BoR (18) 116

BEREC Report on infrastructure sharing

14 June, 2018
 BoR (18) 116

Content
Executive Summary .............................................................................................................................. 2
1. Introduction and objective ........................................................................................................... 5
2. Current regulations and legal framework................................................................................... 6
3. Current sharing arrangements .................................................................................................. 10
3.1. Scope .................................................................................................................................................. 10
3.2. Cost sharing within agreements .......................................................................................................... 14
3.3. Assessments and/or decisions on infrastructure sharing .................................................................... 14

4. Benefits and challenges from infrastructure sharing arrangements .................................... 15

4.1. Benefits of sharing .............................................................................................................................. 15
4.2. Challenges and downsides associated with sharing ........................................................................... 16
4.3. General experiences with sharing agreements ................................................................................... 18
4.4. Barriers to increase infrastructure sharing .......................................................................................... 19

5. Future evolution of sharing arrangements and the role of 5G in shaping

requirements/regulatory framework ......................................................................................... 21
Annex 1 – Individual assessments of active sharing in various countries .................................. 23
Annex 2 – Full questionnaire ............................................................................................................. 29
Annex 3 – Acronyms ........................................................................................................................... 32

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Executive Summary

Overview of this report

This preliminary report constitutes a provisional analysis of mobile network infrastructure

sharing arrangements which are currently in place in various individual European markets.
The report is a first step towards identifying best practices on mobile infrastructure sharing
arrangements and seeking to develop a common BEREC position on sharing. The objective
is to facilitate the enhancement of mobile connectivity in European markets, in particular with
regard to the rollout of 5G networks, whilst protecting and promoting competition.

Background

Mobile infrastructure sharing (both passive and active) describes the process by which
operators share infrastructure to deliver a mobile service to end users. "Passive sharing" is
the sharing of the passive elements of network infrastructure such as masts, sites, cabinet,
power, and air conditioning. "Active sharing" is the sharing of active elements in the radio
access network such as antennas and radio network controllers (RNC). National roaming is a
form of active sharing. Sharing is a feature in many European mobile markets and is often but
not always concluded on a voluntary basis (i.e. “commercially driven”), and not as a result of
regulatory intervention.

In some of the countries where mobile infrastructure sharing is already a factor in the market
or under active consideration, NRAs have adopted guidelines trying to achieve a reasonable
balance between incentivising investment and ensuring a fair and competitive market
development through infrastructure-based competition. One of the factors taken into account
is cost savings, which have to be assessed in the overall context of the market and the position
of the sharing parties.

The future rollout of 5G is expected to make use of higher frequency bands, which will entail,
amongst other things, more use of small cells. This will result in an increase in the number of
base stations relative to existing networks. Consequently, there might be a greater impetus
for new (models of) infrastructure sharing arrangements and NRAs might need to reconsider
their existing approach to infrastructure sharing.

This report is based on NRA responses to a comprehensive questionnaire which was prepared
by BEREC specifically for the purposes of this report (see Annex 2). In their responses, most
NRAs state that there is some degree of passive infrastructure sharing, but the ways in which
infrastructure sharing is managed or assessed differs from country to country. Differences
arise from how information about infrastructure sharing agreements is treated and shared
between the parties and the authorities and how disputes are dealt with. NRAs are often not
informed about the detailed agreements in cost sharing models such as reciprocal sharing
and cost-based pricing. There are also differences in the approaches regarding the inclusion
of rules in spectrum awards that may foster, mandate or prohibit network sharing.

Most NRAs have the competency and authority to resolve disputes in particular with respect
to passive sharing, but there are differences in how these powers are applied. Dispute

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resolution takes the form of voluntary negotiation, public consultation and binding decision-
making. There are also differences in terms of providing guidelines or rules with respect to
infrastructure sharing with some countries providing detailed guidelines and some providing
none at all.

Respondents reported several different types of sharing agreements:

- Passive sharing on a lease basis

- Active sharing agreements involving joint deployment

- Agreements where an MNO is permitted to use the network of another MNO for a specific
technology, e.g. 2G.

- Sharing agreements that are related to specific locations like indoor sharing.

When it comes to assessing individual active sharing agreements, several approaches to

making decisions, informal assessments and ongoing proceedings were reported. In some
cases, remedies were imposed to address competitive concerns. The impact on long-term
competition – coverage and deployment and spread of new technologies – was mentioned by
NRAs but no single remedy was identified. In some cases, competition authorities have relied
on fines whereas in other cases NRAs have imposed coverage obligations on operators to
secure infrastructure competition.

With regard to the future trend in infrastructure sharing, most NRAs expect there to be
pressure for more sharing arrangements due to greater network densification driven by 5G,
which will in turn place a greater emphasis on cost management. As well as requiring more
small cells, NRAs also expect 5G to need higher backhaul capacity. There is a consensus that
this will lead to an increase or at least an increased call for sharing (passive, active, backhaul,
active indoor, spectrum and others) but NRAs want to ensure that sharing arrangements do
not result in competition being distorted. Some NRAs have also stated concerns that
operators might rely on exclusivity contracts in order to impede rollout by other operators.

Key points

There are a number of general points which can be drawn from the assessment of the NRA
responses to the infrastructure sharing questionnaire:

- There is a large range of experience amongst NRAs;

- There is a variety in the type of infrastructure sharing arrangements;

- The motivation for sharing is primarily market driven;

- Where sharing is the result of intervention it can be due to

o a general regulatory or government policy of encouraging sharing,

o conditions attached to spectrum awards,

o a means to aid new entrants or

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o access obligations in State Aid decisions;

- There do not seem to be common areas of competence among NRAs (except in the area
of dispute resolution);

- Action against some anti-competitive sharing arrangements have come through the
competition law framework;

- There is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the impact on sharing and implications for
regulatory approaches stemming from 5G;

- There is a common view that infrastructure sharing is likely to be a key market aspect
when 5G is introduced; and

- There is a view that developments in infrastructure sharing are likely to continue to be

driven by the market.

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1. Introduction and objective

Mobile infrastructure sharing (both passive and active) describes the process by which one or
more operators share infrastructure to deliver a mobile service to end users. By passive
sharing we mean sharing of the passive elements of network infrastructure (mast, sites,
cabinet, power, conditioning), and by active sharing we mean sharing of active elements in
the radio access network (e.g. antenna, radio network controller (RNC)). We consider national
roaming to be a form of active sharing.

Sharing in a variety of forms is a feature of a number of European markets. Generally, sharing

arrangements are the result of commercial negotiation, but it does sometimes result from
regulatory intervention. In those countries where mobile infrastructure sharing is present, the
assessment of its impact requires striking a reasonable balance between incentivising efficient
infrastructure investment and promoting competition. The operators’ motivation is to reduce
the costs of infrastructure deployment to what they consider to be a commercially viable and
economically efficient level. With the forecast increase in the use of small cells as a result of
greater usage of higher frequency bands associated with 5G networks, there is likely to be a
large increase in the number of base stations. This network densification may create a greater
incentive for infrastructure sharing. As such, NRAs might have to consider and/or revise their
general approach to arrangements made by operators for infrastructure sharing.

This report is intended to describe the infrastructure sharing arrangements currently in place
in Europe, and it assesses the benefits and drawbacks of such arrangements. It is not intended
to be normative or to describe best practice; rather, it provides a ‘snapshot’ of the current
status of the market in this area.

This report is the first step towards identifying best practice and seeking to develop a Common
Position on sharing with the objective of facilitating the enhancement of mobile connectivity in
European markets. BEREC will work towards the development of a Common Position in the
next phase of the project in the second half of 2018.

The report describes the different existing sharing models which are in place in the main
categories of sharing (passive infrastructure, active infrastructure and spectrum). It describes
the following:

- The current regulations and legal framework relating to infrastructure sharing;

- The scope of current sharing arrangements including the geographic scope, degree
(passive/active/core/spectrum), time frame, technology (2G, 3G, 4G), agreement type
(JV, lease, IRU), and commercial/regulatory drivers;

- The benefits and challenges from infrastructure sharing arrangements; and

- A brief summary of NRA approaches regarding 5G.

A total of 30 responses were received. The full questionnaire is included as Annex 2.

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2. Current regulations and legal framework

This section describes the current legal framework and regulations for infrastructure sharing
in different countries, including information-sharing requirements, NRA powers, infrastructure
sharing obligations and any guidelines in place to support operators.

Publication of information about infrastructure sharing opportunities

Operators are obliged to publish information on passive infrastructure sharing opportunities in

advance, in a public forum, in nine countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Montenegro and Serbia). In Norway, the obligation applies only to the SMP
operator. The obligations can take the form of online publication, notifying the NRA/Ministry or
publication via a third party platform.

In some countries, although there is not a regulated approach that mandates operators to
publish sharing opportunities, information regarding cell site location is available through either
privately organised databases/structures or NRA managed portals. For example, there are
privately organised databases/structures in Austria and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands,
this is complemented by a requirement that mobile operators must coordinate site planning to
minimise environmental disruption to local communities. A similar requirement exists in France
that requires operators to consult other operators to gauge their interest when deploying new
sites (excluding dense areas).

Following the transposition of the broadband cost reduction directive (BCRD 1) most countries
have a general passive infrastructure sharing obligation, although this does not translate into
a requirement for publication of information on infrastructure locations or deployment plans in
a number of countries (Czech Republic, Finland, Germany 2, Hungary, Malta, Poland,
Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey). In Bulgaria, Finland and Italy,
there is a Single Information Point (SIP) in accordance with the requirements of the BCRD
that provides information on the location of physical infrastructure that can be used for
infrastructure sharing.

NRA information gathering about infrastructure sharing opportunities

Most NRAs gather information on infrastructure sharing agreements in specific circumstances

only. This is the case, for example, in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Sweden, Italy,
Switzerland and Norway (where the NRA gathers information in cases of disputes between
operators, although for national roaming, there is an obligation on the SMP operator to send
a reference offer to the NRA).

In terms of formal requirements for operators to notify NRAs about infrastructure sharing, there
are no legal/regulatory requirements in most countries although there is a duty to provide
information on request. Where there are requirements to inform regulatory authorities, there

1 Broadband Cost Reduction Directive – Directive 2014/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 may 2014 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying high-speed electronic communications networks
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0061&from=pl
2https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/EN/Areas/Telecommunications/Companies/FrequencyManagement/Infrastru

ctureSharing/InfrastructureSharing_node.html

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are different thresholds that determine requirements. In Cyprus, France, Greece, Romania,
Montenegro, Portugal and Turkey, operators are obliged to inform NRAs of any infrastructure
sharing plans. In Germany, shared use of certain assets (physical sites, masts, antennas,
support cabinets and some degree of RAN sharing provided that there is no pooling of
frequencies and logical base stations (e.g. Node B)) is allowed without any notification
requirements; all other types of sharing agreements have to be notified to the NRA. In the
United Kingdom (UK), there is no regulatory requirement to provide information on sharing
arrangements but as part of their competition law compliance (and risk management),
operators typically share terms of agreements with the NRA.

Infrastructure sharing obligations

In Norway, infrastructure sharing obligations have been imposed on the SMP operator
following a market review – the dominant mobile operator has been subjected to infrastructure
sharing obligations including national roaming.

There are also examples of more targeted regulatory approaches regarding mobile
infrastructure sharing. In Austria, the NRA can grant a new entrant national roaming access
to the mobile networks of existing operators for a limited term – this balances the need to
promote competition and incentivises investment. In Belgium, the NRA can impose shared
use with due regard for the principle of proportionality. In the event of disputes between
operators, the NRA can impose cost sharing fees as well as the terms regarding shared use
of antenna sites. It can also impose national roaming obligations on operators controlling
access to end users. In Portugal, national decree law goes further than just allowing passive
infrastructure sharing and actively obliges operators (where technically possible) to make
sharing agreements regarding passive assets. Regarding active infrastructure sharing, the
NRA assesses proposals on a case-by-case basis in terms of how such sharing agreements
may affect competition. In Liechtenstein, operators are obliged to grant access to passive
infrastructure assets and mobile operators are obliged to share sites subject to capacity being
available. In Turkey, during 2011-16, exemptions from administrative fees were used as an
incentive to encourage sharing agreements; these exemptions have now been withdrawn
although the obligation for sharing agreements continues.

Infrastructure sharing associated with spectrum awards

Just under half of the respondents (12 out of 29) reported that their countries have introduced
rules on regulating mobile infrastructure sharing during spectrum awards. Spectrum awards
often include coverage obligations that are designed to stimulate infrastructure deployment,
which limits the use of active infrastructure sharing arrangements. This is the case in Austria,
Finland and Switzerland. In the forthcoming 3.4 - 3.8 GHz awards, Austria plans to prohibit
active sharing in the three biggest cities (Wien, Graz, Linz) with the exception of non-replicable
active components where sharing will be allowed. This proposal is still under consultation. A
different approach is taken in Denmark in which the spectrum and legislative frameworks do
not prohibit network sharing and where recently awarded spectrum licences allow operators
to meet their coverage obligations through concluding roaming agreements. Any sharing
agreements remain subject to general competition law.

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Similarly, Belgium, Czech Republic, France and Romania imposed obligations on license
holders to provide national roaming services for new entrants or to share spectrum with
operators that have relatively less spectrum holdings. These obligations are adjusted to
national circumstances. In Belgium, the obligation applies to operators that have 2G coverage
so as to give new entrants without a 2G footprint time (9 years) to develop their own national
network. A similar approach is taken in France in which 2G renewal awards during 2006-09
included obligations for national roaming agreements in so called ‘white areas’ and spectrum
licences of the three incumbent operators in 2010 provided for a new entrant to benefit from
2G national roaming for the first six years.

The Portuguese NRA referred to national legislative stipulations in its 2011 auction (of
450 MHz, 800 MHz, 900 MHz, 1800 MHz, 2.1 GHz and 2.6 GHz frequency bands) to oblige
operators to negotiate passive infrastructure sharing agreements. In Liechtenstein, the NRA
included ancillary conditions in its spectrum awards that obliged operators to share passive
assets – these ancillary conditions did not extend to active network elements. In Turkey, there
were mandatory provisions for passive infrastructure sharing in larger population areas and
provisions for active infrastructure sharing in smaller population areas. In Greece and
Hungary, spectrum awards allow license holders to enter into passive infrastructure sharing
agreements when no viable alternatives exist. Conditions are attached to any such sharing
agreements. For example, in Greece, there is a requirement to notify the NRA and it is subject
to an assessment that no sharing agreement restricts competition.

17 out of 29 respondents report that they do not have sharing regulations associated with
spectrum awards but some of them are considering introducing such regulations in the future.

Dispute resolution

The majority of NRAs hold competence for dispute resolution, including in cases of passive
infrastructure sharing agreements. Generally, issuing a binding decision on passive
infrastructure sharing terms and conditions is only justified upon failure of voluntary
negotiations attempted by the sharing parties. The procedure is often complemented with
public consultations. Some NRAs also hold powers to assess sharing agreements ex post. In
France, a national judicial framework empowers the NRA with its dispute settlement
mechanism. In Greece and Hungary, the operators submit sharing agreements to the NRA
who can evaluate and adjust sharing terms and conditions.

The Table 1 below shows examples of how disputes concerning infrastructure sharing are
treated in the different countries.

Table 1: dispute treatment in some European countries

Procedure Case by case Other/unknown

Special law, e.g. BCRD, Croatia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic
Communications Finland, Cyprus,
legislation Italy, Denmark
Latvia,
Romania

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Procedure Case by case Other/unknown

General law France, Greece,
Ireland, Malta,
Liechtenstein, Montenegro,
Netherland Norway,
Serbia,
Sweden,
Turkey,
UK
Other/unknown Germany, Switzerland
Hungary,
Spain

Public consultations covering mobile infrastructure sharing

The majority of respondents report that there have not been any consultations regarding
mobile infrastructure sharing. 12 out of 29 respondents report having held workshops or
consultations concerning different areas of infrastructure sharing with the outcomes including
position papers, guidelines and sharing obligations to facilitating spectrum and RAN sharing.
In Ireland, the NRA set out its view on spectrum and network sharing following a consultation
on its draft Radio Spectrum Management Strategy Statement (2016-18).The consultation
sought high-level views and did not distinguish between passive or active infrastructure
sharing. As a result of the consultation, the NRA was able to reaffirm its view that its key
assessment criteria on network sharing agreements would be their impact on competition and
end user benefits.

Guidance or specific rules with respect to infrastructure sharing

In terms of providing specific guidance/rules with respect to infrastructure sharing, there was
an equal split between countries that provided guidance and countries that did not. Where
guidance was provided, it tended to promote passive infrastructure sharing and took a much
more circumspect approach to active infrastructure sharing. For example, in Austria, an old
position paper from 2011 considered that there were no concerns on sharing passive
infrastructure sites (subject to two operators not sharing more than 50% of their sites) whereas
for active infrastructure sharing, each network operator was required to operate at least 50%
of its sites outside of (active sharing) cooperation arrangements and only uses its own
frequencies in the arrangement. Similarly, in Finland, the implementation of the BCRD sets
out guidelines/law on co-construction of networks and, in Denmark, the implementation of the
BCRD sets out law and guidelines on joint utilisation of passive physical infrastructure and
high-speed infrastructure preparation of buildings.

Guidelines can be provided by NRAs, competition authorities or government ministries. For

example, in France, the competition authority issued an opinion on sharing agreements
assessment in 2013. In 2016, following the adoption of national specific provisions in French
law 3, Arcep (the NRA) published sector specific guidelines setting out risk criteria for the
analysis of sharing proposals and provided network-sharing recommendations, and then

3 National law (Law n° 2015-990) empowered Arcep to request changes in the sharing agreements between mobile
operators

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invited the operators to present the modifications they made to existing sharing agreements,
if needed, to ensure they were in line with its guidelines. In Italy, Latvia, Malta and Norway,
ministries or government agencies are responsible for issuing guidelines; although in Latvia
and Norway, the NRA provides guidance with respect to the SMP operator. In contrast, in
Montenegro, Switzerland and Turkey, the NRA provides guidance on passive infrastructure
sharing.

3. Current sharing arrangements

3.1. Scope

The questionnaire asked each NRA about existing infrastructure sharing agreements. Passive
sharing is defined as sharing of the passive elements of network infrastructure (mast, sites,
cabinet, power, air-conditioning). Active sharing is defined as the sharing of active elements
in the radio access network (e.g. antenna, radio network controller (RNC)). National roaming
is considered as a form of active sharing.

24 NRAs within the EU replied to the questionnaire. In addition, responses were received from
Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey. The responses indicate
that not all NRAs are fully informed about the details of ongoing infrastructure sharing
agreements. As a result, this report should not be treated as an exhaustive summary of all
existing (passive or active) sharing agreements.

Active sharing with joint deployment

Table 2 lists infrastructure agreements with sharing of active infrastructure and joint
deployment. 4 It aims to summarize all active sharing agreements where each partner agrees
to invest into some active infrastructure in order to share it. It gives further information on
spectrum sharing, the geographic scope and the time frame.

Table 2: Active Sharing with Joint Deployment

Country MNOs involved Spectrum Geographic Scope Time Frame

Sharing
Bulgaria two MNOs No national Permanent
(BG)
Cyprus MTN and Primetel No national
(CY)
Czech T-Mobile CZ; No Country divided into two parts, 2013- 2033
Republic CETIN excl. two biggest cities Prague
(CZ) and Brno
Denmark Telenor and Telia Yes national 2012-
(DK)

4 Joint deployment includes joint ventures that deploy infrastructure as well as agreements that divide
responsibilities for deployment among the partners of the sharing agreement. Regionally separated deployments
with reciprocal national roaming for the same technology are thus classified as joint deployment. RAN sharing
with joint spectrum is also classified as active sharing with joint deployment.

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Country MNOs involved Spectrum Geographic Scope Time Frame

Sharing
Finland DNA Ltd and Yes regional, i.e. north and eastern 2015-
(FI) Telia FI Ltd part of Finland (50% of area,
15% of population)
France SFR and Yes excluding dense areas (more N/A
(FR) Bouygues than 200k inhabitants) and rural
Telecom white areas: ~85% of territory
and 57% of population
Greece Vodafone GR and No 2012-
(GR) WIND Hellas
Hungary Magyar Telekom National except Budapest
(HU) and Telenor
Poland Orange & T- Yes National 2011
(PL) Mobile
Romania Orange and No National except 11 municipalities Obligation
(RO) Telekom Romania for three
years. After
that,
commercially
driven.
Spain Orange and No In rural areas with less than 2006-
(ES) Vodafone 25.000 inhabitants
Sweden Tele2 & Telenor Yes national 2009-
(SE)
SE Telenor & Hi3G Yes rural 2001-
SE Telia & Tele2 Yes national 2001-
UK Three and EE No national
UK Telefonica (O2) No national
and Vodafone
Annotations: All active sharing agreements with joint deployment are commercially driven. All agreements except the Swedish
cooperations and Three/EE in UK cover all technologies. All agreements are joint ventures or agreements where the parties have
similar involvement in network deployment with the exception of ES-Orange/Vodafone (national roaming), RO-Orange/Telekom
Romania (national roaming), BG-Max/Mobitel (lease), CY-MTN/Primetel (lease) and CZ-T-Mobile/CETIN. The cooperation in BG-
2MNOs also includes core network sharing which is the only core sharing of all above listed agreements. Active sharing that is
limited to individual antennas was not included in this table.

According to Table 2 all active sharing agreements with joint deployment are commercially
driven. The majority of active sharing agreements with joint deployment are organised in the
form of a joint venture.

The agreements without a formal joint venture are an agreement between Orange and
Vodafone in Spain (where each MNO roams into its partner’s network in rural areas with less
than 25000 inhabitants), and agreements in Romania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Cyprus.

For almost all active sharing agreements with joint deployment, subsequent technologies are
included in the sharing agreement. One exception is Sweden, where different arrangements
for 3G and 2G/4G are observed. For example, two operators (Telia and Hi3G) participated
only in a 3G infrastructure sharing agreement (each with different partners). Tele2 and Telenor
(each a partner of Telia and Hi3G for 3G) formed a joint venture including spectrum sharing
for 4G. The second exception is Three/EE in the UK, where only 3G is actively shared. 5 In

5 For 4G, sharing was limited to passive sharing.

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addition to this exception, this generally indicates that active sharing with joint deployment for
one technology often leads to the sharing for the subsequent technology and that active
infrastructure agreements are often permanent agreements.

On the geographic scope, the available information indicates that active infrastructure sharing
with joint deployment is often limited to non-densely populated areas. The agreement in Czech
Republic excludes the two largest cities (therefore sharing 85% of the population), the
agreement in France excludes the largest urban areas and the agreement in Finland only
covers 15% of the population (but 50% of area).

National roaming (without joint deployment)

In contrast to Table 2, Table 3 aims to summarize those active sharing agreements, where
not all partners agree to jointly invest into active infrastructure. Table 3 lists the agreements
where a partner relies on the network of another partner for a specific technology and roams
into that network without either offering a reciprocal offer (within a specific technology) to the
partner or being part of a joint venture that deploys infrastructure. National roaming is not
necessarily covering the whole nation, but rather increasing the coverage of the network that
is limited in scope.

Several countries reported such agreements. 6 Table 3 lists the countries, the MNOs involved,
the time frame, the technology and whether the agreements were commercially driven or were
a result of regulatory intervention. Some agreements had a clear end date. Some agreements
were or still are limited to legacy technologies (2G/3G). Individual agreements were directly
driven by regulatory intervention. For some other agreements, regulatory intervention might
have been a fallback option that enabled commercially driven agreements.

Table 3: National Roaming Agreements (without joint deployment)

Country MNOs involved Time Frame Technology Commercially driven /

regulatory intervention
Austria T-Mobile; Hutchison 2012- 2G vs 3G Commercially
Croatia Tele 2 d.o.o.; Hrvatski Commercially
Telekom d.d.
Denmark Hi3G; Telia N. a. 2G, 3G Commercially
France Orange; Free Mobile 2012 - 2020 2G, 3G 2G regulation; 3G
commercially
Norway Telia; ICE 2015-2021 2G, 3G, 4G Merger remedy
Spain Yoigo/ Telefónica; -2019; 2017- 2G, 3G, (4G) Commercially
Yoigo/ Orange
Annotations: Sharing agreements above do not include spectrum sharing, except for Orange/Free; additional information based
on publically available information for Hi3G/Telia in Denmark; T-Mobile/Hutchison agreement in Austria offers 2G and 3G in a
reciprocal roaming agreement.

6 Regionally separate deployment with reciprocal national roaming for the same technology is classified as joint
deployment and thus not included in Table 3. The Netherlands reported an agreement that is in principle a passive
sharing agreement but goes in parallel with a MVNO agreement between the same sharing parities. The MVNO
agreement that grants access to the sharing partner as a virtual network operator in case of no coverage or no
VoLTE capable handset available. This agreement is not included in Table 3.

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Passive sharing

For passive sharing, the information that individual NRAs have is often limited (partly due to
information gathering powers listed above). Based on the available information, passive
sharing on a site-by-site basis seems common. In some countries, there was regulatory
intervention to enable passive sharing. Montenegro for instance prescribes (passive) sharing
obligation among all operators in the Electronic Communications Law. At the moment, all
operators within Montenegro have passive sharing via lease agreements. In Norway Telenor
as an SMP operator is obliged to offer co-location to others. Systematic passive sharing
between two MNOs was rarely notified in the answers to the questionnaire. For the EIR/Three
cooperation in Ireland, Three was obliged to continue the agreement with EIR as part of the
remedies related to the merger with O2 Ireland. Further systematic passive sharing
agreements were notified for Cyprus (CYTA/MTN) and Bulgaria. In the UK, EE and Three
share sites for 4G within a joint venture.

Normally, it can be assumed that active sharing (except national roaming) implies also the
sharing of passive infrastructure such as sites. These agreements are shown in Table 2 and
are discussed there.

Special agreements

Several NRAs reported agreements with respect to specific infrastructure. In Belgium, passive
indoor sharing in large buildings among all players is based on regulatory intervention. 7
Switzerland reports RAN sharing for indoor trains and tunnels (3G/4G) between all MNOs.
Malta reports passive indoor sharing among all players with joint deployment that is often
mandated by the premises’ owner. Austria reports passive and partially active sharing (leaky
feeder cable) for specific infrastructure (Vienna underground). Finland reports passive sharing
for indoor coverage in trains.

So there exists a range of special agreements with respect to specific infrastructure for special
locations. It seems that not all NRAs have knowledge and were informed about those
agreements.

Further agreements

Some further infrastructure sharing agreements exist that do not fit in the categories described
above. In France, there is regulatory intervention to share RAN and spectrum in rural “white
areas” (those areas with limited mobile coverage). These agreements were first introduced by
law for 2G deployments in the early 2000s, and then expanded to 3G by national law in 2015 8,
and finally to 4G as an obligation in 4G authorizations. In another agreement that was driven
by regulation, operators are required to share 5000 zones per operator in rural areas (2000
RAN sharing, 3000 passive site sharing). Two MNOs concluded a commercially driven RAN
and spectrum sharing agreement in La Réunion.

7 See https://www.modas.bipt.be/
8 Law n° 2015-990 of 6 August 2015 for economic growth, activity and equality of economic opportunities

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In Switzerland, two MNOs share some of the individual antennas. In Slovenia, some
infrastructure sharing agreements are under study. In Turkey, there is RAN and spectrum
sharing among all operators – partially due to regulatory intervention.

3.2. Cost sharing within agreements

NRAs were asked about forms of cost sharing within infrastructure sharing agreements. Only
for a minority of agreements, NRAs were able to report some information. Information about
cost sharing is often confidential. For a few agreements, reciprocal exchange of services was
agreed, for a few other agreements, cost-oriented pricing was reported. For instance, in the
UK, EE and Three share the cost proportionally, whereas Telefonica and Vodafone are each
responsible for the costs of the half of the UK they manage. In the latter agreement, any
additional investment required unilaterally is paid by the MNO requesting the investment (e.g.
Vodafone wanting a new site in Telefonica’s territory).

For passive sharing, some NRAs imposed pricing sheets.

3.3. Assessments and/or decisions on infrastructure sharing

There were two questions where NRAs were asked about formal or informal assessments of
sharing agreements and decisions and/or ongoing proceedings with respect to infrastructure
sharing. The answers were supplemented by research on websites of NRAs and NCAs. For
passive sharing, several authorities imposed sharing or the terms of passive sharing (RTR,
BIPT, CRC, NKOM). For active sharing, individual assessments in Austria, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Spain, Sweden, UK and Norway are described
in Annex 1.

With respect to active sharing, the assessments raised different competitive concerns:

- collusion in the wholesale market (refusal to supply MVNOs, conversion of fixed into
variable cost and thereby fostering collusion);

- effect on spectrum awards (circumvention of caps, collusion in spectrum awards);

- foreclosure from unused passive infrastructure (sites, …);

- information exchange that fosters collusion;

- reduction of competition on significant parameters such as coverage and/or development

and spread of new technologies.

In the available decisions and for most of the competitive concerns, remedies were imposed
or contracts were adapted in order to address these concerns. However, for a reduction of
competition in long-run competitive parameters like coverage and development and spread of
new technologies, no remedies were imposed. In Austria, MNOs were required to rollout the
next technology independent of each other. In Czech Republic, the European Commission is
still investigating the case. In Denmark such a reduction was accepted within the framework
of Article 101(3) TFEU. In Finland, MNOs were required to offer coverage with their own
network for 80% of the population. In Hungary, there is an ongoing investigation by the

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competition authority. In Spain, the MNOs were fined – especially Telefonica for the delay of
their own rollout of 4G networks.

To summarize, competition and regulatory authorities may tackle some competitive concerns
with remedies – but they seem to be especially concerned about the long-term impact of
infrastructure sharing on competitive parameters such as network coverage and the
deployment and spread of new technologies. For the latter competitive concern, there were
no effective remedies in the ex-post assessment but fines. In spectrum awards, individual
NRAs imposed coverage obligations with an own network in order to secure long-run
infrastructure competition ex-ante.

4. Benefits and challenges from infrastructure sharing

arrangements
This section details potential benefits and challenges of infrastructure sharing arrangements,
based on case studies and questionnaires circulated to NRAs. First, it describes potential
benefits of infrastructure sharing agreements and then explains the potential challenges
associated with infrastructure sharing. Thirdly, it focuses on the experiences of individual
NRAs regarding infrastructure sharing and, finally, identifies potential barriers to infrastructure
sharing. Due to the range of infrastructure sharing arrangements (both active and passive)
currently in place in different Member States, only general preliminary conclusions are to be
drawn from the data available. However, it is possible to discern broad trends from the data
available. These are outlined below.

4.1. Benefits of sharing

There are a large number of potential benefits associated with infrastructure sharing. These
include potential cost-saving benefits and the associated acceleration of coverage for areas
where the coverage costs for a single operator deployment is high (often rural areas). There
is limited evidence from NRAs that different benefits are accentuated by specific types of
sharing (active compared with passive), although this link can only be drawn in certain
circumstances and for certain types of arrangements. Active sharing, for example, is explicitly
highlighted as helping drive better network coverage by several NRAs (Belgium, Bulgaria,
Finland, Latvia) and can also be associated with spectral efficiency. This is not always the
case however; environmental benefits are linked equally with both types of sharing by NRAs.

A number of NRAs, for example, identified infrastructure sharing (both active and passive) as
a means of overcoming challenges related to deployment of infrastructure where deploying
equipment infrastructure is not (easily) replicable (like in indoor) and even in dense areas
where finding new sites could be very difficult (other examples: old city centres, national parks,
highly secured places). Sharing might lead to increased consumer/customer choice (and
associated benefits), especially in areas where it would otherwise be not economical to serve,
as it helps multi-operator service, increasing choice for customers and hence benefiting social
development. Moreover, spectrum sharing may have a potentially positive impact on customer
experience. In fact, it could lead to better quality of service, through combining their spectrum
partners are able to offer higher data peak rates to consumers. A small number of NRAs (such

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as BIPT in Belgium) also identified the potential spectral efficiency benefits of active sharing
agreements. For example, spectrum pooling for MOCN and GWCN configurations or sharing
of backhaul microwave frequencies encourages the optimal use of spectral resources.

Sharing could have environmental benefits, as it reduces the visual impact of mobile networks
on the landscape, reduces energy consumption, and mitigates citizens’ concerns over base
station radiation.

It should be noted, however, that in assessing benefits of sharing agreements, the competent
authority shall ensure that the competition in the market is not hampered.

In relation to cost savings, many NRAs indicated that they did not have any specific estimation
of cost savings related to sharing, and that these were likely to be highly context specific.
Nonetheless, some NRAs provided data indicating that all types of sharing allow operators to
significantly reduce RAN costs which represent the most important part in the total costs.
Costs savings depend on the type of sharing. Some NRAs provided figures of cost savings:

- passive sharing cost savings: [16%-35%] CAPEX, [16%-35%] OPEX;

- active sharing (excl. spectrum) cost savings: [33%-35%] CAPEX, [25%-33%] OPEX;

- active sharing (incl. spectrum) cost savings: [33%-45%] CAPEX, [30%-33%] OPEX;

- core network sharing: according to Swiss authority, core network sharing cost savings
are limited.

Where data was available, NRAs noted that RAN OPEX fell significantly as a percentage of
overall OPEX in cases where network sharing was implemented. This saving was estimated
to be up to 35% of the RAN OPEX costs in certain cases in Netherland, for example.

It should be noted that from the antitrust perspective not all network cost savings qualify as an
efficiency that is likely to be passed on to and benefit consumers. Certain fixed cost savings
(that is, cost savings that do not relate to incremental costs) are unlikely to be passed on to
consumers in the form of lower prices or increased incentives to invest in a foreseeable
timeframe. In addition, the extent to which savings in incremental costs are passed on to
consumers depends on the market structure and more generally the level of competition in
the market. At the same time, from the wider policy perspective, savings in overall costs which
may lower the barriers to investment in network upgrades may also be relevant.

4.2. Challenges and downsides associated with sharing

A number of NRAs responding to the survey do not associate specific downsides or major
negative impact with sharing as they have not observed such issues, or do not have specific
data to support such views, especially if sharing agreements are properly framed by regulation
(e.g.: ensures that agreements are open to third parties). BNetzA considers that analysis
needs to be done on how sharing agreements could hinder competition, especially competition
at infrastructure level.

Nonetheless, many NRAs are of the view that sharing decreases the incentives to investment
and infrastructure competition for better coverage.

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From a competitive viewpoint, many NRAs are of the opinion that non-participating MNOs
might have difficulties to participate in shared infrastructures of other MNOs. This is true for
both active and passive sharing. MVNOs could also be negatively impacted by sharing
agreements due to being excluded from enhanced coverage/capacity on the host network;
e.g.: an MVNO whose host operator itself is in a local roaming situation could in certain
conditions not benefit from the service. Competent authorities (NRAs or NCAs) should be very
vigilant on those issues that could lead to competitive imbalance.

In the case of active sharing, some forms such as GWCN and MOCN configurations, where
spectrum pooling is allowed, could decrease the level of competition as partners may not be
able to distinguish their services adequately because of similarities in their network coverage
and quality of service, at the expense of competition, investment and innovation especially in
dense and competitive areas. It can also require sharing confidential or commercially sensitive
information between competitors. Active sharing could have a negative impact on competition
if not assessed carefully, presenting risks of collusion between the sharing parties. For these
reasons, in France, Arcep states in its 2016 network sharing guidelines that active network
sharing would not be acceptable in dense areas and would require a close supervision in less
dense areas, because infrastructure-based competition is considered both sufficient and
proportional. When sharing is a result of regulatory obligations, competent authorities should
carefully assess whether it leads to a loss of competitive advantage for the operator that was
the only one covering that area, otherwise it would not be rewarding the risk taken by the
operator.

From an operational viewpoint, sharing could have downsides as it requires an extensive

period of planning between the sharing parties (Belgium). Moreover, sharing, especially active
sharing, requires consent and coordination between the sharing parties, making site
evolutions more time consuming because of the joint decision-making process. It may also be
more complicated to make sure that high QoS is always provided throughout the “data chain”
in a shared scenario. Also from a technical viewpoint, if network issues or failures arise,
debugging may be more complicated. In a more specific example related to the consolidation
of existing networks, there could be an expenditure of capital associated with this. The cost
depends on the degree of consolidation, which could entail significant removal costs
(Belgium).

Active and passive sharing could increase the electromagnetic field emissions. This would
create issues if official electromagnetic field emissions limits were exceeded (as operators
would in this case not be able to share networks unless the regulation was subject to a
revision). In consequence, legal provisions on the maximum radiation power (non-ionisating
radiation) reduce the available antenna power (ERP) per MNO on the same mast.

Sharing, especially passive sharing, may significantly load the host network site with the
equipment installed by the guest operators, which could limit potential future network
development such as the installation of new additional modules related to the introduction of
new technologies.

In terms of resilience, with fewer independent mobile networks, infrastructure and mobile
coverage as a whole may be more vulnerable as there is less redundancy and less option for
connecting to cellular services. Robustness in case of emergencies or natural disasters may
be reduced.

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4.3. General experiences with sharing agreements

Negative experiences (Austria, Belgium, Hungary)

The challenges and downsides identified above are mainly resulting from experiences the
respondents have been involved in. These go beyond general competition concerns (as
existing infrastructure sharing agreements are subject to competition law).

In addition to that, some NRAs have observed or are expecting some negative economic
effects relating to market structure. In Austria, the NRA expects that due to sharing
agreements incentives for investment will decrease in the long term. In Hungary, a potential
risk is identified that MNOs, which do not participate in sharing agreements, can suffer
competitive disadvantages. Finally, in Belgium, practical examples show that sharing
agreements raise issues especially in view of finance, operations and strategy, in particular
the relative difficulty of establishing such arrangements relative to the occasionally modest
financial benefits. Due to the alignment of competing objectives from different operators, such
projects generally become very complex and therefore take significant resources. On the one
hand, the scale of an agreement is very important to assess if sharing is worthwhile or not. On
the other hand, the larger the agreement is, the more complex the sharing is likely to be.

Neutral experiences (Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, Malta, and the
Netherlands)

In addition to the negative experiences, there have also been respondents which are quite
neutral.

In Belgium, it was observed that only passive infrastructures are part of existing sharing
agreements and that such agreements are focused on covering difficult access areas like
tunnels or transport routes. Furthermore, it has been observed that less dense areas covered
at a minimum level by one operator are quite rapidly exploited by competitors due to the
(highly) competitive situation. Lastly, in Belgium operators do not depend on regulatory
provisions because existing sharing agreements (which are market-led) seem to be efficient.
In general, according to the Belgian response it seems that due to experiences made, it is not
viable to share existing networks, but it is easier to reach sharing agreements with a view to
new networks on condition that there is a major change to the existing network, like a large
number of new sites and/or new network elements required.

Netherland observed so far marginal impact on the market and assumes that site sharing
reduces costs and hardly reduces useful network competition.

Positive experiences (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, France, Greece,

Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey)

The large amount of the contributions regarding the experience with sharing agreements has
been positive. With a view to the benefits of sharing infrastructure, some of the survey
participants have stated that supervision is not needed and no contentious issues were
observed. In Denmark an active sharing agreement on Radio Access Network (RAN) is seen

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to work fine, although the parties involved are in fierce competition. In France, also RAN
sharing is efficient and resulted in better 2G/3G coverage, as it was a prerequisite for
authorization, as defined in the NRA sharing guidelines. In addition, the rollout of 4G based
on such an agreement was noticeable accelerated. In short term, it was observed that
infrastructure sharing in the form of national roaming had a strong impact on cost saving and
therefore on competition. Finally, this has resulted in a decrease of retail prices and thus
consumers have benefited from such agreements (Spain, Romania and Poland). Also on a
wholesale level, two respondents answered that they observed infrastructure sharing as a
possibility for undertakings to enter the mobile market on a larger scale, which is an advantage
especially for newcomers. Furthermore, Norway describes infrastructure sharing as a
prerequisite for newcomers to enter the mobile retail market.

This again has a positive effect on the quality of the offered services as well as on a larger
coverage of networks and makes new technologies widespread (Turkey, Switzerland). Lastly,
it is worth mentioning that, in contrary to the complexity, Montenegro has also stated that
sharing agreements were reached easily.

4.4. Barriers to increase infrastructure sharing

The last section of this chapter reflects on an assessment of the respondents with regard to
possible barriers to an increased infrastructure sharing in their countries. As the results of the
survey have shown, mainly seven barriers can be seen.

Insufficient space on existing masts (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech

Republic, France, Montenegro and Norway).

In the answer to the questionnaire, from a practical point of view Portugal considered that the
lack of space on a cabinet or in a tower, as well as spectrum planning to avoid interferences,
could be a barrier in spectrum sharing.

According to the answers of the questionnaire, the main barrier seems to be insufficient space
on existing masts respectively sites. In many cases, it is hardly possible to install additional
equipment. This is not only a result from a lack of space, but also due to an increased energy
consumption caused by the additional equipment. The installation of additional antennas can
be problematic due to the length restriction of poles and masts. Poles on rooftops are even
more limited in length. To that extent, in many cases it can be assumed that existing
infrastructure has to be changed to grant a shared usage. Having in mind the lack of space
and the need for more equipment and electricity supply, this leads to the second most
frequently mentioned barrier regarding infrastructure sharing, which is landlord pricing.
However, several measures can be considered against this barrier. Norway has in its SMP
decision a list of relevant measures like removal of equipment on masts and in cabins that are
not being used, moving equipment to provide space for more cabinets, strengthening of masts,
extending masts, expanding cabins, replacing cabins, replacing masts and replacing
antennas. When multiple measures are possible, the starting point should always be that the
easiest and most reasonable alternative is selected.

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Landlord Pricing (Austria, Bulgaria, France, Malta, Netherland)

The need for more space at sites and the leasing of new sites leads more likely to additional
agreements with landlords and therefore potentially to higher rental costs. This again makes
infrastructure sharing more expensive. Especially with a view to 5G and the relating need for
a much larger amount of cells, this might result in higher costs, which could have an impact
on infrastructure sharing. Mentioning additional sites, rental costs can also be driven by
landlords who will impose high-value prices for prime sites. Lastly, the rental of additional
space will also depend on the willingness of landlords.

EMF restrictions (Belgium, Bulgaria, Norway, Poland, Switzerland)

Against the backdrop of barriers, another issue identified by the contributors is the Electro
Magnetic Radiation (EMR). For example, in Poland the level of admissible electromagnetic
radiation is 0.1 V/m2 and is seen as a possible barrier for infrastructure sharing. In addition,
Switzerland stated that the threshold for non-ionizing radiation could be an obstacle for sharing
infrastructure. To sum it up, public concern regarding EMR should not be underestimated while
assessing barriers (Norway).

Administrative processes (Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Malta, Norway, Spain)

Another barrier can be aggregated under the term “administrative processes”. This includes
permits of civil works (Bulgaria, Denmark), slow processing of building permits (Belgium,
Denmark), local taxes for antennas and pylons (especially in the Brussels communes and
Walloon provinces, Belgium) and the access granting to (private) large premises (Malta,
Norway). At least Greece stated that also the licensing period per site could be a burden.

Coordination effort (Austria, France, Hungary, Netherland)

As already stated above with regard to negative experiences concerning infrastructure

sharing, the coordination effort is also seen as a potential barrier. With a view to the 5G rollout
as mentioned before, it is expected that a much larger amount of sites will be needed. As the
amount of sites increases, also the number of sharing agreements is expected to increase or
at least the complexity of such agreements to become higher. In addition, Netherland stated
that the network planning is MNO specific. This means that the existence of a site of one
operator may be irrelevant for the network optimization of another operator. In the context of
network planning, other issues regarding potential barriers to increase infrastructure sharing
is raised by some respondents.

Technical issues (France, Netherland, Spain)

Infrastructure sharing usually requires the same technical standards which are often ensured
due to network equipment from one vendor. As not all MNOs use the same network supplier
or make use of different technologies/protocols, this can also cause technical difficulties and
thus needs close cooperation. As mentioned cooperation in a competitive environment can be

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quite complicated, additional technical cooperation on top of this complexity can therefore be
identified as another barrier.

Competition (Norway, Romania)

According to Romania, multiple and/or extensive agreements may raise competition issues.
Norway contribution also raised competition concerns but from an operator point of view. This
is because market players do not want to give up market shares or first mover advantage by
having active sharing agreements with a competitor.

5. Future evolution of sharing arrangements and the role of

5G in shaping requirements/regulatory framework
Most countries expect that infrastructure sharing will become more important in the future.

Cell densification associated with higher frequency bands that will provide a lot of the spectrum
for 5G will result in increased demand for radio sites. Increased backhaul capacity from these
cell sites are expected to lead to further infrastructure deployment requirements. As a result,
most respondents expect an increase in both infrastructure sharing and spectrum sharing.
Efficient use of national resources and environmental concerns are also expected to be drivers
for greater infrastructure sharing.

Most NRAs are currently considering how 5G will impact infrastructure-sharing agreements.
Given that 5G will probably require an increased number of cell sites and backhaul upgrade,
some NRAs speculated that infrastructure sharing would increase the deployment of further
infrastructure. On the other hand, there are also NRAs stating that infrastructure sharing would
not necessarily be a prerequisite for 5G deployment.

Many NRAs highlighted that the issue of infrastructure sharing in the context of 5G will be
driven by industry. In this context, for example, RTR believes that other business models
(outside of the usual MNO model) will become more important in the development of 5G.

Most NRAs, however, believe that continued market monitoring will be required before NRAs
can take informed decisions in the context of deployment of 5G.

The development of best practices – and their relevance to 5G – will also rely on past
experiences of NRAs in addressing potential challenges related to infrastructure sharing
agreements.

Impact of the rollout of 5G on infrastructure requirements

Answers from NRAs showed their expectations in a denser network of macro sites (Austria,
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Montenegro, Slovenia, Spain), more small cells
(Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Montenegro,
Netherland, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK, Switzerland,
Turkey) and the implementation of massive MIMO (Belgium, Malta). The requirement for more
small cells is seen especially for mm-wave bands like 26 GHz or above and densely populated

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areas. Some countries mention the requirement for more backhaul capacity or fibre backhaul
(Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK). More operational infrastructure would be required like
optical fibre, energy, different submeters to monitor energy consumption per operator and
reinforcement of sites (France). More sharing is expected for fibre backhaul (Croatia),
equipment sharing if site reinforcement is impossible (France), small cells (Netherland, Serbia)
and indoor coverage (Norway). Some countries express a general need to share more
infrastructure (Germany, Greece, Hungary). Exclusivity agreements among site owners and
one operator might impede the rollout of other operators (France). Individual countries mention
the change towards central or virtualized base stations (Malta).

Changes to infrastructure sharing

For some NRAs, sharing will be required in order to lower cost (Belgium, Czech Republic,
Hungary), to increase coverage (Czech Republic) or to increase capacity (Belgium). Many
NRAs see an increase or an increased need of passive sharing (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Poland,
Sweden, UK), active sharing (Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Turkey, UK), spectrum sharing
(Belgium, Croatia), active indoor sharing (Finland, Malta, Slovenia), fronthaul (Malta),
backhaul (Malta, Sweden, UK, Switzerland), dark fibre (Poland), ducts (Poland) and sharing
through user authentification (UK). New types of sharing are also expected, including specific
providers of connectivity cooperating with MNOs (Austria, Spain), municipalities or public
services participating in sharing (Germany) or even verticals (Austria) may be involved in
sharing. Some countries do not expect a specific change for sharing and 5G (Romania).
Netherland states that the existence of private network may further promote infrastructure
sharing. Serbia expects a changed model of charging for shared infrastructure.

Regulatory changes

Some NRAs state that local authorities and/or legislation should support 5G (Bulgaria,
Norway). Some countries think that the regulatory framework is appropriate and sharing
agreements have to be mainly commercially based (Finland, Netherland, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, UK) and competition law provides a sufficient framework to assess which
sharing is desirable (and allowed) and which not (Netherland). Some countries think that
infrastructure sharing might be related to licence exempt spectrum bands (Denmark, Ireland).
Some countries explicitly mention that competition has to be maintained (Czech Republic,
Denmark, Serbia). Individual countries see a risk that MNOs through exclusivity agreements
with infrastructure owners could impede the rollout of other MNOs (France) or want to impose
the sharing of passive sites. An individual country states that service competition may suffice
(Belgium).

To sum up, countries expect that 5G will be especially related to more small cells and higher
backhaul capacity. It is believed that there will be an increase or at least an increased need in
sharing (passive, active, backhaul, active indoor spectrum and others). Some countries state
that operators concluding exclusivity agreements with infrastructure owners could impede
other operators’ rollout. It should therefore be ensured that sharing does not lower competition.

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Annex 1 – Individual assessments of active sharing in

various countries

Austria: T-Mobile / Hutchison 3 Austria

For the reciprocal national roaming agreement, the regulatory authority issued an informal
statement that the national roaming had to be temporary and that the national roaming should
not be applied to new technologies (at that time, to the upcoming LTE rollout). 9

Czech Republic: CETIN / T-Mobile

CTU assessed ex-post the infrastructure sharing agreement between T-Mobile and CETIN
and published an informal opinion in May 2015. 10 CTU has no competence to enforce
competition law. The assessed network sharing agreement concerns the Czech Republic with
the exception of Prague and Brno. Differently to most other sharing agreements, the
agreement is between the two largest MNOs. The smallest MNO, Vodafone, operates an
independent active access network.

The assessment states that, in the short term, CTU expects no negative impact on the retail
level of competition. However, in the long term the effects on innovation and deployment of
new technologies need to be monitored. Since infrastructure costs are only a minor component
of total costs of operators, CTU did not see a risk that cost communalities restrict retail
competition. Furthermore, CTU did not see a risk that the remaining competitor was pushed
out of the market due to significant cost disadvantage. Based on the information CTU was
given, CTU did not see a risk of tacit collusion. CTU did not see a risk on the wholesale market
and the related investment in coverage. Furthermore, spectrum licence could require
increased coverage. To sum up, competitive concerns were focused on the long-term effects
on innovation and deployment of new technologies.

The European Commission has initiated proceedings and is in charge of an assessment based
on competition law.

Denmark: Telenor and Telia

The Danish Competition Council (DCC) investigated the cooperation between Telenor and
Telia (“TT-Netværket”) in 2012. DCC found six different anticompetitive concerns with respect
to Art. 101(1) TFEU. Five remedies were identified to address those concerns. A requirement
to accommodate wholesale customers on customary and market conditions to address the
risk of collusion on the wholesale market was imposed. An internal tariff structure reflecting
underlying cost shall be used to avoid the conversion of fixed into variable costs. The parties
may solely buy spectrum together in order to avoid the accumulation of excessive frequency
resources. The parties must offer antenna sites to others that are to be dismantled due to the

9 See https://www.rtr.at/de/tk/multibandauktion_NR (in German only)

10 See https://www.ctu.cz/stanovisko-ceskeho-telekomunikacniho-uradu-ke-sdileni-siti-2g-3g-4g-pro-ucely-
komplexniho

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network consolidation. Requirements on the organization of the joint venture shall address
and remove the risk of excess information exchange between the parties.

For the sixth anticompetitive concern – reduction of competition on significant parameters such
as coverage and the development and spread of new technology – the parties provided
sufficient proof that the criteria for individual exemption in TFEU Article 101(3) were met.

Besides the TT-Netvaerket, the Danish mobile market consists of two largely independent
competitors: TDC and Hi3G Denmark. In 2015, Telenor and Telia proposed to merge, but
withdrew their application when the European Commission required conditions that the
merging parties did not accept. 11

Finland: DNA / TeliaSonera Finland

DNA Oy and TeliaSonera Finland Oyj announced in August 2014 that they would form a joint
venture (“Suomen Yhteisverkko Oy”) in order to jointly provide coverage for Eastern and
Northern Finland (50% of Finland´s total area and 15% of its population). The Finnish
competition authority initiated proceedings based on competition law in November 2014. 12

The Finnish competition authority expressed competitive concerns with respect to a potential
harmonisation of mobile networks and thus a restriction on national network competition.
Furthermore, operators might tacitly collude to the detriment of consumers. The importance of
incentives to invest in new technology and high quality networks was stressed. As remedies
to these concerns, the Finnish competition authority accepted obligatory MVNO access to the
national network of the involved parties. Furthermore, the parties were required to rent out
masts and sites to competitors. The information exchange between the parties is restricted,
and the parties maintain the ability to bring their preferred network features or additional
capacity to the joint network. 13

FICORA changed the licence conditions to tackle competitive issues related to the joint
venture: For 900/1800 MHz licences, coverage obligations of 99% of the population and the
requirement to cover 80% of the population with an own network were introduced. If UMTS is
used in 900 MHz, the carriers cannot be combined for a larger bandwidth (In other bands this
is not restricted.).

France: Free Mobile / Orange

One of the two main network sharing agreements in France is the national roaming agreement
between Free Mobile (4th mobile operator and last entrant) and Orange. It is a 2G/3G roaming
agreement allowing Free Mobile’s customers on Orange’s network.

Since it was signed in 2012, this agreement is subject to intense debate in the sector.
Designed to allow the entrance to the market of a new mobile operator, by providing access

11 https://www.telenor.com/media/press-release/telenor-and-teliasonera-withdraw-from-merger-in-denmark/
12 https://www.kkv.fi/en/current-issues/press-releases/2014/finnish-competition-and-consumer-authoritys-
inspections-at-teliasonera-finland-oyj-dna-oy-and-suomen-yhteisverkko-oy/
13 https://www.kkv.fi/en/current-issues/press-releases/2015/5.11.2015-fccas-decision-ensures-consumers-benefit-

from-network-partnership-between-dna-and-sonera/

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to an existing infrastructure, national roaming could have undermined investment incentive for
the hosted operator if lasted excessively.

Following the adoption of national specific provisions in French law 14, Arcep adopted
beginning of 2016 guidelines on mobile network sharing (that provides an analysis grid of what
could be acceptable or not in terms of network sharing, with regard to its regulation objectives,
including digital territory planning, infrastructure-based competition, etc.), and then invited the
operators to modify, if necessary, the existing sharing agreements to comply with its
guidelines.

As a result, Free Mobile and Orange agreed, in June 2016, on a roaming extinction trend,
based on a progressive speed throttling for Free Mobile’s roaming customers from January
2017 to end of 2020. After analysis, Arcep considered that these evolutions were in line with
its guidelines and there was no need to use its new power to ask for modification of the
roaming agreements granted by the adoption of national specific provisions in French law.

France: SFR / Bouygues Telecom

In addition to the roaming agreement between Free Mobile and Orange (described above),
another important sharing agreement in France is the active sharing between Bouygues
Telecom and SFR. It involves active sharing of their networks (in 2G/3G/4G) on 85% of the
territory and 4G roaming of SFR’s customers on part of Bouygues Telecom’s network.

On 15th June 2016, following the adoption by Arcep of its guidelines, Bouygues Telecom and
SFR transmitted to Arcep an amendment to their 2G/3G/4G network sharing, including the
extinction of the 4G roaming of SFR on Bouygues Telecom network by the end of 2018.

In addition, the operators precisely documented the incremental deployment expected,

induced by the sharing agreement, in comparison with a situation where the operators deploy
standalone networks, leading to an increased 2G/3G coverage and accelerated 4G coverage.
Finally, the operators committed to provide, on a semi-annual base, detailed information about
the development of the program with regard to forecasts.

After analysis, Arcep considered that these evolutions were in line with its guidelines.

Greece: Vodafone Greece / WIND Hellas

Vodafone Greece and WIND Hellas formed a joint venture “Victus Networks” that shares the
RAN for 2G and 3G. Currently, there is an application to share also 4G. EETT is the regulator
and nationally has the sole responsibility for network sharing based on competition law, too.
The Joint Venture was subject of an ex-ante assessment. EETT issued Decision 698/19/25-
07-2013, allowing the infrastructure sharing agreement with the condition that free competition
is preserved at all times and with the reservation to examine at any time, any anti-competition
results that might arise for reasons attributable to the specific agreement entering into force.
There is no further information with respect to the assessment of that agreement.

14National law (law n° 2015-990) empowered Arcep to request changes in the sharing agreements between mobile
operators.

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Hungary: Magyar Telekom / Telenor

Magyar Telekom and Telenor Magyarország notified NMHH about an agreement to mutually
and partially share spectrum with each other in the 800 MHz band for LTE nationally with
exception of the capital Budapest. 15 NMHH approved the lease as a secondary trading. NMHH
stated that the agreement enabled both operators to offer a larger capacity and better
technologies characteristics. Furthermore, NMHH examined whether the individual obligations
that are linked to the individual licences are fulfilled. Since NMHH has no competence to
examine the competition law aspects of the lease agreement, NMHH sent its decision to the
Hungarian Competition Authority for information purposes after the decision was made. 16

In February 2015, the Hungarian Competition authority initiated proceedings with respect to
that agreement. 17 In January 2018, the Hungarian Competition authority held unannounced
inspections at both parties of the cooperation in order to examine whether there was collusion
during the tender in 2014. 18

No further details on the assessment of the agreement are available.

Norway: Telia / ICE

The Norwegian Competition Authority imposed national roaming during a merger. Tele2 was
sold to TeliaSonera. ICE, a new entrant, bought spectrum in the auction in 2013. The merger
between TeliaSonera and Tele2 raised competitive concerns that solely two operators would
be able to compete effectively. In order to maintain effective competition, several remedies
were imposed on the merging parties: MVNO access, national roaming for ICE, selling of
infrastructure to ICE, selling of the corporate customer base, the distribution network and
frequencies and three Tele2 stores to ICE. 19

Spain: Yoigo / Telefonica

In 2013, Yoigo and Telefonica agreed on a reciprocal national roaming. Yoigo provided
Telefonica with national roaming services for 4G, whereas Yoigo received national roaming
services in order to increase its coverage. The relevant background for Yoigo is that it only
had spectrum in 1800 MHz bands and above and had problems in providing coverage
nationally. The relevant background for Telefonica is that the reciprocal sharing agreement
enabled Telefonica to delay its own 4G rollout.

15According to the answer to the questionnaire, the agreement also includes 3G. The assessment in the press
release of NMHH (next footnote) is limited to the sharing of 4G spectrum.
16

http://english.nmhh.hu/article/165939/NMHH_Approves_Interconnection_of_Magyar_Telekom_and_Telenor_N
etworks
17

http://www.gvh.hu/en/press_room/press_releases/press_releases_2015/gvh_investigating_cooperation_betwee
n_telekom_and_.html
18

http://www.gvh.hu/en/press_room/press_releases/press_releases_2018/the_gvh_held_unannounced_inspectio
ns_at_the_premis.html
19 http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/en/news/news-archive/20152/the-norwegian-competition-authority-clears-
the-acquisition-of-tele2-by-teliasonera-subject-to-conditions/

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 BoR (18) 116

In July 2015, CNMC declared so provisions of these agreements null and void and fined
Telefonica €6 million and Yoigo €300,000. Especially the rollout delay of Telefonica and by
compensation offering national roaming to Yoigo was found to be restrictive of competition.
No efficiencies that would justify such a restriction were found. 20

As indicated in Table 3, Yoigo plans to migrate its reliance on roaming from Telefonica’s
network into Orange’s network from 2019.

Nevertheless, as further developed in section 4.3, despite this particular case where some
risks were identified and addressed, the overall impact of infrastructure sharing agreements
in Spain has been positive.

Sweden: Tele2/Telenor: Net4Mobility

PTS approved the transfer of 900 MHz and 2600 MHz from Tele2 and Telenor to N4M. A
complaint was filed with respect to the deepened cooperation between Tele2 and Telenor
restricting competition within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU and its national equivalent. The
main argument was that a high concentration of spectrum would give Telenor and Tele2 the
possibility to offer more advanced services (higher speed), and therefore a competitive
advantage over other mobile operators. The Swedish Competition Authority did not undertake
any action following the analysis of the complaint.

UK: Several agreements

OFCOM, as a competition authority, may open a competition investigation on an ex-ante

basis. During the process, parties might offer some amendments to the initial agreements so
that OFCOM does not need to open a formal competition investigation.

A range of possible competitive concerns was considered for different agreements (listed in
Table 2). The agreement between EE and Three was originally between T-Mobile 21 and Three.
For that agreement, the considered concerns related to information sharing and MVNO access
(in particular, whether more efficient use of capacity would constrain supply to third parties
and whether there were any ‘veto rights’ or other constraints on MVNOs as a result of the
agreements). In relation to the sharing between Vodafone and O2, in 2009 OFCOM undertook
a preliminary assessment and considered the plausibility of anti-competitive effects being
realised as a result of factors such as information sharing, co-ordination, foreclosure of access
to sites and the effect on coverage from consolidation of sites. In 2012, when Vodafone and
O2 were negotiating to engage in more active sharing with Project Beacon, OFCOM
considered, at a high level, whether the agreement was likely to raise concerns in relation to:
any reduced incentive to supply MVNOs and/or price aggressively at retail level due to
reduced spare capacity; the effect of the traffic balancing mechanism (in the agreement) on
the unilateral incentive to expand; the ability for a potential new entrant to gain access to the
RAN (rather than buying wholesale services); the ability and incentive to co-ordinate in order
to reduce expenditure on network quality and investment, foreclose MVNOs and/or foreclose
new network entrants; information sharing; and the impact on future spectrum auctions. The

20 https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/AR(2016)21/en/pdf, pp 12-14
21 T-Mobile later merged with Orange in order to form EE.

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 BoR (18) 116

parties proposed a number of amendments and so OFCOM did not open a Competition Act
investigation.

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 BoR (18) 116

Annex 2 – Full questionnaire

Infrastructure sharing questionnaire

Current sharing arrangements

1. What are the existing infrastructure sharing agreements in your country?

By passive sharing we mean sharing of the passive elements of network infrastructure (mast, sites,
cabinet, power, and conditioning). By active sharing we mean sharing of active elements in the radio
access network (e.g. antenna, radio network controller (RNC)). We consider national roaming a form of
active sharing. If these definitions are not appropriate, please describe in detail which parts of the
network are shared in the respective agreement.

If all MNOs lease passive infrastructure to each other, please state MNOs involved: “all”; passive
sharing: “yes”, agreement type: “lease”.

Agreement Agreement Agreement

Agreement 4
1 2 3
MNOs involved
Passive sharing
RAN sharing, separate spectrum
RAN sharing, joint spectrum
Core network sharing
Geographic scope
Time Frame
Agreement type (Joint Venture,
Lease, other)
Technology covered (2G, 3G, 4G)
Commercially driven or by
regulatory intervention
Further comments
-

2. How are costs shared between the MNOs that are party to the sharing arrangements?

Current regulations and legal framework

3. Is there any (regulated) approach that network operators can inform each other about the
sharing opportunities? If so, how does this happen (e.g. online platform)?

4. How does the telecom regulator get information on sharing agreements? Do mobile network
operators have a duty to inform you about infrastructure sharing? Or does the telecom
regulator get this information through other authorities, notably the competition authority or
spectrum authority?

5. What are your regulatory powers and/or duties with respect to infrastructure sharing? Please
describe them in detail, with reference to the applicable law 22

6. Do you include any rules in your spectrum awards that foster, mandate or prohibit network
sharing? If so, please describe these in detail.

22 Telecommunication law, competition law or other.

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 BoR (18) 116

7. Was your authority formally or informally involved in the evaluation of any infrastructure
sharing agreement? If so, please briefly describe the competitive assessment, whether it was
an ex-ante or an ex-post assessment, and any remedies/sanctions in detail (with reference to
the agreements mentioned under question 1).

8. Please briefly describe the decisions and/or ongoing proceedings regarding infrastructure
sharing and provide a link (if available) to any publicly available information on those
decisions and/or ongoing proceedings. Preferably also describe the decision and proceedings
based on competition law, differentiated between Art 101 (1) TFEU and/or Art 101 (3) TFEU.

9. Have you had any recent public consultations covering mobile/wireless infrastructure sharing
in your country? If so, what were your proposals and the reactions from industry?

10. Do you or does another national authority provide any guidance or specific rules with respect
to infrastructure sharing? If so, please describe them in detail and, for any specific rule or
guidance please describe whether it is based on competition law or based on sector specific
regulation (e.g. within the ancillary conditions of the spectrum award).

11. Do you expect that infrastructure sharing will become more important in the future? If so why?
Is there any regulation in place or under consideration to i) mandate or ii) facilitate
mobile/wireless infrastructure sharing? If so, what consumer outcomes are these regulations
designed to achieve?

12. Do you have specific dispute settlement mechanisms in place or are disputes settled on a
case by case basis within the existing judicial framework? Please kindly refer to the relevant
law.

Benefits and challenges associated with sharing

13. What kind of benefits do you consider/expect from infrastructure sharing, for instance benefits
for mobile network operators, end-users, in-door coverage, rural areas and/or other social
benefits? Do you have any estimates about the cost savings achieved from the infrastructure
sharing (including estimations in total % of opex and capex)?

14. Do you think there are any downsides associated with sharing (e.g. any negative impact on
competition or coverage)? Does or did sharing for a specific technology or for a specific
spectrum have an impact on competition in new technologies and/or spectrum purchases
later on? Does or did sharing have an impact on MVNOs or non-participating MNOs?

15. What is your general experience with the sharing agreements in place in your country? Has
infrastructure sharing impacted on the market to some extent (i.e. retail market competition,
technological and service innovation)? If applicable, please differentiate between short-term
and long-term effects.

16. Do you think there are any barriers to increase sharing in your country (e.g. co-ordination
failures, landlord pricing, insufficient space on existing masts etc.)?

Future role of sharing in 2G, 3G and 4G networks

17. What further infrastructure sharing might be needed in 2G, 3G and 4G networks in future?
What are the factors that you expect to influence such additional infrastructure sharing?
Relevant factors could include (but are not limited to) mobile technology (2G/3G/4G),
frequency band, geographic and/or demographic location (i.e. dense area), deep indoor
coverage and types of infrastructure.

18. When do you expect that mobile network operators (MNO’s) in your country to phase out
legacy technology such as 2G and 3G? Do you expect the legacy technology would further

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 BoR (18) 116

promote or limit infrastructure sharing, and why? Do you provide any guidance or rules for
infrastructure sharing with respect to legacy technologies?

Future role of sharing in relation with 5G

19. What will the rollout of 5G mean for infrastructure requirements (macro sites, small cells etc.)?

20. What kind of changes in infrastructure sharing do you expect from 5G?

21. What regulatory changes might need to be made in order to support these changes, and how
might they be made (e.g. would it require new legislation), including changes to the licensing
regime and/or new ways of awarding spectrum? Do you know what the cost savings are to
operators of this further sharing?

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 BoR (18) 116

Annex 3 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
Autorité de regulation des communications électroniques et des
Arcep
postes (France)
BCRD Broadband Cost Reduction Directive
BEREC Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications
BIPT Institut Belge des Postes et Télécommunications (Belgium)
BNetzA Federal Network Agency (Germany)
CAPEX Capital expenditure
CNMC National Markets and Competition Commission (Spain)
CRC Communications Regulation Commission (Bulgaria)
CTU Czech Telecommunication Office
DCC Danish Competition Council
EETT Hellenic Telecommunications and Post Commission (Greece)
EMF Electromagnetic Field
EMR Electro Magnetic Radiation
ERP Effective radiated power
EU European Union
FICORA Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority
GWCN Gate Core Network
IRU Indefeasible right of use
JV Joint venture
LTE Long-Term Evolution
MNO Mobile Network Operator
MOCN Multi-Operator Core Network
MVNO Mobile Virtual Network Operator
NKOM Norwegian Communications Authority
NMHH Nemzeti Média és Hírközlési Hatóság (Hungary)
NCA National competition authority
NRA National regulatory authority
OFCOM Office of Communications (UK)
OPEX Operational expenditure
PTS Swedish Post & Telecommunications Agency
QoS Quality of service

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 BoR (18) 116

Acronym Definition
RAN Radio Access Network
RNC Radio Network Controller
Austrian Regulatory Authority for Broadcasting and
RTR
Telecommunications
SIP Single information point
SMP Single market power
TFEU Treaty on the functioning of the European Union
UK United Kingdom
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System

33