LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO.

8 1
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998.* evidence of the parties but includes as well cases in which he acts by resolving motions and issuing orders as respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case.

CARLITOS D. LAZO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO V. TIONG, Municipal Trial Court, Bolinao, Pangasinan, respondent. The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part

Courts;  Judges;  Inhibitions;  A judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned and he should administer justice impartially and without delay.

case without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record.— The Court finds the report to be well taken. Under Rule Same;  Same;  Same;  Where there is no showing that a judge’s failure to inhibit himself from a case within a reasonable time was due to malice or any

137, §1 of the Rules of Court, a judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the case corrupt motive, reprimand would be an appropriate penalty.— Respondent justifies his failure to inhibit himself from the case on the ground that he was hoping he

without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record. This prohibition is not limited to cases in which a judge hears the could make complainant and the accused settle their dispute amicably considering that they are brothers and the wife of the accused is his first cousin. Respondent’s

evidence of the parties but includes as well cases in which he acts by resolving motions and issuing orders as respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case. efforts, praiseworthy though they may be, cannot justify the disregard of the law. At the first sign that complainant was not willing to listen to respondent’s counsel, the

The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part latter should have recused himself from the case without further delay. He cannot sacrifice the integrity of the judicial office on the chance that complainant might

in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned and he should administer justice impartially and without delay. relent and agree at last to settle the matter with his brother. A period of two (2) months is more than enough for respondent to make use of his good office. After a

Same;  Same;  Same;  Where there is no showing that a judge’s failure to inhibit himself from a case within a reasonable time was due to malice or any reasonable time trying his ability to bring the parties to an amicable settlement and

corrupt motive, reprimand would be an appropriate penalty.— Respondent justifies his failure to inhibit himself from the case on the ground that he was hoping he
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998.*
could make complainant and the accused settle their dispute amicably considering that they are brothers and the wife of the accused is his first cousin. Respondent’s
CARLITOS D. LAZO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO V. TIONG, Municipal Trial Court,
efforts, praiseworthy though they may be, cannot justify the disregard of the law. At the first sign that complainant was not willing to listen to respondent’s counsel, the
Bolinao, Pangasinan, respondent.
latter should have recused himself from the case without further delay. He cannot sacrifice the integrity of the judicial office on the chance that complainant might

relent and agree at last to settle the matter with his brother. A period of two (2) months is more than enough for respondent to make use of his good office. After a
Courts; Judges; Inhibitions; A judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
reasonable time trying his ability to bring the parties to an amicable settlement and
affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the case without the consent of all
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998.* parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record.— The Court finds
CARLITOS D. LAZO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO V. TIONG, Municipal Trial Court, Bolinao, Pangasinan, respondent.
the report to be well taken. Under Rule 137, §1 of the Rules of Court, a judge who is related
Courts;  Judges;  Inhibitions;  A judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting
case without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record.— The Court finds the report to be well taken. Under Rule
in the case without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered
137, §1 of the Rules of Court, a judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the case
upon the record. This prohibition is not limited to cases in which a judge hears the evidence of
without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record. This prohibition is not limited to cases in which a judge hears the
the parties but includes as well cases in which he acts by resolving motions and issuing orders
evidence of the parties but includes as well cases in which he acts by resolving motions and issuing orders as respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case.
as respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case. The purpose of the prohibition is to
The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part
prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the
in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned and he should administer justice impartially and without delay.
judge. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be
Same;  Same;  Same;  Where there is no showing that a judge’s failure to inhibit himself from a case within a reasonable time was due to malice or any
questioned and he should administer justice impartially and without delay.
corrupt motive, reprimand would be an appropriate penalty.— Respondent justifies his failure to inhibit himself from the case on the ground that he was hoping he

could make complainant and the accused settle their dispute amicably considering that they are brothers and the wife of the accused is his first cousin. Respondent’s
Same; Same; Same; Where there is no showing that a judge’s failure to inhibit himself from a
efforts, praiseworthy though they may be, cannot justify the disregard of the law. At the first sign that complainant was not willing to listen to respondent’s counsel, the
case within a reasonable time was due to malice or any corrupt motive, reprimand would be an
latter should have recused himself from the case without further delay. He cannot sacrifice the integrity of the judicial office on the chance that complainant might
appropriate penalty.—Respondent justifies his failure to inhibit himself from the case on the
relent and agree at last to settle the matter with his brother. A period of two (2) months is more than enough for respondent to make use of his good office. After a
ground that he was hoping he could make complainant and the accused settle their dispute
reasonable time trying his ability to bring the parties to an amicable settlement and
amicably considering that they are brothers and the wife of the accused is his first cousin.
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998.* Respondent’s efforts, praiseworthy though they may be, cannot justify the disregard of the law.
CARLITOS D. LAZO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO V. TIONG, Municipal Trial Court, Bolinao, Pangasinan, respondent.
At the first sign that complainant was not willing to listen to respondent’s counsel, the latter
Courts;  Judges;  Inhibitions;  A judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the
should have recused himself from the case without further delay. He cannot sacrifice the
case without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record.— The Court finds the report to be well taken. Under Rule
integrity of the judicial office on the chance that complainant might relent and agree at last to
137, §1 of the Rules of Court, a judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the case
settle the matter with his brother. A period of two (2) months is more than enough for
without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record. This prohibition is not limited to cases in which a judge hears the
respondent to make use of his good office. After a reasonable time trying his ability to bring the
evidence of the parties but includes as well cases in which he acts by resolving motions and issuing orders as respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case.
parties to an amicable settlement and using his moral influence on them without success, he
The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part
should have inhibited himself from the case and continued his peace efforts in a private
in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned and he should administer justice impartially and without delay.
capacity. On the other hand, because there is no showing that respondent’s failure to inhibit
Same;  Same;  Same;  Where there is no showing that a judge’s failure to inhibit himself from a case within a reasonable time was due to malice or any
himself from the case within a reasonable time was due to malice or any corrupt motive, the
corrupt motive, reprimand would be an appropriate penalty.— Respondent justifies his failure to inhibit himself from the case on the ground that he was hoping he
Court thinks that reprimand would be an appropriate penalty.
could make complainant and the accused settle their dispute amicably considering that they are brothers and the wife of the accused is his first cousin. Respondent’s

efforts, praiseworthy though they may be, cannot justify the disregard of the law. At the first sign that complainant was not willing to listen to respondent’s counsel, the
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority.
latter should have recused himself from the case without further delay. He cannot sacrifice the integrity of the judicial office on the chance that complainant might

relent and agree at last to settle the matter with his brother. A period of two (2) months is more than enough for respondent to make use of his good office. After a
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
reasonable time trying his ability to bring the parties to an amicable settlement and

A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998.* MENDOZA, J.:

CARLITOS D. LAZO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO V. TIONG, Municipal Trial Court, Bolinao, Pangasinan, respondent.

Courts;  Judges;  Inhibitions;  A judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the
This refers to the complaint against respondent Judge Antonio V. Tiong of the Municipal Trial
case without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record.— The Court finds the report to be well taken. Under Rule
Court of Bolinao, Pangasinan for grave misconduct and abuse of authority.
137, §1 of the Rules of Court, a judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the case

without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record. This prohibition is not limited to cases in which a judge hears the
Complainant Carlitos Lazo is the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 4384, entitled People
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
of the Philippines vs. Danilo D. Lazo, for falsification and use of falsified document, which was
assigned to respondent judge. In his sworn complaint, dated December 13, 1996, 1 Carlitos Lazo
alleged that respondent scheduled the arraignment of the accused on November 14, 1996,
which was a Thursday, when he knew fully well that no proceedings could be had on that date
because the trial prosecutor assigned to respondent judge’s sala was available only on Fridays.
Complainant said that because of the cancellation of the arraignment, his time and efforts were
wasted considering that he came all the way from Las Piñas, Metro Manila. Furthermore, he
claimed that the warrant of arrest was not served on the accused, although it had been issued
much earlier, until the prosecutor called attention to this fact. In addition, complainant charged
that respondent did not inhibit himself from the case until after two (2) months despite the fact
that respondent judge and the accused are related within the fourth degree of affinity, the wife
of the accused being the first cousin of the judge.
In his comment, dated August 7, 1997,2 respondent stated:
That the parties in the criminal case in an information filed by the provincial prosecutor’s office
is between two brothers, the complainant Carlitos D. Lazo and Danilo D. Lazo.
That before Court can commence initial proceedings and/or early stage, the complainant
knowing as indeed correctly stated in his letter complaint, the undersigned to be the first cousin
of the wife of the accused, the complaint appealed to the undersigned for his intercession in the
settlement of their case, probably on the assumption of moral ascendancy to the accused both
in his private capacity and as official capacity as a presiding judge of the court of Bolinao.
That attempts for the settlement of their case failed, and consequently under normal court
processes and in line with the rules on criminal procedure, after issuance of a warrant of arrest
by the court with the posting of the bailbond by the accused the amount fixed by the court, the
case was to be set for arraignment of the accused of which the practice (SOP) of the court is for
the clerk of court to set the initial proceedings of cases filed and pending before the court,
personally at his own sound discretion if only to show trust and confidence to the clerk by the
undersigned presiding judge, as in this case between Carlitos D. Lazo and Danilo D. Lazo.
That accordingly, the case was set by the clerk of court for November 14, 1996, at 8:30 o’clock,
with subpoena to the complainant dated October 28, 1996, for the arraignment of the accused,
not Friday the official day schedule of the Provincial Prosecutor in attending criminal cases
before the Municipal Trial Court of Bolinao, Bolinao, Pangasinan, and probably an oversight of
the clerk of court without knowledge of the undersigned.
That on the scheduled arraignment of the accused on November 14, 1996, both the complainant
and the accused were present in court, duly represented by their respective legal counsels and
when the calendar of the court was read, accused counsel manifested that they are filing a
motion to quash, praying for the deferment of the scheduled arraignment until the resolution of
the court of the said motion to quash they are to file, within (5) days but with no motion filed
within the said period, the arraignment of the accused was reset by the court to November 29,
1996, in the morning which was nevertheless cancelled due to motion for postponement filed by
the accused.
That the proceedings of November 14, 1996, in the morning, set for the arraignment of the
accused, despite the absence of the provincial prosecutor, to the humble and honest opinion of
the undersigned has a semblance of propriety and regularity considering that the purpose was
for arraignment only, it can proceed since the complainant and the accused who are present in
court are both represented by counsel of records, which nonetheless was deferred by the court
for reasons abovestated.
That notwithstanding the doubtful application in a mandatory character to the undersigned after
2
a careful perusal of the language and examination of the provisions of Section 1, Rule 137,
Rules of Court, but if only to give the benefit of the doubt in favor of the complaint for their full
satisfaction have earlier announced in open court, to hold in abeyance the self inhibition of the
undersigned on or before the accused have been arraigned. An early inhibition before the
arraignment may the presiding judge be interpreted to be remised or shrinked from the
performance of his duties and obligations attached to his office knowing pretty well, as it does,
that the evil to be avoided which is suspicion of partiality and biasness finds its vital role only
during the trial on the merits of a case. However, on January 3, 1997, before the filling of much
said and awaited motion, in order to put to rest the issue of Inhibition, an order of self inhibition
of the presiding Judge was finally issued.
....
The accused Danilo D. Lazo is a government employee whose office is opposite the court house
across a street just a few meters apart. Time and again from the time of knowledge of the case
filed against him has frequented the court inquiring status of his case and manifested before
hand his readiness to file his bailbond as he in fact informed the court that he has already
prepared his bailbond and further told the court of his desired posting of the said bailbond in the
amount fixed and recommended by the office of the provincial prosecutor’s office even without
first the issuance of a warrant of arrest having been issued by the court. In all bailable offenses
the right of an accused is both a constitutional and statutory right can be available of anytime of
the day during office hours. To deny an accused of the right is a violation of human rights . . . .
The accused Danilo D. Lazo simultaneously filed bailbond on the same day the warrant of arrest
was issued by the court who of course like anybody, finds it detestable of being arrested even a
moment and jailed especially the accused is a government employee, a law abiding citizen of
good social standing. The posting by the accused of his bailbond in connection of the case
against him was all accordance with all.
The matter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator which on November 5, 1998,
submitted a report, the pertinent portion of which reads:
1.The allegation that respondent Judge scheduled the arraignment of the case on Thursday
knowing fully well that the Public Prosecutor assigned in the case appears only in his court every
Fridays, was denied by the respondent. He claims that it was his Clerk of Court who scheduled
the arraignment on said day without his knowledge. Respondent Judge explains that when it
comes to initiatory proceedings such as arraignment and pre-trial, he gave his Clerk of Court the
discretion to calendar or schedule the cases if only to show his trust and confidence [on] him.
We opined that there is nothing wrong in adjudicating the function of scheduling the cases to
the Clerk of Court. A Clerk of Court is the administrative assistant of the Presiding Judge whose
duty is to assist in the management of the calendar of the court and in all other matters not
involving the exercise of discretion or judgment of the judge ( Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the RTC, Branches 61, 134 and 137, Makati, Metro Manila , 248 SCRA 25 [1995];
Mejia vs. Justice Pamaran, et al., 160 SCRA 457 [1988]).
Although a judge has direct supervision over his court personnel, he is more expected to
perform his judicial functions, hence, on matters not involving the exercise of discretion such as
scheduling of cases, the rule provides that the Clerk of Court shall prepare or cause to be
prepared a daily court calendar which may include, at the discretion of the Presiding Judge,
cases scheduled for pre-trial, arraignment, trial, hearing on motions or incidents and other
matters (Sec. Q on Manual for Clerks of Courts , p. 59; Section 1, Rule 20, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
In conjunction with this, a Clerk of Court can issue under the seal of the Court all ordinary writs
and processes incident to pending cases, the issuance for ( sic) which does not involve the
exercise of functions appertaining to the Court or Judge only, and may under the discretion of
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
the Court or Judge, make out and sign letters of administration, appointment of guardians,
trustees and receivers and all writs and processes issuing from the Court (Section 4, Rule 136,
Revised Rules of Court)
While the Clerk of Court may have erred in calendaring the case on a Thursday (instead of
Friday) which resulted to the non-appearance of the Public Prosecutor, who has direct control in
the prosecution of criminal cases, it appears that the private complainant (complainant herein)
was not denied his right to counsel as he was duly represented by his counsel de parte. . . .
From the circumstances above, it can be said that no substantial rights of the complainant were
prejudiced.
2.On the allegation that it was only upon the Prosecution’s motion that respondent caused the
issuance of the warrant of arrest and required the accused to post bail, it is noted from the
comment of respondent Judge that there was an attempt to settle the case between the two
brothers upon the prodding of the accused. Nevertheless, upon failure to arrive at an amicable
settlement, respondent issued the warrant of arrest and the accused promptly posted bail.
Therefore, the delay, if there is any, in the issuance of the warrant is not entirely the fault of the
respondent judge.
3.On the issue of inhibition, respondent Judge admits that he is the first cousin of the wife of
the accused. Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, on disqualification of Judges, provides that: No
judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, inter alia, is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree
computed according to the rules of the civil law. Under this provision, the Presiding Judge is
mandated to disqualify himself from sitting in a case. He cannot exercise his discretion whether
to inhibit himself or not. In the case at bar, respondent Judge falls squarely within the above
provision. Being the first cousin of the wife of the accused to whom he is related in the fourth
civil degree by consanguinity he is related to the accused in the same degree by affinity. At the
outset, it was therefore mandatory for him to inhibit himself from the case if only to avoid any
doubt or suspicion of bias and partiality in favor of the accused.
3
hoping he could make complainant and the accused settle their dispute amicably considering
that they are brothers and the wife of the accused is his first cousin. Respondent’s efforts,
praiseworthy though they may be, cannot justify the disregard of the law. At the first sign that
complainant was not willing to listen to respondent’s counsel, the latter should have recused
himself from the case without further delay. He cannot sacrifice the integrity of the judicial office
on the chance that complainant might relent and agree at last to settle the matter with his
brother. A period of two (2) months is more than enough for respondent to make use of his
good office. After a reasonable time trying his ability to bring the parties to an amicable
settlement and using his moral influence on them without success, he should have inhibited
himself from the case and continued his peace efforts in a private capacity. On the other hand,
because there is no showing that respondent’s failure to inhibit himself from the case within a
reasonable time was due to malice or any corrupt motive, the Court thinks that reprimand would
be an appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonio V. Tiong is hereby REPRIMANDED with
WARNING that repetition of the same or similar act or omission will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
     Bellosillo (Chairman), Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Respondent reprimanded and warned against repetition of similar act.
Notes.—A judge is bound never to consider lightly a motion for his inhibition that
questions or puts to doubt, however insignificant, his supposed predilection to a case pending
before him. (Albos vs. Alaba, 231 SCRA 68 [1994])
Impartiality is a state of mind, hence, the need for some kind of manifestation of its
reality. (Parayno vs. Meneses, 231 SCRA 807 [1994])
The rationale of the rule on disqualification of judges is predicated in the long standing
precept that no judge should handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly,
to be susceptible to bias and partiality. (Urbanes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 72 [1994])

WHEREFORE, FOREGOING CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommend[ed] that respondent

Judge Antonio V. Tiong be absolved of any liability as to the charges for lack of merit except on
the charge that he failed to timely inhibit himself from the case for which this office
recommends that he be SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for his failure to inhibit himself from the case
at the outset.

The Court finds the report to be well taken. Under Rule 137, §1 of the Rules of Court, a judge
who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is
disqualified from sitting in the case without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing,
signed by them, and entered upon the record. This prohibition is not limited to cases in which a
judge hears the evidence of the parties but includes as well cases in which he acts by resolving
motions and issuing orders as respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case. The
purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of
impropriety on the part of the judge. 3 A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned 4 and he should administer justice impartially and
without delay.5

Contrary to this Rule, Judge Tiong acted in Criminal Case No. 4384 from November 5, 1996 to
January 3, 1997. He inhibited himself from further consideration of the case only on the latter
date, despite the fact that the complainant filed a motion seeking his inhibition on November 14,
1996.

Respondent justifies his failure to inhibit himself from the case on the ground that he was
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
A.M. No. RTJ-89-286. July 11, 1991.*
ROAN I. LIBARIOS, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS, respondent.
Judges; Grave abuse of discretion and gross ignorance of the law. —In the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be
disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet,
it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal principles.
Same; Same.—A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he
is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the
administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the
bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Where person is accused of a capital offense. —It has been an
established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a capital offense,
the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove
that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the
temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the instant
case amounted to a violation of due process. x x x. Respondent judge’s disregard of an
established rule of law by depriving the prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the
evidence of guilt against the accused was strong, amounted to gross ignorance of the law,
which is subject to disciplinary action.
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT in the Supreme Court. Gross misconduct.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
     Roan I. Libarios for and on his own behalf.
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his client
Mariano Corvera, Jr. against respondent Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, for grave ignorance of the
law, grave abuse of discretion, gross misconduct and partiality, relative to Criminal Case No.
3464. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On 10 March 1988, former Mayor Mariano Corvera, Sr. was shot by Pablo Macapas inside the
courtroom of respondent Judge Dabalos, after a hearing in a frustrated murder case against said
Pablo Macapas. Corvera, Sr. was the private complainant in the aforesaid criminal case, while
Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr. was appearing as counsel of Macapas. As a result of the killing of
Corvera Sr., a formal charge of murder (I.S. No. 88-138) was filed with the City Fiscal’s Office of
Butuan City against Pablo Macapas, Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr., and his driver-bodyguard
Belarmino Allocod, and (2) other “John Does”. Macapas was a bodyguard of respondent Calo, Jr.
On 22 June 1988, Investigating Fiscal Macario Balansag issued a resolution, finding a prima
facie case for murder against the respondents in I.S. No. 88-138.1
On 29 June 1988, the information was signed by the investigating Fiscal; however, a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution was filed by respondent Calo, Jr., which delayed the filing of
the Information against Calo, Jr. and his co-respondents.
4
On 21 July 1988, respondents in I.S. No. 88-138 filed with the RTC Butuan City a petition for
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, to enjoin
the Investigating Fiscal from acting on their afore-mentioned motion for reconsideration. Then
Executive Judge Vicente Hidalgo issued a TRO, directing the Investigating Fiscal to refrain from
acting on the said motion for reconsideration and from further proceeding with the preliminary
investigation of the murder charge against respondent Calo, Jr. and his co-respondents.
However the TRO expired after the lapse of twenty (20) days, without a preliminary injunction
being issued.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be resolved, Investigating Fiscal Balansag was
himself gunned down in cold blood while on his way to his office. Based on the investigation
conducted by the NBI linking the death of Fiscal Balansag to the killing of Corvera, Sr., another
formal complaint for murder was filed against Calo, Jr. and four (4) others.
On 14 September 1988, Acting City Fiscal Brocoy resolved the pending motion for
reconsideration, affirming the 22 June 1988 resolution finding a prima facie case for murder
against the respondents in I.S. No. 88-138.
On 29 September 1988, the information earlier signed by Investigating Fiscal Balansag, carrying
a NO BAIL recommendation, was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch IV,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3464. On 14 October 1988, upon motion of the prosecution and
with the approval of the court, the information was withdrawn for being fatally defective in form,
the same having been signed by Fiscal Balansag who was already dead at the time of the filing
of said information.
On 29 November 1988, a new information signed by Acting Fiscal Brocoy carrying also a NO
BAIL recommendation, was filed with the court without the necessary supporting affidavits and
papers. The case was erroneously assigned to Branch IV of the RTC of Butuan City, where the
original information prior to its withdrawal was assigned. The accused filed a Motion to Dismiss
and/or Opposition to the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest Without Bail, and in the alternative,
accused sought the fixing of bail for their temporary release. 2 Said motion was set for hearing
on 15 December 1988.
Upon motion of the prosecution, the case was scheduled for raffle on 7 December 1988. On said
scheduled date for raffle, accused Calo, Jr. and his counsel personally filed an opposition to the
holding of the raffle on the ground of lack of notice to the parties.
On 6 and 8 December 1988, Corvera, Jr. and his counsel together with their sympathizers
staged a rally demanding the immediate arrest of the accused in Criminal Case No. 3464. After
their rally in the afternoon of 8 December 1988, they personally went to see respondent judge
in his chamber to reiterate their demand.
After said meeting between Corvera, Jr., et al. and respondent judge, the latter issued an order
of 8 December 19883 in his capacity as Executive Judge, directing the raffle of the case with due
notice to the parties. Without conducting any prior hearing, in the same order of 8 December
1988, respondent judge directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, fixing
at the same time the bail for accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod at P50,000.00 each; however, no bail
was recommended for the temporary release of accused Macapas. Respondent judge fixed bail
for the temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod on the ground that they were not
charged as co-principals by cooperation or inducement, and that the evidence of guilt against
them was merely circumstantial.
On 14 December 1988, a petition for certiorari was filed by herein complainant with the Court of
Appeals, assailing the 8 December 1988 order of respondent judge, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
16383. In response to the urgency of the petition, a resolution dated 20 December 1988 was
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
issued by the Court of Appeals restraining the execution and implementation of the assailed
order, pending the resolution of the petition on the merits. However, on 26 December 1988,
respondent judge and Calo, Jr. informed the Court of Appeals that accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod
had already put up their respective bail bonds of P50,000.00 as of 9 December 1988 and that
both have been released, thus rendering the primary objective of the CA temporary restraining
order moot and academic.
On 31 January 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 setting aside the questioned 8
December 1988 order as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The warrants of arrest as well as the bail bonds filed by the accused in
said Criminal Case No. 3464 were declared void and without force and effect; the court of origin
was ordered to immediately issue and serve new warrants of arrest upon the accused. To
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, the trial court was
ordered to conduct a hearing and thus resolve the motion for fixing the bail for the temporary
release of the two (2) accused, Calo, Jr. and Allocod. The decision of the Court of Appeals
became final and executory on 23 February 1989. 5
In the administrative complaint at bar, complainant claims that the act of respondent judge in
granting bail to the accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod without a hearing, is tantamount to gross
ignorance and willful, malicious and blatant disregard of the provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which require a hearing before an accused charged with a capital
offense can be granted bail. The impartiality of respondent judge in issuing the questioned
warrants of arrest but allowing bail is also questioned on the ground of his “close association”
with the accused Calo, Jr.
In his defense, respondent judge argues that Sec. 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure which requires a hearing of an application for admission to bail, filed by any person
who is in custody for the commission of a capital offense, is applicable only to cases where the
accused is already in custody, but neither of the three (3) accused in Criminal Case No. 3464
was being detained at the time their application for bail was acted upon by respondent judge. In
his capacity as Executive Judge, respondent judge claims that he merely followed the
precedents set by his predecessors, in issuing warrants of arrest before the raffle of a case in
order to avoid delay in the arrest of the accused.
In addition, respondent judge denied the allegation that he was a law partner of accused Calo,
Jr., claiming that he was a mere employee in the business of said accused, and that he
appeared with accused Calo, Jr. as co-counsel in a case, but not as an associate. To justify his
finding that the evidence of guilt is circumstantial against accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod,
respondent judge stated that—
“Herein respondent has some doubts whether accused Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. could have done
the acts of giving a revolver to accused Pablo Macapas outside the courtroom and pushed Pablo
Macapas into the courtroom to shoot Mariano Corvera, Sr., which acts were allegedly done in
the presence of witness (sic) Pacifico Largonita and Fernando Casinao, who by their own
admissions, are security personnel and companions of the late Mayor Corvera. These acts being
attributed to accused Calo as the brain behind the killing do not appear to be a natural conduct
of man. These are stupid acts and accused Calo does not impress herein respondent as having
that kind of mental intelligence. Respondent has known accused Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. as a law
practitioner and as a person for about twenty years already. Respondent finds accused Calo to
be of above-average intelligence. Thus, when respondent reviewed the findings of the
investigating fiscal regarding the statements of P. Largonita and F. Casinao, respondent
entertained some serious doubts. Questions cropped up in respondent’s mind. Respondent
asked himself the questions that if he were the mastermind, would he give, in the presence of
some individuals, the gun to the gunman only at the vicinity where the intended victim was to
5
be shot moments before the appointed time of the killing and pushed the gunman to the place
where the victim was? Respondent’s answer was that he would not behave in such manner,
otherwise he would appear to be an inept mastermind and the gunman was reluctant that the
latter had to be pushed to execute the plan.”6
While it does not form part of the record of the case at bar, the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP. No. 16383 is quite enlightening. That decision, as already mentioned, declared as
null and void the warrants of arrest issued by respondent judge as well as the bail fixed by him
for the temporary release of the accused, all accomplished without a hearing. The Court of
Appeals said:
“It is conventional wisdom in legal circles that the determination as to whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong in a capital offense rests upon the sound judgment and discretion of
the court which can only be exercised and reached after due or summary hearing. ( People vs.
San Diego, 26 SCRA 522; Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55). In that hearing, the fiscal must be
notified and given the opportunity to present his evidence. If the court grants bail without
affording such opportunity to the prosecution, due process is seriously violated. ( People vs. San
Diego, supra; Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCRA 373). And even where the prosecutor
refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the Court may
ask the prosecution ‘questions to ascertain the strength of the state’s evidence or judge the
adequacy of the amount of bail.’ (Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 789).
x x x     x x x     x x x
In the petition at bar, private respondents argue that since they are no longer in custody of the
law, the respondent court having granted and fixed their bail which they did forthwith post, the
hearing to determine whether or not their guilt is strong is no longer necessary. The argument
sounds but casuistic because in Our judgment the respondent court acted deliberately with
precipitate haste and with grave abuse of discretion, when on December 8, 1988 it issued the
order granting and fixing the bail without any hearing at all, even as private respondents
themselves had requested their motion to be heard on December 15, 1988 yet, when
respondent court in the same order directed the issuance of warrants of arrest against private
respondents, the act was nothing more than a superfluous and useless ceremony because with
the grant of bail the accused could and did effectively secure their freedom at once without even
seeing a copy of the warrant of arrest itself. As a matter of fact, there is nothing in the records
before Us to show that warrants of arrest were actually issued against private respondents.” 7
Respondent judge was declared by the Court of Appeals to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion in fixing the bail of the accused without a hearing. Generally, a judge cannot be held
liable to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous judgment or
decision rendered by him in good faith.8 However, good faith may be negated by the
circumstances on record.
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. But,
while judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes
or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal
principles.9
In every case, a judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law
unswayed by partisan or personal interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. 10 Respondent
judge should not have allowed himself to be swayed into issuing an order fixing bail for the
temporary release of the accused charged with murder, without a hearing, which is contrary to
established principles of law. A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to
know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in
the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8 6
the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 11

The fact that the complainant and his sympathizers had staged a rally demanding the issuance
of a warrant of arrest against the accused is not a sufficient excuse for the unjustified haste of
respondent judge’s act of fixing bail without a hearing.

It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a
capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the
prosecution an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to
produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the
issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing
bail in the instant case amounted to a violation of due process. 12 Irrespective of respondent
judge’s opinion that the evidence of guilt against herein accused is not strong, the law and
settled jurisprudence demanded that a hearing be conducted before bail was fixed for the
temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, if bail was at all justified. Respondent
judge’s disregard of an established rule of law by depriving the prosecution of the opportunity to
prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong, amounted to gross ignorance of
the law, which is subject to disciplinary action.

Furthermore, considering that respondent judge had a close association with respondent Calo,
Jr. as a former employee of the said accused, prudence and regard for his position as judge
demanded that he should have refrained from fixing the bail of said accused and from
concluding that the evidence against him was merely “circumstantial”, in order to avoid any
doubt as to his judicial impartiality. Respondent judge should have waited for the raffle of the
case and allowed the judge to whom the case was actually raffled to resolve the issue of fixing
the bail of said accused, if he was bailable. A judge should not only render a just, correct and
impartial decision but should do so in a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his
fairness, impartiality and integrity.13

ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge is hereby imposed a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND

PESOS (P20,000.00) and WARNED to exercise more care and diligence in the performance of his
duties as a judge, and that the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severally.
SO ORDERED.
    
 Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
     Gancayco, J., On leave.
Respondent fined of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

Note.—It is the trial court which is tasked to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong x x x. In the absence of manifest abuse of discretion, We are not prepared to substitute
our judgment for that of the trial court. ( People vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA
219.)
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
RTJ No. 90-474. October 4,1991.*
CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR., complainant, vs. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, RTC,
BRANCH 16, NAVAL, LEYTE, respondent.
Judges; The Certificate of Service is not merely a means to one's pay check but an instrument
by which the courts can fulfill the constitutional mandate of the people's right to a speedy
disposition of cases.—A member of the bench can not pay mere lip service to the 90-day
requirement, but should, in fact, persevere in its implementation. The Certificate of Service is
not merely a means to one's paycheck, but an instrument by which the Courts Can fulfill the
Constitutional mandate of the people's right to a speedy disposition of cases.
Same; Same; Negligence; The loss of not one but eight records is indicative of gross misconduct
and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a judge.— Additionally, we have to hold respondent
inexcusably negligent for failure to account for the records of twelve (12) civil and two (2)
criminal cases. "A judge is expected to ensure that the records of the cases assigned to his sala
are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The loss of not
one but eight records is indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming
of a judge. For true professionalism in the bench to exist, judges whose acts demoralize the
ethical standards of a judicial office and whose acts demonstrate unfitness and unworthiness of
the prestige and prerequisite attached to said office must be weeded out."
Same; Judicial Ethics; Interference by members of the bench in pending suits with the end in
view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence
of the judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality.—Cardinal
is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing
in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule
2.04). Interference by members of the bench in pending suits with the end in view of influencing
the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence of the judiciary but
also undermines the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality.
Same; Administrative Law; Evidence; In administrative proceedings, mere preponderance of
evidence suffices to establish the charges.—Whether or not the accused deserved the acquittal,
in point of fact, is of no moment as Respondent's mere act of interference in a criminal case
seals his fate. In administrative proceedings such as this, mere preponderance of evidence
suffices to establish the charges.
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT in the Supreme Court. Falsification of Certificates of Service.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PER CURIAM:
In an Affidavit-Complaint, dated 7 March 1990, Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr., a practicing
lawyer in Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, charged respondent, Judge Adriano R. Villamor of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, with falsification of his monthly Certificates of
Service by making it appear that he had resolved all cases submitted for decision within the
ninety-day period required by the Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 5, when actually he had fifteen
(15) cases undecided from five (5) years back or from March, 1985.
On 7 August 1990, the Court directed Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad to make an
on-the-spot audit of the cases pending in the sala of Respondent Judge. On 2 October 1990,
Deputy Court Administrator Bernad reported that there were, indeed, eighty seven (87) cases
undecided beyond the ninety(90)-day reglementary period as of 3 July 1990, consisting of six
7
(6) criminal cases with prisoners, 36 criminal cases without prisoners, and forty-five (45) civil
cases. Worse the records of two (2) criminal cases and twelve (12) civil cases were missing.
While the records of six (6) criminal cases were not in the Court but acknowledged by
Respondent Judge to have been in his possession.
Deputy Court Administrator Bernad also noted the dismal state of the Courthouse of the RTC,
Branch 16, which he described as "bereft of any dignity as a court of law" showing "a lack of
financial and moral support of the local authorities," and observed that the Municipal Court was
even better housed.
On 31 October 1990, Complainant further furnished the Court with an Affidavit of Judge
Dulcisimo Pitao of the Municipal Trial Court of Maripipi, Leyte, stating that Respondent had
intervened for the accused in Criminal Case No. 959 then pending with the said Municipal Court.
We considered the foregoing as a supplemental charge of undue interest in a pending criminal
case.
On 23 November 1990, Complainant again brought to the attention of the Court seven (7)
additional cases submitted for decision, at the earliest since April 1986, still unresolved by
Respondent (p. 44, Rollo), even though the transcripts were ready as early as 1984 in one (1)
case.
In his Comment filed on 20 December 1990, Respondent claimed that the Complaint was more
for harassment and vengeance, otherwise, Complainant would not have filed a criminal case
against him for Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code before the
Ombudsman, based on the same facts alleged in his Complaint before this Court. Respondent
further claimed that he had not violated the 90-day rule since 1 February 1990 when the Court
required the adoption of the continuous trial system. He did not deny, however, that before said
date, there were other cases not decided within the 90-day rule, including those listed in the
Complaint allegedly because the transcripts were incomplete. He added that he had no hand in
the preparation of his monthly reports of pending cases; that after he had ordered the person-
in-charge of preparing the Certificates of Service to explain why she had made it appear that
said cases were decided within ninety (90) days from its submission when actually they were
not, she stated that he had nothing to do with the preparation of the monthly report except to
sign after she had prepared them.
On 18 April 1991, acting upon a second Report from Deputy Court Administrator Bernad, the
Court resolved: (1) to refer the supplemental charge regarding undue interest in a particular
criminal case to Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr., of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report and recommendation; (2) to order Respondent to decide with dispatch cases still
unresolved beyond the 90-day-period; and (3) to inform the Court immediately regarding steps
he had taken to retrieve lost records and to personally put his records in order.
To date, Respondent has been unheard from on those directives.
On 12 July 1991, Complainant followed up with another letter complaint stating that the seven
cases mentioned in his letter of 23 November 1990 remained undecided, adding that five (5)
cases handled by him were unresolved since January 1987, not to speak of cases handled by
other lawyers.
Judging from the Deputy Court Administrator's two Reports, there is validity to Complainant's
charge that Respondent had failed to decide cases within the 90-day reglementary period
notwithstanding "Second Ex-parte Motions to Decide Case" filed by Complainant (Annexes A to
L, Complaint), and that Respondent had falsified his Certificates of Service for 2 September
1986, 3 October 1987, 3 October 1988, 3 November 1989, and 1 March 1990 (Annexes N to R,
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
Complaint). Respondent's defense that incomplete transcripts of stenographic notes dissuaded
him from deciding those cases for fear of "rendering an injustice" is controverted by his own
stenographic reporter who stated that the transcripts in some of those cases were ready as far
back as 1984 (Comment, Annex "2").
Respondent, however, shifts the blame on his Clerk of Court, Atty. Rogelio Jocobo, who, he
claims, was inefficient in the management of Court records. Respondent forgets, however, that
he sits not only to Judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but that his responsibilities
include being an effective manager of the Court and its personnel. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, provides:
"A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional
competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions
of other judges and court personnel."
Also expected of a Judge under Rule 3.09 is that:
"A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service
and fidelity."
As we held in Secretary of Justice vs. Legaspi (A.M. No. 997-CFI, 10 September 1981, 107 SCRA
234):
"Respondent, as the incumbent judge, ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision,
particularly those pending for more than ninety days. As a matter of fact, he is supposed to
keep his own record of cases submitted for decision so that he could act on them promptly and
without delay, mindful of the mandate in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 296, also known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948 . . . It is expected that he should be more diligent and more vigilant in
attending to cases submitted for decision as well as in the preparation of his monthly certificates
of service by verifying every now and then whether there are cases pending decision for more
than ninety days; because he could be held accountable for any error or falsification in his
certificates. Thus, respondent cannot now escape liability for falsification of his certificates of
service with the lame excuse that he has no knowledge of those cases pending decision for
more than ninety days at the time he submitted his certificates of service. Nor could he give the
excuse that his attention was not called to the cases pending decision ninety days because he
need not be reminded of his deadlines by a subordinate court employee like the clerk of court.
Court employees are not the guardians of a judge's responsibilities."
In Nidua vs. Lazaro (A.M. No. R-465 MTJ, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 581), we maintained:
"It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his Court so that
no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition, particularly those
submitted for decision. A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement
by Court personnel. Proper and efficient court management is as much his responsibility. He is
the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions."
And in Cipriano vs. Judge Villamor (A.M. No. RTJ-88-207, 22 June 1989, en banc, Minute
Resolution) we ruled,
"The Supreme Court cannot countenance such undue delay of a judge especially now when
there is an all-out effort to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the problems of congestion and
delay long plaguing our courts. Thus, judges are called upon to exercise the utmost diligence
and dedication in the performance of their duties. It is a measure of a judge's competence as an
8
administrator that he is capable of delegating to his personnel those tasks which properly
pertain to them, maintaining, likewise, their trust and confidence in him."
A member of the bench can not pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement, but should, in
fact, persevere in its implementation. The Certificate of Service is not merely a means to one's
paycheck, but an instrument by which the Courts can fulfill the Constitutional mandate of the
people's right to a speedy disposition of cases.
"The people's faith in the administration of justice, especially those who belong to the low
income group, would be greatly impaired if decisions are long in coming, more so from trial
courts which unlike collegiate tribunals where there is a need for extended deliberation, could be
expected to act with dispatch" (Magdamo vs. Pahimulin, Adm. Mat. No. 662-MJ, 30 September
1976, 73 SCRA 110).
Additionally, we have to hold respondent inexcusably negligent for failure to account for the
records of twelve (12) civil and two (2) criminal cases.
"A judge is expected to ensure that the records of the cases assigned to his sala are intact.
There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight
records is indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a judge. For
true professionalism in the bench to exist, judges whose acts demoralize the ethical standards of
a judicial office and Whose acts demonstrate unfitness and unworthiness of the prestige and
prerequisite attached to said office must be weeded out" (Longboan vs. Polig, Adm. Mat. No.
704-RTJ, 14 June 1990, 186 SCRA 557).
We come now to the supplemental charge of undue interest in a pending criminal case, subject
of the Investigative Report submitted on 9 August 1991 by Justice Fermin A. Martin, who found
the imputation sufficiently substantiated, and has recommended the imposition of a fine of
P10,000.00.
From that Report, we gather that on 16 July 1987, Respondent, as Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XVI, Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, designated Judge Dulcisimo
Pitao, of the Municipal Trial Court of Maripipi, Leyte, as Acting Judge of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of BiliranCabucgayon, Leyte, which was then vacant, with the directive to allocate
two (2) session days a week in his additional sala.
On 19 August 1987, while Judge Pitao was at his residence at Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte,
he received a note handcarried by a woman, whom he came to know later as the wife of
Guillermo Lipango, the accused in Criminal Case No. 959, which had long been pending trial in
the 4th MCTC of Biliran Cabucgayon, Leyte.
The note (Exhibit "A"), written on Respondent's letterhead, reads:
"Aug. 19, 1987
"Dear Tete,
"The bearer is the wife of Guillermo Lipango who has a long pending theft case. If you have
jurisdiction hear and decide. If none, remand it to RTC.
"Take care because I learned Big Man Egane is taking much interest because accused is
competing with his fishing but only in a small scale. Okay? Thanks.
Sincerely,
Ading."
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
Sometime later, Judge Pitao sought respondent, as the Executive Judge, regarding his
application for leave of absence which had to be coursed through the latter. During their
conversation, respondent mentioned the case of "People vs. Lipango," asked Judge Pitao
whether the latter had received the note, and again warned the latter about a certain "Big Man
Egane," who was backing the complainant therein and that he (Judge Pitao) better acquit the
accused (Tsn., 15 July 1991 pp. 13-14).
On 25 August 1988, after hearing the case, Judge Pitao rendered his decision convicting the
accused, Guillermo Lipango, of the crime of Theft (Exhibit "C") "because the evidence against
the accused was very strong" (ibid., p. 14).
On 16 November 1988, when Judge Pitao went to the boarding house of Respondent to invite
the latter to a birthday party, and while they were walking together, Judge Pitao confided to
Respondent that he had convicted Lipango "because he could not in conscience acquit him"
(ibid., p. 17). Irked, Respondent directed Judge Pitao to forward the records to the former's
Court (ibid., p. 18).
On 23 November 1988, the records of Criminal Case No. 959 were elevated to the RTC, Leyte,
Branch XVI, over which Respondent presides, but the case was actually docketed thereat on 5
December 1988.
From 1 to 3 December 1988, Judge Pitao attended the National Convention of Lawyers in Cebu
City. Upon his return, he learned that Judge Meljohn de la Peña had been designated as Acting
Judge of the 4th MCTC Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte, and that his designation had been revoked
effective 30 November 1988 (ibid., pp. 18-19).
On 9 December 1988, Respondent promulgated his decision acquitting accused-appellant
Guillermo Lipango of the crime charged (Exhibit "F"). This, despite the fact that the records of
the case disclosed that no notice had been sent to the parties of the receipt of the entire record
to enable them to submit their respective memoranda.
For his part, Respondent opted to rely on his six (6)-page Comment, dated 19 December 1990
(Exh. H, pp. 78-83, Rollo), as his testimony-in-chief. As correctly observed by the Investigating
Justice, said Comment contains nothing more than a denial of the charge of falsification and an
attribution of ill motive to the Complainant. He then determined that Respondent is deemed not
to have denied:
"1)that he sent the handwritten note dated August 19, 1987 (Exhibit "A") to Judge Dulcisimo
Pitao through the wife of the accused Guillermo Lipango;
2)that when Judge Pitao brought his application for leave of absence to respondent as Executive
Judge, respondent took up the matter of the note he sent and the theft case against accused
Guillermo Lipango which was pending trial before Judge Pitao and even hurried the remark
"better acquit him;" and,
3)that he decided the appealed criminal case and acquitted the appellant Guillermo Lipango
although the record of the case disclosed that no notice had been sent yet by the branch clerk
of court to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable the parties to submit
memoranda pursuant to Rule 21 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines."
Accordingly, the Investigating Justice came up with the following apt observations and findings:
"In sending his handwritten note (Exhibit "A") to Judge Pitao, and through the wife of the
accused Guillermo Lipango, respondent failed to exercise due care. It is true that the contents of
the letter may not have directly exhorted the addressee to decide the case in favor of one party
9
but to have the wife of the very accused deliver the letter to the municipal judge who will decide
the case and over whom he (respondent) exercised supervision and wielded a degree of moral
ascendancy as Executive Judge was simply a big letdown in the required circumspection and
high ideals expected of a judge. It is a truism that a judge's official conduct and his behavior in
the performance of judicial duties should be free from the appearance of impropriety (Aleza vs.
Reyes, 131 SCRA 445, 453).
Moreover, respondent Judge, while cautioning Judge Pitao to watch out and exercise care in
handling the case supposedly on account of the interest of persons not parties to the case,
made a side remark for the acquittal of the accused. Such a statement, which was not denied,
was highly improper and was apt to create the impression that he was for the exoneration of
the accused Guillermo Lipango. It tended to influence the trial judge who was going to decide
the case and thus did violence to the lofty principle that "the office of a judge exists for one
solemn end: to promote justice by administering it fairly and impartially" (Gonzales-Austria vs.
Abaya, 176 SCRA 634, 646)."
Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from
influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court
(Canon 2, Rule 2.04). Interference by members of the bench in pending suits with the end in
view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence
of the judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality
(Commentaries on the Code of Judicial Conduct). On this point, Impao vs. Makilala (A.M. No.
MTJ-88-184, 13 October 1989, 178 SCRA 541) expounds:
"It is an important judicial norm that a judge's private as well as official conduct must at all
times be free from the appearance of impropriety [Lugue vs. Kayanan, G.R. No. L-26826, August
29,1969, 29 SCRA 165; x x x]. As held by this Court in the case of De la Paz vs. Inutan, Adm.
Mat. No. 201 MJ, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 540: . . . The judge is the visible representation of the
law and, more importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to
obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests,
specially in the station of municipal judges, like respondent Judge, who have that close and
direct contact with the people before nobody else in the judiciary. Thus, for the judge to return
that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to
follow."
The Investigating Justice gave one final and pointed observation on respondent's culpability,
thus:
'The clincher though came when respondent Judge decided the same case which was appealed
to his branch although he knew that no notice had been sent yet by the branch clerk of court to
the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable the prosecution and the defense to
submit memoranda pursuant to Rule 21 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, Respondent's
excuse was that under the rules, it was (and still is) the duty of the clerk of court to notify the
parties of the fact that the original record of the case, together with the transcripts and exhibits,
had been received (Rule 21, paragraph c, Interim Rules and Guidelines). Respondent
overlooked, however, that the same rule provides that the RTC judge shall decide the case on
the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
and/or briefs, as may have been filed (paragraph D, Rule 21, ibid)."
Whether or not the accused deserved the acquittal, in point of fact, is of no moment as
Respondent's mere act of interference in a criminal case seals his fate. In administrative
proceedings such as this, mere preponderance of evidence suffices to establish the charges (The
Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, et al., A.M. No. R-97-RTJ, 28 May 1987, 150 SCRA 269).
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8 10
Upon the facts and the evidence, we can not but hold respondent guilty (1) of having made
untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service, of inexcusable negligence and gross
inefficiency in connection with missing records in his Sala, and of utter indifferences ,to the
directives of this Court; and (2) of serious misconduct for undue interest in a pending criminal
case before a lower Court over which he exercised supervision, all in violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The dilapidated condition of the Courthouse of the RTC, Branch 16. also
betrays a lack of management capabilities desired of a Presiding Judge and an insensitiveness to
the needs of a Court of Justice worthy of its name. All told, we find him unfit to continue with
his membership in the Bench.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor, Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, from the service, with forfeiture of all his
accrued retirement benefits, leave and other privileges, if any, and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including
governmentowned or controlled corporations.
Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his personal record
SO ORDERED.
    
 Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Respondent Judge dismissed from the service.

Note.—A judge must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to
follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. ( Ompoc
vs. Teves, 178 SCRA 14.)
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
A.M. No. MTJ-93-888. October 24, 1994.*
MAYOR ROGER S. PADILLA, complainant, vs. HON. ROBERTO V. ZANTUA, JR., Municipal
Trial Court, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; Respondent Judge should be reminded of the directive in Circular
No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989 requiring all courts to conduct a mandatory continuous trial
which is to be terminated within 90 days from inception of the initial hearing. —Complainant in
the instant case failed to specifically cite any of the cases referred to in the complaint which
remained undecided after the lapse of the required 90-day period to decide cases; hence, the
dismissal of charges of violation of the 90-day period is in order. The delay in the trial of the
cited cases in the complaint, particularly Criminal Case Nos. 5935 and 5936, Criminal Case No.
5908 and Criminal Case No. 5998, was not entirely the fault of herein respondent Judge. The
delay was caused by the numerous postponements both by the prosecution and the defense.
However, respondent Judge should be reminded of the directive in Circular No. 1-89 dated
January 19, 1989 requiring all courts to conduct a mandatory continuous trial which is to be
terminated within 90 days from inception of the initial hearing.
Same; Same; Constant company with a lawyer tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie to the
point that favors in the future may be asked from respondent judge which he may find hard to
resist.—We cannot fully countenance the view of respondent Judge. Constant company with a
lawyer tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie to the point that favors in the future may be
asked from respondent judge which he may find hard to resist. The actuation of respondent
Judge of eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer who has pending cases in his sala
may well arouse suspicion in the public mind, thus tending to erode the trust of the litigants in
the impartiality of the judge. This eventuality may undermine the people’s faith in the
administration of justice. It is of no moment that Atty. Augusto Schneider is the only lawyer in
the locality.
Same; Same; A judge should behave at all times as to inspire public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.—A judge should behave at all times as to inspire public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The prestige of judicial office shall
not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Same; Same; Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. —
Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A
judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant
public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Serious Irregularities and Grave Misconduct.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a sworn complaint dated October 5, 1993, Mayor Roger S. Padilla of the Municipality of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte charges respondent Judge Roberto V. Zantua, Municipal Trial
Court of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte with serious irregularities and grave misconduct in
the performance of his official duties for: (1) failure to decide cases within the prescribed period;
(2) unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases which have been prejudicial to litigants; (3)
manifest partiality in favor of a litigant and (4) fraternizing with lawyers who have pending cases
11
in his sala.1
Mayor Roger S. Padilla alleges that in Criminal Case Nos. 5935 and 5936 (People v. Ventura
Calzada, et al.) for grave coercion and grave threats; Criminal Case No. 5973 (People v. Efren
Dalde, et al.) for highgrading; Civil Case No. 610 (Vicente Enriquez v. Zaldy Suarez) for
trespassing (sic); Criminal Case No. 5908 (People v. Rolando Racasa) for highgrading; and
Criminal Case No. 5998 (People v. Job Riel) for alarms and scandals, the opposing counsel, Atty.
Augusto B. Schneider is always seen eating and drinking in the constant company of respondent
Judge in public establishments in the Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
Mayor Padilla complains that these cases have been pending since 1991, some have not even
been tried and because of delays in the disposition of these cases and the perceived partiality of
respondent Judge to Atty. Augusto Schneider, the people’s confidence in the judiciary is being
eroded.
In compliance with the Resolution of this Court dated February 14, 1994, 2 respondent Judge
Zantua denied the accusations against him in his answer and comment alleging, among others,
that Criminal Case Nos. 5935 and 5936 for grave coercion and grave threats had been lagging
for more than two (2) years because of the numerous postponements of both the prosecution
and the defense; that he allowed the presentation of the witnesses without the presence of
opposing counsel provided that the parties and their counsel were properly notified and the
witnesses shall be subject to cross examination pursuant to Section 2, par. (c) of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure and the case of Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422; that Atty. Schneider has
never been a counsel in this case because the prosecutor was Pedro Vega and the defense
counsel was Freddie Venida.3
Respondent Judge claims that in Criminal Case No. 5973 (People v. Efren Dalde) for highgrading
wherein Mayor Padilla claims that no hearing has been conducted, records of the case will bear
him out that a hearing had actually been conducted; that the accused, represented by a DAR
lawyer, was arraigned, pre-trial was held, and ocular inspection was made.
In Civil Case No. 610 (Vicenta Enriquez v. Zaldy Suarez) for forcible entry (not for trespassing)
wherein Mayor Padilla complains that it was decided without a hearing, respondent Judge
maintains that the case was tried pursuant to Section 1, par. 1-A of the Rule on Summary
Procedure. After an answer was filed, the parties were asked to submit their respective position
papers with their evidence, after which the case was decided in accordance with Section 10
thereof.
The delay in Criminal Case No. 5908 (People v. Rolando Racasa), according to respondent
Judge, was caused by the frequent postponements and non-appearance of the private
prosecutor and/or defense counsel, and justice requires the presence of lawyers in the trial of
cases where the records show that the accused had already been arraigned and the three
prosecution witnesses had already been presented.
In Criminal Case No. 5998 (People v. Job Riel), respondent Judge claims that the delay was due
to numerous postponements but explains that the accused has already been arraigned and the
last witness is to be presented by the prosecution.
Respondent Judge denies that he is fraternizing with lawyers with pending cases in his sala,
explaining that in the case of Atty. Schneider, he is the only lawyer in the Municipality of Jose
Panganiban and it is but natural for respondent Judge to be friendly with him but maintains that
their friendship has never been a hindrance to the proper disposition of the cases in his sala as
his impartiality is known not only in the Municipality of Jose Panganiban, but also in the province
of Camarines Norte as shown by his decisions in MTC Mercedes, MTC Paracale and MTC Basud.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
Respondent Judge attributes the filing of the instant complaint against him to local politics in the
Municipality of Jose Panganiban, alleging that since his appointment on February 16, 1983, he
has always been neutral and impartial in all the cases he disposed of; that even in the case
against herein complainant Mayor for slander by deed, he displayed his position of being neutral
and impartial, for which reason he has earned the ire of governor Roy Padilla, Sr., complainant’s
father, and Mayor Roger Padilla because respondent Judge refuses to succumb to their influence
and pressure; that for this reason, he requested his transfer on November 29, 1990 to another
station (MTC, Basud, Camarines Norte) as his life in Jose Panganiban is in imminent danger
brought about by the political pressures, and this request was followed by his letter-requests
dated May 2, 1991, then August 30, 1993, and most recently, the letter-request dated
December 10, 1993 addressed to Hon. Reynaldo L. Suarez, Deputy Court Administrator.
12
appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior not only in the discharge of their official
duties but also in their everyday life, for as we have earlier stressed, ‘no position exacts greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary’ so
that (a) magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his
conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to
him as the epitome of integrity and justice.”7
Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A
judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant
public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.8

The case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. In a Memorandum dated August 4, 1994 addressed to the Hon. Chief Justice
Andres R. Narvasa, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, concurred in by Court
Administrator Ernani Cruz Paño, recommended the dismissal of charges for failure to decide
cases within the prescribed period and for unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases. 4
We agree with the dismissal of the charges with respect to failure to decide the cases within the
prescribed period and the charges of unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases against
respondent Judge.
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby ADMONISHED with a
warning that a repetition of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent Judge is reminded to be prompt in the disposition of cases pending in his sala
pursuant to Sections 3, 4, 5 of Rule 22, Rules of Court and Administrative Circular No. 1-88 and
Circular 1-89.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal records.
     Bidin (Acting Chairman), Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
     Feliciano, J., On leave.
Respondent admonished with a warning.

Complainant in the instant case failed to specifically cite any of the cases referred to in the Note.—Failure of a judge to decide a case within the required period of 90 days is not
complaint which remained undecided after the lapse of the required 90-day period to decide excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. (Longoban vs. Polig, 186 SCRA 557 [1990])
cases; hence, the dismissal of charges of violation of the 90-day period is in order. The delay in
the trial of the cited cases in the complaint, particularly Criminal Case Nos. 5935 and 5936,
Criminal Case No. 5908 and Criminal Case No. 5998, was not entirely the fault of herein
respondent Judge. The delay was caused by the numerous postponements both by the
prosecution and the defense. However, respondent Judge should be reminded of the directive in
Circular No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989 requiring all courts to conduct a mandatory continuous
trial which is to be terminated within 90 days from inception of the initial hearing.

However, as regards the allegations of manifest partiality in favor of a litigant and fraternizing
with lawyers who have pending cases in his sala, we note that respondent Judge does not deny
his close friendship and association with Atty. Augusto Schneider. Respondent Judge pointed out
that while it is true that Atty. Schneider has pending cases in his sala, the latter lost in these
cases which is supposed to give the impression that such close association with Atty. Schneider
has not affected his neutrality and impartiality as a Judge.

We cannot fully countenance the view of respondent Judge. Constant company with a lawyer
tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie to the point that favors in the future may be asked
from respondent judge which he may find hard to resist. The actuation of respondent Judge of
eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer who has pending cases in his sala may well
arouse suspicion in the public mind, thus tending to erode the trust of the litigants in the
impartiality of the judge. This eventuality may undermine the people’s faith in the administration
of justice. It is of no moment that Atty. Augusto Schneider is the only lawyer in the locality.

A judge should behave at all times as to inspire public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary.5 The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence the judge.6

Once again, we find this case an occasion to remind members of the Judiciary:
“x x x to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and be free from any
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563. September 8, 2004.*
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ)
LUCILA TAN, complainant, vs. Judge MAXWEL S. ROSETE, respondent.
Courts; Judges; Duties; Gross Misconduct; When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of
any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for
the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself .—We
have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct.
They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Like Caesar’s wife, a
judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting
standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the people’s confidence in the judicial system
is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of
the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are
expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is
sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount
that a judge’s personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free
from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. Respondent’s act of sending a
member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of his draft decisions, and his act
of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours violate the standard of
judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench. They constitute gross
misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019).
The facts are stated in the decision of the Court.
PUNO, J.:
Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former Acting Presiding
Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila, 1 for violation of Rule 140 of
the Revised Rules of Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).
The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 59440
and Criminal Case No. 66120, both entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso Pe Sy and
pending before Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, then presided by
respondent judge. Before the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of
his staff to talk to complainant. They met at Sangkalan Restaurant along Scout Albano, near
Timog Avenue in Quezon City. The staff member told her that respondent was asking for
P150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases. She was shown copies of
respondent judge’s Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, both still unsigned,
dismissing the complaints against the accused. She was told that respondent judge would
reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the amount demanded. The staff
member allowed complainant to keep the copy of the draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440.
Complainant, however, did not accede to respondent’s demand because she believed that she
had a very strong case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were eventually
dismissed by respondent judge.2
Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of complainant. He instead stated
that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him in exchange for a favorable decision. She
even tried to delay and to derail the promulgation of the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440
and 66120. Complainant also sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada,
to obtain judgment in her favor. Mayor Estrada allegedly talked to him several times to ask him
13
to help complainant. The former even called him over the phone when he was in New Zealand,
persuading him to hold in abeyance the promulgation of the Decisions in said cases. But he
politely declined, telling him that there was no sufficient evidence to convict the accused, and
moreover, he had already turned over the Decisions to Judge Quilatan for promulgation.
Respondent further stated that complainant kept bragging about her close relations with Mayor
Estrada who was her neighbor in Greenhills, San Juan, and even insinuated that she could help
him get appointed to a higher position provided he decides the suits in her favor. Respondent
judge also claimed that complainant offered to give cash for the downpayment of a car he was
planning to buy. But he refused the offer. Finally, respondent judge denied that a member of his
staff gave complainant a copy of his draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. He said that he
had entrusted to Judge Quilatan his Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120 before
he left for New Zealand on study leave. Thus, he asserted that it was impossible for him to
thereafter change the resolution of the cases and it was likewise impossible for any member of
his staff to give complainant copies of said Decisions.3
In a resolution dated December 2, 2002, the Court referred the complaint to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for investigation, report and recommendation. 4
First Vice Executive Judge Edwin A. Villasor conducted several hearings on the administrative
case. Only complainant Lucila Tan testified for her side. She presented as documentary evidence
the copy of the unsigned Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 dated February 23, 2001 which
was allegedly handed to her by a member of respondent judge’s staff. 5 Respondent judge, on
the other hand, presented four (4) witnesses: Josefina Ramos, Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), Fernando
B. Espuerta, and Joyce Trinidad Hernandez. His documentary evidence consists of the affidavits
of his witnesses,6 copy of the Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440, 7 and
various documents composed of the machine copy of the Order of Arrest in Criminal Case No.
117219, machine copy of the letter dated December 29, 1997, machine copy of Certification
dated Nov. 13, 2000, front and dorsal sides of Check No. QRH-0211804, Bank Statement dated
March 31, 1998, Stop Payment Order dated April 6, 1998, Current Account Inquiry, and
Transaction Record, which documents were allegedly given by complainant to respondent’s
witness, Fernando B. Espuerta.8
The Investigating Judge summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows:
COMPLAINANT’S VERSION:
1. LUCILA TAN
Complainant Lucila Tan testified that she knew Respondent Judge because she had a case in
Branch 58, MeTC, San Juan, Metro Manila. She alleged that, in September 1998, she filed two
cases involving B.P. 22 and Other Deceits with the Prosecutor’s Office in Pasig. After resolution,
the cases were filed in the MeTC, San Juan. One case went to Branch 57 and the other one
went to Branch 58, where Respondent Judge Rosete was the Presiding Judge. Judge Quilatan
was the Presiding Judge of Branch 57. Upon advise of a friend, she moved for consolidation and
the two cases were transferred to Judge Quilatan in Branch 57. Subsequently, in view of the
Motion for Inhibition filed by Complainant’s lawyer, Judge Quilatan inhibited himself and the two
cases were transferred to the sala of Respondent Judge Rosete ( TSN, pp. 9-16, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). After several hearings, the Clerk of Court, named Joyce, called up the
Complainant and advised her to talk to San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to seek for ( sic)
assistance. Joyce gave her the phone number of the Office of the Mayor ( TSN, pages 17-18,
Hearing of March 3, 2003 ). Complainant then called up the Office of the Mayor but her call was
intercepted by Josie, the Mayor’s Secretary. When she told Josie why she called, the latter asked
her if she wanted to meet the Judge and when Complainant answered in the affirmative, Josie
made arrangements for Complainant to meet the Judge ( TSN, pages 19-21, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant called up the Office of the Mayor sometime in November or late October
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
2000 and she met the Judge on November 10. She, Josie and Respondent Judge met at the
Cravings Restaurant in Wilson, San Juan (TSN, page 22, Hearing of March 3, 2003 ). During the
meeting, Complainant “told the Judge regarding this matter, how this happened and that he will
convince the Accused to pay me as soon as possible” ( TSN, page 23, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
When she went to the restroom for a few minutes, Respondent Judge and Josie were left alone.
After she came back, they went home. On the way home, Josie told her to give something to
[the] Judge, “Sabi niya magbigay tayo ng kaunti para bumilis iyong kaso mo ” (TSN, page 24,
Hearing of March 3, 2003 ). At first, Josie did not mention any amount but when the
Complainant asked her how much, the former mentioned Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
Complainant asked for a lesser amount, Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) ( TSN, page 25,
Hearing of March 3, 2003 ). When Josie agreed, she sent the amount of P20,000.00 to Josie
through her driver after two days ( TSN, pages 26-27, Hearing of March 3, 2003 ). When Josie
received the money, the Clerk of Court, Joyce, also called her (Complainant) on that date. The
Clerk of Court asked her if she sent money. At first, Complainant denied it but the Clerk of Court
said that Josie went there and there was money in the drawer ( TSN, pages 28-29, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). After that, several hearings were on-going, and before the resolution, Joyce
called up the Complainant again around February 2001. Complainant was in Baguio when Joyce
called saying that she had an important thing to tell to ( sic) the Complainant. After Complainant
got back to Manila, Joyce called her again and said that she will show Complainant something.
When they were in Complainant’s car in San Juan, Joyce showed Complainant two unsigned
Decisions of the case[s]. After reading the Decisions, Complainant saw that the cases were
dismissed and that it will be dismissed if she will not accede to Joyce’s request ( TSN, pages 30-
33, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant claimed that Joyce asked for Php 150,000.00 for
each case. “Sabi niya it [was] for Judge daw, kailangan daw ni Judge because he is leaving at
that time” (TSN, page 34, Hearing of March 3, 2003 ). Complainant identified the copy of the
Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 for Other Deceits, dated 23 February 2001, which was
marked as Exhibit “A” for the Complainant ( TSN, pages 35-38, Hearing of March 3, 2003 ).
Complainant further alleged “Sabi niya, if I will accede to that request of P150,000.00 for each
case then they will (sic) going to reverse the Decision” and “Si Judge daw” will reverse the
Decision. Complainant met with Joyce around February 2001 ( TSN, page 39, Hearing of March
3, 2003). Complainant further claimed that Joyce told her to go to Mayor because he is a friend
of the Judge. Complainant went again to the Office of the Mayor to seek the Mayor’s help and
she met the Mayor at his Office in San Juan. The Mayor called up the Judge but he was not
around so the Clerk of Court, Joyce, was called. Joyce went to the Office of the Mayor and when
she arrived, she said that the Judge was out of the country ( TSN, pages 40-41, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). The Mayor asked for the phone number of Respondent Judge Rosete, which
Joyce gave. Mayor Estrada was able to get in touch with the Judge. While the Mayor was talking
in (sic) the phone with the Judge, Complainant was in front of the Mayor ( TSN, pages 42-43,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant heard the Mayor “because his voice is very loud.” He
said, “Judge, Saan ka? Sabi niya New Zealand. When were you coming back? I do not know
what is the answer and then he said, you help my friend naswindler siya, pabilisin mo ang kaso
niya para matapos na kasi matagal na iyan ” (TSN, page 43, Hearing of March 23, 2003 ). After
that they left the Office of the Mayor and Complainant was not able to approach Mayor Estrada
again. Since the Complainant was still carrying the Decision, and being afraid that it will be
promulgated already, she sought the advi[c]e of her friends. The Complainant showed the
decision to the Prosecutor in San Juan at that time ( TSN, pages 44-45, Hearing of March 3,
2003). The Prosecutor told the Complainant that she is going to meet with the Judge when he
comes back from New Zealand. Complainant testified that, sometime in April, in Sangkalan,
Quezon City, a night life restaurant, she met Respondent Judge Rosete. She was with two (2)
Prosecutors. When she arrived at Sangkalan at about 8:30 in the evening, Judge Rosete was
already in the company of several men whom she got to know as Fernan and Buboy ( TSN,
pages 46-48, Hearing of March 3, 2003 ). After eating and drinking, the Complainant left at
around 10:30 in the evening. While they were inside, Complainant claimed that she did not say
anything at all and it was the Prosecutor who talked in her behalf. She was the one who paid all
14
the bills which amounted to Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00). When Complainant left, only they,
three (3) girls, left while the Judge and his company were still there drinking. While Complainant
was waiting for her car outside, a man came over from behind ( TSN, pages 49-50, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). Complainant did not know him but she asked the Prosecutor later after the man
left. The Complainant said that the man asked if he could have an advance, which she
understood as a payment, and she told the Prosecutor. Complainant heard the Prosecutor say
that she already talked to the Judge. The man left and went back inside the restaurant ( TSN,
page 51, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant said that when she did not give the money
she was still scared because there will already be a promulgation and she did not know whether
it will be in her behalf (sic) or not. Complainant did not give anything aside from the P20,000.00
because her case was very strong and she had all the papers and evidence and that she
promised them that she will give them after she was ( sic) able to collect all the debts.
Complainant did not know the actual date of the promulgation but somebody from the Office of
Respondent Judge called her up in her house and told her not to go to the promulgation. When
Complainant asked why, “Sabi niya baka mapaiyak daw ako kasi alam na daw nila ang decision.
Sabi niya ako na lang ang magdedeliver ng case ng promulgation .” She received the decision
when she sent her driver to pick it up. The caller said that the decision was unfavorable to her
(TSN, pages 52-55, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
RESPONDENT’S VERSION:
1. JOSEFINA RAMOS
She testified that she was the Private Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, the former Mayor of
San Juan, Metro Manila, since he was Vice Mayor of San Juan. In 2000 and 2001, she was
already the Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy ( TSN, page 7, Hearing of September 9, 2003 ). She met
Lucila Tan when the latter went to the Mayor’s Office together with Tita Pat, the sister of
President Estrada, but she could no longer remember the year. Lucila Tan went to the Office,
together with Tita Pat, and they were seeking the help of Mayor Jinggoy because they have a
case. She did not know the case because they were talking to Mayor Jinggoy. She could no
longer remember how many times Lucila Tan went to the Office of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. She
did not know what Lucila Tan wanted from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or how close Lucila Tan was
to him (TSN, pages 8-11, Hearing of September 9, 2003 ). She denied that she met Lucila Tan at
the Cravings Restaurant and that she suggested to Lucila Tan to give Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) to Judge Rosete to speed up or facilitate her cases but that Lucila Tan agreed for
only Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). She claimed that she did not know what Lucila Tan
was talking about regarding the money. There was no occasion that she suggested or even
intimated to Lucila Tan the idea of giving money to Judge Rosete. She denied that she met with
Lucila Tan and Respondent Judge at Cravings Restaurant along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro
Manila. She identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 5, 2003, which was marked
as Exhibit “1” (TSN, pages 12-16, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She denied that Lucila Tan
gave anything to her (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September 9, 2003).
2. RODOLFO CEA
He testified that his acquaintances usually call him “Buboy” and for about two years or more he
had no occupation. Two years before, he was a Clerk III at Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58,
San Juan. He knows Lucila Tan because, when he “was still working as Clerk in San Juan, she
approached me and asked if I can introduce her to Judge Rosete and eventually asked for a
favorable decision against her case.” He could not remember anymore when that was because
“it was a long time ago” (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing of September 22, 2003). It was when he was
still with the MeTC, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. He met Lucila Tan at the corridor of the
Metropolitan Trial Court when she approached him and asked if he can introduce her to Judge
Rosete. He agreed to introduce Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete but he was not able to actually
introduce Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete “because aside from the introduction, she wants me to ask
Judge Rosete for a favorable decision against ( sic) her case and I told her that Judge Rosete
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
don’t (sic) like his staff (to) indulge on that kind of transaction” ( TSN, pages 8-9, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). As far as he knows, the meeting he had with Lucila Tan in the corridor of
the Court in San Juan was “the first and the last time.” When asked about the claim of Lucila
Tan that he approached her and demanded from her a sum of money to represent an advance
payment for a favorable decision in her cases then pending before Judge Rosete, he answered
“I don’t know about that, sir.” (TSN, page 10, Hearing of September 22, 2003 .) He identified the
Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 6, 2003, and confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness
of the contents of the Affidavit, which was marked as Exhibit “2” ( TSN, pages 11-12, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). He denied that he met the Complainant at Sang-kalan Restaurant around
8:30 in the evening of an unspecified date (TSN, page 13, Hearing of September 22, 2003).
3. FERNANDO B. ESPUERTA
He testified that he is a government employee employed at the Supreme Court with the position
Budget Officer III since November 9, 1981. His first job was Casual and he became Budget
Officer in 1997 (TSN, page 46, Hearing of September 22, 2003 ). He recalled having met Lucila
Tan sometime just before Christmas in October or November 2000. The first time he saw Lucila
Tan was in a restaurant in Quezon City where she was introduced to him by Fiscal Reyes. He
went to the restaurant alone. He was invited by Judge Rosete because they had not been
together for a long time and they were long time friends. They ate at the restaurant. When he
arrived, Judge Rosete and Buboy were already there. They stayed in the restaurant until 11:00
[eleven] o’clock in the evening (TSN, pages 47-49, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He met
Lucila Tan in that restaurant when Fiscal Reyes pointed him to Lucila Tan as Fernan of the
Supreme Court. When he arrived there, Buboy and Judge Rosete were already there. Later, the
three (3) girls arrived, namely: Fiscal Reyes, Lucila Tan and the sister of the Fiscal ( TSN, page
50, Hearing of September 22, 2003 ). They ordered and ate but they were in a separate table.
He recalled that Judge Rosete paid for their bill because he saw him get a credit card and sign
something. He did not know about Mrs. Tan but he saw Judge Rosete sign and give to the
waiter. The incident where he met Lucila Tan in the restaurant in Quezon City came before the
incident when she went to his Office (TSN, pages 51-52, Hearing of September 22, 2003 ). He
could not remember the month when Lucila Tan went to his Office but he remembers that it was
nearing Christmas in 2000. “Pumunta siya sa akin parang may ipinakiusap siya sa akin,
katunayan nandito po dala ko.” Lucila Tan asked him to help her in her case with Alfonso Sy.
“Meron siyang inalok sa akin. Sabi bibigyan niya ako ng three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) para iabot kay Judge Rosete. Ang sagot ko nga sa kanya, hindi ganun ang aking
kaibigan. Matagal na kaming magkaibigan niyan noong nagpapractice pa yan. Iyon ang sagot ko
sa kanya.” He told Judge Rosete about that and the latter got mad at him. In their second
meeting, Lucila Tan gave him papers. He presented a Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal
Case No. 59440, which was marked as Exhibit “3” ( TSN, pages 53-56, Hearing of September 22,
2003). He presented the papers actually given to him by Lucila Tan. He claimed that the xerox
copy was the exact same document given to him by Lucila Tan when she went to his Office. The
other documents that Lucila Tan gave to him when she went to his Office were marked as
Exhibit “4” and submarkings (TSN, pages 57-63, Hearing of September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan
told him the contents of the documents and how the case against Alfonso Sy came about. When
Lucila Tan asked him, he answered her that his friend (Respondent Judge) was not like that and
they had been together for a long time and it is not possible. When he told Judge Rosete about
that, the latter got mad at him. Lucila Tan also mentioned to him that she knew the son of the
Chief Justice (TSN, pages 64-66, Hearing of September 22, 2003 ). Lucila Tan was insisting that
he give Judge Rosete so that her case will win but he answered that his friend was not like that
(TSN, pages 67-68, Hearing of September 22, 2003).
4. JOYCE TRINIDAD HERNANDEZ
She testified that she was a government employee connected with the Judiciary at the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. She knew Complainant Lucila Tan
because in the year 2000 she had a case in their court. She first came to know Lucila Tan when
15
the latter went to their Office with Ellen Sorio, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 57, who
introduced Lucila Tan to her. Ellen Sorio said, “ may kaso ito sa inyo, pinapasabi ni Mayor kay
Judge” (TSN, pages 7-11, Hearing of September 29, 2003 ). She did not say anything but Lucila
Tan asked “may tumawag na ba sa Mayor’s Office? ” and she said “yes, ma’am.” After that there
was a hearing and the sister of former President Estrada went to their Office looking for Judge
Rosete. She told her that Judge Rosete was on a hearing and the former told her to tell Judge
Rosete about the case of Lucila “ na pinakikiusap ni Mayor” (TSN, page 12, Hearing of
September 29, 2003). She told Judge Rosete about the things that the sister of the former
President told her and that Judge Rosete said nothing. She denied the testimony of Complainant
on March 3, 2003 that, sometime in November 2000, she (Joyce Hernandez) called up Lucila
Tan by telephone and said that she saw money stuffed inside the drawer of the Respondent in
his Office and that she asked the Complainant whether the latter was the one who sent the
money stuffed inside the drawer. What she remembers is that Lucila Tan called her and asked if
Josie went to their Office and she told Lucila Tan that Josie never went to their Office. She also
denied that she called up Lucila Tan sometime in February 2001 and claimed that Lucila Tan
was the one who called her up and told her that she (Lucila Tan) was going to show her
something. Lucila Tan showed her a copy of the Decision and she was surprised when the
former showed her the copy. When she asked where Lucila Tan got the copy, the latter did not
answer and said that Mayor Jinggoy wanted to talk to her ( TSN, pages 13-16, Hearing of
September 29, 2003). She immediately went to the Office of the Mayor with Lucila Tan and
Mayor Jinggoy talked to her. The Mayor asked her where Judge Rosete was and she answered
that he was in New Zealand on study leave. When the Mayor asked if she knew the telephone
number of the Judge, she gave him the telephone number in New Zealand. She was present
when the Mayor called up Respondent Judge and talked to him ( TSN, page 17, Hearing of
September 29, 2003). “He said ‘Pare ko, ano na itong kaso na pinakikiusap ko sa iyo?’ I don’t
know what was your answer(ed) [ sic] to him, you were talking and then he said ‘ ganun ba?’
then Mayor Jinggoy said ‘o sige, okay na’ and then we left the Office.” She denied that she gave
two advance copies of the Decisions in Complainant’s two cases inside the latter’s parked car in
San Juan, Metro Manila and claimed that Complainant was the one who showed her the copy in
their Office. She likewise denied the testimony of the Complainant that she allegedly demanded
Php150,000.00 for each of the two cases then pending before Branch 58, which were decided
by Respondent Judge, in return for a favorable decision ( TSN, pages 18-21, Hearing of
September 29, 2003). She claimed that it was the Complainant who offered to her. She
identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed and sworn to on February 5, 2003, which was
marked as Exhibit “5,” and confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness of all the contents thereof
(TSN, pages 22-25, Hearing of September 29, 2003).9
The Court is now faced with two opposing versions of the story. Complainant claims that
respondent judge, through his staff, required her to pay the amount of P150,000.00 for him to
render judgment in her favor in the two criminal cases she filed against Alfonso Pe Sy.
Respondent judge, on the other hand, asserts that it was complainant who attempted to bribe
him by offering to pay for the downpayment of the car he was planning to buy, and she even
sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to persuade him to rule for the
complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120.
The issue in this administrative case thus boils down to a determination of the credibility of the
parties’ evidence.
After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as the documentary
evidence presented by both parties, we find the complainant’s version more trustworthy. Not
only did she testify with clarity and in full detail, but she also presented during the investigation
the unsigned copy of the draft decision of respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 59440 given to
her by a member of his staff. Said documentary evidence supports her allegation that a member
of complainant’s staff met with her, showed her copies of respondent judge’s draft decisions in
Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, and demanded, in behalf of respondent judge, that she
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
pays P150,000.00 for the reversal of the disposition of said cases. It would be impossible for
complainant to obtain a copy of a judge’s draft decision, it being highly confidential, if not
through the judge himself or from the people in his office. And an ordinary employee in the
court cannot promise a litigant the reversal of a case’s disposition if not assured by the judge
who drafted the decision.
The respondent’s evidence did not overcome the facts proved by complainant. We note that the
testimonies of two of respondent’s witnesses contradict each other. Fernando Espuerta
confirmed complainant’s claim that she met respondent judge and his two companions, Espuerta
himself and Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City. Rodolfo Cea, on the
other hand, denied that he met complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant and swore that he never
went out with respondent judge in non-office functions. The Investigating Judge observed:
16
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDED from office
without salary and other benefits for FOUR (4) MONTHS.
SO ORDERED.
     Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
     Austria-Martinez, J., On Official Leave.
Respondent judge suspended from office for 4 months without salary and benefits.
Note.—For a judge to be held guilty of misconduct, the act complained of must be such
as to affect the performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character
as a private individual. (Bernardo vs. Tiamson, 363 SCRA 279 [2001])

Thus, there is an apparent inconsistency in the testimony of the Respondent Judge’s two
witnesses, Rodolfo Cea and Fernando B. Espuerta, regarding the incident at Sangkalan
Restaurant in Quezon City where Complainant claimed that she met Respondent Judge, a
certain Fernan, and Buboy, while she was with two Prosecutors. Fernando B. Espuerta testified
that he was at Sangkalan Restaurant with Respondent Judge and Buboy (Rodolfo Cea), while
the latter (Rodolfo Cea) denied that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant. 10
(citations omitted)

Hence, we are more inclined to believe complainant’s version that she met with respondent
judge and his companions at Sangkalan Restaurant sometime in April 2001.

We have also observed that respondent judge has not been very candid with the Court as
regards the dates when he went to New Zealand and when he came back to the Philippines.
Respondent asserts that he was already in New Zealand at the time when complainant claims
that he met with her. However, the evidence he presented only shows his New Zealand visa and
the dates when he entered said country. 11 He did not show to the investigating body the dates
when he left and returned to the Philippines. Apparently, he entered New Zealand on two dates:
March 4, 2001 and May 1, 2001. We may therefore infer that complainant was in the Philippines
before May 1, 2001, which is consistent with complainant’s testimony, as well as that of
Fernando Espuerta, that she met with respondent judge and his companions, Fernando and
Buboy in April 2001.

We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct.
They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Like Caesar’s wife, a
judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting
standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the people’s confidence in the judicial system
is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of
the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are
expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is
sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount
that a judge’s personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free
from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.12

Respondent’s act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of
his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office
hours violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench.
They constitute gross misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
A.M. No. RTJ-93–1021. January 31, 1997.*
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR P. DE
GUZMAN, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 142, City of Makati,
Metro Manila, respondent.
Remedial Law; Lis Pendens; The notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only upon order of the
court after proper showing that the notice IS for the purpose of molesting the adverse party or
that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.—Under
Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only upon
order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
recorded. The cancellation order of respondent was issued pursuant to the second ground, that
is, the notice of lis pendens was not necessary to protect the right of Norvic which caused it to
be recorded. A cautious reading of the records of the instant case reveals that never was Norvic
the owner of the Yakal property. It was Overseas Superintendence Corporation (OSC) that
owned the Yakal property prior to its transfer to SMIRM. The fact that Norvic was the majority
stockholder of OSC would not legally clothe it (Norvic) with personality to cause the notice of lis
pendens affecting the property of the corporation (OSC) specially so when the corporation was
not even one of the parties to the case. Well settled is the rule that properties registered in the
name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members. A
stockholder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation, nor is he entitled to
the possession of any definite portion of its ,property or assets; he is not a co-owner or tenant
in common of the corporate property.
Administrative Law; Judges; In the absence of fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith in
issuing the order lifting the notice of lis pendens the act of respondent which pertains to his
judicial capacity is not subject to disciplinary action.—In the absence therefore of fraud,
dishonesty, corruption or bad faith in issuing the order lifting the notice of lis pendens, this act
of respondent which pertains to his judicial capacity is not subject to disciplinary action.
Same; Same; A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or judge.—We are convinced, however, that respondent
approached Judge Cosico at least twice asking him to cancel the notice of lis pendens, thereby,
trying to influence the course of the litigation in the subject case in violation of Rule 2.04, Canon
2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit: “A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner
the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or judge.”
Same; Same; Being the dispensers of justice, judges should not act in a way that would cast
suspicion in order to preserve faith in the administration of justice.—As the visible representation
of law and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance
the respect and confidence of our people in the judicial system. It is incumbent upon them to so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary. Being the dispensers of justice, judges should not act in a way that would cast
suspicion in order to preserve faith in the administration of justice. They should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. In the case at bar, the act of
interference by respondent De Guzman with the subject case pending in the sala of Judge
Cosico clearly tarnishes the integrity and independence of the judiciary and subverts the
people’s faith in our judicial process. His evident misconduct collides with the established ethical
standards mandated upon those who sit in the bench. It is significant to stress that judges are
held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other persons not
invested with the public trust. They should inspire trust and confidence, and should bring honor
to the judiciary. Honos habet onushonor carries with it, responsibility.
17
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Serious Misconduct.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
TORRES, JR., J.:
The administration of justice is likened to that of a voyage to nowhere—unless it is manned by
honest and able magistrates, it drifts aimlessly. Magistracy is after all about character.
In this administrative case, the Office of the Court Administrator 1 filed against Judge Salvador P.
De Guzman, Jr., Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 142, Makati, Metro Manila, for
serious misconduct in connection with the lifting of the notice of lis pendens in the case of
Norvic Incorporated, represented by its president Atty. Vicente Santos against St. Michael
International Institute of Technology, represented by its president Erlinda M. Peñaloza, and St.
Michael Institute Corporation, represented by its president Patricia M. Peñaloza, docketed as
Civil Case No. 91–1123.
From the underlying record of Civil Case No. 91–1123, its factual backdrop may be summed up
as follows:
It appears that Norvic Incorporated (Norvic, for brevity) was the principal stockholder of
Overseas Superintendence Corporation, (OSC, for brevity) which was the registered owner of a
parcel of land (Yakal property) situated in Makati, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
142203. On August 1, 1986, Atty. Vicente Santos, acting as president of Norvic entered St
Michael International Institute of Erlinda nology bgy IT, for brevity), represented by its its
president Erlinda M. Peñaloza, into a contract to sell 2 the OSC shares of stock and the Yakal
property. Subsequently, OSC conveyed the Yakal property to St. Michael International Realty
and Management Corporation (SMIRM, for brevity) pursuant to the Deed of Conveyance and
Exchange dated December 21, 1989.3 The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 142203 of OSC was
consequently cancelled and a new one (TCT No. 167832)4 was issued in the name of SMIRM.
Two years later, Norvic filed this subject case5 (Civil Case No. 91–1123 which was assigned to
the sala of Judge Cosico) for the annulment of the Deed of Conveyance and Exchange dated
December 21, 1989 on the ground that the transfer of the Yakal property was fraudulent. Due
to the filing of this case, Norvic caused the annotation of lis pendens on TCT No. 167832 on
April 22,1989.6 SMIIT and SMIRM, the defendants in this Civil Case No. 91–1123, filed a motion
to cancel the notice of lis pendens,7 but, the same was denied by Judge Cosico in his order
dated June 26, 1991.8 As a result of Judge Cosico’s resignation from judicial service on
December 31, 1991, Norvic filed a motion to re-raffle the case on January 20, 1992 9 which was
granted by executive Judge Job B. Madayag. 10 Thus, the case was referred to respondent Judge
De Guzman following the re-raffling11 of the case on February 7, 1992 before the sala of
Executive Judge Job B. Madayag. Later on, defendants SMIIT and SMIRM filed a motion for
reconsideration12 of the order of denial dated June 26, 1991 of then Judge Cosico and for the
cancellation of notice of lis pendens contending, inter alia, that Norvic was not the proper party
whose rights might be protected by the annotation of lis pendens because it was not the
registered owner of the Yakal property before and after it was transferred to defendant SMIRM.
On August 5, 1992, respondent De Guzman reconsidered the order of denial dated June 26,
1991 of then Judge Cosico and ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pentens.13 A year
later the parties reached a compromise settlement, thus, a joint motion 14 was filed by both
parties praying for the dismissal of the case which was granted by respondent De Guzman in his
order dated September 23, 1993.15
The administrative suit against respondent Judge de Guzman was based on the testimony 16 of
former judge Manuel Cosico which was taken during the investigation of the alleged
irregularities in service of some judges in Makati conducted by the Ad Hoc Committee created
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
under Administrative Order No. 11–93 which was composed of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
and retired Justices Lorenzo R. Relova and Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera.
The Complaint dated July 5, 1993 17 against respondent Judge De Guzman states, inter alia, that
respondent approached at least twice Judge Manuel Cosico, then Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 136 of Makati in whose sala the aforesaid Case No. 91–1123 was
then pending and asked him to grant the motion to lift the notice of lis pendens filed by one of
the parties in the said case, When Judge Cosico denied the motion, respondent came back
asking him to reconsider the order of denial. Following the resignation from the service of Judge
Cosico, the said case was resignation to the sala of respondent who reconsidered the order of
denial issued by then Judge Cosico and cancelled the notice of lis pendens, thereby showing
keen personal interest on the said case to the prejudice of the administration of justice.
Respondent, in his Comment dated September 3, 1993 18 denies having approached Judge
Cosico and asking’ him to take any action in connection with the said case. He asserts that
Judge Cosico was motivated by vindictiveness when he testified falsely against respondent
during the Ad Hoc Committee hearing. During their several meetings, respondent and Judge
Cosico only talked to each other mostly on matters of law but he never asked Judge Cosico any
favor nor to act in a certain way in any case except in Civil Case No. 90–1506 involving the
respondent himself who requested Judge Cosico to rule on his motion for execution. He alleges
that he became aware only of the Norvic case when he was informed through telephone by the
President of Norvic Incorporated, Atty. Vicente Santos who was his former classmate in Ateneo
de Manila, that said case was re-raffled to his sala. He offered to inhibit from trying the case
because of his friendship with Atty. Santos but both parties requested the respondent to keep
the case and help in its amicable settlement. He adds that the reversal of Judge Cosico’s order,
which was done in utmost good faith after several months of efforts in arriving at a settlement,
was well-taken and accepted by the parties.
In a Resolution dated October 4, 199319 of the First Division of this Court, this administrative
case was referred to Justice Manuel C. Herrera for report and evaluation. Pursuant to the
authority given, he conducted hearings on November 19, 1993 and December 3, 1993.
Considering however his request 20 that he be allowed to inhibit from further proceeding with the
said case on the ground that Judge Cosico, the principal witness of the case, was his colleague
in the Faculty of the Ateneo Law School, the case was assigned to Justice Jaime N. Lantin. 21 But
Justice Lantin likewise inhibited from trying the case, so, it was given to Justice Gloria C. Paras
for report and recommendation. 22 On April 13, 1994, Justice Paras asked to be relieved from the
investigation of the case which was granted by this Court. Finally, the case was re-assigned to
Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas by virtue of the Resolution dated May 18, 1994. 23
In his Report dated September 14, 1994, Justice Salas found that respondent, in reconsidering
the order of denial issued by Judge Cosico and consequently lifting the notice of lis pendens,
was not dictated by pecuniary consideration, but nevertheless held-him liable for influencing the
outcome of the subject case when it asked Judge Cosico to cancel the notice of lis pendens.24
The recommendation of Justice Salas in his Report reads as follows:
“THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the undersigned recommends as a penalty, reprimand, with a
warning of a more severe penalty in case of repetition." 25
Upon a careful scrutiny of the records, We find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the
allegation that respondent was moved by personal or financial interest in issuing the order dated
August 5, 1992 which cancelled the notice of lis pendens. On the contrary, the explanation
offered by respondent and the circumstances prevailing in the subject case are sufficient to
warrant a conclusion that he in utmost good faith merely discharged his public duty when he
lifted the notice of lis pendens. The following significant points are worth considering: first, as
18
what Justice Salas appropriately stated, “if he (respondent) had, either, a desire manifesting
financial interest, or to favor somebody, then he should have instead ruled against the lifting (of
notice of lis pendens), considering that Atty. Santos (the president of Norvic) was not only his
classmate but also a relative of his wife by affinity"; 26 second, the subject case was assigned to
respondent simply because it was re-raffled to his sala upon motion of Norvic; third, he tried to
voluntarily inhibit from the case but the parties themselves asked him to stay on with the case
and to help, as he did help, in amicably settling the case which culminated to the filing of a joint
motion to dismiss by both parties; fourth, he issued the order lifting the notice of lis pendens
after a careful and thorough study of the merits of the motion 27 and opposition28 filed by the
parties; and, fifth, respondent was legally justified in issuing the order cancelling the notice of lis
pendens, the pertinent portion of the said order reads as follows:
“x x x
The Court subscribes to the position of defendants-movants (SMIIT and SMIRM). Plaintiff Norvic
Incorporated is manifestly not the proper party whose rights may be protected by the
annotation of lis pendens. It is neither the previous registered owner nor the present registered
owner of the property subject matter of the instant case and presently covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 167832, hence, bereft of personality to cause the annotation of the
subject notice of lis pendens on the said title. The property owned by the plaintiff subject matter
of its transaction with the defendants are plaintiff’s shares of stock in Overseas Superintendence
Corporation. x x x’ “29
Under Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only
upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
recorded. The cancellation order of respondent was issued pursuant to the second ground, that
is, the notice of lis pendens was not necessary to protect the right of Norvic which caused it to
be recorded. A cautious reading of the records of the instant case reveals that never was Norvic
the owner of the Yakal property. It was Overseas Superintendence Corporation (OSC) that
owned the Yakal property prior to its transfer to SMIRM. The fact that Norvic was the majority
stockholder of OSC would not legally clothe it (Norvic) with personality to cause the notice of lis
pendens affecting the property of the corporation (OSC) specially so when the corporation was
not even one of the parties to the case. Well settled is the rule that properties registered in the
name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members. 30 A
stockholder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation, nor is he entitled to
the possession of any definite portion of its property or assets; he is not a co-owner or tenant in
common of the corporate property.31
In the absence therefore of fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith in issuing the order lifting
the notice of lis pendens, this act of respondent which pertains to his judicial capacity is not
subject to disciplinary action.32
We are convinced, however, that respondent approached Judge Cosico at least twice asking him
to cancel the notice of lis pendens, thereby, trying to influence the course of the litigation in the
subject case in violation of Rule 2.04, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
“A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court or judge.”
Justice Salas, in his Report, made the following observation, to which We agree:
“There is, on the other hand, a reason to believe that the respondent indeed approached Judge
Cosico and requested him, from the beginning, to lift the notice of lis pendens. Moreover, the
respondent went to Judge Cosico the second or third time, on both occasions mentioning the
Norvic Case. Judge Cosico even told the Court, the first time the respondent approached him,
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8 19
the former was in white barong and even knocking the door loudly before coming in. It is hard
to consider the possibility that Judge Cosico, in testifying before the Ad Hoc Committee, told a
lie, considering that he was facing a panel that was attended not only by the Chief Justice, but
also by Justices Relova and Herrera. Before such Honorable Justices, certainty it will take one
with bravado and cockiness to tell a brazen lie. Secondly, by being a lawyer alone, he knows a
price of telling a lie. Even the respondent admitted, he and Judge Cosico had been on friendly
terms, and that the former talked back against Cosico only in one isolated case involving an
ejectment on appeal from the MTC, of which the respondent was himself a party. Admittedly,
Judge Cosico is by nature a person who is talkative, who possibly would like to be looked upon
as an idealist or reformer or as a person if not conceited or overconfident at least looks at
himself as better than anybody else. However we can hardly reconcile having a situation where
Judge Cosico then appearing before the Ad Hoc Committee would invent a version identifying
the respondent as the person who asked him more than once to lift a notice of lis pendens."33 x
xx

Considering the foregoing. We cannot but give credence to the testimony of former Judge
Cosico who narrated the event in a clear and straightforward manner. It is our finding that he
was not in any way motivated by enmity or bad faith when he testified against respondent. Both
Judge Cosico and respondent even admitted that no animosity existed between them, 34 in fact,
during Judge Cosico’s tenure in office they used to meet and discuss with each other about
many things mostly of law.35 Contrary therefore, to respondent’s claim that Judge Cosico was
motivated by vindictiveness, it is highly improbable for Judge Cosico to prevaricate and cause
damnation to respondent who brought no harm to the former. Well settled is the rule that in the
absence of any evidence to show any reason or motive why witnesses should have testified
falsely, the logical conclusion is that no improper motive existed and that their testimony is
worthy of full faith and credit.

As the visible representation of law and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a
manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of our people in the judicial system. 36 It
is incumbent upon them to so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 37 Being the dispensers of justice, judges should not act
in a way that would cast suspicion in order to preserve faith in the administration of justice. 38
They should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. 39 In the case
at bar, the act of interference by respondent De Guzman with the subject case pending in the
sala of Judge Cosico clearly tarnishes the integrity and independence of the judiciary and
subverts the people’s faith in our judicial process. His evident misconduct collides with the
established ethical standards mandated upon those who sit in the bench. It is significant to
stress that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or
other persons not invested with the public trust. They should inspire trust and confidence, and
should bring honor to the judiciary.40 Honos habet onus-honor carries with it, responsibility.

WHEREFORE, this COURT finds sufficient evidence to hold respondent GUILTY OF

SERIOUS MISCONDUCT for influencing the course of litigation in Civil Case No. 91–1123 in
evident violation of Rule 2.04, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Accordingly, a fine of
ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) is hereby imposed upon respondent with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more SEVERELY.
SO ORDERED.
     Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Respondent meted a P10,000 fine for serious misconduct, with a stern warning against
repetition of similar act.

Note.—Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of

judges. (Panganiban vs. Guerrero, Jr., 242 SCRA 11 [1995])
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1663. March 26, 2010.*
ROLAND ERNEST MARIE JOSE SPELMANS, complainant, vs. JUDGE GAYDIFREDO T.
OCAMPO, Municipal Trial Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato, respondent.
Judges; Gross Misconduct; A judge is not a warehouseman for personal properties of
litigants in his court. —For the above reasons, the OCA erred in regarding Judge Ocampo’s
offense as falling merely under Section 11(B), in relation to Section 9(4) of Rule 140, as
amended, which is a less serious charge of violation of Supreme Court rules, punishable by
either suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more
than three months or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. On the
other hand, impropriety is treated as a light charge and is punishable by a fine of not less than
P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 or by censure, reprimand, or admonition with warning.
Respondent judge should be made accountable for gross misconduct constituting violations of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Section 6 of Canon 1, Section 1 of Canon 2, and
Section 1 of Canon 4. From the circumstances, his acts were motivated by malice. He was not a
warehouseman for personal properties of litigants in his court. He certainly would have kept
Spelmans’ properties had the latter not filed a complaint against him. He was guilty of
covetousness. It affected the performance of his duties as an officer of the court and tainted the
judiciary’s integrity. He should be punished accordingly.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
  
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
ABAD, J.:
This is a case about the improper conduct of an MTC judge who kept properties owned by
the complainant while conducting a preliminary investigation.
The Facts and the Case
On April 8, 2006 complainant Roland Ernest Marie Jose Spelmans (Spelmans), a Belgian,
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, a complaint for theft and graft and
corruption against respondent Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Judge Gaydifredo Ocampo (Judge
Ocampo) of Polomolok, South Cotabato.1
Spelmans alleged in his affidavit that in 2002 his wife, Annalyn Villan (Villan), filed a
complaint for theft against Joelito Rencio (Rencio) and his wife from whom Spelmans rented a
house in Polomolok, South Cotabato. Spelmans claimed, however, that this complaint was but
his wife’s scheme for taking out his personal properties from that house. In the course of the
investigation of the complaint, Judge Ocampo, together with the parties, held an ocular
inspection of that rented house and another one where Spelmans kept some of the personal
belongings of his late mother.
During the ocular inspection, Judge Ocampo allegedly took pieces of antique, including a
marble bust of Spelmans’ mother, a flower pot, a statue, and a copper scale of justice. A week
later, Judge Ocampo went back and further took six Oakwood chairs and its table, four gold
champagne glasses, and a deer horn chandelier. 2 In the meantime, the Bureau of Immigration
happened to detain Spelmans in Manila and let him free only on January 28, 2003. 3
The Ombudsman, Mindanao, referred Spelmans’ complaint against Judge Ocampo to the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA). In his comment of August 8, 2006 4Judge Ocampo denied the
charge, pointing out that Spelmans’ wife, Villan (the complainant in that theft case), gave him
20
certain household items for safekeeping before she filed the case of theft against Rencio. On
August 28, 2002, however, after conducting a preliminary investigation in the case, Judge
Ocampo dismissed Villan’s complaint.
Only in 2006, according to Judge Ocampo, when he received a copy of Spelmans’ complaint
for grave misconduct did he learn of the couple’s separation and his unwitting part in their legal
battles. As a last note, Judge Ocampo said that instead of hurling baseless accusations at him,
Spelmans should have thanked him because he kept his personal properties in good condition.
In a supplemental complaint dated August 30, 2006 5Spelmans further alleged that Judge
Ocampo requested him to sign an affidavit which cleared the Judge and prayed for the dismissal
of the administrative complaint.6
On October 17, 2006 OCA found Judge Ocampo guilty of committing acts of impropriety
and maintaining close affinity with a litigant in violation of Canons 1 and 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. 7Since, under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended, a violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars constitutes a
less serious charge, punishable either with suspension or fine, the OCA recommended the
imposition of a fine of P5,000.00 on Judge Ocampo with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.8
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not Judge Ocampo’s taking and keeping of the personal
items belonging to Spelmans but supposedly given to him by the latter’s wife for safekeeping
constitutes a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court’s Ruling
The evidence of Spelmans is that his wife, Villan, made it appear that she filed a complaint
for theft against Rencio, the lessor or caretaker of the rented house, before Judge Ocampo’s
court but that this was a mere ploy. Her true purpose was to get certain properties belonging to
Spelmans from that house. During the preliminary investigation of the case, Judge Ocampo held
an ocular inspection of the house and another one that also belonged to Spelmans and took
some of the personal properties from these places.
On the other hand, Judge Ocampo insists that Villan gave him the personal items mentioned
by Spelmans for safekeeping before she filed in his court the complaint for theft against Rencio.
This did not influence him, however, since he eventually ordered the dismissal of that complaint.
But this explanation is quite unsatisfactory.
First. Judge Ocampo did not explain why, of all people in Polomolok, South Cotabato,
Spelmans’ wife, Villan, would entrust to him, a municipal judge, certain personal items for
safekeeping. This is essentially suspect because she would subsequently file, according to Judge
Ocampo, a case of theft of personal items that Rencio supposedly took from Spelmans’ houses.
Second. Judge Ocampo does not deny that he conducted an ocular inspection of the houses
that Spelmans used in Polomolok. But the purpose of this ocular inspection is suspect. Judge
Ocampo did not explain what justified it. The charge was not robbery where he might have an
interest in personally looking at where and how the break-in took place. It was a case of theft
where it would be sufficient for the complainant to simply state in her complaint-affidavit where
the alleged theft took place.
Third. If Judge Ocampo received the pieces of antique from Villan for safekeeping, this
meant that a relation of trust existed between them. Consequently, Judge Ocampo had every
reason to inhibit himself from the case from the beginning. He of course claims that he
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8 21
dismissed the case against Rencio eventually but this is no excuse since his ruling could have
gone the other way. Besides, Spelmans claims that the complaint was just a scheme to enable
Villan to steal his personal properties from the two houses. This claim seems believable given
the above circumstances.

Fourth. By his admission, Judge Ocampo returned the items only after four years when
Spelmans already filed a complaint against him. He makes no claim that he made a previous
effort to return those supposedly entrusted items either to Villan or to Spelmans. His years of
possession obviously went beyond mere safekeeping.

For the above reasons, the OCA erred in regarding Judge Ocampo’s offense as falling
merely under Section 11(B), in relation to Section 9(4) of Rule 140, as amended, which is a less
serious charge of violation of Supreme Court rules, punishable by either suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months or a fine of
more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. 9 On the other hand, impropriety is treated
as a light charge and is punishable by a fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding
P10,000.00 or by censure, reprimand, or admonition with warning.10

Respondent judge should be made accountable for gross misconduct 11 constituting violations of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Section 6 of Canon 1, 12Section 1 of Canon 2,13 and
Section 1 of Canon 4.14 From the circumstances, his acts were motivated by malice. 15 He was not
a warehouseman for personal properties of litigants in his court. He certainly would have kept
Spelmans’ properties had the latter not filed a complaint against him. He was guilty of
covetousness. It affected the performance of his duties as an officer of the court16 and tainted
the judiciary’s integrity. He should be punished accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Gaydifredo Ocampo GUILTY of gross
misconduct and IMPOSES on him the penalty of SUSPENSION from office without salary and
other benefits for six (6) months.17 He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo  and Perez, JJ., concur.
Judge Gaydifredo Ocampo suspended from office without pay and other benefits for six (6)
months for gross misconduct, with stern warning against repetition of similar act.

Note.—There is serious or gross misconduct when judicial acts complained of are corrupt or
inspired by an intention to violate the law or are in persistent disregard of well-known legal
rules. (Sevilleja vs. Laggui, 362 SCRA 715 [2001])
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
A.M. No. MTJ-94-985. February 21, 1995.*
APOLINARIO MUÑEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE CIRIACO ARIÑO, MCTC, San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur, respondent.
Administrative Law; Criminal Law; Usurpation; Elements Involved in the Crime of Usurpation of
Judicial Authority.—Under Art. 241 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation of judicial
authority involves the following elements: (1) that the offender is an officer of the executive
branch of the government; and (2) that he assumes judicial powers, or obstructs the execution
of any order or decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Mayors have no longer the power to conduct preliminary
investigations, much less issue orders of arrest.—No longer does the mayor have at this time the
power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the
Local Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered
functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its
ratification by the Filipino people.
Same; Judges; Respondent showed poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal
principles.—Respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño should have known that the case of Mayor Irisari
was not before him on review from the decision of an administrative agency and, therefore,
there was no basis for applying the rule on substantiality of evidence. What was before him was
a criminal case and he should have considered solely the facts alleged in the information in
resolving the motion to dismiss of the accused. At the very least, he showed poor judgment and
gross ignorance of basic legal principles.
Same; Same; While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of
occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly imperative that they should be
conversant with basic legal principles.—In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the
acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though
such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on
account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly imperative that
they should be conversant with basic legal principles.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint 1 against respondent Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
as defined and penalized under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint was
originally filed with the Office of the Ombudsman which, after dismissing the case for lack of
probable cause for filing in court, nevertheless referred the case to this Court "for possible
administrative action against respondent."
It appears that on December 26,1989, Mayor Asuero Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur
summoned to his office herein complainant Apolinario S. Muñez for conference respecting a land
dispute which Muñez had with one Tirso Amado. As complainant failed to attend the conference,
Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against him on December 27, 1989. 2
The warrant was served on complainant by CFC Redelio Caballes and Cpl. Rolando Limayan and
by virtue of it complainant was brought before Mayor Irisari, although no investigation was later
conducted.
22
Complainant filed a complaint 3 against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct and usurpation of
judicial function with the Office of the Ombudsman as well as an administrative complaint 4 for
violation of the Constitution, misconduct in office and abuse of authority with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur.
After preliminary investigation, the investigating officer of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a
case5 for usurpation of judicial function against Mayor Asuero Irisari in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Loreto, Agusan del Sur. Originally raffled to the judge of that court, the criminal case
was later assigned to respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño on account of the inhibition of the first
judge.
Accused Irisari moved to quash the information on the ground that the acts complained of did
not constitute a crime under the law. He contended that under § 143(3) of the former Local
Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337), mayors were authorized to issue warrants of
arrest.6
On July 28, 1992, respondent Judge Ariño denied the motion to quash on the ground that the
power of mayors to issue warrants of arrest had ceased to exist as of February 2, 1987 when
the Constitution took effect.
For its part the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, acting on the administrative complaint against the
mayor, found him guilty of misconduct in office and abuse of authority and accordingly ordered
him suspended for eight (8) months without pay. On appeal, however, the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) reversed on the ground that what the mayor had issued
to the complainant, although denominated "Warrant of Arrest," was actually just an invitation or
a summons.
On September 21, 1992, Mayor Irisari filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial of
respondent judge, invoking the resolution of the DILG.
In an order dated February 15, 1993, respondent Judge Ariño reconsidered his previous order
and dismissed the case. Respondent said in his order:
The accused, in his Motion for Reconsideration, asserts that since the question about the
warrant of arrest issued against Apolinario Muñez has been resolved in an administrative
proceeding as not the warrant of arrest contemplated by law, it would follow then that this case
now before this Court against the accused be dismissed. The Court finds that the subject matter
in this case and that in the administrative complaint arose from one and the same incident and it
involved the same parties.
Courts are not bound by the findings of administrative agencies like the DILG as in this case if
such findings are tainted with unfairness and there is arbitrary action or palpable serious
error. . . . The Court believes that the resolution by the administrative agency in DLG-AC-60-91
is not tainted with unfairness and arbitrariness neither it shows arbitrary action or palpable and
serious error, therefore, it must be respected (Mangubat vs. de Castro, G.R. 33892; July 28,
1988; Blue Bar Coconut Philippines vs. Tantuico, Jr., et al., G.R. 47051, July 29, 1988; Cuerdo
vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. 84592, October 27, 1988).
Upon receipt of this order, complainant Muñez sent two letters dated July 5 and 12, 1993 to the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, charging respondent Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño with knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment for dismissing the case against Mayor Irisari. The matter was
indorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman which, as already stated, referred it to this Court for
possible disciplinary action against respondent judge.7
We agree with the Office of the Ombudsman that while respondent judge may have acted in
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
good faith, he should nevertheless be administratively held liable.
The acts alleged in the information constitute a crime. Under Art. 241 of the Revised Penal
Code, the crime of usurpation of judicial authority involves the following elements: (1) that the
offender is an officer of the executive branch of the government; and (2) that he assumes
judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of any order or decision rendered by any judge within
his jurisdiction. These elements were alleged in the information. Mayor Irisari was an officer of
the executive branch.
It is not true that what he had issued against the complainant was not a warrant of arrest.
It was. In plain terms it stated:
Republic of the Philippines
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR
MUNICIPALITY OF LORETO
Office of the Mayor
27 December 1989
WARRANT OF ARREST
TO: ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW
     This Municipality
GREETINGS:
You are hereby requested/ordered to effect the arrest of Apolinario Muñez of Poblacion, Loreto,
Agusan del Sur, for his refusal to acknowledge the Summons dated December 26, 1989, and
bring him before the Office of the Municipal Mayor to answer an inquiry/investigation in
connection with the complaint of one Tirso Amado held pending before this Office.
FOR COMPLIANCE.
(Sgd) ASUERO S. IRISARI
Municipal Mayor      You are hereby demanded to appear before the Office of the Municipal Mayor on 27 December
For and in the absence of
the Municipal Circuit Judge
Any one reading the warrant could not have been mistaken that it was a warrant for the
arrest of the complainant Apolinario Muñez. As a matter of fact Mayor Irisari justified his order
on the basis of § 143(3) of the former Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) which
expressly provided that "in cases where the mayor may conduct preliminary investigation, the
mayor shall, upon probable cause after examination of witnesses, have the authority to order
the arrest of the accused." This provision had, however, been repealed by Art. III, § 2 of the
1987 Constitution, as this Court held in Ponsica v. Ignalaga,8 in which it was explained:
No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations,
much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this
power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution
which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." The
constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of
determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search
23
warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the
present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law"
found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution—who, aside from judges, might
conduct preliminary investigation and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants.
That there was no pending criminal case against the complainant did not make the order against
him any less an order of arrest, contrary to the opinion of DILG.
On the other hand, the issuance of the warrant when there was before him no criminal case, but
only a land dispute as it is now being made to appear, only made it worse for the mayor, for it
would then appear that he assumed a judicial function which even a judge could not have done.
All the more, therefore, respondent judge should not have dismissed the criminal case against
the mayor.
It cannot be pretended that Mayor Irisari merely intended to invite or summon Muñez to his
office because he had precisely done this the day before he issued the warrant of arrest, and he
ordered the arrest of complainant because the latter had refused to appear before him. The
summons issued by Mayor Irisari shows clearly that he understood the difference between a
summons and a warrant of arrest. The summons read:
Republic of the Philippines
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR
MUNICIPALITY OF LORETO
Office of the Mayor
26 December 1989
SUMMON
TO: Mr. Apolinario Muñez
     Loreto, Agusan del Sur
GREETINGS:
1989 at around 9:30 A.M. then and there to answer in an inquiry/investigation in connection
with a certain complaint of Mr. Tirso Amado lodged in this office.
PLEASE FAIL NOT under the penalty of the law.
Loreto, Agusan del Sur, Philippines.
(SGD.) ASUERO S. IRISARI
Municipal Mayor     
Indeed, respondent had previously denied the motion to dismiss which the accused Mayor Irisari
had filed on the ground that the authority (B.P. Blg. 337, § 143(3)) invoked by him as basis for
his warrant of arrest had been abrogated by the Constitution. He subsequently reversed himself
on the ground that the decision of the DILG, finding Mayor Irisari not guilty, "must be
respected." He said, "Courts are not bound by findings of administrative agencies like the DILG
as in this case if such findings are tainted with unfairness and there is arbitrary action or
palpable serious error." Since the DILG decision was not so tainted, "therefore, it must be
respected."
Respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño should have known that the case of Mayor Irisari was not
before him on review from the decision of an administrative agency and, therefore, there was
no basis for applying the rule on substantiality of evidence. What was before him was a criminal
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8 24
case and he should have considered solely the facts alleged in the information in resolving the
motion to dismiss of the accused. At the very least, he showed poor judgment and gross
ignorance of basic legal principles, for which he should be reminded of what this Court said in
Libarios v. Dabalos:9
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. But,
while judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes
or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal
principles.
In every case, a judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law
unswayed by partisan or personal interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.... A judge owes it
to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a
given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be
a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a
deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.10

But there is more than just gross ignorance of legal principles shown here. Although he denies
it, what the respondent judge appears to have actually done in this case was to rely on the
opinion of the DILG which found the mayor not guilty of serious misconduct in office on the
ground that he had not really issued a warrant of arrest against the complainant but only an
invitation or a summons. To justify his reliance on the opinion of the DILG, respondent judge
invoked the rule in administrative law that the findings of facts of administrative agencies, when
supported by substantial evidence, are binding on the courts in the absence of a showing of
fraud, imposition or dishonesty. We have already stated why that is grossly erroneous. What we
are here concerned is that by relying on the opinion of the DILG, disregarding a previous ruling
he had made which was in accordance with law, respondent judge showed lack of capacity for
independent judgment.

WHEREFORE, a FINE of P5,000.00 is imposed on respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño. He is

enjoined to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge and
warned that a repetition of the similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
Judge Ariño meted a fine and warned against repetition of similar offense.

Note.—A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. (Libarios vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991])
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1621. September 27, 2007.*
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 01-1121-RTJ)
CONCERNED BOHOLANOS FOR LAW AND ORDER, complainants, vs. JUDGE DIONISIO
R. CALIBO, JR., RTC, BRANCH 50, LOAY, BOHOL, respondent.
Courts; Judges; Administrative Complaints; Mitigating Circumstances; The fact that it is the first
time that a judge has been charged administratively is a mitigating circumstance. —We
observed, however, that this is the first time respondent Judge has been charged
administratively. This is a mitigating circumstance. Hence, the recommended penalty of fine of
P25,000.00 is reduced to only P20,000.00.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Conduct Unbecoming a Judge and Highly
Unethical Act.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In an anonymous complaint dated August 28, 2000 filed by “Concerned Boholanos for Law and
Order,” Judge Dionisio R. Calibo, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Loay, Bohol,
is charged with conduct unbecoming a judge and highly unethical act for “publicly speaking on
radio and in public fora regarding his bias and parochial views on certain controversial issues
against public personalities and public officials.”
Required to comment, respondent claimed that the complaint was initiated by the “alter ego” of
the provincial governor because of his objection to the sale of the performing assets of the
provincial government of Bohol disadvantageous to the latter.
Then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo designated retired Justice Pedro A. Ramirez of the
Court of Appeals, former Consultant in the Office of the Court Administrator, as Hearing Officer
to investigate the complaint. On August 5, 2005, he submitted his Report and Recommendation.
After a review of Justice Ramirez’s Report and Recommendation, the Court RESOLVES to ADOPT
and APPROVE his findings of facts and conclusions of law reproduced as follows:
“Respondent Judge relates the antecedents of the controversy. He states that a very
questionable and controversial project was being pursued by the Provincial Governor which was
to sell the two major performing assets of the Province of Bohol, the Provincial Electrical System
(PES) and the Provincial Waterworks System (PWS) of the Provincial Utilities Division (PPUD),
without consulting its customers in Tagbilaran and Dauis, Bohol, which are the places served by
these two utilities. It was shocking to the people because it was of public knowledge that these
were the only major profitable ventures of the province. It was no surprise, therefore, that the
residents of these two towns went on the air over the three radio stations vigorously protesting
this move of the Governor.
Respondent Judge narrates that although he is one of the consumers affected by the projected
sale, he kept silent. He claims that since his appointment, he had distanced himself from the
media even if he was previously the head of the Department of Public Information. However,
when it became apparent that the Governor was ignoring the legitimate issues presented by the
people, he decided to take part in the debate. He studied the documents and concluded that
indeed it was a contract that would be very disadvantageous to the province. He joined the
oppositors and admits having gone on the air. Although the Governor did not do anything to
stop him, other provincial officials tried to suppress respondent’s revelations on the air reasoning
that being a Judge, respondent should not involve himself in controversy. The concerned
25
consumers filed a petition to stop the projected sale at auction and respondent admits having
taken the stand for the petitioners. As regards the statement of Judge Melicor in his order
quoted above, the respondent Judge made no mention of it in his Comment.
It was probably because of this Order of Judge Melicor describing the acts of respondent Judge
attempting to influence another Judge who was presiding the injunction petition that prompted
DCA Bernardo T. Ponferrada to recommend, despite the fact that the complaint is not under
oath, that an investigation be conducted to determine the extent of Judge Calibo’s liability.
xxx
x x x As it can be seen, the letter complaint is anonymous. For this reason, the undersigned is
submitting this Report based on the pleadings extant on the record.
As regards going on the air to express one’s opinion over a matter of public concern, the
undersigned believes that respondent Judge cannot be held to answer administratively simply
because he was only exercising his constitutional right to be heard in a petition for the redress
of grievances. As a consumer and as a member of the body politic, it was his right, nay his duty
to air what he honestly believed to be an incipient irregularity.
However, his two telephone calls to Judge Achilles L. Melicor who was presiding the court where
the petition to stop the governor was pending, definitely violates the Code of Judicial Conduct,
particularly Section 3 of Canon I, which states that “Judges shall refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency.”
Rule 140, Section 7, classifies gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct as a serious offense and penalizes the same with “dismissal from the service, with
forfeiture of benefits and with prejudice to reemployment; suspension from office without salary
for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but
not exceeding P40,000.00.”
Considering the inappropriateness of the calls made by respondent Judge to another Judge who
was presiding the Court where the case was being heard, it is respectfully recommended that
said respondent Judge Dionisio R. Calibo, Jr., be made to pay a fine of P25,000.00.
We observed, however, that this is the first time respondent Judge has been charged
administratively. This is a mitigating circumstance. Hence, the recommended penalty of fine of
P25,000.00 is reduced to only P20,000.00.
ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Judge Dionisio R. Calibo, Jr.
of the RTC, Branch 50, Loay, Bohol, is declared guilty of serious misconduct and is ordered to
pay a FINE of P20,000.00, payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
     Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Corona, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Judge Dionisio R. Calibo, Jr. meted with P20,000.00 fine for serious misconduct.
Notes.—A judge’s undisputed claim of having disposed of numerous cases in previous
years serves to mitigate his liability. (Gonzalez-Decano vs. Siapno, 353 SCRA 269 [2001])
The Supreme Court is cognizant of the predicament of judges in rendering decisions on
cases, especially those that involve complex questions of facts or law—the Court allows a certain
degree of latitude to judges and grants them a reasonable extension of time to resolve cases
upon proper application by the judge concerned and on meritorious grounds. ( Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Joven , 399 SCRA 18 [2003])
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8 26
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362. February 22, 2011.*
(formerly A.M. No. 01-2-49-RTC)
JUDGE NAPOLEON E. INOTURAN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City, vs.
JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Valladolid, San
Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785. February 22, 2011.*
(formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 07-1945-MTJ)
SANCHO E. GUINANAO, complainant, vs. JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental,
respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; Case Law teaches us that a judge is the visible representation of
the law, and more importantly of justice; he or she must be the first to follow the law and
weave an example for the others to follow. —Case law teaches us that a judge is the visible
representation of the law, and more importantly of justice; he or she must, therefore, be the
first to follow the law and weave an example for the others to follow. Interestingly, in Julianito
M. Salvador v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., etc ., 485 SCRA 1 (2006), a case where Judge
Limsiaco was also the respondent, we already had the occasion to impress upon him the clear
import of the directives of the Court, thus: For a judge to exhibit indifference to a resolution
requiring him to comment on the accusations in the complaint thoroughly and substantially is
gross misconduct, and may even be considered as outright disrespect for the Court. The office
of the judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders of his superiors. After all, a resolution of
the Supreme Court is not a mere request and should be complied with promptly and completely.
Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but has
likewise been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain with, if not contempt of the
judicial system.
Same; Same; Obedience to the Court’s lawful orders and directives should not be
merely selective obedience, but must be full.—We also cited in that case our ruling in Josephine
C. Martinez v. Judge Cesar N. Zoleta, 315 SCRA 438 (1999), and emphasized that obedience to
our lawful orders and directives should not be merely selective obedience, but must be full: [A]
resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on an administrative complaint against
officials and employees of the judiciary should not be construed as a mere request from the
Court. Nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. Respondents in
administrative complaints should comment on all accusations or allegations against them in the
administrative complaints because it is their duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary.
Moreover, the Court should not and will not tolerate future indifference of respondents to
administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring comment on such administrative
complaints.
Same; Same; Compliance with the rules, directives and circulars issued by the Court is
one of the foremost duties that a judge accept upon assumption to office. —We cannot
overemphasize that compliance with the rules, directives and circulars issued by the Court is one
of the foremost duties that a judge accepts upon assumption to office. This duty is verbalized in
Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Same; Same; Public confidence in the judiciary can only be achieved when the court personnel
conduct themselves in a dignified manner befitting the public office they are holding. —Under the
circumstances, the conduct exhibited by Judge Limsiaco constitutes no less than clear acts of
defiance against the Court’s authority. His conduct also reveals his deliberate disrespect and
indifference to the authority of the Court, shown by his failure to heed our warnings and
directives. Judge Limsiaco’s actions further disclose his inability to accept our instructions.
Moreover, his conduct failed to provide a good example for other court personnel, and the public
27
as well, in placing significance to the Court’s directives and the importance of complying with
them. We cannot allow this type of behavior especially on a judge. Public confidence in the
judiciary can only be achieved when the court personnel conduct themselves in a dignified
manner befitting the public office they are holding. They should avoid conduct or any demeanor
that may tarnish or diminish the authority of the Supreme Court.
Same; Same; Gross Inefficiency; The delay in deciding a case within the reglementary
period constitutes a violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. —The
delay in deciding a case within the reglementary period constitutes a violation of Section 5,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates judges to perform all judicial
duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with promptness. In
line with jurisprudence, Judge Limsiaco is also liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to
decide a case within the reglementary period.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Failure to Comply with Directives of the Court
and Failure to Decide a Case Within the 90-day Reglementary Period.
  
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Jose Allan N. Maglasang for complainant Sancho E. Guinanao.
PER CURIAM:
Before us are two (2) consolidated cases filed against Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. as the
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ( MCTC) of Valladolid, San Enrique-
Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. The first case involves the failure of Judge Limsiaco to comply
with the directives of the Court. The second case involves the failure of Judge Limsiaco to decide
a case within the 90-day reglementary period.
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362
On September 25, 1998, a complaint was filed against Judge Limsiaco for his issuance of a
Release Order in favor of an accused in a criminal case before him. 1 After considering the
evidence, we then found Judge Limsiaco guilty of ignorance of the law and procedure and of
violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. In the decretal portion of our May 6, 2005 Decision, we
ruled:
“WHEREFORE, Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. is found GUILTY of ignorance of the law
and procedure and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is hereby ordered to pay a
FINE in the amount of Forty Thousand pesos (P40,000.00) upon notice, and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to explain, within ten (10) days from notice, why he
should not be administratively charged for approving the applications for bail of the accused and
ordering their release in the following Criminal Cases filed with other courts: Criminal Cases Nos.
1331, 1342, 1362, 1366 and 1368 filed with the RTC, Branch 59, San Carlos City; 67322, 69055-
69058 filed with the MTCC, Branch 3, Bacolod City; 67192-67193 filed with the MTCC, Branch 4,
Bacolod City; 72866 filed with the MTCC, Branch 5, Bacolod City; 70249, 82897 to 82903,
831542, 83260 to 83268 filed with the MTCC, Branch 6, Bacolod City; and 95-17340 filed with
the RTC, Branch 50, Bacolod City, as reported by Executive Judge Edgardo G. Garvilles.
SO ORDERED.”
Judge Limsiaco twice moved for an extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of the
above decision and to comply with the Court’s directive requiring him to submit an explanation.
Despite the extension of time given however, Judge Limsiaco failed to file his motion for
reconsideration and the required explanation.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
In the Resolution dated January 24, 2006, we issued a show cause resolution for contempt and
required Judge Limsiaco to explain his failure to comply with the Decision dated May 6, 2005. In
the Resolution dated December 12, 2006, after noting the failure of Judge Limsiaco to comply
with the Resolution dated January 24, 2006, we resolved to impose a fine in the amount of
P1,000.00 against Judge Limsiaco and to reiterate our earlier directive for him to file an
explanation to the show cause resolution.
On February 1, 2007, Judge Limsiaco filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion for Extension of
Time to File Explanation wherein he apologized to the Court and paid the P1,000.00 fine. He
cited poor health as the reason for his failure to comply with the Resolution dated January 24,
2006. On February 6, 2007, we resolved to grant the motion for extension filed by Judge
Limsiaco and gave him ten (10) days from January 15, 2007 within which to file his explanation.
Despite the grant of the extension of time, no explanation for the show cause
resolution was ever filed. Per Resolution dated December 15, 2009, we again required Judge
Limsiaco to comply with the show cause resolution within ten (10) days from receipt under pain
of imposing a stiffer penalty. Verification made from the postmaster showed that a copy of the
December 15, 2009 Resolution was received by Judge Limsiaco on February 1, 2010.
In addition, a Report (as of August 31, 2010) from the Documentation Division, Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) showed that the directives in our Decision dated May 6, 2005
have not been complied with by Judge Limsiaco.
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785
On September 24, 2007, Judge Limsiaco was charged with Delay in the Disposition of a Case by
complainant Sancho E. Guinanao, a plaintiff in an ejectment case pending before Judge
Limsiaco. Guinanao claimed that Judge Limsiaco failed to seasonably decide the subject
ejectment case which had been submitted for resolution as early as April 25, 2005. The OCA
referred the matter to us when Judge Limsiaco failed to file his comment to the administrative
complaint. Under the pain of a show cause order for contempt for failure to heed the OCA
directives to file a comment, Judge Limsiaco informed us that he had already decided the case
on February 4, 2008. Subsequently, we resolved 2 to declare Judge Limsiaco in contempt and to
impose a fine of P1,000.00 for his continued failure to file the required comment to the
administrative complaint. The records show that Judge Limsiaco paid the P1,000.00 fine
but did not submit the required comment.
Per Resolution dated November 23, 2010, we ordered the consolidation of the above cases,
together with A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734, entitled Florenda V. Tobias v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco,
Jr., which case was separately decided on January 19, 2011.
The Court’s Ruling
We shall consider in this ruling not merely Judge Limsiaco’s conduct in connection with the
discharge of judicial functions within his territorial jurisdiction, but also the performance of his
legal duties before this Court as a member of the bench. We shall then take both matters into
account in scrutinizing his conduct as a judge and in determining whether proper disciplinary
measures should be imposed against him under the circumstances.
A judge’s duties to the Court
Case law teaches us that a judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly
of justice; he or she must, therefore, be the first to follow the law and weave an example for the
others to follow. 3 Interestingly, in Julianito M. Salvador v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., etc .,4 a
case where Judge Limsiaco was also the respondent, we already had the occasion to impress
upon him the clear import of the directives of the Court, thus:
28
“For a judge to exhibit indifference to a resolution requiring him to comment on the accusations
in the complaint thoroughly and substantially is gross misconduct, and may even be considered
as outright disrespect for the Court. The office of the judge requires him to obey all the lawful
orders of his superiors. After all, a resolution of the Supreme Court is not a mere request and
should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays
not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but has likewise been considered as an utter lack of
interest to remain with, if not contempt of the judicial system.”
We also cited in that case our ruling in Josephine C. Martinez v. Judge Cesar N. Zoleta 5 and
emphasized that obedience to our lawful orders and directives should not be merely selective
obedience, but must be full:
“[A] resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on an administrative complaint against
officials and employees of the judiciary should not be construed as a mere request from the
Court. Nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. Respondents in
administrative complaints should comment on all accusations or allegations against them in the
administrative complaints because it is their duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary.
Moreover, the Court should not and will not tolerate future indifference of respondents to
administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring comment on such administrative
complaints.”
As demonstrated by his present acts, we find it clear that Judge Limsiaco failed to heed the
above pronouncements. We observe that in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362, Judge Limsiaco did not fully
obey our directives. Judge Limsiaco failed to file the required comment to our show cause
resolution despite several opportunities given to him by the Court. His disobedience was
aggravated by his insincere representations in his motions for extension of time that he would
file the required comments.
The records also show Judge Limsiaco’s failure to comply with our decision and orders. In A.M.
No. MTJ-01-1362, Judge Limsiaco failed to file his comment/answer to the charge of irregularity
pertaining to his approval of applications for bail in several criminal cases before him. He also
failed to pay the P40,000.00 fine which we imposed by way of administrative penalty for his
gross ignorance of the law and procedure and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Incidentally, in A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785, Judge Limsiaco failed to file his comment on the verified
complaint despite several orders issued by the Court.
We cannot overemphasize that compliance with the rules, directives and circulars issued by the
Court is one of the foremost duties that a judge accepts upon assumption to office. This duty is
verbalized in Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:
“SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge
of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational
independence of the Judiciary.
SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in
order to reinforce public confidence in the Judiciary, which is fundamental to the
maintenance of judicial independence.”
The obligation to uphold the dignity of his office and the institution which he belongs to is also
found in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 2.01 which mandates a judge to
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
Under the circumstances, the conduct exhibited by Judge Limsiaco constitutes no less than clear
acts of defiance against the Court’s authority. His conduct also reveals his deliberate disrespect
and indifference to the authority of the Court, shown by his failure to heed our warnings and
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8
directives. Judge Limsiaco’s actions further disclose his inability to accept our instructions.
Moreover, his conduct failed to provide a good example for other court personnel, and the public
as well, in placing significance to the Court’s directives and the importance of complying with
them.
We cannot allow this type of behavior especially on a judge. Public confidence in the judiciary
can only be achieved when the court personnel conduct themselves in a dignified manner
befitting the public office they are holding. They should avoid conduct or any demeanor that
may tarnish or diminish the authority of the Supreme Court.
Under existing jurisprudence, we have held judges administratively liable for failing to comply
with our directives and circulars.
In Sinaon, Sr.,6 we penalized a judge for his deliberate failure to comply with our directive
requiring him to file a comment. We disciplined another judge in Noe Cangco Zarate v. Judge
Isauro M. Balderian7 for his refusal to comply with the Court’s resolution requiring him to file a
comment on the administrative charge against him. In Request of Judge Eduardo F. Cartagena,
etc.,8 we dismissed the judge for his repeated violation of a circular of the Supreme Court. In
fact, we have already reprimanded and warned Judge Limsiaco for his failure to timely heed the
Court’s directives in Salvador.9
A judge’s duty to his public office
Given the factual circumstances in A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785, the considerable delay Judge Limsiaco
incurred in deciding the subject ejectment case has been clearly established by the records and
by his own admission. Judge Limsiaco admitted that he decided the ejectment case only on
February 4, 2008. In turn, the records show that Judge Limsiaco did not deny Guinanao’s claim
that the ejectment case was submitted for resolution as early as April 25, 2005. Thus, it took
Judge Limsiaco more than two (2) years to decide the subject ejectment case after it was
declared submitted for resolution.
The delay in deciding a case within the reglementary period constitutes a violation of Section 5,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct 10 which mandates judges to perform all judicial
duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with promptness. In
line with jurisprudence, Judge Limsiaco is also liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to
decide a case within the reglementary period.11
The Penalty
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11,
2001, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, and gross inefficiency are
categorized as less serious charges with the following sanctions: (a) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one or more than three months; or (b) a fine
of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.12
In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Limsiaco’s work history
which reflects how he performed his judicial functions as a judge. We observed that there are
several administrative cases already decided against Judge Limsiaco that show his inability to
properly discharge his judicial duties.
In Salvador,13 we penalized Judge Limsiaco for having been found guilty of undue delay in
rendering a decision, imposing on him a P20,000.00 fine, with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
In Helen Gamboa-Mijares v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco , Jr.,14 we found Judge Limsiaco guilty of
gross misconduct and imposed on him a P20,000.00 fine, with a warning that a more severe
29
penalty would be imposed in case of the same of similar act in the future.
In Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco , Jr.,15 we resolved to impose
a P20,000.00 fine on Judge Limsiaco for gross ignorance of the law and procedure, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely.
The Court also resolved in the said case to re-docket, as a regular administrative case, the
charge for oppression and grave abuse of authority relative to Judge Limsiaco’s handling of two
criminal cases.
In Re: Withholding of Salary of Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., etc. ,16 we imposed a P5,000.00
fine, with warning, against Judge Limsiaco for his delay in the submission of the monthly
report of cases and for twice ignoring the OCA’s directive to explain the delay.
Moreover, in the recent case of Florenda Tobias v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr .,17 where Judge
Limsiaco was charged with corruption, the Court found him liable for gross misconduct and
imposed a fine in the amount of P25,000.00.
Lastly, we also note the existence of two other administrative cases filed against Judge
Limsiaco that are presently pending with the Court. The first case is Mario B. Tapinco v. Judge
Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr.,18 where Judge Limsiaco is charged with grave misconduct, obstruction
of justice, and abuse of authority in connection with his invalid issuance of an order for the
provisional release of an accused. The second case entitled Unauthorized Hearings Conducted
by Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, et al .,19 is a complaint charging Judge Limsiaco of
violating the Court’s Administrative Circular No. 3, dated July 14, 1978 which prohibits the
conduct of hearings in another station without any authority from the Court.
We find that his conduct as a repeat offender exhibits his unworthiness to don the judicial robes
and merits a sanction heavier than what is provided by our rules and jurisprudence. Under the
circumstances, Judge Limsiaco should be dismissed from the service. We, however, note that on
May 17, 2009, Judge Limsiaco has retired from judicial service. We also note that Judge
Limsiaco has not yet applied for his retirement benefits. Thus, in lieu of the penalty of dismissal
for his unethical conduct and gross inefficiency in performing his duties as a member of the
bench, we declare all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, forfeited.
Furthermore, he is barred from re-employment in any branch or service of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. administratively liable
for unethical conduct and gross inefficiency under the provisions of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, specifically, Sections 7 and 8 of Canon 1, and Section 5 of Canon 6. For these
infractions, we DECLARE all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits if any,
FORFEITED. He is likewise barred from re-employment in any branch or service of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J.), Carpio, Nachura, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama,
Jr., Mendoza and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., On Wellness Leave.
Velasco, Jr., J., No part due to prior action in Office of the Court Administrator.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., On Official Leave.
Perez, J., No part. I acted as Court Administrator on the matter.
All retirement benefits of Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. forfeited, except accrued leave
credits, with prejudice to re-employment in government service.
Note.—The office of the Judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders of his superiors.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8 30
(Sinaon, Sr. vs. Dumlao, 547 SCRA 531 [2008])