.

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(1) In selecting out of different interpretation, court will adopt that which
is trust, reasonable and sensible rather than which is none of those
things.
 Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate AIR 1976 SC 331 (338)

(2) It is proper to assume that legislature enact a law which the society
considers as honest, fair and reasonable.
 Budhan Singh v. Bibi be AIR 1970 SC 1880
(B) Inconsistency and Repugnancy to be avoided.

Internal aid to Construction

Part of a statute

1. Long title
2. Preamble
3. Headings
4. Marginal notes
5. Punctuations
6. Illustrations
7. Definition/ Interpretation clause
8. Proviso
9. Explanation
10.Schedules
11. Transitional provisions

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Long titles of an Act:

1. It is part of the enactment. It is admissible as an aid to its construction.


2. Long title which precedes the preamble must be distinguished with the
short title.
3. Short title is only for the purpose of reference to act whereas long title
along with the preamble is a god guide regarding-
a. Object
b. Scope
c. Purpose of Act.
 Kerala Education Bill AIR 1958 SC 956
 Aswini Kumar v. Aurvindo Bose AIR 1956 369 (383)
4. The long title although part of the Act is itself not enacting provision and
though useful in case of ambiguity of enacting provision is ineffective to
control their clear meaning.
 ManoharLal v. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 418 (419)

Preamble of the Act:

I. Not enacting part of act


II. Like long title.

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It is the cardinal principles of interpretation that where the language of the act
is clear. The Preamble must be disregarded though were the object or meaning
of an enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resurted to explain it.

1. Burakar Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 954 (956-57)
2. Arnit Das v. State of Bihar AIR 2000 SC 2264 (2271)

Preamble of the Constitution:

1. The drafting committee of the Constituent Assembly formulated


preamble is the light of the objective resolution but restricted it “to
defining the essential feature of the new state and its basic socio political
objective”
2. Draft of Preamble was considered by the Constituent Assembly after
considering other part of the constitution.
3. Constituent Assembly adopted a motion that the preamble stands part of
the Constitution.

Headings:

1. Heading or title prefixed to section or grant of sections can be referred to


in constructing an act of the legislative.
Bhikna v. Charan Singh AIR 1959 SC 960 (966)

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2. A heading is to be regarded as giving the key to the interpretation of
clauses ranged under it, unless the warding is inconsistent with such
interpretation.
3. Headings can only be taken into consideration when the enacting words
are ambiguous.
4. Headings prefixed to section or entries cannot control the plain meaning
of the word used in any statute only in case of ambiguity or doubt the
heading or sub-heading may be referred to as aid in constructing the
provisions. Even in such case it could not be used for cutting down the
wide application or clear words used in the statute.
 Frick India v Union of India AIR 1990 SC 134 (141)
 Forage Comp. v M.C. Bombay AIR 2000 SC 378 (380)

Marginal Notes:

1. Marginal Notes appended to a section cannot be used for constructing


the section.
2. Marginal Notes in an Indian statute cannot be referred to for the
purpose of constructing the statute.
 CIT v. AhmedbhaiUmarbhai AIR 1950 SC 134 (141)
 KalawatiBai v. SoeryBai AIR 1991 SC 1581
 Uttam Das v. ShiromaniGurudwaraAIR 1996 SC 2133 (2137)

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Punctuation:

It is error to rely on punctuation in constructing Act of the legislative.

1. Lewis v. AshutoshSenAIR 1929 PC 69(71)


Section 48 of Limitation Act 1908 “For specific movable property lost or
acquired by theft or dishonest misappropriation or conversion or for
compensation for wrongfully taking or detaining for same”
PC rejected the contention that the word ‘dishonest’ qualified ot only
misappropriation but also conversion.
2. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Aurvindo
3. Gopalan

Illustration:

1. Illustration appended to a section form part of the statute and although


forming no part of the section are of relevance and value in the
construction of the text of the section and they should not be rejected as
repugnant to the section.
 Mahesh Kumar Sharma v. Raj Kumar Sharma AIR 1996 SC
869 (877)

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2. Illustrations cannot have the effect of modification (modifying) language
of the section and cannot either curtail or expand the ambit of the section,
which alone forms the enactment.
 ShambhuNathMehra v. State of Ajmer AIR 1956 SC 404(406)

Definition Section:

It is a common to find in a statute. ‘Definitions’ of certain words and


expressions used elsewhere in the body of the statute, in order to avoid
necessity of frequent repetition in describing the entire subject matter to which
word or expression sub-defined is intended to apply.

1. A definition section may borrowed definitions form an earlier Act.


 LIC v. Crown life Insurance AIR 1965 SC 1985 (1986)
2. A definition borrowed by incorporation or reference.
 Tata Tea Ltd. v. State of Bombay AIR 1988 SC 1435

[Art. 366(1) of Indian Constitution] Agriculture Income as Income


Tax Act.

3. But in absence of incorporation or reference it is hazardous to interpret a


word is accordance with its definition in another statute and more so
when such statute is not dealing with any cohant subject.

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 MSCO pvt ltd. v. Unoin of India AIR 1985 SC 76
 State of Kerala v. MathaiAIR 1987 SC 33

A. Restrictive and Extensive definitions:

1. The legislature has power to define a word even artificially.


 KishunLal v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1990 SC 2269 (2270)
 CIT Madras v. Sundaram Spinning AIR 2000 SC 490
(491)
 FerozeN. Dotivala v. P.M. Wadhwani, (2003) 1SEC
433(442)
2. The definition of a word in definition clause may either restrictive
to its ordinary meaning or it may be extensive of same.
3. When a word is defined to ‘mean’, such definition is prima facie
restrictive and exhaustive.
 Feroze M. Dotiwala
 Vanguard Fire & General Insurance v. Fraser and Ross
AIR 1960 SC 971 (975)
4. When a word is defined to ‘include’ it is prima facie extensive.
 Kishunlal v. Rajasthan AIR 1990 SC 2269 (2270)

Extensive Definition:

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1. ‘Means and includes’
 Jagir Singh v Bihar AIR 1976 SC 997 (999-1001)
2. ‘To apply and includes’ when by an amending act.
3. The word ‘mean’ ‘includes’ was substituted for the word ‘mean’.
 GollaleswarDev v. Gangavwa.

B. Ambiguous definitions:
1. It is presume that the legislature will be specially precise and careful
in its choice of language used in such a section itself requires
interpretation.
 Banglore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A
Rajappa. AIR1978 SC 548 (561)
2. A definition is not to be read in isolation. It must be defined in the
context of the phrase.
 Banglore Water Supply and Sewerage v. A. Rajappa
C. Definitions are subject to a Contrary Context:

1. When a word has been defined in the definition clause, prima facie
that definition governs whenever that word is used in the bodyof the
statute.
 Indian immigration trust Board v. GovindswamiAIR 1920
PC 114(116)

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 Vanguard fire and general Insurance v. Fraser and Ross
AIR 1960 971(975)
2. “Unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.
3. Unless the context otherwise requires [such qualification is always
implied, Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. Asst. Commission Tax officer,
1994(2) sec434]
4. Art 367 of the Constitution: General Clause Act is applies in
Interptretation of Constitution Sec.5 (500) of General Clause Act
defines ‘state’ includes Union territories. Therefore the word ‘state’
includes Union territory but as the context otherwise requires the word
‘state’ in article 246 does not include Union territory.
 T.M. Kanniyam v. I.T.O. PondicheriAIR 1968 SC 637

a. ‘Court’ in arbitration Act 1940 defined word court but does not govern
sec 14(2)
b. Workman sec 33-C (2) I.D. Act 1947 include dismissed employee only
for section 10.

Proviso:

A. Its real nature-

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1. The normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the
enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the
proviso would be within the purview of the enactment.
 KedarNath Jute v. Comm. Tax Officer AIR 1966 SC SC
12(14)
 KhushSahgal v. M.C. MitterAIR 2000 SC1390 (1398)
 Calcutta Tramway Co. v. Corporation of Calcutta AIR 1965
SC 1728 (1730)
2. The general rule relating to proviso is that a proviso is added to an
enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment
and ordinarily a proviso is not interpreted as stating general rule.
 Shah Bhojraj v. Subhash Chandra AIR 1961 SC 1596 (1690)
B. Not constructed as excluding or adding something by implication.
When on a fair construction the principal provision is clear a proviso
cannot expand or limit it.
 Dwaraka Prasad v. Dwarika Das AIR 1975 SC 1758 (1763)
C. Construed in relation to the section or sections to which it is appended-
The language of a proviso even it’s general normally to be construed in
relation to the subject matter covered by the section to which the proviso
is appended.
 Dwarika Prasad v Dwarika Das AIR 1975 SC 1758 (1764)

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In other words normally a proviso does not travel beyond the provisions
to which it is a proviso.

 Mackinnon v. Audrey D’ CosraAIR 1987 SC 1281


D. Use as guide to Construction of enactment
There is no doubt that where the main provisions are its effect cannot be
cut down by the proviso, but where it is not clear the proviso which
cannot be presumed to be surplusage can be properly be looked into
ascertained the meaning and the scope of the main provision.
 Hindustan Ideal Insurance v. LIC AIR 1963 (1087)
E. Proviso as a fresh enactment .
 State of Orissa v Debaki Debi AIR 1964 SC 1413 (1417)

Sometimes it is substantive enactment.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROVISO EXCEPTION AND SAVING


CLAUSE

1. Exception- It is intended to restrain the enactment /enacting clause to a


particular case.
2. Proviso- It is used to remove special cases from the general enactment
and provide for them specially.
3. Savings- It is used to preserve from destruction, certain rights remedies
or privilege already existing.

EXPLAINATION:

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1. An explanation is appended to a section to explain the meaning of words
contained in te section.
 Deepak Chandra v. Chandan Kumar (2003) 7 SEC 66(71)
2. It becomes part and parcel of the enactment.
 Bengal Immuniy v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661
3. When a section contains number of clauses and there is an explaination at
the end of the section it should be seen as to which clause it applies.
 Patel Roadways v. Prasad Travelling AIR 1992 SC 1514
(1518)

WHEN EXPLAINATIONS OPEN WITH-

1. “For the purpose of their section”


2. “Nothing in their section”
And placed at the end of the section, it will be prima facie indicate that
the explanation applies to all the clause in the section.
 Commission of Agriculture v. Plantation Corporation of
Kerala. AIR 2000 SC 3714 (3717)

SCHEDULES:

1. Schedule appended to statute form part of statute form part of statute.


 Ujagar Prints v. Union of India AIR 1989 sc 516(531)
2. Schedule contains details and forms for working out the policy
underlying the section of statute.

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3. The division of a statute in section and schedule is mere matter of
convenience and a schedule contains substantive enactment.
 Aphali Pharma Cuetical Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1989
SC 2227 (2237-38)

TRANSITORY PROVISIONS:

One feature of a transitory provision in that it is temporary.

 K.S. Pari Poornam v. State of Kerala AIR 1995 SC 1012 (1035-


1036)

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PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY

Tradition View:

1. Intend of Parliament which passed the act is not to be gather from


parliamentary history of the statute.
2. No more accurate source of information as to what was the evil or defect
which the act now under construction was intended to remedy could be
imagined from the report or the commission
3. Limited but often use should be made of parliamentary history in
constructing the statute.

External Aid:

Parliamentary History

1. Bill is original form.


2. Amendment considered during its process is legislative.
3. Speech of the minister
4. Debate is legislature.

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5. Report of Commission which may have lead to the introduction of the
legislation.
6. Report of law commission.

1. Court sometimes makes distinction between use of a material for


finding mischief dealt with by the act and its use for finding the
meaning of the act.
 Shashikant v. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 2114 (2119-
20)
2. It was held that speeches made the members of the constituent
assembly in the course of debate or the debate on the draft
constitution cannot be admitted as external aid to the construction of
the constitution.
 State of Travan v. Bombay Co. Ltd. AIR 1952 SC 366
(368)
3. A statute is expression or the collective intention of the legislation as
a whole and any statement made by an individual, member or
minister of the intention and object of the Act, cannot be used to cut
down the generality of the words used in the statute.

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 State of West Bengal v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC
1241 (1247)
4. Chiaranjit Lal Chowdhary v. Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41
admitted parliamentary history including speech of minister.
5. Gopalan, AIR 1950 SC 27. Debate can be used to show that the use
of a particular word was up for consideration at all or not.
6. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dadabhoy’s new Chirmiri Pandri
Hill. AIR 1972 SC 614 minister’s speech.
7. It is now settled that the debates in the constituent Assembly may be
relied upon to interpret a provision in the constitution.
a. S.R. Chowdhary v. St. of Punjab AIR 2001 SC 2707 (2717)
b. Reference under article 143 2003 AIR 2003 SC 87 (101)
c. T.M. Pai Foundation v. St. of Karnataka AIR 2003 SC255
(415,430)
d. Arna Roy v Union of India AIR 2002 SC 3176 (3199)

Minister’s Speech- Not relied

 Rel. Pepper v. Hari


 P.V. Narsimha Rao v. State AIR 1998 SC 2120

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The statement of minister who had moved the bill can be looked at
to:-

i. Ascertain the mischief sought to be remedied and


ii. Object and purpose for which the legislation is enacted, but
iii. It is not taken into account for interpreting the provisions of
the enactment.

Ammendment Considered during progress of Bill

The amendment considered during the progress of the bill were also
ruled for the construction of the act.

a. Ashwini Kumar, AIR 1952 SC 369 (378-79)


b. Express newspapers, AIR 1958 SC 578 (622)
c. Harsaran Verma v. T.N. Singh AIR 1971 SC 1331 (1333)
d. S.P. Anand v. H.D. Dev Gowda AIR 1997 sc272 (276)

Statement of Object and reasons appended to a bill:

It is well settled that the statement of object and reasons


accompanying a bill when introduced in Parliament cannot be used to

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determine the time meaning and effect of substantive part of the
statute.

They cannot be used except for limited purpose of understanding the


background and the antecedent state of affairs leading up to the
legislation

 State of West Bengal v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1241


(1247)

Report of Commission preceding the introduction of a bill:

Report of a committee which preceded the enactment of legislation,


report of joint parliamentary committee and report of commission set
up for collecting information leading to legislation are permissible
external aid to the construction.

a. R.S. Naik v A.R. Artulay AIR 1984 SC 684


b. Haldiram Bhujiawala v. Anand Kumar AIR 2000 SC 1287
(1291)
c. Jayalaxmi rice and oil mills, AIR 1971 SC 1015 (1016)

Report of drafting Committee

32
Report of drafting committee and sub-committees of the Constituent
Assembly, the draft constitution and changes made thereafter in
giving the constitution the final shape were referred in interpreting
Para 5 (2) of Fifth schedule.

 Samatha v. St. of Andra Pradesh AIR 1997 SC 3297

White papers:

White papers issued by the Government detailing the facts leading to


enactment of a statute is also admissible for understanding the
background when the court is called upon to interpret and decide the
validity of the statute.

 M. Ismail Faruqqui v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 605

Historical facts and surrounding circumstances:

a. Historical works
b. Pictures
c. Engravings
d. Documents
e. Contemporary treaties.

33
Policy followed in the working of earlier act can be presumed to be
known to Parliament while legislating subsequently on a related
subject and will thus admissible in construing the later act.

Social, Political and Economic development Economic invention:

1. Court must apply a statute to the world as it exists today.


2. Statute must be interpreted as it exists today.

A. Reference to the circumstances existing at the time of passing of


the statute does not therefore means that the language used at
any rate in a statute should be held in applicable to social ,
political and economic development or scientific invention not
known at the time of passing of the
1. Telephone: - Technological advances not known at the time
when the act was passed. It was held that the telephone is
telegraph within the meaning of that word in the telegraph Act
1863 and 1869. Although telephone was not invented.
 A.G. v. Edison Telephone Co. of London (1880) 6 QBD 244
referred
a. Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxmimnarain Chopra AIR
1962 SC 159 (162)

34
b. Vishnu Agencies v. Commercial Tax officer AIR 1978 SC
449(460)
2. Video: - Cinematograph Act 1952 and cinema to Regulation
Acts defined “Cinematography” contained in section 2 (e) of
Cinematograph Act 1952 will cover video cassette.
 Laxmi video Theatere v. State of Haryana AIR 1993 SC 2328
 Shankar video v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1993 SC 2111

Handwriting includes typewriter

 State v. S.J. Chowdhary AIR 1996 SC 1491 (1496)

Evidence taken through video confession.

 Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai 2003 AIR SEW 1885

Reference to other statute:

a) Statute in Pari Materia.


b) Assistance of earlier statute.
c) Assistance of earlier statute.
d) Incorporation of earlier act into later.
e) Reference of earlier act into later.
f) Codifying and consolidating statute.

35
Pari Materia

1. Statutes dealing with the same subject matter or forming same


systems are known as Pari-materia statute.
2. A statute must be read as a whole as words are to be
understood in their context. Extension of this rule of context
permit references to other statute of Pari materia.
3. Where there are different statute in pari materia though made
at different times or even expired and not referring each other
they shall be taken and continue together as one system.
 J.K. Steel Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 1173 (1183)
 Board of Trustees v. Srinesh AIR 1999 SC 2947 (2952)
4. Statutes are pari materia which relates to the same person or
things or to the same class of persons or things.
 Shah and Co. Bombay v. Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 317
(330)
5. When two pieces of legislation are differing scopes it cannot
be said that they are pari materia. Bombay Rent, Hotel and
Lodging House Rate control Act 1947 and Bombay Land
Requisition Act 1948 are not pari materia.

36
6. It is not necessary that the entire subject matter in the two
statute should be identical any provision in one may be held to
be Pari material with some provisions in the other statute.

Examples:

a. Section 4 of Prevention of Corruption Act 1994 and “shall


presume” in Evidence act are pari materia.

B.Assistance of earlier Statute:


1. Use of same words in similar connection in a later statute gives rise
to a presumption that they are intended to convey the same meaning
as in the earlier statute.
 In re lily Isabel Thomas AIR 1964 SC 855

2. When once certain words in an act of parliament have received a


judicial construction in one of the superior courts and the legislature
has repeated them without alteration in a subsequent statute.

 Banarasi Devi v. I.T.O. AIR 1964 SC 1742 (1745)


 Diwan Brothers v. Central Bank AIR 1976 SC 1503 (1515)

37
3. When a particular form of legislative enactment which has received
authorities interpretation whether by long course of practice is
adopted in framing of a later statute, it is a sound rule of construction
to hold that the words so adopted were intended by the legislature to
bear the meaning which has been put upon them.

4. Article 245 (1) and 246 of Constitution and section 95(1) and 100
of Government of India Act 1935 are pari material.

“It is well settled rule of construction that when a statute is re- enacted
and the words on repealed statute are reproduced in the new statute,
they should be interpreted in the sense which had been judicially put
on them under the repeal Act because the legislature is presumed to be
acquainted with the construction which the court have put upon the
word and when they repeat the same words they must be taken to have
accepted the interpretation put on them by the courts as correctly
reflecting the legislature mind.”

 Bengal Immunity co. ltd. v. State of Bihar. AIR 1955 SC 661


(749)
 Sakal Deep v. Union of India AIR 1974 SC 338 (341-42)
 Shiv Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1992 SC 1213 (1226)

38
Meaning of Judicial officer with reference ti Industrial dispute
Act 1947 (Statesman pvt. Ltd. v. H.R. Deb AIR 1968 SC 1495
(1499) cannot be used for constructing that expression in article
217 (2) (a) of the Constitution for the two are of pari materia.
C. Assistance of later Statute:
1. A later statute is normally not used as an aid to construction of
an earlier one.
 ITO v. Maniram AIR 1569 SC 543 (548)
 Vaijath v. Guramma AIR 1999 SC 555 (557)
2. When an earlier act is truly ambiguous a later act may in
certain circumstances serve as a parliament are exposition for
the former.
 Ram Krishna v. Janpad Sabha AIR 1962 SC 1073
(1079)
3. It is proper that a subsequent legislation may be looked at in
order to see what is the proper interpretation to be put upon the
earlier act, where the earlier act is obscure or ambiguous or
readily capable of more than one interpretation.
 State of Bihar v. S.K. Roy AIR 1960 SC 1995

39
 Hari Prasad v. A.D. Divaker AIR 1957 SC 121 (130-
31)
 Assam Sillimamite v. Union of India AIR 1990 SC
1417 (1422)

In Corporation of Earlier Act into later reference of earlier Act in


to later:

1. Incorporation of an earlier Act in to a later act is a legislative


device adopted for the sale of convenience in order to avoid
verbatim reproduction of the earlier Act in to later.
 Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Amik Singh AIR 2002 SC
3499 (3512)
 Mary Roy v. Kerala AIR 1986 SC 1011
2. When an earlier act or certain of its provision are incorporated by
reference in to a later Act, the provision so incorporated become
part and pared of the later act as if they had been “bodily
transposed in to it”
 Nagpur Improvement Trust
 Ramswaroop v. Munshi AIR 1963 SC 553 (558)

40
Effect of Incorporation:

1. If the subsequent act brings in to itself by reference some of the


clause act, the legal effect is write those sections into the new act
as if they had been actually written in it with pen and printed in
it.
 Mahendra & Mahendra v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 798
(810-11)
 Surana steels v. Dy Com. Income Tax AIR 1999 SC 1455
(1459)
2. The result is to constitute the later act along with the
incorporated provisions of earlier act an independent legislation,
which is not modified or repealed by a modification or repeal of
earlier legislation.
 Narottam Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1964 SC 1667
(1670)
3. The constitutional validity of incorporated provisions and the
statute is judged with references to power of legislature enacting
the fresh legislation and not with reference to the power of
legislature which enacted earlier enactment.

41
 Bhaiyalal Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1962 SC
981 (985)

A statute may instead of referring to a particular previous statute or to


any specific provision therein refer to the law on the subject generally
in such a case the reference is construed to mean that the law is as it
reads there after including amendments subsequent to the time of
adoption.

 Bajya v. Gopikabai AIR 1978 SC 793

Example:-

M.P. Land Revenue Code 1954

Section 154 provide that “subject to his personal law, the interest of a
tenure holder shall on his death pass by inheritance survivorship or
bequest as the case may be. It was held that a case of legislation by
reference of law on the subject generally and therefore expression
personal law will not be limited to the personal law as it stood when
the statute as it stood when the statute was enacted in 1954 but also
embrace all subsequent statute like Hindu succession act 1956 which
time to time amended the Personal law.
42
 Baijya v. Gopika bai
 Heera v. Kasturibai (1996) 6 SCC 82
 Singhai Rakesh Kumar v. Union of India AIR 2001 SC 390

Example:-

M.P. Gram Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam 1973

SADA shall for the purpose or taxation have the power of Municipal
Corporation or council has as the case may be under M.P. Municipal
Corporation Act 1956 or M.P. Municipalities Act 1961.

This is held not legislation by incorporation but legislation by


reference.

 WCL v. SADA AIR 1982 SC 697


 State of M.P. v. M.V. Narsimha AIR 1975 SC 1835 (1841)

Exception to General Rule that repeal or amendment of an act which


is incorporated in a later act has no effect on the later act or on the
provisions incorporated herein subject to the following four
exceptions:

a. Where the later and earlier act are supplemental to each other.
43
Explaination:- whether the amendment of section 21 of Penal
code by the criminal law (amend) Act 1958 was also applicable
for the purpose of prevention of corruption Act 1947, which by
section 2 incorporated the definition of ‘Public servant’ as
contained in section 21 of IPC.
 State of M.P. v. M.V. Narsimhan AIR 1975 SC 1835 (1841)
 State of Kerala v. Attessee AIR 1989 SC 222 (226)
b. Where two acts are pari materia.
c. Where the amendments of the earlier act, if not incorporated in
the later act, would render it wholly unworkable.
d. Where the amendment of the earlier acts either expressly or by
necessary intendment also applies to the later act.

Codifying and Consolidating Statute:

1. The purpose of a codifying statute is a present an orderly and


authoritative statement of law on a given subject.
2. Codifying act is presumed not to after the law unless a contrary
intention appears.
 Board of trustee v. Sriyanesh AIR 1995 SC 2947 (2952)

44
3. The essence of a codifying statute is to be exhaustive on the
matters in respect of which it declares the law and it is not the
province of judges the disregard or go outside the letters of the
enactment according to its

Example:-

A question of res-judicata in relation to a suit is decided solely on


the terms of section 11 or C.P.C. and not on general principles of
res-judicata.

 L. Jankirama v. P.P.M. Nilkanta AIR 1962 SC 633 (641)


 Gulab Chandra v. State of Gujrat AIR 1965 SC 1153 (1163)

Consolidating Statute:

1. The purpose of consolidating statute is to present the whole body


of statutory law or a subject in complete form, repealing the
former statute.
2. In case of purely consolidating statute the presumption is that
such a statue is not intended to alter the law.

45
3. A consolidating act may be an amending act. This additional
purpose is usually indicated in the preamble or in the law titles.
An act to consolidate.

Kind of consolidating enactment:

1. Pure consolidation i.e. re-enactment.


2. Consolidation with correction and minor improvements
3. Consolidation with law commission amendments.

Effect of Usage and Practice

Contemporanea Expositio:

Usage or Practice developed under a statue is indicative of the


meaning ascribed to its words by contemporary ancient statute is as
admissible external aid to construction.

1. Doctrine of stare devises may also be applied when the law is


settled in a state for 100 years.

 Ram Adhar Singh v. Bansi AIR 1987 SC 987

46
Dictionaries

1. When the words are not defined in the act itself it is permissible
to refer to dictionaries to find out the general sense in which that
word is understand in common parlance.
 Mahinder Singh v. Narayana AIR 1989 SC 1367 (1368)
2. A statute cannot be construed with the dictionaries in one hand
and the statue in the other. Regard must also be had to scheme,
context and to the legislative history.
 Commissioner Income Tax v. M C Budhraja AIR 1993
SC 2529 (2540)
3. A dictionary meaning cannot be adopted if it will make some
existing words redundant or will require reading or some
additional words.
 Dental Council of India v. Hari Prakash AIR 2001
SC3303 (3309).

7. Use of Foreign Decisions

On a question of Constitution of Indian statute, use of foreign


decisions of countries following the same system of

47
jurisprudence as ours and rendered on statute in pari materia has
been permitted practice in Indian Court.

 Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC


881 (887)

Subsidiary Rule

1. Same word same meaning;


a. When the legislature uses same word in different part of the same
section or statute, there is a presumption that the word is used in
the same word throughout.
 Bhogilal v. Bombay AIR 1959 SC 356 (377)

Word ‘statement’ in section 157 of Evidence Act 1872 and use of


same word in section 17to 21, 32 39 and 1495 carries same meaning.

2. “The guards on which the order has been made” was used in
section 3(3) and 7(1) of Preventive Detention Act 1950 carry
different meaning.
 Sham Rao v D.M. Thara AIR 1957 SC 231

48
3. Even when same word is used at different places in the same
clause of same section it may not bear same meaning at each
place having regard to the context of its used.
 Ramnarayan Mor v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1964 SC
949 (953)

Section 117 (1) of U.P. Zamidari:

Abolition and Land Reform laws authorizes the state govt. to declare
that ‘hats bazaar and melas’ which had vested in the state shall vest in
Goan Sabha Supreme Court says that vesting in State govt is absolute
and vesting in Sabha is limited to possession and management.

 Maharaja Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1976 SC 2602


(2608)

Example of different meaning of same word used in same clause


depending upon context.

2. Use of different word

When in relation to the same subject matter different words are used
in same statute, there is presumption that they are not used in same
sense.

49
 B.R. Enterprise v. State of U.P. AIR 1999 SC 1867 (1902)

“Trade and business” in Art 298 have different meaning from “trade
and Commerce” used in art 301 of the Constitution.

3. Rule of last Amendment


 Aswini Kumar Ghiose v. Aurbindo Bose AIR 1952 SC
369 (76)
4. Non- Obstante Clause
a. A clause beginning with “Notwithstanding anything contained
in this act or in same particular provision in the act or in some
particular act or in any law for the time being in force.” Is
sometime appended to a section in the beginning with a view
to give the enacting provisions of the section in case of
conflict overriding effect over the provisions or act mentioned
in non obstante Clause.
 Union of India v. G.M. Kakil AIR 1984 SC 1022
b. The phrase “Notwithstanding anything” is used in contradiction
of the phrase “subject to”
 Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service Raspur v. R.T.A.
AIR 1966 SC 1318

50
i. When provision ‘A’ is subject to the provision ‘B’ a case
falling under the provision ‘B’ is taken out of the provision
‘A’.
ii. Comm. Of Wealth Tax v. Trustee H.E.H Nizam AIR 1977
SC 2103
Section 3 of Wealth Tax Act is subject to the other provisions
of the act hence a case of a trustee which falls in section 21 is
outside of section 3.

“Notwithstanding anything (contained) in any other law”


occurring in a section of an act cannot construe to take away the effect
of any provision of the act in which that section appears.

 P. Virudha Chalam v. Management of Lotus Mills AIR


1998 SC 554 (561-62)
 Any other law will refer to any law other than in which that
section occurs.

“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act” may be


construed to take away the effect of any provision of the act in which
the section occurs but it cannot take away the effect of any other law.

51
 Satyanarayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2001 SC
2856 (2860-61)

“Notwithstanding anything contained in this code” in section 482 of


CrPc cannot take away the effect of section 19 of P.C. Act which
prevent grant of stay.

“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment”


cannot take away the effect of any provision in a law which is not an
enactment.

 Sharda Devi v. Bihar AIR 2002 SC 1357 (1360)

Section 54 of Land Acquisition Act 1894 – “Notwithstanding


anything contained in any enactment” does not exclude a letter patent
appeal as letter’s patent is not an enactment.

PEK Kalliani Amma v. K. Devi AIR 1964 SC 1963 (1976)

Section 16 of Hindu Marriage Act 1956 ofens with “Notwithstanding


that a marriage is null and void under section 11” but having regard to
the language and beneficient purpose of enacting clause it was not
restricted to marriages that were void under section 11 of the act and
children born of all void marriages were held to be legitimate.

52
5. Legal Fiction:
1. The legislature is quite competent to create a legal fiction.
2. Legislature can enact a deeming provision for the purpose of
assuming existence of a fact which does not really exist.
 Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishwa Cooperative AIR 1990 SC
1563 (1575)
 CIT V. Urmila Ramesh AIR 1998 SC 2640 (2645-46)

When act enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done,
which in fact and in truth was not done the court is entitled and bound
to ascertain for what purposes between what person the statute fiction
is to be resort to.

 State Travancore v. Sammug Vilas AIR 1953 SC 333(343)

6. Mandatory or Directory Provisions:


1. The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory
depends upon the intend of legislature and not upon the language
in which intent in clothes.
 State of M.P. v. Pradeep Kumar (2000) 7 SEC 372 (377)
53
2. If a provision is mandatory an act done in breach thereof will be
invalid but if it is directory the act may be valid although the non
compliance may give rise to some other penalty if provided by
the statute.
 Drigraj Kaur v. Amar Krishna AIR 1960 SC 444 (449)
 Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel AIR 1985 SC 1416
Breach of a directory provision does not entail any invalidity.

Exception:

The general rule that non-compliance of a mandatory requirement


results in nullification of the act is subject to following two
exceptions:-

a. Performance of the requirement is impossible.


b. Waiver: “Quilibet Potest renunia re juri pro se introducto” every
man is entitled to renounce a rright introduced in his favour.
 Lachamma v. Radheshyam AIR 1971 SC

It must be remembered that the principles of waiver applies when the


requirements of statute do not involve any question of Public interest
or public policy, than performance of condition cannot be waived.

54
 Raichand Jain v. Miss Chandra Kanta AIR 1991 SC 744
(754) permission of rent controller to convert residential
building into non-residential.

When consequences provided:

When consequences of nullification on failure to comply with a


prescribed requirement is provided by the statute itself that such
requirement must be interpreted as mandatory.

Rajsekhar Gogoi v. Assam AIR 2001 SC 2313 (2315)

Example:

Requirement of registration of certain prescribed documents section


17 of the Registration act or T P Act is mandatory since the
consequences of non-registration is given in section 49 that such
document if not registered do not affect the property comprised
therein.

 Secretary of state v. kachwar lime AIR 1935 PC 20 (22)

Use of negative words

55
1. Negative words are clearly prohibitory and are ordinary used as a
legislative device to make a statute imperative.
 M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa AIR 1961 SC
1107 (1113)

Exceptions:- Direction relating to solemnization of marriage through


using negative words, have been construed directory in case where the
enactment in question did not provide for consequences that the
marriage in breach of those direction shall be invalid.

 Lila Gupta v. Laxmi Narayan AIR 1978 SC 1351 (1354-


55)
2. Section 25f (c) of I.D. Act 1947 held directory and (a) and (b) are
mandatory.
The rule that negative words are usually mandatory is like any
other rule subordinate to the context and the object intended to be
achieved by the particular requirement.

Affirmative words may imply negative:

Affirmative words stand at a weaker footing than negative words for


reading the provision mandatory but affirmative words may also be so
limiting as to imply negative.

56
Section 54, 59, 107 and 123 of Transfer of Property Act 1882 and in
affirmative language but the requirement are mandatory.

 Mian PirBux v. Mohd. Taher AIR 1935 PC 235 (237)

Use of ‘Shall’ and ‘May’ and ‘must and ‘should’

1. The use of the word shall raises a presumption that the particular
provisions and imperative.
 State of U.P. v. Maharashtra AIR 1957 SC 912 (917)
2. This presumption may be rebutted by other consideration such as
object and scope of enactment and the consequences from the
construction.
 Mohan Lal (AIR 1957 SC 912)
3. When a statute uses the word ‘shall’ prima facie it is mandatory
but the Court may ascertain the real intention of legislature by
attending to the whole scope of statute.
 State of U.P. v. Babu Ram AIR 1961 SC 751 (765)
4. The word ‘must’ in place of ‘shall’ will itself be sufficient.
5. The use of word ‘should’ instead of ‘must’ may not justify the
influence that the provision is directory if the context in
otherwise.

57
 Bhattacharya v. State of Madhya Pradesh

Consideration of general inconvenience in statutes imposing Public


duty-

Where a statute imposes a public duty and lays down the manner in
which and time within which the duty shall be performed injustice or
inconvenience may be relevant, in holding such prescription only
directory.

Time:

Where a public officer is directed by a statute to perform a duty within


a specified time the cases established that provisions as to time are
only directory while construing sec 17(1) of Industrial Dispute Act
1947 that it is obligatory on the govt. to publish an award, but the
provision that it should be published within thirty days is not
mandatory and award published beyond thirty days is not invalid.

 Ramington Rand v. Workman AIR 1950 SC 224 (226)

Consultation:

1. Provision in article 320 (3) (e) of Constitution of India requiring


that the Public service commission shall be consulted on all

58
disciplinary matters affecting civil servants has been interpreted
as directory.
 State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal AIR 1957 SC 912

Contra:-

 K.K. Shrinivasan v. Union of India AIR 1958 SC 419


(430)
 Jyoti Prakash Mitter v. Chief Justice AIR 1965 SC 961
(966)

Formalities prescribed for making Contract:

1. Formalities and requirement for making contract or transfer have


been held imperative.
2. Provisions of Constitution and Municipal Act providing the
manner in which contract shall be executed held mandatory.

Article 299:

 Sohan Lal v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 955 (956)


 B.C. Mahindra v. Municipal AIR 1970 SC 729

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