G.R. No.

219645, September 21, 2016

VICTORIA CABBIGAT, PETITIONER,
VS
JACINTO DUMULAG, RESPONDENT.
DOCTRINE: ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION

FACTS:

G.R. No. 219645 - VICTORIA CABBIGAT, Petitioner, v. JACINTO

DUMULAG, Respondent. Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration of our
Resolution[1] dated November 9, 2015 filed by petitioner Victoria Cabbigat
(Cabbigat). In said Resolution, we denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court for Cabbigat's failure to sufficiently
show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its challenged
Decision[2] dated February 25, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No. 131815.
The instant Petition arose from a land dispute case filed in 2009 by respondent
Jacinto Dumulag (Dumulag) against Cabbigat before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay Hapao, Hungduan, Ifugao.
Translated to English, the Arbitration Award reads: "We the pangkat members
based our decision on the testimony of the witnesses, evidence presented and the
ocular inspection and we found that the land beside the road and located above the
rice field at Buhuan is owned by Jacinto Dumulag."[4]
The parcel of land thus awarded to Dumulag would hereinafter be referred to as the
"subject property." Cabbigat repudiated under oath before the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo on September 4, 2009 the "settlement agreement for arbitration"
on the ground that her consent was vitiated by fraud.[5] In December 2010,
Dumulag sold a portion of the subject property to spouses Peter and Marilou
Buyayo (spouses Buyayo), who immediately occupied the portion they bought.
Cabbigat instituted on February 15, 2011 an action for forcible entry against the
spouses Buyayo before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Banaue-
Hungduan-Mayoyao, Banaue, Ifugao, docketed as Civil Case No. 719. In a
Decision[6] dated October 18, 2011, the MCTC declared that the spouses Buyayo
have the better right to possess the land in controversy. Cabbigat filed an appeal of
the said MCTC Decision before the Regional Trial Court of Banaue, Ifugao,
Branfch 34 (RTC-Branch 34), docketed as Civil Case No. 126. RTC-Branch 34
rendered a Decision[7] on May 4, 2012, reversing the MCTC judgment in Civil
Case No. 719, declaring Cabbigat the rightful owner and possessor of the land in
dispute, and ordering spouses Buyayo to cease and desist from disturbing
Cabbigat's peaceful possession and to remove whatever construction they built on
said land. RTC-Branch 34 denied the spouses Buyayo's Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order dated July 13,' 2012, and the spouses Buyayo received
a copy of said Order on July 2Q, 2012. On October 15, 2012, Cabbigat filed a
Motion for Execution of Judgment in Civil Case No. 126 before RTC-Branch 34,
pointing out that the spouses Buyayo did not file an appeal within 15 days from
notice of the Order dated July 13, 2012 denying their Motion for Reconsideration.
As it turned out, the spouses Buyayo subsequently filed on September 17, 2012 a
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
126708,alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTCBranch 34 in issuing
its Decision dated May 4, 2012 and Order dated July 13, 2012 in Civil Case No.
126. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution[8] dated November 29, 2012,
dismissed the spouses Buyayo's Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy.
The said Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 126708 became final and executory on
July 8, 2013. In the meantime, on October 4, 2012, Dumulag filed a Petition for
Execution before the MCTC, seeking the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce
the Arbitration Award dated August 16, 2009 of the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo
in Barangay Case No. 24, S2009. Dumulag's Petition was docketed as Civil Case
No. 736. Cabbigat filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss on November 26, 2012,
arguing that Dumulag's Petition lacked a cause of action as the Arbitration Award
was timely and properly repudiated. Also, Dumulag had no more interest in the
subject property as he had already sold the same to the spouses Buyayo. In its
Decision dated May 4, 2012 in Civil Case No. 126, RTCBranch 34 upheld
Cabbigat's ownership of the subject property as against the spouses Buyayo's
claim; and since said Decision already became final and executory, res judicata had
set in. The MCTC rendered its Decision[9] on March 12, 2013, denying Dumulag's
Petition for lack of merit and dismissing the same. The MCTC reasoned: At the
outset, this is an attempt of [Dumulag] to thwart the decision rendered by the RTC.
To repeat, in Civil Case No. 719, Victoria sued Peter and Marilou Buyayo
([spouses Buyayo]) before this court for recovery of ownership of land. The
[spouses Buyayo] used the arbitration award to prove that it was [Dumulag] who
owned the land. The RTC already disposed this issue finding [Cabbigat] as the
owner of the land. The defenses of the [spouses Buyayo] is applicable to
[Dumulag] since the [spouses Buyayo] merely relied on the claim of ownership of
[Dumulag]. The RTC appreciated the evidence of [Cabbigat] over the [spouses
Buyayo's] evidence. The Arbitration Award submitted by the [spouses Buyayo]
was of scant consideration. Thus, while it may be true that it is now Jacinto
Dumulag who filed this instant petition for execution over the same land in
dispute, the principle of res judicata sets in. The [spouses Buyayo] were mere
buyers. They bought the land from Jacinto Dumulag. When they were sued, they
asserted the ownership of the vendor [Dumulag]. They submitted the arbitration
award including documents to prove the ownership of the vendor.: As it was earlier
said, this was resolved by the RTC in favor of [Cabbigat] and the decision became
final and executory. While this court ruled in favor of the [spouses Buyayo], the
decision was reversed by the RTC. It is the decision of the RTC which will prevail.
[Dumulag] should not test this court again by simply changing one of the parties
bringing the: same evidence over the same land in dispute. xxxx All said, the
petition must fail. The MCTC denied Dumulag's Motion for Reconsideration in an
Order[10] dated April 10, 2013. j Dumulag appealed before the RTC-Branch 34,
docketed as Civil Case No. 137. The RTC, in its Decision[11] dated August 26,
ioi3, denied Dumulag's appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the MCTC judgment
dismissing the case. Undeterred, Dumulag sought recourse from the Court ofj
Appeals by filing a Petition for Review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 131815. The
Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on February 25, 2015, in Dumulag's
favor. According to the Court of Appeals, the Arbitration Award already became
final, with the force and effect of a final judgment, because Cabbigat failed to
repudiate the Arbitration Award within 10 days from the date of its execution, as
prescribed by! Sections 11 and 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise
kn6wn as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. The Court of Appeals rationalized:
[T]he case of Galuba v. Laureta emphasizes on the strict adherence to the ten (10)-
day period and parties who fail to do so should face the consequences of abiding
by the arbitration award: xxxx "Pursuant to P.D. 1508, Section 12, Rule VI of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules which were promulgated "for the amicable
settlement of disputes at the barangay level, without judicial recourse," also
provides that "failure to repudiate the settlement or the arbitration agreement
within the time limits respectively set [in Section 10 thereof], shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to challenge on said grounds," i.e., fraud, violence or
intimidation. Any party, therefore, who fails to avail himself of the remedy set
forth in Section 13 must face the consequences of the amicable settlement for he
can no longer file an action in court to redress his grievances arising from said
settlement. x x x x Having failed to repudiate the amicable settlement within the
ten-day period, petitioner is left with norecourse but to abide by its terms. He,
therefore, acted correctly when he eventually fully satisfied his obligation pursuant
to the amicable settlement, thereby, rendering his case moot and academic. " xxxx
Given the applicable law and jurisprudence, this Court is persuaded to affirm the
findings of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in MCTC Civil Case No. 719 when it
ruled that the settlement became final and executory, thus leaving nothing more to
repudiate. [I]t is clear from the records that the Arbitration Award was rendered on
16 August 2009 in favor of [Dumulag] while the repudiation was filed on 04
September 2009, after the lapse of nineteen (19) days from the date of the award,
which is far beyond the period provided by law.[12] The Court of Appeals likewise
rejected Cabbigat's other arguments against the validity of the Arbitration Award,
thus: (a) there was no statutory basis for Cabbigat's argument that the 10-day
period to repudiate should be reckoned from the date she came to know of the
Arbitration Award, i.e., August 30, 2009, and neither was there any evidence to
substantiate that Cabbigat indeed only received notice of said Award on such date;
and (b) there was no violation of Cabbigat's due process as the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo afforded the parties in Barangay Case No. 24, S-2009 three
hearings and complied with the written form for settlements and awards under
Section 13 of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. The Court of Appeals further
adjudged that the Decision dated May 4, 2012 of the RTCBranch 34 in Civil Case
No. 126 did not constitute res judicata in the present case: Contrary to the findings
of res judicata by the lower courts in MCTC Civil Case No. 736 and RTC Civil
Case No. 137, this Court rules in the negative. The most recent case of Arigo v.
Swift revisits the well-entrenched doctrine of res judicata and its elements to
warrant its existence, viz.: x x x x "x x x (1) the former judgment must be final; (2)
the former judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there must be between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity
of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (ii)
identity of subject matter, or of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and, (in) identity of causes of action in both
actions such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration." x x x x The said lower courts have ruled that the Decision in RTC
Civil Case No. 126 filed by [Cabbigat] against spouses Buyayo effectively
constitutes a bar to the present case for the execution of the arbitration award as the
Regional Trial Court had already disposed of this issue, having found [Cabbigat] as
the proper owner and possessor of the subject property. Moreover, there is an
identity in the evidence submitted, the subject matter involved, as well as a
substantial identity of parties as [Dumulag] is privy to the spouses Buyayo, having
sold a portion of the subject property to the latter. It can be gleaned from the
records that although there may have been identical facets in both cases, it is clear
that there is a glaring disparity in the cause of action for both cases. In MCTC Civil
Case No. 736 and RTC Civil Case [No.] 137, the cause of action is for the
"execution of the arbitration award" or the recovery of the ownership of the land,
while in MCTC Civil Case No. 719 and RTC Civil Case No. 126, the cause of
action is "forcible entry with prayer for preliminary injunction." The former action
is an ordinary civil action while the latter is a special civil action with a special
procedure under the Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the case of De Jesus y
Ladao v. Mendoza is instructive: x x x x "A judgment rendered in an action of
forcible entry and detainer is not res judicata in and is nobar to the successful
prosecution of a later action between the same parties for the recovery of the
property in litigation. " x x x x In the recovery of the subject property, the issue is
ultimately one of ownership while in forcible entry cases, the only issue to be
resolved is the. question of who is entitled to the physical and material possession
of the property; the ownership or the title to the subject property is not involved,
except for provisional purposes. Thus, aside from the difference in the issues
involved to bolster the claim that there is no res judicata present in the case at
bench, the assertion of [Cabbigat] that she is the rightful owner of the subject
property by virtue of the Decision in RTC Civil Case No. 126 bears no weight. As
the action she had filed is one of ejectment, the latter can only invoke her right to
possess the subject property, not her right to ownership. As stated in the case of
Barbra v. Court of Appeals: x x x x "In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases,
even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
inferior courts, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally
resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of
possession. Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership
of the land or building, neither shall it bar an action between the same parties
respecting the title to the land or building nor be held conclusive of the facts
therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action
involving possession, "xx x.13 Lastly, the Court of Appeals clarified that Dumulag
still possessed an interest in the subject property because he only sold a portion of
it to the spouses Buyayo. Thus, Dumulag was well within his right to file a petition
for the execution of the Arbitration Award as to the remaining portion of the
subject property. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
reads: WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition [is] GRANTED. The 26
August 2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court affirming the 12 March 2013
Decision of the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Arbitration Award rendered on 16 August 2009 is declared FINAL and
EXECUTORY.[14] In its Resolution[15] dated July 8, 2015, the Court of Appeals
denied Cabbigat's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, Cabbigat came before us
through a Petition for Review on Certiorari with a lone assignment of error, viz.:
The Court of Appeals committed serious error of law in not deciding and/or
granting [Cabbigat's] prayer of dismissing the Petition for Review and reversing
and setting aside the Decisions of MCTC Banaue and RTC Branch 34 of Banaue,
Ifugao directly going against the principle of res judicata; and the blatantly
erroneous application of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law (P.D. No. 1508).[16]
We issued a Resolution dated November 9, 2015 denying the Petition for
Cabbigat's failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error in its Decision dated February 25, 2015 and Resolution dated July
8, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No. 131815. Since Cabbigat's Motion for Reconsideration
does not proffer any new issue or argument, we are not persuaded to reverse our
Resolution dated November 9, 2015. However, we still deem it necessary to issue
this Resolution to correct the apparent misapplication of Section 418 of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as
amended by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision dated February 25, 2015. There is no dispute in the case at bar that the
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of Barangay Hapao, Hungduan, Ifugao, conducted
arbitration proceedings and rendered an Arbitration Award on August 16, 2009 in
Barangay Case No. 24, S-2009 in favor of Dumulag and against Cabbigat.
Arbitration is "a process for the adjudication of disputes by which the parties agree
to be bound by the decision of a third person or body in place of a regularly
organized tribunal."[17] Arbitration[18] at the barangay level is governed by the
following provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended: Sec.
413. Arbitration. - (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in
writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the
pangkat. Such agreement to arbitrate may be repudiated within five (5) days from
the date thereof for the same grounds and in accordance with the procedure
hereinafter prescribed. The arbitration award shall be made after the lapse of the
period for repudiation and within ten (10) days thereafter. (b) The arbitration award
shall be in writing in a language or dialect known to the parties. When the parties
to the dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the award shall be written in
the language or dialect known to them. x x x x Sec. 416. Effect of Amicable
Settlement and Arbitration Award. - The amicable settlement and arbitration award
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of
ten (10) days from the date thereof, unless repudiation of the settlement has been
made or a petition to nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or
municipal court. However, this provision shall not apply to court cases settled by
the lupon under the last paragraph of Section 408 of this Code, in which case the
compromise settlement agreed upon by the parties before the lupon chairman or
the pangkat chairman shall be submitted to the court and upon approval thereof,
have the force and effect of a judgment of said court. Sec. 417. Execution. - The
amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the
lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such
time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal
court. (Emphases ours.) In relation to the foregoing, the Katarungang Pambarangay
Circular No. 1, dated June 1, 1992, otherwise known as the Katarungang
Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations, further provides: RULE VI
Amicable Settlement of Disputes x x x x Sec. 15. Effect of settlement by
arbitration or conciliation. — The amicable settlement and arbitration award shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten
(10) days from date of the settlement or date of receipt of the award, unless
repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition for nullification of the
award has been filed before the proper local trial court. By the plain and clear
language of the law, the arbitration award will have the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court upon the expiration of 10 days from date of receipt of the
award, unless a petition for nullification of the award has been filed before the
appropriate trial court. By her own allegation, Cabbigat received a copy of the
Arbitration Award dated August 16, 2009 on August 30, 2009.Cabbigat had 10
days, or until September 9, 2009, to file a petition for nullification of said Award
before the appropriate trial court. This Cabbigat failed to do. Consequently, the
Arbitration Award attained the force and effect of a final judgment of a court.
Cabbigat argued that the Arbitration Award did not become final because she
timely executed her Repudiation dated September 4, 2009. Preceding from
Cabbigat's argument, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated February 25,
2015, cited Section 418 of the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended,
which states: Sec. 418. Repudiation. - Any party to the dispute may, within ten
(10) days from the date of settlement,repudiate the same by filling with the lupon
chairman a statement to that effect sworn to before him, where the consent is
vitiated by fraud, violence, or intimidation. Such repudiation shall be sufficient
basis for the issuance of the certification for filing a complaint as hereinabove
provided. (Emphases ours.) The Court of Appeals did not accord any legal effect to
Cabbigat's Repudiation for it was executed beyond the 10-day prescriptive period
set in the foregoing provision. We find though that repudiation has no application
at all in this case. What may be repudiated under the Local Government Code of
1991, as amended, are: (1) an amicable settlement, as provided under Sections 416
and 418; and (2) an agreement to arbitrate, per Section 413, in relation to Section
418, of the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended. Amicable settlement, as
opposed to an arbitration award, are executed by the parties following the
mediation efforts of the Lupon Chairman or conciliation proceedings by the
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. Mediation and Conciliation are "interchangeable
terms indicating the process whereby disputants are persuaded by the Punong
Barangay or Pangkat to amicably settle their disputes."[19] These are governed by
Sections 408 to 412 of the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended. We
stress that what is involved herein is an Arbitration Award by the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo (not an amicable settlement), which can only be challenged by a
party by the filing of a petition to nullify before the appropriate trial court within
10 days from receipt of notice of such Award. The agreement to arbitrate under
Section 413 of the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended, is the agreement
in writing of the parties "that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon
chairman or the pangkat." Said agreement may be repudiated within five days from
its execution on the ground that the party's consent to the same was vitiated by
fraud, violence, or intimidation. This is evidently different from the arbitration
award made by the Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa or the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo at the end of the arbitration proceedings, finally resolving the
dispute. Cabbigat's allegations/arguments reveal that she was not actually
repudiating the agreement to arbitrate but was challenging the Arbitration Award
itself. We are reproducing below the contents of Cabbigat's Repudiation: I/WE
hereby repudiate the settlement agreement for arbitration on the ground that
my/our consent was vitiated by: ()-Fraud ' - That it is not true that the Pangkat
Members based their decision on what they heard from my statement and my
witnesses. - that the boundary specified in my declaration is the irrigation in which
the Pangkat Members did not base their decision. - that [Dumulag] has no right to
claim any part of my residential lot because it is an inheritance from my parents
and that, the parents of Mr. Jacinto Dumulag only bought the rice field [from] the
parents of Mr. Ciriaco Gano. - that in May, 1970, Mrs. Angelina Gano and Mrs.
Rosita * Magatolmi did not continue to build their Sari-Sari store located at
Buhucan because my late father [stopped] them from doing so. - that the house of
Bayong Umiki above the rice field of Jacinto Dumulag was permitted by my late
father and the house of Mrs. Teresa Tayaban, before its construction, was
permitted by me, and , - that below the irrigation was a Pul-ing, when the rice is
harvested it only consist of 1 or 2 bundles of rice. This pul-ing was witnessed by
many people, passing through the irrigation and by those tending their kaingins.
This 4th day of September, 2009.[20] Essentially, Cabbigat's Repudiation focused
on the merits of her claim of ownership over the subject property and questioned
the basis for the Arbitration Award of the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo in
Dumulag's favor. We reiterate that the only way Cabbigat could have freed herself
from the binding effect of the Arbitration Award was to file a petition to nullify the
same before the proper trial court. In the Petition at bar, the Arbitration Award
dated August 16, 2009 of the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo acquired the force and
effect of a final judgment on September 9, 2009, thus, said Award became
immutable and unalterable. It was merely ministerial for the MCTC to enforce or
execute the Arbitration Award. A final judgment becomes immutable and
unalterable, as we declared in Heirs of Shomanay Paclit v. Belisario[21]: Nothing
is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by
the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has
the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has
the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. The doctrine
of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy
and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or
orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise,
there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of courts
of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.
We also held in Tabalno v. Dingal, Sr.[22] that "[t]he principle of immutability of
a final judgment stands as one of the pillars supporting a strong, credible, and
effective court. The principle prohibits any alteration, modification, or correction
of final and executory judgments as what remains to be done is the purely
ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment." We are aware that the
doctrine of finality of judgment admits of several exceptions, to wit: (1) the
correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tune entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, (2) void judgments, and (3) whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.[23] None of these circumstances exist in this case. Thus, there is no
special or compelling circumstance for us to set aside the Arbitration Award which
had become final. Cabbigat is merely reiterating the merits of her claim of
ownership over the subject property, which was precisely the subject matter of the
Arbitration Award. We are not bound in this case by the final judgment in the
forcible entry case initiated by Cabbigat against the spouses Buyayo. The
Arbitration Award became final on September 9, 2009, way before the finality of
the Resolution dated November 29, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 126708 (dismissing the spouses Buyayo's Petition for Certiorari for being the
wrong remedy and rendering final the Decision dated May 4, 2012 of the RTC-
Branch 34 in Civil Case No. 126. The said decision declared Cabbigat the owner of
the subject property and ordered the spouses Buyayo to vacate the said property)
on July 8, 2013. Furthermore, the forcible entry case only settled the issue of
possession of the subject property, not ownership, and for this reason, the Court of
Appeals correctly ruled that the judgment in the forcible entry case would not
constitute res judicata in the present case. Our pronouncements in Baluyo v. De la
Cruz[24] are instructive on this point: In ejectment cases, such as in forcible entry,
the only question to be resolved is who between the contending parties is entitled
to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership set forth by the parties-litigants. In ejectment cases, possession
means nothing more than actual physical possession (possession de facto); it is not
juridical possession (possession de jure), which gives the transferee a right over the
thing that he may set up even against the owner. Thus, "an ejectment case will not
necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the
subject property." Issues regarding the validity of title to property can be assailed
only in an action expressly instituted for that specific purpose, either in an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. A forcible entry action such as the present
case, which by nature is an accion interdictal, is merely a quieting process and
never determines actual title to an estate. However, where the issue of ownership is
raised by any of the parties to an ejectment case, the courts may provisionally pass
upon the same in order to determine who has the better right to possess the
property. We stress that the adjudication of the issue of ownership is merely
provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. Finally, the Court of Appeals herein correctly noted
that Dumulag only sold a portion of the subject property to the spouses Buyayo,
consequently, he remained the owner of the unsold portion of said property with
legal interest to seek the enforcement or execution of the Arbitration Award dated
August 16, 2009. Dumulag properly filed his Petition for Execution of the
Arbitration Award before the MCTC on October 4, 2012 pursuant to Section 417,
Chapter 7 (Katarungang Pambarangay), Title One (The Barangay), Book III (Local
Government Units) of the Local Government Code, since he could no longer seek
enforcement of the said Award by the Lupon ng Tagapagkasundo given that more
than six months had passed from the date the Award was rendered, i.e., August 16,
2009. WHEREFORE, we RESOLVE to DENY with FINALITY the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner Victoria Cabbigat. SO ORDERED." Very truly
yours, (Sgd.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA Division Clerk of Court